The Centre for Internet and Society
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Govt cracks down on cyber jehad network, blocks access to 32 websites
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/india-today-january-1-2015-govt-cracks-down-on-cyber-jehad-network-blocks-access-to-32-websites
<b>The Modi government is starting the New Year with the resolve to wipe out terror and it has cracked down on websites that have been carrying anti-India views and spreading the propaganda of the Islamic State (IS). </b>
<p>The article <a class="external-link" href="http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/cyber-jehad-network-dot-vimeo-git-hub-daily-motion-source-forge-paste-bin--islamic-state-mehdi-masroor-biswas/1/410787.html">published in India Today</a> on January 1, 2015 quotes Pranesh Prakash.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">Reacting to an alert from the antiterror squad of a state police department, the Department of Telecom (DoT) has blocked access to 32 websites. The DoT order that was tweeted by Pranesh Prakash, policy director of the Bangalore-based research organisation, said that 32 URLs have been blocked under section 69 of the Information and Technology Act, 2000.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The order was reportedly issued on December 16 and it was shared on Twitter on Wednesday. GitHub, Archive.org, Imgur, Vimeo, Daily Motion, Pastebin, sourceforge, justpaste, cryptbin were among the sites that were blocked.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As reports emerged on the ban of these sites, there was outrage on Twitter on the issue of internet censorship. However, most of the websites mentioned in the list that were to be blocked were accessible. Pastebin and Internet Archive, two websites that have reportedly been blocked, tweeted their views.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"If you are from India and unable to visit Pastebin, please email us," Pastebin tweeted on December 19. Internet Archive tweeted on December 31 that they too received complaints from users in India who can't access its website.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Reacting to the outrage, Arvind Gupta, national head of the BJP IT Cell took to Twitter and said that these sites have been blocked after an alert from an anti-terrorism squad that most of them were carrying anti-India content from the Islamic State (IS).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"We should congratulate the government for taking a preventive and precautionary step in a proactive manner based on an advisory," Gupta told Mail Today.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">He added that he does not have any details of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) order and only reacted to the Twitter debate on the subject.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Intelligence agencies have been struggling to monitor terror activities on cyber space. There have been reports of terror groups using social media to attract young minds to jehadi ideology.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The recent arrest of Bangalore-based executive Mehdi Masroor Biswas, who was operating a Twitter handle under the the name @ShamiWitness and promoting the views of the Islamic State, has come as a wake-up call for security agencies. Biswas, an engineer working as a "manufacturing executive" with ITC Foods, was nabbed from his rented oneroom apartment after a news report stated that his was the most popular IS Twitter account with close to 17,000 followers, and his tweets were getting viewed over two lakh times a month.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Sources said there are close to 30,000 such Twitter handles and other social media forums along with websites that are spewing venom, and little can be done to monitor all of them and act on time. With cyber threat becoming a clear and present danger, the Centre has decided to set up a highlevel committee to only monitor social media and cyber space. Counter-terror officials believe that the jehadi nexus has a huge bearing on India as youth active on social media are vulnerable to the propaganda being carried out online.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Other than @ShamiWitness, there are Twitter handles such as @MagnetGas with radical views and pro-IS tone that are now under the lens. What is disturbing is that many such sites are India-specific and some are believed to be handled by Indians.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"If there is misuse of Internet and social media, it needs to be dealt with legally. The Internet is like a public place, so if there are extreme views, the state needs to exercise its powers," says D.C. Pathak, former chief of the Intelligence Bureau.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is not the first time that the DoT has clamped down on websites for promoting "objectionable" content. In June 2013, 39 websites that allowed users to share pornographic content were reportedly blocked.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/india-today-january-1-2015-govt-cracks-down-on-cyber-jehad-network-blocks-access-to-32-websites'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/india-today-january-1-2015-govt-cracks-down-on-cyber-jehad-network-blocks-access-to-32-websites</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaSocial MediaCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceChilling Effect2015-01-03T03:29:21ZNews ItemIndia 'jihadi' web blocking causes anger
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-january-2-2015-india-jihadi-web-blocking-causes-anger
<b>A government block on more than 30 high-profile websites has caused anger across India.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The story was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30656298">published in BBC</a> on January 2, 2015. It was also <a class="external-link" href="http://thepuffington.com/anger-at-india-website-blocking/">mirrored in the Puffington Post</a> the same day. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">India's Department of Telecoms ordered the blocking of the sites in order to prevent the publicising of "jihadi activities".</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">After considerable pressure, four of the sites - Weebly, Vimeo, Daily Motion and Github - were unblocked.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Officials said the other sites would have their blocks lifted if they complied with the "law of the land".</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Indian Ministry for Communication and Information Technology said in a statement: "It was stated that Anti National group are using social media for mentoring Indian youths to join the Jihadi activities."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It went on to say that the primary concern was that users posting material on the sites did not require any authentication, and that identities could be hidden.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The four websites that have been unblocked were said to have worked with the Indian government to address concerns - although it is unclear what changes, if any, have been made.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some users were reporting that they were still unable to reach the apparently unblocked sites.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Pranesh Prakash, from the India-based Centre for Internet and Society, said: "Any intelligent person can see these sites don't incite terrorism."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span class="cross-head">'Many complaints'</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Ahead of the ban lifting, a Vimeo spokeswoman said: "It is Vimeo's longstanding policy not to allow videos that promote terrorism, and we remove such videos whenever we become aware of them.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/blocked.png" alt="blocked" class="image-inline" title="blocked" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"We have not received notice from the Indian government concerning such videos and have contacted them requesting the blocking order to identify, and evaluate the video in question."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Many internet users in the country are angry that other sites remain blocked, in particular Pastebin - a site used for "dumping" text online anonymously - and The Internet Archive, a US organisation that offers a database of old websites.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://twitter.com/internetarchive/status/550202081349353472">The Internet Archive said on Twitter</a> that it had received "many complaints" from users who were unable to access the service.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India has a history of sporadically blocking websites, or issuing warnings about online content.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In August 2012, <a href="http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19343887">245 sites were blocked by the government</a> in an attempt, it said, to quell violence.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-january-2-2015-india-jihadi-web-blocking-causes-anger'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-january-2-2015-india-jihadi-web-blocking-causes-anger</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaSocial MediaCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceChilling EffectPress Freedoms2015-01-03T02:48:48ZNews ItemVimeo, DailyMotion, Pastebin Among Sites Blocked In India For 'Anti-India' Content From ISIS
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/ib-times-jeff-stone-december-31-2014-sites-blocked-in-india-for-anti-india-content-from-isis
