The Centre for Internet and Society
https://cis-india.org
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CIS's Statement at SCCR 24 on Exceptions & Limitations for Libraries and Archives
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-statement-sccr24-libraries-archives
<b>This was the statement delivered by Pranesh Prakash on Wednesday, July 25, 2012, at the 24th session of the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyrights and Related Rights on the issue of exceptions and limitations for libraries and archives.</b>
<p>Thank you, Mr. Chair.</p>
<p>We would like to associate ourselves with the statements made by International Federation of Library Associations, Electronic Information for Libraries, Knowledge Ecology International, Conseil International des Archives, Library Copyright Alliance, Computer and Communications Industry Association, and the Canadian Library Association.</p>
<p>The Centre for Internet and Society would like to commend this house for adopting SCCR/23/8 as a working document on the issue of exceptions and limitations on libraries and archives. This issue is of paramount interest the world over, and particularly in developing countries. I would like to limit my oral intervention to three quick points, and will send a longer statement in via e-mail.</p>
<p>First, we feel that this committee should pay special attention to ensuring that digital works and online libraries and archives such as the Internet Archive, also receive the same protection as brick-and-mortar libraries.</p>
<p>Second, we are concerned that we have been seeing some delegations advancing a very narrow interpretation of the three-step test. Such a narrow interpretation is not supported by leading academics, nor by practices of member states. A narrow interpretation of the three-step test must be squarely rejected. In particular, I would like to associate CIS with the strong statements by IFLA and KEI to maintain flexibilities within exceptions and limitations, instead of overly prescriptive provisions encumbered by weighty procedures and specifications.</p>
<p>We have comments about parallel trade as well, drawing from our experience and research in India, and will send those in writing.</p>
<p>Libraries and archive enhance the value of the copyrighted works that they preserve and provide to the general public. They do not erode it. Exceptions and limitations that help them actually help copyright holders. The sooner copyright holders try not to muzzle libraries, especially when it comes to out-of-commerce works, electronic copies of works, and in developing countries, the better it will be for them, their commercial interests, as well as the global public interest.</p>
<p>Thank you.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-statement-sccr24-libraries-archives'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-statement-sccr24-libraries-archives</a>
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No publisherpraneshAccess to KnowledgeCopyrightFair DealingsIntellectual Property RightsArchivesWIPO2012-07-25T10:54:38ZBlog EntryCIS's Closing Statement at Marrakesh on the Treaty for the Blind
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-closing-statement-marrakesh-treaty-for-the-blind
<b>Pranesh Prakash read out an abridged version of this statement as his closing remarks in Marrakesh, where the WIPO Treaty for the Blind (the "Marrakesh Treaty") has been successfully concluded. The Marrakesh Treaty aims to facilitate access to published works by blind persons, persons with visual impairment, and other print disabled persons, by requiring mandatory exceptions in copyright law to enable conversions of books into accessible formats, and by enabling cross-border transfer of accessible format books.</b>
<p>Thank you, Mr. President.</p>
<p>I am truly humbled to be here today representing the Centre for Internet and Society, an Indian civil society organization. If I may assume the privilege of speaking on behalf of my blind colleagues at CIS who led much of our work on this treaty, and the many blindness organizations we have been working with over the past five years who haven't the means of being here today, I would like to thank you and all the delegates here for this important achievement. And especially, I would like to thank the World Blind Union and Knowledge Ecology International who renewed focus on this issue more than 2 decades after WIPO and UNESCO first called attention to this problem and created a "Working Group on Access by the Visually and Auditory Handicapped to Material Reproducing Works Produced by Copyright".</p>
<p>While doing so, I would like to remember my friend Rahul Cherian — a young, physically impaired lawyer from India — who co-founded Inclusive Planet, was a fellow with the Centre for Internet and Society, and was a legal adviser to the World Blind Union. He worked hard on this treaty for many years, but very unfortunately did not live long enough to see it becoming a reality. His presence here is missed, but I would like to think that by concluding this treaty, all the distinguished delegations here managed to honour his memory and work.</p>
<p>I am grateful to all the distinguished delegations here for successfully concluding a reasonably workable treaty, but especially those — such as Brazil, India, Ecuador, Nigeria, Uruguay, Egypt, South Africa, Switzerland, and numerous others — who realized they were negotiating with blind people's lives, and regarded this treaty as a means of ensuring basic human rights and dignity of the visually impaired and the print disabled, instead of regarding it merely as "copyright flexibility" to be first denied and then grudgingly conceded. The current imbalance in terms of global royalty flows and in terms of the bargaining strength of richer countries within WIPO — many of who strongly opposed the access this treaty seeks to facilitate right till the very end — is for me a stark reminder of colonialism, and I see the conclusion of this treaty as a tiny victory against it.</p>
<p>It is historic that today WIPO and its members have collectively recognized in a treaty that copyright isn't just an "engine of free expression" but can pose a significant barrier to access to knowledge. Today we recognize that blind writers are currently curtailed more by copyright law than protected by it. Today we recognize that copyright not only <em>may</em> be curtailed in some circumstances, but that it <em>must</em> be curtailed in some circumstances, even beyond the few that have been listed in the Berne Convention. One of the original framers of the Berne Convention, Swiss jurist and president, Numa Droz, recognized this in 1884 when he emphasized that "limits to absolute protection are rightly set by the public interest". And as Debabrata Saha, India's delegate to WIPO during the adoption of the WIPO Development Agenda noted, "intellectual property rights have to be viewed not as a self contained and distinct domain, but rather as an effective policy instrument for wide ranging socio-economic and technological development. The primary objective of this instrument is to maximize public welfare."</p>
<p>When copyright doesn't serve public welfare, states must intervene, and the law must change to promote human rights, the freedom of expression and to receive and impart information, and to protect authors and consumers. Importantly, markets alone cannot be relied upon to achieve a just allocation of informational resources, as we have seen clearly from the book famine that the blind are experiencing. Marrakesh was the city in which, as Debabrata Saha noted, "the damage [of] TRIPS [was] wrought on developing countries". Now it has redeemed itself through this treaty.</p>
<p>This treaty is an important step in recognizing that exceptions and limitations are as important a part of the international copyright acquis as the granting of rights to copyright holders. This is an important step towards fulfilling the WIPO Development Agenda. This is an important step towards fulfilling the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This is an important step towards fulfilling Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and Article 30 of the UN Convention on Persons with Disabilities, all of which affirm the right of everyone — including the differently-abled — to take part in cultural life of the community.</p>
<p>While this treaty is an important part of overcoming the book famine that the blind have faced, the fact remains that there is far more that needs to be done to bridge the access gap faced by persons with disabilities, including the print disabled.</p>
<p>We need to ensure that globally we tackle societal and economic discrimination against the print disabled, as does the important issue of their education. This treaty is a small but important cog in a much larger wheel through which we hope to achieve justice and equity. And finally, blind people can stop being forced to wear an eye-patch and being pirates to get access to the right to read.</p>
<p>I also thank the WIPO Secretariat, Director General Francis Gurry, Ambassador Trevor Clark, Michelle Woods, and the WIPO staff for pushing transparency and inclusiveness of civil society organizations in these deliberations, in stark contrast to the way many bilateral and plurilateral treaties such as Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, the India-EU Free Trade Agreement, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement have been, and are being, conducted. I hope we see even more transparency, and especially non-governmental participation in this area in the future.</p>
<p>I call upon all countries, and especially book-exporting countries like the USA, UK, France, Portugal, and Spain to ratify this treaty immediately, and would encourage various rightholders organizations, and the MPAA who have in the past campaigned against this treaty and now welcome this treaty, to show their support for it by publicly working to get all countries to ratify this treaty and letting us all know about it.</p>
<p>I congratulate you all for the "Miracle of Marrakesh", which shows, as my late colleague Rahul Cherian said, "when people are demanding their basic rights, no power in the world is strong enough to stop them getting what they want".</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-closing-statement-marrakesh-treaty-for-the-blind'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-closing-statement-marrakesh-treaty-for-the-blind</a>
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No publisherpraneshAccess to KnowledgeCopyrightIntellectual Property RightsFeaturedWIPO2013-07-03T12:01:25ZBlog EntryCIS Statement in WIPO SCCR 43
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-statement-in-wipo-sccr-43
<b>Shweta Mohandas delivered a statement on behalf of CIS, on day 1 of the 43rd WIPO SCCR session on the Broadcast Treaty. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><br />Thank you, Mr. Chair.<br /><br />I’m speaking on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The second revised draft text for the WIPO Broadcasting Organisations Treaty presents certain concerns.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The absence of a provision on term allows perpetual rights to both traditional broadcasters and streamers. Further, the provision on limitations and exceptions is narrow, and not mandatory. It undermines the existence of open-licensing models on the internet. In the absence of a strong mandatory limitations and exceptions provision, the text gives broadcasters rights over openly-licensed content and works in the public domain.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thank you.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-statement-in-wipo-sccr-43'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-statement-in-wipo-sccr-43</a>
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No publisherShweta Mohandas and Anubha SinhaCopyrightAccess to KnowledgeWIPO2023-03-28T14:12:21ZBlog EntryCIS Statement at 27th SCCR on the WIPO Proposed Treaty for the Protection of Broadcasting Organizations
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-statement-27-sccr-on-wipo-proposed-treaty-for-protection-of-broadcasting-organizations
<b>The 27th Session of the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights is being held in Geneva from April 28, 2014 to May 2, 2014. Nehaa Chaudhari, on behalf of CIS made the following statement on April 29, 2014.</b>
<p>This statement was in response to the Chairperson seeking NGO inputs specifically on the Scope of the Treaty and the Rights of Broadcasting Organizations. The statement makes references to a specific Working Document <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/sccr-27-cis-wipo.pdf" class="internal-link">available here</a>. CIS statement is quoted in <a class="external-link" href="http://keionline.org/node/1994">Knowledge Ecology International</a> on April 29, 2014 and in the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/05/01/at-wipo-authors-civil-society-watchful-of-rights-for-broadcasters/">Intellectual Property Watch</a> on May 1, 2014.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thank you, Mister Chair.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We have some concerns regarding the intended scope and language of Article 9 in Working Document SCCR/27/2 Rev. We believe that this expands the scope of this proposed treaty and is likely to have the effect of granting broadcasters rights over the content being carried and not just the signal. On this issue, we have two brief observations to make:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">First- Article 9 envisages fixation and post fixation rights for broadcasting organizations- for instance among others, those of reproduction, distribution and public performance This, we believe is not within the mandate of this Committee, being as it is, inconsistent with a signal based approach.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Second- we express our reservations on the inclusion of “communication to the public” reflected in Article 9 Alternative B, which also relates to the definition of communication to the public under alternative to d of Article 5 of this document. Communication to the public is an element of copyright and governs the content layer, as distinct from the “broadcast” or “transmission” of a signal. Therefore, attempts to regulate “communication to the public” would not be consistent with a signal based approach, which we believe is the mandate binding on this Committee. <br /> <br /> That is all, Mr. Chair. Thank you very much.<br /> <br /> In response to CIS' statement, the Chair had this to say:<br /> <br /> <i>Thank you, CIS,. That was a very clear statement and gave us a very clear explanation of the situation. We will indeed take due account of that in the course of this afternoon's further discussion. </i></p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-statement-27-sccr-on-wipo-proposed-treaty-for-protection-of-broadcasting-organizations'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-statement-27-sccr-on-wipo-proposed-treaty-for-protection-of-broadcasting-organizations</a>
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No publishernehaaIntellectual Property RightsCopyrightAccess to KnowledgeWIPO2014-05-01T14:27:48ZBlog EntryCIS RTI REQUEST TO DIPP - NUMBER 1 - FEBRUARY, 2015
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-rti-request-to-dipp-number-1-february-2015
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-rti-request-to-dipp-number-1-february-2015'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-rti-request-to-dipp-number-1-february-2015</a>
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No publishernehaaAccess to KnowledgeCopyrightIntellectual Property RightsAccountabilityPatents2015-04-14T17:17:53ZFile CIS Intervention on the Treaty for the Visually Impaired at SCCR/SS/GE/2/13
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-intervention-eu-blocking-wipo-treaty-for-blind
<b>The informal session and special session of the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights was organised by WIPO in Geneva from April 18 to April 20, 2013. Pranesh Prakash participated in the session and spoke about the rights of the visually impaired. An abridged version of this was read out during the meeting on Saturday, April 20, 2013, at 22:15 due to time restrictions.
