Centre for Internet and Society

The Surveillance Industry in India: At Least 76 Companies Aiding Our Watchers!

maria — 2013-07-12T11:59:10Z

Maria Xynou is conducting research on surveillance technology companies operating in India. So far, 76 companies have been detected which are currently producing and selling different types of surveillance technology. This post entails primary data on the first ever investigation of the surveillance industry in India. Check it out!

This blog post has been cross-posted in Medianama on May 8, 2013. This research was undertaken as part of the 'SAFEGUARDS' project that CIS is undertaking with Privacy International and IDRC.

So yes, we live in an Internet Surveillance State. And yes, we are constantly under the microscope. But how are law enforcement agencies even equipped with such advanced technology to surveille us in the first place?

Surveillance exists because certain companies produce and sell products and solutions which enable mass surveillance. Law enforcement agencies would not be capable of mining our data, of intercepting our communications and of tracking our every move if they did not have the technology to do so. Thus an investigation of the surveillance industry should be an integral part of research for any privacy advocate, which is why I started looking at surveillance technology companies. India is a very interesting case not only because it lacks privacy legislation which could safeguard us from the use of intrusive technologies, but also because no thorough investigation of the surveillance industry in the country has been carried out to date.

The investigation of the Indian surveillance industry has only just begun and so far, 76 surveillance technology companies have been detected. No privacy legislation...and a large surveillance industry. What does this mean?

A glimpse of the surveillance industry in India

In light of the UID scheme, the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network System (CCTNS) and the Central Monitoring System (CMS), who supplies law enforcement agencies the technology to surveille us?

In an attempt to answer this question and to uncover the surveillance industry in India, I randomly selected a sample of 100 companies which appeared to produce and sell surveillance technology. This sample consisted of companies producing technology ranging from internet and phone monitoring software to biometrics, CCTV cameras, GPS tracking and access control systems. The reason why these companies were randomly selected was to reduce the probability of research bias and out of the 100 companies initially selected, 76 of them turned out to sell surveillance technology. These companies vary in the types of surveillance technology they produce and it should be noted that most of them are not restricted to surveillance technologies, but also produce other non-surveillance technologies. Paradoxically enough, some of these companies simultaneously produce internet monitoring software and encryption tools! Thus it would probably not be fair to label companies as ´surveillance technology companies´ per se, but rather to acknowledge the fact that, among their various products, they also sell surveillance technologies to law enforcement agencies.

Companies selling surveillance technology in India are listed in Table 1. Some of these companies are Indian, whilst others have international headquarters and offices in India. Not surprisingly, the majority of these companies are based in India's IT hub, Bangalore.

Table 2 shows the types of surveillance technology produced and sold by these 76 companies.

The graph below is based on Table 2 and shows which types of surveillance are produced the most by the 76 companies.

Graph on types of surveillance sold to law enforcement agencies by 76 companies in India

Out of the 76 companies, the majority (32) sell surveillance cameras, whilst 31 companies sell biometric technology; this is not a surprise, given the UID scheme which is rapidly expanding across India. Only one company from the sample produces social network analysis software, but this is not to say that this type of technology is low in the Indian market, as this sample was randomly selected and many companies producing this type of software may have been excluded. Moreover, many companies (13) from the sample produce data mining and profiling technology, which could be used in social networking sites and which could have similar - if not the same - capabilities as social network analysis software. Such technology may potentially be aiding the Central Monitoring System (CMS), especially since the project would have to monitor and mine Big Data.

On countless occasions I have been told that surveillance is an issue which concerns the elite and which does not affect the poorer classes, especially since the majority of the population in India does not even have Internet access. However, the data in the graph above falsifies this mainstream belief, as many companies operating in India produce and sell phone and SMS monitoring technology, while more than half the population owns mobile phones. Seeing as companies, such as ClearTrail Technologies and Shoghi Communications, sell phone monitoring equipment to law enforcement agencies and more than half the population in India has mobile phones, it is probably safe to say that surveillance is an issue which affects everyone, not just the elite.

Did you Know:

CARLOS62 on flickr

WSS Security Solutions Pvt. Ltd. is north India´s first CCTV zone
Speck Systems Limited was the first Indian company to design, manufacture and fly a micro UAV indigenously
Mobile Spy India (Retina-X Studios) has the following mobile spying features:

SniperSpy: remotely monitors smartphones and computers from any location

Mobile Spy: monitors up to three phones and uploads SMS data to a server using GPRS without leaving traces

4. Infoserve India Private Limited produces an Internet monitoring System with the following features:

Intelligence gathering for an entire state or a region
Builds a chain of suspects from a single start point
Data loss of less than 2%
2nd Generation Interception System
Advanced link analysis and pattern matching algorithms
Completely Automated System
Data Processing of up to 10 G/s
Automated alerts on the capture of suspicious data (usually based on keywords)

5. ClearTrail Technologies deploys spyware into a target´s machine
6. Spy Impex sells Coca Cola Tin Cameras!
7. Nice Deal also sells Coca Cola Spy Cameras, as well as Spy Pen Cameras, Wrist Watch Cameras and Lighter Video Cameras to name a few...
8. Raviraj Technologies is an Indian company which supplies RFID and biometric technology to multiple countries all around the world... Countries served by Raviraj Technologies include non-democracies, such as Zimbabwe and Saudi Arabia...as well as post-revolutionary countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia... Why is this concerning?

Non-democracies lack adequate privacy and human rights safeguards and by supplying such regimes with biometric and tracking technology, the probability is that this will lead to further oppression within these countries

Egypt and Tunisia had elections to transit to democracy and by providing them biometric technology, this could lead to further oppression and stifle efforts to increase human rights safeguards

“I´m not a terrorist, I have nothing to hide!”

r1chardm on flickr

It´s not a secret: Everyone knows we are being surveilled, more or less. Everyone is aware of the CCTV cameras (luckily there are public notices to warn us...for now). Most people are aware that the data they upload on Facebook is probably surveilled...one way or the other. Most people are aware that mobile phones can potentially be wiretapped or intercepted. Yet, that does not prevent us from using our smartphones and from disclosing our most intimate secrets to our friends, from uploading hundreds of photos on Facebook and on other social networking sites, or from generally disclosing our personal data on the Internet. The most mainstream argument in regards to surveillance and the disclosure of personal data today appears to be the following:

“I´m not a terrorist, I have nothing to hide!”

Indeed. You may not be a terrorist...and you may think you have nothing to hide. But in a surveillance state, to what extent does it really matter if you are a terrorist? And how do we even define ´risky´ and ´non-risky´ information?

Last year at the linux.conf.au, Jacob Appelbaum stated that in a surveillance state, everyone can potentially be a suspect. The argument “I´m not a terrorist, I have nothing to hide” is merely a psychological coping mechanism when dealing with surveillance and expresses a lack of agency. Bruce Schneier has argued that the psychology of security does not necessarily reflect the reality of security. In other words, we may feel or think that our data is secure because we consider it to ential ´non-risky´ information, but the reality of security may indicate that our data may entail ´risky information´ depending on who is looking at it, when, how and why. I disagree with the distinction between ´risky´ and ´non-risky´ information, as any data can potentially be ´risky´ depending on the circumstances of its access.

That being said, we do not necessarily need to disclose nude photos or be involved in some criminal organization in order to be tracked. In a surveillance society, we are all potentially suspects. The mining and profiling of our data may lead to us somehow being linked to someone who, for whatever reason, is a suspect (regardless of whether that person has committed an actual offence) and thus may ultimately end us up being suspects. Perhaps one of our interests (as displayed in our data), our publicly expressed ideas or even our browsing habits may fall under ´suspicious activity´. It´s not really an issue of whether we are involved in a criminal organisation per se or if we are disclosing so-called ´risky information´. As long as our data is being surveilled, we are all suspects, which means that we can all potentially be arrested, interrogated and maybe even tortured, just like any other criminal suspect.