<b>The Indian government has convinced ISPs to block dozens of popular websites accused of hosting “anti-India” content posted by members of the Islamic State group, also known as ISIS or ISIL.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The story was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.ibtimes.com/vimeo-dailymotion-pastebin-among-sites-blocked-india-anti-india-content-isis-1770814">published by IB Times</a> on December 31. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">GitHub, Pastebin, as well as the video sites Vimeo and DailyMotion were among those rendered inaccessible to many of India’s nearly 250 million Internet users.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The text repository Pastebin <a href="https://twitter.com/pastebin/status/545881385756798978">first tweeted on Dec. 19</a> that it had been blocked, confirming on Dec. 26 that the blockade was at the behest of India’s Department of Telecom. Pranesh Prakash, the policy director at the Center for Internet and Society in Bangalore, posted a list of the blocked sites Wednesday. Notice the list was issued Dec. 17.</p>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" style="text-align: justify; ">
<p>Insane! Govt orders blocking of 32 websites including <a href="https://twitter.com/internetarchive">@internetarchive</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/Vimeo">@vimeo</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/github">@github</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/pastebin">@pastebin</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/censorship?src=hash">#censorship</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/FoEx?src=hash">#FoEx</a> <a href="http://t.co/F75ngSGohJ" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">pic.twitter.com/F75ngSGohJ</a></p>
<p>— Pranesh Prakash (@pranesh_prakash) <a href="https://twitter.com/pranesh_prakash/status/550196008416600064">December 31, 2014</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Hours later Arvind Gupta, the national head of information technology at India’s Bharatiya Janata Party, <a href="https://twitter.com/buzzindelhi">confirmed on Twitter</a> that a block had indeed been put in place. Other than referencing “ongoing investigations,” Gupta did not provide specific details on the type of threats being made.</p>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" style="text-align: justify; ">
<p>The websites that have been blocked were based on an advisory by Anti Terrorism Squad, and were carrying Anti India content from ISIS. 1/2</p>
<p>— Arvind Gupta (@buzzindelhi) <a href="https://twitter.com/buzzindelhi/status/550225247455035392">December 31, 2014</a></p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" style="text-align: justify; ">
<p>The sites that have removed objectionable content and/or cooperated with the on going investigations, are being unblocked. 2/2</p>
<p>— Arvind Gupta (@buzzindelhi) <a href="https://twitter.com/buzzindelhi/status/550225666847690752">December 31, 2014</a></p>
</blockquote>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The move comes after it was discovered that the operator of a prominent pro-ISIS Twitter account was <a href="http://www.ibtimes.com/mehdi-masroor-biswas-was-only-isis-sympathizer-not-recruiter-bangalore-police-1752839">based in Bangalore</a>. Mehdi Masroor Biswas, 24, was arrested earlier this month after a <a href="http://www.channel4.com/news/unmasked-the-man-behind-top-islamic-state-twitter-account-shami-witness-mehdi" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Channel 4 News investigation</a> determined he was behind @ShamiWitness, an account with more than 17,700 followers and 2 million tweets seen each month.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi unveiled the “Make in India” campaign earlier this year in an attempt to encourage international businesses to invest in India. The campaign specifically mentions information technology as a sector in which India wishes to improve.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/ib-times-jeff-stone-december-31-2014-sites-blocked-in-india-for-anti-india-content-from-isis'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/ib-times-jeff-stone-december-31-2014-sites-blocked-in-india-for-anti-india-content-from-isis</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionSocial MediaInternet GovernanceCensorship2015-01-02T16:43:20ZNews ItemGovt blocks 32 websites, including Vimeo and Github
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-december-31-2014-moulishree-srivastava-govt-blocks-32-websites
<b>The websites that have been blocked were based on an advisory by Anti Terrorism Squad, and were carrying anti-India content from ISIS.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Moulishree Srivastava was published in <a class="external-link" href="http://www.livemint.com/Industry/drJ5ToWFEIyRNEAbn9OcGN/Govt-blocks-32-websites-including-Vimeo-and-Github.html">Livemint</a> on December 31, 2014. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Indian government has blocked access to 32 websites based on the advice of an anti-terrorism team. The blocked URLs (uniform resource locator, an address to any website on the Internet) include files, videos and source code-sharing websites such as dailymotion.com, github.com, vimeo.com and archive.org.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In an order, tweeted by Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Bengaluru-based research organization Centre for Internet and Society on Wednesday, the department of telecom said the 32 URLs had been blocked under Section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and under Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009. “The websites that have been blocked were based on an advisory by Anti Terrorism Squad, and were carrying anti-India content from ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria),” Arvind Gupta, head of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s information technology cell, said in a message on Twitter.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">His tweet came in response to a backlash to the move from Internet users. “The sites that have removed objectionable content and/or cooperated with the ongoing investigations, are being unblocked,” he added. If Internet service providers (ISPs) don’t comply with the demand, they are liable to being penalized, the order said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The rules give the central government powers to block access to information if it is in the interest of the “sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above.” Intermediaries failing to comply with the rules are punishable with fines and prison terms of up to seven years, it notes. “Pastebin is still blocked in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We are getting many reports about this. The Indian government has blocked us...,” said one of the source code sharing websites, Pastebin.com, in a tweet. This is not the first time the government has cracked down on websites. A recent report by Freedom House, an independent watchdog, said the information ministry received a total of 130 court orders to block Web content between February 2009 and December 2013.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In February 2014, the then minister of communication and information technology told Parliament that 62 URLs were blocked in 2013 under Section 69A for hosting objectionable information with the potential to disturb public order. As many as 82 URLs were blocked on 18 September 2013 in addition to 26 blocked a week earlier after violence escalated between Hindu and Muslim communities in Muzaffarnagar district of Uttar Pradesh. A total of 362 URLs were blocked in response to communal violence in the northeast, the report said. “The problem isn’t just about the specific sites that are blocked; the prob(lem) always about the bad law...,” tweeted Prakash. “The 69A rules don’t allow for transparency, accountability, time-limits on blocks, etc. So easily misused by govt. + courts + individuals.”</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-december-31-2014-moulishree-srivastava-govt-blocks-32-websites'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-december-31-2014-moulishree-srivastava-govt-blocks-32-websites</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionSocial MediaInternet GovernanceCensorship2015-01-02T16:09:24ZNews ItemDoT Reportedly Orders Blocking of 32 Websites Including GitHub, Archive.org, SourceForge
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/ndtv-december-31-2014-dot-reportedly-orders-blocking-of-32-websites-including-github-archiveorg-sourceforge
<b>Many users on Twitter are claiming that several websites, including many software development resources such as GitHub and SourceForge, along with research resources like the Internet Archive have all been blocked on order of the Department of Telecom. </b>
<p>The story was <a class="external-link" href="http://gadgets.ndtv.com/internet/news/dot-reportedly-orders-blocking-of-32-websites-including-github-archiveorg-sourceforge-642273">published in NDTV</a> on December 31, 2014. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/server.png" alt="server" class="image-inline" title="server" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A letter circulating online shows a list of 32 URLs that ISPs have reportedly been ordered to block, with most of these URLs being entire websites, instead of specific webpages that's usually been the case with such blocks in the past.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We tried to verify the users' claims, but on both our office broadband network, and also on Airtel and Vodafone 3G networks, all the sites were opening properly at the time of writing. Interestingly, many of the sites failed the load at the first try, but simply hitting refresh once solved the problem.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This does not mean that blocking is not happening - it is possible that the order has been sent recently, and will take some time to be fully implemented. Here is the email which purportedly shows the list of the 32 blocked URLs, as posted by Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director of the Center for Inernet and Society:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/InternetServiceLicenses.png" alt="internet service licenses" class="image-inline" title="internet service licenses" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">No information is available at present to confirm if blocking is truly happening, or why, but we are trying to ascertain the exact details and will update this story with the information as soon as possible.