</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thank you, Mr. Chair. I represent the Centre for Internet and Society, a policy research organization based in India. India, as everyone who has been attending these SCCR meetings since 2008 would know, has the world's largest population of blind and visually impaired persons. Two of my colleagues at CIS — Nirmita Narasimhan and Anandhi Viswanathan — are blind, and another one of my CIS colleagues who passed away recently (and whose tireless efforts were remembered here at WIPO recently with a minute of silence) — Rahul Cherian — spent many years working extensively on policy issues related to persons with disabilities, and in particular worked here in WIPO as part of Inclusive Planet, and with the World Blind Union. Hence, this issue is not an abstract one for us, but a very real one.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">I commend the delegates here for taking some steps forward during this meeting. However, very disappointingly, with those few steps forward, we have seen a few things we had taken as settled being opened up again, and many steps being taken backward. The already-onerous requirements and procedures laid down in this treaty are seen by a few countries as not being onerous enough. Blind people, it is believed, might 'wrongly' take advantage of these provisions. Worse yet, there is a fear that sighted persons might take advantage of these provisions relating to the blind.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The absurdity of these fears somehow seems to have escaped the notice of many involved in these discussions. There is nothing in these provisions that would convert infringement by sighted people — even if under the pretence of this treaty — magically into lawful acts. And, indeed, there are multifarious ways of infringing copyright without such resort to this treaty. Yet, these very same onerous requirements (such as the "commercial availability" requirement) and bureaucratic processes will unrealistically increase transaction costs for the visually impaired and render infructuous the very purpose of this treaty. Those delegations who are unrelenting on these issues seem to living in a bizarre world where sighted infringers deviously use exceptions granted in an international copyright treaty to engage in piracy; a bizarre world where scanners and the Internet have not been invented. And by refusing to acknowledge these ground realities, they are merely forcing the blind into wearing eye-patches and being 'pirates'.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In particular, I would like to deplore the stand taken by the European Union, being represented here by the European Commission, whose actions run contrary to the call made in May 2011 by the European Parliament to "to address the ‘book famine’ experienced by visually impaired and print-disabled people". This is despite the European Parliament having reminded "the Commission and Member States of their obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to take all appropriate measures to ensure that people with disabilities enjoy access to cultural materials in accessible formats, and to ensure that laws protecting IPR do not constitute an unreasonable or discriminatory barrier to access by people with disabilities to cultural materials". The EU, and a few countries of Group B, including the United States, have been slowly bleeding this treaty to death through over-legislation and bureaucracy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The United States' and EU's stand on technological protection measures, if accepted, would mean that publishers will technologically be able to prevent the blind from enjoying accessible works, even when they can't do so legally on the basis of copyright law. The European Union's stand on all issues has been extraordinarily harmful, and seems to have an aim to make this treaty as unwieldy and unworkable as possible. They seem to regard the Berne Appendix as their model in this regard: an international agreement that exists on paper for the benefit of developing countries, but because of its bureaucratic processes is little used, and is widely regarded as a failure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Here is what it boils down to: when it comes to the economic rights of copyright owners, current international law insists that there be no formalities, yet when it comes to the human rights of visually impaired person to access information — a right specifically guaranteed to them under the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities — some delegates in this room wish to ensure as many formalities as possible.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The rights of the visually impaired are being buried under unnecessary and complicated requirements and bureaucratic practices. This injustice must stop: the delegates here have the power to do so. And if the EU does not wish to be viewed as villains by all persons with print disabilities and all persons with conscience, it should stop trying to make this an ineffectual treaty. Many have quipped that this is fast becoming "A Treaty for Rightholders Against Persons with Visual Impairments and Print Disabilities" or alternatively "A Treaty for Morally Impaired Persons and Persons with Ethical Disabilities". That is an international shame.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Having colonized much of the world into using English, French, and Spanish, these European countries along with the USA are now in a position to be both culturally dominant and to refuse to sign up to this treaty if it helps blind persons outside of the EU and the USA who seek access to texts in these languages. These remnants of colonialism must be stamped out.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-intervention-eu-blocking-wipo-treaty-for-blind'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-intervention-eu-blocking-wipo-treaty-for-blind</a>
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No publisherpraneshCopyrightAccessibilityAccess to KnowledgeWIPO2013-04-25T11:57:02ZBlog EntryCIS Intervention on Future Work of the WIPO Advisory Committee on Enforcement
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ace-7-future-work-cis-intervention
<b>The seventh session of the World Intellectual Property Organization's Advisory Committee on Enforcement (ACE) is being held in Geneva on November 30 and December 1, 2011. Pranesh Prakash intervened during the discussion of future work of the ACE with this comment.</b>
<p> </p>
<p>Thank you, Chair.</p>
<p>I just wanted to point out that some of the proposals on future work could be worded better to reflect their true meaning. For instance, one of the proposal calls for control of the problem of "parallel import". However, "parallel importation" is actually allowed by both the TRIPS Agreement and by various other instruments such as the Berne Convention? Indeed, calling “parallel import” a problem is like calling "exceptions and limitations" a problem. This is a view that has been firmly rejected here at WIPO, especially post the adoption of the WIPO Development Agenda. This, quite obviously, could not have been the intention of the proposal framers.</p>
<p>Further, the link between some of the proposals and the Development Agenda could be made clearer. It has been established that the Development Agenda is not just something for the Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (CDIP) to consider, but for all committees to make an integral part of their work.</p>
<p>I would also like to underscore the importance of evidence-based policy-making.</p>
<p>Lastly, I would like to mention that a report has already been commissioned by WIPO on intermediary liability, which was written by Prof. Lilian Edwards and was released in a side-event during SCCR 22, in June 2011.</p>
<p>If the ACE is going ahead with a study or an event, I would suggest that the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion, who in his report to the UN Human Rights Council dealt in some depth with intermediary liability, be involved or invited.</p>
<p>Thank you.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ace-7-future-work-cis-intervention'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ace-7-future-work-cis-intervention</a>
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No publisherpraneshDevelopmentAccess to KnowledgeCopyrightIntellectual Property RightsWIPO2011-12-01T15:30:38ZBlog EntryCIS Hosts Scanned Version of George Orwell’s Books vs. Cigarettes
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/books-vs-cigarettes
<b>Verbindingen/Jonctions (V/J), the bi-annual multidisciplinary festival organised by Constant is taking place on December 1, 2011. Amateur scanning of books often raises a lot of questions, around the issue of copyright. For this V/J13 is scanning George Orwell’s Books vs. Cigarettes. The essay is in public domain in Russia, India and South Africa, but not in Europe and America due to copyright issues. CIS is hosting the scanned pages of the essay in public domain.</b>
<p>During the morning session DIY-made book scanner and OCR-software will be used to transform the scans into text files and in the afternoon session the digital material generated in the morning will be remixed.<br /><br />The main sessions can be followed online at the home page of <a class="external-link" href="http://www.vj13.constantvzw.org/site/">VJ13</a></p>
<h3>About VJ13</h3>
<p>Verbindingen/Jonctions (V/J) is the bi-annual multidisciplinary festival organised by Constant. Since 1997, Verbindingen/Jonctions combines high, low and no-tech strategies from utopian, contemporary, traditional and tribal cultures, free software, feminism and queer theories. V/J is an occasion to explore the space between thinking and doing, and the festival is always a mix of activities. It is an occasion to invite radio makers, artists, programmers, academics, Linux users, interface designers, urban explorers, performance artists, technicians, lawyers and others to experience each other’s practice, and to share their interests with a broad public of visitors.</p>
<p>V/J13 has been developed in collaboration with Le P’tit Ciné, Recyclart, Hacker Space Brussels (HSB), QO2, Renovas, Boutique de Quartier and Yves Poliart, Myriam Van Imschoot, Piet Zwart Institute: Networked Media.</p>
<p>Download the <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/books-vs-cigarettes.zip" class="internal-link" title="Books vs Cigarettes">scanned version</a> (Zip files, 28091 kb)</p>
<p> </p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/books-vs-cigarettes'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/books-vs-cigarettes</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaCopyrightAccess to Knowledge2011-12-01T13:31:39ZBlog EntryCI IP Watch List 2009 - India Report
https://cis-india.org/publications-automated/cis/pranesh/IP%20Watch%20List%20-%20India%20Report.pdf
<b>The India Report of the Consumers International IP Watch List 2009, detailing ways in which Indian copyright laws are beneficial and harmful for creators and consumers.</b>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/publications-automated/cis/pranesh/IP%20Watch%20List%20-%20India%20Report.pdf'>https://cis-india.org/publications-automated/cis/pranesh/IP%20Watch%20List%20-%20India%20Report.pdf</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshIntellectual Property RightsCopyrightAccess to Knowledge2009-12-09T10:09:52ZFileಸೃಜನಶೀಲತೆಗೆ ಸಂದ ಗೌರವ
https://cis-india.org/a2k/pros-and-cons-of-copyright-act
<b>ತಾಂತ್ರಿಕ ಆವಿಷ್ಕಾರಗಳು `ಕೃತಿ ಸ್ವಾಮ್ಯ` ಎಂಬ ಪರಿಕಲ್ಪನೆಯನ್ನು ಅದರ ಮಾಮೂಲು ಅರ್ಥದಲ್ಲಿ ಬಳಸಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಾಗದಂತೆ ಮಾಡಿವೆ. ತಡವಾಗಿಯಾದರೂ ಭಾರತದ ಸಂಸತ್ತು `ಕೃತಿ ಸ್ವಾಮ್ಯ`ದ ಹೊಸ ಅರ್ಥವನ್ನು ಪರಿಗಣಿಸುವ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ ಮಸೂದೆಯೊಂದನ್ನು ಅಂಗೀಕರಿಸಿದೆ. </b>
<p><a class="external-link" href="http://prajavani.net/include/story.php?news=561&section=51&menuid=15">The article was published by Prajavani on June 9, 2012</a></p>
<p>ಹಲವು ಧನಾತ್ಮಕ ಅಂಶಗಳನ್ನು ಒಳಗೊಂಡಿರುವ ಈ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಗೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಿಸಿದಂತೆ ಕೆಲವು ಸಂಶಯಗಳಿನ್ನೂ ನಿವಾರಣೆಯಾಗಿಲ್ಲ. ಕೃತಿ ಸ್ವಾಮ್ಯ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಯ ಹೊಸ ಸ್ವರೂಪದ ಮೇಲೆ ವಿವಿಧ ಕ್ಷೇತ್ರಗಳ ತಜ್ಞರಿಲ್ಲಿ ಬೆಳಕು ಚೆಲ್ಲಿದ್ದಾರೆ.</p>
<p>ರಾಜ್ಯಸಭೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಇತ್ತೀಚೆಗೆ ಕೃತಿಸ್ವಾಮ್ಯ (ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್) ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ ಮಸೂದೆ ಕುರಿತು ಚರ್ಚೆ ನಡೆಯುತ್ತಿರುವಾಗ ಹಿಂದಿಯ ಪ್ರಸಿದ್ಧ ಗೀತ ರಚನೆಕಾರ ಹಾಗೂ ಬರಹಗಾರ ಜಾವೇದ್ ಅಖ್ತರ್, ಹಿರಿಯ ಚಿತ್ರ ಸಾಹಿತಿಗಳು, ಸಂಗೀತಗಾರರು, ಗೀತ ರಚನೆಕಾರರು ಅನುಭವಿಸುತ್ತಿರುವ ಕಷ್ಟ- ಕಾರ್ಪಣ್ಯದ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಆಕ್ರೋಶದಿಂದ ಮಾತನಾಡಿದರು.<br /><br />ಭಾರತೀಯ ಸಿನಿಮಾ ರಂಗದಲ್ಲಿ ಇತಿಹಾಸ ಸೃಷ್ಟಿಸಿರುವ ಚಿತ್ರಗಳಿಗೆ ಕೆಲಸ ಮಾಡಿದ ಸಾಹಿತಿಗಳು, ಗೀತ ರಚನೆಕಾರರು ಹಾಗೂ ಸಂಗೀತಗಾರರು ತಮ್ಮ ಇಳಿಗಾಲದಲ್ಲಿ ಅನುಭವಿಸುತ್ತಿರುವ ಆರ್ಥಿಕ ಸಂಕಷ್ಟಗಳ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಬೆಳಕು ಚೆಲ್ಲುವಾಗ ಅವರ ದನಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ವಿಷಾದವಿತ್ತು.<br /><br />ತಮ್ಮ ಸೃಜನಶೀಲ ಸೃಷ್ಟಿಗಳ ಮೇಲೆ ಯಾವುದೇ ಹಕ್ಕು ಹೊಂದಿಲ್ಲದಿರುವುದೇ ಇವರೆಲ್ಲರ ಕಷ್ಟಕ್ಕೆ ಕಾರಣ. ಗೌರವಧನದ ಮೂಲಕ ಯಾವುದೇ ಲಾಭ ಇವರಿಗೆ ಬರುತ್ತಿಲ್ಲ ಎಂದು ಅಖ್ತರ್ ಹೇಳಿದರು. ಈ ವಿಚಾರ ಹೇಳುವಾಗ `ಆವಾರಾ`, `420`ಯಂತಹ ಚಿತ್ರಗಳಿಗೆ ಗೀತ ರಚನೆ ಮಾಡಿದ ಶೈಲೇಂದ್ರ ಅವರಿಗೆ ವೃದ್ಧಾಪ್ಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಔಷಧಕ್ಕೆ ನೀಡಲು ಹಣ ಇಲ್ಲದಿದ್ದುದು, `ಸೀತಾ ಔರ್ ಗೀತಾ` ಹಾಗೂ `ಸತ್ತೆ ಪೇ ಸತ್ತಾ` ಚಿತ್ರಗಳ ಕಥೆ ಬರೆದಿದ್ದ ಸತೀಶ್ ಭಟ್ನಾಗರ್ ಅನುಭವಿಸಿದ ಕಷ್ಟಗಳ ಉದಾಹರಣೆ ನೀಡಿದರು.<br /><br />ಬರಹಗಾರರು, ಸಂಗೀತಗಾರರನ್ನು ದುಸ್ಥಿತಿಗೆ ತಳ್ಳಿ, ಕೇವಲ ನಿರ್ಮಾಪಕರ ಜೇಬು ತುಂಬಿಸುವ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಯ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಅವರಿಗೆ ಅಸಮಾಧಾನವಿತ್ತು. ಈ ವ್ಯವಸ್ಥೆಯನ್ನು ಸುಧಾರಿಸಲು ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಗೆ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ ತರುವುದು ಅತ್ಯಗತ್ಯ ಎಂದು ಅಖ್ತರ್ ಬಲವಾಗಿ ಪ್ರತಿಪಾದಿಸಿದರು.<br /><br />ಜಾವೇದ್ ಅಖ್ತರ್ ಇಷ್ಟೆಲ್ಲ ಹೇಳಿದ ಮೇಲೆ ಲೋಕಸಭೆ ಹಾಗೂ ರಾಜ್ಯಸಭೆಯಲ್ಲಿ `ಕೃತಿಸ್ವಾಮ್ಯ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ ಮಸೂದೆ 2012`ಗೆ ಎಲ್ಲ ರಾಜಕೀಯ ಪಕ್ಷಗಳ ಸದಸ್ಯರು, ಪಕ್ಷಭೇದ ಮರೆತು ಸರ್ವಾನುಮತದಿಂದ ಒಪ್ಪಿಗೆ ನೀಡಿದ್ದರಲ್ಲಿ ಆಶ್ಚರ್ಯ ಕಾಣುವುದಿಲ್ಲ. ` ಇದು ಬರಹಗಾರರು ಹಾಗೂ ಸಂಗೀತಗಾರರ ಹಕ್ಕನ್ನು ಕಾಪಾಡುವ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ` ಎಂದು ಬಣ್ಣಿಸಲಾಯಿತು.</p>
<p>ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಯ ವಿಚಾರ ಬಂದಾಗ ಈ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ ಮಹತ್ವದ್ದು ಎಂಬುದರಲ್ಲಿ ಯಾವ ಅನುಮಾನವೂ ಬೇಡ. ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ ಕುರಿತು ಹೇಳುವಾಗ ಮಾಧ್ಯಮಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ಇದನ್ನು ಚಿತ್ರ ನಿರ್ಮಾಪಕರ ವಿರುದ್ಧ ಕಲಾವಿದರಿಗೆ ಸಿಕ್ಕಿದ ಜಯ ಎಂದೇ ವರ್ಣಿಸಲಾಯಿತು.<br /> <br />ಆದರೆ, ಕೃತಿಸ್ವಾಮ್ಯ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ ಇನ್ನಷ್ಟು ವಿಸ್ತೃತವಾದ ವಿಚಾರಗಳನ್ನು ಹೇಳುತ್ತಿದ್ದು, ಈ ಜಯಘೋಷಗಳ ಅಬ್ಬರದ ನಡುವೆ ಅದರಲ್ಲಿನ ಸೂಕ್ಷ್ಮ ವಿಚಾರಗಳು ಯಾರ ಕಣ್ಣಿಗೂ, ಕಿವಿಗೂ ಬೀಳದೇ ಹೋಗುವ ಅಪಾಯವೂ ಇದೆ. ಈ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿಯಿಂದ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಹಲವು ಸ್ವಾಗತಾರ್ಹ ಬದಲಾವಣೆಗಳಾಗಿವೆ ನಿಜ. ಜ್ಞಾನ, ಸಂಸ್ಕೃತಿ, ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದಂತಹ ವಿಚಾರಗಳು ಎಲ್ಲರಿಗೂ ದಕ್ಕಬೇಕು ಎಂಬ ಆಶಯ ಹೊಂದಿರುವವರನ್ನು ಚಿಂತೆಗೆ ಹಾಗೂ ಚಿಂತನೆಗೆ ದೂಡುವ ಅಂಶಗಳೂ ಇದರಲ್ಲಿ ಅಡಕವಾಗಿವೆ.<br /><br />ಮೊದಲಿಗೆ ಈ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಯ ಒಳ್ಳೆಯ ಅಂಶಗಳನ್ನು ಪರಿಶೀಲಿಸೋಣ. ಚಿತ್ರೋದ್ಯಮದಲ್ಲಿ ಕೆಲಸ ಮಾಡುವ ಸೃಜನಶೀಲ ಕಲಾವಿದರೆಲ್ಲ ಹಣದ ಥೈಲಿ ಹಿಡಿದುಕೊಂಡಿರುವ ಚಿತ್ರ ನಿರ್ಮಾಪಕರ ಮರ್ಜಿಯಲ್ಲೇ ಇರಬೇಕಾಗುತ್ತದೆ ಎಂಬುದು ಐತಿಹಾಸಿಕ ಸತ್ಯ. ಈ ಕಲಾವಿದರೊಂದಿಗಿನ ಮಾಡಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವ ಒಪ್ಪಂದದ ನಿಬಂಧನೆಗಳು ಸಹ ನಿರ್ಮಾಪಕರ ಮೂಗಿನ ನೇರಕ್ಕೆ ಇರುತ್ತವೆ ಎಂಬುದು ಮತ್ತೊಂದು ಕಟು ಸತ್ಯ.<br /><br />ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆ ಪ್ರಕಾರ ಯಾವುದೇ ಕೃತಿ, ಅದು ಸಂಗೀತ ಸಂಯೋಜನೆ, ಗೀತೆ, ಬರಹ ಯಾವುದೇ ಆಗಿದ್ದರೂ ಅದನ್ನು ಸೃಷ್ಟಿಸಿದ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿ ಅದರ ಮಾಲೀಕನಾಗಿರುತ್ತಾನೆ. ಇದೇ ಕಾಯ್ದೆ ಅಡಿ ಕೃತಿಯನ್ನು ಸೃಷ್ಟಿಸಿದ ಕಲಾವಿದ ಅಥವಾ ಬರಹಗಾರ ತನ್ನ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳನ್ನು ಮೂರನೆಯ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಗೆ ವರ್ಗಾವಣೆ ಮಾಡುವ ಅವಕಾಶವನ್ನೂ ಕಲ್ಪಿಸಲಾಗಿದೆ. ಇಂತಹ ವರ್ಗಾವಣೆ ಒಪ್ಪಂದ ಸಂಪೂರ್ಣವಾಗಿ ನಿರ್ಮಾಪಕರ ಪರವಾಗಿ ಇರುತ್ತದೆ.<br /><br />ಎಲ್ಲ ಮಾಧ್ಯಮಗಳಿಗೂ ಸಂಬಂಧಿಸಿದಂತೆ ಆ ಕೃತಿಯ ಎಲ್ಲ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳನ್ನು (ವರ್ತಮಾನ ಮತ್ತು ಭವಿಷ್ಯದ) ನಿರ್ಮಾಪಕರಿಗೆ ವರ್ಗಾವಣೆ ಮಾಡಲಾಗುತ್ತದೆ. ಯಾವುದೇ ಕೃತಿಯನ್ನು ಸೃಷ್ಟಿ ಮಾಡಿದವರು ಆ ಕೃತಿಯ ಮೇಲೆ ಎಲ್ಲ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳನ್ನೂ ಕಳೆದುಕೊಂಡಿರುತ್ತಾರೆ.</p>
