The research paper was co-authored by Maggie Huang, Arpita Sengupta, Paavni Anand.

Taking into account the needs of users and members of CMOs, the following pieces of information was determined to be useful to report on the websites: : membership lists, governing directors, user types, tariff rates, royalty distribution schemes, and annual revenue reports. Collectively, the presence of these became rough parameters for transparency. The authors then reviewed each website to determine whether this information was made publicly available, and whether such disclosure was voluntary or mandated by law. As a proxy for effectiveness, percentage of revenue distributed as royalties was calculated for those who made their annual revenue report available.

Broadly, the review found that India's 2012 Copyright Amendment Act and 2013 Copyright Rules were by far the most stringent regarding registration, operations, rate setting, and reporting. Despite India's strict laws, it appears there is little compliance, particularly by PPL which failed to report the mandated tariff rates, royalty distribution policy, and its annual revenue report. ISRA had all the information sought on their website except for the crucial annual revenue report. IPRS however clearly made an effort to comply, with all information sought, provided.

Relative to India, CMOs in the United Kingdom were regulated less strictly, with U.K.'s 2014 Copyright Regulations allowing self regulation provided CMOs follow guidelines to comply with the operating code of conduct.  All six indicators were available on websites of both UK PPL and PRS for Music, although the latter required user authorization to access membership/repertoire data.

In comparison, the U.S. seems to have the most lax reporting standards of the three, really only mandating basic reporting for CMOs administering statutory licenses. However, similar to India, rate-setting in the U.S. for certain digital broadcasts are subject to significant government control, in addition to anticompetetive measures which prevent partial withdrawal of rights from certain CMOs’ blanket licenses. Availability of information varied, with BMI and Sound Exchange complying with the more demanding parts of US legislation and disclosing all information sought, while ASCAP and HFA were missing tariff rates and user types respectively. SESAC was the least informative, with governing directors absent, and more crucially, their annual revenue report.

To determine relative efficiency, the authors calculated the percentage of royalties distributed per total revenue for those CMOs which published their revenue reports. All distributed royalties ranged between 80%-90%. Though not necessarily the most accurate measure, there appeared no significant correlation between the percentage of distributed royalties, and amount of information found; therefore a correlation between effectiveness and information transparency remain unknown.

However, throughout the exercise, the limitations of the research design became clear, leading to its own learnings for future research. Methodologically, the more attention should have been paid to spanning a wider spectrum of legal control, drawing clear lines of which types of CMOs to include in the study, being careful not to equate presence of information with usability or effectiveness, deeper assessment of the legal provisions, and the inclusion of membership exclusive data as part of the exercise.

Nevertheless, the comparative review process did produce several learnings that Indian CMOs could adopt for enhanced transparency and potentially improved effectiveness as well. These recommendations are as follows:

1. Publish the full repertoire of works the CMO is authorized to license, and its corresponding rights holder information in a searchable format;
2. Provide a platform for collectively identifying the rights-holder of orphan works (works which are registered whose royalties are collected, but ownership information is unknown);
3. Guide new users and potential members through a more user-friendly designed page with simplified, accessible introduction to music licensing;
4. Increase clarity surrounding royalty distribution policies;
5. Publish updated annual revenue reports; and
6. Clarify the dispute resolution processes.

This review concludes by suggesting future research through stronger methodological design, further exploring membership exclusive data, assessing effectiveness outcomes between multiple, competing licensing bodies versus a single, state-granted monopoly society, and the possibility of alternative compensation schemes for music financing and production.

MOTIVATIONS FOR RESEARCH: MUSIC COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT IN THE MOBILE MUSIC AGE for the PERVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT

Managing copyright in the digital age is one of the most contentious issues today amongst music industries globally. Innovation in digital technologies has opened up formerly restricted production and distribution channels, resulting in a proliferation of music like never before.

The mobile phone is one of these innovations, particularly since becoming the most preferred music listening device in India. [1] The overarching utility of the mobile phone has made it the object of study for the Centre for Internet and Society's Pervasive Technologies project[2], which seeks to identify intellectual property levers which can enhance access to affordable mobile devices' hardware, software, and content within India and China.

