Centre for Internet and Society

The world is your oyster, by invitation only

praskrishna — 2011-05-01T01:40:59Z

Recent trends show the world of social networking actually reflects the social divides and groupings in the real world. This article by Shreya Ray was published in the Livemint on April 26, 2011.

Looking for love and thinking it’s a shame someone as gorgeous as you is single? Worry not, for Beautifulpeople.com is here. The UK-based site guarantees beautiful singletons a chance to find “beautiful relationships” through their network. The homepage gives you a little snapshot into what they are all about. A cluster of model-like people, different ethnicities and yet, ironically, strikingly similar in their Anglo-Saxon good looks: high cheekbones and sharp noses. Membership is open for all with one caveat: The photo you submit must first be rated by your peer group (that is, the people already deemed “beautiful” by the website), only then do you get admission.

Based on a similar principle of peer-group approval is Facebook’s Compare People application, where you rate friends based on their smile, eyes, sex appeal, profile picture (and other school-report card qualities such as “helpfulness”). And then, of course, there are quizzes such as “How Beautiful Are You”, in which too your final score is based on where you stand vis-à-vis other people in the network.

To be fair, this isn’t just a fetish of the beautiful and those who want to officially belong to “beautiful-only” groups. Because, in just the same way, the social networking world is just as populated by people wanting to either be part of “rich-only” (Affluence.org) or “smart only” (Epernicus.com, for researchers) groups, and most recently, the India-based Vagad Visible (Vagadvisible.com, for the Vagads, a small clan within Kutchi Jains), among others. The world of social networking is about everyone wanting to be something “only” and in that sense, to quote Chicago-based social networking expert David Armano, it is “less about being social”.

Exclusivity: The invite-only system allows social networks and other Web platforms to control and stagger the growing load on their infrastructure. Raajan/Mint

Unsocial networking

One of the latest improvements on Facebook towards the end of 2010 was the option that allows you to edit friends with hyperactive user activity (people who are forever cluttering your page with Farmville updates or quizzes) and “hide” such user activity from your feed. “On Facebook, groups are smaller gatherings, individuals which are invite-only. On Twitter, users create lists to help them filter out signal from noise. Lists on Twitter are not really about exclusivity, but they do say something about how people desire to extract more value from a network,” says Armano, in an email interview.

Sunil Abraham, executive director of the research institute Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore, says the “hierarchy on the online attention economy often reflects the class and social divides in the real world”.The term attention economy was first used by Michael Goldhaber in December 1997 to describe a new arrangement in which the “flow of attention” metaphorically replaced money as the currency of the Internet.

Quantitative research in the Philippines has shown that rich people are less likely to respond to messages that say “will you be my friend”, he adds, citing the work of researcher Raul Pertierra. “On Facebook, the act of friending someone may appear symmetric. But privacy settings on content, groups and feed configurations may be used to fine-tune the exact power dynamics of the relationship. In platforms such as Twitter, the asymmetry is explicit: For example, Twitter, where I can follow you but you need not follow me,” he says.

Technology has aided this aspect of exclusivity. “There are now beta releases of social software which typically get released to a smaller group of influential and digital savvy individuals. There are now services such as Klout that partner with brands to reward individuals who have the largest social graphs,” adds Armano. Klout measures your overall online influence using over 35 variables on Facebook and Twitter and rates you as True Reach, Amplification Probability, and Network Score.

The other way of practising exclusivity—unlike Facebook, Twitter and other “open” networks—is to just come out and say it: invite only. Beautifulpeople.com will only admit you on the basis of your looks; asmallworld (Asmallworld.net), becoming increasingly popular among the First World swish set, can only be accessed by invitation; and Affluence.org very categorically states it is a place for wealthy individuals to “connect” (membership is free but requires a verifiable minimum household net worth of $1 million, or Rs. 4.5 crore) and “engage in meaningful conversations”. There are others that are slightly work oriented: The Behance network (Behance.net) is a place for creative professionals and you have to seek a membership invitation by describing your creative work. Sermo (Sermo.com) is a place for physicians to “share medical insights”.

Vahad Visible is completely restricted to the Vahad community (a user’s credentials are authenticated by a phone interview and other records), and is social networking meets matrimonial meets classified ads.

The why

There are many reasons for this exclusivity. First, technical. “The invite-only system allows social networks and other Web platforms to control and stagger the growing load on their infrastructure,” says Abraham.

There is also a marketing and commercial aspect to it. Affluence.org, for instance, provides a forum for “exclusive, high quality content and advice from experts on subjects such as art, technology and travel”. Similarly, asmallworld has advertisements for accommodation (it also doubles up as a couch-surfing site of sorts, only these are all rich people living in the First World), among others. Both the technical and the commercial aspects, however, are tied to the larger, that is, sociological aspect of exclusivity. For instance, the “invite-only” system also creates a sense of exclusivity and then drives registrations, says Abraham.

Sociologically, the recipient of this exclusivity, according to Armano, “feels special and rewarded for their social status”. “Those who deal in exclusivity are looking to create smaller “higher quality” networks of individuals who they deem are connected in a way which benefits them,” he says. The way we configure our social network and allow access to our feeds on Twitter or the Facebook page are based on our individual priorities and objectives. “Exclusive social networks are meant for those with overlapping priorities and objectives. The generic social networking websites are meant for finding long-lost classmates and friends and weak ties in general. Exclusive social networks are for accumulating new contacts and building strong ties,” says Abraham.

The dichotomy about social networks, adds Armano, is that “in theory, they flatten social norms” and also make certain things more accessible—like personal publishing. “However, networks do not guarantee that you will find yourself in the desirable social circles. You still have to do that the old-fashioned way—networking,” he adds.

Read the original article published by Livemint here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/world-is-your-oyster

CDT Provides Answers to Questions on Internet Neutrality

pranesh — 2012-06-04T05:56:46Z

Pranesh Prakash of CIS asked David Sohn of CDT a few pointed questions on the emerging hot topic of 'Internet neutrality', and received very useful responses. Those questions and Mr. Sohn's responses are documented in this blog post.

As part of the Centre for Democracy and Technology's (CDT's) excellent "Ask CDT" initiative, we were provided the opportunity to clear up some of our doubts around "net neutrality" (which CDT prefers referring to as Internet neutrality rather than network neutrality) by asking an expert: David Sohn, CDT's Senior Policy Counsel. Reproduced below are the questions that I asked (inset and in gray), and David's replies (provided below each question). Some of the questions I asked below were doubts that I had, while some others are instances of donning the roles of devil's advocate. We hope this will be helpful in clarifying doubts that some of the readers of this blog have had as well.

1a. "As far as I can understand, content distribution networks (CDNs) such as Akamai, don't really fall within your understanding of violations of Internet neutrality. Why not? In what cases is 'spending more to get faster speeds' permitted for content hosts? Since not only specialised companies like Akamai, but regular Tier 1 companies like Level3 and AT&T also engage in CDN-like behaviour, does it make it more liable to illicit/underhand/non-transparent service differentiation techniques?"

1a. That's correct, CDNs don't violate either Internet neutrality principles or the FCC's recent rules. I talked about this at some length in a blog post a couple years ago. The short answer is that Internet neutrality does not aim to guarantee that all online content and services will work equally well, but rather to prevent ISPs from exercising "gatekeeper" control with respect to their subscribers. Thus, content providers who have money can purchase various advantages -- for example, more or better servers, upgraded software, or caching services from a CDN such as Akamai. Significantly, things like servers and caching are available from competitive sources; no supplier has gatekeeper control. In contrast, priority treatment on the transmission facilities serving any given Internet user is an advantage that only that user's ISP could provide. Another difference is that when one content provider purchases caching, it doesn't slow anybody else's traffic (indeed, it could speed it up, since it may help reduce overall network congestion). By contrast, when an ISP designates favoured traffic for priority transmission, non-favoured traffic by definition is de-prioritized. Think about a line of "bits" waiting in a router queue -- if you let some bits "cut in line," it inevitably lengthens the wait for those who don't get to cut. Given CDT's general comfort level with CDNs and the existence of competitive offerings in the marketplace, I'm not too concerned about who provides the service (Akamai, Level3, AT&T, etc.). It doesn't seem to be a case of the ISP leveraging its unique control over access to subscribers.

1b. "A large part of the claims of Internet neutrality supporters are founded on the basis of 'dumb networks', which can also be seen as a reformulation of the end-to-end principle. A question arises, which is often posed by the likes of Dave Farber, Bob Kahn and Robert Pepper: why should we stick dogmatically to the end-to-end principle when embedding 'intelligence' in the core is/will soon be a viable option *without* jeopardising the simplicity of the Internet? If you are fine with CDNs, then are you fine with a partial supplanting of the dogmatism of the end-to-end principle (because, after all, CDNs are in a sense, intelligence in the core rather than in the edges)?"

1b. I don't think that supporting Internet neutrality requires a dogmatic opposition to any and all built-in "intelligence" in the network. Certainly a strong case can be made for handling certain network management matters, such as some cyber security issues, at the network level. I get concerned on neutrality grounds not by the mere existence of "intelligence" in the core, but by the use of that intelligence to make judgments and decisions about which applications and services are most important or most in need of special treatment -- as opposed to remaining application-agnositic or, in the alternative, leaving the decision to end users. Intelligence that is put in the service of end users, allowing the users themselves to make judgments about what to prioritize, does not concern me at all. But if the network-level intelligence results in broader reliance on centralized evaluation and categorization of the type or content of Internet communications, and centralized decisions about what to favor or disfavor, then I think it poses a neutrality problem. The bottom line is, the idea that networks could benefit from some built-in intelligence does not argue for giving ISPs unbounded discretion to discriminate among traffic. Indeed, a network that empowered users themselves to determine the relative priority levels of their traffic based on their individual needs would be far "smarter" than on in which ISPs make broad, across-the-board choices.

2. "What is the bright-line rule that separates some IP-based networks that are 'private' (and hence free to do as they please), and others that are part of the 'Internet' (and hence need to follow Internet neutrality)? Where does IPTV fall? (While answering that question, think not only of present-day IPTV, but keep in mind its potential applications.) Where do 'walled gardens' of the WWW fall?"

2. In CDT's view, Internet access service provides a general-purpose ability to send and receive data communications across the Internet. Other services could be exempt from neutrality rules if they serve specific and limited functional purposes and have limited impact on the technical performance of Internet traffic. CDT's comments to the FCC went into considerable detail -- see, for example, the comments we filed in October. The FCC rules took a similar but not identical tack, saying that Internet access services are services that provide the capability to send and receive data "from all or substantially all Internet endpoints" or that provide a functional equivalent of such a service. In any event, the question of how clear the line is between Internet access services that are subject to neutrality rules and other services that are not is an important one that will bear close watching over time. As for IPTV, it offers a specific function -- access to video programming -- rather than general purpose access to the entire Internet. So IPTV can be distinguished from Internet service. As for "walled gardens," it likely would depend how large the garden is. If the garden seeks to offer a wide enough variety of sites that it can be used as a substitute for Internet access, then the FCC could choose to apply neutrality rules. At some point, a garden can become big and general-purpose enough that it is effectively serving as a non-neutral version of an Internet access service. That kind of end-run around neutrality rules shouldn't be allowed.

3a. "Should Internet neutrality be kept at the level of non-enforceable (but still important) enunciation of principles, or should they be enforceable laws? In either case, who has the authority to regulate Internet neutrality, given the non-territoriality of the 'Internet' (and especially keeping in mind the direction that ICANN's been taking with things like the Affirmation of Commitments). Why should the FCC have such powers? Why should any American governmental body have such powers?"

3a. It is important to have some enforceable rules. The FCC enunciated principles back in its 2005 broadband Policy Statement -- but when the agency tried to act after Comcast violated those principles, a court ruled that the FCC had no ability to do so. Enunciated principles are of little value if ISPs are free to violate them without consequence. For U.S. Internet users, I think the FCC is an appropriate agency in which to lodge the authority to police neutrality violations; the FCC has a long history of working to ensure that providers of physical communications infrastructure do not abuse their position. And since the focus is on the provisions of physical communications connections, I don't the the territoriality issue you raise is a major problem. The United States has the authority to establish rules for companies providing last-mile communications links to U.S.-based subscribers. The Internet is of course a global medium, but the endpoint connections have a clear geographic location.

3b. "If Internet neutrality is really about ensuring fair competition (so an ISP doesn't promote one company's content), then why not just allow competition law / anti-trust law to ensure that fair competition? What are the lacunae in global competition laws that necessitate the separate articulation of 'Internet neutrality' principles/rules?"

3b. The ability of antitrust law to protect Internet openness is pretty limited. Absent a clear anticompetitive motive, network operators likely could curtail Internet openness in a variety of ways without running afoul of antitrust law. Antitrust’s prohibition against anticompetitive conduct is a far cry from any kind of affirmative policy to preserve the Internet’s uniquely open network structure. Nor can antitrust law take into account the major non-economic reasons for maintaining an open Internet, such as the impact on independent speech and civic empowerment. Finally, as a practical matter, antitrust cases tend to drag on for many years. Individual innovators and small startup companies – key beneficiaries of Internet openness – are unlikely to be in a position to bring antitrust cases against major network operators.

4a. "One of the strongest arguments of anti-Internet neutrality folks is that adoption of Internet neutrality principles/rules will ensure that it is only the consumers who foot the bill for bandwidth consumption, and bandwidth hogs (like NetFlix) don't ever pay. This, they say, is unfair on consumers. How do you respond to this?"

4a. First, I question the statement that "bandwidth hogs like NetFlix don't ever pay." For starters, NetFlix buys a huge amount of bandwidth connecting its servers to the Internet. Once on the Internet, its traffic is carried onward pursuant to peering agreements between the ISPs and backbone providers. When NetFlix traffic volume grows, it may trigger new payment demands between carriers, as we've seen in the recent dispute between Comcast and Level3. But the bottom line is, nobody is forced to carry any traffic they haven't contractually agreed to handle. Of course, it is true that NetFlix doesn't make payments to (for example) AT&T for delivering NetFlix traffic to AT&T's customers. That might seem unfair if you think of NetFlix as a "bandwidth hog" eating up AT&T's capacity. I believe that is the wrong way to think about it. NetFlix has no ability to forcefeed traffic onto AT&T's network. Every bit it sends was requested by an AT&T subscriber. So if there are "bandwidth hogs" here, they are the end users -- they are the ones that pull all those bits onto AT&T's network. And they have already paid AT&T for the ability to get those bits. I would add that when individual users choose to download huge volumes, I have no problem with the ISP charging them more. Second, you suggest that it may be unfair to ask consumers to foot the full bill for their connectivity. But the Internet is such an open and innovation-friendly platform precisely because it is so user-driven. This user-centric focus could change if ISPs start thinking of themselves as providing services not just to end user subscribers, but also to non-subscribers such as large online content providers to whom the ISPs do not directly provide bandwidth. The ISPs would then have divided loyalties; rather than just focusing on empowering users, they would be collecting fees to steer users in particular directions. Sure, in other contexts there are examples of "two-sided markets" in which end users foot only part of the bill. Newspapers are often cited. But including paid advertising in newspapers doesn't have much impact in how the overall product is perceived or presented to users. In contrast, ISPs charging content providers for special transmission priority would be akin to a newspaper in which advertisers pay not just to place ads, but also to influence where the substantive articles appear -- which ones go on the front page and which on the interior, for example. In turn, content providers of all stripes would need to think about striking deals with multiple ISPs -- something that is not necessary today. In the end, turning the Internet into a two-sided market would make the medium dramatically less open, less innovative, and less empowering of users.