But what fuels a surveillance society? How can law enforcement agencies mine such huge volumes of data? Many companies, such as the 76 listed in this research, equip law enforcement agencies with the technology to monitor the Internet and our phones, to deploy malware to our computers, to mine and profile our data on social networking sites and to track our vehicles and movement. A main reason why we currently live in a Surveillance State is because the surveillance industry is blooming and currently equipping law enforcement agencies with the technology to watch our every move. Thus companies producing and selling surveillance technologies play an essential role in maintaining the surveillance state and should be accountable for the implications their products have on individuals´ right to privacy and other human rights.

Surveillance technologies, however, are not the only factor which fuels a surveillance state. Companies produce technologies based on the market´s demand and without it, the surveillance industry would not exist. The market appears to demand for surveillance technologies because a pre-existing surveillance culture has been established which in turn may or may not have been created by political interests of public control. Nonetheless, surveillance appears to be socially integrated. The fact that some of the most profitable businesses in the world, such as 3M, produce and sell surveillance technologies, as well as the fact that, in most countries in the world, it is considered socially prestigious to work in such a company is minimum proof that surveillance is being socially integrated. In other words, companies should be accountable in regards to the technologies they produce and who they sell them to, but we should also take into consideration that the only reason why these companies exist to begin with is because there is a demand for them.

By not opposing to repressive surveillance laws, to the CCTV cameras in every corner, to surveillance schemes -such as NATGRID and the CMS in India- or by handing over our data, we are fuelling the surveillance state. Unlike Orwell's totalitarian state described in 1984, surveillance today does not appear to be imposed in a top-down manner, but rather it appears to be a product of both the Information Revolution and of our illusionary sense of control over our personal data. Our ´apathy´ enables surveillance laws to be enacted and companies to produce the technology which will aid law enforcement agencies in putting us all under the microscope. As easy as it would be to blame companies for producing surveillance technologies, the reality of surveillance appears to be much more complicated than that, especially if surveillance is socially integrated.

Yet, the reality in India is that at least 76 companies are producing and selling surveillance technologies and equipping law enforcement agencies with them. This is extremely concerning because India lacks privacy legislation which could safeguard individuals from potential abuse. The fact that India has not enacted a privacy law ultimately means that individuals are not informed when their data is collected, who has access to it, whether it is being processed, shared, disclosed and/or retained. Furthermore, the absence of privacy legislation in India also means that law enforcement agencies are not held liable and this has an impact on accountability and transparency, as it is not possible to determine whether surveillance is effective or not. In other words, there are currently absolutely no safeguards for the individual in India and simultaneously, the rapidly expanding surveillance industry poses major threats to human rights.

Not only does India urgently need privacy legislation to be enacted to safeguard citizens from potential abuse, but the use of all surveillance technologies should be strictly regulated now. As previously mentioned, some companies, such as Raviraj Technologies, are exporting biometric technology to non-democratic countries and to fragile states transitioning to democracy. This should be prevented, as equipping a country - which lacks adequate safeguards for its citizens - with the technology to ultimately control its citizens can potentially have severe effects on human rights within the country. Thus export controls are necessary to prevent the expansion of surveillance technologies to countries which lack legal safeguards for their citizens. This also means that there should be some restrictions to international companies selling surveillance technologies from creating offices in India, since the country currently lacks privacy legislation.

Surveillance technologies can potentially have very severe effects, such as innocent people being arrested, interrogated, tortured...and maybe even murdered in some states. Should they be treated as weapons? Should the same export restrictions that apply to arms apply to surveillance technologies? Sure, the threat posed by surveillance technologies appears to be indirect. But don't indirect threats usually have worse outcomes in the long run? We may not be terrorists and we may have nothing to hide...but we have no privacy safeguards and a massively expanding surveillance industry in India. We are exposed to danger...to say the least.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-surveillance-industry-in-india-at-least-76-companies-aiding-our-watchers

The Surveillance Industry in India – An Analysis of Indian Security Expos

divij — 2015-03-08T12:25:15Z

The author talks about the surveillance industry in India and analyses Indian security expos.

Introduction

The 'Spy Files', a series of documents released by whistleblower website WikiLeaks over the last few years, exposed the tremendous growth of the private surveillance industry across the world - a multi-billion dollar industry thriving on increasing governmental and private capabilities for mass surveillance of individuals.[1] These documents showed how mass surveillance is increasingly made possible through new technologies developed by private players, often exploiting the framework of nascent but burgeoning information and communication technologies like the internet and communication satellites. Moreover, the unregulated and undiscerning nature of the industry means that it has enabled governments (and also private agencies) across the world - from repressive dictatorships to governments in western democracies with a growing track record of privacy and civil liberties infringements - to indulge in secretive, undemocratic and often illegal surveillance of their citizens. The Spy Files and related research have revealed how the mass surveillance industry utilizes the rhetoric of national security and counter-terrorism to couch technologies of surveillance.

'Security' and the Normalization Of Surveillance

New technologies undoubtedly create a potential for both malicious as well as beneficial use for society. Surveillance technologies are a prime example, having both enabled improvements in law enforcement and security, but at the same time creating unresolved implications for privacy and civil liberties. These technologies expose what Lawrence Lessig describes as 'latent ambiguities' in the law - ambiguities that require us to assess the implications and effects of new technologies and how to govern them, and most importantly, to choose between conflicting values regarding the use of technologies, for example, increased security as against decreased privacy.[2]

Unfortunately, In India, the ambiguity seems to have been resolved squarely in favour of surveillance - under the existing regulatory regime, surveillance is either expressly mandated or unregulated, and requires surveillance to be built into the architecture and design of public spaces like internet and telephone networks, or even public roads and parks. Most of these regulations or mechanisms are framed without democratic debate, through executive mechanisms and private contracts with technology providers, without and public accountability or transparency.

For example, under the telecom licensing regime in India, the ISP and UASL licenses specifically require lawful interception mechanisms through hardware or software to be installed by the licensees, for information (Call Data Records, Packet Mirroring, Call Location) to be provided to 'law enforcement agencies', as specified by the Government.[3] Section 69 of the Information Technology Act, the main legislation governing the Internet in India, read with the rules framed under the Act, makes it incumbent upon 'intermediaries' to provide surveillance facilities at the behest of government agencies.[4]

Beyond this, the State and its agencies Section 69 and 69B of the IT Act empower the government to intercept and monitor any data on the Internet. The Telegraph Act also permits wiretapping of telephony.[5] The proposed Central Monitoring System by the Central Government would give state agencies centralized access to all telecommunications in real time, on telephony or on the Internet. Other surveillance schemes include the Keyword Tracking system NETRA, as well as several state government proposed comprehensive CCTV-surveillance schemes for cities. [6] Clearly, therefore, there is a massive market for surveillance technologies in India.

Tracking the Surveillance Market

The Mass surveillance industry by its very nature is closed, secretive and without democratic oversight, Insights into the prevalence, nature and scope of the companies that form this industry, or the technologies that are utilized are far and few. No democratic debate about surveillance can take place in such a paradigm. In this context, security expos and exhibitions provide critical insight into this industry. Several of the important revelations about the industry in the past have been from examinations of large exhibitions in which the various governmental and industry actors participate, and therefore, such analysis is critical to the debate surrounding mass surveillance. Such exhibitions are a logical starting point because they are one of the few publically accessible showcases of surveillance-ware, and are also a congregation of most major players who are part of this market both as suppliers and purchasers.

Our research identified at least 13 exhibitions in India that specifically cater to the surveillance industry. A brief outline of each of these exhibitions is provided below:

1. Secutech India (Brochures: 2015 -http://www.secutechindia.co.in/pdf/secutech%20brochure.pdf)

The Secutech Expo is an exhibition held in Bombay and Delhi since 2011, to showcase Information Security, Electronic Security and Homeland Security technologies. Secutech also organizes the Global Digital Surveillance Forum, a conference amongst the stakeholders of digital surveillance industry in India.[7]

Exhibitors: Ivis; Matrix Comsec; Neoteric; Smartlink; Kanoe; Micro Technologies; Aditya Infrotech; CoreTech Solutions; Merit Lilin; Schneider Electric; Pash systems; Nettrack Technologies Pvt Ltd.; QNAP; Axxonsoft; Hk Vision (China); Alhua; Axis; Vivotech (Taiwan); Endroid (USA); Vantge (UK); Pelco (France); Advik; Hi Focus (UK); ESMS; Keeper (China); Neoteric; Vizor, etc

Visitors: The visitor profile and target audience consists of government and defense agencies, besides private agencies.