Access to music content[3] via the mobile phone is one of the chapter's primary focus, with a research objective of balancing access to music for internet and mobile consumers, while ensuring the protection of rights and remuneration for artists and creators.

The initial phases of this research found that new stakeholders such as device manufacturers, telecom operators, and streaming services were developing business models based on a free, ad-supported service with a paid premium tier, ultimately resulting in high royalty payouts and low profit margins. However, artists in India and worldwide are raising grievances due to decreasing royalty revenue, putting to question whether these business models are sustainable in the long term.

We had hoped to answer these questions within the Indian context, but the findings were ultimately inconclusive. This was primarily due to two reasons: 1) lack of data transparency at multiple levels of the music distribution chain, and 2) a copyright management system heavily in flux due to poor enforcement of the ambiguous 2012 Copyright Amendment Act. The copyright societies in India embodied both these issues in India, resulting in a need to study these institutions further as one of the main objects of research.

INTRODUCTION to COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS and the NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY

Music copyright societies, commonly referred to as collecting agencies or collective management organizations ("CMOs") provides music rights holders (authors, owners, and performers of lyrics, compositions, and sound recordings) the ability to authorize the licensing of their copyrighted works to another body (the CMO) who can collect royalties from the numerous sources of usage on behalf of its members. If the law allows, these CMOs are also able to collectively negotiate for rates as well. Royalties derived from these licenses are often collected and distributed by CMOs as a source of income for the creators of musical works, after administrative costs are deducted.

CMOs and their rights-holder members represent a principle-agent relationship as agent-CMOs collects royalties from users on behalf of its principle rightsholder-members. However, if a conflict of interest arises, the inherent information asymmetry may give rise to abuse. In the case of CMOs, this standard principle-agent problem has manifested in forms ranging from inefficient administration overhead, to more dubious acts of corruption and collusion.

Economic theory tells us that the key to a free and fair market is "perfect information", or when stakeholders are equipped with the relevant information needed to make market decisions. Information enforces accountability, an idea that sparked the Right to Information movement in India. This is why transparency is especially critical in the music industry, characterized by complex revenue and consumption patterns, an intricate copyright law framework and stakeholders with varying levels of bargaining power.

Given many CMOs operate as state-granted monopolies which exclusively administer specific class of works, it is important that the collection and distribution of royalties occur in a transparent manner so members and regulators can scrutinize its functioning to ensure greatest effectiveness. For countries which allow competition between CMOs, transparency in operations and revenue data can provide users and members the ability to make an informed choice, and the opportunity for other competing players to enter the market.

Within India, transparency has been a recurring issue due to allegations of mismanagement and corruption[4] of the copyright societies. This was one of the motivations for the 2012 Copyright Amendment and subsequent2013 Copyright Rules which attempted to address, amongst other issues, regulations around transparency for registered copyright societies in India.

Thus, in light of new transparency and operations regulations for India, and inconclusive research findings due to sparse data, the authors sought to review the transparency of various CMO websites and their corresponding regulatory measures in the hopes of answering the following questions:

1. How does India's level of CMO transparency compare to other countries?

2. Is disclosure of information a result of regulatory pressures or voluntary?

3. What kind of learnings and recommendations can be made from the voluntary information disclosure and/or legal regulatory environments of other countries?

METHODOLOGY

Selecting countries for comparison

Since one of the broader goals of this review was to identify legal and/or industry led proposals for increased CMO effectiveness in India, the authors wanted to select case study country samples which were relevant and useful for the Indian context, while also considering differing legal and regulatory regimes.

The United States was chosen due to its competitive CMO structure where multiple CMOs administering the same class of musical works, and representing similar kinds of rights-holders can co-exist as private entities. Aside from statutory rate-setting of sound recording broadcasts, and anticompetitive consent decrees for ASCAP and BMI, the United States seem to have little to no regulation overall surrounding CMO operations and management.

The United Kingdom was selected due to its recent growing interests in the Indian music industry. This was demonstrated by the high volume of British attendants at recent Indian music industry conferences , several of which were directly sponsored by UK Trade & Investment as a music trade export mission.[5] In addition, U.K.'s CMO structure seemed to be more streamlined, with class of works separately managed under two main music CMOs.