4b. "If a consumer wants a faster connection (to access content faster), she can get that by paying the ISP more and getting more bandwidth. If a business wants a faster connection (to deliver content faster), it can get that by paying the ISP more bandwidth. However, certain kinds of paying for faster delivery of content are sought to be curbed. Where should we draw that line? And Why should we hold on so dearly to a certain model of accounting for costs?"

4b. Consumers and businesses should be able to pay their respective ISPs for more bandwidth. I think that is very different from paying other people's ISPs for preferential treatment. The latter arrangement turns ISPs into gatekeepers with respect to their subscribers -- because once the quality of delivery depends on which content providers have struck a deal with the subscribers' ISP, every content provider needs to negotiate with that ISP in order to keep up with its competitors. We hold on to the Internet's model of accounting for costs because it is part of what makes the Internet such an open, innovative environment: content providers and innovators don't face the hurdle of having to negotiate deals with all their users' ISPs.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cdt-internet-neutrality

India Proposes Restrictions on Tapping Telephone Calls

praskrishna — 2011-05-06T05:53:43Z

An Indian government report has recommended that interception of telephone calls by government agencies should be limited to situations when there is a "public emergency" or "public safety" is at stake. John Riberio's article appeared in the PC World, TechWorld and CIO. Pranesh Prakash, program manager from the Centre for Internet and Society has been quoted in these articles.

John Riberio's article was published in the following publications:

PC World [April 26, 2011]
TechWorld [April 26, 2011]
CIO [April 26, 2011]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/tapping-telephone-calls

The DNA Profiling Bill 2007 and Privacy

elonnai — 2012-03-21T09:40:56Z

In 2007 a bill known as the Draft DNA Profiling Bill was piloted by the Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics, an autonomous organization funded by the Department of Biotechnology, Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India. The below is a background to DNA collection/analysis in India, and a critique of the Bill a from a privacy perspective.

Introduction

In 2007 a bill known as the Draft DNA Profiling Bill was piloted by the Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics, an autonomous organization funded by the Department of Biotechnology, Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India[1]. The Bill is pending in parliament. The DNA Profiling Bill looks to legalize the collection and analysis of DNA samples for forensic purposes. We believe that it is important that collection of DNA has associated legislation and regulation, because DNA is sensitive physical evidence that if used correctly can benefit the public good, but if misused can lead to serious privacy and human rights violations. Therefore it is important to create a balance between the constitutional rights of an individual and the public interest and bring accountability and transparency to the practice of DNA collection and testing.

In our research we consulted with GeneWatch UK to learn from their work and experience with DNA testing in the UK. This briefing is meant to give a background on the logistics of DNA testing, highlight ways in which DNA testing raises privacy concerns, and provide a critique of the DNA Profiling Bill.

Background Facts about DNA and DNA testing:

What is DNA: DNA is material that determines a persons hereditary traits such as hair color, eye color, body structure etc. Most DNA is located in the cell nucleus, and wrapped up in small structures called chromosomes. Every person inherits 50% of genetic material from their mother and 50% from their father. Genetic disorders are caused by mutations in a person's DNA, and comparing DNA within families can reveal paternity and non-paternity. DNA is found in every cell of our bodies, and each person has a unique strand of DNA [2]. Thus, DNA is seen as a useful form of identification with marginal room for error [3].

What is a DNA profile/ DNA database, and how can it be used/misused:

When DNA samples are taken from individuals they are analyzed in laboratories to produce a digitized representation of numbers known as a DNA profile. Once created, a DNA profile is stored on a DNA database (i.e. an electronic database) with other identifying information from the individual and information from the crime scene. A DNA profile is based on parts of a person's DNA, so it is not unique to an individual. The probability of an individual's DNA profile matching a stranger's by chance is very small, but not impossible. To collect a sample of DNA police normally use a mouth swab to scrape cells from inside the suspect's cheek. If the individual refuses, their DNA can be obtained by pulling some hairs out of their head (cut hair does not contain DNA, it is only in the roots), if the law allows DNA to be taken without consent. DNA samples are also collected from crime scenes, for example from a blood stain, and analyzed in the same way. DNA samples are sometimes stored indefinitely in the laboratory with a bar code number (or other information) that allows them to be linked back to the individual [3]. Stored DNA profiles from crime scenes can be helpful to exonerate an innocent person who is falsely accused of a crime if their DNA does not match a crime scene DNA profile that is thought to have come from the perpetrator. However, stored DNA profiles from individuals are not needed for exoneration because the individual's DNA can always be tested directly (it does not need to be stored on a database). Collecting DNA profiles from individuals can be useful during an investigation, to compare with a crime scene DNA profile and either exonerate an individual or confirm they are a suspect for the crime. Corroborating evidence is always needed because of the possibility of false matches (which can occur by chance or due to laboratory errors) and because there may be an innocent explanation for an individual's DNA being at a crime scene, or their DNA could have been planted there. Storing DNA profiles from individuals on a database is only useful to implicate those individuals in possible future crimes, not to exonerate innocent people, or to solve past crimes. An individual is implicated as a possible suspect for a crime if their stored DNA profile matches a new crime scene DNA profile that is loaded on to the database. For this reason, most countries only store DNA profiles from individuals who have committed serious crimes and may be at risk of re-offending in the future. Stored DNA profiles could in theory be used to track any individual on the database or to identify their relatives, so strict safeguards are needed to prevent misuse [4].

DNA testing in India:

At present, India does not have a national law that empowers the government to collect and store DNA profiles of convicts, but DNA collection and testing and is taking place in many states. For instance, in Pune the army is currently considering creating DNA profiles of troops who are involved in hazardous tasks inorder to help identify bodies mutilated beyond recognition [5]. In December of this year a judge in the Supreme Court ordered DNA testing on a congress spokesmen to determine if his child was really his child [6]. Also in December this year a news article announced the establishment of the first DNA profiling databank in Nehru Nagar [7]. Additionally DNA has been used to identify criminals , for instance in the Tandoor Murder DNA testing was used to reveal the identity of the culprit [8].

India hosts both private and public DNA labs. Public labs are sponsored by the Government, and use DNA purely for forensic purposes. For example The Centre for DNA Fingerprinting and Diagnostics (CDFD) located in Hyderabad is sponsored by the Department of Biotechnology and Ministry of Science. CDFD runs DNA testing for: establishment of parentage, identification of mutilated remains, establishment of biological relationships for immigration, organ transplantation, property inheritance cases, identification of missing children and child swapping in hospitals, identification of rapist in rape cases, identification in the case of murder.

Cases are only accepted by CDFD if they are referred by law enforcement agencies or by a court of law. Only an officer of the rank Inspector of Police or above may forward DNA cases to CDFD. Copies of DNA report are released to individuals if they are able to prove needed interest in the case through a notarized affidavit [9]. In 2010 CDFD received 100 cases from law enforcing agencies. Additionally, in 2010 CDFD was given rupees eighteen lakhs thirty nine thousand five hundred and forty five from the Government of India towards DNA fingerprinting services [10]. The Indian Government has also established National Facilities for Training in DNA Profiling in order to train individuals in DNA testing and expand the number of DNA examiners and laboratories available in the country [11].

Examples of private DNA labs include DNA labs India and Truth Labs. DNA labs India runs paternity testing, forensic testing, prenatal testing, and genetic testing [12]. Truth Labs is a private lab that provides legal services directly, without a court or police order [13].

The Complexity of privacy and DNA collection/ testing:
As mentioned above, the personal and sensitive nature of DNA, the use of DNA raises many privacy concerns. The concerns fall into three basic areas: first, if a person has given consent to have his or her DNA used for a specific purpose, must the DNA be destroyed or can it be used for other purposes as well? Related to that, if a person must give consent for a specific purpose, what happens if the person is no longer able to give consent -- if, for example, the person has died? Finally, if the testing of one person's DNA yields information that is likely, or probable, or certain to impact another person, does that person have a right to know the information discovered? There are variations on these questions -- as for example does DNA is permitted to be taken without consent (to test for a crime, perhaps), does that lack of need for consent permit all uses of DNA that others want. Who decides? The complexity of these questions demonstrates that in the situation of DNA collection and testing privacy cannot be protected simply through consent from an individual. Instead the law must permit specific thresholds to be established in order to cover the privacy needs of different situations.

Can DNA evidence be considered self-incriminating evidence?
According to the Supreme Court fingerprinting and other physical evidence is not covered by article 20(3). In the case of State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, the courts answered the question of whether or not the freedom against self-incrimination guaranteed under article 20(3) of the Constitution of India – which is meant to protect a person from torture from the police – can be extended to the collection of DNA? the courts answered this question by upholding that
“To be a witness may be equivalent to ‘furnishing evidence’ in the sense of making oral or written statement, but not in the larger sense of the expression so as to include giving of thumb impression or impression of palm or foot or fingers or specimen writing or exposing a part of the body by an accused person for purposes of identification [14]”

Critique of the DNA Profiling Bill 2007

Does India already have sufficient legislation?
The collection and use of biometrics for identification of criminals legally began in India during the 1920's with the approval of the Identification of Prisoners Bill 1920 [15]. The object of the Bill is to “provide legal authority for the taking of measurements of finger impression, foot-prints, and photographs of persons convicted or arrested…”[16] The Bill is still enforced in India, and in October 2010 was amended by the State Government of Tamil Nadu to include “blood samples” as a type of forensic evidence [17]. Other Indian legislation pertaining to forensic evidence is the CrPC and the Indian Evidence Act. In 2005 section 53A of the CrPC was amended to authorize investigating officers to collect DNA samples with the help of a registered medical practitioner, but the Indian Evidence Act fails to manage science and technology issues effectively [18]. The current state of statutes for DNA collection in India are not sufficient as the neglect to lay out precise procedures for collection, processing, storage, and dissemination of DNA samples. One question to consider though is if the Prisoners Identification Bill, CrPC, and Indian Evidence Act could be amended to incorporate DNA, and the needed safeguards, as a type of forensic evidence for all of India.

Lack of requirement for additional evidence: The preamble of the DNA Profiling Bill states that “The Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid (DNA) analysis of body substances is a powerful technology that makes it possible to determine whether the source of origin of one body substance is identical to that of another, and further to establish the biological relationship, if any, between two individuals, living or dead without any Doubt.” This statement is untrue as DNA test can be compromised under many circumstances including: techniques for declaring a match, the proficiency of examiners, laboratory control standards and statistical problems, and DNA samples can become degraded due to age or exposure to chemical or bacterial agents [19]. Because DNA is not foolproof individuals can be falsely implicated in a crime as a result of an incorrect DNA match. The Bill needs to put in place procedures for the court to recognize the fact that DNA is not 100% foolproof, present the statistics correctly, and require supporting evidence [20].

Scope for DNA Collection: The stated object of the DNA Bill is to: “enhance protection of people and administration of justice, analysis of DNA found at the crime scene, establish identity of victim and offender”. The list of offenses and situations in which the collection and testing of DNA is permitted, found in the Schedule of the Bill, provides for the collection DNA from individuals who are not related to a crime scene, are not victims, and are not criminals. Furthermore, section 13(xxii) allows this list to be expanded by the DNA board. We believe these sections should be omitted from the scope of the Bill, so that it is limited to only identifying individuals who are victims and offenders, and that a statutory body besides the DNA board be given the authority to expand the list of proposed offences [21]. Furthermore, within the Bill there are many places where vague language permits the DNA testing of individuals who are not yet convicted of a crime, which will constitute an invasion of privacy unless the DNA is provided voluntarily to release a person suspected or accused of a crime [22]. Additionally as mentioned above it is critical that the Bill recognizes and allows for different thresholds of privacy when collecting, analyzing and sharing DNA profiles.

Clear definition of when collection of DNA samples can be taken: The schedule of the Bill only lists the offenses and situations for which the collection of DNA is permitted. We believe a provision must be added that clarify when exactly DNA can be collected e.g. whether the DNA can be collected on arrest or on charge, whether the DNA has to be relevant to the offence, or whether the police decide this for themselves, and what are the oversight mechanisms for these decisions [23].

Privacy Principles: The Bill enables the DNA Profiling Board to recommend privacy protection statutes, regulations, and practices concerning: use and dissemination, accuracy, security, and confidentiality, and destruction of DNA information [24]. Privacy principles should not be left to recommendations by the board or to regulations of the Bill, but instead should be incorporated into the Bill itself to ensure that such practices are in place if the Bill is passed. Furthermore, the appropriate collection, access, and retention of DNA information should be specified in this Bill.

Obligations for DNA laboratories: Section 19 of the Bill lays out the obligations of DNA laboratories [25]. We recommend that the implementation of a privacy policy should be mandatory under this section.

Storage of DNA profiles and samples: Currently the Bill allows for the complete storage of DNA of: volunteers, suspects, victims, offenders, children (with parental consent), and convicted persons. DNA samples taken from individuals contain unlimited genetic information (including health-related information) and are not needed for identification purposes once the profiles have been obtained from them, thus we recommend that the bill requires that DNA samples be stored temporarily for quality assurance purposes (e.g. for up to six months) and then destroyed to prevent misuse. This is an important privacy protection, which also reduces the cost of storing samples. The only purpose of retaining DNA profiles on a criminal database is to help identify the individual if they reoffend. Thus we recommend that the criminal databases should be restricted to holding DNA profiles only from convicted persons, and the types of offence and time period for retention should be limited. Although DNA profiles may have alternative uses other than solving crimes (e.g. identifying missing persons) we recommend that the missing persons databases are kept separate from criminal databases. Furthermore, although collecting DNA from victims and volunteers may be useful during the investigation of a crime, DNA profiles obtained from victims and volunteers should be destroyed once an investigation is complete.

Conflicting Clauses: Section 14 of the Bill provides that DNA laboratories can only undertake DNA procedures with the approval, in writing, from the DNA profiling Board. Section 15(2) contradicts this statement by permitting already existing DNA laboratories to function and use DNA already collected even before they receive approval from the DNA profiling Board. We suggest that Section 14 is clearly written so that DNA laboratories that have already been set up are unable to continue functioning until they have met the approval of the DNA Profiling Board, and Section 15(2) should thus be deleted.