Technologies on display: Digital surveillance, biometrics, CCTV and RFID are some categories of the technologies which are showcased here.

2. IFSEC India (Brochures: 2013 - http://www.ifsecindia.com/uploads/IFSEC%20INDIA%20brochure%202013.pdf; 2014 - http://www.ubmindia.in/ifsec_india/uploads/IFSEC_INDIA_Brochure_CS5_new_low.pdf.)

IFSEC India, an extension of IFSEC UK, the 'worlds largest security exhibition', proclaims to be South Asia's largest security exhibition with 15,000 participants in its latest edition, including a special segment on surveillance. It has been held in either Bombay or Delhi since 2007.

Exhibitors: Honeywell; Infinova; Radar Vision; QNAP; Ensign; Winposee; Bosch; Comguard; Verint; ACSG; Ensign etc.

Visitors: Visitors include government agencies such as the Central Industrial Security Force, Border Security Force, Department of Internal Security, Railway Protection Force and the Department of Border Management.

Technologies on display: RFID, Video Surveillance, Surveillance Drones, IP Surveillance, Digital Surveillance and Monitoring were some of the categories of technologies on display.

3. India International Security Expo (Brochures: 2014 - http://www.indiasecurityexpo.com/images/e_brochure.pdf)

Held in New Delhi since 1996, and organized by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the expo is described as "India's largest show case of goods and services related to Homeland Security, Fire Safety, Traffic Management, Industrial Safety and Public Safety, Hospitality and Reality Security." With specific reference to the changing 'modus operandi of crime by using technology', the Expo focuses on using surveillance technologies for law enforcement purposes.

Exhibitors: Intellivision (USA); Intex (India); ESC Baz (Israel); Sparsh Securitech; Source Security (USA); Intellivision (USA); Interchain Solutions; ESSI; Kritikal; Matrix; Pace Solutions etc.

Visitors: According to the show's brochure, visitors include Central & State Police Organisations, Paramilitary Forces, Policy-makers from the Government, Industrial Establishments, Security Departments of Educational, Retail, Hospitality, Realty & other sectors, Colonisers, Builders, RWAs, System Integrators Large business houses and PSU's.

Technologies on display: Access control systems, surveillance devices, RFID, traffic surveillance and GPS Tracking.

4. Secure Cities Expo (Brochures: 2013 - http://securecitiesindia.com/Secure_Cities_2013_Brochure.pdf; 2014 - http://securecitiesindia.com/images/2014/SC_2014_Brochure.pdf.)

Secure Cities Expo has been organized since 2008, on the platform of providing homeland security solutions and technologies to government and private sector participants.

Exhibitors: Dell; Palo Alto Networks; Motorola; Konnet; Vian Technologies; Quick Heal; Intergraph, GMR, Tac Technologies, Steria, Teleste, Elcom, Indian Eye Security; Mirasys; CBC Group; Verint (USA); IBM (USA); Digitals; EyeWatch; Kanoe; NEC (Japan); ACSG Corporate; ESRI (USA), etc.

Visitors: Visitors include government and law enforcement agencies including the Ministry of Home Affairs as well as systems integrators and private firms including telecom firms.

Technologies on display: CCTV, Biometrics, Covert Tracking and Surveillance Software, Communication Interception, Location and Tracking systems, and IT Security.

5. Defexpo India (Brochures: No publically available brochures)

By far India's largest security exposition, the Ministry of Defense has organized Defexpo India since 1999, showcasing defense, border, and homeland security systems from technology providers internationally.

Exhibitors: Aurora Integrated; Airbus Defence (France); Boeing (USA); Hacking Team (Italy); Kommlabs (Germany); Smoothwall; Atlas Electronik; Cyint; Audiotel International; Cobham; Tas-Agt; Verint; Elsira (Elbit) (Israel); IdeaForge; Comint; Controp; Northrop Gruman; Raytheon; C-DoT; HGH Infrared (Israel); Okham Solutions (France); Septier (Israel); Speech Technology Centre (Russia); Aerovironment (USA); Textron; Sagem (France); Amesys (France); Exelis; ITP Novex (Israel), etc.

Visitors: The latest edition of the Expo saw participation from governmental delegations from 58 countries, besides Indian governmental and law enforcement authorities.

Technologies on display: The entire spectrum of surveillance and homeland security devices is on display at Defexpo, from Infrared Video to Mass Data Interception.

6. Convergence India Expo (Brochures: 2012 - http://convergenceindia.org/download/CI2012-PSR.pdf; 2014 -http://www.convergenceindia.org/pdf/CI-2014-Brochure.pdf; 2015 - http://www.convergenceindia.org/pdf/brochure-2015.pdf.)

Convergence India, being held in New Delhi since 1991, is a platform for interaction between Information and Communication Technology providers and purchasers in the market. In recent years, the expo has catered to the niche market for IT surveillance.

Exhibitors: ELT (UK); Comguard; Fastech; Synway (China); Saltriver; Anritsu (Japan); Cdot; Fastech; Rahul Commerce; Deviser Electronics; RVG Diginet; Blue Coat (USA); Cyberoam (USA); ZTE (China); Net Optics (USA); Controp; Comint etc.

Visitors: Visitors include Paramilitary Forces, Cable Operators, Government Ministries and PSU's and Telecom and Internet Service Providers.

Technologies on Display: Biometrics, Content Filtering, Data Mining, Digital Forensics, IP-Surveillance, Embedded Softwares, Network Surveillance and Satellite Monitoring were some of the technologies on display.

7. International Police Expo (Brochures: 2014 - http://www.nexgengroup.in/exhibition/internationalpoliceexpo/download/International_Police_Expo_2014.pdf.)

The International Police Expo held in New Delhi focuses on providing technologies to police forces across India, with specific focus on IT security and communications security.

Exhibitors: 3G Wireless Communications Pvt Ltd; Motorola Solutions; Cyint; Matrix Comsec; Cellebrite; Hayagriva; MKU; CP Plus etc.

Visitors: Visitors include State Police, Procurement Department, CISF, CRPF, RAF, BSF, Customs, GRPF, NDRF, Special Frontier Force, Para Commandos, Special Action Group, COBRA and PSU's and educational institutes, stadiums and municipal corporations, among others.

Technologies on display: Technologies include RFID and surveillance for Internal Security and Policing, CCTV and Monitoring, Vehicle Identification Systems, GPS, Surveillance for communications and IT, Biometrics and Network surveillance.

8. Electronics For You Expo (EFY Expo) ( 2014 - http://2013.efyexpo.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/efy_PDFisation.pdf; 2015 - http://india.efyexpo.com//wp-content/uploads/2014/03/5th%20EFY%20Expo%20India_Brochure.pdf.)

EFY Expo is a electronics expo which showcases technologies across the spectrum of electronics industry. It has been held since 2010, in New Delhi, and is partnered by the Ministry of Communications and IT and the Ministry of Electronics and IT.

Exhibitors: Vantage Security; A2z Securetronix; Avancar Security; Digitals security; Securizen Systems; Vision Security; Mangal Security Systems, etc.

Visitors: The visitors include Government Agencies and ministries as well as systems integrators and telecom and IT providers.

Technologies on display: Identification and Tracking Products and Digital Security Systems are a specific category of the technologies on display.

9. Indesec Expo (Brochures: 2009 - http://www.ontaero.org/Storage/14/897_INDESEC_Oct11-13_2009.pdf. )

An exhibition focused on homeland security, and sponsored by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the expo has been held since 2008 in New Delhi, which includes a specific category for cyber security and counter terrorism.

Exhibitors: Rohde and Schwarz; Salvation Data; AxxonSoft; KritiKal; Shyam Networks; Teledyne Dalsa; Honeywell; General Dynamics; Northrop Grumman; Interchain Solutions, etc.