<p>ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನ ಬೆಳೆದಂತೆಲ್ಲ ಸಿನಿಮಾ ಹಾಗೂ ಸಂಗೀತದ ಮಾರುಕಟ್ಟೆ ವಿಸ್ತರಿಸುತ್ತಲೇ ಹೋಗುತ್ತದೆ (ವಿಡಿಯೋ, ಡಿವಿಡಿ, ಸ್ಯಾಟ್ಲೈಟ್, ಎಂಪಿ ತ್ರಿ, ಮೊಬೈಲ್ ರಿಂಗ್ ಟೋನ್ ಇತ್ಯಾದಿ). ಈ ಕೃತಿಯ ಮಾಲಿಕರ (ನಿರ್ಮಾಪಕರು) ಬೊಕ್ಕಸ ತುಂಬುತ್ತಲೇ ಹೋಗುತ್ತದೆ. ಆದರೆ, ಅವರು ಈ ಆದಾಯವನ್ನು ಕೃತಿಯ ಸೃಜನಶೀಲ ಸೃಷ್ಟಿಕರ್ತರ ಹಂಚಿಕೊಳ್ಳಬೇಕೆಂಬ ನಿಯಮ ಮಾತ್ರ ಇಲ್ಲ.<br /> <br />ಈ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ, ಎರಡು ಮಹತ್ವದ ಬದಲಾವಣೆಗಳ ಮೂಲಕ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಯಲ್ಲಿರುವ ಲೋಪದೋಷ ನಿವಾರಿಸುವಂತಿದೆ. ಯಾವುದೇ ಕೃತಿಯ ಮೇಲಿನ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳ ವರ್ಗಾವಣೆ ಆ ಸಮಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಅಸ್ತಿತ್ವದಲ್ಲಿದ್ದ ಮಾಧ್ಯಮಕ್ಕೆ ಮಾತ್ರ ಸೀಮಿತವಾಗಿರಬೇಕು ಎಂಬುದು ಮೊದಲನೆಯ ಬದಲಾವಣೆ.<br /><br />ಸಿನಿಮಾ ಹಾಡುಗಳ ಗೀತ ರಚನೆಕಾರರು ಹಾಗೂ ಸಂಗೀತಗಾರರಿಗೆ ಈ ಹಾಡನ್ನು ಬೇರೆ ರೂಪದಲ್ಲಿ ಬಳಸಿಕೊಂಡಾಗ, ಅಂದರೆ ಚಿತ್ರಮಂದಿರದ ಪ್ರದರ್ಶನ ಬಿಟ್ಟು ಇತರ ರೂಪದಲ್ಲಿ ಬಳಸಿಕೊಂಡಾಗ ಕಡ್ಡಾಯವಾಗಿ ಗೌರವಧನ ನೀಡಬೇಕು (ಅವರ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳನ್ನು ಕಾನೂನುಬದ್ಧ ವಾರಸುದಾರರು ಅಥವಾ ಕೃತಿ ರಚನೆಕಾರರಿಗೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಿಸಿದ ಸಂಸ್ಥೆಗೆ ಮಾತ್ರ ವರ್ಗಾಯಿಸಬಹುದು) ಎಂಬುದು ಎರಡನೆಯ ಬದಲಾವಣೆ. ಕೃತಿಯನ್ನು ರಚಿಸಿದವರಿಗೆ, ಸಂಗೀತ ಸಂಯೋಜಕರಿಗೆ ಎರಡನೇ ಹಂತದ ಮಾರುಕಟ್ಟೆಯ ಲಾಭ ಪಡೆದುಕೊಳ್ಳಲು ಹಾಗೂ ವ್ಯವಹಾರದಲ್ಲಿ ಮತ್ತಷ್ಟು ಚೌಕಾಸಿ ಮಾಡಲು ನೆರವಾಗುವ ಕ್ರಾಂತಿಕಾರಿ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ ಇದಾಗಿದೆ ಎಂಬುದರಲ್ಲಿ ಯಾವುದೇ ಸಂಶಯವಿಲ್ಲ.</p>
<p>ಆದರೆ, ಚಿತ್ರ ನಿರ್ಮಾಪಕರು ಸಿಟ್ಟಿನಿಂದ ತಮ್ಮ ವಾದ ಮಂಡಿಸುತ್ತಿದ್ದಾರೆ. ಚಿತ್ರದ ಮೇಲೆ ಹಣ ಹೂಡಿಕೆ ಮಾಡುವುದರಿಂದ, ಅದರಲ್ಲಿರುವ ರಿಸ್ಕ್ ಪರಿಗಣಿಸಿ ಚಿತ್ರದಿಂದ ಬರುವ ಎಲ್ಲ ಲಾಭಗಳನ್ನು ತಮಗೇ ನೀಡಬೇಕು ಎಂಬುದು ಅವರ ಅಭಿಪ್ರಾಯ. ಈ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ ಸ್ವಾಗತಾರ್ಹವಾದರೂ ಅದರಲ್ಲಿನ ಗೊಂದಲಗಳು ನಿವಾರಣೆಯಾದಂತಿಲ್ಲ.<br /><br />ಈ ಕಾಯ್ದೆ ಹೇಗೆ ಅನುಷ್ಠಾನಗೊಳ್ಳಲಿದೆ ಎಂಬುದನ್ನು ಕಾದು ನೋಡಬೇಕಾಗಿದೆ. ಇದು ಗುತ್ತಿಗೆ ಒಪ್ಪಂದದ ಸ್ವಾತಂತ್ರ್ಯ ಹಾಗೂ ವಾಣಿಜ್ಯ ವ್ಯವಹಾರದ ಸ್ವಾತಂತ್ರ್ಯ ಉಲ್ಲಂಘಿಸುತ್ತದೆ ಎಂಬ ಕಾರಣಕ್ಕೆ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಯನ್ನು ಕೋರ್ಟ್ನಲ್ಲಿ ಪ್ರಶ್ನಿಸುವ ಸಾಧ್ಯತೆಯೂ ಇದೆ. ಈ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿಯನ್ನೇ ರದ್ದುಪಡಿಸುವ ಯತ್ನಗಳು ನಡೆದರೂ ಆಶ್ಚರ್ಯವಿಲ್ಲ.<br /><br />ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಸೇರ್ಪಡೆ ಮಾಡಿರುವ ಬಹುಜನರಿಗೆ ಉಪಯುಕ್ತವಾಗಬಲ್ಲ ಮತ್ತೊಂದು ಮಹತ್ವದ ಅಂಶವೆಂದರೆ ಸಿನಿಮಾ ಹಾಗೂ ಸೌಂಡ್ ರೆಕಾರ್ಡಿಂಗ್ ಸೇರಿದಂತೆ ಎಲ್ಲ ಬಗೆಯ ಸೃಜನಶೀಲ ಕೆಲಸಗಳನ್ನು `ಫೇರ್ ಯೂಸ್` ನಿಯಮಾವಳಿ ಅಡಿ ತಂದಿರುವುದು. (ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆ ಅಡಿ ಯಾವುದೇ ಸೃಜನಶೀಲ ಕೃತಿ ವಿಮರ್ಶೆ ಮಾಡುವಾಗ ಆ ಮೂಲ ಸಾಹಿತ್ಯದ ಭಾಗ ಉದ್ಧರಿಸಲು ಅನುಮತಿ ನೀಡಲಾಗಿದ್ದು, ಅದಕ್ಕೆ `ಫೇರ್ ಯೂಸ್` ಎನ್ನುತ್ತಾರೆ. ಇದರಿಂದ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಉಲ್ಲಂಘನೆಯಾಗುವುದಿಲ್ಲ.)<br /><br />ಇಂದಿನ ಯುಟ್ಯೂಬ್ ಯುಗದಲ್ಲಿ ಯಾವುದೇ ಹವ್ಯಾಸಿ ಕಲಾವಿದರು ಮನೆಯಲ್ಲೇ ಕುಳಿತು ರಿಮಿಕ್ಸ್ ಮಾಡಿದ ತಮ್ಮ ಕ್ಲಿಪಿಂಗ್ಗಳನ್ನು ಅಪ್ಲೋಡ್ ಮಾಡಬಹುದಾಗಿದೆ. ಹವ್ಯಾಸಿ ಅಥವಾ ಸಾಕ್ಷ್ಯಚಿತ್ರ ತಯಾರಕರು ಮತ್ಯಾವುದೋ ಚಿತ್ರದ ಸಂಗೀತ ಅಥವಾ ವಿಡಿಯೋ ಚಿತ್ರದ ಕೆಲ ಭಾಗಗಳನ್ನು ತಮ್ಮ ಚಿತ್ರದಲ್ಲಿ ಅಳವಡಿಸಿಕೊಂಡಾಗ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಉಲ್ಲಂಘಿಸಿದ್ದಕ್ಕಾಗಿ ಕಾನೂನು ಕ್ರಮ ಎದುರಿಸುವ ಭೀತಿ ಇದ್ದೇ ಇರುತ್ತದೆ.<br /> <br />ಈಗ ತಂದಿರುವ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ ಯಿಂದ ಈ ಭಯ ನಿವಾರಣೆಯಾಗಿದೆ. ಸಂಶೋಧನೆ, ವಿಮರ್ಶೆ ಸೇರಿದಂತೆ ಖಾಸಗಿ ಹಾಗೂ ವೈಯಕ್ತಿಕ ಬಳಕೆಗಾಗಿ ಯಾವುದೇ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿ ಚಿತ್ರದ ಅಥವಾ ಸಂಗೀತದ ಕ್ಲಿಪಿಂಗ್ ಬಳಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳಬಹುದು ಎಂದು ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಹೇಳಲಾಗಿದೆ.<br /><br />ಈ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಶಿಕ್ಷಣ ಸಂಸ್ಥೆಗಳು ಹಾಗೂ ಲಾಭ ರಹಿತವಾಗಿ ಗ್ರಂಥಾಲಯ ನಡೆಸುತ್ತಿರುವವವರಿಗೆ ಅನುಕೂಲಕರವಾಗುವ ಒಂದು ಅಂಶವಿದೆ. ಈ ಸಂಸ್ಥೆಗಳು ಕಾನೂನುಬದ್ಧವಾಗಿ ಖರೀದಿಸಿದ ಸಾಫ್ಟ್ವೇರ್ ಪ್ರೋಗ್ರಾಂ, ಸಂಗೀತ ಅಥವಾ ಸಿನಿಮಾದ ಪ್ರತಿಯನ್ನು ಬಾಡಿಗೆಗೆ ಕೊಡಬಹುದು ಅಥವಾ ಬಾಡಿಗೆಗೆ ಪಡೆಯಬಹುದು. ಇದರಿಂದ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಉಲ್ಲಂಘನೆಯಾಗುವುದಿಲ್ಲ ಎಂದು ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಹೇಳಲಾಗಿದೆ.<br /><br />ಈಗ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಸ್ವಾಗತಾರ್ಹವಲ್ಲದ ಕೆಲ ವಿಚಾರಗಳ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಚರ್ಚಿಸೋಣ. ಯಾವುದೇ ಸಂಗೀತ ರೆಕಾರ್ಡಿಂಗ್ ಆದ ಐದು ವರ್ಷದೊಳಗೆ ಅದರ `ಕವರ್ ವರ್ಷನ್` (ಕವರ್ ವರ್ಷನ್ ಅಂದರೆ ಯಾವುದೇ ಗೀತೆಯನ್ನು ಅದೇ ಟ್ಯೂನ್ನಲ್ಲಿ ಮೂಲ ಗಾಯಕರ ಬದಲಾಗಿ ಮತ್ತೊಬ್ಬರ ಬಳಿ ಹಾಡಿಸುವುದು) ಸೃಷ್ಟಿಸಬಾರದು ಎಂದು ಸ್ಪಷ್ಟವಾಗಿ ಹೇಳಲಾಗಿದೆ. ಜನಪ್ರಿಯ ಗೀತೆಗಳ ಕವರ್ ವರ್ಷನ್ಗಳ ಆಧರಿಸಿಯೇ ಭಾರತದ ಸಂಗೀತ ಉದ್ಯಮ ಬದುಕಿದೆ, ಬೆಳೆದಿದೆ ಹಾಗೂ ಬೆಳೆಯುತ್ತಿದೆ.<br /> <br />ಮತ್ಯಾರದೋ ಸೃಷ್ಟಿಯನ್ನು ಆಧರಿಸಿ ಹಣ ಮಾಡಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವ ಅಕ್ರಮ ಮಾರ್ಗದಂತೆ `ಕವರ್ ವರ್ಷನ್`ಗಳು ಕಾಣಬಹುದು. ಆದರೆ, ಸಂಗೀತ ಉದ್ಯಮದಲ್ಲಿ ಯಾವುದೋ ವ್ಯಕ್ತಿಯ, ಸಂಸ್ಥೆಯ ಏಕಸ್ವಾಮ್ಯವನ್ನು ಇದು ಮುರಿದಿದೆ ಎಂಬುದನ್ನು ನಾವು ಮರೆಯಬಾರದು.<br /><br />ಈ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿಯ ಮೂಲಕ ಭಾರತದಲ್ಲಿ ಡಿಜಿಟಲ್ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳ ನಿರ್ವಹಣೆಯ (ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ) ನಿಯಮಾವಳಿಯನ್ನೂ ಜಾರಿಗೆ ತರಲಾಗಿದೆ. ವಿಪೊ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಒಪ್ಪಂದ ಹಾಗೂ ವಿಪೊ ಪ್ರದರ್ಶನ ಹಾಗೂ ಧ್ವನಿ ಒಪ್ಪಂದದ (ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ಗೆ ಸಂಬಂಧಿಸಿದಂತೆ 1996ರಲ್ಲಿ ರೂಪಿಸಿರುವ ಜಾಗತಿಕ ಒಪ್ಪಂದ) ಧಾಟಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಈ ಕಾಯ್ದೆ ರೂಪಿಸಲಾಗಿದೆ.<br /> <br />ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ ಅಂದರೆ ಡಿಜಿಟಲ್ ರೂಪದಲ್ಲಿ ಇರುವ ವಿಚಾರಗಳನ್ನು ಯಾರೂ ಕಳವು, ನಕಲು ಮಾಡದಂತೆ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ಮೂಲಕ ಕೀಲಿ ಹಾಕುವುದು. ಈ ತಾಂತ್ರಿಕ ಕೀಲಿಯನ್ನು ಮುರಿದು ಡಿಜಿಟಲ್ ಮಾಹಿತಿಗಳನ್ನು ಪಡೆದಲ್ಲಿ ಅದು ಈಗ ಅಪರಾಧ. ಆದರೆ, ಡಬ್ಲುಸಿಟಿ ಅಥವಾ ಡಬ್ಲುಪಿಪಿಟಿಗೆ ಭಾರತ ಇನ್ನೂ ಸಹಿ ಹಾಕಿಲ್ಲವಾದ್ದರಿಂದ `ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ` ಅನ್ನು ಭಾರತದಲ್ಲಿ ಜಾರಿಗೆ ತರುವ ಅಗತ್ಯ ಇತ್ತೆ ಎಂಬ ಪ್ರಶ್ನೆಯೂ ಇಲ್ಲಿ ಏಳುತ್ತದೆ. <br /><br />ಇಷ್ಟೆಲ್ಲ ಹೇಳಿದ ಮೇಲೂ ಈ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಪ್ರಶಂಸಿಸಬಹುದಾದ ಮತ್ತೊಂದು ಅಂಶವಿದೆ. `ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ` ಮೇಲೆ ಜಾರಿಗೆ ತರಲಾದ ಕಾನೂನು ಈ ನಿಟ್ಟಿನಲ್ಲಿ ಜಗತ್ತಿನ ಯಾವುದೇ ದೇಶದಲ್ಲಿ ರೂಪಿಸಲಾದ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಗಿಂತ ಅತ್ಯುತ್ತಮವಾಗಿದೆ. ಭವಿಷ್ಯದಲ್ಲಿ ಭಾರತ ಜಾಗತಿಕ ಒಪ್ಪಂದಗಳಾದ `ವಿಪೊ` ಮತ್ತು `ಡಬ್ಲುಪಿಪಿಟಿ`ಗೆ ಸಹಿ ಹಾಕುವ ಸಂದರ್ಭ ಬಂದೇ ಬರುತ್ತದೆ.</p>
<p>ಆಗ ಹೆಚ್ಚು ಚೌಕಾಸಿ ಮಾಡಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಾಗುವುದಿಲ್ಲ. ಒತ್ತಡ ಬರುವ ಮುನ್ನವೇ ನಮ್ಮ ದೇಶಕ್ಕೆ ಸೂಕ್ತವಾಗಬಲ್ಲ `ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ` ಕಾನೂನು ರೂಪಿಸುವ ದೂರದೃಷ್ಟಿ ಹಾಗೂ ಜಾಣ್ಮೆಯನ್ನು ನಮ್ಮ ನೀತಿ ನಿರೂಪಕರು ಈಗ ತೋರಿದ್ದಾರೆ.<br /><br />ಸೃಜನಶೀಲ ಕೃತಿಯ ಸೃಷ್ಟಿಕರ್ತರಿಗೆ ಸಾಕಷ್ಟು ಲಾಭ ಮಾಡಿಕೊಡುವ ಉದ್ದೇಶ ಹಾಗೂ ಜ್ಞಾನದ ಮುಕ್ತ ಬಳಕೆಯ ಅವಕಾಶ ಇವೆರಡರ ನಡುವೆ ಸಮತೋಲನ ಸಾಧಿಸುವಂತೆ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆ ಇರಬೇಕು. ಮಾಧ್ಯಮಗಳ ಏಕಸ್ವಾಮ್ಯ ಹಾಗೂ ಹಾಲಿವುಡ್ ಉದ್ಯಮದ ಅಗಾಧ ಬೆಳವಣಿಗೆಯಿಂದ ಕಾಲಾಂತರದಲ್ಲಿ ಈ ಸಮತೋಲನ ಹಕ್ಕುಸ್ವಾಮ್ಯ ಪಡೆದ ಮಾಲೀಕರತ್ತ ವಾಲಿತ್ತು.<br /> <br />ಕೃತಿಯ ಸೃಷ್ಟಿಕರ್ತರು ಹಾಗೂ ಸಾರ್ವಜನಿಕರು ಲೆಕ್ಕಕ್ಕೇ ಇರಲಿಲ್ಲ. ಇಂತಹ ಅಸಮತೋಲನ ನಿವಾರಿಸುವ ನಿಟ್ಟಿನಲ್ಲಿ ಸರ್ವರಿಗೂ ಒಳಿತಾಗುವಂತೆ ಸರ್ಕಾರ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಗೆ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ ತಂದಿದೆ. ಮುಂದಿನ ದಿನಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ನಿರ್ದಿಷ್ಟ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿಯ ಕುರಿತು ವಿಶದವಾಗಿ ಚರ್ಚಿಸಬಹುದು. ಆದರೆ, ಸದ್ಯಕ್ಕೆ ಸಂಸತ್ತಿನಂತೆ ಒಕ್ಕೊರಲಿನಿಂದ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಯನ್ನು ಸ್ವಾಗತಿಸೋಣ.</p>
<p>ಆಲ್ಟರ್ನೇಟಿವ್ ಲಾ ಫೋರಂನ ಸ್ಥಾಪಕರಲ್ಲಿ ಒಬ್ಬರಾದ ಲೇಖಕರು ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಯ ವಿಷಯದಲ್ಲಿ ತಜ್ಞರು.</p>
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<p>
Read the English translation below:</p>
<h2>The pros and cons of the Copyright Amendment Act 2012</h2>
<p>In his passionate speech in debate on the Rajya Sabha the noted lyricist and writer Javed Akhtar highlighted the plight of a number of musicians, lyricists and film writers who despite having contributed to some of the most important films in Indian history remained in poverty since they did not receive any benefits by way of royalties for their work. Examples of artists who suffered in penury unable to even afford medicines range from Shailendra who gave us the lyrics for films like Awara and Shree 420 to writer Satish Bhatnagar who wrote ‘Seeta aur Geeta’ and ‘Satte pe Satta’. Akhtar argued that the copyright amendment was a necessary corrective to a system that had worked incredibly well for film producers at the cost of artists. It was not surprising then that the Copyright Amendment Act 2012 saw a surprising consensus from all the political parties in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha and has been hailed as an amendment that restores rights to writers and musicians.</p>
<p>There is no doubt that the Copyright Amendment 2011 is one of the most significant developments in copyright law and while the media attention has been on the victory of artists against film producers it is important to remember that the amendment itself covers a much wider gamut of issues which runs the risk of being lost in the euphoria of this victory. While there are many welcome changes that have been brought about by the Amendment, there are also many others which should give cause of concern for anyone interested in public interest issues of wider access to knowledge, culture and technology. Lets start with the good news first.</p>
<p>It is well known that artists working in the film industry have historically been at a significant disadvantage when it comes to negotiating with the film producers who control the money and consequently dictate the terms of contracts with people who contribute to the film. Even though copyright law says that the owner of copyright is the creator of the work there has always existed an exception which allows the creator to assign their rights to a third party. The assignment agreements are heavily tilted in favour of the producers and all rights in all mediums (present and future) are handed over to the producer. It is a common experience that the creators of copyright are rarely ever the owners of copyright. As the secondary market for films and music developed with each generation of technology (videos, DVD, Satelite, MP3s, mobile ring tones) the owners of content found a situation in which we saw an evergreening of their property guaranteeing an eternal source of revenue which they were not obliged to share with any of the contributors. The amendment seeks to correct this by bringing in two significant changes. Firstly it says that an assignment of rights shall only be for a medium of exploitation which was in existence at the time of the assignment. It also says that authors of a literary or musical work used in a film song lyrics shall have a right to receive royalties from the work if the work is used in any manner other than as a part of a film shown in a cinema hall (the right may be assigned only to legal heirs or to a collecting society).</p>
<p>There can be no arguing that this is a radical amendment that significantly alters the ability of creators to participate in the benefits of secondary markets and also increase their bargaining power. Film producers on the other hand are livid arguing that as the primary investors and risk takers in a film they should be entitled to all the benefits accruing from the film. While the amendment is very welcome it is not bereft of ambiguities and possible complications, and we have to wait and see how the law will now be enforced. It is also likely that there will be constitutional challenges on the grounds that this is in violation of freedom of contract and the right to trade, and possibly even attempts to subvert the law. But for the moment lets celebrate a very significant victory for creators.</p>
<p>Even as creators celebrate, we should also toast the amendment for its sensitive response to the demands made by the visually disabled community. Technology has bridged the incredible gap that existed for disabled people desiring to access books and other materials. Braille was a horribly expensive and archaic technology but screen reading software has made it possible for visually disabled people to convert books into digital formats which can be read through mobile phones, computers and digital tablets. But it was impossible to convert books without violating the rights of copyright owners since the right to make electronic versions of the book is their exclusive right. The Amendment now carves out an exception for people with disabilities to be able – as a matter of right- to create digital versions and Sections 51(1)(zb) and 31B now allow the creation of ‘any accessible format’ without needing to pay royalty.</p>
<p>Another very significant amendment is the extension of the fair use provision to all classes of works including films and sound recordings. In this era of youtube when people routinely create their own remixes, upload clips this is a very welcome amendment. Any amateur or documentary film maker will testify to the difficulty hat the face when they need to use music or video clips as a part of their films and they do so with the constant threat of being sued for copyright infringement. The amendment allows a person to use film and music clips for private or personal use including research, as well as for criticism or review of that work. It is to be noted that the word criticism has been interpreted by the courts to include the ability to create parodies of the original work. Other people who should welcome the act includes educational institutions and non profit libraries who are now allowed to rent or lend a lawfully acquired copy of a software program, music and films.</p>
<p>And now for some of the not so good news. The amendment makes it more difficult to create cover versions of songs and cover versions can now not be made for a period of five year form the time of the recording of the song. As is well known the Indian music industry has grown on the basis of the freedom to make cover versions. While cover versions may seem like an unfair way of benefiting form someone else’s creation the fact of the matter is that version recording has been one of the most significant ways in which the music industry was demonopolized. The Amendment also brings in Digital rights Management (DRM) to keep India in tune with the WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty. DRM are essentially digital or technology locks that are used to protect content and the law now makes it an offence to circumvent any technology lock. It is questionable whether this is a desirable introduction. India is not yet a signatory to the WCT or the WPPT and hence there is no need to bring DRM into Indian law. Having said that one must also appreciate that the Indian law on DRM is perhaps one of the best in the world, and one can speculate that the law makers decided to bring in a home grown version more suited to Indian reality knowing that at some point if time there would be global pressure on Indian to sign onto the two treaties and then there would be less bargaining power in terms of the law that would have been introduced.</p>
<p>Copyright was always supposed to be balance between providing incentives to creators and ensuring that there was adequate public access to knowledge. Over the years the rise of media monopolies and the might of Hollywood effectively ensured that this balance tilted heavily in favour of rights owners against the interests of creators and the general public. The Copyright amendment demonstrates that when such imbalances threaten creativity and free speech it is incumbent on the government to respond with necessary and adequate measures that serve the greater good. There will be time in the coming future to discuss and debate the specific amendments in detail, but for now lets join the parliament in unanimously welcoming a much over due amendment to the law.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/pros-and-cons-of-copyright-act'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/pros-and-cons-of-copyright-act</a>
</p>
No publisherLawrence LiangCopyrightAccess to Knowledge2012-06-18T11:22:07ZBlog EntryCan Judges Order ISPs to Block Websites for Copyright Infringement? (Part 3)
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/john-doe-orders-isp-blocking-websites-copyright-3