Access: According to section 41 of the Bill, the Data Bank Manager is given sole discretion as to who may have access to the DNA database, including persons given access for training purposes [26]. Low standards such as these vest too much discretion in the Data Bank Manager. We recommend that access is strictly limited to trained personnel who have undergone proper security clearance. Furthermore, we recommend that the role of Data Bank Manager be analogous to a custodian for the databank. Thus, the manager would be accountable for the integrity and security of the data held in the DNA databank.

Offenses: Though the Bill provides for penalties such as unauthorized access, disclosure, destruction, alterations, and tampering [27], the Bill fails to provide punishment for the illegal collection of DNA samples. This should be made an offense under the Bill.

Redress: The Bill provides no redress mechanism to an individual whose DNA was illegally used or collected. Furthermore, section 49 (1) only permits the Central Government or DNA Profiling Board to bring complaints to the courts [28]. Thus, we recommend that individuals are enabled to bring charges against entities (such as DNA labs or police officials) for the misuse of their data.

Delegation of powers: The Bill allows the DNA Profiling Board to form committees of the members and delegate them the powers and functions of the board. This clause could allow outsourcing, and could allow a dilution of authority by which the DNA Profiling Board weighs approval or rejection of requests [29]. We recommend that the outsourcing of functions be limited to administration duties and jobs that do not directly relate to the core duties of the DNA Profiling Board.

Access by law enforcement agencies: The Bill currently allows for the DNA Profiling Board to grant law enforcement agencies access to DNA profiles [30]. We recommend that DNA profiles are only accessed by the Data Bank Manager. Law enforcement agencies should send requests for matches to the Data Bank Manager, and the Manger would provide the needed intelligence [31].

Public interest: The Bill allows for DNA laboratories to continue to operate, even if the laboratory has violated the specified procedures, if the DNA Profiling Board finds it in the public interest [32]. We believe that where there have been violations, a laboratory should be required to demonstrate remediation before being allowed to resume operations.

Contamination of DNA samples: Currently the Bill holds laboratories responsible for “minimizing the contamination of DNA.”[33] DNA Laboratories should be held fully and legally responsible for preserving the quality of DNA samples. If a DNA sample is contaminated, and the DNA lab does not follow due diligence to discard the contaminated sample and or collect a new sample, and subsequently the DNA used wrongly against an individual - an individual should have the ability to press charges against the institution.

Audits: The Bill provides for the auditing of DNA laboratories, but the DNA Profiling Board must also undergo annual audits [34].

Indices Held by DNA Banks: Under section 33 (4),(5)The Bill provides for the DNA data bank to set up indices that hold DNA identification records and DNA analysis from: crime scenes, suspects, offenders, missing persons, unknown deceased persons, volunteers and such other indexes as specified by regulations. We believe the DNA data bank should not hold indexes on suspects, missing persons, or volunteers without consent and the ability for the individual to withdraw their consent. Furthermore, the Bill requires the taking of a victim’s DNA, but it is not listed as an index. We recommend that this section be deleted, as the creation of a DNA index is simply another copy of a DNA profile, and it does not serve a particular purpose.

Communicating of DNA Profile with Foreign States: Section 35 permits, with the approval of the Central Government, the sharing of DNA profiles with Foreign States [35]. We recommend that communication and use of a DNA profile with Foreign States should be limited to comparison only.

Access to Data Banks for administration purposes: Section 39 of the Bill permits access to the databank for “administrative purposes”. We recommend that the Bill clarify what exactly constitutes “administrative purposes”, and clarify that the process/procedures that permit access to data banks for administration purposes will not require access to data stored in Data Banks [36].

Enforcement for the removal of innocents: Section 36(3) of the Bill requires that the DNA profile of individuals who are found innocent be removed from the database. This provision should have legal mechanisms to ensure enforcement of the provision e.g. reporting by the Board [37].

Ability to access one’s own DNA Profile: A provision should be added to the Bill that gives individuals the right to ask the police for any of their own details held on police databases, so an individual has the ability to know if their data is being held against the law [38].

Clear Definition of identity: Section 33(6)(i) maintains that the DNA Data Bank will contain in relation to each of the DNA profiles… the “identity of the person”. The Bill needs to define what is "identity" and how “identifying” information can be used. Furthermore, it is important to ensure that no other information (like an identity number) that would allow for function creep, is included in the DNA data base[39].

Transparency of the DNA board: Section 13 of the Bill describes the powers and functions the DNA Board. In this section the DNA board should be required to publish and submit minutes and annual reports including detailed information on how it has exercised all its functions to the public and to Parliament. The report should include: numbers of profiles added to the database; numbers removed on acquittal, numbers of matches and solved crimes; costs; numbers of quality assurance inspections, and breakdowns of these figures by state [40].

Restricted use of DNA database: Section 39 (1) of the Bill permits the DNA database to be used for identification purposes that are not related to solving a crime including the “ identification of victims of: accidents, disasters or missing persons or for such other purposes”. The DNA database should be restricted to the identification of a perpetrator of a specified criminal offence, and consent or a court order must be sought for any other use of the database for identification purposes.

Probability of error published: Because profiles found in the DNA data base are comprised of only parts of individuals DNA, the profiles are not unique to individuals. Thus, the number of false matches that are expected to occur by chance between crime scene DNA profiles and stored individual's profiles depends on how the profiling system used, how complete the crime scene DNA is before it is added to the database (many crime scene DNA stains are degraded and not complete), and how many comparisons are done (i.e. how big the database it is and how often it is searched). With a population the size of India, the number of these false matches could be very high. The DNA board needs to take this probability for error into consideration and publish researched statistics on how many false matches they expect to occur purely by chance, based on the numbers of profiles they expect to store under the proposed criteria for entry and removal of profiles [41].

Cost analysis: The DNA board should publish a cost benefit analysis for the implementation the Bill. This should include the cost of storing samples, collecting sample, and testing samples [42].

Bibliography

http://www.cdfd.org.in/
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/basics/dna
Adhikary, Jyotirmoy. DNA Technology in Administration of Justice. Lexis Nexis. 2007 pg.6, 22
Ibid email conversation with Dr. Wallace from Genewatch UK April 2nd 2002
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-01-02/india/28371869_1_dna-data-bank-blood-samples-bodies
http://www.merinews.com/article/justice-s-rabindra-bhatt-orders-dna-test-for-nd-tiwari/15838508.shtml
http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_nehru-nagar-first-region-in-country-to-have-dna-profiling-database_1477211
Adhikary, Jyotirmoy. DNA Technology in Administration of Justice. Lexis Nexis. 2007. Pg.263
http://www.cdfd.org.in/servicespages/dnafingerprinting.html
ibidhttp://www.cdfd.org.in/image/AR_2009_10.pdf
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/planrel/fiveyr/11th/11_v1/11v1_ch8.pdf
http://www.dnalabsindia.com/
http://www.truthlabs.org/
AIR 1961 SC 1808
The Prisoners Identification Bill was most recently amended 1981
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/report87.pdf
http://www.tn.gov.in/stationeryprinting/extraordinary/2010/305-Ex-IV-2.pdf
Adhikary, Jyotirmoy. DNA Technology in Administration of Justice. Lexis Nexis. 2007 pg. 259
Adhikary, Jyotirmoy. DNA Technology in Administration of Justice. Lexis Nexis. 2007 pg. 245
Email conversation with Dr. Wallace from Genewatch UK. April 2nd
Schedule of offenses 5) Miscarriage or therapeutic abortion, b. Unnatural offenses, 7) Other criminal offenses b. Prostitution 9) Mass disaster b) Civil (purpose of civil cases) c. Identification purpose 10) b) Civil:1) Paternity dispute 2) Marital dispute 3) Infidelity 4) Affiliation c) Personal Identification 1) Living 2) Dead 3) Tissue Remains d)
2 (xxvii) “offender” means a person who has been convicted of or is under trial charged with a specified offense.
2(1)(vii) “crime scene index” means an index of DNA profiles derived from
forensic material found: (a) at any place (whether within or outside India) where a specified offense was, or is reasonably suspected of having been, committed;
or (b) on or within the body of the victim, or a person reasonably
suspected of being a victim, of an offense (DNA Profiling Bill)
Adhikary, Jyotirmoy. DNA Technology in Administration of Justice. Lexis Nexis. 2007 Pg. 291
Section (1) (xv) –(xvi) of DNA Profiling Bill
Section 19 of DNA Profiling Bill
Section 41(i) (ii) of DNA Profiling Bill
Section 45, and section 46 of DNA Profiling Bill
Section 49 (1) of DNA Profiling Bill
Section 52 (2) The DNA Profiling Board may, by a general or special order in writing,
also form committees of the members and delegate to them the powers
and of the Board as may be specified by the regulations.
Section 13(x), Section(2) The DNA Profiling Board may, by a general or special order in writing,also form committees of the members and delegate to them the powers and functions of the Board as may be specified by the regulations.
Adhikary, Jyotirmoy. DNA Technology in Administration of Justice. Lexis Nexis. 2007 Pg. 300
Section 17 (2) of DNA Profiling Bill
Section 22 of DNA Profiling Bill
Section 28 of DNA Profiling Bill
Section 35 (1) of DNA Profiling Bill
Section 39 of DNA Profiling Bill
http://www.genewatch.org/sub-539478
http://www.genewatch.org/sub-539478
http://www.genewatch.org/article.shtml?als[cid]=492860&als[itemid]=567376
Email conversation with Dr. Wallace from Gene Watch UK April 2nd
Standard setting and quality regulation in forensic science. GeneWatch UK submission to the Home Office Consultation.
October 2006.
Standard setting and quality regulation in forensic science. GeneWatch UK submission to the Home Office Consultation.
October 2006.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/dna-profiling-bill

An Interview with Activist Shubha Chacko: Privacy and Sex Workers

elonnai — 2012-03-28T06:26:03Z

On February 20th I had the opportunity to speak with Shubha Chacko on privacy and sex workers. Ms. Chacko is an activist who works for Aneka, an NGO based in Bangalore, which fights for the human rights of sexual minorities. In my interview with Ms. Chacko I tried to understand how privacy impacts the lives of sex workers in India. The below is an account of our conversation.

Introduction

In our research we have been exploring where and how privacy is found in different areas of Indian society, law, and culture. As part of our research we have been holding public conferences across the country to raise awareness and gather opinions around privacy. One area that was discussed in the public conference in Bangalore was the privacy of sex workers. Shubha Chacko, who is from Aneka - an NGO located in Bangalore which fights for the human rights of sexual minorities, made a presentation that focused on the privacy challenges that sex workers in India face. In our interview Ms. Chacko pointed out many misconceptions that society holds about sex workers’ lives. She also detailed the challenges of stigma and discrimination that sex workers face, and described the precarious position that sex workers find themselves in as their work is constantly being pushed out of the public sphere by the law and society. I later interviewed Ms. Chacko to follow up on her presentation on privacy and sex workers. During the interview I had the opportunity to speak with both Ms. Chacko and a board member from the Karnataka Sex Workers Union. The following is meant to provide a perspective on how and in what ways society, law, media and tradition invades the privacy of sex workers. Though the piece is focused on the lives of sex workers, many of the issues raised are not limited to only sex workers, but characterize other marginalized communities as well.

When I began the interview with Ms. Chacko I was hoping to do a piece that looked at the different elements of a sex worker’s life, and identified the points at which their privacy was invaded – such as in contacting a client, going to the doctors, etc. After I began my interview only, I realized how privacy impacts sex workers is much more complicated than a life cycle analysis. Among other things, privacy issues for sex workers prompt questions challenging social definitions of public and private, having the right to an identity and a recognized profession, and having the autonomy to control decisions about oneself.

Basic Facts and Background Information:

Karnataka has been found to have 85,000 sex workers, and India has an estimated 2 million female sex workers [1]

Sex work is not against the law in India, but any commercialized aspect of the trade is prohibited – including running a brothel or soliciting a client.

Sex work is a multi-faceted profession with many positive and negative complexities that are rarely known to the public.

Understanding the Challenge of the Public and the Private

My interview with Ms. Chacko began with my seeking an understanding of the challenges that traditional notions of the public sphere and the private sphere pose for sex workers. Ms. Chacko explained that to understand how privacy impacts the life of a sex worker, it is important to first understand that sex workers by profession confront and question traditional conceptions of the public and the private. Sex and everything associated with it is seen as something that is to be kept only in the private sphere. The work of sex workers brings sex into the public sphere, and thus the workers are seen as being public women not entitled to privacy, because they stand on street corners and conduct their work in the public. This notion that sex workers are public women without a right to privacy shows through in the way they are treated by the media, the police, NGOs, and researchers. An example of this tension and society’s response can be seen in the recent elections. On April 6th, a Times of India news article reported that the election commission will be setting up “special booths” for sex workers to vote in because “while the sex workers had been waiting in queues to cast their votes, common people were not comfortable with that”[2]

What is the Challenge of the Public and the Private?

“It starts with a conception of issues around privacy vis-à-vis sex workers. The general perception is that sex workers are considered “public women”, because they are considered available to the public and because they sell sexual services on the streets (and are seen in contrast to the “good” woman who is confined to the private world of the home This then leads people to assume that then sex workers have are not entitled to privacy. Also sex workers are forced to reckon with issues of sex and sexuality, and if you talk about issues of sexuality - issues that are considered private are forced into the public domain, so sex workers by their presence force these issues into the public domain. So notions of privacy become complicated by this challenge of what is public and private, because the sex workers’ presence brings into the public domain what is private.”

How does this tension of the public and the private translate into privacy violations?

"Due to the stigma around sex work all rights of sex workers are seriously compromised; with impunity. Thus, privacy is a threshold issue.

The violation of privacy happens at various points, for example the way the media deals with them – publishing their photographs, outing them without their consent, talking about them without their consent. There are the police who are often engaged in so called “rescue and rehabilitation” work, but in the process of rescuing the sex workers, disregard the harmful impacts that compromising their right to privacy will do to them. The HIV prevention intervention programs that are in place now that target sex workers (along with other ‘high risk groups”) also erode their right to confidentiality. Besides intimate details of their lives being recorded, their address and other coordinates are noted. This information along with other sensitive information including their HIV status, is often accessible to a host of people and is a potential threat to their privacy and anonymity. Researchers and NGOs too often quiz sex workers about a range of intimate details about their lives with little sensitivity and expect them to be totally candid. These interviews also raise questions that relate to privacy."