Indian research participants of ongoing research also expressed interest in registering their musical works with CMOs in the U.S. and U.K. given increasing market demand, higher currency exchange, and increased reliability of royalty receipts. This was further indication of relevant country case studies for a comparison with India.

Identifying the Relevant CMOs

Due to challenges enforcing India's 2012 Copyright Amendment Act, and subsequent ambiguity of copyright societies' registration statuses, the selection criteria for CMOs consisted of those organizations which generally issued music licenses and collected royalty revenue on behalf of other rights-holder members.

In India, the following three CMOs were identified for this review: the Indian Performing Right Society ("IPRS") which collects on behalf of composers, lyricists, and publisher-members[6]; the Phonographic Performance Limited ("PPL") which exclusively controls public performance and broadcasting rights for its music label members[7]; and the Indian Singers Rights Association ("ISRA") which is currently the sole officially registered copyright society collecting on behalf of singers for their Performer's Rights. [8]

The status of IPRS and PPL as registered societies are ambiguous due to recent reports of registration withdrawal [9]; therefore compliance to Section 33 of the Copyright Act is uncertain. However, the authors chose to uphold the same standards in this review due to similarity in purpose and functioning.

In the U.S., the identified CMOs included the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP"), Broadcast Music, Inc, ("BMI") and SESAC (originally the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers) which are all competing Performing Rights Organizations collecting on behalf of songwriters and music publishers for public performance rights. SoundExchange is responsible for managing digital sound recordings for copyright owners (mostly music labels) and performing artists; while Harry Fox Agency ("HFA") collects mechanical royalties on behalf of publishers and songwriters when their compositions are reproduced.

In the U.K., two CMOs were identified: PRS for Music which manages public performance rights on behalf of songwriters, composers, and music publishers; and Phonographic Performance Limited ("PPL-UK"), which manages the rights of performers and record producers. Unlike the United States and India, each society exclusively manages separate categories of works. Although technically a compulsory collective licensing scheme is mandated under Indian copyright law for musical works incorporated in cinematograph films or sound recordings, ambiguity in India remains due to the unregistered/deregistered yet still functioning licensing bodies.

Identifying the comparative parameters

To compare CMOs transparency, the authors sought to develop a feasible proxy to determine their website's degree of disclosure. This was done considering two main stakeholders who most often access CMO websites: rights-holders, and users. The rights holders are owners and/or authors of a copyright or related right (i.e. performer's right) who is a member, has sought membership, or is a potential member of the CMO. The user is any person or organization who seeks to use the copyrighted work and is hence made to pay a fee for such use. This fee is generally based on the licensing agreement, struck between the CMO and the user on behalf of their collective rights holders.

Thus, the following information was identified to be useful for comparative assessment: list of members, governing directors, usage types, tariff rates, royalty distribution policy, annual revenue report, and percentage of distributed royalties. The justifications, and comparative findings are outlined below.

FINDINGS

List of members

Publishing members lists is useful for potential users since it can collectively reduce search costs for ownership information, making the process of licensing and royalty collection more efficient overall. In addition, users approached for licensing payment can also verify that the CMO is indeed authorized to administer those works. This has been a recurring issue in recent history for CMOs in both the United States [10] and India[11], which have reported extortion-like licensing demands for songs which may not have been even owned by their member rights-holders. Some have been alleged to demand licenses for broad, undefined catalogs like entire genres of music.[12] Having members lists published can prevent these discrepancies.

In India, all identified CMOs published their membership lists in accordance with Rule 66, section 1(c) of the Copyright Rules, which mandates the disclosure of members lists explicitly on the website.

In the U.S., all CMOs have published their membership data either as full lists or in the form of a searchable repertoire database corresponding with the specific work. This presentation format was similar in the U.K. although PRS for Music restricted access to authorized users. Nevertheless, this disclosure went beyond U.K.'s Copyright Regulations which only require the number of rights holders represented, whether as members or non-member rights holders to be published in the annual report. To the authors' knowledge, the U.S. does not seem to have an equivalent law as such.

Several CMO websites in the U.S. and U.K. also feature a search for owners of orphan works - copyrighted songs within their catalog in which the due rights-holders are unable to be contacted, or simply unknown due to a multitude of reasons, including lack of data collection, transfer of rights, unknown inheritance from deceased rights holders, amongst others. Many of these CMOs hold undistributed royalties for these works, bringing to question whether rights-holder members truly give genuine authorization for their continued licensing.