<b>In a three-part study, Ananth Padmanabhan examines the "John Doe" orders that courts have passed against ISPs, which entertainment companies have used to block dozens, if not hundreds, of websites. In this, the third and concluding part, he looks at the Indian law in the Copyright Act and the Information Technology Act, and concludes that both those laws restrain courts and private companies from ordering an ISP to block a website for copyright infringement.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the third part of his study, Ananth Padmanabhan looks into the fair use provisions recently introduced in respect of mere conduit intermediaries by the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012, and concludes that there is no scope for any general, or specific, access blocking orders at the behest of the plaintiff in a civil suit, in India. He also argues that the <a class="external-link" href="http://eprocure.gov.in/cppp/sites/default/files/eproc/itact2000.pdf">Information Technology Act, 2000</a> read with the<a class="external-link" href="http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR314E_10511%281%29.pdf"> Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011</a> do not in any manner permit the Government to override the provisions of the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.ircc.iitb.ac.in/webnew/Indian%20Copyright%20Act%201957.html">Copyright Act, 1957</a> (as amended) while facilitating the denial of access to websites on grounds of copyright infringement, because the Copyright Act, 1957, is a complete code by itself.</p>
<hr />
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Fair Use Provisions Introduced by the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In 2010, the <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/copyright-bill-analysis" class="external-link">controversial Copyright (Amendment) Bill</a> came up for deliberation before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resource Development headed by Mr. <a class="external-link" href="http://archive.india.gov.in/govt/rajyasabhampbiodata.php?mpcode=173">Oscar Fernandes</a>. While a major part of the discussion on this amendment revolved around the altered royalty structure and rights allocation between music composers and lyricists on the one hand and film producers on the other, it can be safely stated that this is the most significant amendment to the Copyright Act, 1957 for more than this one reason. The amendment seeks to reform the Copyright Board, bring in a scheme of statutory licenses, expand the scope of performers’ rights and introduce anti-circumvention measures to check copyright piracy. As part of its ambitious objective, the amendment also attempts a new fair use model to protect intermediaries and file-sharing websites.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012, which gives expression to this fair use model through Sections 52(1)(b) and (c), reads thus:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><b><i>52. Certain acts not to be infringement of copyright</i></b><i>. - (1) The following acts shall not constitute an infringement of copyright, namely:</i></p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><i>(a) to (ad) - *****</i></p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><i>(b) the transient or incidental storage of a work or performance purely in the technical process of electronic transmission or communication to the public;</i></p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><i> </i></p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><i>(c) transient or incidental storage of a work or performance for the purpose of providing electronic links, access or integration, where such links, access or integration has not been expressly prohibited by the right holder, unless the person responsible is aware or has reasonable grounds for believing that such storage is of an infringing copy:</i></p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><i> </i></p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><i>Provided that if the person responsible for the storage of the copy has received a written complaint from the owner of copyright in the work, complaining that such transient or incidental storage is an infringement, such person responsible for the storage shall refrain from facilitating such access for a period of twenty-one days or till he receives an order from the competent court refraining from facilitating access and in case no such order is received before the expiry of such period of twenty-one days, he may continue to provide the facility of such access;</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">From a plain reading, it is clear that two important exceptions are carved out: one, in respect of the technical process of electronic transmission and the other, in respect of providing electronic links, access or integration. The material distinction between these exceptions is the presence of a take-down <i>proviso </i>in respect of the latter kind of activity, ie. when providing electronic links, access or integration. This window of opportunity is not provided to the copyright owner when the third party is an ISP involved in the pure technical process of electronic transmission of data.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In <i>R.K. Productions</i>, the court was not informed of the introduction of these provisions <i>vide</i> the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012, despite the hearing happening on a date subsequent to the amendment coming into force. This probably influenced the outcome as well, since the court held that ISPs were liable to block access to infringing content, once the specific webpage was brought to the notice of the concerned ISP. Newly introduced Section 52(1)(b) however makes it abundantly clear that ISPs cannot, in any manner, be held liable when they are acting as mere conduit pipes for the transmission of information. This legal position is also materially different from jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom where, the ISPs though not liable for copyright infringement, are statutorily mandated to lend all possible assistance such as take-down or blocking of access upon notice of infringement being furnished to them. This dichotomy between liability for infringement on the one hand and a general duty to assist in the prevention of infringement on the other is explained clearly by the Chancery Division in <i>Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v. British Telecommunications Plc.</i><a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In <i>Newzbin2</i>, the Chancery Division took note of the safe harbour provisions created by the E-Commerce Directive,<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2] </a>particularly Articles 12 to 14 that dealt with acting as a “mere conduit”, caching and hosting respectively. The interesting feature with the “mere conduit” exception, which in all other respects is akin to the exception contained in Section 52(1)(b) of the Copyright Act, 1957, is the additional presence of Article 12(3). This provision clarifies that the “mere conduit” exception shall not stand in the way of a court or administrative authority requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement. Article 18 of this Directive also casts an obligation upon Member States to ensure that court actions available under national law permit the rapid adoption of measures, including interim measures, designed to terminate any alleged infringement and to prevent any further impairment of the interests involved. Similarly, the court looked into the Information Society Directive,<a href="#fn3" name="fr3">[3] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Article 8(3) of which provides that “Member States shall ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right.” This Directive was transposed into the domestic law in UK by the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2498, resulting in the insertion of Section 97A in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This provision empowers the court to grant an injunction against a service provider who has actual knowledge of another person using their service to infringe copyright, such as where the service provider is given sufficient notice of the infringement. Finally, the Chancery Division also took note of the Enforcement Directive,<a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Article 11 of which provided that Member States shall ensure that copyright owners are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right. This entire legislative scheme compelled the court in <i>Newzbin2</i> to conclude that an order of injunction could be granted against ISPs who are “mere conduits”, restraining them from providing access to websites that indulged in mass copyright infringement. The court reasoned that the language used in Section 97A did not require knowledge of any particular infringement but only a more general kind of knowledge about certain persons using the ISPs’ services to infringe copyright. Thus, it is seen that in the United Kingdom, though a “mere conduit” activity is not infringement at all, the concerned ISP can be directed by the court to block access to a website that hosts infringing content on the basis of the above legislative scheme. The enquiry should therefore be directed towards whether India has a similar scheme for copyright enforcement.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The Information Technology Act – An Inapplicable Scheme for Website Blocking</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Information Technology Act, 2000<a href="#fn5" name="fr5">[5]</a>read with certain recently framed guidelines provides for a duty that could be thrust upon even “mere conduit” ISPs to disable access to copyrighted works. This is due to the presence of Section 79(2)(c) of this Act, which makes it clear that an intermediary shall be exempt from liability only where the intermediary observes due diligence as well as complies with the other guidelines framed by the Central Government in this behalf. Moreover, Section 79(3) provides that the intermediary shall not be entitled to the benefit of the exemption in Section 79(1) in a situation where the intermediary, upon receiving actual knowledge that any information, data, or communication link residing in or connected to a computer resource controlled by the intermediary is being used to commit an unlawful act, fails to expeditiously remove or disable access to that material on that resource without vitiating the evidence in any manner. In pursuance of Section 79(2)(c), the Central Government has also framed the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011, which came into effect on 11.04.2011. Rule 4 of these Rules, when read along with Rule 2(d), casts obligation on an intermediary on whose computer system, copyright infringing content has been <i>stored, hosted or published</i>, to <i>disable</i> such information within thirty six hours from when it is brought to actual knowledge of the existence of such content by any affected person.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">One way of understanding and interpreting in harmonious fashion, the provisions of the IT Act and the Rules therein and the recent amendments to the Copyright Act, is to contend that the issue of infringement of copyright by “mere conduit” ISPs is governed by Section 52(1)(b), which completely absolves them of any liability, while that of enforcement of copyright through the medium of such ISPs is governed by the IT Act. This bifurcation suffers from the difficulty that Section 79 of the IT Act is not an enforcement provision. It is a provision meant to exempt intermediaries from certain kinds of liability, in the same way as Section 52 of the Copyright Act. This provision, read with Section 81, makes it clear that the IT Act does not speak to liability for copyright infringement. From this, it has to necessarily follow that all issues pertaining to liability for such infringement have to be decided by the provisions of the Copyright Act. Therefore, the scheme in the IT Act read with the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules cannot confer additional liability for copyright infringement on ISPs where the Copyright Act exempts them from liability. More to the point, the intermediary cannot be liable for copyright infringement in the event of non-compliance with Section 79(3) or Rule 4 of the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules read with Section 79(1)(c) of the IT Act. Rule 4 of the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules, 2011, to the extent that it renders intermediaries outside the protective ambit of Section 79(1) upon failure to disable access to copyrighted content, is of no relevance as “mere conduits” have already been exempted from liability under Section 52(1)(b). Moreover, since these provisions in the IT Act do not deal with enforcement measures such as injunction orders from the court to disable access to infringing content in particular or infringing websites in general, it would be wrong to contend that the scheme in India is similar to the one in the United Kingdom where the issue of infringement has been divorced from that of enforcement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To conclude, Section 52(1)(b) is a blanket “mere conduit” exemption from liability for copyright infringement that stands uninfluenced by the presence of Section 79 of the IT Act or the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules. In the absence of a legislative scheme for enforcement in India akin to Section 97A of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Indian Courts cannot grant an injunction directing such “mere conduit” ISPs to block access to websites in general or infringing content in particular and any such action is not even maintainable in law post the insertion of Section 52(1)(b). The decision to the contrary in the <i>R.K.Productions </i>case is incorrect.</p>
<hr />
<p>[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch.). Hereinafter referred to as <i>Newzbin2.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (8 June 2000). This Directive was transposed into the domestic law in UK by the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2013.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>]. European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (22 May 2001).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr4" name="fn4">4</a>]. European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (29 April 2004). This Directive was transposed into the UK domestic law primarily by the Intellectual Property (Enforcement, etc.) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1028.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr5" name="fn5">5</a>]. Hereinafter referred to as the IT Act.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/john-doe-orders-isp-blocking-websites-copyright-3'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/john-doe-orders-isp-blocking-websites-copyright-3</a>
</p>
No publisherananthFeaturedHomepageCopyrightAccess to Knowledge2014-02-14T05:13:36ZBlog EntryCan Judges Order ISPs to Block Websites for Copyright Infringement? (Part 2)
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/john-doe-orders-isp-blocking-websites-copyright-2
<b>In a three-part study, Ananth Padmanabhan examines the "John Doe" orders that courts have passed against ISPs, which entertainment companies have used to block dozens, if not hundreds, of websites. In this, the second part, he looks at the law laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court on secondary and contributory copyright infringement, and finds that those wouldn't allow Indian courts to grant "John Doe" orders against ISPs.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the second part of his study, Ananth Padmanabhan proceeds to examine applying a general theory of secondary or contributory copyright infringement against ISPs. He traces the basis for holding a third party liable as a contributory by closely examining the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios<a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1] </a>and MGM Studios, Inc. v Grokster, Ltd.<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2] </a>and concludes that this basis does not hold good in the case of a mere conduit intermediary such as an ISP.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Hereinafter referred to as <i>Betamax</i>.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Hereinafter referred to as <i>Grokster.</i></p>