Visitors: Visitors include officials of the central government, central police and paramilitary forces, Ministry of Defence, central government departments, institutes and colleges, state government and police and ports and shipping companies.

10. Next Generation Cyber Threats Expo

Held since 2012 in New Delhi and Mumbai, the Next Generation Cyber Threats Expo focuses on securing cyber infrastructure and networks in India.

Exhibitors: Ixia, CheckPoint, etc.

Visitors: Visitors include Strategic Planning Specialists, Policy Makers and Law Enforcement among others.

11. SmartCards/RFID/e-Security/Biometrics expo (Brochures: 2013 - http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/brochures-from-expos-in-india-2013 ; 2015 - http://www.smartcardsexpo.com/pdf/SmartCards_Expo_2015_Brochure_$.pdf)

These expos are organized by Electronics Today in Delhi or Mumbai since 1999 and supported by the Ministries of Commerce, Home Affairs and External Affairs. They showcase various identification solutions, attended by hundreds of domestic and international exhibitors.

Visitors: Target audiences include central and local level law enforcement and government organizations, Colleges and Universities, and defense forces.

12. Com-IT Expo (Brochure: 2014 - http://www.comitexpo.in/doc/Brochure.pdf)

This expo has been organized by the Trade Association of Information and Technology in Mumbai since 2008, and focuses on software and hardware Information Technology, with specific focus on IT security and surveillance.

Visitors: Visitors include Government Agencies, Airport Authorities, Police and Law Enforcement, Urban Planners, etc.

Technologies Displayed: CCTV's, Surveillance Devices and IP Cameras, etc.

13. GeoIntelligence India (Brochures: 2013 - http://www.geointelligenceindia.org/2013/Geointelligence%20India%20Brochure.pdf; 2014 - http://geointworld.net/Documents/GeoInt_Brochure_2014.pdf.)

It is an exposition held in New Delhi since 2014, organized by Geospatial Media and Communications Pvt Ltd, and is 'dedicated to showcasing the highest levels of information exchange and networking within the Asian defense and security sector.'

Exhibitors: ESRI (USA); BAE Systems (UK); Leica (Switzerland); Helyx (UK); Digital Globe; Intergraph; Trimble (USA); RSI Softech; Silent Falcon etc.

Visitors: Visitors included the Director General of Information Systems, CRPF, Manipur, Delhi, Haryana and Nagaland Police, CBI, ITBP, NSDI, SSB, National Investigation Agency, Signals Intelligence Directorate among others.

Surveillance Wares in India - The Surveillance Exhibits and what they tell us about the Indian Surveillance Industry

An analysis of the above companies and their wares give us some insight into what is being bought and sold in the surveillance industry, and by whom. Broadly, the surveillance technologies can be grouped in the following categories:

Video Surveillance and Analysis

IP Video Surveillance and CCTV are quickly becoming the norm in public spaces. Emerging video surveillance tools allow for greater networking of cameras, greater fields of vision, cheaper access and come with a host of tools such as facial recognition and tracking as well as vehicle tracking. For example, IBM has developed an IP Video Analytics system which couples monitoring with facial recognition.[8] USA's Intellivision also offers analytics systems which enable licence plate tracking, facial recognition and object recognition.[9] HGH Infrared's Spynel system allows infrared wide-area surveillance,[10] and CBC's GANZ allows long-range, hi-resolution surveillance. [11]

Video surveillance is gradually infiltrating public spaces in most major cities, with Governments promoting large-scale video surveillance schemes for security, with no legal sanctions or safeguards for protecting privacy.

Companies showcasing Video Surveillance: 3G Wireless Communications Pvt Ltd, Motorola Solutions (USA), Bosch, CP Plus, Ivis, Aditya Infotech, Micro technologies, Core Tech (Denmark), Merit Lilin , Schneider Electric, Shyam Systems, Dalsa, Honeywell, Teleste, Mirasys, CBC Group, Infinova, Radar Vision, QNAP, Ensign, Winposee, Bosch, Hik Vision (China), Alhua, Axis Communications, Vivotech (Taiwan), Endroid (USA), Vantge (UK), Pelco (France), Advik, Hi Focus (UK), ESMS, Keeper (China), Neoteric, Vizor, Verint (USA), IBM (USA), Digitals Security, Intellivision (USA), Intex, Esc Baz (Israel), Sparsh Securitech, A2zsecuretronix, Avancar Security, Securizen Systems, Vision Security, HGH Infrared (Israel).

RFID/Smart Cards/Biometric Identification

India has begun the implementation of the Unique Identification Programme for its 1.2 billion strong population, combining a host of identification technologies to provide a unique identification number and Aadhar Card - promoted as an all-purpose ID. However, this remains without legislative sanction, and continues in the face of severe privacy concerns. Such centralized, accessible databases of ostensibly private information present a grave threat to privacy. RFID, Smart Cards and Biometric Identification technologies (like the Aadhar) all make individual monitoring and surveillance significantly easier by enabling tracking of individual movements, consumer habits, attendance, etc.

Companies showcasing Identification Technologies:

AxxonSoft, Matrix Comsec, Ensign, Hi focus, Intellivision (USA), Interchain solutions, Inttelix, Kanoe, NEC (Japan), Pace, Realtime, Secugen, Source Security (USA), Spectra, Speech technology centre (Russia), BioEnable Technologies.

(For a more detailed list, see the Smart Cards Expo Brochures, linked above)

Mass Data Gathering, Monitoring and Analysis

The age of Big Data has led to big surveillance. Information and communication technologies now host significant amounts of individual data, and the surveillance industry makes all of this data accessible to a surveyor. Government mandated surveillance means any and all forms of communication and data monitoring are being implemented in India - there are network taps on telephony and deep packet inspection on internet lines, which makes telephone calls, SMS, VoIP, Internet searches and browsing and email all vulnerable to surveillance, constantly monitored through systems like the Central Monitoring System. Moreover, centralized information stores enable data mining - extracting and extrapolating data to enable better surveillance, which is what India's NATGRID aims to do.

Hacking Team Italy, Blue Coat USA and Amesys France, three of the five companies identified as 'enemies of the internet' for enabling dictatorships to use surveillance to quell dissent and violate human rights,[12] have all presented surveillance solutions at Defexpo India. Cyberoam USA and ZTE China also market Deep Packet Inspection technology,[13] while ESRI's Big Data suite allows analysis through mass surveillance and analysis of social media and publically available sources. [14]

Indian companies showcasing mass data monitoring technologies include Cyint, Fastech DPI tools,[15] Kommlabs VerbaProbe packet switching probes,[16] and ACSG's OSINT, which allows Big Data social media surveillance and Call Data Record analysis.[17]

Companies showcasing Data Gathering and Monitoring technologies:

Cobham, Comguard, Cyint, ELT (UK), Fastech, Hacking Team (Italy), Smoothwall (USA), Verint Systems (USA), Cyint technologies, Atlas Electronik (Germany), Audiotel International (UK), Avancar, Cobham (UK), ELT (UK), Eyewatch, Kommlabs, Mangal Security Systems, Merit Lilin (Taiwan), Ockham Solutions (France), Septier (Israel), Synway (China), ACSG Corporate, Amesys (France), Anritsu (Japan), Axis (Sweden), BAE Systems (UK), Blue Coat (USA), C-dot, Comint, Cyberoam (USA), Deviser Electronics, Elsira (Elbit) (Israel), Esri (USA), Exelis, General Dynamics (USA), Helyx (UK), ITP Novex (Israel), Leica (Switzerland), Net Optics (Ixia) (USA), Northrop Gruman (USA), Rahul Commerce, Rohde And Schwarz (Germany), RVG Diginet, Tas-Agt, Trueposition (USA), Zte Technologies (China).

Cell-Phone Location Tracking and Vehicle Monitoring

A number of technologies enable location tracking through vehicle GPS, GLONASS or other location technologies. RFID or optical character recognition further enables Automatic Number Plate Recognition, which can be exploited to enable vehicle surveillance to track individual movements. Embedded hardware and software on mobile phones also allows constant transmission of location data, which is exploited by surveillance agencies to track individual movements and location.