<br /><br />However, there is some partial confirmation because both Pastebin and the Internet Archive have tweeted about blocking from India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/internetarchive.png" alt="Internet Archive" class="image-inline" title="Internet Archive" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Such blocks in the past have been <a href="http://gadgets.ndtv.com/internet/news/confusion-reigns-as-indian-isps-block-vimeo-torrent-websites-223340">due to John Doe orders</a> but the fact it is targeting software development sites like Github and Sourceforge is strange - the John Doe orders have specifically been used to block piracy of films, and blocking off sites that have no connection to movies makes no sense.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Arvind Gupta, the National Head of the BJP IT cell also took to Twitter, stating that these websites were being blocked for security reasons, based on the advice of the Anti-Terrorism Squad. According to Gupta's Tweets, the sites were being unblocked as soon as they removed "objectionable materials", allegedly related to ISIS.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It's extremely unusual that a government decision is being communicated by a political party official - if the Department of Telecom is blocking sites, then it should be the one to communicate and clarify these events. However, so far, it has not issued any statements, and neither has the IT Ministry.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/ndtv-december-31-2014-dot-reportedly-orders-blocking-of-32-websites-including-github-archiveorg-sourceforge'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/ndtv-december-31-2014-dot-reportedly-orders-blocking-of-32-websites-including-github-archiveorg-sourceforge</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionSocial MediaInternet GovernanceCensorship2015-01-02T14:51:39ZNews ItemGovernment blocks over 60 websites including github & sourceforge on anti-terror advisory
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-december-31-2014-jayadevan-neha-alawadhi-december-31-2014-govt-blocks-over-60-websites
<b>Over 60 websites and links, including popular online tools like Github and Sourceforge used by thousands of programmers have been blocked in India, triggering angry protests by Internet users.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by P.K. Jayadevan and Neha Alawadhi was <a class="external-link" href="http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-12-31/news/57558537_1_websites-information-technology-various-internet-service-providers">published in the Economic Times</a> on December 31, 2014. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The websites were blocked for hosting content that is pro terrorist group ISIS and not cooperating with government investigations, officials said.</p>
<div class="mod-articletext mod-economictimesarticletext mod-economictimesarticletextwithadcpc" id="mod-a-body-after-first-para" style="text-align: justify; ">
<p><a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Arvind%20Gupta">Arvind Gupta</a>, the head of IT Cell, BJP Tweeted: "The websites that have been blocked were based on an advisory by Anti Terrorism Squad, and were carrying Anti India content from ISIS. The sites that have removed objectionable content and/or cooperated with the on going investigations, are being unblocked."</p>
<p>Based on an order issued by the country's telecom department, in a letter dated December 17 and a subsequent letter on December 19, over 60 websites have been blocked by various internet service providers in the country.</p>
<p>While some internet service providers are yet to block these websites, many users have been reporting frequent outages in these web services over the last two weeks.</p>
<p>Websites like Pastebin don't host any content but are a platform for users to paste text. Popular video <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/networks">networks</a> like <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Vimeo">Vimeo</a> and Dailymotion are among the websites that have been blocked.</p>
<p>Officials from the department of Information Technology and the department of telecom were not available for comment. "These are all providing very dangerous kind of cut and paste services..You can take code, cut it, paste it, remove it, delete it," said one government official who requested anonymity.</p>
<p>The government has invoked section 69A of the Information technology Act (2000) and Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules ("Blocking Rules") to ban these websites.</p>
<p>Many websites have been blocked in India from time to time on various grounds. In September, following the Muzaffarnagar riots, over 80 websites and links on social media were blocked.</p>
<p>However, the inclusion of services like Github and Sourceforge that host code for open source software are causing much anger among the developer community. "Sometimes they might need to block specific URLs, but blocking the entire website is wrong or they haven't thought through it," said Thejesh GN, the co-founder of <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Datameet">Datameet</a> and an open source developer.</p>
<p>"There is also a lack of transparency where people don't get to know why their sites were blocked," he added.</p>
<p>"We're aware of reports of connectivity issues in India. We're looking into it, and will update with more information when we have it," a Github spokesperson said.</p>
<p>In June 2014, the <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Delhi%20High%20Court">Delhi High Court</a> ordered a block of 472 file sharing websites including <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Google%20Docs">Google Docs</a> and <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Pirate%20Bay">Pirate Bay</a> following a complaint filed by Sony Entertainment. The entertainment company was hacked and contents from its servers were shared by hackers on various file sharing websites. In earlier instances, many websites have been blocked for copyright infringement as well.</p>
<p>"Courts unfortunately are not exercising restraint and are indulging ignorant copyright lawyers," said Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director at the <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/topic/Centre%20for%20Internet">Centre for Internet</a> and Society. Prakash said that most of the sites on the list don't host copyrighted material themselves and a case can not be made against them.</p>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-december-31-2014-jayadevan-neha-alawadhi-december-31-2014-govt-blocks-over-60-websites'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-december-31-2014-jayadevan-neha-alawadhi-december-31-2014-govt-blocks-over-60-websites</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionSocial MediaInternet GovernanceCensorship2015-01-02T14:22:58ZNews ItemCentre blocks 32 websites for security reasons, restores some later
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-businessline-december-31-2015-s-ronendra-singh-
<b>The Centre on Wednesday asked Internet Service Providers (ISP) to block 32 websites citing national security concerns, especially from terror group ISIS.</b>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">The article by S. Ronendra Singh was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/features/smartbuy/tech-news/centre-blocks-32-websites-for-security-reasons-restores-some-later/article6742568.ece">published in the Hindu Businessline</a> on December 31, 2014. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.</p>
<hr />
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">The move created a flutter on social networking sites, as most of the Web sites, such as archive.org, vimeo.com, github.com, pastebin.com, codepad.org and paste2.org, were being used by global communities like application developers for free movies and books, coders and text sharing.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">By late evening, some sites were restored.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">Sources in the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology confirmed the development and told <i>BusinessLine</i>: “It was based on some national security issues, and we cannot compromise with our nation’s security….”</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">A senior official from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) said the directive had come from a Mumbai court after the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) had approached it to block some Web sites carrying anti-India content.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">The matter came to light after a circular, purportedly sent by DoT to ISPs, showed up on social networking sites, listing the sites, along with some screen shots. Incidentally, the said circular had edited out the letter head, date and the signature below. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s IT cell head, Arvind Gupta, tweeted saying ‘the Web sites that have been blocked were based on an advisory by the Anti-Terrorism Squad, and were carrying anti-India content from ISIS’.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">However, later in the evening, Gupta, in his tweet said, some of the Web sites such as vimeo.com have been restored because they have removed ‘objectionable content and/or cooperated with the on going investigations’.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">However, the blocked Web sites raised a furore in the social media wherein people said the Government should amend the laws than do such things.</p>
<p class="body" style="text-align: justify; ">“The problem isn’t just about the specific sites that are blocked; the problem is always about the bad law + process relating to #GoIBlocks,” Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director at Centre for Internet and Society tweeted. He said the 69A Rules (of the IT Act 2000) does not allow for transparency, accountability and time-limits on blocks, so it is easily misused by the Government, the courts and individuals.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-businessline-december-31-2015-s-ronendra-singh-'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-businessline-december-31-2015-s-ronendra-singh-</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionSocial MediaInternet GovernanceCensorship2015-01-02T14:13:03ZNews ItemInternet users fume as govt blocks 32 sites
