Centre for Internet and Society

Clearing Misconceptions: What the DoT Panel Report on Net Neutrality Says (and Doesn't)

pranesh — 2015-07-21T12:36:26Z

There have been many misconceptions about what the DoT Panel Report on Net Neutrality says: the most popular ones being that they have recommended higher charges for services like WhatsApp and Viber, and that the report is an anti-Net neutrality report masquerading as a pro-Net neutrality report. Pranesh Prakash clears up these and other incorrect notions about the report in this brief analysis.

Background of the DoT panel

In January 2015, the Department of Telecommunication (DoT) formed a panel to look into "net neutrality from public policy objective, its advantages and limitations," as well the impact of a "regulated telecom services sector and unregulated content and applications sector". After spending a few months collecting both oral and written testimony from a number of players in this debate, and analysing it, on July 16 that panel submitted its report to the DoT and released it to the public for comments (till August 15, 2015). At the same time, independently, the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) is also considering the same set of issues. TRAI received more than a million responses in response to its consultation paper — the most TRAI has ever received on any topic — the vast majority of of them thanks in part to the great work of the Save the Internet campaign. TRAI is yet to submit its recommendations to the DoT. Once those recommendations are in, the DoT will have to take its call on how to go ahead with these two sets of issues: regulation of certain Internet-based communications services, and net neutrality.

Summary of the DoT panel report

The DoT panel had the tough job of synthesising the feedback from dozens of people and organizations. In this, they have done an acceptable job. Although, in multiple places, the panel has wrongly summarised the opinions of the "civil society" deponents: I was one of the deponents on the day that civil society actors presented their oral submissions, so I know. For instance, the panel report notes in 4.2.9.c that "According to civil society, competing applications like voice OTT services were eroding revenues of the government and the TSPs, creating security and privacy concerns, causing direct as well as indirect losses." I do not recall that being the main thrust of any civil society participant's submission before the panel. That having been said, one might still legitimately claim that none of these or other mistakes (which include errors like "emergency" instead of "emergence", "Tim Burners Lee" instead of "Tim Berners-Lee", etc.) are such that they have radically altered the report's analysis or recommendations.

The report makes some very important points that are worth noting, which can be broken into two broad headings:

On governmental regulation of OTTs

Internet-based (i.e., over-the-top, or "OTT") communications services (like WhatsApp, Viber, and the like) are currently taking advantage of "regulatory arbitrage": meaning that the regulations that apply to non-IP communications services and IP communications services are different. Under the current "unified licence" regime, WhatsApp, Viber, and other such services don't have to get a licence from the government, don't have to abide by anti-spam Do-Not-Disturb regulations, do not have to share any part of their revenue with the government, do not have to abide by national security terms in the licence, and in general are treated differently from other telecom services. The report wishes to bring these within a licensing regime.
The report distinguishes between Internet-based voice calls (voice over IP, or VoIP) and messaging services, and doesn't wish to interfere with the latter. It also distinguishes between domestic and international VoIP calls, and believes only the former need regulation. It is unclear on what bases these distinctions are made.
OTT "application services" do not need special telecom-oriented regulation.
There should a separation in regulatory terms between the network layer and the service layer. While this doesn't mean much in the short-term for Net neutrality, it will be very important in the long-term for ICT regulation, and is very welcome.

On Net neutrality

The core principles of Net neutrality — which are undefined in the report, though definitions proposed in submissions they've received are quoted — should be adhered to. In the long-run, these should find place in a new law, but for the time being they can be enforced through the licence agreement between the DoT and telecom providers.
On the contentious issue of zero-rating, a process that involves both ex-ante and ex-post regulation is envisaged to prevent harmful zero-rating, while allowing beneficial zero-rating. Further, the report notes that the supposed altruistic or "public interest" motives of the zero-rating scheme do not matter if they result in harm to competition, distort consumer markets, violate the core tenets of Net neutrality, or unduly benefit an Internet "gatekeeper".

Where does the DoT panel report go wrong?

The proposal by the DoT panel of a licensing regime for VoIP services is a terrible idea. It would presumptively hold all licence non-holders to be unlawful, and that should not be the case. While it is in India's national interest to want to hold VoIP services to account if they do not follow legitimate regulations, it is far better to do this through ex-post regulations rather than an ex-ante licensing scheme. A licensing scheme would benefit Indian VoIP companies (including services like Hike, which Airtel has invested in) over foreign companies like Viber. The report also doesn't say how one would distinguish between OTT communication services and OTT application services, when many apps such as food ordering apps, including text chat facilities. Further, VoIP need not be provided by a company: I run my own XMPP servers, which is a protocol used for both text and video/voice. Will a licensing regime force me to become a licence-holder or will it set a high bar? The DoT panel report doesn't say. Will there be a revenue-sharing mechanism, as is currently the case under the Unified Licence? If so, how will it be calculated in case of services like WhatsApp? These questions too find no answer in the report. All in all, this part of the report's analysis is found to be sadly wanting.
Many important terms are left undefined, and many distinctions that the report draws are left unexplained. For instance, it is unclear on what regulatory basis the report distinguishes between domestic and international VoIP calls — which is an unenforceable (not to mention regulatorily unimportant) distinction — or between regulation of messaging services and VoIP services, or what precisely they mean by "application-agnostic" and "application-specific" network management (since different scholars on this issue mean different things when they say "application").

What does the DoT panel report mean for consumers?

Not too much currently, since the DoT panel report is still just a set of recommendations by an expert body based on (invited) public consultations.
Does it uphold Net neutrality? The DoT panel report is clear that they strongly endorse the "core principles of Net neutrality". On the issue of "zero-rating", the panel proposes some sound measures, saying that there should be a two-part mechanism for ensuring that harmful zero-rating doesn't go through: First, telecom services need to submit zero-rating tariff proposals to an expert body constituted by DoT; and second consumers will be able to complain about the harmful usage of zero-rating by any service provider, which may result in a fine. What constitutes harm / violation of Net neutrality? The panel suggests that any tariff scheme that may harm competition, distorts the consumer market, or violates the core principles of Net neutrality is harmful. This makes sense.
Will it increase cost of access to WhatsApp and Viber? Well, one the one hand, zero-rating of those services could decrease the cost of access to WhatsApp and Viber, but that might not be allowed if the DoT panel recommendations are accepted, since that would possibly be judged to harm competition and distort the consumer markets. The DoT panel has also recommended bringing such services within a licensing framework to bridge the "regulatory arbitrage" that they are able benefit from (meaning that these services don't have to abide by many regulations that a telecom provider has to follow). Whether this will lead to WhatsApp and similar services charging depends on what kinds of regulations are placed on them, and if any costs are imposed on them. If the government decides to take the approach they took to ISPs in the late 90s (essentially, charging them Re. 1 as the licence fee), doesn't impose any revenue sharing (as they currently require of all telecom services), etc., then there needn't be any overly burdensome costs that WhatsApp-like services will need to pass on to consumers.

What misunderstandings do people have?

There are multiple news reports that the DoT panel has recommended increased charges for domestic VoIP calls, or that ISPs will now be able to double-charge. Both of these are untrue. The DoT panel's recommendations are about "regulatory arbitrage" and licensing, which need not be related to cost.
There is a fear that the exception from net neutrality of "managed services and enterprise services" is a "loophole", or that exceptions for "emergency services" and "desirable public or government services" are too vague and carry the potential of misuse. If one goes by the examples that the panel cites of managed services (e.g., services an ISP provides for a private company separately from the rest of the Internet, etc.), these fear seems largely misplaced. We must also realize the the panel report is a report, and not legislation, and the rationale for wanting exemptions from Net neutrality are clear.
The DoT panel has given the go-ahead for zero-rating. Once again, this is untrue. The panel cites instances of zero-rating that aren't discriminatory, violative of Net neutrality and don't harm competition or distort consumer markets (such as zero-rating of all Internet traffic for a limited time period). Then it goes on to state that the regulator should not allow zero-rating that violates the core principles of Net neutrality.

What's missing in the Net neutrality debate is nuance. It's become a debate in which you are either for Net neutrality or against it. However, none of the underlying components of Net neutrality — a complex mix of competition policy, innovation policy, the right to freedom of expression, etc. — are absolutes; therefore, it is clear that Net neutrality cannot be an absolute either.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/clearing-misconceptions-dot-panel-net-neutrality

Regulatory Perspectives on Net Neutrality

pranesh — 2015-07-18T02:46:30Z

In this paper Pranesh Prakash gives an overview on why India needs to put in place net neutrality regulations, and the form that those regulations must take to avoid being over-regulation.

With assistance by Vidushi Marda (Programme Officer, Centre for Internet and Society) and Tarun Krishnakumar (Research Volunteer, Centre for Internet and Society). I would like to specially thank Vishal Misra, Steve Song, Rudolf van der Berg, Helani Galpaya, A.B. Beliappa, Amba Kak, and Sunil Abraham for extended discussions, helpful suggestions and criticisms. However, this paper is not representative of their views, which are varied.

Today, we no longer live in a world of "roti, kapda, makaan", but in the world of "roti, kapda, makaan aur broadband". ^{^[1]} This is recognized by the National Telecom Policy IV.1.2, which states the need to "recognise telecom, including broadband connectivity as a basic necessity like education and health and work towards 'Right to Broadband'."^{^[2]} According to the IAMAI, as of October 2014, India had 278 million internet users. ^{^[3]} Of these, the majority access Internet through their mobile phones, and the WEF estimates only 3 in 100 have broadband on their mobiles.^{^[4]} Thus, the bulk of our population is without broadband. Telecom regulation and net neutrality has a very important role in enabling this vision of Internet as a basic human need that we should aim to fulfil.

1. Why should we regulate the telecom sector?

All ICT regulation should be aimed at achieving five goals: achieving universal, affordable access; ^{^[5]} ensuring and sustaining effective competition in an efficient market and avoiding market failures; protecting against consumer harms; ensuring maximum utility of the network by ensuring interconnection; and addressing state needs (taxation, security, etc.). Generally, all these goals go hand in hand, however some tensions may arise. For instance, universal access may not be provided by the market because the costs of doing so in certain rural or remote areas may outweigh the immediate monetary benefits private corporations could receive in terms of profits from those customers. In such cases, to further the goal of universal access, schemes such as universal service obligation funds are put in place, while ensuring that such schemes either do not impact competition or very minimally impact it.