Stigma, Discrimination, and Identity

Ms. Chacko also spoke about how the stigma and discrimination that sex workers face invades their privacy. Society views sex workers in one light – as immoral women. This stigma is attached to them permanently and is a source of violence and discrimination in the home, from the state, and from society. The sex workers’ right to anonymity and identity is also restricted because of the stigma attached to their work. Sex workers do not have the ability to control information about themselves, and they face challenges in obtaining official documents like a PAN card or a passport. This stigma and its consequences impedes sex workers from functioning comfortably in society and creates a difficult tension for sex workers to live with. Society denies the presence of sex workers, and police patrol parks and other public areas chasing away individuals whom they believe to be sex workers. The increased passivisation of public spaces – parks, (for example) and the over gentrification of the neighborhoods squeeze them out

In New York, one way that sex workers have overcome this constant and sometimes violent confrontation with society is through the use of mobile phones. Sex workers will contact clients only through mobile phones. This allows them to find their clients in private and anonymous ways, and it eliminates the need of a pimp or other type of ring leader. When I asked Ms. Chacko if sex workers are using this same technique in India, she recognized that they are, but said that it is not a yet widely practiced - especially among women in rural areas.

How Restricting is the Stigma?

“Huge - hardly ever does a person’s entire identity get conflated with her with occupation or livelihood option; the way it does with sex workers. … I mean, for example, if you go to a movie - people would not say; oh, look, there is a researcher come to see a movie - people would call you by name, but if a sex worker goes to a movie they always say: oh, look, there is a sex worker. There is only one side to her identity according to society. And everyone wants to know the same thing - How did they get into sex work. There is an excessive interest in this aspect alone (and generally they are seeking simple answers) - they never ask other questions about them as a person, only about them as a sex worker. Thus, real issues of violence and exploitation are never dealt with”.

HIV Initiatives, Medical Counseling , and Privacy

Medical consultations, especially those related to HIV/AIDS, in many ways violate the privacy of sex workers.

HIV Initiatives

HIV initiatives run by the Government are often invasive and function off of privacy-violating techniques. The government runs many HIV initiatives where sex workers are employed to be “peer educators.” A peer educator’s job is to spread awareness about HIV, distribute condoms, and bring sex workers for HIV testing. The privacy and anonymity of peer educators is compromised in the job title itself. Everyone in the community knows that to be a peer educator, one must also be a sex worker. Thus, if a person is a peer educator or with a peer educator, she is immediately outed and identified as a sex worker. Furthermore, HIV testing is compulsory for sex workers, though on paper it looks as though it is a choice. Because there are quotas that must be filled, sex workers often go through HIV testing without full consent.

How do Government HIV Initiatives Violate Privacy?

“The whole HIV intervention itself violates sex workers’ privacy. Both in the sense that people get jobs as peer educators and they have to carry condoms around and talk to other sex workers, and everyone thinks that if you are a peer educator then you are a sex worker, and there is no protection for these people even though it is sponsored by the state government.”

Line Listing

The HIV programs and testing centers also violate the privacy of sex workers. The clinics have a system known as line listing, which is meant to ensure that there are no duplications in data. In order to ensure this they collect identifying information from sex workers including address and phone number. The information is not protected and is easily accessible to whoever wishes to see it.

Line Listing and Privacy

“HIV programs have a process called line listing, which is to ensure that there is no duplication. So they take all your facts from you, and from that a sex workers address and such go out, and it’s put out with no safeguards.”

HIV Counselors and Doctors

HIV counselors also violate the privacy of sex workers. Though a patient’s HIV status is only supposed to be known to the counselor at the testing clinic and the lab technician, it often becomes the case that HIV results are widely shared. As per protocol, doctors and counselors must follow up with sex workers every three months if a sex worker is HIV negative. This is to ensure that they are still HIV negative, and to provide them treatment at the soonest if they do contract the disease. To carry out this follow-up work, counselors keep a list of patients whom they have seen. This list is supposed to be confidential, but other personnel in the hospital are assigned to do the follow-up phone calls, and thus the list is in fact easily accessible. If a person’s name disappears from the list, it is obvious that the person is now HIV positive, and that person’s privacy is violated and her status known.

How does HIV Counseling compromise Privacy?

“…only the counselor and the lab technician is supposed to know about it, but it turns out a whole number of people know about it, because of follow up. The counselor is supposed to follow up on the list with people every three months for further testing, but if you are positive then you do not need to follow up. Plus, these results are shared with everyone. Because of the stigma attached to HIV there is a need for privacy to be protected, so confidentiality is routinely violated.”

Media and Research

Media

Media was another area of contention that Ms.Chacko pointed out. Though the media plays an important role as being a channel for the voice of sex workers, it can also be intrusive on the sex worker by publishing stories without their consent, or reporting in ways that can be misconstrued. Through their coverage, the media can also deepen the stigma against sex workers and place them under an unwanted social spotlight. For example, a news article in The Hindu spoke about the World Cup bringing an “off day” for sex workers.

“With hoards of supporters glued to their television screens for the World Cup cricket final between India and Sri Lanka on Saturday, sex workers are anticipating a slow day, but they are not disappointed. It is a rare weekend for them with their children. The prospects of fewer clients coming in only buoyed the enthusiasm of the women in Sonagachi, the largest red-light area in the city…”[3]

The media is also often a part of raids by cover stories of brothels being uncovered, and in doing so expose the lives of sex workers, often printing sensitive information, including addresses, while portraying the sex workers as victims. The media, along with NGOs and the police will conduct raids that severely violate the privacy of sex workers. For example, in an Express India article a raid was described that took place in Pune with NGOs and the police in which sex workers were dragged out, beaten, and molested by the police against their will [4].

How does the media violate the privacy of sex workers?

“The media conducts raids, and so do NGOs in an attempt to rescue them. Once they are rescued and taken back with police escorts to their village, the whole village knows that she was in sex work, and then her privacy is violated because she was publicly returned. My problem is not about them being rescued, but they need to have consent from the person. If a person wants to do sex work – this decision needs to be respected. The media is difficult because you don’t want to ask for a ban, so we don’t ask for banning, but we do put pressure on the media to be more responsible in their reporting.”

Research/Films

Ms. Chacko also spoke about how research often violates the privacy of sex workers, in ways that range from the words that are used to describe sex workers to the one-sided victim story that is too often used to describe the lives of sex workers, to the methods researchers use to find their facts. Thus, perhaps without meaning to, research can de-legitimatize the work that sex workers do, and can work to increase the amount of violence or abuse that they are exposed to.

Research and Privacy

“Researchers who are writing a report on sex workers - land up in some village and end up violating their privacy as everyone in the village wants to know why the researchers came. The researchers also ask invasive questions. They want to know details about the sex workers’ lives: what kind of sex they have and with whom? What do they experience with their clients? What is their relationship with their partners? What is the status of their relationship.? They do not have a sense of whether the workers will want to talk about their lives or not…Some people make films and some make them in extremely exploitative ways. Films are also often incorrect and invasive of privacy in that way as well.”

The Role of a Privacy Legislation

In our research, we are looking at how a privacy legislation could help remedy the challenges to privacy that different people face in society; or ,if a privacy legislation cannot offer a solution, if there are other ways in which a legislation or society can offer solutions. When I asked Ms. Chacko if a privacy legislation or the right to privacy could improve the lives of sex workers, she was not certain if a privacy legislation would make a difference directly, and thought it might in fact overlook sex workers because currently they are seen in society as immoral women that are not to be afforded the right to privacy. In fact, it is the law and enforcers of the law itself that is invading their privacy. For example, in a study done by the World Health Organization it was found that in India 70 per cent of sex workers in a survey reported being beaten by the police, and more than 80 per cent had been arrested without evidence [5]. Thus, before a right to privacy can apply to sex workers, sex work itself must be decriminalized and recognized as a legitimate profession worthy of labor rights and other rights. Furthermore the debate around sex work needs to move away from the traditional dialogue of who is having sex and who is not to one that looks at what rights should be protected for every person. At that point perhaps a law which protects dignity and regulates the use of information could be useful. On another note, the UID (the Unique Identification Project) could be a potential benefit for sex workers as it would serve as identity that would give only a yes or no response at the time of a transaction.

Could a Privacy Legislation help?

“Some of the privacy is violated by the raids that happen by the police. So those raids are problematic. What kind of laws would help? One would be to decriminalize sex work itself and also work with society to gain understanding and perspective. Because now people think: they are immoral women ,so what privacy do they deserve? The sexual debate should not be about who is having sex and who is not, but about who has the power…”

The Current Law

In India, the Immoral Trafficking prevention Act ( ITPA) is the law that governs sex work. The ITPA does not make prostitution illegal, but instead tries to target the commercialized aspects of the trade such as brothel keeping, pimping, and soliciting. Though the law does not attack the sex workers as individuals, and its stated purpose is to prevent the trafficking of sex workers, the law has become a tool of harassment and abuse by law enforcement agencies. Sections 5A, 5B, 5C, which pertain to trafficking are the most troublesome, because the clauses do not distinguish between trafficking and sex work, but instead defines them as the same[6]. Thus, the new definitions of prostitution and trafficking leave room for reading all sex work as within the meaning of trafficking, and thus criminalizing sex work by defacto.[7] In addition, under the new Section 5C, clients visiting or found in a brothel will face imprisonment and/or fines [8]. Penalization of clients is a significant modification to the the ITPA, which formally targeted 'third parties' profiting from prostitution and not sex workers or clients themselves [9]. Sex workers have fought for a long time to overturn the ITPA. In June 2008, sex workers went on a hunger strike in the hopes of forcing the bill to be discarded [10]. In 2010 sex workers demonstrated against the amendment of the ITPA that would hold the clients of sex workers liable. Despite their protests and demands for their occupation to be treated equally, the Indian courts are slow to move forward and recognize sex work as a dignified profession. “A woman is compelled to indulge in prostitution not for pleasure but because of abject poverty,” the court said last month. “If such woman is granted opportunity to avail some technical or vocational training, she would be able to earn her livelihood by such vocational training and skill instead of selling her body.” The court has also promised to initiate a program in May for vocational training of sex workers [11]. Unfortunately, vocational training fails to address the actual issues and violations that sex workers face – a fact that was demonstrated by one sex worker’s saying: “If we can’t solicit clients without getting arrested, we will naturally rely on pimps to carry on our trade…What we need are practical measures that free us from exploitation created by the law itself.”

Solutions

One of the most impactful source of aid for sex workers currently is the sex workers union. I had the opportunity to speak with a member from the board of the Karnataka Sex Workers
union. She spoke about the challenges that sex workers face and how the Union provides assistance to the sex workers. The union helps them obtain benefits, helps with enrolling their children in schools, and answers questions that they would not be able to seek legal or other assistance on. The union is a confidential and safe space for sex workers to function in society. The person interviewed feels as though the information about herself that should be kept confidential is: her medical information, her clients, where she meets her clients, and information about her family. Ms. Chacko also spoke about the positives that an identity scheme like the UID could have on sex workers, because the transactions would be done through a yes/ no response, and no one will be denied a UID number. Most importantly, Ms. Chacko stressed that it is important to recognize sex work as a legitimate profession,and focus on the actual problems, rather than limiting the debate to stigmas around sex. The interview with Ms. Chacko demonstrated that protection of sex workers’ and sexual minorities’ privacy cannot be addressed simply by a law, but must be embodied by an ethos and a culture before that law is meaningful.

Bibliography

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/privacy_privacyandsexworkers

Iraqi delegation in Bangalore to study e-governance projects

praskrishna — 2011-04-21T09:41:45Z

A 20-member delegation from Iraq, led by its Science and Technology Minister Abdul Kareem El-Samarai, is in this tech hub for a firsthand account of the e-governance projects used for community development and as an interface between the government and citizens. This news was published in the Economic Times, April 20, 2011.

The delegation, on a three-day study tour since Tuesday in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Centre for Internet & Society, visited multi-specialty hospital Narayana Hrudayalaya to learn about tele-medicine services, which provide healthcare in remote villages using information and communication technology (ICT).

"The e-governance projects and ICT practices employed for citizen services and community development in India could be a useful guide in developing a strategy for e-governance in our country," Deputy Iraqi Science and Technology Minister Samir Salim Raouf said in a statement late Wednesday.

The delegation, comprising officials and experts from various fields, also visited the Azim Premji Foundation , a not-for-prof IT organisation set up by IT bellwether Wipro's chairman Azim Premji. The delegation wanted to gain insight into the foundation's efforts to reform school education across the country through ICT and modern management practices.

"What is interesting is that the civil society and the private sector innovate and contribute to governance in India and everything is not left for the government to deal with," Raouf noted.

After interacting with officials and experts in-charge of the e-governance projects in Karnataka, the delegation went to mobile and wireless communications firm Geodisc Ltd to study its innovative product GeoAmida, an open source handheld device for e-governance and banking solutions.

"The mobile device, which can be used in diverse domains such as e-governance, banking, healthcare, transportation and retail, is a unique solution to address various societal problems faced by the Iraqi government, which is set to formulate a policy for e-governance and use ICT for social reform and development," the statement added.

The delegation, which is a part of the 'Building e- Iraq National e-Governance Strategy' of the Iraqi government, will go to New Delhi Friday for studying similar projects of the central government.

"Our objective is to increase transparency and accountability in Iraq through ICT and provide citizen services through e-governance initiatives," Raouf added.

Read the original in Economic Times here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/iraqi-delegation-in-bangalore

Dark waders

praskrishna — 2011-04-20T05:22:10Z

Akhila Seetharaman finds out why a group of artists and researchers are preoccupied with chasing shadows. This article was published in Time Out Bengaluru, Vol. 3, Issue 20, April 15 - 28, 2011.

The New Bharat Brass Band from Kalasipalayam performed an unusual ditty at the Chitrakala Parishat last month. In a typical concert, the band plays raucous renditions of the latest hit Hindi film songs, but the music at this gig had its origin in a database of photographs of the city. These images had been taken by a group of student-artists, who converted the visual data into binary codes of 0s and 1s, and then transcribed the codes into musical notation, which they asked the band to perform. The result: strange, random, almost robotic music which represented a uniquely distilled experience of the city, peppered with the band’s characteristic filmy flourishes.

This performance was one among the several experimental art projects developed by participants as part of the Space the Final Frontier project, an initiative by the Dutch Art Institute and Centre for Experimental Media Arts at Srishti School of Art, Design and Technology to get students to – as described in a introduction to the project – articulate “spaces of flux” and “index the shadow worlds” of the city.

“When we speak about mapping the city, we immediately think in terms of physical geography. We don’t usually approach it in an aesthetic or theoretical way,” said Deepak DL, an art student from Chitrakala Parishat who participated in the two-week programme. His group chose to map shadow sounds – birds, buses on the street, sounds from a bar, and pressure cookers whistling in homes – piecing together an aural landscape of the city. “This project was about mapping the non-spaces. For instance when you go to a restaurant, you rarely see what’s going on behind the wall in the kitchen. We tried to do just that using sound,” said Deepak.