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/mumbai-mirror-jaison-lewis-jan-1-2015-internet-users-fume-as-govt-blocks-32-sites
<b>The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) has ordered Internet service providers to block 32 websites, in cluding popular video-sharing plat forms such as Dailymotion and Vimeo, reportedly over concerns that they are being misused by Islamic State jihadists. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Jaison Lewis was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.mumbaimirror.com/mumbai/others/Internet-users-fume-as-govt-blocks-32-sites/articleshow/45713109.cms">published in Mumbai Mirror</a> on January 1, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The ban has angered free-speech proponents who allege that the Narendra Modi government is using national security as a pretext to censor online content. On Wednesday, tweets criticising the restrictions were trending on #GOIBlocks. Senior lawyer Karuna Nandy said that she would challenge the DoT order in the Supreme Court.<br /><br />Apart from Dailymotion and Vimeo, Internet service providers have also been ordered to block Github and Pastebin, which are popular among programmers; Weebly, a free website creator; and Archive.org, a non-profit digital library.<br /><br />Some Internet users, however, were able to access some of the sites. This could be because their Internet service providers have not yet implemented the DoT order or because the government has lifted restrictions on some web addresses, according to activists monitoring the blockage of the websites.<br /><br />The order was issued under Section 69A (procedure for blocking public access) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The section allows authorities to block websites without giving any formal reason or making any public announcement.<br /><br />However, Arvind Gupta, BJP's national head for information and technology, tweeted that the sites had been blocked over security concerns. "The Web sites have been blocked based on an advisory by Anti-Terrorism Squad, and were carrying Anti India content from ISIS.The sites that have removed objectionable content andor cooperated with the ongoing investigations, are being unblocked," he wrote.<br /><br />Gupta, however, did not explain how the sites were being misused by terrorists. Some of the sites are mostly frequented by programmers looking for open-source software and codes.<br /><br />Nandy, a Supreme Court lawyer who specialises in human rights litigations, criticised the ban. "I will challenge the order in the Su preme Court this week. I will seek directions to lift the secrecy surrounding such bans and also request for a right to appeal," she said.<br /><br />She added that censoring the Internet was against the idea of free expression guaranteed under the Constitution. "Such steps are not good for a healthy society," she said.<br /><br />Pranesh Prakash, a policy director with the Centre for Internet and Society and one of the most vocal opponents of the blockage, said that the people had the right to know why the websites had been blocked.<br /><br />"We still don't know why these blocks were issued: was it an overzealous copyright lawyer who found an indulgent judge to issue an overbroad and baseless order? Or was it a public servant who wrongly directed the Department of Electronics and IT to block the sites under the IT Act? We have no idea," said Prakash, who tweeted a picture of the DoT order on Wednesday.<br /><br />He added that websites were frequently blocked without clear evidence of wrongdoing. "These laws must be changed," Prakash said.<br /><br />Internet users also voiced their anger over the DoT order. "This only proves ATS is an idiot. If terrorists use buses, phones & Whatspp, you'll block whole system? #GOIBlocks," Poonam Sharma tweeted.<br /><br />Some users retweeted a Modi post from August 2012: "As a common man, I join the protest against crackdown on freedom of speech!"</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/mumbai-mirror-jaison-lewis-jan-1-2015-internet-users-fume-as-govt-blocks-32-sites'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/mumbai-mirror-jaison-lewis-jan-1-2015-internet-users-fume-as-govt-blocks-32-sites</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionSocial MediaInternet GovernanceCensorship2015-01-02T13:46:25ZNews ItemGovernment blocks 32 websites to check ISIS propaganda
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-jan-1-2015-kim-arora-government-blocks-32-websites-to-check-isis-propaganda
<b>The Centre has blocked 32 websites, including vimeo.com, dailymotion.com, pastebin.com and github.com, in an effort to curb ISIS propaganda, prompting a wave of online protests.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Kim Arora was <a class="external-link" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Government-blocks-32-websites-to-check-ISIS-propaganda/articleshow/45712815.cms">published in the Times of India</a> on January 1, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">An Indian "hacktivist" group, Anonymous India, has threatened reprisal. By Wednesday evening, however, websites that had complied with the government order to remove objectionable content had been unblocked, sources said.<br /><br />A confidential department of telecom order, dated December 17, instructing all internet service licensees to block the websites appeared online on Wednesday. When contacted to verify the news, Dr Gulshan Rai, director of the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), told TOI the directions had been issued to internet service providers following a Mumbai additional chief metropolitan magistrate's November order directing the government's Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY) to implement the same.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">He added that Mumbai's Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) had approached the judiciary after interrogating Arif Majeed, a 23-year-old ISIS recruit from Kalyan. More recently, Bengaluru professional Mehdi Biswas was arrested for allegedly spreading ISIS propaganda on Twitter. "These websites were being used to invite youths to join ISIS. We had contacted the websites sometime back and asked for the removal of the objectionable content. At that time, our communications were ignored. Some of them have now agreed to work with the government. The websites that have complied are being unblocked," Rai told TOI.<br /><br />The move met with opposition from the online community. While the tech community opposed the Github ban, others were upset about video-sharing websites like dailymotion.com and vimeo.com being taken down. "By blocking vimeo and dailymotion along with other websites, India is walking in the footsteps of Pakistan," tweeted @baawraman.<br /><br />The list of websites in the DoT document was heavy on large text-sharing and collaboration websites, like Github and Pastebin, popular with coders and software developers. Many objected to the blocking of entire websites instead of specific URLs hosting problematic content. However, Rai explained that individual URLs could not be blocked because of the "high mobility of content" on the websites. "It can just be removed and pasted elsewhere. There are no checks and balances," he said.<br /><br />Hacktivist group Anonymous India tweeted, "One fine morning, Indian government decided to block sites like Github. Now now, it is time to wake-up. Government of India, Expect Us," a tweet from their handle @opindia_revenge said.<br /><br />As questions began to be raised on social networks, BJP IT cell head Arvind Gupta tweeted, "The websites that have been blocked were based on an advisory by the Anti-Terrorism Squad, and were carrying anti-India content from ISIS. The sites that have removed objectionable content and/or cooperated with the ongoing investigations, are being unblocked."<br /><br />The sustainability of counter-measures like blanket blocking to contain threats is being questioned. Prasanth Sugathan, counsel at Software Freedom and Law Center, said such a move is short-sighted. "If you block one website, terrorists can always use another one. Or they will move to using encrypted channels, peer-to-peer communication or even telephones. One can't block everything. In my opinion, such a move only inconveniences the daily users and doesn't solve the long-term purpose," said Sugathan. The sentiment was echoed by common Twitter users as well.<br /><br />Prime Minister Narendra Modi's tweet from August 2012 condemning blanket blocking of websites was pulled out for recirculation. "As a common man, I join the protest against crackdown on freedom of speech! Have changed my DP. 'Sabko Sanmati De Bhagwan.' #GOIBlocks," Modi had tweeted on August 24, 2012.<br /><br />Pranesh Prakash, policy director at Bengaluru-based Center for Internet and Society, questioned the lack of transparency around the practice of blocking websites under the Indian law. "Qn for govt: Why does the law require secrecy of web blocking orders when it doesn't allow such secrecy for books, films? #GoIBlocks," he tweeted, adding, "The 69A Rules don't allow for transparency, accountability, time-limits on blocks, etc. So easily misused by govt. + courts + individuals." The websites were blocked under section 69 A of the IT Act, 2000 and the IT (Procedure and sdafeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) rules, 2009.<br /><br />Currently, the Supreme Court is in the middle of hearing a clutch of petitions challenging several IT Act provisions, including blocking and takedown of websites.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-jan-1-2015-kim-arora-government-blocks-32-websites-to-check-isis-propaganda'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-jan-1-2015-kim-arora-government-blocks-32-websites-to-check-isis-propaganda</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceChilling EffectCensorship2015-01-02T13:37:39ZNews ItemDepartment of Telecommunications Order u/s. 69A IT Act Blocking 32 URLS (2014-12-17, plaintext version)