It is clear that to maximise societal benefit, effective regulation of the ICT sector is a requirement, which otherwise, due to the ability of dominant players to abuse network effect to their advantage, is inherently prone towards monopolies. For instance, in the absence of regulation, a dominant player would charge far less for intra-network calls than inter-network calls, making customers shift to the dominant network. This kind of harm to competition should be regulated by the ICT regulator. However, it is equally true that over-regulation is as undesirable as under-regulation, since over-regulation harms innovation - whether in the form of innovative technologies or innovative business models. The huge spurt of growth globally of the telecom sector since the 1980s has resulted not merely from advancements in technology, but in large part from the de-monopolisation and deregulation of the telecom sector.^{^[6]} Similarly, the Internet has largely flourished under very limited technology-specific regulation. For instance, while interconnection between different telecom networks is heavily regulated in the domestic telecom sector, interconnection between the different autonomous systems (ASes) that make up the Internet is completely unregulated, thereby allowing for non-transparent pricing and opaque transactions. Given this context, we must ensure we do not over-regulate, lest we kill innovation.

2. Why should we regulate Net Neutrality? And whom should we regulate?

We wouldn't need to regulate Net Neutrality if ISPs were not "gatekeepers" for last-mile access. "Gatekeeping" occurs when a single company establishes itself as an exclusive route to reach a large number of people and businesses or, in network terms, nodes. It is not possible for Internet services to reach the customers of the telecom network without passing through the telecom network. The situation is very different in the middle-mile and for backhaul. Even though anti-competitive terms may exist in the middle-mile, especially given the opacity of terms in "transit agreements", a packet is usually able to travel through multiple routes if one route is too expensive (even if that is not the shortest network path, and is thus inefficient in a way). However, this multiplicity of routes is not possible in the last mile.

This leaves last mile telecom operators (ISPs) in a position to unfairly discriminate between different Internet services or destinations or applications, while harming consumer choice. This is why we believe that promoting the five goals mentioned above would require regulation of last-mile telecom operators to prevent unjust discrimination against end-users and content providers.

Thus, net neutrality is the principle that we should regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic.

3. How should we regulate Net Neutrality?

3.1. What concerns does Net Neutrality raise? What harms does it entail?

Discriminatory practices at the level of access to the Internet raises the following set of concerns:

1. Freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and privacy.

2. Harm to effective competition

a. This includes competition amongst ISPs as well as competition amongst content providers.

b. Under-regulation here may cause harm to innovation at the content provider level, including through erecting barriers to entry.

c. Over-regulation here may cause harm to innovation in terms of ISP business models.

3. Harm to consumers

a. Under-regulation here may harm consumer choice and the right to freedom of speech, expression, and communication.

b. Over-regulation on this ground may cause harm to innovation at the level of networking technologies and be detrimental to consumers in the long run.

4. Harm to "openness" and interconnectedness of the Internet, including diversity (of access, of content, etc.)

a. Exceptions for specialized services should be limited to preserve the open and interconnectedness of the Internet and of the World Wide Web.

It might help to think about Net Neutrality as primarily being about two overlapping sets of regulatory issues: preferential treatment of particular Internet-based services (in essence: content- or source-/destination-based discrimination, i.e., discrimination on basis of 'whose traffic it is'), or discriminatory treatment of applications or protocols (which would include examples like throttling of BitTorrent traffic, high overage fees upon breaching Internet data caps on mobile phones, etc., i.e., discrimination on the basis of 'what kind of traffic it is').

Situations where the negative or positive discrimination happens on the basis of particular content or address should be regulated through the use of competition principles, while negative or positive discrimination at the level of specific class of content, protocols, associated ports, and other such sender-/receiver-agnostic features, should be regulated through regulation of network management techniques . The former deals with instances where the question of "in whose favour is there discrimination" may be asked, while the latter deals with the question "in favour of what is there discrimination".

In order to do this, a regulator like TRAI can use both hard regulation - price ceilings, data cap floors, transparency mandates, preventing specific anti-competitive practices, etc. - as well as soft regulation - incentives and disincentives.

3.1.1 Net Neutrality and human rights

Any discussion on the need for net neutrality impugns the human rights of a number of different stakeholders. Users, subscribers, telecom operators and ISPs all possess distinct and overlapping rights that are to be weighed against each other before the scope, nature and form of regulatory intervention are finalised. The freedom of speech, right to privacy and right to carry on trade raise some of the most pertinent questions in this regard.

For example, to properly consider issues surrounding the practice of paid content-specific zero-rating from a human rights point of view, one must seek to balance the rights of content providers to widely disseminate their 'speech' to the largest audiences against the rights of consumers to have access to a diverse variety of different, conflicting and contrasting ideas.

This commitment to a veritable marketplace or free-market of ideas has formed the touchstone of freedom of speech law in jurisdictions across the world as well as finding mention in pronouncements of the Indian Supreme Court. Particular reference is to be made to the dissent of Mathew, J. inBennett Coleman v. Union of India^{^[7]} and of the majority Sakal Papers v. Union of India^{^[8]} which rejected the approach.

Further, the practice of deep-packet inspection, which is sometimes used in the process of network management, raises privacy concerns as it seeks to go beyond what is "public" information in the header of an IP packet, necessary for routing, to analysing non-public information. ^{^[9]}

3.2 What conditions and factors may change these concerns and the regulatory model we should adopt?

While the principles relating to Net Neutrality remain the same in all countries (i.e., trying to prevent gatekeepers from unjustly exploiting their position), the severity of the problem varies depending on competition in the market, on the technologies, and on many other factors. One way to measure fair or stable allocation of the surplus created by a network - or a network-of-networks like the Internet - is by treating it as a convex cooperation game and thereupon calculating that game's Shapley value:^{^[10]} in the case of the Internet, this would be a game involving content ISPs, transit ISPs, and eyeball (i.e., last-mile) ISPs. The Shapley value changes depending on the number of competitors there are in the market: thus, the fair/stable allocation when there's vibrant competition in the market is different from the fair/stable allocation in a market without such competition. That goes to show that a desirable approach when an ISP tries to unjustly enrich itself by charging other network-participants may well be to increase competition, rather than directly regulating the last-mile ISP. Further, it shows that in a market with vibrant last-mile competition, the capacity of the last-mile ISP to unjustly are far diminished.

In countries which are remote and have little international bandwidth, the need to conserve that bandwidth is high. ISPs can regulate that by either increasing prices of Internet connections for all, or by imposing usage restrictions (such as throttling) on either heavy users or bandwidth-hogging protocols. If the amount of international bandwidth is higher, the need and desire on part of ISPs to indulge in such usage restrictions decreases. Thus, the need to regulate is far higher in the latter case, than in the former case.

The above paragraphs show that both the need for regulation and also the form that the regulation should take depend on a variety of conditions that aren't immediately apparent.

Thus, the framework that the regulator sets out to tackle issues relating to Net Neutrality are most important, whereas the specific rules may need to change depending on changes in conditions. These conditions include:

● last-mile market

○ switching costs between equivalent service providers

○ availability of an open-access last-mile

○ availability of a "public option" neutral ISP

○ increase or decrease in the competition, both in wired and mobile ISPs.

● interconnection market

○ availability of well-functioning peering exchanges

○ availability of low-cost transit

● technology and available bandwidth

○ spectrum efficiency

○ total amount of international bandwidth and local network bandwidth

● conflicting interests of ISPs

○ do the ISPs have other business interests other than providing Internet connectivity? (telephony, entertainment, etc.)

3.3 How should we deal with anti-competitive practices?

Anti-competitive practices in the telecom sector can take many forms: Abuse of dominance, exclusion of access to specific services, customer lock-in, predatory pricing, tying of services, cross-subsidization, etc., are a few of them. In some cases the anti-competitive practice targets other telecom providers, while in others it targets content providers. In the both cases, it is important to ensure that ensure that telecom subscribers have a competitive choice between effectively substitutable telecom providers and an ability to seamlessly switch between providers.

3.3.1 Lowering Switching Costs

TRAI has tackled many of these issues head on, especially in the mobile telephony space, while competitive market pressures have helped too:

● Contractual or transactional lock-in. The easiest way to prevent shifting from one network to another is by contractually mandating a lock-in period, or by requiring special equipment (interoperability) to connect to one's network. In India, this is not practised in the telecom sector, with the exception of competing technologies like CDMA and GSM. Non-contractual lock-ins, for instance by offering discounts for purchasing longer-term packages, are not inherently anti-competitive unless that results in predatory pricing or constitutes an abuse of market dominance. In India, switching from one mobile provider to another, though initiated 15 years into the telecom revolution, is in most cases now almost as easy as buying a new SIM card.^{^[11]} TRAI may consider proactive regulation against contractual lock-in.

● Number of competitors. Even if switching from one network to another is easy, it is not useful unless there are other equivalent options to switch to. In the telecom market, coverage is a very important factor in judging equivalence. Given that last mile connectivity is extremely expensive to provide, the coverage of different networks are very different, and this is even more true when one considers wired connectivity, which is difficult to lay in densely-populated urban and semi-urban areas and unprofitable in sparsely-populated areas. The best way to increase the number of competitors is to make it easier for competitors to exist. Some ways of doing this would be through enabling spectrum-sharing, lowering right-of-way rents, allowing post-auction spectrum trading, and promoting open-access last-mile fibre carriers and to thereby encourage competition on the basis of price and service and not exclusive access to infrastructure.

● Interconnection and mandatory carriage. The biggest advantage a dominant telecom player has is exclusive access to its customer base. Since in the telecom market, no telco wants to not connect to customers of another telco, they do not outright ban other networks. However, dominant players can charge high prices from other networks, thereby discriminating against smaller networks. In the early 2000s, Airtel-to-Airtel calls were much cheaper than Airtel-to-Spice calls. However, things have significantly changed since then. TRAI has, since the 2000s, heavily regulated interconnection and imposed price controls on interconnection ("termination") charges.^{^[12]} Thus, now, generally, inter-network calls are priced similarly to intra-network calls. And if you want cheaper Airtel-to-Airtel calls, you can buy a special (unbundled) pack that enables an Airtel customer to take advantage of the fact that her friends are also on the same network, and benefits Airtel since they do not in such cases have to pay termination charges. Recently, TRAI has even made the interconnection rates zero in three cases: landline-to-landline, landline-to-cellular, and cellular-to-landline, in a bid to decrease landline call rates, and incentivise them, allowing a very low per call interconnection charges of 14 paise for cellular-to-cellular connections. ^{^[13]}

○ With regard to Net Neutrality, we must have a rule that no termination charges or carriage charges may be levied by any ISP upon any Internet service. No Internet service may be discriminated against with regard to carriage conditions or speeds or any other quality of service metric. In essence all negative discrimination should be prohibited. This means that Airtel cannot forcibly charge WhatsApp or any other OTT (which essentially form a different "layer") money for the "privilege" of being able to reach Airtel customers, nor may Airtel slow down WhatsApp traffic and thus try to force WhatsApp to pay. There is a duty on telecom providers to carry any legitimate traffic ("common carriage"), not a privilege. It is important to note that consumer-facing TSPs get paid by other interconnecting Internet networks in the form of transit charges (or the TSP's costs are defrayed through peering). There shouldn't be any separate charge on the basis of content (different layer from the carriage) rather than network (same layer as the carriage). This principle is especially important for startups, and which are often at the receiving end of such discriminatory practices.