<hr />
<h2>Primary and Secondary Infringement</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Liability for copyright infringement can either be primary or secondary in character. In the case of ISPs, liability as primary infringers does not arise at all, and it is in their capacity as conduit pipes facilitating the transmission of information that they could be held secondarily liable. Even in such cases, the contention of copyright owners is that once the ISP is notified of infringing content, it has the primary responsibility of preventing access to such content. This contention is essentially rooted in a theory of secondary infringement based on knowledge and awareness, and the means to prevent further infringement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The controversy around a suitable model of secondary infringement is reflected in two judicial pronouncements – separated by a gap of more than two decades – delivered by the U.S. Supreme Court. In <i>Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios</i>,[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>] the US Supreme Court held that the manufacturers of home video recording devices known in the market as Betamax would not be liable to copyright owners for secondary infringement since the technology was capable of substantially non-infringing and legitimate purposes. The U.S. Supreme Court even observed that these time-shifting devices would actually enhance television viewership and hence find favour with majority of the copyright holders too. The majority did concede that in an appropriate situation, liability for secondary infringement of copyright could well arise. In the words of the Court, “<i>vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another</i>”. However, if vicarious liability had to be imposed on the manufactures of the time-shifting devices, it had to rest on the fact that they sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers <i>may</i> use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. In the view of the Court, there was no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability merely on the showing of such fact.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Notes of dissent were struck by Justice Blackmun, who wrote an opinion on behalf of himself and three other judges. The learned Judge noted that there was no private use exemption in favour of making of copies of a copyrighted work and hence, unauthorised time-shifting would amount to copyright infringement. He also concluded that there was no fair use in such activity that would exempt it from the purview of infringement. The dissent held the manufacturer liable as a contributory infringer and reasoned that the test for contributory infringement would only be whether the contributory infringer had <i>reason to know or believe </i>that infringement would take place and <i>not whether he actually knew of the same</i>. Off-the-air recording was not only a foreseeable use for the Betamax, but also its intended use, for which Sony would be liable for copyright infringement.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This dissent has considerably influenced the seemingly contrarian position taken by the majority in the subsequent decision, <i>MGM Studios, Inc. v Grokster, Ltd.</i><a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4]</a> This case called into question the liability of websites that facilitated peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing. Re-formulating the test for copyright infringement, the US Supreme Court held that ‘<i>one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties</i>’. In re-drawing the boundaries of contributory infringement, the Court observed that contributory infringement is committed by any person who intentionally induces or encourages direct infringement, and vicarious infringement is committed by those who profit from direct infringement while declining to exercise their right to limit or stop it. When an article of commerce was good for nothing else but infringement, there was no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability and there would be no injustice in presuming or imputing intent to infringe in such cases. This doctrine would at the same time absolve the equivocal conduct of selling an item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses and would limit the liability to instances of more acute fault than the mere understanding that some of the products shall be misused, thus ensuring that innovation and commerce are not unreasonably hindered.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Court distinguished the case at hand from <i>Betamax</i>, and noted that there was evidence here of active steps taken by the respondents to encourage direct copyright infringement, such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use. This evidence revealed an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and an <i>active </i>encouragement of infringement. Without reversing the decision in <i>Betamax</i>, but holding that it was misinterpreted by the lower court, the Court observed that <i>Betamax</i> was not an authority for the proposition that whenever a product was capable of substantial lawful use, the producer could never be held liable as a contributory for the use of such product for infringing activity by third parties.<i> </i>In the view of the Court, <i>Betamax </i>did not displace other theories of secondary liability.<i> </i>This other theory of secondary liability applicable to the case at hand was held to be the inducement rule, as per which any person who distributed a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as evidenced by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, would be liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. However, the Court clarified that <i>mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough</i> under this rule to subject a distributor to liability. Similarly, ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support or product updates, support liability etc. would not by themselves attract the operation of this rule. The inducement rule, instead, premised liability on <i>purposeful, culpable expression and conduct</i>, and thus did nothing to compromise <i>legitimate</i> commerce or discourage innovation having a <i>lawful</i> promise.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These seemingly divergent views on secondary infringement expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court are of significant relevance for India, due to the peculiar language used in the Indian Copyright Act, 1957.<a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 51 of the Act, which defines infringement, bifurcates the two types of infringement – ie. primary and secondary infringement – without indicating so in as many words. While Section 51(a)(i) speaks to primary infringers, 51(a)(ii) and 51(b) renders certain conduct to be secondary infringement. Even here, there is an important distinction between 51(a)(ii) and 51(b). The former exempts the alleged infringer from liability if he could establish that <i>he was not aware and had no reasonable ground for believing that </i>the communication to the public, facilitated through the use of his “place”, would amount to copyright infringement. The latter on the other hand permits no such exception. Thus, any person, who makes for sale or hire, or by way of trade displays or offers for sale or hire, or distributes for the purpose of trade, or publicly exhibits by way of trade, or imports into India, any infringing copies of a work, shall be liable for infringement, without any specific <i>mens rea</i> required to attract such liability. It is in the context of the former provision, ie. 51(a)(ii) that the liability of certain file-sharing websites for copyright infringement has arisen.<a href="#fn5" name="fr5">[5]</a></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Mere Conduit ISPs – Secondary Infringement Absent</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In <i>MySpace</i>, the Delhi High Court examined the liability for secondary infringement on the part of a website that provides a platform for file-sharing. While holding the website liable, the Single Judge considered material certain facts such as the revenue model of the defendant, which depended largely on advertisements displayed on the webpages, and automatically generated advertisements that would come up for a few seconds before the infringing video clips started playing. Shockingly, the Court even considered relevant the fact that the defendant did provide for safeguards such as hash block filters, take down stay down functionality, and rights management tools operational through fingerprinting technology, to prevent or curb infringing activities being carried on in their website. This, in the view of the Court, made it evident that the defendant had a <i>reasonable apprehension or belief </i>that the acts which were being carried on in the website <i>could</i> infringe someone else’s copyright including that of the plaintiff. The logic employed by the Court to attribute liability for secondary infringement on file-sharing websites is befuddling and reveals complete disregard for the degree of regulatory authority available on the internet even where the space, i.e., the website, is supposedly “under the control” of a person. However, a critical examination of this decision is not relevant in understanding the liability of mere conduit ISPs. This is for the reason that none of the factual considerations relied on by the Single Judge to justify imposition of liability on a file-sharing website under Section 51(a)(ii) arise when the defendant is an ISP that only provides the path for content-neutral transmission of data.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This was completely ignored by the Madras High Court in <i>R.K.Productions v. B.S.N.L.</i>,<a href="#fn6" name="fr6">[6] </a>where the producers of the Tamil film “3”, which enjoyed considerable pre-release buzz due to its song “Kolaveri Di”, sought an omnibus order of injunction against all websites that host torrents or links facilitating access to, or download of, this film. Though this was worded as a John Doe plaint by branding the infringers as unknown administrators of different torrent sites and so on, the real idea was to look to the resources and wherewithal of the known defendants, ie. the ISPs, to block access to the content hosted by the unknown defendants.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This prompted the ISPs to file applications under Or. VII, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit against them was barred by law. The Single Judge of the Madras High Court dismissed these applications for rejection of the plaint, after accepting the contention that the ISPs are necessary parties to the suit as the act of piracy occurs through the channel or network provided by them. The High Court heavily, and incorrectly, relied on MySpace without appreciating the distinction between a mere conduit ISP and a file-sharing website such as MySpace or YouTube, as regards their respective roles and responsibilities, the differing degrees of regulatory control over content enjoyed by them, and most importantly, the recognition and formalisation of these distinctions in the Copyright Act, 1957, vide the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.</p>
<hr />
<p>[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>]. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Hereinafter referred to as Betamax.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr4" name="fn4">4</a>]. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Hereinafter referred to as Grokster.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr5" name="fn5">5</a>]. Hereinafter the Act.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr6" name="fn6">6</a>]. <i>Super Cassette Industries Ltd. v MySpace Inc.</i>, MIPR 2011 (2) 303 (hereinafter referred to as <i>MySpace</i>). This decision of the Delhi High Court has been rightly criticised. <i>See </i><a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/super-cassettes-v-my-space">http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/super-cassettes-v-my-space</a> (last accessed on 24.03.2013).</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/john-doe-orders-isp-blocking-websites-copyright-2'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/john-doe-orders-isp-blocking-websites-copyright-2</a>
</p>
No publisherananthAccess to KnowledgeCopyrightPiracyFeaturedHomepage2014-03-06T16:48:18ZBlog EntryCan Judges Order ISPs to Block Websites for Copyright Infringement? (Part 1)
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/john-doe-orders-isp-blocking-websites-copyright-1
<b>In a three-part study, Ananth Padmanabhan examines the "John Doe" orders that courts have passed against ISPs, which entertainment companies have used to block dozens, if not hundreds, of websites. In this part, he looks at the theory behind John Doe orders and finds that it would be wrong for Indian courts to grant "John Doe" orders against ISPs.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Madras High Court, in its 2012 order in <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/john-doe-order-r.k.-productions-v.-bsnl-mtnl-and-ors.-movie-3" class="external-link"><i>R.K.Productions v. B.S.N.L.</i></a>,<a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1] </a>has affirmed the possibility of a suit against internet service providers (ISPs) to block access to certain webpages upon notification by the copyright owner. Though this appears to be a reasonable order at first glance, keeping in mind the fact that access to identified copyrighted works alone is targeted and not websites in their entirety, the legal basis for the same is highly questionable. In this two-part study, Ananth Padmanabhan explores the legal sanctity of these orders, especially post the coming into force of the Copyright Amendment, 2012. The first part of this study explores the genesis of <a class="external-link" href="http://lawmantra.co.in/recent-inclination-of-indian-judiciary-to-pass-john-doe-orders-a-critical-analysis-on-the-perspective-of-copyright-infringement-of-film-productions/">John Doe orders</a> and proceeds to examine the conceptual problems arising from tagging along website blocking orders within the broad sweep of John Doe action. This part concludes that website blocking orders against ISPs stand separately from, and cannot be justified in the same manner as, John Doe orders.</p>
<p>[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. (2012) 5 LW 626. Hereinafter referred to as <i>R.K. Productions</i>.</p>