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order.txt
<b></b>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order.txt'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order.txt</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshFreedom of Speech and ExpressionIT ActCensorship2014-12-31T15:21:21ZFileDepartment of Telecommunications Order u/s. 69A IT Act Blocking 32 URLS (2014-12-17, compressed version)
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order_compressed.pdf
<b>On December 17, 2014, the Dept. of Telecommunications blocked 32 URLs (as it was ordered to do so by the by Dept. of Electronics & IT — specifically the Designated Officer under section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and under the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009), those being:
01) https://justpaste.it/
02) http://hastebin.com
03) http://codepad.org
04) http://pastie.org
05) https://pasteeorg
06) http://paste2.org
07) http://slexy.org
08) http://paste4btc.com/
09) http://0bin.net
10) http://www.heypasteit.com
11) http://sourceforge.net/projects/phorkie
12) http://atnsoft.com/textpaster
13) https://archive.org
14) http://www.hpage.com
15) http://www.ipage.com/
16) http://www.webs.com/
17) http://www.weebly.com/
18) http://www.000webhost.com/
19) https://www.freehosting.com
20) https://vimeo.com/
21) http://www.dailymotion.com/
22) http://pastebin.com
23) https://gist.github.com
24) http://www.ipaste.eu
25) https://thesnippetapp.com
26) https://snipt.net
27) http://tny.ct (Tinypaste)
28) https://github.com (gist-it)
29) http://snipplr.com/
30) http://termbin.com
31) http://www.snippetsource.net
32) https://cryptbin.com</b>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order_compressed.pdf'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order_compressed.pdf</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshFreedom of Speech and ExpressionIT ActCensorship2014-12-31T14:48:24ZFileOverview of the Constitutional Challenges to the IT Act
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/overview-constitutional-challenges-on-itact
<b>There are currently ten cases before the Supreme Court challenging various provisions of the Information Technology Act, the rules made under that, and other laws, that are being heard jointly. Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan who's arguing Anoop M.K. v. Union of India has put together this chart that helps you track what's being challenged in each case.</b>
<br />
<br />
<br />
<table class="tg" style="undefined;table-layout: fixed; border=">
<tr>
<th class="tg-s6z2">PENDING MATTERS</th>
<th class="tg-s6z2">CASE NUMBER</th>
<th class="tg-0ord">PROVISIONS CHALLENGED</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-4eph">Shreya Singhal v. Union of India</td>
<td class="tg-spn1">W.P.(CRL.) NO. 167/2012</td>
<td class="tg-zapm">66A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-031e">Common Cause & Anr. v. Union of India</td>
<td class="tg-s6z2">W.P.(C) NO. 21/2013</td>
<td class="tg-0ord">66A, 69A & 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-4eph">Rajeev Chandrasekhar v. Union of India & Anr.</td>
<td class="tg-spn1">W.P.(C) NO. 23/2013</td>
<td class="tg-zapm">66A & Rules 3(2), 3(3), 3(4) & 3(7) of the Intermediaries Rules 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-031e">Dilip Kumar Tulsidas Shah v. Union of India & Anr.</td>
<td class="tg-s6z2">W.P.(C) NO. 97/2013</td>
<td class="tg-0ord">66A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-4eph">Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Ors.</td>
<td class="tg-spn1">W.P.(CRL.) NO. 199/2013</td>
<td class="tg-zapm">66A, 69A, Intermediaries Rules 2011 (s.79(2) Rules) & Blocking of Access of Information by Public Rules 2009 (s.69A Rules)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-031e">Mouthshut.Com (India) Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.</td>
<td class="tg-s6z2">W.P.(C) NO. 217/2013</td>
<td class="tg-0ord">66A & Intermediaries Rules 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-4eph">Taslima Nasrin v. State of U.P & Ors.</td>
<td class="tg-spn1">W.P.(CRL.) NO. 222/2013</td>
<td class="tg-zapm">66A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-031e">Manoj Oswal v. Union of India & Anr.</td>
<td class="tg-s6z2">W.P.(CRL.) NO. 225/2013</td>
<td class="tg-0ord">66A & 499/500 Indian Penal Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-4eph">Internet and Mobile Ass'n of India & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr.</td>
<td class="tg-spn1">W.P.(C) NO. 758/2014</td>
<td class="tg-zapm">79(3) & Intermediaries Rules 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td class="tg-031e">Anoop M.K. v. Union of India & Ors.</td>
<td class="tg-s6z2">W.P.(CRL.) NO. 196/2014</td>
<td class="tg-0ord">66A, 69A, 80 & S.118(d) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011</td>
</tr>
</table>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/overview-constitutional-challenges-on-itact'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/overview-constitutional-challenges-on-itact</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshIT ActCourt CaseFreedom of Speech and ExpressionIntermediary LiabilityConstitutional LawCensorshipSection 66AArticle 19(1)(a)Blocking2014-12-19T09:01:50ZBlog EntryIs India’s website-blocking law constitutional? – I. Law & procedure
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/is-india2019s-website-blocking-law-constitutional-2013-i-law-procedure
<b>Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, along with its corresponding Rules, set out the procedure for blocking of websites in India. Over two posts, Geetha Hariharan examines the constitutional validity of Section 69A and the Blocking Rules. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Introduction</span>:</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Information Technology Act, 2000 (“<strong>IT Act</strong>”) is no stranger to litigation or controversy. Since its enactment in 2000, the IT Act has come under stringent criticism, both for the alleged Constitutional infirmities of its provisions and Rules, as well as for the way it is implemented. In recent years, Sections 66A (re: criminal liability for offensive, annoying or inconveniencing online communications), 67A (re: obscene 69A (re: website-blocking) and 79 (re: intermediary liability) have all come under attack for these reasons.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Today, these Sections and several others have been challenged before the Supreme Court. A total of ten cases, challenging various Sections of the IT Act, are being heard together by the Supreme Court. This is a welcome occasion, for the IT Act desperately needs judicial review. Nikhil Pahwa over at Medianama provides an </span><a href="http://www.medianama.com/2014/12/223-if-a-law-requires-a-person-to-be-careful-it-is-not-violative-of-free-speech-notes-from-the-supreme-court/">update and the list of cases</a><span>.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Among the challenged provisions are Section 66A, Section 79 and Section 69A. Section 66A was and continues to be used wantonly by the State and police. A student was <a href="http://m.thehindu.com/news/national/andhra-pradesh/andhra-pradesh-law-student-arrested-for-facebook-comment-on-cyclone-hudhud/article6544417.ece/">recently arrested</a> for a Twitter comment regarding Cyclone Hudhud, while anti-Modi comments led to several arrests earlier in the year (see <a href="http://m.firstpost.com/politics/goa-facebook-user-faces-jail-term-for-anti-modi-comments-1538499.html">here</a>, <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/aap-activist-arrested-for-allegedly-forwarding-anti-modi-mms-in-karnataka/article1-1222788.aspx">here</a> and <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/modi-on-negative-faces-list-principal-6-others-booked/">here</a>). At CIS, we have previously subjected Section 66A to constitutional analyses. <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-section-66-a-of-the-it-act">Pranesh Prakash traced</a> the genealogy of the Section and <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/bal-thackeray-comment-arbitrary-arrest-295A-66A">its import</a> in targeting offensive, annoying and inconveniencing communications and spam, while <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/two-arguments-against-the-constitutionality-of-section-66a">Gautam Bhatia examined</a> the Section’s overbreadth and vagueness. The casual wording and potential for misuse of Section 79 and the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/constitutional-analysis-of-intermediaries-guidelines-rules">led Ujwala Uppaluri</a> to offer strong arguments regarding their violation of Part III of the Constitution.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Similar infirmities also handicap Section 69A and its Rules. This provision empowers the Central government and officers authorised by it to order the blocking of websites or webpages. Website-blocking is permissible for reasons enumerated in Section 69A, and in accordance with the process laid out in the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public (sic)) Rules, 2009 (“<strong>Blocking Rules</strong>”). In our view, Section 69A and the Blocking Rules are also unconstitutional, and liable to be declared as such by the Supreme Court. We provide our analysis in this post and the next.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Section 69A, IT Act</span><span>:</span></h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 69A and the Blocking Rules provide for website-blocking in accordance with enumerated reasons and process. The Section reads as follows:</p>
<blockquote class="quoted" style="text-align: justify; "><strong>69A.</strong> <i>Power to issue directions for blocking for public access of any information through any computer resource.- </i></blockquote>
