Centre for Internet & Society
Should Nandan Nilekani's Aadhaar project, for identity proof and welfare delivery, exist at all?

A picture of a girl getting her retina tested as part of the enrolment for Aadhar card. Picture by Economic Times

The foundation of Aadhaar—a Congress flagship project to give every Indian a unique identity number and then use it to deliver services—has been under assault in the past three months.

Should Nandan Nilekani's Aadhaar project, for identity proof and welfare delivery, exist at all?

A picture of a girl getting her retina tested as part of the enrolment for Aadhar card. Picture by Economic Times

The article by M. Rajshekhar was published in the Economic Times on April 3, 2014. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

Political, legal, reputational.

The political backlash is coming from leaders of BJP, the Congress' principal rival. Meenakshi Lekhi and Ananth Kumar are not, by any stretch of the imagination, the first or the last word on policy matters in the BJP, but they mince no words when they say that if their party forms a government, it will trash Aadhaar —a project that has delivered a unique ID to half of India and on which Rs 3,800 crore has been spent.

Even as BJP's loose cannons fired, the Supreme Court repeated on March 24 that the government cannot make Aadhaar mandatory to access welfare services like pensions and LPG subsidy. The same day, investigative journalism portal Cobrapost aired videos that allegedly showed agencies agreeing to enrol people from neighbouring countries for a bribe.

The BJP piled on. "It (Aadhaar) has served no purpose. They have issued cards to illegal migrants. We want citizenship cards," says Prakash Javadekar, spokesperson of BJP. His party does not have an official policy line on Aadhaar as yet, but another of its leaders, Yashwant Sinha, headed the Parliamentary panel that, in 2011, severely criticised and rejected the draft bill that provided the legal framework for Aadhaar. "We are for direct benefit transfer but not on the basis of Aadhaar, which is a very badly-designed scheme," Sinha told CNBC-TV18 on January 31. "We will give it to all citizens of India on the basis of NPR."

On the campaign trail in Bangalore, Nandan Nilekani, the chief architect and implementer of Aadhaar, defends his work as the chairman of Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). "Aadhaar is a pro-development and an anti-corruption platform," says Nilekani, who was brought in by the Congress high command in 2009 and is contesting these elections on a party ticket against BJP's Kumar in Bangalore South. "It is a pity that some vested interests with narrow political and other motives are trying to stall the project."

Lost in those binaries are the objectives of Aadhaar, to universalise identity proof and to use it to plug leakages in delivery of welfare services. UIDAI, led by a hands-on Nilekani, pursued this agenda with a certain authority, great speed and an overriding emphasis on technology, all of which delivered outcomes.

But they also contributed to shortcomings that saw the project stumble on its way and for which it is now being critiqued. "This is the only way transformation takes place," says K Koshy, who was part of the team that conceptualised Aadhaar and is now with Ernst & Young. "When you know the ultimate system is workable, you sort out the problems as you go along."

Except, given the political winds blowing, it's anyone's guess what the new dispensation will feel about Aadhaar and UIDAI, from where Nilekani resigned on March 13 and which is seeing many officers who came from other parts of the government, on deputation, returning. Will the new dispensation see Aadhaar as an idea that is sound but with parts that need strengthening? Or, will they see it as an idea that is, by itself, fallacious? "I don't know where this is going," says Abhijit Sen, member, Planning Commission, under which UIDAI is housed.

At one level, it's a political question. "The next Parliament will have to decide what UIDAI can and cannot do," says Sen. At another level, even that political answer will stem from the answers to three questions that go to the core of what Aadhaar was meant to be and where it fell short.

1. Does Aadhaar Provide a Unique and Definitive Identity?

Yes and no. UIDAI collects two sets of information from an individual. The first is biometrics: prints of all 10 fingers and a scan of the iris in both eyes. Biometric data, which is supposed to be unique to every individual, is used to assign a unique number to the individual. The second set is basic personal information: name, address, father's name, date of birth and address. Individuals can show existing documents—like voter's I-card or passport —as verification. For those who did not have identification documents, UIDAI allowed certain people to attest for them.

Aadhaar is better at identifying individuals through their biometrics than ensuring the accuracy of their add-on data. This is partly due to its design. When Aadhaar was being conceptualised, says Shrikant Nadhamuni, who headed technology for UIDAI: "We wanted to move the ID game—from a state where some people had no ID and others had paper ID to something beyond even what Singapore had, in the form of smart cards, to online. Like biometric. Which is the future.

Here, your presence is enough to vet your ID." This is also partly due to how UIDAI did its enrolments. Shortly after taking charge, Nilekani announced UIDAI would issue 600 million Aadhaar numbers by March 2014. The initial plan was that the National Population Register (NPR), which conducts the decadal Census and which is housed under the ministry of home, would do the enrolments— capturing biometrics and information— and UIDAI would only issue the numbers.

Soon after, Nilekani decided he could not meet his 600 million target if he waited for NPR to give him biometric packets, and offered to do enrolments too. To meet the target, UIDAI wanted to outsource enrolment to multiple vendors. And compared to NPR, UIDAI collected very little demographic data. UIDAI appointed public and private companies as enrolment agencies. Quality issues arose. "90% of the larger enrolment agencies offloaded the work to local, small-time guys," says the head of a Gurgaon-based enrolment agency, not wanting to be named.

