Centre for Internet and Society

Combinations and Competition: Why the draft DCB must account for digital mergers and acquisitions

Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri — 2024-08-08T07:47:01Z

Authored by Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri, reviewed by Nishant

“It is better to buy than to compete”

Mark Zuckerberg (Meta CEO, 2008)[1]

Mergers and Acquisitions (collectively, M&As or Combinations) have been a common practice in industry consolidation for many years now. In fact, as Zuckerberg’s infamous quote suggests, it might be one of the central pillars of today’s internet economy. The recently announced $1.5 billion merger between Reliance Industries and Disney, which, among other things, aims to combine their streaming services – Jio Platforms and Hotstar, respectively – is just another instance of this growing trend.[2] Data on market activity suggests that far from being an outlier, M&As are becoming commonplace in the Indian technology ecosystem as well - a trend likely to continue and increase unless market regulators intervene.

Built on direct and indirect network effects, digital markets are susceptible to concentration in the hands of a few dominant platforms. In addition to potentially anti-competitive practices that these platforms are likely to engage in such as deep discounting, they often use ‘strategic investments and partnerships’ with their competitors or other firms in their supply chains to further consolidate their position in the market. Examples include but are not limited to Facebook’s 2012 acquisition of Instagram for $1 billion, its 2014 acquisition of WhatsApp for $19 billion, or even its 2020 investment of $5.7 billion in Reliance Industries’ Jio – a partnership that positions itself at “bringing together JioMart, Jio’s small-business initiative, with WhatsApp”.[3][4][5][6] Through similar transactions, dominant players are in a position to foreclose competition and further entrench their position as market leaders.

In 2022, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on “Anti-Competitive Practices by BigTech Companies” also highlighted ‘killer acquisitions’ in India’s digital markets as one of the many concerning anti-competitive practices.[7] As per the Standing Committee, in the choice between ‘Build versus Buy’, “large platforms tend to pick the latter, thereby disallowing smaller firms to grow beyond a certain limit.” [8] However, the Committee on Digital Competition Law (CDCL), specifically formed to look into competition-related concerns in digital markets, chose to exclude this particular anti-competitive practice from the ambit of its proposed Digital Competition Bill (Draft DCB). Moreover, the CDCL explains this choice by pointing to the Competition [Amendment] Act, 2023, which theoretically allows the Competition Commission of India (CCI) to review more M&As.

But this justification is only partial.[9] While the 2023 Amendment tries to answer the question “Are the right digital M&As being regulated by CCI?”, it ignores the more pertinent “Are the right principles being deployed to review digital M&As?”.

In this context, the first section of this article provides an overview of conventional M&A regulation in India and underlines prominent trends in the process. This is followed by an inquiry into the evolution of digital combinations in India, and their treatment by CCI. We conclude the piece by recommending CCI incorporate more accurate and relevant theories of harm for digital mergers – a practice that competition authorities have incorporated in other jurisdictions such as the EU’s Digital Markets Act, the UK’s Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill and the 2022 guidelines released by Singapore’s Competition and Consumer Commission.[10]

Reviewing Combinations for Anti-competitiveness

M&As, including digital mergers, are governed through Sections 5 and 6 of the Competition Act, 2002 [Act] and the Combination Regulations, 2011. The Act lays out many key elements in this respect, including defining ‘Combinations’ - referred to a sub-group of M&As that qualify certain threshold values and are required to notify CCI about their existence.[11] In addition, the Act also empowers the CCI to evaluate and adjudicate on these combinations.[12]

Typically, a qualified combination – including a merger, an acquisition, or an investment that meets the threshold criteria – must notify the CCI of the relevant transaction.[13] Following this notification, as per the rules, the Commission conducts a thorough review of the anti-competitive effects of the proposed combinations. Once complete, the CCI is empowered to either approve or reject the transaction. Overall, the CCI primarily assesses the combination based on its effect on the competition structure of the relevant market. In cases where the CCI is satisfied that such adverse effects can be eliminated by suitable modification, it may approve the combination with modifications. Conversely, the Commission might also pursue an investigation against a combination that has failed to notify it of the relevant transaction.

It is important to note that not every M&A requires notification and approval from the Commission and depends on whether that particular transaction qualifies the threshold values set under Section 5 of the Act.[14] With massive digitisation underway across all sectors of the Indian economy, concerns about how these threshold values affect scrutiny of digital mergers – which usually didn’t qualify – have drawn focus in recent years.[15] Deals such as Facebook’s 2014 acquisition of WhatsApp, which evaded the regulator’s scrutiny since it failed to meet the qualifying thresholds, have also uncovered the need for newer ‘theories of harm’ that can be used to govern such combinations adequately [more on this later].[16]

Digital M&As and Limitations of the Status Quo

According to data released by CCI in its annual reports, the Commission reviewed 99 combination notices in 2022-23, an increase from 90 during the previous year.[17] Out of these 99, the Commission approved 92 such combinations in 2022-23, up from 89 in 2021-22.[18] However, it is pertinent to note that none of these combination notices were rejected by the Commission. In fact, CCI has not rejected any of the 400+ combination notices filed with it in the last five years.[19]

Furthermore, research undertaken by Deloitte suggests that there were more than 160 mergers or acquisitions in India in 2022-23.[20] This disparity between CCI’s figures and market estimates can largely be attributed to the threshold requirements under the 2002 Act. Taking into account that over 36% of these 160+ M&A deals are estimated to be in the ‘Technology, Media and Telecommunications’ industry, it is reasonable to assume that ‘asset-light’ digital combinations continue to escape the Commission’s scrutiny.[21] This is a risk because despite failing to meet the threshold values set under the 2002 Act, many deals are still significant in their scale. For example, Reliance Industries group, which also owns the telecom giant Jio, single-handedly accounted for eight (8) digital acquisitions in 2019.[22]

The Commission’s high approval rate, coupled with its inability to appropriately scrutinise such digital M&As, led to the government seeking modifications to India’s competition law.[23] In 2023, following the recommendations of the 2019 Competition Law Review Committee, the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 [or ‘the 2023 Amendment’] was passed.[24] Among other changes, the 2023 Amendment included “value of transaction” as one of the threshold measures for triggering the notifying clause.[25] This meant that even if a merger did not satisfy the ‘asset’ or ‘turnover’ threshold values, it could still be deemed a combination if the value of the transaction exceeded ₹2000 cr.[26] However, the impact of the 2023 Amendment on CCI’s future rulings is yet to be seen.

Thereafter in 2023, the Government of India constituted the CDCL “to examine the need for a separate law on competition in digital markets”, including a framework similar to the EU’s Digital Markets Act.[27][28] However, unlike the US, the EU, the UK, or Singapore – jurisdictions that the CDCL referred to during its deliberations – it explicitly excluded ‘mergers and acquisitions’ from the draft bill’s scope, instead relying solely on the 2023 Amendment.[29] But the intended objectives of the 2023 Amendment and the proposed DCB are entirely different. While deal value thresholds aim to address the ‘threshold value’ problem to include more deals under merger review, they provide no guidance that can help adapt the merger review process to the context of digital markets.