<blockquote class="quoted" style="text-align: justify; "><i> </i><span>(1) Where the Central Government or any of its officer specially authorized by it in this behalf is satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, it may subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource. </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="quoted" style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span><span>(2) The procedure and safeguards subject to which such blocking for access by the public may be carried out shall be such as may be prescribed. </span></blockquote>
<blockquote class="quoted" style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span><span>(3) The intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and also be liable to fine.</span></blockquote>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As you will notice, the Central government may block any information that is “<i>generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted</i>” in any computer. This will extend, clearly, to any webpage available and/or hosted in India. The Government can order website-blocks if it is satisfied of the necessity or expedience for this on the basis of (any of) six reasons. These reasons are:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Sovereignty and integrity of India,</li>
<li>Defense of India,</li>
<li>Security of the State,</li>
<li>Friendly relations with foreign states,</li>
<li>Public order,</li>
<li>Preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>If the Central government is convinced it has a valid reason, then it must follow the blocking procedure set out in the </span><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/information-technology-procedure-and-safeguards-for-blocking-for-access-of-information-by-public-rules-2009">Blocking Rules</a><span>, which were notified on 27 October 2009. Before entering into an analysis of the Blocking Rules, let us understand the blocking procedure.</span></p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Blocking Procedure</span><span>:</span></h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I will explain the blocking procedure in 4 steps: (1) Relevant designations and committees; (2) Procedure to make and examine a blocking request, and issue blocking direction; (3) Blocking in special circumstances; and (4) Review of blocking directions.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>(1) Relevant designations and committees:</span></h3>
<p><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Designated Officer (“<strong>DO</strong>”)</span></strong>: The Central government notifies an officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary as the Designated Officer, who will issue the blocking direction ot the relevant intermediary or agency [Rule 3]. By a <a href="http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/Gazette1_20082010(1).pdf">notification dated 20 January 2010</a>, the DO is the Group Coordinator, Cyberlaw Division, Department of Information Technology (DIT). Unfortunately, I was unable to locate the Group Coordinator, Cyberlaw Division <a href="http://deity.gov.in/content/people-and-offices">on the website</a> of the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY, the name to which DIT was renamed in 2012). I am also unable to find a notification updating the designation of the DO. Presumably, Dr. Gulshan Rai, Director General (Cyberlaws & E-security), DeitY, continues to be the DO.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Nodal Officer (“<strong><strong>NO</strong></strong>”)</span></strong></span>: Every organization designates one of its officers as a Nodal Officer, who will receive blocking requests and forward them to the DO [Rule 4]. ‘Organisation’ is defined in Rule 2(g) as Ministries or Departments of the Government of India, State governments and Union Territories, and any Agency of the Central government notified in the Official Gazette. I am unable to find <a href="http://deity.gov.in/content/notifications">on the DeitY website</a> a notification explaining which government Agencies are ‘organisations’ under Rule 2(g).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Intermediary Contact</span></strong></span>: Every intermediary also designates one person to receive and handle blocking directions from the DO [Rule 13].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Committee for Examination of Request (“<strong><strong>CER</strong></strong>”)</span></strong></span>: The 5-membered CER comprises the DO as Chairman, along with officers not below the rank of Joint Secretary from the Ministries of Law & Justice, Home Affairs, Information & Broadcasting and <a href="http://deity.gov.in/content/indian-computer-emergency-response-team-cert-dpl-rtoi">CERT-In</a> [Rule 7]. The CER examines each blocking request, before issuing recommendations to the DO to block or not to block. Regrettably, I am unable to identify the current membership of the CER, as no document is available that gives this information. However, the CER’s composition in 2010 <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/dit-response-2nd-rti-blocking">may be gleaned</a> (see Annexure III).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">Review Committee (“<strong><strong>RC</strong></strong>”)</span></strong></span>: Rule 2(i) defines the RC as the body set up under Rule 419A, Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. <a href="http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/358%20GI-2014%20dated%208.2.2014_6.pdf">As per Rule 419A(16)</a>, the Central RC is constituted by the Cabinet Secretary, Secretary to the Government of India (Legal Affairs) and Secretary (Department of Telecom).</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong>(2) </strong><strong>Blocking procedure</strong><span>:</span></span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Blocking Rules stipulate that the entire blocking procedure, from examining a blocking request to issuing a blocking direction, must be carried out within 7 days from the date on which the DO receives the blocking request from the NO [Rule 11].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">(a) Making a blocking request</span></strong>: Any person may send a request for a website-block to an NO of any ‘organisation’ (“<strong>outside request</strong>”). Alternatively, the NO may himself raise a blocking request. The organization has to examine each outside request and be satisfied that it meets the requirements of Section 69A(1), IT Act. Once it is satisfied, the NO forwards the blocking request to the DO. Outside requests must be approved by the Chief Secretary of the State or Union Territory, before they are sent to the DO. [See Rule 6 for this procedure]</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">(b) Examining a blocking request</span></strong>: Once the DO receives a blocking request, he/she places it before the CER. The DO tries to identify the person/intermediary hosting the troubling information, and if identified, issues a notice seeking their representation before the CER. Foreign entities hosting the information are also informed over fax/email. The person/intermediary has 48 hours from the date of receiving the DO’s notice to make its representation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">After this, the CER will examine the blocking request. It will “consider whether the request is covered within the scope of Section 69A(1)”, and whether it is justifiable to block [Rule 8(4)].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">(c) Blocking direction</span></strong>: The DO then places the CER’s recommendation to block or not to block before the Secretary (DeitY) for his/her approval. If and once approval is granted, the DO directs the relevant Agency or intermediary to block the website/page.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong>(3) </strong><strong>Blocking in special circumstances</strong>:</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">(a) Emergencies [Rule 9]</span></strong>: In an emergency “when no delay is acceptable”, the DO passes over the blocking procedure described above. With written recommendations, the DO directly approaches the Secretary (DeitY) for approval of blocking request. If satisfied, the Secretary (DeitY) issues the blocking direction as an <i>interim measure</i>. Nevertheless, the DO is required to place the blocking request before the CER at the earliest opportunity (in any case, not later than 48 hours after blocking direction).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong><span style="text-decoration: underline;">(b) Court orders [Rule 10]</span></strong>: If a court has ordered a website-block, the DO follows a procedure similar to an Emergency situation. He/she submits the certified copy of order to the Secretary (DeitY), and then initiates action as ordered by the court.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span><strong>(4) </strong><strong>Review of blocking directions</strong>:</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The RC is to meet once in 2 months to evaluate whether blocking directions issued under the Blocking Rules are in compliance with Section 69A(1) [Rule 14]. No other review or appeal mechanism is provided under the Blocking Rules. Nor are aggrieved parties afforded any further opportunities to be heard. Also note that Rule 16 mandates that all requests and complaints received under the Blocking Rules are to the kept strictly confidential.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the next post, I will subject Section 69A and the Blocking Rules to a constitutional analysis.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Blocking procedure poster</span>:</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS has produced a poster explaining the blocking procedure (<a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/blocking-websites.pdf/at_download/file">download PDF</a>, 2.037MB).</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/is-india2019s-website-blocking-law-constitutional-2013-i-law-procedure'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/is-india2019s-website-blocking-law-constitutional-2013-i-law-procedure</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionIT ActBlocking2014-12-11T11:02:01ZBlog EntryE-Consultation on Cyber Security, Justice, and Governance Begins!