● Number Portability. One other factor that prevents users from shifting between one network and another is the fact that they have to change an important aspect of their identity: their phone number (this doesn't apply to Internet over DSL, cable, etc.). At least in the mobile space, TRAI has for several years tried to mandate seamless mobile number portability. The same is being tried by the European Commission in the EU. ^{^[14]} While intra-circle mobile number portability exists in India - and TRAI is pushing for inter-circle mobile number portability as well^{^[15]} - this is nowhere as seamless as it should be.

● Multi-SIM phones. The Indian market is filled with phones that can accommodate multiple SIM cards, enabling customers to shift seamlessly between multiple networks. This is true not just in India, but most developing countries with extremely price-sensitive customers. Theoretically, switching costs would approach zero if in a market with full coverage by n telecom players every subscriber had a phone with n SIM slots with low-cost SIM cards being available.

The situation in the telecom sector with respect to the above provides a stark contrast to the situation in the USA, and to the situation in the DTH market. In the USA, phones get sold at discounts with multi-month or multi-year contracts, and contractual lock-ins are a large problem. Keeping each of the above factors in mind, the Indian mobile telecom space is far more competitive than the US mobile telecom space.

Further, in the Indian DTH market, given that there is transactional lock-in (set-top boxes aren't interoperable in practice, though are mandated to be so by law^{^[16]}), there are fewer choices in the market; further, the equivalent of multi-SIM phones don't exist with respect to set-top boxes. Further, while there are must-carry rules with respect to carriage, they can be of three types: 1) must mandatorily provide access to particular channels^{^[17]} (positive obligation, usually for government channels); 2) prevented from not providing particular channels (negative obligation, to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and political censorship); and 3) must mandatorily offer access to at least a set number of channels (positive obligation for ensuring market diversity). ^{^[18]} Currently, only (1) is in force, since despite attempts by TRAI to ensure (3) as well.^{^[19]}

If the shifting costs are low and transparency in terms of network practice is reported in a standard manner and well-publicised, then that significantly weakens the "gatekeeper effect", which as we saw earlier, is the reason why we wish to introduce Net Neutrality regulation. This consequently means, as explained above in section 3.2, that despite the same Net Neutrality principles applying in all markets and countries, the precise form that the Net Neutrality regulations take in a telecom market with low switching costs would be different from the form that such regulations would take in a market with high switching costs.

3.3.2 Anti-competitive Practices

Some potential anti-competitive practices, which are closely linked, are cross-subsidization, tying (anti-competitive bundling) of multiple services, and vertical price squeeze. All three of these are especial concerns now, with the increased diversification of traditional telecom companies, and with the entry into telecom (like with DTH) of companies that create content. Hence, if Airtel cross-subsidizes the Hike chat application that it recently acquired, ^{^[20]} or if Reliance Infocomm requires customers to buy a subscription to an offering from Reliance Big Entertainment, or if Reliance Infocomm meters traffic from another Reliance Big Entertainment differently from that from Saavn, all those would be violative of the principle of non-discrimination by gatekeepers. This same analysis can be applied to all unpaid deals and non-commercial deals, including schemes such as Internet.org and Wikipedia Zero, which will be covered later in the section on zero-rating.

While we have general rules such as sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, we do not currently have specific rules prohibiting these or other anti-competitive practices, and we need Net Neutrality regulation that clearly prohibit such anti-competitive practices so that the telecom regulator can take action for non-compliance . We cannot leave these specific policy prescriptions unstated, even if they are provided for in section 3 of the Competition Act. These concerns are especial concerns in the telecom sector, and the telecom regulator or arbitrator should have the power to directly deal with these, instead of each case going to the Competition Commission of India. This should not affect the jurisdiction of the CCI to investigate and adjudicate such matters, but should ensure that TRAI both has suo motu powers, and that the mechanism to complain is made simple (unlike the current scenario, where some individual complainants may fall in the cracks between TRAI and TDSAT).

3.3.3 Zero-rating

Since a large part of the net neutrality debate in India involves zero-rating practices, we deal with that in some length. Zero-rating is the practice of not counting (aka "zero-rating") certain traffic towards a subscriber's regular Internet usage. The zero-rated traffic could be zero-priced or fixed-price; capped or uncapped; subscriber-paid, Internet service-paid, paid for by both, or unpaid; content- or source/destination-based, or agnostic to content or source/destination; automatically provided by the ISP or chosen by the customer . The motivations for zero-rating may also be varied, as we shall see below. Further, depending on the circumstances, zero-rating could be competitive or anti-competitive. All forms of zero-rating result in some form of discrimination, but not all zero-rating is harmful, nor does all zero-rating need to be prohibited.

While, as explained in the section on interconnection and carriage above, negative discrimination at the network level should be prohibited, that leaves open the question of positive discrimination. It follows from section 3.1 that the right frame of analysis of this question is harm to competition, since the main harm zero-rating is, as we shall see below, about discriminating between different content providers, and not discrimination at the level of protocols, etc.

Whether one should allow for any form of positive discrimination at the network level or not depends on whether positive discrimination of (X) has an automatic and unfair negative impact on all (~X). That, in turn, depends on whether (~X) is being subject to unfair competition. As Wikipedia notes, "unfair competition means that the gains of some participants are conditional on the losses of others, when the gains are made in ways which are illegitimate or unjust." Thus, positive discrimination that has a negative impact on effective competition shall not be permitted, since in such cases it is equivalent to negative discrimination ("zero-sum game") . Positive discrimination that does not have a negative impact on effective competition may be permitted, especially since it results in increased access and increases consumer benefit, as long as the harm to openness and diversity is minimized .

While considering this, one should keep in mind the fact that startups were, 10-15 years ago, at a huge disadvantage with regard to wholesale data purchase. The marketplaces for data centres and for content delivery networks (which speed up delivery of content by being located closer, in network terms, to multiple last-mile ISPs) were nowhere near as mature as they are today, and the prices were high. There was a much higher barrier to startup entry than there is today, due to the prices and due to larger companies being able to rely on economies of scale to get cheaper rates. Was that unfair? No. There is no evidence of anti-competitive practices, nor of startups complaining about such practices. Therefore, that was fair competition, despite specific input costs that were arguably needed (though not essential) for startups to compete being priced far beyond their capacity to pay.

Today the marketplace is very different, with a variety of offerings. CDNs such as Cloudflare, which were once the preserve of rich companies, even have free offerings, thus substantially lowering barriers for startups that want faster access to customers across the globe.

Is a CDN an essential cost for a startup? No. But in an environment where speed matters and customers use or don't use a service depending on speed; and where the startup's larger competitors are all using CDNs, a startup more or less has to. Thankfully, given the cheap access to CDNs these days, that cost is not too high for a startup to bear. If the CDN market was not competitive enough, would a hypothetical global regulator have been justified in outright banning the use of CDNs to 'level' the playing field? No, because the hypothetical global regulator instead had the option to (and would have been justified in) regulating the market to ensure greater competition.

A regulator should not prohibit an act that does not negatively impact access, competition, consumer benefit, nor openness (including diversity), since that would be over-regulation and would harm innovation.

3.3.3.1 Motivations for Zero-Rating

3.3.3.1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility / Incentivizing Customers to Move Up Value Chain

There exist multiple instances where there is no commercial transaction between the OTT involved and the telecom carrier, in which zero-priced zero-rating of specific Internet content happens. We know that there is no commercial transaction either through written policy (Wikipedia Zero) or through public statements (Internet.org, a bouquet of sites). In such cases, the telecom provider would either be providing such services out of a sense of public interest, given the social value of those services, or would be providing such services out of self-interest, to showcase the value of particular Internet set the same time.

The apprehended risk is that of such a scheme creating a "walled garden", where users would be exposed only to those services which are free since the search and discovery costs of non-free Internet (i.e., any site outside the "walled garden") would be rather high. This risk, while real, is rather slim given the fact that the economic incentives for those customers who have the ability to pay for "Internet packs" but currently do not find a compelling reason to do so, or out of both a sense of public interest and self-interest of the telecom providers works against this.

In such non-commercial zero-priced zero-rating, a telecom provider would only make money if and only if subscribers start paying for sites outside of the walled garden. If subscribers are happy in the walled garden, the telecom provider starts losing money, and hence has a strong motivation to stop that scheme. If on the other hand, enough subscribers start becoming paying customers to offset the cost of providing the zero-priced zero-rated service(s) and make it profitable, that shows that despite the availability of zero-priced options a number of customers will opt for paid access to the open Internet and the open Web, and the overall harms of such zero-priced zero-rating would be minimal. Hence, the telecom providers have an incentive to keep the costs of Internet data packs low, thus encouraging customers who otherwise wouldn't pay for the Internet to become paying customers.

There is the potential of consumer harm when users seek to access a site outside of the walled garden, and find to their dismay that they have been charged for the Internet at a hefty rate, and their prepaid balance has greatly decreased. This is an issue that TRAI is currently appraised of, and a suitable solution would need to be found to protect consumers against such harm.

All in all, given that the commercial interests of the telecom providers align with the healthy practice of non-discrimination, this form of limited positive discrimination is not harmful in the long run, particularly because it is not indefinitely sustainable for a large number of sites. Hence, it may not be useful to ban this form of zero-priced zero-rating of services as long as they aren't exclusive, or otherwise anti-competitive (a vertical price-squeeze, for instance), and the harm to consumers is prohibited and the harm to openness/diversity is minimized.

3.3.3.1.2 Passing on ISP Savings / Incentivizing Customers to Lower ISP's Cost

Suppose, for instance, an OTT uses a CDN located, in network distance terms, near an eyeball ISP. In this case, the ISP has to probably pay less than it would have to had the same data been located in a data centre located further away, given that it would have fewer interconnection-related charges.

Hence the monetary costs of providing access to different Web destinations are not equal for the ISP. This cost can be varied either by the OTT (by it locating the data closer to the ISP - through a CDN, by co-locating where the ISP is also present, or by connecting to an Internet Exchange Point which the ISP is also connected to - or by it directly "peering" with the ISP) or by the ISP (by engaging in "transparent proxying" in which case the ISP creates caches at the ISP level of specific content (usually by caching non-encrypted data the ISP's customers request) and serves the cached content when a user requests a site, rather than serving the actual site). None of the practices so far mentioned are discriminatory from the customer's perspective with regard either to price or to prioritization, though all of them enable faster speeds to specific content. Hence none of the above-mentioned practices are considered even by the most ardent Net Neutrality advocates to be violations of that principle. ^{^[21]} However, if an ISP zero-rates the content to either pass on its savings to the customer^{^[22]} or to incentivize the customer to access services that cost the ISP less in terms of interconnection costs, that creates a form of price discrimination for the customer, despite it benefiting the consumer.