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<h2>John Doe Orders and their Conceptual Understanding</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The concept of <i>John Doe Orders</i> in <i>ex parte </i>proceedings for copyright infringement came in due to the peculiar character of copyright piracy. Orders of this nature were being passed in jurisdictions across the world till they were, probably for the first time, passed in India in 2003. Since then, such orders have become a somewhat regular feature. In short, such orders permit the plaintiff to enforce an injunction order against unidentified / unnamed defendants, ‘John Doe’ being a generic name for such defendants. To understand the nature and mechanism of such enforcement and the various guidelines governing such orders, exploring the genesis of these orders is imperative.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In <a class="external-link" href="http://www.leagle.com/decision/19801290499FSupp791_11189"><i>Billy Joel v Various John Does</i></a>,<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2]</a> one of the earliest instances of a <i>John Doe </i>order, the plaintiff who was a musician and a successful recording artist, found to his annoyance that his success had spawned an underground industry that capitalised on his popularity through the sale of merchandise, usually T-shirts bearing his picture and name. These sales were carried on by unauthorised persons who showed up at his concerts with the merchandise and sold them outside the concert halls where he was performing. The plaintiff had in fact granted his recording company the exclusive right to market such merchandise, and the company was doing so inside the concert halls. Obviously, the presence of the unauthorised vendors outside the concert halls hurt the company’s sales and the plaintiff’s revenue share. This compelled him to approach the district court in Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief against various <i>"</i>John Does" or unidentified defendants who were carrying on the unauthorised sale of merchandise. The order was specifically sought seeking an <i>ex parte</i> temporary restraining order prohibiting certain unnamed persons from selling merchandise bearing the plaintiff’s name or likeness outside the Milwaukee Arena where he was scheduled to perform on that day. Thus, the order sought was confined to one particular instance and the situation demanded expedient preventive action since the concert was on the very same day.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The district court, while finding the propriety of an order against unidentified defendants "troubling", still went ahead and passed the order sought for. The court felt that the problem of the defendants’ identities would be met if the copies of the summons, complaint, and restraining order itself were to be served on all persons from whom merchandise connected with the plaintiff was seized on the night of the concert. Additionally, the<i> </i>court clarified that all these parties would be entitled to have their names added as parties to the cause title and even otherwise, to contest the seizures. The plaintiff had also furnished a bond to cover damages that may arise due to the awarding of such relief. The court applied the principle of <i>ubi jus ibi remedium</i> – where there is a wrong done, there has to be a remedy in law – while granting this relief. This is clear from the last paragraph of the judgement where the Court says : "<i>Were the injunction to be denied, plaintiffs would be without any legal means to prevent what is clearly a blatant infringement of their valid property rights. While the proposed remedy is novel, that in itself should not weigh against its adoption by this court. A court of equity is free to fashion whatever remedies will adequately protect the rights of the parties before it.</i>"</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Subsequently, various courts in the United States have granted such relief. However, most such instances of judicial intervention in cases of piracy have confined themselves to specific instances of piracy as opposed to orders of wider applicability extending to more than one instance of apprehended or real piracy. For instance, in <a class="external-link" href="http://www.leagle.com/decision/19821605551FSupp1054_11443"><i>Brockum Intern., Inc. v Various John Does</i></a>,<a href="#fn3" name="fr3">[3]</a> the plaintiff sought a nation-wide order prohibiting the same activity in other cities visited by the popular rock band, The Who, on its national tour. The court declined to do so.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The Metallica Order</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In New Zealand, the High Court has specifically applied the principle of <i>ubi jus ibi remedium </i>while justifying the issuance of <i>John Doe Orders</i>. In <a class="external-link" href="http://swarb.co.uk/tony-blain-pty-ltd-v-splain-1994/"><i>Tony Blain Pty.Limited v Splain and other Persons Unknown</i></a>,<a href="#fn4" name="fr4">[4]</a> the court likened this kind of relief sought against unidentified defendants, to an order in the nature of <i>Anton Piller </i>remedy. The court stated that both these orders involved a common feature, being an intrusion into the privacy of the defendants. However, such an intrusion would be justified applying the maxim of <i>ubi jus ibi remedium</i>. According to the court, "<i>in circumstances where it is plain that persons are infringing proprietary interests which the law recognises, or deceiving the public by way of trade in a manner which may indirectly affect the commercial interests of others, the law should, if it reasonably can, provide a remedy"</i>. Emphasising on the conduct-centric nature of these reliefs, the court held that John and Jane Does will be known by their works.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, in its attempt to bring in some safeguards before passing such an order, the court held that it would be better in the future to bring such applications a little in advance so that amicus curiae could be appointed to represent the view point of the John and Jane Does. Further, the court observed that it was important to build into the procedure appropriate protections, including means of informing persons served with orders for injunction in clear language and simple terms what their remedies were. These remedies, in turn, would include a right to apply to the court within twenty four hours for a review of the order and a right to claim damages in an appropriate case, not merely on the basis of the usual undertaking to be given by plaintiffs, but also on the basis of the tort of misfeasance of public office. It will also be necessary for the plaintiff to file before the court, a full report verified by affidavit, of the process of execution of the particular orders.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is thus seen that the High Court, though keen to do justice by providing a remedy that is effective enough to protect the plaintiff’s rights, also tried to mitigate the harshness of the measures proposed by bringing in some safeguards. This decision gave birth to the <i>Metallica Order</i> in New Zealand, the New Zealander’s equivalent of a <i>John Doe Order</i>. It has to be added that the nature of the order passed by the High Court in this case is very detailed and can be used as precedent, even for the requisite format, by all courts that pass similar orders.<a href="#fn5" name="fr5">[5] </a></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">John Doe Orders in India</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The decision in <a class="external-link" href="http://www.institute-ip-asia.org/articles/IndiaReport2004.pdf"><i>Tej Television Ltd. v Rajan Mandal</i></a>,<a href="#fn6" name="fr6">[6]</a> will have to find first mention since these kind of orders against unidentified defendants hit the shores of the Indian legal landscape through this decision. Here, the plaintiff owned the Ten Sports television channel and had procured the broadcasting rights to several important sporting events including the 2002 Football World Cup matches. Being a paid channel, the cable operators had to part with royalty to the plaintiff for airing the programs broadcasted on this channel. To the plaintiff’s consternation, many local cable operators were airing these sporting events without taking licenses from the plaintiff / its authorised marketing agency. This resulted in the channel approaching the Delhi High Court and seeking, for the first time, a John Doe order against unidentified defendants. The channel had some evidence of unauthorised broadcasting of the initial matches by certain cable operators and apprehended that this conduct by more operators would not only result in revenue loss but also cause the 1377 cable operators, who had taken licenses from the plaintiff, to re-think the very necessity of doing so when they could air the sporting events in an unauthorised manner without any fear of liability. Another concern was the ease with which those who carried on the practise of unauthorised transmission could destroy any evidence of such conduct. The prayer sought by the plaintiff was an <i>ex parte</i> order against six named cable operators and “John Doe” orders against a further fourteen unnamed persons who, the plaintiff claimed, were wrongfully transmitting the Ten Sports channel. The order against unidentified defendants was sought to be justified on two broad grounds: (i) Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which gives courts the inherent power to evolve a fair and reasonable procedure for meeting exigent situations, and (ii) international practise in the form of John Doe orders issued by courts in various countries including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The High Court refused to grant a John Doe order on the facts and circumstances of this case but also clarified that in an appropriate situation, courts could well award a John Doe order even in India. The court granted relief to the plaintiff by appointing a Court Commissioner who was authorised to visit the premises of various cable operators, and search, make an inventory, and take into custody all equipment / wires used for the broadcast of the plaintiff’s channel. The court empowered the Commissioner to take the assistance of technical experts and police officials in carrying out this order, and directed him to prepare a report after gathering evidence of cable piracy in the form of video recordings and photographs. The court also considered itself at liberty, on the basis of this report, to issue notices to all alleged violators, and after the hearing, to initiate civil and criminal action against them in accordance with law. The Court Commissioner was also empowered to issue warnings to such prospective violators though there was no mention of any contempt proceedings against the violators for ignoring the warning given by the Commissioner. Upon close examination, this order was nothing but a mild modification of the power vested in the court under Order XXVI, Rule 9 of the CPC.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Final and Interim John Doe Orders</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Delhi High Court has, in some subsequent decisions, considered the possibility of a John Doe order without expressly granting the same. In <i><a class="external-link" href="http://delhicourts.nic.in/Jan09/Ardath%20Tobacco%20Co.%20Ltd.%20Vs.%20Mr.%20Munna%20Bhai.pdf">Ardath Tobacco Co. Ltd. v Munna Bhai & Ors</a>.</i>,<a href="#fn7" name="fr7">[7] </a>the plaintiff was the proprietor of a tobacco brand, “State Express 555”. Aggrieved by the conduct of the defendants who were distributing <i>"</i>Peacock" cigarettes in packaging and trade dress that bore deceptive similarity to that of the plaintiff’s brand, the plaintiff sought a John Doe order against all such distributors including unidentified ones. From the report, it appears that an <i>ex parte </i>order appointing Court Commissioners, similar to the order in <i>Tej Television</i>,<i> </i>was awarded by the High Court initially. In the final order, the court was constrained to confine the order of permanent injunction to the named defendants since the plaintiff had failed to identify any John Does and add them to the array of parties for the purpose of securing injunctive relief. The same was again found to be the case in <i>3M Company v A. Patel</i>,<a href="#fn8" name="fr8">[8] </a>where the final order of injunction was granted only against the 2 identified defendants.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thus, in these cases, a distinction seems to be made between the interim orders that may be passed against the unidentified defendants, and the final relief granted by the court. The principle that emerges from these decisions is that orders against unidentified defendants can only go to the extent of collecting evidence against them through search of their premises by the Court Commissioner, or with the assistance of the Station House Officer (S.H.O) as was directed in <i><a class="external-link" href="http://indiankanoon.org/docfragment/100370340/?formInput=espn%20software%20india%20%20doctypes%3A%20judgments">ESPN Software India Private Ltd. v Tudu Enterprises</a>.</i><a href="#fn9" name="fr9">[9]</a> No final relief can be granted against any person who is unnamed in the array of parties as a defendant. The purpose of an <i>Ashok Kumar </i>order (as such orders are branded in India) is only to bring such persons on record.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">John Doe Orders – Procedure and Guidelines</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Recently, the Delhi High Court has enunciated, with sufficient clarity, the procedure to be followed while granting interim orders against unidentified defendants. In <i>Luxottica S.R.L v Mr. Munny & Ors.</i>,<a href="#fn10" name="fr10">[10]</a> the plaintiff which owned the popular trade mark "Ray Ban" in respect of sunglasses, sought John Doe orders from the Delhi High Court with the aim of tacking rampant piracy and counterfeiting of its products. Surprisingly, there was no exigent necessity cited by the plaintiff for justifying the grant of such an order, unlike in <i>Billy Joel</i>, <i>Metallica</i>, <i>Brockum,</i> or <i>Tej Television</i>. Piracy had been going on in the past, and it continues to occur – that was broadly the case of the plaintiff here. Despite this, the Delhi High Court went on to issue an order of <i>ex parte </i>injunction restraining third parties from carrying on such counterfeiting activities. Extending the powers of the Court Commissioner, the High Court held:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; padding-left: 30px; "><i>The Commissioners are also authorized to visit any other premises/warehouse/store where they may have reason to suspect and/or information be received that counterfeit optical sunglasses bearing the Plaintiffs trademark RAY BAN are being stored/sold/offered for sale and thereafter. In respect of such Ashok Kumar Defendants, upon the seizure of any infringing/counterfeit products, the Commissioners shall forthwith serve such Ashok Kumar Defendants with a complete set of papers and a copy of the notice and summons. The Commissioners will seize and make an inventory of all the infringing goods including packaging material, cartons, stationery, literature, dyes, blocks, moulds, etc. bearing the impugned RAY BAN trademark and sign all books of accounts including ledgers, cash books, purchase and sale records etc., and return the seized goods on suprdari to such Ashok Kumar defendants and obtain undertakings from each of them that they will produce the seized goods as and when directed by the court.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The object behind this order seems to be the prevention of any destruction of the evidence. In consonance with this object, the High Court has even made provision for return of the seized material to the unnamed defendants during the pendency of this order, and given them the option of approaching the court and vacating the <i>ex parte </i>order of injunction issued against them. This Luxottica decision can be considered as India’s equivalent of the <i>Metallica Order</i>, as it gives a clear roadmap for courts that pass such orders in the future. Considering that John Doe orders have attracted criticism on the ground that they make serious inroads into the rights of the defendant, these safeguards specifically articulated by the Court do go some way in addressing these concerns and mitigating the hardship caused to the defendants.