“Wherever there is light, there is also shadow. For all the spaces getting attention, there are many more spaces not getting attention, but surviving and often thriving,” said Prayas Abhinav, faculty member and researcher at CEMA and one of the organisers of Space the Final Frontier. In collaboration with Renée Ridgeway, founder of an online platform for art activities called n.e.w.s., and a third collaborator Stephen Wright, Abhinav is currently working on a book which examines the distribution of human attention in the art world, based on a concept known as “attention economy”.

The trio’s fascination with the theme also led them to hunt for shadow art activities on the internet. In the course of their search they found themselves wondering how to find art online without necessarily limiting themselves to work that described itself as “art”. For Abhinav and his colleagues this became more than a technical problem, since search engines assume that users are looking for what others are looking for and throw up the most popular or valid entries first, leaving the vast majority of less popular entries in the shadow. “Lesser known artists don’t refer to themselves as ‘lesser known artists’, so finding them online via Google isn’t all that easy,” said Abhinav. “Everyone is operating in the same space with established hierarchies. Shadows exist, but how do we look for them?”

“In the 1990s we used to have a culture of community web sites that looked really bad, but were thriving hubs,” said Abhinav. He pointed out that over the decade, with the advent of search engines, the larger databases gained priority among users. To democratise search results, Abhinav and Ridgeway, along with the Centre for Internet and Society, launched the Shadow Search Project with an open call for entries in early 2010 to find an algorithm that could bring up entries that otherwise exist under the radar, through search.

“If the new currency is attention – that is, if users are supposed to pay not money but time –, certain kinds of priorities are set up and vast amounts of information will always remain invisible,” said Nishant Shah, researcher at the Centre for Internet and Society. The Shadow Search Project is intended to serve as a platform to look for these shadows and give them visibility.

The winning entry, a search engine called Narcissus, which will be demonstrated this fortnight, takes the search results of a regular search engine like Google and reverses it, such that the user gets the last page first. “The least popular results come up first, and as those become more popular, the new least popular results come up. This continues in a cyclical manner,” said Ridgeway.

Data gathered and indexed by students during the Space the Final Frontier programme will be used to test the Narcissus algorithm. “If one of the strengths of the Internet is serendipity – stumbling upon a small, but great find by chance – the idea of a search engine plug in like Narcissus that scrambles Google results and presents it in a democratic manner, definitely has appeal,” said Shah.

Read the original in Time Out Bengaluru here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/chasing-shadows

We are anonymous, we are legion

sunil — 2012-03-21T09:38:56Z

Online anonymity is vital for creativity and entrepreneurship on the Web, writes Sunil Abraham. The article was published in the Hindu on April 18, 2011.

During his keynote at the International World Wide Web Conference recently, Sir Tim Berners-Lee argued for the preservation of online anonymity as a safeguard against oppression. This resonated with his audience in Hyderabad, given the recent uproar in the Indian blogosphere and twitterverse around the IT Act (Amendment 2008) and the recently published associated rules for intermediaries and cyber cafes.

Over time, there has been a dilution of standards for blanket surveillance. The Telegraph Act allowed for blanket surveillance of phone traffic only as the rarest of exceptions. The IT Act and the ISP licence on the other hand, authorise and require ISPs and cyber cafes to undertake blanket surveillance as the norm in the form of data retention. The transaction database of the UID (Unique Identification Number) project will log of all our interactions with the government, private sector and other citizens; all these are frightening developments for freedom of expression in general and anonymous speech in particular.

Anonymous speech is a necessary pre-condition for democratic and open governance, free media, protection of whistle-blowers and artistic freedom. On many controversial areas of policy formulation, it is usually anonymous officials from various ministries making statements to the press. Would mapping UIDs to IP address compromise the very business of government? A traditional newspaper may solicit anonymous tips regarding an ongoing investigative journalism campaign through their website.

Would data retention by ISPs expose their anonymous sources? Whistle-blowers usually use public Wi-Fi or cyber cafes because they don't want their communications traced back to residential or official IP addresses. Won't the ban on open public Wi-Fi networks and the mandatory requirement for ID documents at cyber cafes jeopardise their safety significantly? Throughout history, great art has been produced anonymously or under a nom de plume. Will the draft Intermediary Due Diligence Rules, which prohibits impersonation even if it is without any criminal intent, result in artists sanitising their art into banality?

Anonymous speech online is facilitated by three forms of sharing — shared standards, shared software and shared identities. Shared or open standards such as asymmetric encryption and digital signatures allow for anonymous, private and yet authenticated communications. Shared software or Free/Open Source Software reassures all parties involved that there is no spy-ware or back door built into tools and technologies built around these standards.

Shared identities, unlike shared software and standards, is a cultural hack and, therefore, almost impossible to protect against. V for Vendetta, the graphic novel by Alan Moore gives us an insight into how this is could be done. The hero, V, hides his identity behind a Guy Fawkes mask. Towards the end of the novel, he couriers thousands of similar masks to the homes of ordinary citizens.

In the final showdown between V and the oppressive regime, these citizens use these masks to form an anonymous mob that confuses the security forces into paralysis. Shared identities online therefore, is the perfect counterfoil to digital surveillance.

As Dr. Berners-Lee spoke in Hyderabad, the Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic Coalition of the Internet Governance Forum released a list of 10 principles for online governance at the meeting convened by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression in Stockholm.

The fifth principle includes “freedom from surveillance, the right to use encryption, and the right to online anonymity”. One hopes that Gulshan Rai of CERT-IN will heed the advice provided by his international peers and amend the IT Act rules before they have a chilling effect on online creativity and entrepreneurship.

Read the article originally published in the Hindu, here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/online-anonymity

You Have the Right to Remain Silent

anja — 2011-08-02T07:55:22Z

India has a long history of censorship that it justifies in the name of national security. But new laws governing the Internet are unreasonable and — given the multitude of online voices — poorly thought out, argues Anja Kovacs in this article published in the Sunday Guardian on 17 April 2011.

In March 2011, Indian media - both social and traditional - was ablaze with fears that a new set of rules, proposed to complement the IT (Amendment) Act 2008, would thwart the freedom of expression of India's bloggers: contrary to standard international practice, the Intermediary Due Dilligence Rules seemed intent on making bloggers responsible for comments made by readers on their site. Only a few weeks earlier, the threat of online censorship had manifested itself in a different form: although the block was implemented unevenly, mobile applications market space Mobango, bulk SMS provider Clickatell, hacking-related portal Zone-H.com and blogs hosted on Typepad were suddenly no longer accessible for most Indian netizens, without warning or explanation.

Censorship in India is nothing new. At the time of Independence, there was widespread fear among its lawmakers that unrestricted freedom of expression could become a barrier to the social reforms necessary to put the country on Nehru's path to development – particularly as the memory of Partition continued to be vivid. Although freedom of expression is guaranteed by the Constitution, it is therefore subject to a fairly extensive list of so-called "reasonable" restrictions: the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. But while this long list might have made sense at the time of Partition, in the mature democracy that India has now become, its existence, and the numerous opportunities for censorship and surveillance that it has enabled or justified, seems out of place. Indeed, though all these restrictions in themselves are considered acceptable internationally, there are few other democratic states that include all of them in the basic laws of their land.

An appetite for censorship does not only exist among India's legislature and judiciary, however. Especially since the early nineties, instances of vigilante groups destroying art, preventing film screenings, or even attacking offending artists, writers and editors have become noteworthy for their regularity. But it is worth noting that even more progressive sections of society have not been averse to censorship: for example, section of the Indian feminist movement have voiced strong support for the Indecent Representation of Women Act that seeks to censor images of women which are derogatory, denigrating or likely to corrupt public morality.

What connects all these efforts? A belief that suppressing speech and opinions makes it possible to contain the conflicts that emanate from India's tremendous diversity, while simultaneously ensuring its homogenous moral as much as political development. But if the advent of satellite television already revealed the vulnerabilities of this strategy, the Internet has made clear that in the long term, it is simply untenable. It is not just that the authors of a speech act may not be residents of India; it is that everybody can now become an author, infinitely multiplying the number of expressions that are produced each year and that thus could come within the Law's ambit. In this context, even if it may still have a role, suppression clearly can no longer be the preferred or even dominant technology of choice to manage disagreements. What is urgently needed is the building of a much stronger culture of respectful disagreement and debate within and across the country's many social groups. If more and more people are now getting an opportunity to speak, what we need to make sure is that they end up having a conversation.

Yet the government of India so far has mostly continued on the beaten track, putting into place a range of legislations and policies to meticulously monitor and police the freedom of expression of netizens within its borders. Thus, for example, section 66F(1)(B) of the IT (Amendment) Act 2008 defines "cyberterrorism" so broadly as to include the unauthorised access to information on a computer with a belief that that information may be used to cause injury to...decency or morality. The suggested sentence may extend to imprisonment for life. The proposed Intermediary Due Dilligence Rules 2011 privatise the responsibility for censorship by making intermediaries responsible for all content that they host or store, putting unprecedented power over our acts of speech into the hands of private bodies. The proposed Cyber Cafe Rules 2011 order that children who do not possess a photo identity card need to be accompanied by an adult who does, constraining the Internet access of crores of young people among the less advantaged sections of society in particular. And while the US and other Western countries continue to debate the desireability of an Internet Kill Switch, the Indian government obtained this prerogative through section 69A of the IT (Amendment Act) 2008 years ago.

Such measures are given extra teeth by being paired with unprecedented systems of surveillance. For example, there are proposals on the table that make it obligatory for telecommunication carriers and manufacturers of telecommunications equipment to ensure their equipment and services have built-in surveillance capabilities. While at present, records are only kept if there is a specific requirement by intelligence or security agencies, the Intelligence Bureau has proposed that ISPs keep a record of all online activities of all customers for at least six months. The IB has also suggested putting into place a unique identification system for all Internet users, whereby they would be required to submit some form of online identification every time they go online.

Proponents of such legislation often point to the new threats to safety and security that the Internet poses to defend these measures, and it is indeed a core obligation of any state to ensure the safety of its citizens. But the hallmark of a democracy is that it carefully balances any measures to do so with the continued guarantee of its citizens' fundamental rights. Despite the enormous changes and challenges that the Internet brings for freedom of expression everywhere, such an exercise seems to sadly not yet have been systematically undertaken in India so far.

The recent blocking of websites with which we started this article reflects the urgent need to do so. In response to RTI applications by the Centre for Internet and Society and Medianama, the Department of Information Technology, which is authorised to order such blocks, admitted to blocking Zone-H, but not any of the other websites affected earlier this year. In an interview with The Hindu, the Department of Telecommunication too had denied ordering the blocking of access, despite the fact that some users trying to access Typepad had reported seeing the message "this site has been blocked as per request by Department of Telecom" on their screen. In the mean time, Clickatell and Mobango remain inaccessible for this author at the time of writing. That we continue to be in the dark as to why this is so in the world's largest democracy deserves to urgently become a rallying point.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/your-right-to-remain-silent

Beyond Clicktivism

praskrishna — 2011-04-20T04:33:53Z

Moral support Hazare has in plenty. Count the missed calls, writes Debarshi Dasgupta in this article published in the Outlook on April 18, 2011.

Want to commit sedition against the government?” “Join Dandi March-II.” “A Mahatma announces a fast-unto-death.” These were some of the clarion calls that organisers of the protest against corruption led by Anna Hazare were making online. And people from all classes responded in massive numbers. Possibly fed up with the scale of the CWG and 2G scams and exasperated by the petty and mundane corruption they encounter daily.

Anna Hazare and Jantar Mantar were among the top 10 global trending topics on Twitter on April 7 afternoon. “Earthquake named Anna Hazare lashes on corrupted Indian Politicians, epicenter India, it measures 1.22 Billion Richter Hearts,” said one. A disengaged youngster tweeted: “OK, enough of ignorance...time to read up on Anna Hazare.” On the ‘India Against Corruption’ page on Facebook, people from across the country left posts either announcing their local programme to support Hazare or asking for advice to organise one. Leaflets urged people to give a missed call on a Mumbai landline expressing support. With 6,00,000 missed calls, the organisers were urging more to call in to take that number to over 25 lakh.

Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, said the organisers of this social media campaign had adopted a “funnel approach”, in which they get people involved gradually. “Clicking on the ‘Like’ function on Facebook to making a call—they are increasing the action, incrementally getting people to become proper activists from being armchair slacktivists.”

Read the original here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/beyond-clicktivism

Gone in a flash

praskrishna — 2011-04-20T04:58:48Z

Net-savvy crowds gather in public places for moments of wacky fun, then vanish. This article by Neha Thirani was published in the Times of India Crest Edition on April 16, 2011.

It's an ordinary day at the MGF mall in Gurgaon, when a group of fifteen people suddenly appears carrying lanterns made from discarded plastic bottles and starts passing them along in relay fashion. Starting from the plaza in front of the mall, the crowd goes into the metro station nearby and back again, and then suddenly disperses, attracting amused stares from befuddled passersby. This lantern-wielding crowd is a flash mob, a global phenomenon that has now hit India.

So is this part of a mass social experiment? Political movement? Performance art? Pointless fun? Malini Kochupillai and Kanishka Prasad, both professors at the Sushant School of Art and Architecture in Gurgaon who orchestrated the event, say it's an effort to add a modicum of vibrancy to otherwise ignored public places, reclaiming the space for public use. Along with their students, the duo has organised about a dozen such 'flash mobs'.

For the uninitiated, a flash mob appears to be entirely random - a group of people, performing an unusual and seemingly pointless act and then dispersing. For those in the know, the flash mob is mobilised by an organiser, who brings together a crowd of people at a predefined location and time via social media, viral emails or mass texting. The crowd then carries out a scripted series of actions. The participants are typically strangers and the purpose is usually satire. Their actions transform a public place for the period of the performance, and engender discussion at the unexpected.

This rather quirky social phenomenon, popular in the US and Europe, originated in 2003 when Bill Wasik, senior editor of Harper's Magazine, organised the first successful flash mob in Macy's department store. Over a hundred people converged on the store, gathered over an expensive rug and pretended to be shopping for a 'love rug' for their shared apartment. Wasik's aim was apolitical. Through amusement, he wanted to question notions of conformity and the hipster culture of wanting to be a part of the 'next big thing'. Since then, there have been hugely successful flash mobs all over Europe and America. The biggest recorded flash mob has been the International Pillow Fight Day, which took place on March 22, 2008 in over 25 cities simultaneously. More recently, Egypt has seen a series of flash mobs who left security forces befuddled by their silent protests.

While the word was officially coined in 2003, the phenomenon can be traced back to 18th century England where workers in an assembly line would stitch secret messages into garments to plan a congregation of strangers.