Adopting Accurate and Relevant Theories of Harm

Established theories of harm lie at the core of any merger review process, with the competition regulator relying on them to assess potential damage to competition. Traditionally, if merging parties are neither competitors (horizontal) nor trading relationships (vertical), their combinations are usually not subject to strict enforcement under the conventional merger review regime.[30][31] As a result, traditional theories of harm focus on the risk that the post-merger firm will ‘bundle’ or ‘tie’ the pre-merger firms’ products together. In contrast, many inherent characteristics of digital markets – such as network effects and low marginal costs – have been found to exacerbate the gaps in these outdated theories of harm.[32][33] While network effects allow first movers to access a positive feedback loop and become dominant in digital markets, they also incentivise mergers between competitors because an increase in the network of users is likely to generate further returns.[34]

Take the case of ‘platform envelopment’, for example, where a platform dominant in one market i.e., ‘the origin market’, enters another platform market i.e., ‘the target market’ – through a merger or an acquisition – and bundles its original functionality with that of its newly acquired platform in the target market.[35] As a prominent example of this theory, Google entered mobile operating systems by bundling Android with Google Search – two separate markets – to leverage the data generated by users of both. Such data was effectively monetized through Google’s online advertising platforms, thereby enabling the firm to fund its entry in a way that could not be replicated by other competitors and contributed to its eventual dominance of the mobile operating system market.[36] However, recognising envelopment and using other such theories of harm requires an understanding of platform characteristics, the impact of direct and indirect network effects, and the role of data in enabling platform monopolisation – all of which the draft DCB seeks to do.[37]

As highlighted earlier, many other jurisdictions have also updated or are in the process of updating their merger guidelines to incorporate these newer theories of harm. For instance, the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) amended its merger guidelines in 2019 to address the competitive concerns of conglomerate mergers, especially in digital markets. This allows the JFTC to consider factors such as network effects, the value of data, and the importance of marginal costs while reviewing digital combinations.[38]

With M&A activity in India’s digital sector also bound to witness an upward trend, we reiterate that merger review for digital markets should account for many of these characteristics that are likely to amplify the shortcomings of traditional theories of harm. This requires the CDCL to modify the draft DCB accordingly or, at the very least, for the CCI to publish detailed guidelines on reviewing digital M&As, accounting for more evolved theories of harm.

[1]FTC v. Facebook, Inc, FTC Amended Complaint, 2021, p. 1, available here

[2]Reliance and Disney team up to crush Netflix and Prime Video in India, Rest of World, March 2024, available here

[3]The Inside Story of How Facebook Acquired Instagram, OneZero, August 2020, available here

[4]India seeks to tighten rules on M&A antitrust scrutiny, Reuters, 2022, available here

[5]CCI approves acquisition of approximately 9.99% of Jio Platforms by Facebook, AZB and Partners, 2020, available here

[6]Facebook Invests $5.7 Billion in Indian Internet Giant Jio, The New York Times, April 2020, available here

[7]Parliamentary Standing Committee on Anti-Competitive Practices by BigTech Companies, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, p. 8, available here

[8]Parliamentary Standing Committee on Anti-Competitive Practices by BigTech Companies, Ministry of Corporate Affairs, p. 8, available here

[9]Comments to the Draft Digital Competition Bill, 2024, Nayyar, A., Suri, I., and Bedi, P., Centre for Internet and Society, May 2024, p. 20-22, available here

[10]Singapore: Competition law fact sheet, Norton Rose Fulbright, April 2024, available here

[11]The Competition Act, 2002, Government of India, p. 8, available here

[12]The Competition Act, 2002, Government of India, p. 12, available here

[13]Combination FAQs, Competition Commission of India, available here

[14]The Competition Act, 2002, Government of India, p. 8, available here

[15]Big Data Mergers: Bridging the Gap for an Effective Merger Control Framework, Tyagi, K., May 2021, p. 34, available here

[16]India seeks to tighten rules on M&A antitrust scrutiny, Reuters, 2022, available here

[17]Annual Reports, Competition Commission of India, available here

[18]Annual Reports, Competition Commission of India, available here

[19]Annual Reports, Competition Commission of India, available here

[20]India’s M&A Trends 2023, Deloitte, 2023, available here

[21]India’s M&A Trends 2023, Deloitte, 2023, available here

[22]2019 In Review: Top 10 High-Profile Startup Acquisitions In India, Inc42, 2019, available here

[23]India seeks to tighten rules on M&A antitrust scrutiny, Reuters, 2022, available here

[24]The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, Government of India, available here

[25]The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, Government of India, available here

[26]The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023, Government of India, available here

[27]Unstarred question No. 81, Government of India, Lok Sabha, December 2023, available here

[28]The Digital Markets Act Proposal of the European Commission: Ex-ante Regulation, Infused with Competition Principles, European Papers, 2021, available here

[29]Report of the Committee on Digital Competition Law, Government of India, 2024, p. 151 onwards, available here

[30]A note on conglomerate mergers: The Google/Fitbit case, Nakagawa, K. and Matsushima, N., Japan and the World Economy, Volume 67, 2023, 101203, ISSN 0922-1425, available here

[31]Executive Summary of the Roundtable on Conglomerate effects of mergers, OECD, June 2020, available here

[32]Executive Summary of the Roundtable on Conglomerate effects of mergers, OECD, June 2020, available here

[33]Tying and bundling in the digital era, Holzweber, S., European Competition Journal, October 2018, available here

[34]Horizontal mergers, cost savings, and network effects, Cosnita-Langlias, A. and Rasch, A., Bulletin of Economic Research, April 2018, available here

[35]Harnessing Platform Envelopment in the Digital World, Condorelli, Daniele; Padilla, Jorge, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 00(00), 1-45, 2020, available here

[36] Harnessing Platform Envelopment in the Digital World, Condorelli, Daniele; Padilla, Jorge, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 00(00), 1-45, 2020, available here

[37]Summary of Discussion of the roundtable on Conglomerate Effects of Mergers, OECD, Feb 2021, available here

[38]Conglomerate effects of mergers – Note by Japan, OECD, May 2020, available here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/combinations-and-competion

Karnataka’s uniform fare policy—Do attempts at parity consider the impact on workers?

Chiara Furtado and Nishkala Sekhar — 2024-07-08T03:53:37Z

Chiara Furtado and Nishkala Sekhar write in The News Minute about the Karnataka transport department’s February 2024 fare policy aiming for parity between aggregator (app-based) and other taxis. While policy interventions towards parity is a welcome step, the article highlights how inequalities and systemic barriers to parity remain for workers.