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Website Blocking Orders</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">An extension of the John Doe orders discussed above is the recent spate of decisions from various High Courts blocking access to certain websites that upload, or permit the uploading of, copyrighted content such as sound recordings and cinematograph films, without authorisation from the copyright owner. The relief granted is either movie-specific but against unknown persons, or website-specific.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To give a sample of the movie-specific relief: <i>For the foregoing reasons, defendants and other unnamed and undisclosed persons, are restrained from copying, recording or allowing camcording or communicating or making available or distributing, or duplicating, or displaying, or releasing, or showing, or uploading, or downloading, or exhibiting, or playing, and/or defraying the movie ‘DON2’ in any manner without a proper license from the plaintiff or in any other manner which would violate/infringe the plaintiff?s copyright in the said cinematograph film ‘DON2’ through different mediums like CD, DVD, Blue- ray disc, VCD, Cable TV, DTH, Internet services, MMS, Pen drives, Hard drives, Tapes, CAS or in any other like manner.</i><a href="#fn11" name="fr11">[11] </a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Similarly, in <i>R.K.Productions Pvt. Ltd. v B.S.N.L. & Ors.</i><a href="#fn12" name="fr12">[12]</a>an order of the above nature has been passed in respect of the Tamil film "3". There are a few more that have already been passed by the Delhi and Madras High Courts, indicating that these kind of protective orders under Or.XXXIX R.1 and 2, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are well going to be the order of the day, especially when it comes to online piracy of copyrighted content.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Indian Music Industry and a sound recording label have also approached the Calcutta High Court and obtained an order of the second kind, ie. a direction to the known defendants who are Internet Service Providers (ISPs), to block access to various websites listed in the Schedule to the Plaint, which are used exclusively for providing unauthorised access to copyrighted sound and video recordings. The order<a href="#fn13" name="fr13">[13]</a> is extracted below:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><i>This is an application by the plaintiffs in aid of a suit complaining of copyright infringement. The plaintiff no. 1 and the members of the plaintiff no. 2 are the copyright owners of Hindi film songs. It is argued that the website mentioned in the prayers are posting and playing the songs, without any copyright or licence. This application is made ex parte on the apprehension that if notice of this application was served on the website they would shift their service to a different website. </i></p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px; text-align: justify; "><i>In those circumstances, I pass an order of injunction in terms of prayer (a) of the Notice of Motion till further orders. I direct the respondent ISPs to indicate to the plaintiff the address of the website owner/operator referred to in the prayers.</i><i><br /><br />I also make it clear that the above order of blocking should be confined to the above website only and <span>should not otherwise interfere with internet service</span>.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The last part of the last sentence extracted above has been emphasised as this is precisely what is happening as a consequence of the dual kind of orders discussed in this section. Though the first kind of order is, on its own terms, confined to only the film that is the subject matter of the suit, ISPs have used it to block access to entire websites in contravention of all recognised principles of network neutrality. Even in the case of the second kind of orders, there is absolutely no transparency as to how ISPs have been interpreting the order, and what websites are being targeted by them under the garb of such an order.<a href="#fn14" name="fr14">[14]</a> It is a well-established maxim that courts and judicial orders cannot be used as a vehicle for oppression, harassment, or to perpetrate abuse of power. This is precisely what has been witnessed since the last year in relation to the website blocking, and film-access blocking, orders passed by different courts. It is felt that legislative intervention is absolutely necessary in this field without any further delay to lay down parameters for exercise of judicial power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which power can otherwise be construed in any manner by any Court with little checks and balances on the possibility of such exercise of power.<a href="#fn15" name="fr15">[15] </a></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Conceptual Differences between John Doe and Website Blocking Orders</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The most crucial point of distinction between these two types of orders is that while <i>John Doe </i>orders speak to the primary infringer, website blocking orders impose onerous responsibility on the ISP. <i>John Doe</i> orders as used in India thus far have served the purpose of a blanket search and seize mandate to gather evidence of direct infringement. As seen above, the final relief in the suit is granted only against those John Does who are subsequently identified and arrayed as parties to the main suit.<a href="#fn16" name="fr16">[16]</a> Website blocking orders, on the other hand, amount to granting the final relief at the interim stage itself, as access is blocked to web links hosted by unknown persons by taking recourse to the ISP.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Moreover, there is a vital difference between holding primary infringers liable and making mere conduits, such as ISPs. parties to a civil suit. The maxim <i>ubi jus ibi remedium</i> is clearly applicable in the former case, because the remedy is fashioned to bring on board the primary infringer and then afford him an opportunity of hearing before confirming the <i>ex parte </i>order against him. In the case of website blocking orders, the court straightaway directs the ISP to block access to the content, and the third party infringer is really a non-entity in the whole process as the attempt is not to bring him on board or to gather evidence. Hence, it is impermissible for an Indian court to grant an <i>ex parte </i>order directing the denial of access to a website or webpage by taking umbrage under its power to grant a John Doe order. However, Indian courts have done so, and the recent decision of the Madras High Court in <i>R.K.Productions v. B.S.N.L.</i><a href="#fn17" name="fr17">[17] </a>has also affirmed the legality of such action. The court has judicially created a responsibility on ISPs that is akin to the take-down requirements thrust upon file-sharing websites, and which kicks in upon notice of infringing content given to the ISP by the copyright owner. This decision deserves serious critical evaluation, and an understanding of the different types of liability for copyright infringement is material for the same.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. 499 F.Supp. 791 (1980). Hereinafter referred to as <i>Billy Joel</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr3" name="fn3">3</a>]. 551 F.Supp. 1054 (D.C.Wis.,1982). Hereinafter referred to as <i>Brockum</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr4" name="fn4">4</a>]. [1994] F.S.R. 497. Hereinafter referred to as <i>Metallica. </i>The plaintiff here was the exclusive authorised merchandiser for Metallica and Sir Paul McCartney, and the piracy alleged was similar to the one in Billy Joel’s case. Here too, the order was sought in respect of a specific concert to be held in Auckland within the next few days. The plaintiff innovatively sought an order by virtue of which certain solicitors named in the plaintiff’s application would, due to their status as officers of the court, be authorised to accost bootleggers at the concert venues and require them to provide their current addresses and evidence of identity, and these bootleggers would have to surrender up to these named solicitors all merchandise including T-shirts, head-bands, badges, or programmes in their possession or control.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr5" name="fn5">5</a>]. <i>See <a class="external-link" href="http://www.5rb.com/case/Bloomsbury-Publishing-Group-Ltd-v-News-Group-Newspapers-Ltd-%28No.2%29">Bloomsbury Publishing Group Limited v News Group Newspapers Ltd</a>.</i> [2003] 3 All E.R. 736.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr6" name="fn6">6</a>]. [2003] F.S.R. 22. Hereinafter referred to as <i>Tej Television</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr7" name="fn7">7</a>]. 2009 (39) PTC 208 (Del).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr8" name="fn8">8</a>]. Order dated 15.01.2009 in C.S. (O.S.) 1771 / 2006, reported as MANU/DE/1991/2009.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr9" name="fn9">9</a>]. MANU/DE/1061/2011.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr10" name="fn10">10</a>]. Order dated 25.09.2009 in C.S. (O.S.) 1846 / 2009, available at <a href="http://courtnic.nic.in/dhcorder/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=173895&yr=2009">http://courtnic.nic.in/dhcorder/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=173895&yr=2009</a> (last accessed on 24.03.2013)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr11" name="fn11">11</a>]. Order of the Delhi High Court dated 19.12.2011 in I.A. No.20510/2011 in C.S.(O.S.) No. 3207/2011 (<i>Reliance Big Entertainment Pvt Ltd v Multivision Network & Ors.</i>)<i>, </i>available<i> </i>at <a href="http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=269404&yr=2011">http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=269404&yr=2011</a> (last accessed on 24.03.2013)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr12" name="fn12">12</a>]. Order of the Madras High Court dated 29.03.2012 in O.A.No. 230 of 2012 in C.S.No. 208 of 2012, the link to which is provided at <a href="http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/search?q=madras+high+court+first+john+doe">http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/search?q=madras+high+court+first+john+doe</a> (last accessed on 24.03.2013)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr13" name="fn13">13</a>]. Order of the Calcutta High Court dated 27.01.2012 in GA No. 187 of 2012 in CS No. 23 of 2012 (<i>Sagarika Music Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v Dishnet Wireless Ltd. & Ors.</i>), available at <a href="http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/147345981/">http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/147345981/</a> (last accessed on 24.03.2013)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr14" name="fn14">14</a>]. The prayers sought in some of these civil suits are in complete contravention of the salutary principle in Or.VII, R.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, that “<i>every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims</i>”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr15" name="fn15">15</a>]. The website blocking order dated 29.01.2013 passed by a District Court in Dabra near Gwalior in respect of websites that posted content related to the Indian Institute of Planning and Management, a Business School, and the subsequent unblocking order by the same Court dated 28.02.2013 have again brought back the spotlight on the legality of such orders passed by the judiciary. <i>See </i><a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/unblock-urls-about-iipm-court/articleshow/18743461.cms">http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/unblock-urls-about-iipm-court/articleshow/18743461.cms</a> (last accessed on 24.03.2013).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr16" name="fn16">16</a>]. <i>Ardath Tobacco Co. Ltd. v Munna Bhai & Ors.</i>, 2009 (39) PTC 208 (Del); <i>3M Company v A. Patel</i>, MANU/DE/1991/2009.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr17" name="fn17">17</a>]. (2012) 5 LW 626. Hereinafter referred to as <i>R.K.Productions</i>.</p>
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No publisherananthPiracyCopyrightAccess to Knowledge2014-01-31T06:00:47ZBlog Entryಡಿಜಿಟಲ್ ನಿರ್ಬಂಧಗಳ ನಿರ್ವಹಣೆ
https://cis-india.org/a2k/digital-restrictions-management
<b>ಸ್ವತಂತ್ರ ತಂತ್ರಾಂಶ ಪ್ರತಿಷ್ಠಾನದ ಸ್ಥಾಪಕ ರಿಚರ್ಡ್ ಸ್ಟಾಲ್ಮನ್ ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ (ಡಿಜಿಟಲ್ ರೈಟ್ಸ್ ಮ್ಯಾನೇಜ್ಮೆಂಟ್) ಎಂಬ ಪರಿಕಲ್ಪನೆಯನ್ನು `ಡಿಜಿಟಲ್ ರೆಸ್ಟ್ರಿಕ್ಷನ್ ಮ್ಯಾನೇಜ್ಮೆಂಟ್` ಎಂದು ಬಿಡಿಸಿಡುತ್ತಾರೆ. ಅವರ ದೃಷ್ಟಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಇದು ಡಿಜಿಟಲ್ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳ ನಿರ್ವಹಣೆಯಲ್ಲ. ಡಿಜಿಟಲ್ ನಿರ್ಬಂಧಗಳ ನಿರ್ವಹಣೆ. ಈ ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ ತಂತ್ರ ಬಳಕೆದಾರನ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳನ್ನು ನಿಯಂತ್ರಿಸುತ್ತದೆ. </b>
<p><a class="external-link" href="http://prajavani.net/include/story.php?news=562&section=51&menuid=15">The article was published in Prajavani on June 9, 2012</a></p>
<p>ಕಾಪಿ ರೈಟ್ ಹೊಂದಿರುವವನಿಗೆ ಬಳಕೆದಾರನ ಹಾರ್ಡ್ವೇರ್, ಸಾಫ್ಟ್ವೇರ್ ಮತ್ತು ಅದರಲ್ಲಿ ನೋಡುವ, ಆಲಿಸುವ ಮತ್ತು ಓದುವ ವಸ್ತು-ವಿಷಯದ ಮೇಲೆಯೂ ನಿಯಂತ್ರಣ ಹೇರುವ ಅನೈತಿಕ ಅಧಿಕಾರವನ್ನು ಕೊಟ್ಟು ಬಿಡುತ್ತದೆ ಎಂಬುದು ಸ್ಟಾಲ್ಮನ್ ಅವರ ಅಭಿಪ್ರಾಯ.</p>
<p>ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ನ ಮಾಲೀಕರು ಈ ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ ತಂತ್ರ ತಮ್ಮ ಹಕ್ಕಿನ ಉಲ್ಲಂಘನೆಯನ್ನು ತಡೆಯುತ್ತದೆ ಎಂದು ಹೇಳುತ್ತಾರಾದರೂ ಇದು ಜಾರಿಯಲ್ಲಿರುವ ಅನೇಕ ದೇಶಗಳ ಉದಾಹರಣೆಯನ್ನು ಮುಂದಿಟ್ಟುಕೊಂಡು ನೋಡಿದರೆ ಬಳಕೆದಾರನ ಮಟ್ಟಿಗೆ ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ ಜ್ಞಾನದ ಬಾಗಿಲುಗಳನ್ನು ಮುಚ್ಚುತ್ತದೆ ಎಂಬುದೇ ನಿಜ.</p>
<p>ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಯನ್ವಯ ಅಸ್ತಿತ್ವದಲ್ಲೇ ಇರದ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳನ್ನು ಈ ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ನ ಮಾಲೀಕರಿಗೆ ನೀಡಿಬಿಡುತ್ತದೆ. ಅಂಗವಿಕಲರು ತಮಗೆ ಓದಲು ಅನುಕೂಲವಾಗುವ ಮಾಧ್ಯಮಕ್ಕೆ ಒಂದು ಪುಸ್ತಕವನ್ನು ಪರಿವರ್ತಿಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವುದು, ಸಂಶೋಧಕರು ಪುಸ್ತಕ ಅಥವಾ ಈ ಬಗೆಯ ಜ್ಞಾನದ ಮಾಧ್ಯಮಒಂದರಲ್ಲಿರುವ ವಿಷಯವನ್ನು ತಮ್ಮ ಸಂಶೋಧನೆಗೆ ಬಳಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವುದು, ಹಾಗೆಯೇ ಸಿನಿಮಾ, ಸಾಫ್ಟ್ವೇರ್ ಇತ್ಯಾದಿಗಳನ್ನು ವೈಯಕ್ತಿಕ ಬಳಕೆಗಾಗಿ ಉಳಿಸಿ ಇಟ್ಟುಕೊಳ್ಳಲು (ಬ್ಯಾಕ್ಅಪ್) ಬೇಕಾದಂತೆ ಪರಿವರ್ತಿಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವುದು, ಸಾಫ್ಟ್ವೇರ್ನಂಥ ಉತ್ಪನ್ನ ಗಳನ್ನು ಅವುಗಳನ್ನು ಉದ್ದೇಶಿತ ಉಪಯೋಗ ಕ್ಕಿಂತ ಭಿನ್ನ ಬಗೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಬಳಸುವುದು, ಉದ್ದೇಶಿತ ವೇದಿಕೆಗಳಿಗಿಂತ ಭಿನ್ನವಾದ ವೇದಿಕೆಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ಬಳಸಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಾಗುವಂತೆ ಸಾಫ್ಟ್ವೇರ್ಗಳಂಥ ಉತ್ಪನ್ನಗಳನ್ನು ರಿವರ್ಸ್ ಇಂಜಿನಿಯರಿಂಗ್ ಮಾಡುವಂಥ ಕ್ರಿಯೆಗಳಿಗೆ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆ ಅನುವು ಮಾಡಿಕೊಡುತ್ತದೆ.</p>
<p>ಆದರೆ ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನ ಕಾನೂನುಬದ್ಧವಾಗಿಯೇ ಇರುವ ಈ ಎಲ್ಲಾ ಕೆಲಸಗಳಿಗೂ ತಡೆಯೊಡುತ್ತದೆ.2011ರ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿಯೊಂದಿಗೆ ಹೊಸ ರೂಪ ಪಡೆದುಕೊಂಡಿರುವ 1957ರ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ಮೂಲಕ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಉಲ್ಲಂಘನೆಯನ್ನು ತಡೆಯುವ ವಿಧಾನಕ್ಕೆ ಕಾನೂನಿನ ಮಾನ್ಯತೆಯನ್ನು ನೀಡಿದೆ.</p>
<p>ತನ್ನ ಹಕ್ಕಿನ ಉಲ್ಲಂಘನೆಯನ್ನು ತಡೆಯುವು ದಕ್ಕಾಗಿ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಮಾಲೀಕ ಅಳವಡಿಸಿರುವ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನವನ್ನು ಹ್ಯಾಕ್ ಮಾಡುವಂಥ ಕೆಲಸ ಮಾಡಿದವರಿಗೆ ಎರಡು ವರ್ಷಗಳ ಕಾರಾಗೃಹ ವಾಸದಂಥ ಶಿಕ್ಷೆಯೂ ಹೊಸ ಕಾನೂನಿನಲ್ಲಿದೆ. ಹಾಗೆಂದು ಈ ಕಾನೂನು ಬಹಳ ಋಣಾತ್ಮಕವಷ್ಟೇ ಆಗಿದೆ ಎನ್ನಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಿಲ್ಲ.</p>
<p>ಇದರಲ್ಲಿ ಮೂರು ಅತಿ ಮುಖ್ಯ ಧನಾತ್ಮಕ ಅಂಶಗಳಿವೆ. ಮೊದಲನೆಯದ್ದು ಸಾರ್ವತ್ರಿಕ ಲಭ್ಯತೆಯ ವಸ್ತು-ವಿಷಯಗಳನ್ನು ಈ ಬಗೆಯ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನ ಉಪಯೋಗಿಸಿ ಬಳಕೆದಾರರನ್ನು ನಿರ್ಬಂಧಿಸಲು ಅವಕಾಶವಿಲ್ಲ. ಎರಡನೆಯದ್ದು ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ಮಿತಿಯನ್ನು ಪರೀಕ್ಷಿಸುವ ಉದ್ದೇಶದಿಂದ ನಡೆಸಲಾಗುವ ಹ್ಯಾಕಿಂಗ್ ಅಪರಾಧವಲ್ಲ. ಮೂರನೆಯದ್ದು ಹೀಗೆ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ಮಿತಿಗಳನ್ನು ಬಳಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವ ಮತ್ತೊಂದು ತಾಂತ್ರಿಕ ವಿಧಾನವನ್ನು ಆವಿಷ್ಕರಿಸುವುದನ್ನು ಕಾನೂನು ತಡೆಯುತ್ತಿಲ್ಲ.</p>