Nishant Shah, research director for the Centre for Internet and Society in Bangalore, says the growth in places of globalised consumption parallels the formation of flash mobs. "We can call malls places of public consumption, but at the back of our minds is the uneasy thought that the sign reads - rights of entry reserved. The mall, then, is only for certain public, " says Shah. "What flash mobs do is abuse the space - subverting the intention of the space that they are orchestrated in. "

This social experiment that has now made its way to metros across the country has been loosely related to locations of consumerism. The first ever flash mob in India took place on October 4, 2003 when a group of over 60 people swarmed the then newly built Crossroads mall in Mumbai. The flash mobbers shocked the malls security guards when they inexplicably starting screaming into their cellphones vague directions such as: "Infosys becho ek hazaar, and SBI gheun tak don she. " This was followed by some frenzied dancing, and a moment later, they were gone.

New media professional Noel Braganza, 26, organised a flash mob in the main courtyard of Phoenix Mills, Mumbai on Independence Day last year. Along with his colleague Nicole, Braganza spread the message over social media entirely;"We didn't take any prior permission, and this was possible because we organised it around Independence Day - our concept was patriotic, not disruptive, " says Braganza. At 4 pm on August 15, 2010, a crowd of over one hundred people, dressed in tri-color, lined up in rows in the courtyard of Pheonix Mills, sang the national anthem and then dispersed. Though most were there by design, some of the shoppers present joined spontaneously. "There was a huge snaking queue outside Big Bazaar that stopped in its tracks and started singing. "

The Urban Gorillaz - as the Gurgaon group is called - has organised its events with a particular focus on reclaiming spaces that have largely been ignored, or usurped by private developers. "Most public spaces in Delhi are decrepit and in desperate need of refurbishment, " says Kochupillai. "Perhaps increased use of these spaces will push the authorities to look beyond roads, flyovers and parking lots and give pedestrians an equally deserving space in the public realm. " The group encourages people to engage with the spaces available to them so that they do not become unused and unsafe.

By studying what prevents or promotes the use of public space - such as movement patterns, active/ inactive zones and traffic interference in pedestrian areas - the group hopes to encourage architects and urban planners to create spaces where people can relax without feeling like they are trespassing or encroaching. "A flash mob says that you can create public spaces but we will decide how we will use them, " says Nishant Shah. "It gives a certain sense of power to the user who is no longer a consumer but an architect of the space. "

Started as an exercise in an architecture class at the Sushant School of Art and Architecture, the Urban Gorillaz facebook group has grown to over 400 members.

Up until now, they have orchestrated over ten flash mobs doing a variety of random acts from exercising in the main courtyard of Heritage city, flying paper planes in an office complex, sketching people passing by in a mall, creating installations for passersby to paint and building a canopy on a sidewalk with rope and bamboo. The one which attracted the most attention was during the Commonwealth Games, where they organised the 'Common Man Games' at Nehru Place to entertain Delhi citizens who were sidelined during the games. The games included track and field and pitthu.

"The first reaction of most people is what are you selling or promoting? And I reply that I am promoting public space, " says Kochupillai. "On occasions when guards have asked us to stop, we simply move into an area that is not under their jurisdiction. " The group has not encountered much antagonism, with most people amused rather than angry. Pragya Vig, 19, is a member of the group and a second year student at the college. "It set me thinking - why aren't we using the public spaces?" says Vig.

In the coming month, the Urban Gorillaz are planning flash mobs in the metro to raise awareness for a women's right to personal space.

Not all flash mobs have any apparent rationale. In the week after the death of Michael Jackson, Bangalore saw a spontaneous flash mob. At every red light signal, whenever the traffic would stop, people would suddenly come together and perform popular Michael Jackson dance moves. When the light changed, they would be gone in a flash.

Read the article in the Times of India

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/changing-tide

Iraq Delegation to Visit India for Study of E-Governance in Indian Cities ― Meetings in Bangalore and Delhi

praskrishna — 2011-08-02T07:13:52Z

An Iraqi Government delegation headed by HE Mr. Abdul Kareem Al-Samarai, Minister of Science & Technology, Government of Iraq will be in India on a e-governance tour. The study tour is organised by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA).

The Building e-Iraq National e-Governance strategic plan clearly emphasizes the need for connecting services and citizens to better access of information and services using ICTs as a leading resource/innovative force and as a contributing factor to enhancing transparency and accountability as well as facilitate the effective and efficient provisioning of essential services. In this context, and as identified by the Iraqi e-governance ministerial steering committee, community service centers (CSCs) have been identified as having a direct bearing on sustainable social and economical changes consistent with the MDGs.

As agreed within the steering committee, the community based connectivity services centres will be hosted within existing community structures throughout Iraq in order to enhance penetration levels and provide for cost-effective strategies. Post offices and youth centres would henceforth represent the point of entry for the community centres, where the Iraqi government is rehabilitating the buildings and has already provided Internet access with the hope of introducing e-governance services. The centres will also be linked with the implementation of the pilot e-services to promote access to information resources and government programmes and services. Additionally, the centres will serve to address local issues and priorities.

UNDP in partnership with ESCWA is organizing a study tour to India that would expose senior Iraqi stakeholders to e-government and e-governance as a means to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector in service provision, and make them learn from India's experience in:

Harnessing ICT technologies in service of community development, inclusiveness and empowerment, particularly at the local level;

Highlighting e-governance practices in connecting citizens to the state – at both the federal and local levels – and enhancing services;
Presenting success stories and lessons learned from India’s experience in instigating and operating CSCs; and
Providing the Government of India with a frame of reference in designing an appropriate, efficient and effective decentralized planning process and service delivery.

Dr. Samir Salim Raouf, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Science and Technology, Dr. Mahmood Kasim Sharief, Director General, Ministry of Science and Technology, Zagros Fattah Mohammed Mohammed, Director General, Ministry of Planning - KRG, Najwa Saeed Fathullah, Director General, Ministry of Finance, Majeed Hameed Jassim, Director General, Ministry of Communication, Dr. Kathim Mohammed Breesam, Director General, Ministry of Planning, Majed Sadoon Jasim, Director General, Ministry of Interior, Naeef Thamer Hussien, Director General, Ministry of Education, Ismael Khaleel Murad, Chief of Information, Ministry of Higher Education, Anwer Alwan Jassim, Ministry of Higher Education, Khalaf Muhammad Khalaf, Deputy Director General, Ministry of Education, Samer Noori Taqi, Chief of Information, Ministry of Municipalities and Public Works, Safaa Mohammed Kassar, Anbar Governorates, Abdulamer Abdulwahid Mubarak, Basra Governorates, Isam Hussein Ali, Ministry of Science and Technology, Sudipto Mukherjee, Head of Economic Recovery and Poverty Alleviation, UNDP, Abeer Fawaeer, E-Governance Specialist, UNDP and Dalia Zendi, Project Associate, UNDP will participate in the meetings.

Study tour structure

The delegation will hold meetings with Deepak Menon of India Water Portal, Ashok Kamath of Pratham Books, Srikanth Nadhamuni of E-governments foundation, Dr. Subbramanya of Geodesic, Parth Sarwate of Azim Premji Foundation, Abhay Singhavi of Narayana Hrydayalaya and MN Vidyashankar and DS Ravindran of Department of e-governance, Government of Karnataka.

In Delhi, the delegation will hold meetings in the Department of Information Technology, National Informatics Centre, National Institute for Smart Government, Ministry of Urban Development and Ministry of Panchayati Raj.

Expected outcomes

The study tour will be concluded in Delhi with a brainstorming session to discuss and explore the results achieved by the study tour, and ultimately formulate an integrated framework for identifying, establishing, operating and managing CSCs in Iraq with wider national and local e-governance development plan in line with overarching public sector and modernization programme and generate a list of pilots quick-win e-services applications that can be implemented in Iraq.

Other expected outputs are:

To identify critical and relevant lessons from the Indian e-governance models, with particular emphasis on linkages between ICT and broad-based development in the areas of education, health, water and social development of rural and urban areas;
To enhance awareness on the role and operation of CSCs at various levels and their pivotal role in facilitating access to essential services and reducing service costs;
To improve understanding of the challenges in the effective application of ICTs for development and the key factors in the design and implementation of ICT for development projects and programmes;
To enhance the understanding of the measures to be undertaken by the centre and the provinces to identify and put in place e-services;
To highlight the successes and lessons learned from the Indian decentralized and local area planning and development model;
To learn about the latest development in IT industry and the infrastructure required for CSCs and e-services; and
To explore working partnerships between the Government of India and the Indian IT companies.

This study tour is in furtherance to the e-Governance Action plan prepared by the Iraq Government. The Centre for Internet and Society is assisting the delegation for the meetings held in Bangalore.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iraqi-e-governance-india-tour

Limits to Privacy

praskrishna — 2012-12-14T10:28:59Z

In this chapter we attempt to build a catalogue of these various justifications, without attempting to be exhaustive, with the objective of arriving at a rough taxonomy of such frequently invoked terms. In addition we also examine some the more important justifications such as “public interest” and “security of the state” that have been invoked in statutes and upheld by courts to deprive persons of their privacy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/publications/limits-privacy.pdf

How Web 2.0 responded to Hazare

praskrishna — 2011-04-11T10:38:03Z

Social media often fails to give us time to form critical opinions. ‘It mirrored the spectacle that we were being fed by TV channels', says Nishant Shah in an interview with Deepa Kurup. This news was published in the Hindu on April 11, 2011.

By Day Two of the protests at Jantar Mantar, where social activist Anna Hazare was leading a fast-unto-death against corruption, most commentators were drawing fierce parallels with Tahrir Square, and other pro-democracy revolutions in the Middle-East.

Soon enough, the social media angle raised its head. After a quiet Tuesday, when television channels began to “play up” the protests, Wednesday morning saw social media platforms abuzz with chatter. Initiated by campaign organisers, the India Against Corruption team, Facebook profile badges, missed call campaigns and petitions (most notably on online campaign site Avaaz (where over 6.17 lakh have registered support) entered the scene.

In 140 characters, #janlokpal, #annahazare and the less gracious #meranetachorhain began to trend on Twitter. YouTube shows up around 2,000 video results, a lot of which are amateur videos shot by participants.

‘Causes' application requests for “brandishing corruption”, ‘Like'-this-revolution requests and Tweets on how you can indeed weed out the corruption demon with a Re-Tweet, were abound.

But did this social media buzz translate into more people on the ground? Did the Tweets and chain e-mails, that were doing the rounds fairly early on, manage to drive public opinion, or outrage, as in this case? On this, the jury is divided.

Crunching numbers

Even in the Middle-East, where we saw dictators plug social media channels, experts have downplayed the pivotal role attributed to social media. A tool for sharing information, its standalone role in triggering a revolution has been dismissed by many.

In the current context, this is even more difficult to establish because efforts appear to be all too scattered, unlike in Egypt where the ‘We are all Khaled Said' page by Wael Ghonim, appeared to be a focal point of sorts.

In comparison, a simple search on Facebook reveals over 20 pages that all have around 25,000-30,000 users on-board. Mr. Hazare's Facebook profile page has over 1.3 lakh ‘Likes'.

Gaurav Mishra, social media analyst, pegs the total support at around 15 lakh. Drawing parallels with the citizen activism campaigns that emerged between the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008 and the Lok Sabha elections of 2009 (the former being when social media arrived in India), Mr. Mishra also points out that corruption did go for a Six on Friday (the final day) with IPL4 dominating conversation online.

Nishant Shah, director (research) at the Centre for Internet and Society, points out that while during revolutions, the social media has proved to be a poignant and powerful tool to mobilise resources, last week it emerged that it can not only propagate dubious opinions, but also it often (because it relies on the temporal quality of making things viral) fails to give us time to form critical opinions.

He compares a platform like Avaaz, that mobilised people ‘against corruption', with long-term Ipaidabribe project (using the same digital tools) which actually leads to debate around why corruption is so endemic.

Mirrors TV

Interestingly, as Mr. Shah points out, the social media mirrored the spectacle that people were being fed by TV channels, instead of being a true discursive space of public dialogue. It's now getting clear that they are actually playing out an interesting traction as they supplement each other in bolstering of evidence and participation, he adds.

On the other hand, blogs too were abuzz. However, many did seek to provide deeper perspective, and provided more space for debate and dissent. In fact, progressive blogs even attempted to counter the one-sided commentary provided on traditional visual media.

Click here for the story in the Hindu

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/web2.0-responds-to-hazare

Privacy and the Information Technology Act — Do we have the Safeguards for Electronic Privacy?

Prashant Iyengar — 2012-12-14T10:29:12Z

How do the provisions of the Information Technology Act measure up to the challenges of privacy infringement? Does it provide an adequate and useful safeguard for our electronic privacy? Prashant Iyengar gives a comprehensive analysis on whether and how the Act fulfils the challenges and needs through a series of FAQs while drawing upon real life examples.

What kinds of computer related activities impinge on privacy?

Although Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) have greatly enhanced our capacities to collect, store, process and communicate information, it is ironically these very capacities of technology which make us vulnerable to intrusions of our privacy on a previously impossible scale. Firstly, data on our own personal computers can compromise us in unpleasant ways — with consequences ranging from personal embarrassment to financial loss. Secondly, transmission of data over the Internet and mobile networks is equally fraught with the risk of interception — both lawful and unlawful — which could compromise our privacy. Thirdly, in this age of cloud computing when much of "our" data — our emails, chat logs, personal profiles, bank statements, etc., reside on distant servers of the companies whose services we use, our privacy becomes only as strong as these companies’ internal electronic security systems. Fourthly, the privacy of children, women and minorities tend to be especially fragile in this digital age and they have become frequent targets of exploitation. Fifthly, Internet has spawned new kinds of annoyances from electronic voyeurism to spam or offensive email to ‘phishing’ — impersonating someone else’s identity for financial gain — each of which have the effect of impinging on one’s privacy.

Although there are a number of technological measures through which these risks can be reduced, it is equally important to have a robust legal regime in place which lays emphasis on the maintenance of privacy. This note looks at whether and how the Information Technology Act that we currently have in India measures up to these challenges of electronic privacy [1].

What provisions in the IT Act protect against violations of privacy?

At the outset, it would be pertinent to note that the IT Act defines a ‘computer resource’; expansively as including a “computer, computer system, computer network, data, computer database or software” [2]. As is evident, this definition is wide enough to cover most intrusions which involve any electronic communication devices or networks — including mobile networks. Briefly, then IT Act provides for both civil liability and criminal penalty for a number of specifically proscribed activities involving use of a computer — many of which impinge on privacy directly or indirectly. These will be examined in detail in the following sub-sections.