The essential economic problem is that the cost to the ISP is variable, but the cost to the customer is fixed. Importantly, this problem is exacerbated in India where web hosting prices are high, transit prices are high, peering levels are low, and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) are not functioning well. ^{^[23]} These conditions create network inefficiencies in terms of hosting of content further away from Indian networks in terms of network distance, and thus harms consumers as well as local ISPs. In order to set this right, zero-rating of this sort may be permitted as it acts as an incentive towards fixing the market fundamentals. However, once the market fundamentals are fixed, such zero-rating may be prohibited.

This example shows that the desirability or otherwise of discriminatory practices depends fully on the conditions present in the market, including in terms of interconnection costs.

3.3.3.1.3 Unbundling Internet into Services ("Special Packs")

Since at least early 2014, mobile operators have been marketing special zero-rating "packs". These packs, if purchased by the customer, allow capped or in some instances uncapped, zero-rating of a service such as WhatsApp or Facebook, meaning traffic to/from that service will not be counted against their regular Internet usage.

For a rational customer, purchasing such a pack only makes sense in one of two circumstances:

● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, but has not purchased an "Internet data pack" since she doesn't find the Internet valuable. Instead, she has heard about "WhatsApp", has friends who are on it, and wishes to use that to reduce her SMS costs (and thereby eat into the carriage provider's ability to charge separately for SMSes). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for around ₹25 a month instead of paying ₹95 for an all-inclusive Internet data pack.

● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, and has purchased an "Internet data pack". However, that data pack is capped and she has to decide between using WhatsApp and surfing web sites. She is on multiple WhatsApp groups and her WhatsApp traffic eats up 65% of her data cap. She thus has to choose between the two, since she doesn't want to buy two Internet data packs (each costing around ₹95 for a month). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for ₹25 a month, paying a cumulative total of ₹120 instead of ₹190 which she would have had to had she bought two Internet data packs. In this situation, "unbundling" is happening, and this benefits the consumer. Such unbundling harms the openness and integrity of the Internet.

If users did not find value in the "special" data packs, and there is no market demand for such products, they will cease to be offered. Thus, assuming a telco's decision to offer such packs is purely customer-demand driven - and not due to deals it has struck with service providers - if Orkut is popular, telcos would be interested in offering Orkut packs and if Facebook is popular, they would be interested in offering a Facebook pack. Thus, clearly, there is nothing anti-competitive about such customer-paid zero-rating packs, whereas they clearly enhance consumer benefit. Would this increase the popularity of Orkut or Facebook? Potentially yes. But to prohibit this would be like prohibiting a supermarket from selectively (and non-collusively) offering discounts on popular products. Would that make already popular products even more popular? Potentially, yes. But that would not be seen as a harm to competition but would be seen as fair competition. This contravenes the "openness" of the Internet (i.e., the integral interconnected diversity that an open network like the Internet embodies) as an independent regulatory goal. The Internet, being a single gateway to a mind-boggling variety of services, allows for a diverse "long tail", which would lose out if the Internet was seen solely as a gateway to popular apps, sites, and content. However, given that this is a choice exercised freely by the consumer, such packs should not be prohibited, as that would be a case of over-regulation.

The one exception to the above analysis of competition, needless to say, is if that these special packs aren't purely customer-demand driven and are the product of special deals between an OTT and the telco. In that case, we need to ensure it isn't anti-competitive by following the prescriptions of the next section.

3.3.3.1.4 Earning Additional Revenues from Content Providers

With offerings like Airtel Zero, we have a situation where OTT companies are offering to pay for wholesale data access used by their customers, and make accessing their specific site or app free for the customer. From the customer's perspective, this is similar to a toll-free number or a pre-paid envelope or free-to-air TV channel being offered on a particular network.

However, from the network perspective, these are very different. Even if a customer-company pays Airtel for the toll-free number, that number is accessible and toll-free across all networks since the call terminates on Airtel networks and Airtel pays the connecting network back the termination charge from the fee they are paid by the customer-company. This cannot happen in case of the Internet, since the "call" terminates outside of the reach of the ISP being paid for zero-rating by the OTT company; hence unless specific measures are taken, zero-rating has to be network-specific.

The comparison to free-to-air channels is also instructive, since in 2010 TRAI made recommendations that consumers should have the choice of accessing free-to-air channels à-la-carte, without being tied up to a bouquet.^{^[24]} This would, in essence, allow a subscriber to purchase a set-top box, and without paying a regular subscription fee watch free-to-air channels. ^{^[25]} However, similar to toll-free numbers, these free-to-air channels are free-to-air on all MSO's set-top boxes, unlike the proposed Airtel Zero scheme under which access to a site like Flipkart would be free for customers on Airtel's network alone.

Hence, these comparisons, while useful in helping think through the regulatory and competition issues, should not be used as instructive exact analogies, since they aren't fully comparable situations.

3.3.3.1.5 Market Options for OTT-Paid Zero-Rating

As noted above, a competitive marketplace already exists for wholesale data purchase at the level of "content ISPs" (including CDNs), which sell wholesale data to content providers (OTTs). This market is at present completely unregulated. The deals that exist are treated as commercial secrets. It is almost certain that large OTTs get better rates than small startups due to economies of scale.

However, at the eyeball ISP level, it is a single-sided market with ISPs competing to gain customers in the form of end-users. With a scheme like "Airtel Zero", this would get converted into a double-sided market, with a gatekeeper without whom neither side can reach the other being in the middle creating a two-sided toll. This situation is ripe for market abuse: this situation allows the gatekeeper to hinder access to those OTTs that don't pay the requisite toll or to provide preferential access to those who pay, apart from providing an ISP the opportunity to "double-dip".

One way to fix this is to prevent ISPs from establishing a double-sided market. The other way would be to create a highly-regulated market where the gatekeeping powers of the ISP are diminished, and the ISP's ability to leverage its exclusive access over its customers are curtailed. A comparison may be drawn here to the rules that are often set by standard-setting bodies where patents are involved: given that these patents are essential inputs, access to them must be allowed through fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licences. Access to the Internet and common carriers like telecom networks, being even more important (since alternatives exist to particular standards, but not to the Internet itself), must be placed at an even higher pedestal and thus even stricter regulation to ensure fair competition.

A marketplace of this sort would impose some regulatory burdens on TRAI and place burdens on innovations by the ISPs, but a regulated marketplace harms ISP innovation less than not allowing a market at all.

At a minimum, such a marketplace must ensure non-exclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency. Thus, at a minimum, a telecom provider cannot discriminate between any OTTs who want similar access to zero-rating. Further, a telecom provider cannot prevent any OTT from zero-rating with any other telecom provider. To ensure that telecom providers are actually following this stipulation, transparency is needed, as a minimum.

Transparency can take one of two forms: transparency to the regulator alone and transparency to the public. Transparency to the regulator alone would enable OTTs and ISPs to keep the terms of their commercial transactions secret from their competitors, but enable the regulator, upon request, to ensure that this doesn't lead to anti-competitive practices. This model would increase the burden on the regulator, but would be more palatable to OTTs and ISPs, and more comparable to the wholesale data market where the terms of such agreements are strictly-guarded commercial secrets. On the other hand, requiring transparency to the public would reduce the burden on the regulator, despite coming at a cost of secrecy of commercial terms, and is far more preferable.

Beyond transparency, a regulation could take the form of insisting on standard rates and terms for all OTT players, with differential usage tiers if need be, to ensure that access is truly non-discriminatory. This is how the market is structured on the retail side.

Since there are transaction costs in individually approaching each telecom provider for such zero-rating, the market would greatly benefit from a single marketplace where OTTs can come and enter into agreements with multiple telecom providers.

Even in this model, telecom networks will be charging based not only on the fact of the number of customers they have, but on the basis of them having exclusive routing to those customers. Further, even under the standard-rates based single-market model, a particular zero-rated site may be accessible for free from one network, but not across all networks: unlike the situation with a toll-free number in which no such distinction exists.

To resolve this, the regulator may propose that if an OTT wishes to engage in paid zero-rating, it will need to do so across all networks, since if it doesn't there is risk of providing an unfair advantage to one network over another and increasing the gatekeeper effect rather than decreasing it.

However, all forms of competitive Internet service-paid zero-priced zero-rating, even when they don't harm competition, innovation amongst content providers, or consumers, will necessarily harm openness and diversity of the Internet. For instance, while richer companies with a strong presence in India may pay to zero-rate traffic for their Indian customers, decentralized technologies such as XMPP and WebRTC, having no central company behind them, would not, leading to customers preferring proprietary networks and solutions to such open technologies, which in turn, thanks to the network effect, leads to a vicious cycle. These harms to openness and diversity have to be weighed against the benefit in terms of increase in access when deciding whether to allow for competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating, as such competition doesn't exist in a truly level playing field . Further, it must be kept in mind that there are forms of zero-priced zero-rating that decrease the harm to openness / diversity, or completely remove that harm altogether: that there are other options available must be acknowledged by the regulator when considering the benefit to access from competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating.

3.3.3.1.6 Other options for zero-rating

There are other models of zero-priced zero-rating that either minimize the harm is that of ensuring free Internet access for every person. This can take the form of:^{^[26]}

● A mandatorily "leaky" 'walled garden':

○ The first-degree of all hyperlinks from the zero-rated OTT service are also free.

○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers during specified hours.

○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers based on amount on usage of the OTT service.^{^[27]}

● Zero-rating of all Web traffic

○ In exchange for viewing of advertisements

○ In exchange for using a particular Web browser

○ At low speeds on 3G, or on 2G.

3.3.3.2. What kinds of zero-rating are good

The majority of the forms of zero-rating covered in this section are content or source/destination-based zero-rating. Only some of the options covered in the "other options for zero-rating" section cover content-agnostic zero-rating models. Content-agnostic zero-rating models are not harmful, while content-based zero-rating models always harm, though to varying degrees, the openness of the Internet / diversity of OTTs, and to varying degrees increase access to Internet-based services. Accordingly, here is an hierarchy of desirability of zero-priced zero-rating, from most desirable to most harmful:

1. Content- & source/destination-agnostic zero-priced zero-rating.^{^[28]}

2. Content- & source/destination-based non-zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, chosen freely & paid for by users. ^{^[29]}

3. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, with full transparency. ^{^[30]}

4. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of commercial deal with partial zero-priced access to all content, with non-discriminatory access to the same deal by all with full transparency.^{^[31]}

5. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of a non-commercial deal, without any benefits monetary or otherwise, flowing directly or indirectly from the provider of the zero-rated content to the ISP, with full transparency. ^{^[32]}

6. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, across all telecom networks, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

7. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

8. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

9. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and transparency to the regulator.

10. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any regulatory framework in place.

3.3.4 Cartels and Oligopoly

While cartels and oligopolies may have an impact on Net Neutrality, they are not problems that any set of anti-discrimination rules imposed on gatekeepers can fix. Further, cartels and oligopolies don't directly enhance the ability of gatekeepers to unjustly discriminate if there are firm rules against negative discrimination and price ceilings and floors on data caps are present for data plans. Given this, TRAI should recommend that this issue be investigated and the Competition Commission of India should take this issue up.

3.4 Reasonable Network Management Principles

Reasonable network management has to be allowed to enable the ISPs to manage performance and costs on their network. However, ISPs may not indulge in acts that are harmful to consumers in the name of reasonable network management. Below are a set of guidelines for when discrimination against classes of traffic in the name of network management are justified.

● Discrimination between classes of traffic for the sake of network management should only be permissible if:

○ there is an intelligible differentia between the classes which are to be treated differently, and

○ there is a rational nexus between the differential treatment and the aim of such differentiation, and

○ the aim sought to be furthered is legitimate, and is related to the security, stability, or efficient functioning of the network, or is a technical limitation outside the control of the ISP^{^[33]}, and

○ the network management practice is the least harmful manner in which to achieve the aim.

● Provision of specialized services (i.e., "fast lanes") is permitted if and only if it is shown that

○ The service is available to the user only upon request, and not without their active choice, and

○ The service cannot be reasonably provided with "best efforts" delivery guarantee that is available over the Internet, and hence requires discriminatory treatment, or

○ The discriminatory treatment does not unduly harm the provision of the rest of the Internet to other customers.

These principles are only applicable at the level of ISPs, and not on access gateways for institutions that may in some cases be run by ISPs (such as a university network, free municipal WiFi, at a work place, etc.), which are not to be regulated as common carriers.

These principles may be applied on a case-by-case basis by a regulator, either suo motu or upon complaint by customers.

^{^[1]} Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, (19 May 2011), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf.

^{^[2]} Available at http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/userfiles/file/NTP%202012.pdf.

^{^[3]} IAMAI, India to Cross 300 million internet users by Dec 14, (19 November, 2014), http://www.iamai.in/PRelease_detail.aspx?nid=3498&NMonth=11&NYear=2014.

^{^[4]} World Economic Forum, The Global Information Technology Report 2015, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_IT_Report_2015.pdf.

^{^[5]} http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/4.1#s4.1.1

^{^[6]} See R.U.S. Prasad, The Impact of Policy and Regulatory Decisions on Telecom Growth in India (July 2008), http://web.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/SCID361.pdf.

^{^[7]} 1973 AIR 106

^{^[8]} 1962 AIR 305

^{^[9]} "When ISPs go beyond their traditional use of IP headers to route packets, privacy risks begin to emerge." Alissa Cooper, How deep must DPI be to incur privacy risk? http://www.alissacooper.com/2010/01/25/how-deep-must-dpi-be-to-incur-privacy-risk/

^{^[10]} Richard T.B. Ma & Vishal Misra, The Public Option: A Non-Regulatory Alternative to Network Neutrality, http://dna-pubs.cs.columbia.edu/citation/paperfile/200/netneutrality.pdf

^{^[11]} Mobile number portability was launched in India on January 20, 2011 in the Haryana circle. See http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-launches-nationwide-mobile-number-portability/1/127176.html . Accessed on April 24, 2015.

^{^[12]} For a comprehensive list of all TRAI interconnection regulations & subsequent amendments, see http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[13]} See Telecommunication Interconnection Usage Charges (Eleventh Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (1 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[14]} Article 30 of the Universal Service Directive, Directive 2002/22/EC.

^{^[15]} See Telecommunication Mobile Number Portability (Sixth Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (3 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[16]} The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Seventh) (The Direct to Home Services) Tariff Order, 2015 (2 of 2015).

^{^[17]} Section 8, Cable Television Networks Act, 1995.

^{^[18]} TRAI writes new rules for Cable TV, Channels, Consumers, REAL TIME NEWS, (August 11, 2014), http://rtn.asia/rtn/233/1220_trai-writes-new-rules-cable-tv-channels-consumers.

^{^[19]} An initial requirement for all multi system operators to have a minimum capacity of 500 channels was revoked by the TDSAT in 2012. For more details, see http://www.televisionpost.com/cable/msos-not-required-to-have-500-channel-headends-tdsat/.

^{^[20]} Aparna Ghosh, Bharti SoftBank Invests $14 million in Hike, LIVE MINT, (April 2, 2014), http://www.livemint.com/Companies/nI38YwQL2eBgE6j93lRChM/Bharti-SoftBank-invests-14-million-in-mobile-messaging-app.html.

^{^[21]} Mike Masnick, Can We Kill This Ridiculous Shill-Spread Myth That CDNs Violate Net Neutrality? They Don't, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140812/04314528184/can-we-kill-this-ridiculous-shill-spread-myth-that-cdns-violate-net-neutrality-they-dont.shtml.

^{^[22]} Mathew Carley, What is Hayai's stance on "Net Neutrality"?, https://www.hayai.in/faq/hayais-stance-net-neutrality?c=mgc20150419

^{^[23]} Helani Galpaya & Shazna Zuhyle, South Asian Broadband Service Quality: Diagnosing the Bottlenecks, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1979928

^{^[24]} DTH players told to offer pay channels on la carte basis, HINDU BUSINESS LINE (July 22, 2010), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/dth-players-told-to-offer-pay-channels-on-la-carte-basis/article999298.ece.

^{^[25]} The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Fourth) (Addressable Systems) Tariff Order, 2010.

^{^[26]} These suggestions were provided by Helani Galpaya and Sunil Abraham, based in some cases on existing practices.

^{^[27]} This is what is being followed by the Jana Loyalty Program: http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/05/06/with-a-new-loyalty-program-mobile-app-marketplace-jana-pushes-deeper-into-the-developing-world/

^{^[28]} Example: free Internet access at low speeds, with data caps.

^{^[29]} Example: special "packs" for specific services like WhatsApp.

^{^[30]} Example: zero-rating of all locally-peered settlement-free traffic.

^{^[31]} Example: "leaky" walled gardens, such as the Jana Loyalty Program that provide limited access to all of the Web alongside access to the zero-rated content.

^{^[32]} Example: Wikipedia Zero.

^{^[33]} A CGNAT would be an instance of such a technology that poses network limitations.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/regulatory-perspectives-on-net-neutrality

Definition of Net Neutrality should be flexible: Pranesh Prakash

pranesh — 2015-06-19T01:43:04Z

Critics argue that Facebook’s Internet.org violates the principle of Net Neutrality.

The article by Sanjay Vijaykumar was published in the Hindu on May 10, 2015. Pranesh Prakash is extensively quoted.

The definition of Net Neutrality should be flexible enough to allow for experimentation with different models of providing cheaper Internet access and such experimentation needs to be regulated by the telecom regulator, Telecom and Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) according to Internet expert Pranesh Prakash.

Mr. Prakash was reacting to the business model of Boston-based start-up Jana, which said it had figured out a way to offer billions of people in the emerging world free access to the Internet, without violating the web’s open nature. The firm has launched Jana Loyalty, a product that seeks to reward its smartphone users in two ways. One, it reimburses users the cost of downloading and using an app of Jana’s clients. Two, it gives free additional data with which the user can access any content online.

“While Jana is like Internet.org, since it is Internet service-specific zero-rating, Jana Loyalty is what my colleague Sunil Abraham dubs a ‘leaky walled garden’. The walled garden (site-specific access) exists, but you also get free access to the whole of the Web in return. Given that there is no one universal definition of Net Neutrality, and given India currently doesn’t have a definition, I can’t answer if this is a violation of Net Neutrality,” said Mr. Prakash, who is Policy Director at The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), a Bangalore-based, non-profit, research and policy advocacy.

Facebook’s attempts to provide a limited version of the Internet free has been attracting criticism from supporters of Net Neutrality, especially in India. Critics argue that Facebook’s Internet.org, which offers users free access to a bouquet of pre-selected Web sites, violates the principle of Net Neutrality by choosing what is accessible and what isn’t. Facebook has reacted to this by opening up Internet.org to all developers who meet its guidelines. Mr. Prakash said the definition of Net Neturality should be flexible enough to allow for experimentation with different models of providing cheaper Internet access, including Jana Loyalty.

“However, such experimentation ought to be regulated by the telecom regulator. To minimise harm, they should be allowed on a case-by-case basis after the regulator has had an opportunity to conduct risk-benefit analysis against four goals it should seek to promote — universal and affordable access; effective competition; protection of consumers against harm; and diversity that arises from the openness and interconnectedness of the Internet,” he added.

Net neutrality is a principle that says Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should treat all traffic and content on their networks equally.

Why now?

Late last month, Trai released a draft consultation paper seeking views from the industry and the general public on the need for regulations for over-the-top (OTT) players such as Whatsapp, Skype, Viber etc, security concerns and net neutrality. The objective of this consultation paper, the regulator said, was to analyse the implications of the growth of OTTs and consider whether or not changes were required in the current regulatory framework.

What is an OTT?

OTT or over-the-top refers to applications and services which are accessible over the internet and ride on operators' networks offering internet access services. The best known examples of OTT are Skype, Viber, WhatsApp, e-commerce sites, Ola, Facebook messenger. The OTTs are not bound by any regulations. The Trai is of the view that the lack of regulations poses a threat to security and there’s a need for government’s intervention to ensure a level playing field in terms of regulatory compliance.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-sanjay-vijaykumar-may-10-2015-pranesh-prakash-on-definition-of-net-neutrality

Digital India: PM Modi to launch BJP's flagship programme likely in July

pranesh — 2015-08-22T16:45:33Z

The article by Jochelle Mendonca and Neha Alawadhi was published in the Economic Times on May 29, 2015.

The Modi government, which completed one year at the Centre, is preparing for a big-ticket launch of Digital India, taking technology to the villages and block levels, through merchandise, hackathons and games spread over a week-long initiative across the country.

The National e-Governance Division (NeGD), under the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY), has empanelled agencies for a messaging campaign, gamification, printing and merchandise, advertising and creatives, including advertising for rural outreach and social media.