Calling for a worker justice lens to policy imaginations of parity

The Karnataka transport department’s February 2024 policy on uniform fares for aggregator (app-based) taxis and all other taxis is an encouraging step towards addressing disparities created by market-dominant platforms such as Ola Cabs and Uber. In a first, the policy attempts to bring parity between the app-based and offline taxi sectors by setting the same base and per kilometre fares for both categories. It also looks at a novel aspect of regulating app-based platforms through the prohibition of surge pricing.

This article views the policy against workers’ experiences with platforms’ management and income distribution practices. Policies such as these may well be one of many attempts to draw parity between aggregator platforms and other offline taxi firms. Yet, we find that workers have barely featured in these conversations of transport policy, whether on parity or otherwise.

The fare policy has been welcomed by some workers’ organisations as fulfilling a key demand for uniformity. However, it still remains silent on actual systemic issues and impacts for workers on platforms. This is a pressing issue in light of how workers face the worst impacts of platform practices that extract value and create disparities. CIS’ surveys showed that workers worked over 84 hours a week whilst only earning a median of Rs 5,000. For over half of them, these earnings were not sufficient to cover even basic household expenses. Further reflecting their vulnerability, 28% of workers had access to workplace accident insurance, and an even lower 6% had access to health insurance, while 57% depended on the government for benefits like food rations.

Operational and algorithmic accountability within a policy agenda on labour and data rights are inextricably linked to curbing disparities driven by dominant aggregator platforms. There is a need therefore to ensure that uniform fare policies are not limited only to customers, but also consider potential impacts on workers.

Contributors

Authors: Chiara Furtado and Nishkala Sekhar

Research data: Centre for Internet and Society

Reviewers: Aayush Rathi and Chetna V. M.

Editors: The News Minute

Images: The News Minute

Publisher: The News Minute

Click to read the full essay

The views and opinions expressed on this page are those of their individual authors. Unless the opposite is explicitly stated, or unless the opposite may be reasonably inferred, CIS does not subscribe to these views and opinions which belong to their individual authors. CIS does not accept any responsibility, legal or otherwise, for the views and opinions of these individual authors. For an official statement from CIS on a particular issue, please contact us directly.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/karnataka2019s-uniform-fare-policy2014do-attempts-at-parity-consider-the-impact-on-workers

‘Future of work’ or 21st–century oppressed labour?: Findings from an AIGWU survey with 50 Urban Company housekeeping workers in Bengaluru

Nihira Ram — 2024-05-16T15:29:58Z

n this essay, Nihira Ram shares findings from a survey done by the All India Gig Workers Union with more than 50 migrant workers living in a slum in Bengaluru. The workers primarily provided cleaning and domestic services on the platform, Urban Company (previously UrbanClap).

Nihira highlights the impact that diluted rights and rising exploitation have had on the workers. The workers’ experiences show how they faced mounting costs merely to access work on the platform. Once they joined, the workers faced oppressive working conditions and stringent control by the platform, where rules and processes are designed in favour of the platform, at the expense of its workers. Not only were the workers from highly marginalised backgrounds and more vulnerable to this exploitation, a paucity of alternative jobs and their tenuous position as migrants meant that they were trapped by the platform’s unfair practices for years.

When workers join Urban Company as housekeeping services ‘partners’, they first pay INR 16,000 as ‘joining fees’. After undergoing an uncompensated training programme, which costs them INR 1,000, workers are rebranded as ‘professionals’ who are now eligible to provide the services for which they have been trained.

However, the provision of services comes at a huge cost to the workers. They have to pay INR 6,000 per month in order to receive a number of guaranteed jobs as part of the Minimum Guarantee plan (MG Plan) – or, as the workers refer to them – leads. Urban Company terms this a ‘subscription’.

In essence, Urban Company does not qualify people from whom they generate profit as workers. They consider them ‘professionals’ who are ‘subscribing’ to the platform in order to ‘market’ their ‘services’ to earn an income. Workers are cunningly portrayed as another set of ‘customers’ who buy guaranteed jobs from the platform on a monthly basis, essentially having to ‘pay to work’.

Apart from this monthly subscription, workers are made to pay GST on each job. They are required to purchase company-branded uniforms and bags costing around INR 2,000. Further, they must also buy all cleaning supplies relevant to their work from Urban Company at higher costs than those sold elsewhere (INR 10,000 per month or above). This is despite the fact that workers find these supplies to be of poor quality and thus hazardous to their safety.

The framing of Urban Company ‘partners’ as non-workers is inaccurate for a number of reasons. A majority of the housekeeping workers with whom we spoke were not previously employed in the services sector. Urban Company targeted their slum as part of its recruitment drives in 2018. Knowing that their cleaning and housekeeping services vertical faced a deficit of labour supply despite a perceived spike in demand in Bengaluru, Urban Company aggressively onboarded men from this slum to undergo their training programme and join the company as cleaning and housekeeping ‘professionals’. How, then, is Urban Company merely a platform from which pre-existing workers gain business, and not an employer hiring labour with particular skills for its supply chain?

Click to download the full essay

Contributors

Author: Nihira Ram
Images: All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU)
Design: Annushka Jaliwala
Copy edit: The Clean Copy

About the All India Gig Workers’ Union

The All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU) is a registered trade union for all food delivery, logistics, and service workers that work on any app-based platforms in India.

Contact: contactaigwu@gmail.com

Connect: Twitter; Facebook

The views and opinions expressed on this page are those of their individual authors. Unless the opposite is explicitly stated, or unless the opposite may be reasonably inferred, CIS does not subscribe to these views and opinions which belong to their individual authors. CIS does not accept any responsibility, legal or otherwise, for the views and opinions of these individual authors. For an official statement from CIS on a particular issue, please contact us directly.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/future-of-work-21st-century-oppressed-labour-findings-from-aigwu-survey-with-50-urban-company-housekeeping-workers-in-bengaluru

That Is Not A Livelihood – That Is Helplessness”: Field notes from the Fraazo Delivery Workers Strike in Noida, Greater Noida, and Ghaziabad

Rikta Krishnaswamy — 2024-04-24T02:05:03Z

In this essay, Rikta Krishnaswamy of the All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU) narrates her experiences of organising and supporting delivery workers’ collective action against Fraazo (a now-defunct platform for produce and grocery delivery). Her essay sheds light on the challenges workers face in organising for better conditions of work. She describes how platforms hide behind legal smokescreens and threats of police action to shirk their responsibility as employers. To make matters worse, obscure employment terms and work management systems make it harder for workers to seek redress from the government through labour dispute resolution processes. The essay is illustrative of how digital platforms have exploited and violated freedoms of the gig workers they employ, while facing no accountability. For this to change, gig workers have to be guaranteed employment rights along with collective rights to their data.