Intrusions into computers and mobile devices

accessing

downloading/copying/extraction of data or extracts any data

introduction of computer contaminant[3];or computer virus[4]

causing damage either to the computer resource or data residing on it

disruption

denial of access

facilitating access by an unauthorized person

charging the services availed of by a person to the account of another person,

destruction or diminishing of value of information

stealing, concealing, destroying or altering source code with an intention

The Act provides for the civil remedy of “damages by way of compensation” for damages caused by any of these actions. In addition anyone who “dishonestly” and “fraudulently” does any of these specified acts is liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term of upto three years or with a fine which may extend to five lakh rupees, or with both[5].

Bangalore techie convicted for hacking govt site (2009, Deccan Herald)[6]

In November 2009, The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai, sentenced N G Arun Kumar, a techie from Bangalore to undergo a rigorous imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs 5,000 under section 420 IPC (cheating) and Section 66 of IT Act (hacking).

Investigations had revealed that Kumar was logging on to the BSNL broadband Internet connection as if he was the authorised genuine user and ‘made alteration in the computer database pertaining to broadband Internet user accounts’ of the subscribers.

The CBI had registered a cyber crime case against Kumar and carried out investigations on the basis of a complaint by the Press Information Bureau, Chennai, which detected the unauthorised use of broadband Internet.

The complaint also stated that the subscribers had incurred a loss of Rs 38,248 due to Kumar’s wrongful act. He used to ‘hack’ sites from Bangalore as also from Chennai and other cities, they said.

Children's privacy online

As computers and the Internet become ubiquitous children have increasingly become exposed to crimes such as pornography and stalking that make use of their private information. The newly inserted section 67B of the IT Act (2008) attempts to safeguard the privacy of children below 18 years by creating a new enhanced penalty for criminals who target children.

The section firstly penalizes anyone engaged in child pornography. Thus, any person who “publishes or transmits” any material which depicts children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, or anyone who creates, seeks, collects, stores, downloads, advertises or exchanges this material may be punished with imprisonment upto five years (seven years for repeat offenders) and with a fine of upto Rs. 10 lakh.

Secondly, this section punishes the online enticement of children into sexually explicitly acts, and the facilitation of child abuse, which are also punishable as above.

Viewed together, these provisions seek to carve out a limited domain of privacy for children from would-be sexual predators.

The section exempts from its ambit, material which is justified on the grounds of public good, including the interests of "science, literature, art, learning or other objects of general concern". Material which is kept or used for bona fide "heritage or religious purpose" is also exempt.

In addition, the newly released Draft Intermediary Due-Diligence Guidelines, 2011 [7]require ‘intermediaries’[8]to notify users not to store, update, transmit and store any information that is inter alia, “pedophilic” or “harms minors in any way”. An intermediary who obtains knowledge of such information is required to “act expeditiously to work with user or owner of such information to remove access to such information that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity”. Further, the intermediary is required to inform the police about such information and preserve the records for 90 days.

Electronic Voyeurism

Although once regarded as only the stuff of spy cinema, the explosion in consumer electronics has lowered the costs and the size of cameras to such an extent that the threat of hidden cameras recording people’s intimate moments has become quite real. Responding to the growing trend of such electronic voyeurism, a new section 66E has been inserted into the IT Act which penalizes the capturing, publishing and transmission of images of the "private area" [9]of any person without their consent, "under circumstances violating the privacy" [10] of that person.

This offence is punishable with imprisonment of upto three years or with a fine of upto Rs. two lakh or both.

Phishing – or Identity Theft

The word 'phishing' is commonly used to describe the offence of electronically impersonating someone else for financial gain. This is frequently done either by using someone else’s login credentials to gain access to protected systems, or by the unauthorized application of someone else’s digital signature in the course of electronic contracts. Increasingly a new type of crime has emerged wherein sim cards of mobile phones have been ‘cloned’ enabling miscreants to make calls on others' accounts. This is also a form of identity theft.

Two sections of the amended IT Act penalize these crimes:

Section 66C makes it an offence to “fraudulently or dishonestly” make use of the electronic signature, password or other unique identification feature of any person. Similarly, section 66D makes it an offence to “cheat by personation” [11] by means of any ‘communication device’[12] or 'computer resource'.

Both offences are punishable with imprisonment of upto three years or with a fine of upto Rs. one lakh.

Mumbai Police Solves Phishing scam [13]

In 2005, a financial institute complained that they were receiving misleading emails ostensibly emanating from ICICI Bank’s email ID.

An investigation was carried out with the emails received by the customers of that financial institute and the accused were arrested. The place of offence, Vijaywada was searched for the evidence. One laptop and mobile phone used for committing the crime was seized.

The arrested accused had used open source code email application software for sending spam e-mails. He had downloaded the same software from the Internet and then used it as it is.

He used only VSNL to spam the e-mail to customers of the financial institute because VSNL email service provider does not have spam box to block the unsolicited emails.

After spamming e-mails to the institute customers he got the response from around 120 customers of which 80 are genuine and others are not correct because they do not have debit card details as required for e-banking."

The customers who received his e-mail felt that it originated from the bank. When they filled the confidential information and submitted it the said information was directed to the accused. This was possible because the dynamic link was given in the first page (home page) of the fake website. The dynamic link means when people click on the link provided in spam that time only the link will be activated. The dynamic link was coded by handling the Internet Explorer onclick () event and the information of the form will be submitted to the web server (where the fake website is hosted). Then server will send the data to the configured e-mail address and in this case the e-mail configured was to the e-mail of the accused. All the information after phishing (user name, password, transaction password, debit card number and PIN, mother’s maiden name) which he had received through the Wi-Fi Internet connectivity of Reliance.com was now available on his Acer laptop.

This crime was registered under section 66 of the IT Act, sections 419, 420, 465, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 51, 63 and 65 of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957 which attract the punishment of three years imprisonment and fine upto Rs 2 lac which the accused never thought of.

Spam and Offensive Messages

Although the advent of e-mail has greatly enhanced our communications capacities, most e-mail networks today remain susceptible to attacks from spammers who bulk-email unsolicited promotional or even offensive messages to the nuisance of users. Among the more notorious of these scams is/was the so-called "section 409 scam" in which victims receive e-mails from alleged millionaires who induce them to disclose their credit information in return for a share in millions.

Section 66A of the IT Act attempts to address this situation by penalizing the sending of:

any message which is grossly offensive or has a menacing character
false information for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, insult, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill-will
any electronic e-mail for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience, or to deceive the addressee about the origin of such messages;

This offence is punishable with imprisonment upto three years and with a fine[14]

Hoax E-mails [15]

In 2009, a 15-year-old Bangalore teenager was arrested by the cyber crime investigation cell (CCIC) of the city crime branch for allegedly sending a hoax e-mail to a private news channel. In the e-mail, he claimed to have planted five bombs in Mumbai, challenging the police to find them before it was too late.

According to police officials, at around 1p.m. on May 25, the news channel received an e-mail that read: “I have planted five bombs in Mumbai; you have two hours to find it.” The police, who were alerted immediately, traced the Internet Protocol (IP) address to Vijay Nagar in Bangalore. The Internet service provider for the account was BSNL, said officials.

Minor Hoax Spells Major Trouble

Sixteen-year-old Rakesh Patel (name changed), a student from Ahmedabad, sent an e-mail to a private news channel on March 18, 2008, warning officials of a bomb on an Andheri-bound train. In the e-mail, he claimed to be a member of the Dawood Ibrahim gang. Three days later, the crime investigation cell (CCIC) of the city police arrested the boy under section 506 (ii) for criminal intimidation. He was charge-sheeted on November 28, 2008.
Status: Patel was given a warning by a juvenile court
A 14-year-old Colaba boy sent a hoax e-mail to a TV channel in Madhya Pradesh, three days after the July 26, 2008, Ahmedabad bomb blasts. He claimed that 29 bombs would go off in Jabalpur. He was picked up by officers of the anti-terrorism squad (ATS) who, with the help of the MP police, were able to trace the e-mail to a cyber café in Colaba.
Status: No FIR was registered. The Cuffe Parade police registered a non-cognizable (NC) complaint against him, and the boy was allowed to go home after the police gave him a “strict warning”.
Shariq Khan, 18, was arrested in Bhopal on July 26, 2006, for sending out three e-mails claiming to be a member of the terrorist organisation, which the police believed was behind the 7/11 train bombings. He was arrested by the Bhopal police. Later, the ATS brought the boy to Mumbai and also booked him for a five-year-old unsolved case where an unknown accused had sent e-mail warnings to the department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in 2001.
Status: The police filed a charge-sheet against Shariq who claimed that he had sent the e-mails for fun. Trial is pending in a juvenile court. Shariq is presently out on bail in Bhopal.
On February 26, 2006, a 17-yearold student from Jamnabai Narsee School called an Alitalia flight bound to Milan at 2 a.m. telling them there was a bomb on board. He wanted to stop his girlfriend from going abroad. She was one of the 12 students on their way to attend a mock United Nations session in Geneva.
Status: After being grilled by the police, he was arrested, but let out on bail.

Lawful Interception and monitoring of electronic communications under the IT Act

In addition to violations of privacy by criminal and the mischievous minded, electronic communications and storage are also a goldmine for governmental supervision and surveillance. This section provides a brief overview of the provisions in the IT Act which circumscribe the powers of the state to intercept electronic communications.

The newly amended IT Act completely rewrote its provisions in relation to lawful interception. The new section 69 dealing with “power to issue directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of any information through any computer resource” is much more elaborate than the one it replaced, In October 2009, the Central Government notified rules under section 69 which lay down procedures and safeguards for interception, monitoring and decryption of information (the “Interception Rules 2009”). This further thickens the legal regime in this context.

Unlawful Intercept

In August 2007, Lakshmana Kailash K., a techie from Bangalore was arrested on the suspicion of having posted insulting images of Chhatrapati Shivaji, a major historical figure in the state of Maharashtra, on the social-networking site Orkut. The police identified him based on IP address details obtained from Google and Airtel – Lakshmana’s ISP. He was brought to Pune and detained for 50 days before it was discovered that the IP address provided by Airtel was erroneous. The mistake was evidently due to the fact that while requesting information from Airtel, the police had not properly specified whether the suspect had posted the content at 1:15 p.m. or a.m.

Taking cognizance of his plight from newspaper accounts, the State Human Rights Commission subsequently ordered the company to pay Rs 2 lakh to Lakshmana as damages [16].

The incident highlights how minor privacy violations by ISPs and intermediaries could have impacts that gravely undermine other basic human rights [17].

In addition to section 69, the Government has been empowered under the newly inserted section 69B to "monitor and collect traffic data or information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource".

"Traffic data" has been defined in the section to mean “any data identifying or purporting to identify any person, computer system or computer network or any location to or from which communication is or may be transmitted.” Rules have been issued by the Central Government under this section (the “Monitoring and Collecting Traffic Data Rules, 2009”) which are similar, although with important distinctions, to the rules issued under section 69.

Thus, there are two parallel interception and monitoring regimes in place under the Information Technology Act. In the paragraphs that follow, we provide an overview of the regime of surveillance under section 69 — since they are more targeted towards the individual, and consequently the threats to privacy are more severe — while highlighting important differences in the rules drafted under section 69.

Who may lawfully intercept?

Section 69 empowers the “Central Government or a state government or any of its officers specially authorised by the Central Government or the state government, as the case may be” to exercise powers of interception under this section.

Under the Interception Rules 2009, the secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs has been designated as the "competent authority", with respect to the Central Government, to issue directions pertaining to interception, monitoring and decryption. Similarly, the respective state secretaries in charge of Home Departments of the various states and union territories are designated as "competent authorities" to issue directions with respect to the state government [18].

	Central Government	State/Union Territory
Ordinary Circumstances	Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs	Secretary in charge of Home Departments of State
Emergency	Head or second senior most officer of security and law enforcement	Authorized officer not below the rank of Inspectors General of Police

However, an exception is made in cases of emergency, either

in remote areas where obtaining prior directions from the competent authority is not feasible or

for ‘operational reasons’ where obtaining prior directions is not feasible.

In such cases it would be permissible to carry out interception after obtaining the orders of the Head or second senior most officer of security and law enforcement at the central level, and an authorized officer not below the rank of Inspector General of Police at the state or union territory level. The order must be communicated to the competent authority within three days of its issue, and approval must be obtained from the authority within seven working days, failing which the order would lapse.

Where a state/union territory wishes to intercept/monitor or decrypt information beyond its territory, the competent authority for that state must make a request to the competent authority of the Central Government to issue appropriate directions.

Under what circumstances a direction to intercept may be issued?

Purposes for which interception may be directed

Under section 69, the powers of interception may be exercised by the authorized officers “when they are satisfied that it is necessary or expedient” to do so in the interest of:

sovereignty or integrity of India,

defense of India,

security of the state,

friendly relations with foreign states or

public order or

preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above or

for investigation of any offence.

Under section 69B, the competent authority may issue directions for monitoring for a range of “cyber security”[20] purposes including, inter alia, “identifying or tracking of any person who has breached, or is suspected of having breached or being likely to breach cyber security”.

Contents of direction

The reasons for ordering interception must be recorded in writing [21].

In the case of a direction under section 69, in arriving at its decision, the competent authority must consider alternate means of acquiring the information other than issuing a direction for interception [22]. The direction must relate to information sent or likely to be sent from one or more particular computer resources to another (or many) computer resources [23]. The direction must specify the name and designation of the officer to whom information obtained is to be disclosed, and also specify the uses for which the information is to be employed [24].

Duration of interception and periodic review

Once issued, an interception direction issued under section 69 remains in force for a period of 60 days (unless withdrawn earlier), and may be renewed for a total period not exceeding 180 days [25]. A direction issued under section 69B does not expire automatically through the lapse of time and theoretically would continue until withdrawn.

Within seven days of its issue, a copy of a direction issued under either section 69 or section 69B must be forwarded to the review committee constituted to oversee wiretapping under the Indian Telegraph Act [26]. Every two months, the review committee is required to meet and record its findings as to whether the direction was validly issued in light of section 69(3) [27]. If the review committee is of the opinion that it was not, it can set aside the direction and order destruction of all information collected [28].

What powers of interception do they have?

The competent authority may, in his written direction “direct any agency of the appropriate government to intercept monitor or decrypt or cause to be intercepted or monitored or decrypted any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource”[29].

Accordingly, the subscriber or intermediary or any person in charge of the computer resource is must, if required by the designated government agency, extend all facilities, equipment and technical assistance to:

provide access to or secure access to the computer resource generating, transmitting, receiving or storing such information; or

intercept, monitor, or decrypt[30] the information, as the case may be; or

provide information stored in computer resource.