Companies showcasing Cell-Phone Location Tracking technologies: Verint, Eyewatch, Septier (Israel), True Position (USA),

Companies showcasing Vehicle Monitoring technologies: Hi-techpoint technologies pvt ltd, Axxonsoft, Essi, Fareye, Intellivision (USA), Interchain Solutions, ITP Novex (Israel), Kaneo, Kritikal, NEC (Japan), Saltriver Infosystems, Vision Security Systems.

Air/Ground Drones and Satellite Surveillance

The use of unmanned drones for security purposes is being adopted for law enforcement and surveillance purposes across the world, and India is no exception, using UAV's for surveillance in insurgency-hit areas,[18] amongst other uses, while still having no regulations for their use.[19] Drones, both aerial and ground level, are capable of large-scale territorial surveillance, often equipped with high-technology video surveillance that allows for efficient monitoring at the ground level.

Digital Globe offers satellite reconnaissance surveillance coupled with Big Data analysis for predictive monitoring. [20] Controp offers cameras specifically for aerial surveillance, while Sagem's Patroller Drone and Sperwer, and Silent Falcon's Solar Powered surveillance drone are Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV's) for aerial video surveillance. Auruora Integrated, [21] and IdeaForge are Indian companies which have developed UAV surveillance drones in collaboration with Indian agencies.[22]

Companies showcasing Drone Surveillance: Aurora Integrated, Controp (Israel), Aerovironment (USA), Digital Globe (USA), ESRI (USA), Intergraph (USA), RSI Softech, Sagem (France), Silent Falcon (UAS), Textron (USA), Trimble (USA), Northrop Grumman (USA).

[1] Wikileaks, The Spy Files, available at https://www.wikileaks.org/the-spyfiles.html.

[2] Lawrence Lessig, Code V 2.0.

[3] For more information on the licensing regime, see 'Data Retention in India', available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/data-retention-in-india.

[4] Rule 13, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009.

[5] Section 5, Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.

[6] See, for example, the Bangalore Traffic Police CCTV Scheme, http://www.bangaloretrafficpolice.gov.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=66&btp=66 ; the surveillance scheme supported by the MPLAD Scheme, http://mplads.nic.in/circular08112012.pdf; Mumbai's proposed video surveillance scheme, http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/wipro-tata-ibm-reliance-among-31-bids-for-cctv-scheme-in-mumbai-112112600160_1.html.

[7] Information on the Forum is available at http://gdsf-india.com/Global-Digital-Surveillance-Forum1/images/GDSF-Bengaluru-Conference-program.pdf.

[8] http://www-01.ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/SS88XH_1.6.0/iva/int_i2frs_intro.dita

[9] http://www.intelli-vision.com/products/recognition-suite

[10] http://www.hgh-infrared.com/Products/Optronics-for-security

[11] http://www.ifsecglobal.com/cbc-high-end-surveillance-tech-on-display-at-ifsec-india/

[12] http://surveillance.rsf.org/en/category/corporate-enemies/

[13] http://www.cyberoam.com/firewall.html

[14] http://www.esri.com/products/arcgis-capabilities/big-data

[15] http://www.fastech-india.com/packetBrokers.html

[16] http://www.kommlabs.com/products-verbaprobe.asp

[17] http://www.acsgcorporate.com/osint-software.html

[18] http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/UAV-proves-ineffective-in-anti-Maoist-operations/articleshow/20400544.cms

[19] http://dronecenter.bard.edu/drones-in-india/

[20] https://www.digitalglobe.com/products/analytic-services

[21] http://www.aurora-is.com/

[22] http://www.ideaforge.co.in/home/

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/surveillance-industry-in-india-analysis-of-indian-security-expos

The Surveillance Industry in India

maria — 2015-03-14T03:20:42Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/surveillance-industry-india.pdf

The Surveillance and Security Industry in India - An Analysis of Indian Security Expos

divij — 2015-03-14T02:56:35Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/surveillance-and-security-industry-in-india.pdf

The Stranger with Candy

nishant — 2015-04-17T11:00:04Z

Beware of online threats, as the distinction between friends and foes is false on the internet.

Nishant Shah's column was published in the Indian Express on June 16, 2013.

My parents and I were in Oslo, when after a long day in the city, we returned to an intriguing situation. My father, who is quite a digital migrant and uses the internet for daily exchanges, found an email from an uncle waiting in his inbox. The email begins with the uncle travelling to Madrid, Spain, to help an ailing cousin who needs a surgery and requested that my father help the writer, his cousin, with €2,500. The email ended with a note of urgency, "I will check my email every 30 minutes for your reply".

My father, who was by now rather agitated, asked my brother and me what could be done. People asking for money over email is the modern day equivalent of strangers bearing candy in a car. We were both immediately wary and when we saw the mail, we knew that it was a scam. Somebody had cracked into somebody's account and was now sending out emails to everybody in their contact list, hoping to make a quick buck. The only action we took was to inform the relative that his account seemed to have been compromised and that he needed to protect it.

This incident, in the context of disallowing children below 13 years on Facebook in India, got me thinking. How do we trust somebody, or something online? There is a presumption that digital natives instinctively know how to deal with dubious situations online. True, one seldom hears of a digital native falling for scams of Nigerian princes offering their inheritance or widows of bank managers in Saudi Arabia wanting to transfer millions to their bank accounts. But that might be because digital natives live more in gift and attention economies and have always been suspicious of anybody waving a wad of notes.

However, we do know that the young are often susceptible to other predators on the Web. While it might occasionally seem that the West's paranoia around paedophiles online, preying on young children as sexual victims might have reached the limits of logical absurdity, it remains indisputable that young adults haven't yet developed the codes to trust somebody online. We encounter countless stories of the young who endanger their futures by documenting their follies and foibles in the unforgiving and unforgetting space of the internet. Let us not forget the names of Adnan Patrawala and Koushambi Layek, who fell prey to strangers pretending to be friends and lovers on the social networking site Orkut.

I am not suggesting that the World Wide Web is any more dangerous than the brick and mortar world that we live in. Our flesh- and-bone bodies are under equal danger in our everyday lives. But over time, we have learned and have been taught how to decode conditions that might harm us. We have learned to distance ourselves from strangers with grins, and people who look hostile. The authorities have created visible signposts of danger all around us — from red traffic lights to surveillance cameras — that constantly remind us that safety is not the default mode of our existence but something that we need to incessantly create for ourselves.

The digital world has no such guidelines. The mammoth corporations, which now govern a large part of the cyberspace, individually try to create structures that would save us from falling victim to such attacks. So the filter on your Gmail account is an intelligent system that scans every byte of information that goes in and out of your inbox, learning both your behaviour patterns and your interaction modes, to filter out not only the obvious hoax emails but also things that you might deem as clutter. Smart browsers like Firefox identify IP addresses that are regularly abusive and warn us about installing any software that might originate there. On Facebook, certain pictures and posts with offensive content are censored even before they get into your data stream. The friendship algorithm, further ensures that you increasingly see content from your 'close friends' rather than strangers. In all these mechanisms, which use big data mining tools to recognise harmful patterns as well as encourage you to devise your own vouchsafes, there is an implicit understanding that the people we know will do us less harm. They are designed to keep out unwanted or potentially harmful people because it might lead to danger or conflict.

However, as we saw in the case of the email to my father, the distinctions between strangers and friends on the internet, is a forced one. When all digital avatars are a performance of a kind, it becomes easy for an imposter to take on that identity. The only credentials we have of somebody's authenticity are often their user accounts and email — data which can be stolen and manipulated effortlessly. And increasingly, we have learned that when it comes to the online world, the people who infect us with viruses, rob us of our money and crash our digital worlds are people who are our 'friends'.

While we shall learn through experience and through stories, there remains a need to develop a larger social discussion around trust online. This debate cannot be whether content needs to be censored online or whether certain groups should be allowed to get on to social network systems. Instead, it has to be a debate that realises the notions of friendship and trust, of networks and connections, are not merely extensions of the physical into the digital. On the infobahn, these are new modes of operation and being and it is not going to be easy to create a handbook of online safety. What we will need is an involved and inter-generational debate about the social, political and economic safety online and create signposts that remind us of the dangers of being online.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/digital-natives/blog/indian-express-june-16-2013-nishant-shah-the-stranger-with-candy

The State of Secure Messaging

divyank — 2020-07-17T08:12:15Z

A look at the protections provided by and threats posed to secure communication online.