We have observed that over time, Indian gig workers across platforms almost certainly face a decrease in overall wages, an increase in working hours, and ever-worsening working conditions. The rhetoric of ‘large-scale employment’ is a false one, as corporates do not consider the gig workers as employees and the workers do not come under the aegis of the country’s labour laws. But the gig workers on these platforms don’t share the corporate and government view at all.

Unlike the capital city of Delhi, the suburbs of Noida, Greater Noida, and Ghaziabad have fewer opportunities even for gig work. Delivery workers across platforms regularly face theft and petty crimes, especially during late-night deliveries. Housing societies prevent them from taking their bikes to customers’ apartments and, in some cases, deny them access to building lifts to carry out deliveries. Despite its dehumanising nature, gig work provides some means of survival in this epoch of rampant unemployment.

On 30 May 2022, striking delivery workers in Noida, Greater Noida, and Ghaziabad—all of whom work for an app-based, fresh produce and grocery delivery platform called Fraazo —approached the All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU). Many of these delivery workers, who are usually referred to as ‘partners’, had lost jobs at banks, data or telecom companies, and call centres during the pandemic, and had joined Fraazo after it started operations in December 2021. They were initially paid a daily wage, called a minimum guarantee (MG) payout, of INR 500 for a 10-hour work shift during which they delivered vegetables, fruits, and groceries to residences near them. Alongwith the MG payout that was disbursed weekly into their accounts, they were also given a petrol surcharge of four rupees for every kilometre they travelled.

The workers told us that on 28 May 2022, the Fraazo head office in Mumbai decided to replace their daily MG payout with a piece-rate payout of INR 45 per delivery. At a time of sky-rocketing fuel prices and inflation, the company decided to remove the petrol surcharge for delivery distances of less than five kilometres (which constitute a bulk of the orders that these delivery workers service). The delivery workers were apprised of these changes the next day by the Fraazo Store Managers, with a promise that the new piece-rate system would bring in more earnings.

The delivery workers rejected this new system outright and demanded that Fraazo restore the earlier payout system with an assurance that in the future, Fraazo will take the consent of the workers before introducing any drastic changes to their service conditions. In addition, they demanded that all delivery riders be provided with accident insurance and paid leaves.

The workers did not view themselves as merely freelance delivery partners. When the store’s operations had just begun, the company faced a lot of challenges in ensuring consistent service. Some delivery partners would help with unloading and sorting produce at the store during or after their work shifts. Even after operations stabilised, many worked overtime (with no pay) at the behest of the store managers to ensure that deliveries were completed to the customer’s satisfaction. A significant portion of deliveries involved carrying 10 kilos of produce to customers’ homes. Delivery workers were entrusted to escalate and resolve complaints as well. Fraazo’s customers complained that the store managers were lackadaisical when it came to providing appropriate support and often called the delivery workers directly to get items replaced.

Anywhere between 25–40 workers were tied to a store, according to the size of the operations, and helped Fraazo set up and smoothly run its services across its various stores in Noida, Greater Noida, and Ghaziabad in the first half of 2022. They usually worked through the week, had no paid sick leaves, and were allowed to take just one unpaid day off during a work week (they often incurred penalties if they took more than one leave). While there were problems with their previous time-wage system, they were dead against the new system of a piece-rate payout. The latter meant that their employer could potentially hire hundreds of workers for a store with no minimum guarantee pay, thereby annihilating the earnings of all the workers.

Click to download the full essay

Contributors

Author: Rikta Krishnaswamy

Images: All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU)

Design: Annushka Jaliwala

Copy edit: The Clean Copy

About the All India Gig Workers’ Union

The All India Gig Workers’ Union (AIGWU) is a registered trade union for all food delivery, logistics, and service workers that work on any app-based platforms in India.

Contact: contactaigwu@gmail.com

Connect: Twitter; Facebook

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/that-is-not-a-livelihood-2013-that-is-helplessness201d-field-notes-from-the-fraazo-delivery-workers-strike-in-noida-greater-noida-and-ghaziabad

The Platform Economy’s Gatekeeping of Class and Caste Dominance in Urban India

Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi — 2024-04-19T03:11:44Z

Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi contributed an essay on how gated society management apps like MyGate and NoBrokerHood feed on caste and income inequalities in new datafied forms. The essay features in The Formalization of Social Precarities, an anthology edited by Murali Shanmugavelan and Aiha Nguyen and published with Data & Society.

Ashrit is an experienced platform worker. He has been a delivery worker for three years, job-hopping frequently. Ashrit has worked as a package delivery worker for three platforms: two courier services and a hyperlocal grocery delivery company, which promises compressed ten-minute deliveries over short distances. While navigating the city, he often deals with omnipresent surveillance tools deployed in apartment complexes owned by upper-class and dominant-caste homeowners. Ashrit is used to being screened at every apartment complex he enters, including having his picture taken and verifying details such as his name, mobile number, and the platform he is delivering for. The everydayness of constant identity verification means that Ashrit is not bothered much by it — he said he doesn’t mind the process so much as the delay it causes when customers forget to approve his entry.

MyGate is one such company offering “gated community management,” claiming to service over 25,000 gated societies in India. A competing application, NoBrokerHood, services over 18,000 societies. Apps of this nature have sprung up across urban India in the past five years, offering “society management” services to a niche market of gated societies. Their bouquet of services includes everything from property listings with a commission rate for the platform, security services, accounting services for maintenance and related expenses, and in-app discussion forums for residents. These apps market digital security, which allows residents to regulate entries and exits and make a database of all non-resident visitors in the society. The objective of these apps is to legitimize surveillance as a way of ensuring safety in gated societies. Through a preliminary search online, we found over 20 different companies specializing in digital solutions for gated societies. The industry even had a business exposition in Mumbai on “Housing Society Management,” focused on technology solutions for gated societies.

This study uses the framework of platform urbanism to understand surveillance platforms. Platform urbanism analyzes the growing power of digital platforms in cities. Urban geographers have argued that platforms are a symptom of current models of capitalism, which exploit “idle resources” to produce new forms of urban spaces and value where they might not have existed earlier. Airbnb and Uber are often used as examples of this new form of extraction and value creation from existing assets by monetizing empty rooms and car seats. We argue that platforms offering surveillance services are another instance of this wider landscape of platform urbanism, manufacturing the need for surveillance systems in elite urban enclaves. We use this case study to show that platforms monetize not just idle resources but social inequality and stratification to generate value and capital.

Click to download the full essay

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/the-platform-economys-gatekeeping-of-class-and-caste-dominance-in-urban-india

Online Gender Based Violence on Short Form Video Platforms

Divyansha Sehgal and Lakshmi T. Nambiar — 2024-04-11T03:24:55Z

An inquiry into platform policies and safeguards. This report explores how short-form video platforms in India address online gender based violence (oGBV) by analysing their terms of service, community guidelines (CG), and reporting workflows.