The intermediary must maintain records mentioning the intercepted information, the particulars of the person, e-mail account, computer resource, etc., that was intercepted, the particulars of the authority to whom the information was disclosed, number of copies of the information that were made, the date of their destruction, etc. [31]. This list of requisitions received must be forwarded to the government agency once every 15 days to ensure their authenticity [32].

In addition, a responsibility is cast on the intermediary to put in place adequate internal checks to ensure that unauthorized interception does not take place, and extreme secrecy of intercepted information is maintained [33].

How long can information collected during interception be retained?

Interception rules require all records, including electronic records pertaining to interception to be destroyed by the government agency “in every six months except in cases where such information is required or likely to be required for functional purposes”. In the case of the Monitoring and Collecting of Traffic Data Rules 2009, this period is nine months from the date of creation of record.

In addition, all records pertaining to directions for interception and monitoring are to be destroyed by the intermediary within a period of two months following discontinuance of interception or monitoring, unless they are required for any ongoing investigation or legal proceedings. In the case of Monitoring Rules, this period is six months from the date of discontinuance.

What penalties accrue to intermediaries and subscribers for resisting interception?

Section 69 stipulates a penalty of imprisonment upto a term of seven years and fine for any “subscriber or intermediary or any person who fails to assist the agency” empowered to intercept.

Data Protection under the IT Act

Data Retention Requirements of 'Intermediaries'

Section 67C of the amended IT Act mandates ‘intermediaries’[34] to maintain and preserve certain information under their control for durations which are to be specified by law.

Any intermediary who fails to retain such electronic records may be punished with imprisonment up to three years and a fine.

Liability for body-corporates under section 43A

The newly inserted section 43A makes a start at introducing a mandatory data protection regime in Indian law. The section obliges corporate bodies who ‘possess, deal or handle’ any ‘sensitive personal data’ to implement and maintain ‘reasonable’ security practices, failing which they would be liable to compensate those affected by any negligence attributable to this failure.

It is only the narrowly-defined ‘body corporates’ [35] engaged in ‘commercial or professional activities’ who are the targets of this section. Thus government agencies and non-profit organisations are entirely excluded from the ambit of this section [36].

“Sensitive personal data or information” is any information that the Central Government may designate as such, when it sees fit to.

The “reasonable security practices” which the section obliges body corporates to observe are restricted to such measures as may be specified either “in an agreement between the parties” or in any law in force or as prescribed by the Central Government.

By defining both “sensitive personal data” and “reasonable security practice” in terms that require executive elaboration, the section in effect pre-empts the courts from evolving an iterative, contextual definition of these terms.

Mphasis BPO Fraud: 2005 [37]

In December 2004, four call centre employees, working at an outsourcing facility operated by MphasiS in India, obtained PIN codes from four customers of MphasiS’ client, Citi Group. These employees were not authorized to obtain the PINs.

In association with others, the call centre employees opened new accounts at Indian banks using false identities. Within two months, they used the PINs and account information gleaned during their employment at MphasiS to transfer money from the bank accounts of CitiGroup customers to the new accounts at Indian banks.

By April 2005, the Indian police had tipped off to the scam by a U.S. bank, and quickly identified the individuals involved in the scam. Arrests were made when those individuals attempted to withdraw cash from the falsified accounts, $426,000 was stolen; the amount recovered was $230,000.

Draft Reasonable Security Practices Rules 2011 [38]

In February 2011, the Ministry of Information and Technology, published draft rules under section 43A in order to define “sensitive personal information” and to prescribe “reasonable security practices” that body corporates must observe in relation to the information they hold.

Sensitive Personal Information
Rule 3 of these Draft Rules designates the following types of information as ‘sensitive personal information’:

password;

user details as provided at the time of registration or thereafter;

information related to financial information such as Bank account / credit card / debit card / other payment instrument details of the users;

physiological and mental health condition;

medical records and history;(vi) Biometric information;

information received by body corporate for processing, stored or processed under lawful contract or otherwise;

call data records;

This however, does not apply to “any information that is freely available or accessible in public domain or accessible under the Right to Information Act, 2005”.

They and “any person” holding sensitive personal information are forbidden from “keeping that information for longer than is required for the purposes for which the information may lawfully be used”[40]

Mandatory Privacy Policies for body corporates

Rule 4 of the draft rules enjoins a body corporate or its representative who “collects, receives, possess, stores, deals or handles” data to provide a privacy policy “for handling of or dealing in user information including sensitive personal information”. This policy is to be made available for view by such “providers of information” [41]. The policy must provide details of:

Type of personal or sensitive information collected under sub-rule (ii) of rule 3;
Purpose, means and modes of usage of such information;
Disclosure of information as provided in rule 6 [42].

Prior Consent and Use Limitation during Data Collection

In addition to the restrictions on collecting sensitive personal information, body corporate must obtain prior consent from the “provider of information” regarding “purpose, means and modes of use of the information”. The body corporate is required to “take such steps as are, in the circumstances, reasonable”[43] to ensure that the individual from whom data is collected is aware of :

the fact that the information is being collected; and
the purpose for which the information is being collected; and
the intended recipients of the information; and
the name and address of :
the agency that is collecting the information; and
the agency that will hold the information.

During data collection, body corporates are required to give individuals the option to opt-in or opt-out from data collection [44]. They must also permit individuals to review and modify the information they provide "wherever necessary" [45]. Information collected is to be kept securely [46], used only for the stated purpose [47] and any grievances must be addressed by the body corporate “in a time bound manner” [48].

Unlike "sensitive personal information" there is no obligation to retain information only for as long as is it is required for the purpose collected.

Limitations on Disclosure of Information

The draft rules require a body corporate to obtain prior permission from the provider of such information obtained either “under lawful contract or otherwise” before information is disclosed [49]. The body corporate or any person on its behalf shall not publish the sensitive personal information [50]. Any third party receiving this information is prohibited from disclosing it further [51]. However, a proviso to this sub-rule mandates information to be provided to ‘government agencies’ for the purposes of “verification of identity, or for prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, and punishment of offences”. In such cases, the government agency is required to send a written request to the body corporate possessing the sensitive information, stating clearly the purpose of seeking such information. The government agency is also required to “state that the information thus obtained will not be published or shared with any other person” [52].

Sub-rule (2) of rule 6 requires “any information” to be “disclosed to any third party by an order under the law for the time being in force.” This is to be done “without prejudice” to the obligations of the body corporate to obtain prior permission from the providers of information [53].

Reasonable Security Practices

Rule 7 of the draft rules stipulates that a body corporate shall be deemed to have complied with reasonable security practices if it has implemented security practices and standards which require:

a comprehensive documented information security program; and

information security policies that contain managerial, technical, operational and physical security control measures that are commensurate with the information assets being protected.

In case of an information security breach, such body corporate will be “required to demonstrate, as and when called upon to do so by the agency mandated under the law, that they have implemented security control measures as per their documented information security program and information security policies”.

The rule stipulates that by adopting the International Standard IS/ISO/IEC 27001 on “Information Technology – Security Techniques – Information Security Management System – Requirements”, a body corporate will be deemed to have complied with reasonable security practices and procedures.

The rule also permits “industry associations or industry clusters” who are following standards other than IS/ISO/IEC 27001 but which nevertheless correspond to the requirements of sub-rule 7(1), to obtain approval for these codes from the government. Once this approval has been sought and obtained, the observance of these standards by a body corporate would deem them to have complied with the reasonable security practice requirements of section 43A.

Penalties and Remedies for breach of Data Protection

Civil Liability for Corporates

As mentioned above, any body corporates who fail to observe data protection norms may be liable to pay compensation if:

it is negligent in implementing and maintaining reasonable security practices, and thereby

causes wrongful loss or wrongful gain to any person;[54]

Claims for compensation are to be made to the adjudicating officer appointed under section 46 of the IT Act. Further, details of the powers and functions of this officer are given in succeeding sections of this note.

Criminal liability for disclosure of information obtained in the course of exercising powers under the IT Act

Section 72 of the Information Technology Act imposes a penalty on “any person” who, having secured access to any electronic record, correspondence, information, document or other material using powers conferred by the Act or rules, discloses such information without the consent of the person concerned. Such unauthorized disclosure is punishable “with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees, or with both.”

Criminal Liability for unauthorized disclosure of information by any person of information obtained under contract

Section 72A of the IT Act imposes a penalty on any person [55] (including an intermediary) who

has obtained personal information while providing services under a lawful contract and

discloses the personal information without consent of the person,

with the intent to cause, or knowing it is likely to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss [56]

Such unauthorised disclosure to a third person is punishable with imprisonment upto three years or with fine upto Rs five lakh, or both.

Whom to call? Adjudicatory Mechanism and Remedies under the IT Act

This section provides a brief outline of the mechanism installed by the IT Act to activate the various remedies and penalties prescribed in various sections of the Act. As a victim of online intrusion, how does one use the IT Act to seek redressal?

As mentioned above, the IT Act provides for both the civil remedy of damages in compensation (Chapter IX) as well as criminal penalties for offences such as imprisonment and fine (Chapter XI). In general, claiming a civil remedy does not bar one from seeking criminal prosecution and ideally both should be pursued together. For clarity, in the sections that follow, we will be discussing the two procedures separately.

Civil Damages and Compensation

Whom to approach?

Section 46 of the IT Act empowers the Central Government to appoint “adjudication officers” to adjudicate whether any person has committed any of the contraventions described in Chapter IX of the Act (See section 2.1 and 4.2 above) and to determine the quantum of compensation payable. Accordingly, the Central Government has designated the secretaries of the Department of Information Technology of each of the states or union territories as the “adjudicating officer” with respect to each of their territories [57].

However, a pecuniary limit has been placed on the powers of adjudicating officers, and they may only adjudicate cases where the quantum of compensation claimed does not exceed Rs. five crores. In cases where the compensation claimed exceeds this amount, jurisdiction would vest in the “competent court”, under the Code of Civil Procedure [58].

Section 61 of the Act bars ordinary civil courts from jurisdiction over matters which the adjudicating officers have been empowered to decide under this Act.

When must a complaint be filed?

The Limitation Act provides that a suit must be filed within three years from when the right to sue accrues [59].

What is the procedure?

Section 46 and the rules framed under that section provide elaborate guidelines on the procedure that is to be followed by the adjudicating officer. Thus, the adjudicating officer is required to give the accused person “a reasonable opportunity for making representation in the matter”. Thereafter, if , on an inquiry, “he is satisfied that the person has committed the contravention, he may impose such penalty or award such compensation as he thinks fit in accordance with the provisions of that section.”

In order to carry out their duties adjudicating officer have been invested with the powers of a civil court which are conferred on the cyber appellate tribunal [60]. Additionally, they have the power to punish for their contempt undert the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Rules framed under the section provide further details on the procedure that must be followed and provide for the issuance of a “show cause notice”, manner of holding enquiry, compounding of offences, etc. [61].

Section 47 provides that in adjudging the quantum of compensation, the adjudicating officer shall have due regard to the following factors, namely:—

the amount of gain of unfair advantage, wherever quantifiable, made as a result of the default;

the amount of loss caused to any person as a result of the default;

the repetitive nature of the default.

Where must a complaint be filed and in what format?

The complaint must be made to the adjudicating officer of the state or union territory on the basis of location of computer system, computer network. The complaint must be made on a plain paper in the format provided in the Performa attached to the rules [62].

In case the offender or computer resource is located abroad, it would be deemed, for the purpose of prosecution to be located in India [63].

How long does the process take?

The Rules direct that the whole matter should be heard and decided “as far as possible” within a period of six months [64].

How much does it cost?

The Rules stipulates a variable fee payable by a bank draft calculated on the basis of damages claimed by way of compensation

a) Upto Rs. 10,000	10% ad valorem rounded off to nearest next hundred
b) From 10001 to Rs.50000	Rs. 1000 plus 5% of the amount exceeding Rs.10,000 rounded off to nearest next hundred
c) From Rs.50001 to Rs.100000	Rs. 3000/- plus 4% of the amount exceeding Rs. 50,000 rounded off to nearest next hundred
d) More than Rs. 100000	Rs.5000/- plus 2% of the amount exceeding Rs. 100,000 rounded off to nearest next hundred

Appeals to the Cyber Appellate Tribunal and the High Court

The Act provides for the constitution of a cyber appellate tribunal to hear appeals from cases decided by the adjudicating officer.

Within 25 days of the copy of the decision being made available by the adjudicating officer, the aggrieved party may file an appeal before the cyber appellate tribunal.

Section 57 provides that the appeal filed before the cyber appellate tribunal shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavor shall be made by it to dispose of the appeal finally within six months from the date of receipt of the appeal. Section 62 gives the right of appeal to a high court to any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the cyber appellate tribunal on any question of fact or law arising out of such order. Such an appeal must be filed within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the cyber appellate tribunal.

Can contraventions be compounded (compromised) with the offender?

Except in the case of repeat offenders, contraventions may be compromised by the adjudicating officer or between the parties either before or after institution of the suit. Where any contravention has been compounded the IT Act provides that “no proceeding or further proceeding, as the case may be, shall be taken against the person guilty of such contravention in respect of the contravention so compounded”[65].

Criminal Penalties

The process described above applies to “contraventions” under Chapter IX of the Act. In addition to being liable to pay compensation, in the cases falling under section 43, such offenders may also be liable for criminal penalties such as imprisonment and fines [66]. This sub-section of this paper deals with the procedure to be followed with respect to the criminal offences set out under Chapter XI of the Act (for example, see sections 2.2 to 2.5 above).

Whom to approach? Who can take cognizance of offences and investigate them?

Section 78 of the IT Act empowers police officers of the rank of Inspectors and above to investigate offences under the IT Act.

Many states have set up dedicated cyber crime police stations to investigate offences under this Act [67]. Thus, for example, the State of Karnataka has set up a special cyber crime police station responsible for investigating all offences under the IT Act with respect to the entire territory of Karnataka [68].

When must a complaint be lodged?

Although there is no time limit prescribed by the IT Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure with respect to when an FIR must be filed, in general, courts tend to take an adverse view when a significant delay has occurred between the time of occurrence of an offence and it’s reporting to the nearest police station.

The Code of Criminal Procedure forbids courts from taking cognizance of cases after three years “if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years”. Where either the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved, or where it is not known by whom the offence committed, this period is computed from the date on which respectively the offence or the identity of the offender comes to the knowledge of the person aggrieved [69].

What is the procedure?

No special procedure is prescribed for the trial of cyber offences and hence the general provisions of criminal procedure would apply with respect to investigation, charge sheet, trial, decision, sentencing and appeal.

Can offences be compounded?

Offences punishable with imprisonment of upto three years are compoundable by a competent court. However, repeat offenders cannot have their subsequent offences compounded. Additionally, offences which “affect the socio-economic conditions of the country” or those committed against a child under 18 years of age or against women cannot be compounded [70].