This blogpost was edited by Gurshabad Grover and Amber Sinha.

The current benchmark for secure communication online is end-to-end encrypted messaging. It refers to a method of encryption wherein the contents of a message are only readable by the devices of the individuals, or endpoints, participating in the communication. All other Internet intermediaries such as internet service providers, internet exchange points, undersea cable operators, data centre operators, and even the messaging service providers themselves cannot read them. This is achieved through cryptographic mechanisms that allow independent devices to establish a shared secret key over an insecure communication channel, which they then use to encrypt and decrypt messages. Common examples of end-to-end encrypted messaging are applications like Signal and WhatsApp.

This post attempts to give at-risk individuals, concerned citizens, and civil society at large a more nuanced understanding of the protections provided and threats posed to the security and privacy of their communications online.

Threat Model

The first step to assessing security and privacy is to identify and understand actors and risks. End-to-end encrypted messaging applications consider the following threat model:

Device compromise: Can happen physically through loss or theft, or remotely. Access to an individual’s device could be gained through technical flaws or coercion (legal, or otherwise). It can be temporary or be made persistent by installing malware on the device.
Network monitoring and interference: Implies access to data in transit over a network. All Internet intermediaries have such access. They may either actively interfere with the communication or passively observe traffic.
Server compromise: Implies access to the web server hosting the application. This could be achieved through technical flaws, insider access such as an employee, or through coercion (legal, or otherwise).

End-to-end encrypted messaging aims to offer complete message confidentiality and integrity in the face of server and network compromise, and some protections against device compromise. These are detailed below.

Protections Provided

Secure messaging services guarantee certain properties. For mature services that have received adequate study from researchers, we can assume them to be sound, barring implementation flaws which are described later.

Confidentiality: The contents of a message are kept private and the ciphers used are practically unbreakable by adversaries.

Integrity: The contents of a message cannot be modified in transit.

Deniability: Aims to mimic unrecorded real-world conversations where an individual can deny having said something. Someone in possession of the chat transcript cannot cryptographically prove that an individual authored a particular message. While some applications feature such off-the-record messaging capabilities, the legal applicability of such mechanisms is debatable.

Forward and Future Secrecy: These properties aim to limit the effects of a temporary compromise of credentials on a device. Forward secrecy ensures messages collected over the network, which were sent before the compromise, cannot be decrypted. Future secrecy ensures messages sent post-compromise are protected. These mechanisms are easily circumvented in practice as past messages are usually stored on the device being compromised, and future messages can be obtained by gaining persistent access during compromise. These properties are meant to protect individuals aware of these limitations in exceptional situations such as a journalist crossing a border.

Shortcomings

While secure messaging services offer useful protections they also have some shortcomings. It is useful to understand these and their mitigations to minimise risk.

Metadata: Information about a communication such as who the participants are, when the messages are sent, where the participants are located, and what the size of a message is can offer important contextual information about a conversation. While some popular messaging services attempt to minimize metadata generation, metadata leakage, in general, is still considered an open problem because such information can be gleaned by network monitoring as well as from server compromise. Application policies around whether such data is stored and for how long it is retained can improve privacy. There are also experimental approaches that use techniques like onion routing to hide metadata.

Authentication: This is the process of asserting whether an individual sending or receiving a message is who they are thought to be. Current messaging services trust application servers and cell service providers for authentication, which means that they have the ability to replace and impersonate individuals in conversations. Messaging services offer advanced features to mitigate this risk, such as notifications when a participant’s identity changes, and manual verification of participants’ security keys through other communication channels (in-person, mail, etc.).

Availability: An individual’s access to a messaging service can be impeded. Intermediaries may delay or drop messages resulting in what is called a denial of service attack. While messaging services are quite resilient to such attacks, governments may censor or completely shut down Internet access.

Application-level gaps: Capabilities offered by services in addition to messaging, such as contact discovery, online status, and location sharing are often not covered by end-to-end encryption and may be stored by the application server. Application policies around how such information is gathered and retained affect privacy.

Implementation flaws and backdoors: Software or hardware flaws (accidental or intentional) on an individual’s device could be exploited to circumvent the protections provided by end-to-end encryption. For mature applications and platforms, accidental flaws are difficult and expensive to exploit, and as such are only accessible to Government or other powerful actors who typically use them to surveil individuals of interest (and not for mass surveillance). Intentional flaws or backdoors introduced by manufacturers may also be present. The only defence against these is security researchers who rely on manual inspection to examine software and network interactions to detect them.

Messaging Protocols and Standards

In the face of demands for exceptional access to encrypted communication from governments, and risks of mass surveillance from both governments and corporations, end-to-end encryption is important to enable secure and private communication online. The signal protocol, which is open and adopted by popular applications like WhatsApp and Signal, is considered a success story as it brought end-to-end encryption to over a billion users and has become a de-facto standard.

However, it is unilaterally developed and controlled by a single organisation. Messaging Layer Security (or MLS) is a working group within the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) that is attempting to standardise end-to-end encryption through participation of individuals from corporations, academia, and civil society. The draft protocol offers the standard security properties mentioned above, except for deniability which is still being considered. It incorporates novel research that allows it to scale efficiently for large groups up to thousands of participants, which is an improvement over the signal protocol. MLS aims to increase adoption further by creating open standards and implementations, similar to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol used to encrypt much of the web today. There is also a need to look beyond end-to-end encryption to address its shortcomings, particularly around authentication and metadata leakage.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-state-of-secure-messaging

The State is Snooping: Can You Escape?

snehashish — 2019-04-29T15:09:18Z

Blanket surveillance of the kind envisaged by India's Centralized Monitoring System achieves little, but blatantly violates the citizen's right to privacy; Snehashish Ghosh explores why it may be dangerous and looks at potential safeguards against such intrusion.

The Snowden Leaks have made it amply clear that the covert surveillance conducted by governments is no longer covert. Information by its very nature is prone to leaks. The discretion lies completely in the hands of the personnel handling your data or information. Whether it is through knowledge obtained by an intelligence analyst about the US Government conducting indiscriminate surveillance, or hackers infiltrating a secure system and leaking personal information, stored information has a tendency to come out in the open sooner or later.

This raises the question whether, with the advancement of technologies, we should trust our personal information and data with computers. Should we have more stringent laws and procedural safeguards to protect our personal information? Of course, the broader question that remains is whether we have a ‘Right to be Forgotten’.

Similar to PRISM in the US, India is also implementing a Centralized Monitoring System (CMS) which would have the capabilities to conduct multiple privacy-intrusive activities, ranging from call data record analysis to location based monitoring. Given the circumstances and the current revelations by a whistleblower in the US, it is more than imperative to take a closer look at the surveillance technologies which are being deployed by India and question what implications it might have in the future.

Technological shift and procedural safeguards
The need for procedural safeguards was brought to light in the Supreme Court case, when news reports surfaced about the tapping of politicians' phones by the CBI. The Court while deciding on the issue of phone tapping in the case of People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India (1996), observed that the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 is an ancient legislation and does not address the issue of telephone tapping. Thereafter, the court issued guidelines, which were implemented by the Government by amending and inserting Rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951. These procedural safeguards ensure that due process will be followed by any law enforcement agency, while conducting surveillance.

Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 grants the power to the Government to conduct surveillance provided that there is an occurrence of any public emergency or public safety. If and only if the conditions of public safety and public emergency are compromised, and if the concerned authority is convinced that it is expedient to issue such an order for interception in the interest of “the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence” is surveillance legitimized. The same was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the 1996 judgment on wire tapping.

Now, as the Government of India is planning to launch a new technology, the Centralized Monitoring System (CMS) which would snoop, track and monitor communication data flowing through telecom and data networks, the question arises: can we have procedural safeguards which would protect our right to privacy against technologies such as the CMS?