Executive Summary

Being a woman or from a gender minority online is a harrowing experience. From early instances of sexual harassment in text-based internet communities in the 1990s, to apps such as Bulli Bai, and harassment in the Metaverse more recently, online gender-based violence (oGBV) is a pervasive problem, affecting 23 per cent of women globally. In India, nearly half of the women surveyed reported facing online harassment, leading to reduced online participation. Other consequences of oGBV include mental health issues, withdrawal from online spaces, and, offline violence.

In 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women & girls, and its causes and consequences recognised online violence against women and the need to counter it, defining it as "any act of gender-based violence against women that is committed, assisted or aggravated in part or fully by the use of ICT, such as mobile phones and smartphones, the Internet, social media platforms or email, against a woman because she is a woman, or affects women disproportionately."

This report explores how short-form video platforms in India address oGBV by analysing their terms of service, community guidelines (CG), and reporting workflows. Recognising the role of intermediaries is crucial in understanding challenges and developing effective strategies to combat oGBV. We selected three Indian video-sharing platforms based on their download numbers, as well as Instagram reels (given their popularity in India).

The CG and terms of use of these platforms were measures against a typology of oGBV we put together based on a literature review.

The guidelines of the platforms included in the study demonstrated minimal recognition of the gendered effects of potential behaviours related to oGBV. None of the platforms had a separate policy or section dedicated to oGBV, and the policies were found to be ambiguous at several points, leaving them open to interpretation by moderators. Josh was particularly noted to have extremely poor coverage overall. Certain forms of oGBV, such as harassment, non-consensual information sharing, and extortion, were addressed to a slightly higher degree in the guidelines of Instagram, Moj, and Roposo. Some exemplary aspects are highlighted in our findings section. However, other forms, such as attacks on communication channels, omissions by regulatory actors, surveillance and stalking, and online domestic violence found little to no mention across policies, despite the likelihood of these issues manifesting offline as well. Further, policy provisions failed to address the needs of gender minorities. Reporting mechanisms were found to be lacking or inconsistent, and failed to consider the networked nature of harassment.

The harms of gendered violence are well-known and documented. The lack of clarity on implementation and policy is no longer an oversight but an active choice to disregard users.

Attributions

Co-authors: Divyansha Sehgal and Lakshmi T. Nambiar
Conceptualisation: Ambika Tandon, Torsha Sarkar
Review: Amrita Sengupta and Divyank Katira
Research Assistance: Cheshta Arora
Design: Anagha Musalgaonkar

The report can be downloaded here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/online-gender-based-violence-on-short-form-video-platforms

Digital Markets and India: Demystifying the Draft DCB

Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri (in alphabetical order) — 2024-04-15T06:15:21Z

This document summarises the proceedings of the Roundtable on the draft Digital Competition Bill (DCB) [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Roundtable’]. The Roundtable was conducted online on April 1, 2024, and included representation from academia, law, civil society, and policy organisations. The primary objective of the Roundtable was to discuss the recent report published by the Committee on Digital Competition Law (CDCL) in March 2024 along with the draft of the DCB.

The event was organized by Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri.

The Roundtable began with a brief presentation by Abhineet Nayyar (Centre for Internet and Society - CIS) providing an overview of the various important themes identified by CIS during the course of their research. This introduction was followed by Roundtable discussions moderated by Isha Suri (CIS), focusing on important areas identified by CIS for the course of this discussion.

This summary seeks to crystallise the learnings that emanated from this Roundtable to inform the discourse and contribute to the ongoing public consultation for the draft DCB, due by April 15, 2024.

I. Ex-ante or ex-post

The initial parts of the discussion focused on the shift from a largely ex-post model to an ex-ante model to competition regulation in India. It was briefly summarised during the discussion that while the extant Competition Act of 2002 relied on ex-post methods to recognise anti-competitive practices, the proposed DCB adopts an ex-ante approach similar to what has been adopted or is being deliberated in other jurisdictions. Few participants highlighted the benefits and costs of switching from the former to the latter and highlighted specific learnings for digital markets in India, while some were sceptical of this shift towards an ex-ante model, given its potentially detrimental impact on MSMEs and lack of enforcement capacity in India.

The discussion began with the participants highlighting the gaps in the extant ex-post regulatory framework, including delayed enforcement and disposal of appeals, and its under-reliance on private enforcement techniques that increase the ecosystem’s dependence on CCI as a central node. Simultaneously, however, several participants also warned against potential issues in the ex-ante approach proposed under the draft DCB. While some of these concerns related to the general ineffectiveness of ex-ante regulations – as highlighted, for example, in data protection and broadcasting – many participants deliberated on specific sections of the draft DCB. It was also pointed out that telecom regulation does have ex-ante provisions to address competition concerns within the sector. One participant, for instance, highlighted the proposed bill’s wide scope and the risk it poses for an under-resourced regulatory regime.

Overall, the group emphasised the need to carefully consider the particulars of the ex-ante approach proposed under the draft DCB. While there was a broader consensus that this approach may address some issues with digital markets particularly, the discussion brought to the fore many concerns with how this approach is currently being articulated. In addition to the bill’s wide scope, the Roundtable also discussed the necessity for an impact assessment study to understand its effects better. Other concerns regarding the proposed threshold values and the draft DCB’s focus on ‘contestable’ markets were also tabled during the discussion.

II. Building Regulatory Capacity

The participants discussed existing regulatory capacity in light of the proposed ex-ante approach under the draft DCB. Several participants highlighted factors that currently inhibit CCI’s capacity, the foremost of them being the Commission’s reliance on enforcement by bureaucrats with time-bound deputations affecting continuity and sustained capacity. In the absence of professional capacity, particularly in digital markets, the wide scope proposed by the draft DCB is only likely to further test CCI’s ability to deliver on its mandate. Moreover, in discussing how to build CCI’s professional capacity, a participant also highlighted the risk of regulatory capture by the private sector if one were to follow a ‘revolving door’ approach.

Participants then delved into potential solutions for CCI’s constrained capacity. In addition to staffing the Commission with subject matter experts, a participant also stated that given the political economy, it may be prudent to design the regulatory ecosystem to work around the problem of legacy issues of lack of professional capacity and independence. The participants also briefly discussed the role of impact assessment in resolving this problem, specifically by including the effect of the draft DCB on CCI’s already strained capacity.

III. Proposed Threshold Values

Deliberations began with the rationale for the Threshold Values (TVs) proposed by the draft DCB. Several participants shared their reservations about the bill’s reliance on international standards, especially for metrics such as market capitalisation and global turnover. Some also identified certain areas where the proposed bill seeks to identify TVs that are more relevant to the Indian market. For example, a participant highlighted that the draft DCB, in Section 3(4) chooses to identify and calculate business users and end users for each of the core digital services separately.