India's CMOs could enhance their transparency by adopting the repertoire format of membership disclosure which corresponds with each copyrighted work. It could also provide a platform to collectively identify orphan works' due rights-holders.

Governing directors

For rights holder members, knowledge of the governing members directing the functioning of the CMO can help ensure decision making occurs in a representative, accountable manner. In 2011, it was found that IPRS and PPL of India were governed by the same Board of Directors [18], despite theoretically managing distinct sets of rights and representing different rights-holder members. Stopps (2013) in WIPO's 'How to Make a Living from Music' states that democratic governance is highly desirable if not essential, since the board structure should ideally reflect the rights they administer.[19]

In India, all CMOs comply with the 2013 Copyright Rules which mandates the publishing of Governing Council members on its website. All CMOs in the United States, with the exception of SESAC have published information on their governing or executive board. SESAC does highlight the appointment of the CEO within its 'news' section, but not in an easily accessible location.

In the UK, the governing directors are disclosed, though not explicitly mandated for disclosure on the website. Copyright Regulations does require the appointment procedure of the Directors and their remuneration be included in the Annual Report. India's 2014 Copyright Rules appears relatively stringent in comparison given the process is specified in detail rather than a self-regulated process.

User Categories

The categorization of users simply allow potential licensees to understand when they would be legally required to purchase a music license given the scope and scale of their business/usage. User categories can range from restaurants, internet streaming, radio broadcasting, and live performance; to the physical reproduction of a musical composition or sound recording (for example through photocopying of sheet music or burning of CDs).

All CMOs identified had user categories displayed on the websites, with some presenting the distinctions through search options while others outlined usage types as a general list. Only India's Copyright Rules mandated the publishing of different categories of users as part of their tariff scheme.
U.S.'s HFA did not not distinguish licensing requirements by user type, but did communicate when a license would be needed through simple questions regarding usage.

Tariff Rates

Tariff rates are the costs of licenses issued by the CMOs. The calculation of these rates are done in a myriad of ways, ranging from being fixed by statutory provisions, set collectively by CMOs, or negotiated privately in a willing buyer-willing seller market. Some rate-setting considerations have included anticipated number of listeners, physical size of establishment, time of music use, number of loudspeakers, etc. Due to similarities in mode and scale of usage, most fixed tariff rates such as blanket licenses offered by CMOs are distinguished by different categories of users, most fixed tariff rates are divided accordingly.

In a market like the U.S. where CMOs compete to sublicense similar kinds of rights, publishing tariff rates can enable comparison of licensing fees for the most cost effective choice.[21] It can also allow users to forecast licensing expenses and adjust their business models or anticipated usage accordingly. Lastly, transparent cost calculations as opposed to hidden negotiated rates can prevent price and user discrimination, since licensees can verify the accuracy of their license charge.

In India, IPRS and ISRA complies to Rule 56 (2) of the Copyright Rules 2014 which mandates the publication of rates distinguished by categories of users, mode of exploitation, user group, durations of use, and territory. In U.K., both CMOs comply with Section 5(c) of their Copyright Regulations 2014 which mandates the publication of 'tariff rates in a uniform format' on the website as part of the monitoring and reporting requirements. In the U.S., all CMOs with the exception of ASCAP publish their tariff rates.

Although the U.S. does not seem to mandate the explicit disclosure of rates, both U.S. and India set statutory rates for certain uses of sound recordings. In the U.S. for example, the rates for ephemeral sound recordings akin to non-interactive, radio-like services are set by the Copyright Royalty Board under S17 USC 112 and 114. Similarly, in India, a statutory rate is also fixed by the Copyright Board for radio broadcasting.

As an anticompetitive measure, music consent decrees in the U.S. also mandate that ASCAP and BMI provide licenses on equivalent, non exclusive terms. This means that while its members can still individually refrain from joining a CMO in its entirety, partial withdrawing of their works from blanket licenses are not allowed.[22]

Despite fairly affordable statutory rates for use in non-interactive services, interactive streaming which seeks to host popular content often still requires direct licensing agreements from major record label conglomerates. Due to the importance of acquiring that content, these labels are often able to negotiate exclusive deals with hidden terms. Evolving music consumption patterns and an inconsistent rate-setting landscape have raised grievances, particularly amongst songwriters. In the U.S., this has led to the Copyright Office's review and reconsideration of the music licensing landscape in recent months, while in India, the cost of content acquisition remain a source of debate by the services.