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hague-institute-for-global-justice-november-4-2014-e-consultation-on-cyber-security-justice-and-governance-begins
<b>Sunil Abraham facilitated the e-consultation on "Internet access, the freedom of expression online, and development in the Global South" at the event organized by the Hague Institute for Global Justice.</b>
<p>This was originally <a class="external-link" href="http://thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/index.php?page=News-News_Articles-Recent_News-E-Consultation_on_Cyber_Security,_Justice,_and_Governance_Begins!&pid=138&id=307">published on the website of the Hague Institute for Global Justice</a> on November 4, 2014.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On 3 November 2014, The Hague Institute launched its first e-consultation, which seeks to contribute to the work of the <a href="http://thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/index.php?page=Programs&pid=180&progid=3&thid=7" target="_blank">Commission on Global Security, Justice, and Governance</a>. This is the first of a series of e-consultations on topics relevant to the research and policy agenda of the Commission.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This consultation brings together over 75 international cyber security and cyber governance experts and seeks to build on the high-level <i>Expert Consultation on Cyber Security, Justice, and Governance </i>hosted by The Hague Institute, The Stimson Center and the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi on 18 October 2014 following the conclusion of the <a href="http://cyfy.org/event/cyfy-2014/" target="_blank">India Conference on Cyber Security and Cyber Governance</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The consultation was chaired by <a href="http://www.counciloncybersecurity.org/about-us/leadership/" target="_blank">Dr. Jane Holl Lute</a> – a Commissioner, and President and CEO of the Council on Cyber Security and Former U.S. Deputy-Secretary for Homeland Security. Speakers included former Deputy National Security Advisor of India, <a href="http://www.ewi.info/profile/latha-reddy" target="_blank">Ambassador Latha Reddy</a> and Executive Director of the Centre for Internet and Society, <a href="http://cis-india.org/publications-automated/cis/sunil" target="_blank">Mr. Sunil Abraham</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A summary of the expert discussion can be read <a href="http://thehagueinstituteforglobaljustice.org/cp/uploads/downloadsprojecten/Summary_Expert_Consultation_New_Delhi.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hague-institute-for-global-justice-november-4-2014-e-consultation-on-cyber-security-justice-and-governance-begins'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hague-institute-for-global-justice-november-4-2014-e-consultation-on-cyber-security-justice-and-governance-begins</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet Governance2014-12-04T23:36:27ZNews ItemGood Intentions, Recalcitrant Text - I: Why India’s Proposal at the ITU is Troubling for Internet Freedoms
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-going-awry-i-why-india2019s-proposal-at-the-itu-is-troubling-for-internet-freedoms
<b>The UN's International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is hosting its Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-14) this year in South Korea. At PP-14, India introduced a new draft resolution on ITU's Role in Realising Secure Information Society. The Draft Resolution has grave implications for human rights and Internet governance. Geetha Hariharan explores.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At the 2014 Plenipotentiary Conference (‘PP-14’ or ‘Plenipot’) of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), India has tabled <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-draft-resolution-itus-role-in-securing-information-security/at_download/file">a draft proposal</a> on “ITU’s Role in Realising Secure Information Society” [Document 98, dated 20 October 2014] (“<strong>Draft Resolution</strong>”). India’s proposal has incited a great deal of concern and discussion among Plenipot attendees, governments and civil society alike. Before offering my concerns and comments on the Draft Resolution, let us understand the proposal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Our Draft Resolution identifies 3 security concerns with exchange of information and resource allocation on the Internet:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li><i>First</i>, it is troubling for India that present network architecture has “<i>security weaknesses</i>” such as “<i>camouflaging the identity of the originator of the communication</i>”;<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> random IP address distribution also makes “<i>tracing of communication difficult</i>”;<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a></li>
<li><i>Second</i>, India is concerned that under the present allocation system of naming, numbering and addressing resources on the Internet, it is impossible or at the very least, cumbersome to identify the countries to which IP address are allocated;<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> </li>
<li><i>Third</i>, India finds it insecure from the point of view of national security that traffic originating and terminating in the same country (domestic traffic) often routes through networks overseas;<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> similarly, local address resolution also routes through IP addresses outside the country or region, which India finds troubling.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In an effort to address these concerns, the Draft Resolution seeks to instruct the ITU Secretary General:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li><i>First</i>,<i> </i>to develop and recommend a ‘traffic routing plan’ that can “<i>effectively ensure the traceability of communication</i>”;<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></li>
<li><i>Second</i>, to collaborate with relevant international and intergovernmental organisations to develop an<i> </i>“<i>IP address plan</i>”<i> </i>which facilitates identification of locations/countries to which IP addresses are allocated and coordinates allocation accordingly;<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a></li>
<li><i>Third</i>, to develop and recommend “<i>a public telecom network architecture</i>” that localizes both routing<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> as well as address resolution<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a> for local/domestic traffic to “<i>within the country</i>”.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Admittedly, our Draft Resolution is intended to pave a way for “<i>systematic, fair and equitable allocation</i>” of, <i>inter alia</i>, naming, numbering and addressing resources,<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a> keeping in mind security and human rights concerns.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> In an informal conversation, members of the Indian delegation echoed these sentiments. Our resolution does not, I was told, raise issues about the “<i>concentration of control over Internet resources</i>”, though “<i>certain governments</i>” have historically exercised more control. It also does not, he clarified, wish to make privacy or human rights a matter for discussion at the ITU. All that the Draft Resolution seeks to do is to equip the ITU with the mandate to prepare and recommend a “<i>roadmap for the systematization</i>” of allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources, and for local routing of domestic traffic and address resolution. The framework for such mandate is that of security, given the ITU’s role in ‘building confidence and security in the use of ICTs’ under Action Line C5 of the <a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/poa.html">Geneva Plan of Action</a>, 2003.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Unfortunately, the text of our Draft Resolution, by dint of imprecision or lack of clarity, undermines India’s intentions. On three issues of utmost importance to the Internet, the Draft Resolution has unintended or unanticipated impacts. <strong><i>First</i></strong>, its text on tracing communication and identity of originators, and systematic allocation of identifiable IP address blocks to particular countries, has impacts on privacy and freedom of expression. Given Edward Snowden’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded">NSA files</a> and the absence of adequate protections against government incursions or excesses into privacy,<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a> either in international human rights law or domestic law, such text is troublesome. <strong><i>Second</i></strong>, it has the potential to undermine multi-stakeholder approaches to Internet governance by proposing text that refers almost exclusively to sovereign monopolies over Internet resource allocation, and <strong><i>finally</i></strong>, displays a certain disregard for network architecture and efficiency, and to principles of a free, open and unified Internet, when it seeks to develop global architecture that facilitates (domestic) localization of traffic-routing, address resolution and allocation of naming, numbering and addressing.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In this post, I will address the first concern of human rights implications of our Draft Resolution.<span> </span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Unintended Implications for Privacy and Freedom of Expression:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s Draft Resolution has implications for individual privacy. At two different parts of the preamble, India expresses concerns with the impossibility of locating the user at the end of an IP address:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Pream. §(e): “<i>recognizing</i>… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, <i>inter alia</i>, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”;</li>
<li>Pream. §(h): “<i>recognizing</i>… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The concerns here surround difficulties in tracking IP addresses due to the widespread use of NATs, as also the existence of IP anonymisers like Tor. Anonymisers like Tor permit individuals to cover their online tracks; they conceal user location and Internet activity from persons or governments conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis. For this reason, Tor has caused much discomfort to governments. <a href="http://www.wired.com/2014/10/laura-poitras-crypto-tools-made-snowden-film-possible/">Snowden used Tor</a> while communicating with Laura Poitras. Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning of Wikileaks fame is<i> </i><a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-dp-2011-10-wikileaks-final.pdf">reported</a> to have used Tor (page 24). Crypto is increasingly the safest – perhaps the only safe – avenue for political dissidents across the world; even Internet companies were <a href="http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-was-going-to-fine-yahoo-250k-a-day-if-it-didnt-1633677548">coerced</a> into governmental compliance. No wonder, then, that governments are doing all they can to dismantle IP anonymisers: the <a href="http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/10/nsa-repeatedly-tries-to-unpeel-tor-anonymity-and-spy-on-users-memos-show/">NSA</a> and <a href="http://www.itproportal.com/2013/10/04/nsa-and-gchq-repeatedly-tried-infiltrate-tor-documents-reveal/">GCHQ</a> have tried to break Tor; the Russian government has <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/putin-sets-110-000-bounty-for-cracking-tor-as-anonymous-internet-usage-in-russia-surges.html">offered a reward</a> to anyone who can.