In addition to discussing the rationale behind TVs, many participants also suggested avenues for potential improvement. For instance, one of the participants recommended the identification of threshold values for each of the core digital services, as opposed to the current service-agnostic thresholds. It was posited that the expedited timeline of three months may have constrained the committee from recommending nuanced thresholds suited for Indian contexts since that would require market studies or commissioned (independent) research for evidence gathering and analysis.

Some participants were optimistic that the currently open consultation process may leave room for further negotiation on the prescribed TVs. This includes, among other things, identifying more representative calculation methods for arriving at appropriate values and incorporating global best practices.

IV. Remedies and Penalties

The participants sought to ascertain the effectiveness of penalties in the form of fines as a tool for deterring abusive conduct by dominant entities in general, and digital behemoths, more specifically. On one hand, some participants highlighted the lack of evidence to support the assumption that currently imposed fines deter such abuse in the market. For instance, one of the participants referred to a recent incident where the Dutch competition regulator imposed a €5 million fine for every week Apple failed to comply with an antitrust decision by the regulator. In the end, Apple had accumulated fines worth €50 million, instead of allowing dating app providers to use alternative modes of payment, ostensibly indicating how companies perceive penalties as yet another operating cost.^{^[1]}

On the other hand, a few participants also underlined the need to look at ‘penalties’ as a part of a larger toolkit and not as a standalone deterrent. In this context, the draft DCB’s focus on settlements and commitments, and criminal penalisation were also highlighted by some attendees; while others pointed out the need for an institutional redesign – for example, by reviewing the current appellate process, or by potentially reintroducing the Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT).

Additionally, the question of penalties led to a discussion on the calculation of the quantum of fines and the process followed therein. Stressing the need for more elaborate penalisation guidelines, one participant questioned CDCL’s choice of capping penalties at 10% of the enterprise’s global turnover, especially for industries that have comparatively higher profit margins. It was also pointed out that there is no empirical evidence suggesting the efficacy of the 10% cap, as a sufficient amount.

The discussion also briefly delved into the issue of structural remedies as a tool for correcting harms in digital markets, given the presence of strong network effects and winner-take-all outcomes. Even though there was not a deep dive into the issue of structural remedies, per se, a participant indicated that certain obligations under the DCB, such as the one on tying and bundling comprise a form of structural reform.

V. Digital Mergers and Acquisitions

Unlike the Competition Act 2002, the draft DCB explicitly excludes combination review from its scope, instead relying on the 2023 amendment to the Act. It was pointed out during the discussion that recent amendments in the merger review process such as the inclusion of deal value thresholds should check anticompetitive mergers. However, as highlighted by a few participants during the Roundtable – even though the amendment would potentially enable CCI to investigate digital M&As, the Commission would still have to rely on theories of harm established under the extant Act, which largely examines price-based effects of mergers. For instance, one participant highlighted the role of price-based assessments informing CCI’s working in many merger review cases and pointed out the limitations of these assessments in examining combinations in the digital market.

On the other hand, many obligations identified and elaborated under the proposed DCB are, in fact, better suited to support CCI’s regulation of such digital M&As. Another participant pointed out that while sections 3 and 4 of the extant Act can still, theoretically, allow CCI to borrow from the draft bill, the proposed regulatory landscape does not ensure this synergy between the two pieces of legislation.

VI. Gaps in the Consultation Process

Finally, the discussion highlighted the consultation process adopted by the CDCL during the drafting of this bill. While there was a general agreement that the process was not very representative, different participants brought up diverse perspectives. One participant, for instance, underlined the importance of including MSMEs in the drafting process, given their deep reliance on digital tools and technologies. Other attendees also echoed this viewpoint, highlighting that although the CDCL incorporated inputs from BigTech companies and industry associations, the perspectives of consumers, technology experts, and platform workers were missing from the list of stakeholders consulted during the process.

There was cautious optimism in the room that subsequent drafts of the Bill might address some of these concerns by including a diverse set of stakeholders and incorporating a bottom-up consultative process.

^{^[1]} https://www.reuters.com/technology/dutch-regulator-rejects-apples-objections-against-fines-2023-10-02/

To download the PDF, click here and the Presentation here

This report has been authored by (Abhineet Nayyar and Isha Suri)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-markets-and-india-demystifying-the-draft-dcb

Understanding Feminist Infrastructures: An Exploratory Study of Online Feminist Content Creation Spaces in India

Puthiya Purayil Sneha and Saumyaa Naidu — 2024-03-25T13:02:28Z

This report explores the growth of feminist infrastructures (including the various interpretations of the term), through research on feminist publishing, content creation and curation spaces and how they have informed the contemporary discourse on feminism, gender, and sexuality in India. The rise of online feminist publications, and related digital media content creation and curation spaces, has engendered new forums for debate, networking, and community-building. This report looks at some of the challenges of developing such publications and platforms, and the role of digital infrastructures in mediating contemporary feminist work and politics.

Click here to download the full report.

The internet and digital media technologies have played an important role in contemporary feminist practice – in addition to social media activism, their growing prevalence in academia, advocacy, and creative expression illustrate how digital media contributes to efforts to question asymmetries of power and knowledge. In the last few years, the concept of a feminist internet and forms of feminist infrastructures have emerged as crucial entry points to understand the affordances of the digital and its many challenges, especially for women and other structurally disadvantaged communities.Feminist content creation has been integral to contemporary feminist work in India, and is an entry-point into discussions on what could be a feminist internet. The growth of online feminist publications, and related digital media content creation and curation spaces, has engendered new forums for debate, networking, and community-building. This study looks at the development of feminist infrastructures (including various interpretations of the term) through an exploration of online feminist publishing, content creation and curation spaces, and their impact on the contemporary discourse on feminism, gender, and sexuality in India.

Through conversations with select online feminist publishing, content creation, and curation spaces, this study outlines motivations for choosing certain media, nature of content, languages and design, and how such choices inform practice and politics. In addition to the above, we also conducted two workshops on feminist infrastructure wishlists, and feminist principles of design and infrastructure. These conversations have offered several insights on the landscape of feminist content creation in India, and the affordances and challenges of digital technologies in facilitating contemporary feminist work. An overarching aim of the project is to unpack the term ‘feminist infrastructure’ and its interpretations in the context of the transition to digital content creation and publication. We aim to continue these conversations with a focus on the larger, often invisible role of digital infrastructures in the development of discourse on human rights, free speech and safety, to understand what are challenges to, and efforts being undertaken to create an inclusive, accessible and feminist internet.

Contributors

Research and Writing Puthiya Purayil Sneha and Saumyaa Naidu

Review Dr. Padmini Ray Murray, Design Beku

Design Saumyaa Naidu and Yatharth

Copy Editing The Clean Copy

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/understanding-feminist-structures

Workers’ experiences in app-based taxi and delivery sectors: Key initial findings from multi-city quantitative surveys

2024-02-16T01:27:07Z

In 2021-22, the labour research vertical at CIS conducted quantitative surveys with over 1,000 taxi and delivery workers employed in the app-based and offline sectors. The surveys covered key employment indicators, including earnings and working hours, initial investments and work-related cost burdens, income and social security, platform policies and management, and employment arrangements. The surveys were part of the ‘Labour Futures’ project supported by the Internet Society Foundation.