Working directly with the Prime Minister's Office, NeGD has been tasked with preparing for the launch since February. Though no formal dates have been fixed yet, the Digital India Week (DIW) is likely to take off in July, and will involve stakeholders across state governments and ministries, and is expected to be the flagship programme for the second year of the BJP government, EThas learnt.

"They really want to make this the biggest programme of the second year. The idea is that many things have been done in the digital space that need to get highlighted," an individual with knowledge of the plans told ET.

The event is certainly being planned on a grand scale, according to the tender documents issued by the government. The government has asked for merchandise such as t-shirts, caps, trophies, pen drives and leather cloth and plastic bags. A gamification agency will work on the portals, mobile applications and social media handles to boost participation.

The messaging agency must be able to carry out, track, record and analyse 50 lakh to one crore messages a day. The event will be launched by the Prime Minister through a radio address on "Mann ki Baat", which will be followed by events at gram panchayats, block and sub divisional headquarters, district and state levels, eventually culminating in a national event, according to a presentation seen by ET.

As part of the run-up to the DIW, events such as hackathons, training programmes and webinars would be held in schools and colleges, followed by crowdsourcing ideas through the government's portal MyGov, as well as a new Digital India portal that is being designed. "It is a typical BJP-style campaign.

The Prime Minister does not want to hold the final day event in Delhi and the location is being finalised. All state and line ministries have been involved, and are being asked to showcase e-services and best practices, along with the launch of some programmes like digital locker," said another person familiar with the plans being rolled out for the DIW. The watch words of the campaign will be "inform, educate and engage", which will include taking the message of Digital India to the masses through educational institutions, industry and government agencies.

"It will educate people on various important services such as digital literacy, cyber hygiene and e-waste management, and also look at engaging a large number of people, especially youth on a continuous basis," said a person familiar with the ongoing preparation.

NeGD is looking at using the principles of gamification to gather feedback. Experts on e-governance say this is a good move as most e-governance projects, across the world, fail because there's not enough buy-in from stakeholders or the goals aren't communicated widely to the public.

"E-governance needs evangelising. That is what this campaign looks like it will do. Some parts are dated — such as posters and the print elements. But this is a good idea. Whether it works or not depends on the participation they see at the end," Sunil Abraham, director at the Centre for Internet and Society, said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-may-29-2015-jochelle-mendonca-and-neha-alawadhi-digital-india

Response to TRAI Consultation Paper on Regulatory Framework for Over-the-Top (OTT) Services

pranesh — 2015-05-09T11:27:15Z

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) sent a joint response to the TRAI Consultation Paper on Regulatory Framework for Over-the-top (OTT) Services with scholars from Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. The response was sent on March 27, 2015.

Executive Summary

The principle objective of net neutrality is that “all the Internet traffic has to be treated equally without any discrimination”; but this has had different interpretations over varied contexts. While the discourse in India has often treated net neutrality as a singular policy construct, we break down net neutrality to its various components. We then individually contextualise each component to the unique characteristics of the Indian telecommunications industry such as dependence on wireless internet access, the fragmented and non-contiguous distribution of spectrum, high competition between TEL-SPs and low digital literacy. The evolving nature of markets and networks are also considered while taking into account various public policy perspectives.

In this submission, we also argue for the need to introduce reasonable regulatory parity between functionally equivalent communications services provided by OTT-SPs and TEL-SPs. We compare the regulations for OTT-SPs under the Information Technology Act 2000 (as amended) with the regulations for TEL-SPs under the Telegraph Act 1885 (as amended), the license agreements (UL, UASL, ISP-L) and TRAI Regulations. Based on an analysis of the current laws and regulations, we suggest how TRAI needs to intervene to create this regulatory parity (for example in areas such as privacy, spam/UCC, interception etc.).

Through the above analysis, we recommend an overall regulatory framework that should be adopted by the Government. The framework takes a nuanced approach to various components of net neutrality, contextualised to India, and also attempts to bring reasonable regulatory parity. Instead of compartmentalising TEL-SPs and OTT-SPs as two distinct actors, the recommended framework considers a two-layered approach which recognises that there is an overlap between TEL-SPs and OTT-SPs. The first layer comprises of network and infrastructure (collectively called the network layer) and the second layer comprises of services and applications (collectively called the service layer).

The framework further divides the service layer into “Non-IP Services”, “Specialised Services” and “Internet Based Services”. The concept of “Specialised Services”, which is borrowed from the European Union, refers to traditional services that have migrated to an IP architecture such as facilities-based VoIP calls to PSTN and IPTV, and are either logically distinct from the Internet or have special needs which the “best efforts” delivery of the general Internet cannot satisfy. This concept helps in applying different evaluation criteria to functionally equivalent “Non-IP Services”, “Specialised Services” and “Internet Based Services”. In the framework, “Specialised Services” are also recognised as an exception to net neutrality. The concept of “Specialised Services” also helps to create an incentive for continued investment in underlying infrastructure by TEL-SPs.

This framework has helped us to bring a more balanced approach from the perspective of both TEL-SPs and OTT-SPs, while also taking into account technological convergence. It has also helped us to bring a more nuanced approach to various issues comprising net neutrality such as zero rating, paid prioritisation etc. We have considered best practices from different international regimes and the pros and cons during implementation in order to determine the exceptions and boundaries of net neutrality that should be adopted in India.

Download the full text of the Response

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/blog/joint-response-to-trai-consultation-paper-on-regulatory-framework-for-over-the-top-services

Financial Express hosts #NetNeutralityDebate: ‘Price discrimination can be allowed, but not for the same packet of data’

pranesh — 2015-04-27T02:18:18Z

Trying to cut through the noise on Net Neutrality in India, FICCI in partnership with Financial Express is hosting a panel discussion titled ‘Decoding Net Neutrality’ in New Delhi on Wednesday.

This was published in the Financial Express on April 24, 2015. Pranesh Prakash participated in the discussion.

Moderated by Sunil Jain, the guests on the Net Neutrality debate panel are Rajya Sabha MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar, Lok Sabha MP Baijayant Jay Panda along with ICRIER chief executive Dr Rajat Kathuria, IAMAI president Dr Subho Ray, Facebook’s head of public policy for South and Central Asia Ankhi Das, COAI director general Rajan S Mathew, Com First director Dr Mahesh Uppal and Policy Director of the Centre for Internet and Society Pranesh Prakash.

Highlights of the debate:

Starting off the discussion, Rajeev Chandrasekhar said that this issue is all about market abuse and market power and not as utopian as it sounds. He said that this debate is nothing new as regulators identified the problem long ago. Chandarasekhar added, “TRAI had recognized in 2006 that there is an opportunity to abuse by access providers.”

Joining the conversation, COAI director general Rajan S Mathew said, “We have put the cart before the horse. What needs to be addressed first is online governance.”

Looking forward, ICRIER chief executive Rajat Kathuria said that we need to figure out the best way to use this privately funded public good. He added, “We still haven’t so far.”

Video

Com First director Dr Mahesh Uppal tries to find a common ground and said, “Everyone is against ‘arbitrary commercial’ prioritisation or throttling.”

Subho Ray agreed and said, “There should be no blocking, throttling and preferential treatment.”

Facebook India’s Ankhi Das said that Internet.org is not for people who are already on the Internet. She explained, “Our objective is that it should be free and non-exclusive.”

Watch video: It’s free, no one has to pay to join the app, says Ankhi Das, Facebook India, on internet.org

Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director of the Centre for Internet and Society intervened to add, “An universally affordable model is important. We must ensure that the diversity that Internet provides is not lost.”

Taking the conversation further, Rajeev Chandrasekhar said, “I don’t believe data packets can be discriminated except in terms of speed and bandwidth.

Rajan Mathews interjected, “We do not discriminate, we differentiate. And all businesses differentiate.”

On this point, Rajat Kathuria said, “Price discrimination is something that should be allowed within boundaries of regulation.”

The Indian Express New Media Editor Nandagopal Rajan said that, “#NetNeutralityDebate panel agrees that price discrimination can be allowed, but not for the same packet of data.”

Jay Panda, Lok Sabha MP now also joins the discussion and says, “I have come out in favour of net neutrality despite the fact that my family will be benefiting from the lack of it. Whether fragmentation is desirable on the Internet or not, it needs to be debated. I am not in favour of fragmented access to the Internet.”

Watch video: There should be no prioritisation of one brand over another, says Baijayant Jay Panda on Net Neutrality

Underlining his views, Jay Panda reiterated, “Spectrum may be limited but access won’t be in the future. I am against prioritizing packets over others.”

Pranesh Prakash gave an overarching view and said, “Everyone benefits from Internet. What we need to figure out is whether everyone is getting paid enough.”

Jay Panda said, “It is possible for access providers to make money.”

Rajan Mathews said, “I think it is not fair to say that telcos can influence the govt.”

On this Jay Panda quipped, “The govt has to chip in its share to make the Internet accessible to all.”

Jay Panda says govts have been behind the curve in #NetNeutralityDebate and telcos have benefitted from it.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/financial-express-april-24-2015-net-neutrality-debate

Freedom struggle 2.0

pranesh — 2015-04-27T01:23:44Z

In the face of the debate on net neutrality, here is a look at the consequences of not having a free, equal, and private internet.

The article was published in the Hindu on April 25, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

There has been so much noise surrounding net neutrality (generously helped along by All India Bakchod’s explanatory video) that by now even my technology-abhorring grandmother knows something is rotten in the state of Denmark.

However, let us recap: net neutrality refers to a free and open Internet that lets us utilise every channel of communication without bias or — heaven forbid — having to pay extra dough. Paid sites and subscriptions excluded of course; the owners have to send their kids to college, you know. As to the Importance of net neutrality, it is “... a democratic principle (in line with the right to equality in our Constitution) and it is important for freedom of speech and expression,” says Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society.

“Evolving technologies cannot be regulated” was one of the opening lines of Almost Human, a science fiction/crime series that did not survive its debut season. A profound statement, especially in the light of the blistering debate over net neutrality. A debate that has the Twitterati frothing at the mouth and primed to spew sarcasm at those against them in what is being perceived as a battle of epic proportions. Sample these: @Roflindian: What if this net neutrality debate was a clever ploy by telcos to merrily push up rates? And we’ll be like — anything for net freedom! @GabbbarSingh: Someone should launch a start-up just to announce its support to #NetNeutrality “We at Random-Word-with-no-vowels support #NetNeutrality”. @madversity: Net Neutrality has become so popular in Delhi in just three days Aunties want to know where it is available so they can wear it for Karva Chauth.