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Far be it from me to defend Tor blindly. There are reports <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption">suggesting</a> that Tor is being <a href="http://news.softpedia.com/news/Tor-Attracts-More-and-More-Cybercriminals-Experts-Warn-430659.shtml">used by offenders</a>, and not merely those of the Snowden variety. But governments must recognize the very obvious trust deficit they face, especially after <a href="http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/may/ep-LIBE-Inquiry-NSA-Surveillance.pdf">Snowden’s revelations</a>, and consider the implications of seeking traceability and identity/geolocation for every IP address, in a systematic manner. The implications are for privacy, a right guaranteed by Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Privacy has been <a href="http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/UNGA_upload_0.pdf">recognized</a> by the UN General Assembly as applicable in cases of surveillance, interception and data collection, in Pream. §4 of its resolution <i>The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age</i>. But many states do not have robust privacy protections for individuals and data. And while governments may state the necessity to create international policy to further effective criminal investigations, such an aim cannot be used to nullify or destroy the rights of privacy and free speech guaranteed to individuals. Article 5(1), ICCPR, codifies this principle, when it states that States, groups or persons may not “<i>engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein…</i>”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Erosion of privacy has a chilling effect on free speech [</span><i><a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/376/254">New York Times v. Sullivan</a></i><span>, 376 U.S. 254], so free speech suffers too. Particularly with regard to Tor and identification of IP address location and users, anonymity in Internet communications is at issue. At the moment, most states already have anonymity-restrictions, in the form of identification and registration for cybercafés, SIM cards and broadband connections. For instance, Rule 4 of India’s </span><a href="http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR315E_10511(1).pdf">Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011</a><span>, mandates that we cannot not use computers in a cybercafé without establishing our identities. But our ITU Draft Resolution seeks to </span><i>dismantle</i><span> the ability of Internet users to operate anonymously, be they political dissidents, criminals or those merely acting on their expectations of privacy. Such dismantling would be both violative of international human rights law, as well as dangerous for freedom of expression and privacy in principle. Anonymity is integral to democratic discourse, held the US Supreme Court in </span><i><a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/93-986.ZO.html">McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission</a></i><span> [514 U.S. 334 (1995)].</span><a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a><span> Restrictions on Internet anonymity facilitate communications surveillance and have a chilling effect on the free expression of opinions and ideas, </span><a href="http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.40_EN.pdf">wrote Mr. Frank La Rue</a><span>, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (¶¶ 48-49).</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So a law or international policy for blanket identification and traceability of IP addresses has grave consequences for and <i>prima facie </i>violates privacy, anonymity and freedom of speech. But these rights are not absolute, and can be validly restricted. And because these human rights are implicated, the ITU with its lack of expertise in the area may not be the adequate forum for discussion or study.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>To be valid and justified interference, any law, policy or order interfering with privacy and free speech must meet the standards of reasonableness and proportionality, even if national security were the government’s legitimate aim, laid down in Articles 19(3) and 17 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) [</span><i><a href="http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/vws488.htm">Toonen v. Australia</a></i><span>, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), ¶6.4]. And as the European Court of Human Rights found in </span><i><a href="http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-76586">Weber & Saravia v. Germany</a></i><span> [Application no. 54934/00, 29 June 2006 (ECHR), ¶95], law or executive procedure that </span><i>enables</i><span> surveillance without sufficient safeguards is </span><i>prima facie</i><span> unreasonable and disproportionate. Re: anonymity, in </span><i><a href="http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-126635">Delfi AS v. Estonia</a></i><span> [Application no. 64569/09, 17 February 2014, ¶83], while considering the liability of an Internet portal for offensive anonymous comments, the ECHR has emphasized the importance of balancing freedom of expression and privacy. It relied on certain principles such as “</span><i>contribution to a debate of general interest, subject of the report, the content, form and consequences of the publication</i><span>” to test the validity of government’s restrictions.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The implications of the suggested text of India’s Draft Resolution should then be carefully thought out. And this is a good thing. For one must wonder why governments need perfect traceability, geolocation and user identification for <i>all</i> IP addresses. Is such a demand really different from mass or blanket surveillance, in scale and government tracking ability? Would this not tilt the balance of power strongly in favour of governments against individuals (citizens or non-citizens)? This fear must especially arise in the absence of domestic legal protections, both in human rights, and criminal law and procedure. For instance, India’s Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in 2008) has Section 66A, which criminalizes offensive speech, as well as speech that causes annoyance or inconvenience. Arguably, arrests under Section 66A have been <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bangalore/Man-arrested-for-allegedly-sending-offensive-MMS-against-Modi-confirmed-innocent-by-police-released/articleshow/35624351.cms">arbitrary</a>, and traceability may give rise to a host of new worries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In any event, IP addresses and users can be discerned under existing domestic law frameworks. Regional Internet Registries (RIR) such as APNIC allocate blocks of IP addresses to either National Internet Registries (NIR – such as IRINN for India) or to ISPs directly. The ISPs then allocate IP addresses dynamically to users like you and me. Identifying information for these ISPs is maintained in the form of </span><a href="http://www.irinn.in/whoisSearchform.action">WHOIS records</a><span> and </span><a href="file://localhost/pub/stats/apnic">registries</a><span> with RIRs or NIRs, and this information is public. ISPs of most countries require identifying information from users before Internet connection is given, i.e., IP addresses allocated (mostly by dynamic allocation, for that is more efficient). ISPs of some states are also regulated; in India, for instance, ISPs require a </span><a href="http://www.dot.gov.in/licensing/data-services">licence</a><span> to operate and offer services.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If any government wished, on the basis of some reasonable cause, to identify a particular IP address or its user, then the government could first utilize WHOIS to obtain information about the ISP. Then ISPs may be ordered to release specific IP address locations and user information under executive or judicial order. There are also technical solutions, such as <a href="http://traceroute.monitis.com/">traceroute</a> or <a href="http://ip-lookup.net/">IP look-up</a> that assist in tracing or identifying IP addresses. Coders, governments and law enforcement must surely be aware of better technology than I.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If we take into account this possibility of geolocation of IP addresses, then the Draft Resolution’s motivation to ‘systematize’ IP address allocations on the basis of states is unclear. I will discuss the implication of this proposal, and that of traffic and address localization, in my next post.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Pream. §(e), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Pream. §(h), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Op. §1, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to collaborate with all stakeholders including International and intergovernmental organizations, involved in IP addresses management to develop an IP address plan from which IP addresses of different countries are easily discernible and coordinate to ensure distribution of IP addresses accordingly”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Pream. §(g), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that communication traffic originating and terminating in a country also many times flows outside the boundary of a country making such communication costly and to some extent insecure from national security point of view”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Pream. §(f), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that even for local address resolution at times, system has to use resources outside the country which makes such address resolution costly and to some extent insecure from national security perspective”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Op. §6, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend a routing plan of traffic for optimizing the network resources that could effectively ensure the traceability of communication”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Op. §1, Draft Resolution; <i>see</i> note 3.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Op. §5, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures that effectively the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country remains within the country”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Op. §4, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures effectively that address resolution for the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country/region takes place within the country”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶3: “Planning and distribution of numbering and naming resources in a systematic, equitable, fair and just manner amongst the Member States…”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶2: “…there are certain areas that require critical attention to move in the direction of building the necessary “Trust Framework” for the safe “Information Society”, where privacy, safety are ensured”.</p>
<p style="text-align: left; "><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> <i>See, for instance</i>, Report of the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), <i>Right to Privacy in the Digital Age</i>, A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014), ¶34-35, <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf">http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf</a>. <i>See esp. </i>note 30 of the Report, ¶35.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Many thorny political differences exist between the US and many states (including India and Kenya, who I am told has expressed preliminary support for the Draft Resolution) with regard to Internet governance. Irrespective of this, the US Constitution’s First Amendment and judicial protections to freedom of expression remain a yardstick for many states, including India. India, for instance, has positively referred to the US Supreme Court’s free speech protections in many of its decisions; <i>ex. see</i> Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 Cri. L.J. 329; R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-going-awry-i-why-india2019s-proposal-at-the-itu-is-troubling-for-internet-freedoms'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-going-awry-i-why-india2019s-proposal-at-the-itu-is-troubling-for-internet-freedoms</a>
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No publishergeethaCryptographyPrivacyCybersecurityInternet GovernanceFreedom of Speech and ExpressionChilling EffectMulti-stakeholderAnonymityITU2014-11-02T15:13:45ZBlog Entry