Royalty distribution policy

The royalty distribution policy typically outlines the process and manner of royalty distribution, specifying how royalty is split between member-rights holders and the CMO. It usually notes the frequency of payments as well. Since one of the main reasons a rights-holder seeks membership within a CMO is to ensure their royalties are received on a consistent basis without themselves having to track down all users of their work, a transparent distribution policy is of utmost importance.

In India, IPRS and ISRA published the distribution policy on their website in compliance with Rule 58 of the Copyright Rules. Upon review of both, it was interesting to note the lack of detail in India's policies. Although it is specified in the Act, ISRA does not convey on its website clearly the distribution of percentages, nor the administrative cut it seeks to take. IPRS was very unclear about their frequency of payments, noting that "The distribution of Royalties shall be carried out promptly from time to time", despite the Copyright rules stipulating that the frequency be set at every quarter.

In the U.S., S. 370.5 (c)oftheCode of Federal Regulations for statutorily set sound recordings do state that online-published Annual Reports must have information on how royalties are collected, distributed, and spent as administrative expenses. All CMOs seem to comply.

In the UK, Section 6 of the 2014 Copyright Regulations Specified Criteria mandates reporting of the distribution policy in its annual report. Both identified CMOs comply.

Annual revenue report

The annual revenue report provides an overview of total income, which is particularly important for a CMO acting as a non-profit organization. Rightsholders can assess what the rest of the revenue is being used for, and cross-verify whether the self-reported data is true. For market and policy researchers, the annual revenue report can also provide the breakdown of which licensing services or catalogs are being used. An externally audited revenue report also enhances trust in the organization and ensures reliable financial transparency. Thus, the publication of the annual revenue report forms one of the most important benchmarks of transparency.

In India, only IPRS has published their 2013-14 annual revenue report in compliance with Rule 66 of the Copyright Rules which mandates the publishing of an annual report and audited accounts on their website. None of the other CMOs seem to have done this.

In the United States,S. 370.5 (c) of the Code of Federal Regulations mandates that CMOs collecting and distributing for statutorily licensed sound recordings must publish their annual revenue report. CMO SoundExchange complies, while HFA does so voluntarily. ASCAP and BMI also post their reports on occasion with a few years missing, but SESAC's report seems to be absent, possibly due to private incorporated company status.

In the UK, both CMOs comply with the 2014 Copyright Regulations under Rule 6 mandating the publication of an annual report.

Percentage of Revenue as Distributed Royalties

Given the main function of CMOs are to secure royalties for rights-holders, the percentage of revenue as distributed royalties was calculated using numbers from the latest published annual revenue reports. Although there are differences in CMO mandates and subsequently their investment on litigation and advocacy for example, the proportion of revenue as distributed royalties was used as a simplified proxy of effectiveness for this review. [26]

For those CMOs who published their annual revenue reports, it was found that the percentage of revenue as distributed royalties seemed to range between 80-90%. Given the controversies surrounding collecting societies in India, it was admittedly surprising that IPRS' distributed royalty percentage averaged almost 1% higher than comparable societies in the UK. It is also interesting that the United States seem to have the most efficient CMOs, with two rounding to 90%.

LIMITATIONS & LEARNINGS

The major limitation of this review is rooted in its various methodological weaknesses, ranging from the sampling of countries, inclusion of ambiguous CMOs, possible bias towards Indian copyright law during the parameter design, limitations of distributed royalties percentage as an effectiveness proxy, lack of measurable factors when attempting to evaluate 'ease of website use', and somewhat shallow legal research. Nevertheless, these were part and parcel of the learnings which stemmed from this review.