The battle for net neutrality, in India at least, looks to have exacerbated suddenly in the past few weeks. In truth, however, the issue has been brewing for quite a while, fanned by the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) penchant for preparing sheaves of rules and regulations, sundry disputes and discourses by the Reddit demigods and anyone who owns a blog or a YouTube channel, the Bitcoin mafia’s complacent insistence on being the saviour of the web as we know it, and the rumours and filtered nuggets of news surrounding Google’s plans for a mobile virtual network operator (MVNO).

Here, then, are the main antagonists of our piece: telecom company Airtel (post its announcement of the ostensibly unpopular Airtel Zero plan, so much so that the CEO decided to grace Airtel’s users with an e-mail to “clear the air”) and Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) that has taken to pitting Davids (consumers) against Goliaths (telecom companies) by floating a paper (subject to discussion and a cannonade of indignant e-mails) containing “some of the strangest and some ridiculously biased statements”, as Nikhil Pahwa succinctly put it in a MediaNama piece.

According to Airtel’s CEO, their “vision is to have every Indian on the Internet. There are millions of Indians who think that the Internet is expensive and do not know what it can do for them… We know that if we allow them to experience the joys of the Internet they will join the digital revolution.” Noble thought, but the sentiment is marred by the sordid matter of blunt. “Airtel Zero is a technology platform that connects application providers to their customers for free. The platform allows any content or application provider to enrol on it so their customers can visit these sites for free. Instead of charging customers we charge the providers who choose to get on to the platform.” In effect, restricting the freedom of the consumer to choose what site he/she wishes to use.

And I wish telecoms would stop bandying about the word “free” like confetti at a wedding. ‘100 free SMSes per day! Only at Rs. 50 a month!’ Well, I’m still losing Rs. 50, aren’t I? Why would you insult my intelligence by telling me my 100 SMSes are free then? “Customers are free to choose which website they want to visit, whether it is toll free or not. If they visit a toll free site they are not charged for data. If they visit any other site normal data charges apply.” Well, pray tell us plebians, Mr. CEO, since companies like Flipkart, NDTV and others have already abandoned the Airtel Zero ship, and a Google probably mightn’t consider coming aboard, having bigger fish to fry (i.e. its MVNO plans), does not your unequal treatment of these websites go against the very backbone of net neutrality?

The debate on net neutrality has more far-reaching consequences, however, than just having to shell out extra to exchange annoying Whatsapp group messages all day long or Skyping with your significant other. The absence of neutrality will result in a barrage of unregulated technologies and the unprecedented growth of the deep web (the portion of Internet content that is not or cannot be indexed by regular or standard search engines — typically comprising around 90 per cent of data presently available on the World Wide Web). Most of the deep web is a fairly innocuous place, consisting of anything from library catalogues to your private folder of dead baby jokes, but it is also a lair of (mostly) undetectable criminal activity (case in point, the recent shutdown of Silk Road, an online black market for your every requirement, and I mean every requirement).

The deep web, naturally, is the best illustration of “a free, equal, and private Internet” (when its powers are harnessed for good, not evil) and so is its most popular currency — Bitcoin. A Bitcoin is, in the concise words of Danny Bradbury (in an informative CoinDesk piece), “a payment mechanism designed to level the playing field, driving out unnecessary costs and making it possible for even the lowest income members of society to participate in the economy. But it relies on a free and open Internet to do so.” And vice versa. Researchers have been working on a way to make micropayments and encryption work together without privacy or bandwidth compromise via mesh networks (faster connections through nearby peers, thus leading to net neutrality, and further to telecoms becoming skittish). However, steady price gains for Bitcoin as well as altcoins (alternative cryptocurrencies to bitcoin) are undeniable proof that telecoms may have to bow to the inevitable.

Also, in the absence of a free and open Internet, organisations like Wikileaks and Anonymous would abound with alacrity. While some would call that an excellent development, there are those who would want to banish Internet altogether from our fair land, making the aam junta cower, tremble and rage by turns at the usurping of its digital rights.

Another thing that seems to be troubling very few, especially in the wake of the wave of acrimony against Airtel, is Google’s plans to expand into the MVNO market. Google, so goes the news, is planning to go into partnership with Sprint and T-Mobile to further its plans of becoming a wireless carrier. While Google already provides free or subsidised Internet with Project Loon and Google Fiber, the new move could easily prove a challenge to net neutrality. Some see the move as harmless — in fact, for the greater good. Evidenced by a senior software engineer of my acquaintance who, since Google makes money by tracking user information and behaviour online and doesn’t prioritise certain kinds of traffic on the Internet access it provides currently, doesn’t see them having any incentive to do so in the cellular space. In fact, he finds the Google MVNO a fascinating move, especially since Sprint and T-Mobile have far fewer subscribers than ATT or Verizon — meaning that the MVNO provider is at the mercy of these MNOs and that, were Google to be successful with this, it means the MNOs are losing selling power. An interesting irony in the context of net neutrality. On the other hand, a researcher at Centre for Internet and Society and former tech journalist is of the opinion that Google may try to push its services since that has always been the case with corporates, whether they provide CSR freebies or diversify their business.

After all, “Who decides what we consume? What if tomorrow the government decides everyone watching YouTube is wasting their time, or [those] watching cricket should be doing something better? That starts to tread into censorship...” says Vijay Anand of The Startup Centre. I suppose all we can do is keep hope animatedly existent as to the triumph of the freedom in our webspace and spam TRAI’s inbox with as many e-mails as we can.

Net Neutrality

Net neutrality is a principle that says Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should treat all traffic and content on their networks equally.

How does net neutrality affect you?
The internet is now a level-playing field. Anybody can start up a website, stream music or use social media with the same amount of data that they have purchased with a particular ISP. But in the absence of neutrality, your ISP might favour certain websites over others for which you might have to pay extra. Website A might load at a faster speed than Website B because your ISP has a deal with Website A that Website B cannot afford. It’s like your electricity company charging you extra for using the washing machine, television and microwave oven above and beyond what you are already paying.

Why Now?

Key Players
Internet Service Providers like Airtel, Vodaphone, Reliance... The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India which lays down the rules for telecom companies The Internet companies like Facebook, Google, whatsapp and other smaller startups You, the consumer

What is an OTT?
OTT or over-the-top refers to applications and services which are accessible over the internet and ride on operators' networks offering internet access services. The best known examples of OTT are Skype, Viber, WhatsApp, e-commerce sites, Ola, Facebook messenger. The OTTs are not bound by any regulations. The Trai is of the view that the lack of regulations poses a threat to security and there’s a need for government’s intervention to ensure a level playing field in terms of regulatory compliance.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-zara-khan-april-25-2015-freedom-struggle

What Does Facebook's Transparency Report Tell Us About the Indian Government's Record on Free Expression & Privacy?

pranesh — 2015-04-05T05:08:37Z

Given India's online population, the number of user data requests made by the Indian government aren't very high, but the number of content restriction requests are not only high on an absolute number, but even on a per-user basis.

Further, Facebook's data shows that India is more successful at getting Facebook to share user data than France or Germany. Yet, our government complains far more about Facebook's lack of cooperation with Indian authorities than either of those countries do. I think it unfair for any government to raise such complaints unless that government independently shows to its citizens that it is making legally legitimate requests.

Since the Prime Minister of India Shri Narendra Modi has stated that "transparency and accountability are the two cornerstones of any pro-people government", the government ought to publish a transparency report about the requests it makes to Internet companies, and which must, importantly, provide details about how many user data requests actually ended up being used in a criminal case before a court, as well as details of all their content removal requests and the laws under which each request was made.

At the same time, Facebook's Global Government Requests Report implicitly showcases governments as the main causes of censorship and surveillance. This is far from the truth, and it behoves Facebook to also provide more information about private censorship requests that it accedes to, including its blocking of BitTorrent links, it's banning of pseudonymity, and the surveillance it carries out for its advertisers.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/what-does-facebook-transparency-report-tell-us-about-indian-government-record-on-free-expression-and-privacy

Three reasons why 66A verdict is momentous

pranesh — 2015-03-29T16:22:51Z

Earlier this week, the fundamental right to freedom of expression posted a momentous victory. The nation's top court struck down the much-reviled Section 66A of the IT Act — which criminalized communications that are "grossly offensive", cause "annoyance", etc — as "unconstitutionally vague", "arbitrarily, excessively, and disproportionately" encumbering freedom of speech, and likely to have a "chilling effect" on legitimate speech.

The article was published in the Times of India on March 29, 2015.

It also struck down Sec 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act on similar grounds. This is a landmark judgment, as it's possibly the first time since 1973's Bennett Coleman case that statutory law was struck down by the Supreme Court for violating our right to free expression.

The SC also significantly 'read down' the draconian 'Intermediary Guidelines Rules' which specify when intermediaries — website hosts and search engines — may be held liable for what is said online by their users. The SC held that intermediaries should not be forced to decide whether the online speech of their users is lawful or not. While the judgment leaves unresolved many questions — phrases like "grossly offensive", which the SC ruled were vague in 66A, occur in the Rules as well — the court's insistence on requiring either a court or a government order to be able to compel an intermediary to remove speech reduces the 'invisible censorship' that results from privatized speech regulation.

The SC upheld the constitutional validity of Sec 69A and the Website Blocking Rules, noting they had several safeguards: providing a hearing to the website owner, providing written reasons for the blocking, etc. However, these safeguards are not practised by courts. Na Vijayashankar, a legal academic in Bengaluru, found a blogpost of his — ironically, on the topic of website blocking — had been blocked by a Delhi court without even informing him. He only got to find out when I published the government response to my RTI on blocked websites. Last December, Github, Vimeo and some other websites were blocked without being given a chance to contest it. As long as lower courts don't follow "principles of natural justice" and due process, we'll continue to see such absurd website blocking, especially in cases of copyright complaints, without any way of opposing or correcting them.

There are three main outcomes of this judgment. First is the legal victory: SC's analysis while striking down 66A is a masterclass of legal clarity and a significant contribution to free speech jurisprudence. This benefits not only future cases in India, but all jurisdictions whose laws are similar to ours, such as Bangladesh, Malaysia and the UK.

Second is the moral victory for free speech. Sec 66A was not merely a badly written law, it became a totem of governmental excess and hubris. Even when political parties realized they had passed 66A without a debate, they did not apologize to the public and revise it; instead, they defended it. Only a few MPs, such as P Rajeev and Baijayant Panda, challenged it. Even the NDA, which condemned the law in the UPA era, supported it in court. By striking down this totem, the SC has restored the primacy of the Constitution. For instance, while this ruling doesn't directly affect the censor board's arbitrary rules, it does morally undermine them.