Instances of incomplete addresses, spelling mistakes, people bribing enrolment staff to obtain numbers, emerged. "There is always a trade off between inclusion and accuracy," says Nilekani. "And the fact that these errors happened only shows that the gates were kept wide enough to ensure there would be no exclusion." "The Aadhaar database is based on very weak data," says Sunil Abraham, the head of Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, an Internet and governance think-tank. "It is basically linking biometrics to a person and the name/address he claims as his." This weakness started showing up as the government began to deliver welfare services by transferring money directly into bank accounts of beneficiaries, using Aadhaar. The first step was to add the Aadhaar number to the department and bank databases.

Reddy Subramanyam, joint secretary of NREGA, tried to seed Aadhaar numbers into his database of NREGA workers. "The current matching is just 25-30%." The mismatch arises because, say, the name will be S Kumar in one and Sunil Kumar in another. Aadhaar is "less ID project and more identification project," says legal researcher Usha Ramanathan. "The onus for ensuring the demographic information is correct falls on the number-holder."

2. Are Aadhaar-enabled Cash Transfers Delivering?

If giving every Indian a unique ID was Aadhaar's main mandate, revamping welfare delivery became its second. In 2011, Nilekani headed a committee to create a roadmap to move to a system of welfare delivery where money was transferred directly into bank accounts of beneficiaries—or direct benefit transfers (DBTs). The architectures it proposed pivoted around Aadhaar and online, realtime biometric authentication. This was to replace the existing smart-card architecture, which can work even in areas even without connectivity.

UIDAI saw the cloud as the future. "We were not very taken with the smart-card solution," says Nadhamuni. "Farmers have to carry multiple smart cards around. And then, there is the cost of the card." Smart-card companies, staring at the prospect of their investments going waste, protested. "Customers and service providers deserve the right to make a convenient choice. Can someone building a public highway insist that only a certain sort of a vehicle can ply on it?" Abhishek Sinha, CEO of Eko India, a mobile-banking start-up told ET in November 2011.

"The question is whether the model is working better now than what existed before," defends Koshy. It's a question that has not been answered conclusively and credibly: there have been no independent evaluations by the government of Aadhaarbased DBTs till now. "Aadhaar should not have been rolled out on a mission mode till it was tested on some scale," says MS Sriram, visiting faculty at IIM Bangalore's Centre for Public Policy. When asked about this, Sen says: "There was no independent evaluation. Everyone was rushing." From the field came reports about manual labourers and the aged struggling to authenticate using biometrics.

Nor were comparative studies conducted to check alternative ways to improve welfare delivery. Economist Reetika Khera argues that Chhattisgarh has removed corruption from its PDS programme through a mix of computerisation and community supervision. This echoes an observation made by the Parliamentary panel while rejecting the UIDAI bill: the government had not considered comparative costs of Aadhaar and other existing ID documents.

Yet, in November 2012, the Congress decided to make DBTs its calling card for the 2014 elections. At a rally in Dudu, Rajasthan, attended by Congress leaders and Nilekani, it announced DBT rollout in the state. A year later, after a patchy rollout, the Congress lost power in the state. And on January 30, the UPA pressed pause on DBTs for cooking gas.

3. Are there Strong Safeguards to Protect a Person's Privacy?

On February 26, the Mumbai High Court directed UIDAI to share its Goa biometrics with the CBI to help it solve a rape case in the state the agency was struggling to solve. UIDAI refused, saying this would violate the privacy of its number holders. The High Court agreed with the CBI. UIDAI went to the Supreme Court, which ruled that its biometric information cannot be shared with any government agency without the consent of number holders.

But the CBI request had shown what could go wrong. "Once you create an ID system, other things happen," says Sen. "The most inevitable one is that government departments—like the police—want to access it. A database exists and I want to use it." Says a Supreme Court lawyer, not wanting to be named: "You innocently give your fingerprints to UIDAI because you want your scholarship or gas subsidy or something. You volunteer this information and then you realise this can be used as evidence against you in a criminal trial?" In time, more agencies will use Aadhaar. "The moment you start putting the Aadhaar number into multiple databases, you make them comparable," says Abraham. "Land registry, tax records, etc, all become comparable." Adds Sen: "We need to think about who can use the authentication service."

He cites the example of banks using Aadhaar to judge a borrower's credit record as a good thing. Conversely, he adds, an insurer using a customer's Aadhaar to access hospital records, and take a call on premiums or policy issuance, is a bad outcome. "Insurance is supposed to work by pooling risk. Should they (insurers) even have the right to ask for authentication?" asks Sen. UIDAI officials say three things in their defence. One, they collect innocuous information, which they don't share. Two, for authentication queries, they only give 'yes/no' answers. Three, they have safeguards.

What is missing is a legal framework that governs collection, use and retention of biometrics. "India has not passed a data privacy law," says Nadhamuni. "This is a very important legislation we need to draft and enact for projects that use large-scale IT systems, be it Aadhaar, NREGA, voter card, income tax, etc. In the absence of such laws, UIDAI came up with rigorous data privacy and security policies to secure resident data." However, the Parliamentary panel, while rejecting the bill, noted that UIDAI began collecting biometric data even as the government worked on a privacy bill and a data protection bill. "The idea that databases can be used by anyone makes people vulnerable, especially in a state where there is neither law nor much respect for law," says Ramanathan.

Aadhaar stands at an uncomfortable junction. A new government, eager to ensure only citizens have unique numbers, could ask all Aadhaar holders to provide address proof and delete the others. Events of the past three months have framed the issues concerning Aadhaar, sometimes with a touch of rhetoric. "This is a good time to open the regulation issue," says Sen.