Limitations in Country Selection Process

The selection of countries to be assessed was not very methodologically sound. After further literature review, it seems a more representative sample could have been selected. Dr. Fabrice Rochelandet in his 1996 conference paper ' Are Collecting Societies Efficient? An evaluation of collective administration of copyright in Europe' categorized legal supervision systems in the following spectrum: lack of control, control at request, setting up control, permanent control, and extreme control. [31]

Rochelandet (1996) identifies UK as having 'control at request' since decisions surrounding operations are generally left up to the CMO themselves, exemplified by the freedom to develop their own functioning and code of practices, which then must be approved. Control at request is also demonstrated by rights-holder members ability to procure certain documentation upon request, and call upon the tribunals for dispute resolution if desired.

Using this taxonomy, India would likely span across 'setting up control', 'control at request', and possibly 'permanent control'. Setting up control is fitting since the 2012 Copyright Amendment mandates the registration of any organization in the business of issuing and granting licenses for underlying musical works (composition and lyrics) as a 'copyright society'. Typically this requires extensive documentation on procedural and governance matters, most of which is predetermined in detail in the 2012 Copyright Act and 2014 Rules. Permanent control may also apply since the Central Government has powers to cancel the registration of any copyright society and legally cease its functioning. Additionally, quite substantial regulations determine rate setting process and even calculation, as well as distribution of royalties. Lastly, control at request may also be fitting since similar to the UK system, an internal dispute resolution is legally mandated. However, any dispute can also be brought to the quasi-judicial Copyright Board if unable to settle matters internally.

The United States appears as if it would deviate from former examples of more involved legal supervision since it would likely be characterized by 'lack of control'. Few requirements exist regarding specific operations of licensing bodies, with the exception of rate setting for ephemereal sound recordings and anticompetitive consent decrees, the U.S. does provide a contrasting comparative system.

Although these examples do span across part of the spectrum of legal control, a future case study country could include one which mandates complete control such as in the case of Italy with a single state granted monopolist or New Zealand in which a single clearance license is offered to reduce complexity and transaction costs for music users.[32]

Limitations of CMO Identification

Throughout the methodology design, one of the main challenges was deciding which CMOs to include in the review. Due to lack of in-depth knowledge of U.S. and U.K.'s music licensing space, the initial survey and selection included bodies irrelevant to music licensing specifically. Due to the ambiguity in India, all organizations who were involved in some form collective licensing were initially included, including private entities like Novex Communications, and the South Indian Music Companies Association, due to their seeming similarities in functioning. However, they were eventually excluded in the final review to include only those which have received registered society status, or are currently registered as such.

There was also a lack of distinction made between licensing bodies specifically managing underlying works like music composition and lyrics, sound recording (phonographic rights), and performance rights. Although interesting insights may have been able to be drawn between similarly managed members and rights, the disaggregated rights management in the U.S. made these categorizations and comparisons challenging.

Part of the confusion stemmed from the vast variety of CMO systems and characteristics. Ficsor (2003) distinguishes these differences from four varying viewpoints: the level of collectivization, rights' owners freedom of choice, scope of rights and rights-owners covered, and the freedom of CMOs to set rates and other licensing terms.[33] The level of collectivization range in terms of representation, authorization, and even distribution of royalties/returns. The freedom of rights owners' have range in the ability to choose joint management of rights, or even which CMO to manage their rights -- assuming the option is not restricted by their respective copyright laws. The scope of rights and rights owners covered by a CMO varies from exclusively managing its own members rights, occasionally managing other members rights, and occasionally managing all similar members rights with no ability to opt out. Lastly, the freedom of CMOs to set rates and licensing terms range from free negotiations with the possibility of an arbitration body, to legally fixed predetermined rates and conditions.

The tremendous variety of CMO characteristics and the lack of bright lines in defining control factors for this review's selection meant that major music publishers, music services who directly issue payment, and even content aggregators who collate and distribute works for a certain fee could have been included. However, the decision to include only those officially recognized and legally registered as CMOs enhanced the feasibility of this review.

Limitations of Parameter Selection

While reviewing the parameters for transparency, it soon became clear that there were several limitations to the information identified. These include heavy influence in its development from India's context and legal provisions, an assumed value in transparency for transparency's sake, lack of specificity when surveying 'ease of website use', overly simplified proxy for efficiency measurement, a relatively shallow review of the law, and lack of assessment of membership data.