The key component of a procedural safeguard is human discretion; either a court authorization or an order from a high ranking government official is necessary to conduct targeted surveillance and the reasons for conducting surveillance have to be recorded in writing. This is the procedure which is ordinarily followed by law enforcement agencies before conducting any form of surveillance. However, with the computational turn, governments have resorted to practices which would do away with the human discretion. Dragnet surveillance allows for blanket surveillance. Before getting to the problems in evolving a due process for systems like CMS, it is imperative to examine the capabilities of the system.

Centralized Monitoring System and death of due process
Setting up of a CMS was conceptualized in India after the 2008 Mumbai attacks. It was further consolidated and found a place in the Report of the Telecom Working Group on the Telecom Sector for the Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012-2017). The Report was published in August, 2011 and goes into the details of the CMS.

When machines and robots are deployed to conduct blanket surveillance and impinge on the most fundamental right to life and liberty, and also violate the basic tenets of due process, then much cannot be done by way of procedures. What then do we resort to, is the primary question. Can there be a compromise between the right to privacy and security?

The Report indicates that the technology will cater to “the requirements of security management for law enforcement agencies for interception, monitoring, data analysis/mining, antiâ€socialâ€networking using the country’s telecom infrastructure for unlawful activities.”

The CMS will also be capable of running algorithms for interception of connection oriented networks, algorithms for interception of voice over internet protocol (VoIP), video over IP and GPS based monitoring systems. These algorithms would be able to intercept any communication without any intervention from the telecom or internet service provider. It would also have the capability to intercept and analyze data on any communication network as well as to conduct location based monitoring by tracking GPS locations. Given such capabilities, it is clear that a computer system will be sifting through the internet/communication data and will conduct surveillance as instructed through algorithms. This would include identifying patterns, profiling and also storing data for posterity. Moreover, the CMS will have direct access to the telecommunication infrastructure and would be monitoring all forms of communication.

With the introduction of CMS, state surveillance will shift to blanket surveillance from the current practice of targeted surveillance which can be carried out under specific circumstances that are well defined in the law and in judgments. Moreover, when it comes to current means of surveillance, there are well-defined procedures under the law which have the ability to prevent misuse of the surveillance systems. This is not to say that the current procedural safeguards under the laws are not prone to abuse, but if implemented properly, there is less chance of them being misused. Furthermore, with strong privacy and data protection laws, unlawful and illegal surveillance can be minimized.

In the current legal framework, with respect to surveillance, if CMS is implemented then it will be in violation of the fundamental right to privacy and freedom of speech as guaranteed under our Constitution. It will be also in contravention of the procedural safeguards laid down in the Supreme Court judgement and the Rule 419A of Indian Telegraph Rules, thereof. Strong privacy laws and data protection laws may be put in place, which are completely absent now. But at the end of the day, a machine will be spying on every citizen of India or anyone using any communication services, without any specific targets or suspects.

In the People’s Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India (1996), the Supreme Court laid down that “the substantive law as laid down in Section 5(2) of the [Indian Telegraph Act, 1885] must have procedural backing so that the exercise of power is fair and reasonable.” But with technologies such as CMS, it will be very difficult to have any form of procedural backing because the system would do away with human discretion which happens to be a key ingredient of any legal procedure.

The argument which can be made in favour of CMS, if any, is that a machine will be going through personal data and it will not be available to any personnel or law enforcement agency without authorization and therefore, it will adhere to the due process. However, such a system will be keeping track of all personal information. Right to privacy is the right to be left alone and any incursion on this fundamental right can only be allowed in special cases, in cases of public emergency or threat of public safety. So, electronic blanket surveillance without human intervention also amounts to violation of the substantive law, which specifically allows surveillance only to be conducted under certain conditions, and not through a system such as CMS that is designed to keep a constant watch on everyone, irrespective of the fact whether there is a need to do so.

Additionally, there exists a strong, pre-established notion that whatever comes out of a computer is bound to be true and authentic and there cannot be any mistakes. We have witnessed this in the past where an IT professional from Bangalore was arrested and detained by the Maharashtra Police for posting derogatory content on Orkut about Shivaji. Later, it was found that the records acquired from the Internet Service Provider were incorrect and the individual had been arrested and detained illegally.

Telephone bills, credit card bills coming out from a computer system are often held to be authentic and error-free. With UID, our identity has been reduced to a number and biometrics stored in a database corresponding to that number. It is this trust in anything which comes out of a computer or a machine that can lead to massive abuse of the system in the absence of any form of checks and balance in place. Artificial things taking control over human lives and our almost unflinching trust in technology will not only cause gross violations of privacy but will also be the death of due process and basic human rights as we know it.

In this regard, due emphasis should be given to the landmark Supreme Court judgment in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) which deals with issues related to due process and privacy. It states that "procedure which deals with the modalities of regulating, restricting or even rejecting a fundamental right falling within Article 21 has to be fair, not foolish, carefully designed to effectuate, not to subvert, the substantive right itself. Thus, understood, ‘procedure’ must rule out anything arbitrary, freakish or bizarre. A valuable constitutional right can be canalised only by canalised processes".

When machines and robots are deployed to conduct blanket surveillance and impinge on the most fundamental right to life and liberty and also violate the basic tenets of due process, then much cannot be done by way of procedures. What then do we resort to, is the primary question. Can there be a compromise between the right to privacy and security?

A no-win situation
In reality, dragnet surveillance or blanket surveillance is not very useful for gathering valuable intelligence to prevent instances of threat to national security, public safety and public emergency. For example, if the CMS is used to mine data, analyse content related to anti-social activities and even if the system is 99 per cent accurate, the remaining 1 per cent which is a false positive happens to be a large set. So, 1 out of every 100 individuals identified as an anti-social element by CMS may actually be an innocent citizen. Given the possibility of false positives and which may be more than 1 per cent, the number of innocent citizens caught in the terrorist net would be much higher.

Even though blanket surveillance or dragnet surveillance can keep a tab on everyone, it is nearly impossible for an algorithm to separate the terrorists from the rest. Moreover, the data set collected by the machine is too big for any human analyst, to actually analyze and identify the terrorist in the midst of a deluge of information. Therefore, the argument that a system like CMS will ensure security in lieu of minor intrusions of privacy is a flawed one. Implementation of CMS will not really ensure security but will be a case of blatant violation of individual’s right to privacy anyway.

What is perhaps more shocking is that not only will CMS be futile in preventing security breaches or neutralizing security threats, it will on the contrary expose individual Indian citizens to breach of personal security. If personal data and information are stored for future reference through a centralized mechanism, which is also the case with UID, it will be highly susceptible to attacks and security threats. It will be a Pandora’s Box with a potential to create havoc the moment someone is able to gain access to the information with intention to misuse that. Leaking of personal information and data on a large scale can be detrimental to society and give rise to instances of public emergency.

The ‘Right to be Forgotten’

Currently, the European Union is engulfed in the debate on the “Right to be Forgotten” laws. The Right to be Forgotten finds its origins in the French Law le droit Ã l’oubli or the right of oblivion, where a convict who has served his sentence can object to the publication of facts of his conviction and imprisonment or penalty. This law has a new found meaning in the context of social media and the internet, where we have the right to delete all our personal information permanently. This is an important issue which India should debate and discuss, as we live in an era where privacy comes at a cost.

On the one hand, technology has made it easier to track, trace, monitor and snoop, on the other it has also seen innovation in the field of encryption and anonymity tools. Encryption tools such as Open PGP exist online, which can secure information from third party access. Tor Browser, allows an user to surf the web anonymously. The use of such technologies should be encouraged as there is no law which prohibits their use. If systems are being built to spy on us, it will be better if we use technologies which protect our personal information from such surveillance technologies.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-together-june-26-2013-snehashish-ghosh-the-state-is-snooping-can-you-escape

The Srikrishna Committee Data Protection Bill and Artificial Intelligence in India

Amber Sinha and Elonnai Hickok — 2018-09-03T13:29:12Z

Artificial Intelligence in many ways is in direct conflict with traditional data protection principles and requirements including consent, purpose limitation, data minimization, retention and deletion, accountability, and transparency.