<p>ಒಂದು ವಿಡಿಯೋ/ಆಡಿಯೋ ಕಂಪೆನಿ ಒಂದು ಡಿವಿಡಿಯನ್ನು ಕೇವಲ ಮೈಕ್ರೋಸಾಫ್ಟ್ ಮೀಡಿಯಾ ಪ್ಲೇಯರ್ನಲ್ಲಿ ಮಾತ್ರ ವೀಕ್ಷಿಸಲು ಅಥವಾ ಆಲಿಸಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಿರುವಂತೆ ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ ಮಾಡಿದ್ದರೆ ಲೀನಕ್ಸ್ ಹೊಂದಿರುವ ಬಳಕೆದಾರರು ಅದನ್ನು ತಮ್ಮ ಕಂಪ್ಯೂಟರ್ಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ನೋಡಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಿರುವಂತೆ ಪರಿವರ್ತಿಸಿ ಕೊಳ್ಳುವುದು ಅಪರಾಧವಲ್ಲ. ಇಲ್ಲಿ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಉಲ್ಲಂಘನೆಯಾಗುವುದಿಲ್ಲ.</p>
<p>ಹಾಗೆಯೇ ಆಡಿಯೋ ಪುಸ್ತಕವೊಂದನ್ನು ಬಿಡುಗಡೆ ಮಾಡಿರುವ ಕಂಪೆನಿ ಅದನ್ನು ಅಂಧರು ಬಳಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳಲಾಗದಂತೆ ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ ಬಳಸಿದ್ದರೆ ಅಂಧರಿಗೆ ಅದನ್ನು ತಮಗೆ ಬೇಕಾದ ಸ್ವರೂಪಕ್ಕೆ ಪರಿವರ್ತಿಸಿಕೊಂಡು ಬಳಸುವ ಸ್ವಾತಂತ್ರ್ಯವನ್ನು ಕಾಯ್ದೆ ನೀಡುತ್ತದೆ. ಹಾಗೆಯೇ ಗೆಳೆಯನೊಬ್ಬನಿಂದ ಪಡೆದ ಡಿಆರ್ಎಂ ಇರುವ ಡಿವಿಡಿಯಿಂದ ಶಿಕ್ಷಕರೊಬ್ಬರು ತಮ್ಮ ತರಗತಿ ಅನುಕೂಲಕ್ಕಾಗಿ ಪ್ರತಿ ಮಾಡಿಕೊಂಡು ವಿಡಿಯೋ ಕ್ಲಿಪ್ಗಳನ್ನು ರೂಪಿಸಿದರೂ ಅದು ಅಪರಾಧವಾಗು ವುದಿಲ್ಲ. ಹಾಗೆಯೇ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞನೊಬ್ಬ ಅಂತರ ಜಾಲಸಂಪರ್ಕವನ್ನು ಬಳಸಿ ಆಡಬಲ್ಲ ಕಂಪ್ಯೂಟರ್ ಗೇಮ್ ಒಂದರಲ್ಲಿ ಸ್ಪೈವೇರ್ ಇದೆ ಅನುಮಾನಿಸಿ ಅದರ ಆಕರ ಸಂಕೇತಗಳನ್ನು ನೋಡಿ ಬದಲಾಯಿಸಲು ಪ್ರಯತ್ನಿಸಿದರೆ ಅದು ತಪ್ಪಲ್ಲ.</p>
<p>ಈ ಸವಲತ್ತನ್ನು ಭದ್ರತಾ ಏಜನ್ಸಿಗಳೂ ಬಳಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಿದೆ. ಹಾಗೆಯೇ ಜಾಗತಿಕ ಮಾರುಕಟ್ಟೆಯಲ್ಲಿರುವ ಪ್ರಖ್ಯಾತವಾಗಿರುವ ಒಂದು ಸಾಫ್ಟ್ವೇರನ್ನು ಹೋಲುವಂಥದ್ದೇ ಉತ್ಪನ್ನವನ್ನು ಬೆಂಗಳೂರಿನ ಉತ್ಸಾಹಿಯೊಬ್ಬ ರೂಪಿಸಿ ಜಾಗತಿಕವಾಗಿ ಮಾರಾಟ ಮಾಡಲು ಹೊರಟರೂ ಅದನ್ನು ನಿಯಮ ತಪ್ಪು ಎನ್ನುವುದಿಲ್ಲ. ಆದರೆ ಇದರಲ್ಲಿ ಆತ ಅನುಕರಿ ಸುತ್ತಿರುವ ಉತ್ಪನ್ನ ಬಳಸಿರುವ ಆಕರ ಸಂಕೇತಗಳು ಇರಬಾರದಷ್ಟೇ.</p>
<p>ಎಲ್ಲವನ್ನೂ ಮಸಿ ನುಂಗಿತು ಎಂಬಂತೆ ಈ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಯಲ್ಲಿರುವ ಎರಡು ಋಣಾತ್ಮಕ ಅಂಶಗಳು ಅದರ ಧನಾತ್ಮಕತೆಗೆ ದೊಡ್ಡ ಮಿತಿಯನ್ನು ಹೇರಿಬಿಟ್ಟಿವೆ. ನಿರ್ದಿಷ್ಟ ಉತ್ಪನ್ನವನ್ನು ಪರಿವರ್ತಿಸಲು ಬೇಕಿರುವ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನವನ್ನು ಒದಗಿಸುವ ಕಂಪೆನಿಗಳು ಅದನ್ನು ಯಾರಿಗೆ ಮಾರಿದ್ದೇವೆ ಎಂಬ ದಾಖಲೆಗಳನ್ನು ಇಟ್ಟುಕೊಳ್ಳಬೇಕೆಂಬ ನಿಯಮವಿದೆ.</p>
<p>ಅಂದರೆ ಇದೊಂದು ಬಗೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಪರೋಕ್ಷವಾಗಿ ಈ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನವನ್ನು ಬಳಸುವುದರ ಮೇಲೆ ಹೇರಿರುವ ನಿಯಂತ್ರಣದಂತಿದೆ. ಯಾರಿಗೆ ಮಾರಿದ್ದೇವೆಂಬ ದಾಖಲೆಯನ್ನು ಕಡ್ಡಾಯವಾಗಿ ಇಟ್ಟುಕೊಳ್ಳುತ್ತಾ ಹೋಗುವ ಕ್ರಿಯೆಯೇ ಮಾರಾಟ ಗಾರರ ಉತ್ಸಾಹಕ್ಕೆ ತಣ್ಣೀರೆರಚುತ್ತದೆ.</p>
<p>ಹಾಗೆಯೇ ಬಳಕೆದಾರರು ತಮ್ಮ `ಪರಿವರ್ತಿಸುವ ಹಕ್ಕನ್ನು` ಚಲಾಯಿಸಲು ಅಗತ್ಯವಿರುವ ಸವಲತ್ತು ಒದಗಿಸುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಮಾಲೀಕರನ್ನು ಬಾಧ್ಯಸ್ಥರನ್ನಾಗಿಸಿಲ್ಲ. ಅಂದರೆ ಬಳಕೆದಾರನಿಗೆ ಹಕ್ಕಿದೆ. ಆದರೆ ಅದನ್ನು ಚಲಾಯಿಸುವ ಅವಕಾಶದ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಮಾತ್ರ ಖಾತರಿ ಇಲ್ಲ ಎಂಬ ಸ್ಥಿತಿ ಇದೆ.</p>
<p>ಲೇಖಕರು ಸೆಂಟರ್ ಫಾರ್ ಇಂಟರ್ನೆಟ್ಅಂಡ್ ಸೊಸೈಟಿಯ ಕಾರ್ಯನಿರ್ವಾಹಕ ನಿರ್ದೇಶಕರು</p>
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<p>English translation below:</p>
<h2>Digital Restrictions Management</h2>
<p>As Richard Stallman the founder of the Free Software movement puts it the correct expansion of the acronym DRM is Digital Restrictions Management and not Digital Rights Management. According to his analysis DRM is used to limit the rights of consumers and enables rights-holders to exercise unethical control over the consumer's hardware, software and content.</p>
<p>Even though copyrights holders will tell us that DRM helps cut down on wilful and unwitting infringement. For consumers and members of the general public evidence from other countries reveal that DRM in most cases undermines access to knowledge. DRM permits the copyright holder to claim rights that don't exist as per copyright law and to restrict fair dealing (also referred to as far use) guarantees. Fair dealing protections include access by the disabled, use in research or academic context, archiving or making a personal backup, reverse engineering for academic reasons to to create interoperable/competing products/services etc.</p>
<p>The 2012 amendment to the Indian Copyright Act 1957 has resulted in legal recognition for effective technological measures [also called Technological Protection Measures or TPMs] and rights management information [RMI] applied for protecting the rights of the copyright-holder. Circumvention of such a measure could result in a 2 year jail term and a fine.<br /><br />The DRM provisions per the amendment does three things correctly. One, it does not allow copyright-holder to use technological measure as a means to enclose public domain content or secure rights that are not granted to them under the Act. Two, any circumvention to exercise limitations and exceptions under the fair dealing provisions of the Act is not considered to be an offence. Three, it does not criminalise the creation of circumvention technologies. Unfortunately, however the Amendment also gets two things wrong. One, there are onerous recording keeping mandates for those providing circumvention technologies to consumers and members of the general public. Two, the provision does not make the rights-holder responsible for providing the means to consumers and members of the general public who wish to exercise their right to circumvention.<br /><br />Suppose a movie studio released DVD version of its films with DRM that only worked with Microsoft Windows operating system. Those who bought the DVD but ran GNU/Linux or any other operating system would then have a right to circumvent the DRM and republish the content in an video encoding format. This would not be considered an offence because the customer is not attempting any copyright infringement.<br /><br />Suppose a publishing house only released audio versions of its books with DRM that prevented accessibility to the content by the disabled. Another newly-introduced exception specifically for the disabled would apply if the rights-holder has ignored the disabled as a market but not making available accessible versions of their content. In other words, the disabled have a right to make accessible versions for themselves and therefore circumvent the DRM if necessary.</p>
<p>Suppose the very same movie studio also ensured that the DRM on its DVDs prevented customers from extracting video clips. If a teacher borrowed the film from a friend and then used circumvention technology to copy and paste video clips into her classroom presentation. This would not be considered an offence as she was only taking advantage of an exception meant for educational institutions.<br /><br />Suppose a security researcher suspected the DRM technology in network enabled gaming console contained spy-ware. He would have the right to circumvent the DRM and reverse engineer the source code of the console in order to audit the code for the existence of back-doors. This exception will also be used by law enforcement agencies and military/intelligence organisations to purge our supply-chain of electronic infrastructure of spy-ware.</p>
<p>Finally assume a young entrepreneur from Bengaluru wanted to make a competing and yet interoperable product based on an existing product with global market penetration. Assume that the developers of the existing product used DRM to keep their source code and file format inaccessible to competitors. Again under the latest amendment our friend would have the right to circumvent the DRM as long as the code he write is not copied from the existing product.<br /><br /></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/digital-restrictions-management'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/digital-restrictions-management</a>
</p>
No publishersunilCopyrightAccess to Knowledge2012-06-18T11:19:35ZBlog EntryAnalysis of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/copyright-bill-analysis
<b>CIS analyses the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, from a public interest perspective to sift the good from the bad, and importantly to point out what crucial amendments should be considered but have not been so far.</b>
<p>
The full submission that CIS and 21 other civil society organizations made to the Rajya Sabha Standing Committee on HRD (which is studying the Bill) is <a title="Copyright Bill Analysis" class="internal-link" href="http://www.cis-india.org/advocacy/ipr/upload/copyright-bill-submission">available here</a>. Given below is the summary of our submissions:</p>
<h2 class="western">Existing Copyright Act</h2>
<p align="JUSTIFY">The Indian Copyright
Act, 1957 has been designed from the perspective of a developing
country. It has always attempted a balance between various kinds of
interests. It has always sought to ensure that rights of authors of
creative works is carefully promoted alongside the public interest
served by wide availability and usability of that material. For
instance, our Copyright Act has provisions for: </p>
<ul><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY">compulsory and
statutory licensing: recognizing its importance in making works
available, especially making them available at an affordable rate.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY">cover versions:
recognizing that more players lead to a more vibrant music industry.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY">widely-worded
right of fair dealing for private use: recognizing that individual
use and large-scale commercial misuse are different.</p>
</li></ul>
<p align="JUSTIFY">These provisions of
our Act <a class="external-link" href="http://a2knetwork.org/watchlist/report/india">have been lauded</a>,<sup><a class="sdfootnoteanc" name="sdfootnote1anc" href="#sdfootnote1sym"></a></sup>
and India has been rated as <a class="external-link" href="http://a2knetwork.org/summary-report-2010">the most balanced copyright system in a
global survey</a><sup><a class="sdfootnoteanc" name="sdfootnote2anc" href="#sdfootnote2sym"></a></sup>
conducted of over 34 countries by <a class="external-link" href="http://www.consumersinternational.org/">Consumers International</a><sup><a class="sdfootnoteanc" name="sdfootnote3anc" href="#sdfootnote3sym"></a></sup>.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY">The Indian Parliament
has always sought to be responsive to changing technologies by paying
heed to both the democratisation of access as well as the securing of
the interests of copyright holders. This approach needs to be lauded,
and importantly, needs to be maintained.</p>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><br /></p>
<h2 class="western">Proposed Amendments</h2>
<h3 class="western">Some positive amendments</h3>
<ul><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Fair
Dealings, Parallel Importation, Non-commercial Rental</strong>: All works
(including sound recordings and cinematograph films) are now covered
the fair dealings clause (except computer programmes), and a few
other exceptions; parallel importation is now clearly allowed; and
non-commercial rental has become a limitation in some cases.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Persons with
disabilities</strong>: There is finally an attempt at addressing the
concerns of persons with disabilities. But the provisions are
completely useless the way they are currently worded.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Public
Libraries</strong>: They can now make electronic copies of works they
own, and some other beneficial changes relating to public libraries.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Education</strong>:
Some exceptions related to education have been broadened (scope of
works, & scope of use).</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Statutory and
compulsory licensing</strong>: Some new statutory licensing provisions
(including for radio broadcasting) and some streamlining of existing
compulsory licensing provisions.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Copyright
societies</strong>: These are now responsible to authors and not owners
of works.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Open
licences</strong>: Free and Open Source Software and Open Content
licensing is now simpler.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Partial
exemption of online intermediaries</strong>:
Transient and incidental storage of copyrighted works has
been excepted, mostly for the benefit of online intermediaries.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Performer’s
rights</strong>: The general, and confusing, exclusive right that
performers had to communicate their performance to the public has
been removed, and instead only the exclusive right to communicate
sound/video recordings remains.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Enforcement</strong>:
Provisions on border measures have been made better, and less prone
to abuse and prevention of legitimate trade.</p>
</li></ul>
<h3 class="western"><br /></h3>
<h3 class="western">Some negative amendments</h3>
<ul><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>WCT and WPPT
compliance</strong>: India has not signed either of these two treaties,
which impose TRIPS-plus copyright protection, but without any
corresponding increase in fair dealing / fair use rights.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Increase in
duration of copyright</strong>: This will significantly reduce the public
domain, which India has been arguing for internationally.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Technological
Protection Measures</strong>: TPMs, which have been shown to be
anti-consumer in all countries in which they have been introduced,
are sought to be brought into Indian law.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Version
recordings</strong>: The amendments make cover version much more
difficult to produce.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Moral rights</strong>:
Changes have been made to author’s moral rights (and performer’s
moral rights have been introduced) but these have been made without
requisite safeguards.</p>
</li></ul>
<h3 class="western"><br /></h3>
<h3 class="western">Missed opportunities</h3>
<ul><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Government-funded
works</strong>: Taxpayers are still not free to use works that were paid
for by them. This goes against the direction that India has elected
to march towards with the Right to Information Act.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Copyright
terms</strong>: The duration of all copyrights are above the minimum
required by our international obligations, thus decreasing the
public domain which is crucial for all scientific and cultural
progress.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Criminal
provisions</strong>: Our law still criminalises individual,
non-commercial copyright infringement.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Libraries and
archives</strong>: The exceptions for ‘public libraries’ are still
too narrow in what they perceive as ‘public libraries’.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Educational
exceptions</strong>: The exceptions for education still do not fully
embrace distance and digital education.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Communication
to the public</strong>: No clear definition is given of what constitute a
‘public’, and no distinction is drawn between commercial and
non-commercial ‘public’ communication.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Internet
intermediaries</strong>: More protections are required to be granted to
Internet intermediaries to ensure that non-market based
peer-production projects such as Wikipedia, and other forms of
social media and grassroots innovation are not stifled.</p>
</li><li>
<p align="JUSTIFY"><strong>Fair dealing
and fair use</strong>: We would benefit greatly if, apart from the
specific exceptions provided for in the Act, more general guidelines
were also provided as to what do not constitute infringement. This
would not take away from the existing exceptions.</p>
</li></ul>
<p align="JUSTIFY"> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/copyright-bill-analysis'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/copyright-bill-analysis</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshAccess to KnowledgeConsumer RightsCopyrightFair DealingsPublic AccountabilityIntellectual Property RightsRTIFeaturedBroadcastingPublicationsSubmissionsTechnological Protection Measures2011-09-21T06:01:54ZBlog Entry