While selecting the comparative parameters, the process of developing a feasible transparency proxy may have been tilted towards the context and legal developments of India. This appeared to be the case when the first round of data collection was inconsistent with further reviews due to what appeared to be differences in the terms being sought - terms used in the Indian Copyright Act - rather than the substance of the content. This is indicative of how India's laws heavily influenced the development of the parameters.

Exposure to mistrust and lack of data in the Indian context may have also led authors to a somewhat presumed ideal of transparency for transparency's sake, implying in a weak correlation between publicly available information, the more effective the website and possibly the CMO . However, Schroff (2014) noted that information overload could occur if a potential licensee is uncertain what they are looking for.[34] From an efficiency point of view, search costs may actually decrease if less information is provided upfront, but better presented in more accessible language and format to guide the user to the relevant information.

Following review of the websites for a list of members, it appears that a more fruitful parameter may have been the publication of actual works and affiliated creators, rather than only the rights-holder members themselves. A grievance occasionally raised is the lack of recognition of composers and producers within a song, since it is typically the singer (or in the case of Indian film music, the actor and the film) who the audience associates with the work. Thus, a full repertoire list could be a useful addition for Indian websites to consider.

The selection of governing directors as a marker of transparency may have also been influenced by India's recent concerns surrounding copyright societies' leadership. Although it is a useful indicator, private, for-profit CMOs which have exclusive membership does not necessarily have the same burdens of a compulsory collective licensing scheme in which representation is necessary. What may be more useful for members is ensuring a dispute resolution process is easily accessible so that any grievances can be taken up through proper channels.

Identifying a relatively simple proxy for effectiveness and efficiency was also challenging. Many CMOs in their annual reports highlighted figures such as 'administrative costs', 'operation costs', 'cost to income ratios', and other similar indicators to report expenses outside of royalty licensing, collection, and distribution. However, due to differences in calculations, a simplified proxy was developed to assess the effectiveness of their core purpose of royalty distribution. However, this calculation does not account for absolute sums, year on year growth, taxation, and other non-monetary benefits. In addition, the differing years, geographies, and class of works makes comparison not very methodologically sound.

The authors had initially included 'ease of website use' as part of the review. However, this parameter was not very clearly developed and defined, and thus reviewed subjectively by different research assistants with varying assessments. Nevertheless, closer attention was paid to web design and user interface to enable greater efficiency in searching for relevant information. Future assessments could measure the number of clicks or amount of time it takes to find a certain piece of oft-sought information.

The assessment of each country's relevant laws was based on whether reporting the information online was mandated by law. However, throughout the exercise it soon became clear that beyond reporting standards, more interesting distinctions such as the level of control and specificity to which the law sought to determine functioning and operations of the CMOs. Although this was briefly touched upon throughout the review, further research should be explored in this area.

Lastly, data the authors did not seek due to logistical limitations were membership-exclusive information. Recent complaints about royalties of streaming services have resulted in the publishing of
numerous HFA and SoundExchange royalty reports by their rights-owners. These reports outline the services and songs from which they have received their royalties, allowing for more informed debate and discussion of royalty payouts and business models of the various digital services. Ongoing research surrounding copyright management in India have found that detailed reports on how royalty was calculated, or from which works/services they were generated are often absent upon receipt of their royalty cheques.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite India's strict legal provisions and control regarding registration, operations, rate setting, and reporting, it appears there is little enforcement and even less compliance, particularly by Phonographic Performance Limited which failed to report tariff rates, royalty distribution policy, and its annual revenue report. The Indian Singers Rights Association published all parameters sought with the exception of their annual revenue report, leaving authors without data needed to calculate the percentage of distributed royalty. The Indian Performing Rights Association provided all information sought in this review, with an 84.25% of revenue as distributed royalties as calculated from its 2013/14 annual revenue report.

Relative to India, CMOs in United Kingdom were regulated less strictly, allowing self-developed codes of conduct providing adherence to certain broad guidelines on operations and reporting. It appears the government only imposes rules in the absence of adequate self-regulation. U.K.'s Phonographic Performance Limited displayed all six indicators sought, with 83.9% as distributed revenues from its 2013 financial statement. PRS for Music did not make its members list and repertoire open to the general public, but did publish all other parameters with 85.1% of distributed revenues as calculated from its 2014 annual revenue report.