It has been over a decade since app-based delivery and taxi sectors began operations in India, and have since expanded to several metropolitan and smaller cities. These sectors together account for the largest proportion of the platform workforce in India. Workers’ collective action and demands have revealed extractive labour practices in the platform economy. However, there has been a dearth of reliable quantitative data on essential labour and economic wellbeing indicators for workers. In 2021-22, we conducted surveys with workers in the taxi and delivery sectors aiming to build an evidence base for worker-first policy-making in the platform economy. 1,048 workers were surveyed across four tier 1 and tier 2 cities—Delhi NCR, Mumbai, Lucknow, and Guwahati.

Research questions

What is the nature and scale of platform operations in the delivery and taxi sectors within various tier 1 and tier 2 cities in India?
What are the socio-economic contexts shaping workers’ decisions around transitioning in and out of the platform workforce in the delivery and taxi sectors?
What are the tangible and intangible costs, and conditions of work that workers navigate to sustain their employment on delivery and taxi platforms?
How does the assemblage of informal and formal structures, actors, and systems of work management shape economic outcomes for workers on delivery and taxi platforms?

Key initial findings

Diverse employment arrangements
There is a sizeable presence of heterogeneous work organisation systems on both app-based delivery and taxi sectors, which diverge from an on-demand model. These systems mediate multiple aspects of everyday work allocation and processes, spatio-temporal rhythms of work, platform design and management, modes of labour control, levels of reintermediation, and employment arrangements.

In the delivery sector, typologies are driven by platform models and work processes. Typologies of work organisation and control in the taxi sector, on the other hand, are centred around diverse employment arrangements and vehicle ownership models.

Socio-economic vulnerabilities impacting work outcomes
Workers in both the delivery and taxi sectors face a number of socioeconomic vulnerabilities that influence their entry and continued employment in platform work. Key motivating factors to enter platform work involved the lack of alternative employment opportunities (over 50 percent in both sectors) and the possibility of better pay than other available jobs (over 40 percent in both sectors).

An overwhelming proportion of workers (over 95 percent in both sectors) were engaged in platform work as their main source of income, as opposed to part-time employment. Workers also faced significant economic burdens in various ways such as being sole earners in their household, having multiple financial dependents, providing remittances back home, and so on. Worsening these burdens was the widespread income insecurity that workers faced in both sectors—for around 50 percent of them, earnings from platform work were insufficient for covering basic household expenses.

Insufficient earnings and rising work-related expenses
Workers' experiences highlight how the majority of workers are forced to deal with low-wage outcomes, worsened by a reduction in bonuses, and high operational work-related expenses. Earnings remain low and uncertain for workers despite the fact that they put in long work hours. At the median level, workers on delivery platforms were working 70 hours a week, and those on taxi platforms were working an even higher 84 hours a week.

In addition to platform charges and commissions, numerous work-related expenses such as fuel and vehicle maintenance costs are important factors that determine take home earnings for workers. The median net earnings, after accounting for all these costs, were INR 3,800 for delivery workers, and INR 5,000 for taxi workers. When adjusted for standard weekly work hours (48 hours/week), these earnings do not meet national minimum wage standards.

Absence of occupational health measures and social protection
Workers in both delivery and taxi sectors are already working immensely long hours in order to try and make adequate earnings on the platform, sometimes working almost double the amount when compared to standard weekly work hours. They also faced additional occupational health and safety risks during their work. Workers in both sectors faced grievous risks during work hours including those relating to road safety (around 80 percent), weather conditions (around 40 percent; 52 percent for delivery workers), theft (around 30 percent), and physical assault (around 25 percent).

To make matters worse, workers were not provided adequate social protections to cope with workplace safety risks. Workers in the taxi sector had very low levels of access to crucial protections such as health insurance (6 percent) and accident insurance (28 percent). Access was relatively higher for workers in the delivery sector—32 percent had access to health insurance, and 62 percent had access to accident insurance. However, workers faced several barriers in receiving these benefits and protections, owing to burdensome and unreliable insurance claims processes.

Upcoming outputs
We hope that findings from these surveys are instrumental in speaking to extant and developing labour policy interventions, as well as adjacent policy areas including social protection, urban and infrastructural development, and sectoral regulation.

In the coming weeks, we will be publishing a series of city briefs for each of the four survey cities. These briefs will be presented as data visualisation narratives, showing how workers’ experiences with platforms vary across tier 1 and tier 2 cities.

Shared under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License (CC BY-SA 4.0)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/workers-experiences-in-app-based-taxi-and-delivery-sectors-key-initial-findings-from-multi-city-quantitative-surveys

Unpacking Algorithmic Infrastructures: Mapping the Data Supply Chain in the Healthcare Industry in India

2024-01-05T02:38:22Z

The Unpacking Algorithmic Infrastructures project, supported by a grant from the Notre Dame-IBM Tech Ethics Lab, aims to study the Al data supply chain infrastructure in healthcare in India, and aims to critically analyse auditing frameworks that are utilised to develop and deploy AI systems in healthcare. It will map the prevalence of Al auditing practices within the sector to arrive at an understanding of frameworks that may be developed to check for ethical considerations - such as algorithmic bias and harm within healthcare systems, especially against marginalised and vulnerable populations.

There has been an increased interest in health data in India over the recent years, where health data policies encourage sharing of data with different entities, at the same time, there has been a growing interest in deployment of Al in healthcare from startups, hospitals, as well as multinational technology companies.

Given the invisibility of algorithmic infrastructures that underlie the digital economy and the important decisions these technologies can make about patients' health, it's important to look at how these systems are developed, how data flows within them, how these systems are tested and verified and what ethical considerations inform their deployment.

The Unpacking Algorithmic Infrastructures project, supported by a grant from the Notre Dame-IBM Tech Ethics Lab, aims to study the Al data supply chain infrastructure in healthcare in India, and aims to critically analyse auditing frameworks that are utilised to develop and deploy AI systems in healthcare. It will map the prevalence of Al auditing practices within the sector to arrive at an understanding of frameworks that may be developed to check for ethical considerations - such as algorithmic bias and harm within healthcare systems, especially against marginalised and vulnerable populations.

Research Questions

To what extent organisations take ethical principles into account when developing AI , managing the training and testing dataset, and while deploying the AI in the healthcare sector.
What best practices for auditing can be put in place based on our critical understanding of AI data supply chains and auditing frameworks being employed in the healthcare sector.
What is a possible auditing framework that is best suited to organisations in the majority world.

Research Design and Methods

For this study, we will use a comprehensive mixed methods approach. We will survey professionals working towards designing, developing and deploying AI systems for healthcare in India, across technology and healthcare organizations. We will also undertake in-depth interviews with experts who are part of key stakeholder groups.