Third, this verdict shows that given proper judicial reading, the Indian constitutional system of allowing for a specific list of purposes for which reasonable restrictions are permissible, might in fact be as good or even better in some cases, than the American First Amendment. The US law baldly states that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press. However, the US Supreme Court has never held the opinion that freedom of speech is absolute. The limits of Congress's powers are entirely judicially constructed, and till the 1930s, the US court never struck down a law for violating freedom of speech, and has upheld laws banning obscenity, public indecency, offensive speech in public, etc. However, in India, the Constitution itself places hard limits on Parliament's powers, and also, since the first amendment to our Constitution, allows the judiciary to determine if the restrictions placed by Parliament are "reasonable". In the judgment Justice Nariman quotes Mark Antony from Julius Caesar. He could also have quoted Cassius: "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves." Judges like Justice Nariman show the constitutional limits to free speech can be read both narrowly and judiciously: we can no longer complain about the Constitution as the primary reason we have so many restrictions on freedom of expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/times-of-india-march-29-2015-pranesh-prakash-three-reasons-why-66a-is-momentous

Department of Telecommunications Order u/s. 69A IT Act Blocking 32 URLS (2014-12-17, plaintext version)

pranesh — 2014-12-31T15:21:21Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order.txt

Department of Telecommunications Order u/s. 69A IT Act Blocking 32 URLS (2014-12-17, compressed version)

pranesh — 2014-12-31T14:48:24Z

On December 17, 2014, the Dept. of Telecommunications blocked 32 URLs (as it was ordered to do so by the by Dept. of Electronics & IT — specifically the Designated Officer under section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and under the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009), those being: 01) https://justpaste.it/ 02) http://hastebin.com 03) http://codepad.org 04) http://pastie.org 05) https://pasteeorg 06) http://paste2.org 07) http://slexy.org 08) http://paste4btc.com/ 09) http://0bin.net 10) http://www.heypasteit.com 11) http://sourceforge.net/projects/phorkie 12) http://atnsoft.com/textpaster 13) https://archive.org 14) http://www.hpage.com 15) http://www.ipage.com/ 16) http://www.webs.com/ 17) http://www.weebly.com/ 18) http://www.000webhost.com/ 19) https://www.freehosting.com 20) https://vimeo.com/ 21) http://www.dailymotion.com/ 22) http://pastebin.com 23) https://gist.github.com 24) http://www.ipaste.eu 25) https://thesnippetapp.com 26) https://snipt.net 27) http://tny.ct (Tinypaste) 28) https://github.com (gist-it) 29) http://snipplr.com/ 30) http://termbin.com 31) http://www.snippetsource.net 32) https://cryptbin.com

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order_compressed.pdf

Department of Telecommunications Order u/s. 69A IT Act Blocking 32 URLS

pranesh — 2014-12-31T14:36:01Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order.pdf

Overview of the Constitutional Challenges to the IT Act

pranesh — 2014-12-19T09:01:50Z

There are currently ten cases before the Supreme Court challenging various provisions of the Information Technology Act, the rules made under that, and other laws, that are being heard jointly. Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan who's arguing Anoop M.K. v. Union of India has put together this chart that helps you track what's being challenged in each case.

PENDING MATTERS	CASE NUMBER	PROVISIONS CHALLENGED
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India	W.P.(CRL.) NO. 167/2012	66A
Common Cause & Anr. v. Union of India	W.P.(C) NO. 21/2013	66A, 69A & 80
Rajeev Chandrasekhar v. Union of India & Anr.	W.P.(C) NO. 23/2013	66A & Rules 3(2), 3(3), 3(4) & 3(7) of the Intermediaries Rules 2011
Dilip Kumar Tulsidas Shah v. Union of India & Anr.	W.P.(C) NO. 97/2013	66A
Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Ors.	W.P.(CRL.) NO. 199/2013	66A, 69A, Intermediaries Rules 2011 (s.79(2) Rules) & Blocking of Access of Information by Public Rules 2009 (s.69A Rules)
Mouthshut.Com (India) Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.	W.P.(C) NO. 217/2013	66A & Intermediaries Rules 2011
Taslima Nasrin v. State of U.P & Ors.	W.P.(CRL.) NO. 222/2013	66A
Manoj Oswal v. Union of India & Anr.	W.P.(CRL.) NO. 225/2013	66A & 499/500 Indian Penal Code
Internet and Mobile Ass'n of India & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr.	W.P.(C) NO. 758/2014	79(3) & Intermediaries Rules 2011
Anoop M.K. v. Union of India & Ors.	W.P.(CRL.) NO. 196/2014	66A, 69A, 80 & S.118(d) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/overview-constitutional-challenges-on-itact

The Socratic debate: Whose internet is it anyway?

pranesh — 2014-12-09T13:35:45Z

In the US, President Obama recently spoke out on the seemingly arcane topic of net neutrality. What is more astounding is that the popular satire news show host John Oliver spent a 13-minute segment talking about it in June, telling Internet trolls to “focus your indiscriminate rage in a useful direction” by visiting the US Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) website and submitting comments on its weak draft proposal on net neutrality.

The article was published in the Economic Times on November 18, 2014.

Due to the work of activists, popular media coverage, pro-net neutrality technology companies, and John Oliver, eventually the FCC received 1.1 million responses. Text analysis by the Sunlight Foundation using natural language processing found that only 1% of the responses were clearly opposed to net neutrality. So millions of people in the US are both aware and care about this issue. But the general response in India would be: what is net neutrality and why should I be concerned?

Net neutrality is commonly described as the principle of ensuring that there is no discrimination between the different ‘packets’ that an Internet service provider (ISP) carries. That means that the traffic from NDTV should be treated equally by Reliance Infocomm as the traffic from Network 18’s CNNIBN; that even if Facebook wants to pay Airtel to deliver Whatsapp’s packets faster than Viber’s, Airtel may not do so; that peer-to-peer traffic is not throttled; that Facebook will not be able to pay Airtel to keep its subscribers bound within its walled gardens; and also that Airtel can’t claim to be providing Internet access while restricting that to only Facebook or Whatsapp.

The counter to this by telecom companies the world over, which has little evidence backing it, is primarily two-fold: first, one of equity — that it is ‘unfair’ for the likes of YouTube to get a ‘free ride’ on Airtel networks, hogging up bandwidth but not paying them; and second, that of economic incentives — networks are bleeding money due to services like WhatsApp and Skype replacing SMS and voice, and not being able to charge them will lead to a decrease in profitability and network expansion. The first claim is based on a myth of the ‘free ride’, while the reality is that subscribers who download more also pay the ISP more, while contentemitting companies also have to pay their network providers as per the traffic they generate, and those network providers, in turn, have to enter into ‘transit’ or ‘peering’ agreements with the ISPs that eventually provide access to consumers. The second claim has little evidence to back it up. Efficient competition is the best driver of both profit as well as network expansion. VSNL complained about services like Net2Phone in the 1990s and even filtered all voice-over-IP (VoIP) traffic — and illegally blocked a number of VoIP websites — to preserve its monopoly over international telephony. Instead, removing VSNL’s monopoly only benefited our nation. As for network expansion, it is inability of networks to profit from sparsely populated rural areas that poses a major roadblock. Fixing those problems require smart pricing by telecom companies and intelligent regulation, including exploring policy options like shared spectrum, but they do not necessarily require the abandoning of net neutrality.

However, the fact that the reasons telecom companies often provide against net neutrality are bogus doesn’t mean that it’s easy to ensure net neutrality. The Trai has been exploring this issue by holding a seminar on OTT services. However, the main focus of the discussions were not whether and how India should ensure net neutrality: it was on whether the government should regulate services like WhatsApp and bring them under the licence Raj. Yes, the debate going around in the regulatory circles is whether India should implement rules to ensure net non-neutrality so as favour telecom companies! Net neutrality is a difficult issue in regulatory terms since there is no common understanding among academics and activists of what all should fall under its ambit: only the ‘last mile’ or interconnection as well?

The policy dialogue in India is far removed from this and from considering the nuanced positions of anti-net neutrality scholars, such as Christopher Yoo, who raise concerns about the harms to innovation and the free market that would be caused by mandating net neutrality. The situation in India is much more dire, since blatant violations of net neutrality — howsoever defined — are already happening with Airtel launching its ‘One Touch Internet’, a limited walled garden approach that lies about offering access to the ‘Internet’ while only offering access to a few services based on secretive agreements with other companies. Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, recently toured India talking about his grand vision of providing connectivity to the bottom half of the pyramid yet did not talk about how that connectivity would not be to the Internet, but will be limited to only a few services — including Facebook.

Even if we had good laws in favour of net neutrality, without effective monitoring and forceful action by the government, they will amount to little. s. Undoubtedly the contours of the conversation that needs to happen in India over net neutrality will be different from that happening in more developed countries with higher levels of Internet penetration.

However it is a cause of grave concern that while net neutrality is being brutally battered by telecom companies in the absence of any regulation, they are also seeking to legitimize their battery through regulation. It is time the direction of the conversation changed. Perhaps we should invite John Oliver over.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-times-november-18-2014-pranesh-prakash-the-socratic-debate-whos-internet-is-it-anyway

CIS Statement at ICANN 49's Public Forum

pranesh — 2014-06-04T05:31:44Z

This was a statement made by Pranesh Prakash at the ICANN 49 meeting (on March 27, 2014), arguing that ICANN's bias towards the North America and Western Europe result in a lack of legitimacy, and hoping that the IANA transition process provides an opportunity to address this.

Good afternoon. My name is Pranesh Prakash, and I'm with the Yale Information Society Project and the Centre for Internet and Society.

I am extremely concerned about the accountability of ICANN to the global community. Due to various decisions made by the US government relating to ICANN's birth, ICANN has had a troubled history with legitimacy. While it has managed to gain and retain the confidence of the technical community, it still lacks political legitimacy due to its history. The NTIA's decision has presented us an opportunity to correct this.

However, ICANN can't hope to do so without going beyond the current ICANN community, which while nominally being 'multistakeholder' and open to all, grossly under-represents those parts of the world that aren't North America and Western Europe.

Of the 1010 ICANN-accredited registrars, 624 are from the United States, and 7 from the 54 countries of Africa. In a session yesterday, a large number of the policies that favour entrenched incumbents from richer countries were discussed. But without adequate representation from poorer countries, and adequate representation from the rest of the world's Internet population, there is no hope of changing these policies.

This is true not just of the business sector, but of all the 'stakeholders' that are part of global Internet policymaking, whether they follow the ICANN multistakeholder model or another. A look at the boardmembers of the Internet Architecture Board, for instance, would reveal how skewed the technical community can be, whether in terms of geographic or gender diversity.

Without greater diversity within the global Internet policymaking communities, there is no hope of equity, respect for human rights -- civil, political, cultural, social and economic --, and democratic funtioning, no matter how 'open' the processes seem to be, and no hope of ICANN accountability either.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann49-public-forum-statement