To the authors' knowledge, the U.S. has the least operations regulation for CMOs with the exception of reporting laws for those issuing statutory licenses. Anticompetitive consent decrees also prevent partial withdrawal from blanket licenses to ensure non-discrimination towards select services. Despite relaxed regulation, BMI and SoundExchange reported all identified parameters, while ASCAP and HFA reported five, with SESAC only having four. ASCAP, Sound Exchange, and BMI were the only ones to have published their annual revenue report, with percentage of revenue royalty calculated to 90.0%, 89.9%, and 83.4% respectively.

It is important to reiterate however that information transparency demonstrated by CMOs website does not necessarily indicate effectiveness. Though not necessarily the most accurate indicator, there appeared no significant correlation between the percentage of distributed royalties, and amount of information found. All three countries have recently, or are currently undergoing regulatory reviews and reform to enhance copyright management. India's Copyright Amendment Act and Copyright Rules was a response to allegations of corruption and collusion of copyright societies. The legal status of certain CMOs and other private authorized agents not included here are ambiguous. Though they seem to function similarly to private CMOs in the US, whether they will be obliged to comply with copyright societies regulation is uncertain. The United States' Copyright Office has recently undergone a major study of the music licensing landscape. One of the major grievances highlighted was the disparity between negotiated sound recording rates and statutory rates of licenses for works of composers and publishers for the rapidly growing use of internet radio streaming. This disparity is furthered by the aforementioned Consent Decrees. In early 2014, the European Commission had also adopted the Collective Rights Management Directive with the main objectives of increasing transparency and efficiency of CMOs, and to facilitate cross-border licensing for music online. Thus, transparency and increased effectiveness of CMOs particularly in light of the digital age are being made a priority within legislation; and hopefully, in execution as well.

Recommendations

Through reviewing other CMO websites, a few learnings were found which could be adopted by Indian CMOs for enhanced transparency and effectiveness:

1. Publish a full repertoire of works the CMO is authorized to license with corresponding rights holder information. This recommendation stems from other CMO websites which present their administrable works in a searchable database, allowing users the ability to efficiently identify whether the work they seek to use are covered by the license.
2. Provide a platform for collectively identifying the due rights-holder of orphan works. This recommendation was a feature found in several other websites which lost contact with the rights holder through failure to update ownership information in the case of rights transfer, changes in contact details ,passing of the original author, unknown inheritance, and more.
3. Guide new users and potential members through a more user-friendly designed page with simplified, accessible introduction to music licensing. As exemplified by the layout of other websites, the webpage could be subdivided between information useful for prospective or current licensees, and prospective or current member rights-holders. Basic questions framed in accessible language can guide the website user to the correct information.
4. Increase clarity surrounding royalty distribution policies. During the review, IPRS and ISRA's royalty distribution scheme were noticeably vague. Although ISRA noted the most crucial elements, certain details like how "reliable statistical data" were to be procured and calculated in the case of missing log sheets was absent. IPRS was even more obscure, noting their frequency of royalty distribution would occur "promptly, from time to time."
5. Publish updated annual revenue reports. This document is probably one of the key indicators of how a CMO is doing financially, and it is important that these are made available so CMOs remain transparent and accountable to its rights-holder members and users.
6. Clarify dispute resolution processes. This is important particularly for those jurisdictions which do not allow much choice, if at all, between various institutions and rate-setting processes. Membership and representation would ideally provide and promote proper channels for raising and addressing grievances prior to seeking legal remedies.

Further Questions

Although a few insights were found through this review, the numerous limitations indicate a better designed exercise asking different, more nuanced questions may uncover some more fruitful conclusions. Future research could explore membership-exclusive data, and how reporting is presented across CMOs. From a legal standpoint, a more detailed analysis of regulations across different jurisdictions may shed light on different international standards of transparency and reporting. Additionally, given that the highest percentage of distributed royalties were from CMOs based in the U.S., the correlation leads to the question of whether more relaxed reporting requirements, or perhaps a competitive CMO structure can actually contribute to increased effectiveness? Lastly, given the increasingly complex licensing environment and continued creation of rights due to technological innovations, the feasibility of this system to monitor and finance music should be questioned as well. Further research on alternative compensation schemes considering tax-based, or patron-based financing will increasingly become more feasible and important systems to explore.

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