We hereby invite researchers, technologists, healthcare professionals, and others working at the intersection of Artificial Intelligence and Healthcare to speak to us and help us inform the study. You may contact Shweta Monhandas at shweta@cis-india.org

Research Team: Amrita Sengupta, Chetna V. M., Pallavi Bedi, Puthiya Purayil Sneha, Shweta Mohandas and Yatharth.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/unpacking-algorithmic-infrastructures

User Experiences of Digital Financial Risks and Harms

2023-12-22T16:05:26Z

The reach and use of digital financial services has risen in recent years without a commensurate increase in digital literacy and access. Through this project, supported by a grant from Google(.)org, we will examine the landscape of potential risks and harms posed by digital financial services, and the disproportionate risk that information asymmetry and barriers to access pose for users, especially certain marginalised communities.

Project Background

There is a big evidence gap in the understanding of the financial risks and harms experienced by users of digital financial services. Consequently, adequate consumer protection frameworks and processes to address these harms have been lagging. A survey of 32,000 Indian consumers found only 17% who lost money through banking frauds were able to recoup their funds. Filling this gap is crucial to inform responsive policy making, platform design and data governance.

While a lot more attention is paid to financial frauds and scams, through this study, we aim to situate these alongside experiences of harms that are understudied and sometimes overlooked. Users may also experience financial harm, when negatively impacted by:

Financial misinformation
Loss of control over their assets
Loss of potential income
Difficulty accessing social protection
Financial abuse perpetrated alongside other forms of domestic and family abuse
Unsustainable levels of debt, i.e. over-indebtedness, and
Exclusion from financial services

The Centre for Internet and Society is undertaking a mixed methods study to better understand user awareness, perceptions and experiences of digital financial risks and harms.

For this study, we will survey nearly 4000 users, with differing levels of access to digital devices, digital services and the internet, and undertake semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with specific target groups and stakeholders. We aim to highlight the experiences of persons with disabilities, gender and sexual minorities, the elderly, women, and regional language first users; to better understand how discrimination and exclusion may increase their burden of risk when using digital financial services.

Key research questions guiding our project are:

How are digital financial risks understood and experienced by users of digital financial services? Which socioeconomic factors amplify risks for different user groups?
What concerns have emerged relating to data privacy, misinformation, identity theft and other forms of social engineering and mobile app based fraud?
How accessible are providers’ and government’s platform based reporting and grievance redressal systems?
What role can fintech platforms, social media platforms, banking institutions, and regulatory bodies play in reducing digital financial risks across the ecosystem?

Project Aims

Through this study, we aim to:

Assess the financial risks and harms users are exposed to when using social media, digital banking, and fintech platforms. While looking at general users, we will also specifically explore this experience for the elderly, gender and sexual minorities, regional language users and persons with visual disabilities.
Develop a framework to categorise the nature of vulnerabilities, risks and harms faced by the concerned user groups
Create a credible evidence base for key stakeholders with regards to experiences of digital financial risks and harm.
Provide recommendations for better policy and platform design to address harms, specifically those arising from lack of accessibility and information asymmetry.
Identify best practices to respond to digital risks and foster safety and equity in digital financial services

Come Talk to Us:

If you have experiences or insights to share, or if you're interested in learning more about our study, please reach out.

We also invite researchers, financial service providers, developers and designers of fintech platforms, and civil society organisations working on digital safety, to speak to us and help inform the study. You may contact garima@cis-india.org

Research Team: Amrita Sengupta, Chiara Furtado, Garima Agrawal, Nishkala Sekhar, Puthiya Purayil Sneha, and Yesha Tshering Paul

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/user-experiences-of-digital-financial-risks-and-harms

Strategies to Organise Platform Workers

furtado — 2023-10-22T09:54:52Z

In 2022, the Centre for Internet and Society hosted a panel with Akkanut Wantanasombut, Ayoade Ibrahim, Rikta Krishnaswamy, and Sofía Scasserra at RightsCon, an annual summit on technology and human rights.

Click to download the full report

Event Report

This event report is based on proceedings from a panel hosted at the 2022 edition of RightsCon. Hosted by the labour and digitalisation team at CIS, the panel brought together seasoned labour organisers, activists, and researchers working across Thailand, Nigeria, India, and Argentina. The panellists represented a diverse group of worker organisations, including transnational federations, national unions, and informally organised movements.

Their experiences of organising in research and practice infused our discussion with insight into collective action struggles across varied sectors and platform economies in the global south. Collective resistance among platform workers has witnessed a sustained rise in these economies over the past three years, with demands for transparency and accountability from platforms, and for a guarantee of rights and protections from governments.

Through this panel, we sought to answer:

How have workers’ organisations overcome challenges in sustained collective action?
What have been unique aspects of organising in the global south?
Which strategies have been gaining traction for organising workers and mobilising other stakeholders?

Placing workers’ participation front and centre, the panellists incorporated common threads around campaigning, education, and mobilisation for increasing worker participation, as well as bargaining with the government for legal and social protections. The panellists highlighted that it’s the resilience and resistance led by workers that drive the way for sustained organising. This panel hoped to spotlight steps taken in that direction, where organising efforts strive to form, sustain, and champion worker-led movements.

Contributors

Panellists:
Akkanut Wantanasombut
Ayoade Ibrahim
Rikta Krishnawamy
Sofía Scasserra

Worker organisations in focus:
Tamsang-Tamsong
National Union of Professional App-based Transport Workers
International Alliance of App-based Transport Workers
All India Gig Workers’ Union
Federación Argentina de Empleados de Comercio y Servicios
Asociación de Personal de Plataformas

Conceptualisation and planning: Ambika Tandon, Chiara Furtado, Aayush Rathi, and Abhishek Sekharan

Author: Chiara Furtado
Reviewers: Ambika Tandon and Nishkala Sekhar
Designer: Annushka Jaliwala

This event report is part of research supported by the Internet Society Foundation under the ‘Labour futures’ grant.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/strategies-to-organise-platform-workers-rightscon

Strategies to Organise Platform Workers

furtado — 2023-10-20T17:04:03Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/strategies-to-organise-platform-workers

PDC 2022

Admin — 2023-07-04T07:05:09Z

Divyansha Sehgal and Yatharth presented their work - Designing Domestic Work Platforms - on critical design assessments of gig work platforms at the Participatory Design Conference.

For more detail on the conference held from 19 August to 1 September 2022, click here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/pdc-2022

As Equals: Frequently Asked Questions

Admin — 2023-07-04T06:54:59Z

Chiara Furtado was a panellist on the ‘As Equals’ series hosted by CNN since 2018 which aims to reveal what systemic gender inequality looks like. Chiara participated in a roundtable on digital harms and gender equality.

For more information, click here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/as-equals-frequently-asked-questions