Privacy Considerations in AI

Other related privacy concerns in the context of AI center around re-identification and de-anonymisation, discrimination, unfairness, inaccuracies, bias, opacity, profiling, and misuse of data and imbedded power dynamics.^[1]

The need for large amounts of data to improve accuracy, the ability to process vast amounts of granular data, and the present relationship between explainability and result of AI systems^{^[2]} have raised many concerns on both sides of the fence. On one hand, there is concern that heavy handed or inappropriate regulation will result in stifling innovation. If developers can only use data for pre-defined purpose - the prospects of AI are limited. On the other hand, individuals are concerned that privacy will be significantly undermined in light of AI systems that collect and process data in realtime and at a personal level not previously possible. Chatbots, house assistants, wearable devices, robot caregivers, facial recognition technology etc. have the ability to collect data from a person at an intimate level. At the sametime, some have argued that AI can work towards protecting privacy by limiting the access that humans working at respective companies have to personal data.^{^[3]}

India is embracing AI. Two national roadmaps for AI were released in 2018 respectively by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Niti Aayog. Both roadmaps emphasized the importance of addressing privacy concerns in the context of AI and ensuring that a robust privacy legislation is enacted. In August 2018, the Srikrishna Committee released a draft Personal Data Protection Bill 2018 and the associated report that outlines and justifies a framework for privacy in India. As the development and use of AI in India continues to grow, it is important that India simultaneously moves forward with a privacy framework that addresses the privacy dimensions of AI.

In this article we attempt to analyse if and how the Srikrishna committee draft Bill and report has addressed AI, contrast this with developments in the EU and the passing of the GDPR, and identify solutions that are being explored towards finding a way to develop AI while upholding and safeguarding privacy.

The GDPR and Artificial Intelligence

The General Data Protection Regulation became enforceable in May 2018 and establishes a framework for the processing of personal data for individuals within the European Union. The GDPR has been described by IAAP as taking a ‘risk based’ approach to data protection that pushes data controllers to engage in risk analysis and adopt ‘risk measured responses’.^{^[4]} Though the GDPR does not explicitly address artificial intelligence, it does have a number of provisions that address automated decision making and profiling and a number of provisions that will impact companies using artificial intelligence in their business activities. These have been outlined below:

Data rights: The GDPR enables individuals with a number of data rights: the right to be informed, right of access, right to rectification, right to erasure, right to restrict processing, right to data portability, right to object, and rights related to automated decision making including profiling. The last right - rights related to automated decision making - seeks to address concerns arising out of automated decision making by giving the individual the right to request to not be subject to a decision based solely on automated decision making including profiling if the decision would produce legal effects or similarly significantly affects them. There are three exceptions to this right - if the automated decision making is: a. necessary for the performance of a contract, b. authorised by the Union or Member State c. is based on explicit consent.^{^[5]}
Transparency: Under Article 14, data controllers must enable the right to opt out of automated decision making by notifying individuals of the existence of automated decision making including profiling and providing meaningful information about the logic involved as well as the potential consequences of such processing.^{^[6]} Importantly, this requirement has the potential of ensuring that companies do not operate complete ‘black box’ algorithms within their business processes.
Fairness: The principle of fairness found under Article 5(1) will also apply to the processing of personal data by AI. The principle requires that personal data must be processed in a way to meet the three conditions of lawfully, fairly, and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject. Recital 71 further clarifies that this will include implementing appropriate mathematical and statistical measures for profiling, ensuring that inaccuracies are corrected, and ensuring that processing that does not result in negative discriminatory results.^{^[7]}
Purpose Limitation: The principle of purpose limitation (Article 5(1)(b) requires that personal data must be collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes and not be further processed in a manner incompatible with those purposes. Processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes are not considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes. It has been noted that it is unclear if research carried out through artificial intelligence would fall under this exception as the GDPR does not define ‘scientific purposes’.^{^[8]}
Privacy by Design and Default: Article 25 requires all data controllers to implement technical and organizational measures to meet the requirements of the regulation. This could include techniques like pseudonymisation. Data controllers also are required to implement appropriate technical and organizational measures for ensuring that by default only personal data which are necessary for a specific purpose are processed.^{^[9]}
Data Protection Impact Assessments: Article 35 requires data controllers to undertake impact assessments if they are undertaking processing that is likely to result in a high risk to individuals. This includes if the data controller undertakes: systematic and extensive profiling, processes special categories of criminal offence data on a large scale, systematically monitor publicly accessible places on a large scale. In implementation, some jurisdictions like the UK require impact assessments on additional conditions including if the data controller: uses new technologies, uses profiling or special category data to decide on access to services, profile individuals on a large scale, process biometric data, process genetic data, match data or combine datasets from different sources, collect personal data from a source other than the individual without providing them with a privacy notice, track individuals’ location or behaviour, profile children or target marketing or online services at them, process data that might endanger the individual’s physical health or safety in the event of a security breach.^{^[10]}
Security: Article 30 requires data controllers to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk including employing methods like encryption and pseudonymization.

Srikrishna Committee Bill and AI

The Draft Data Protection Bill and associated report by the Srikrishna Committee was published in August 2018 and recommends a privacy framework for India. The Bill contains a number of provisions that will directly impact data fiduciaries using AI and that try and account for the unintended consequences of emerging technologies like AI. These include:

Definition of Harm: The Bill defines harm as including bodily or mental injury, loss, distortion or theft of identity, financial loss or loss of property, loss of reputation or humiliation, loss of employment, any discriminatory treatment, any subjection to blackmail or extortion, any denial or withdrawal of a service, benefit or good resulting from an evaluative decision about the data principal, any restriction placed or suffered directly or indirectly on speech, movement or any other action arising out of a fear of being observed or surveilled, any observation or surveillance that is not reasonably expected by the data principal. The Bill also allows for categories of significant harm to be further defined by the data protection authority.

Many of the above are harms that have been associated with artificial intelligence - specifically loss employment, discriminatory treatment, and denial of service. Enabling the data protection authority to further define categories of significant harm, could allow for unexpected harms arising from the use of AI to come under the ambit of the Bill.

Data Rights: Like the GDPR, the Bill creates a set of data rights for the individual including the right to confirmation and access, correction, data portability, and right to be forgotten. At the sametime the Bill is intentionally silent on the rights and obligations that have been incorporated into the GDPR that address automated decision making including: The right to object to processing,^{^[11]} the right to opt out of automated decision making^{^[12]}, and the obligation on the data controller to inform the individual about the use of automated decision making and basic information regarding the logic and impact of same.^{^[13]} As justification, in their report the Committee noted the following: The right to restrict processing may be unnecessary in India as it provides only interim remedies around issues such as inaccuracy of data and the same can be achieved by a data principal approaching the DPA or courts for a stay on processing as well as simply withdraw consent. The objective of protecting against discrimination, bias, and opaque decisions that the right to object to automated processing and receive information about the processing of data in the Indian context seeks to fulfill would be better achieved through an accountability framework requiring specific data fiduciaries that will be making evaluative decisions through automated means to set up processes that ‘weed out’ discrimination. At the same time, if discrimination has taken place, individuals can seek remedy through the courts.

By taking this approach, the Bill creates a framework to address harms arising out of AI, but does not empower the individual to decide how their data is processed and remains silent on the issue of ‘black box’ algorithms.

Data Quality: Requires data fiduciaries to ensure that personal data that is processed is complete, accurate, not misleading and updated with respect to the purposes for which it is processed. When taking steps to comply with this - data fiduciaries must take into consideration if the personal data is likely to be used to make a decision about the data principal, if it is likely to be disclosed to other individuals, if the personal data is kept in a form that distinguishes personal data based on facts from personal data based on opinions or personal assessments.^{^[14]}

This principle, while not mandating that data fiduciaries take into account considerations such as biases in datasets, could potentially be be interpreted by the data protection authority to include in its scope, means towards ensuring that data does not contain or result in bias.

Principle of Privacy by Design: Requires significant data fiduciaries to have in place a number policies and measures around several aspects of privacy. These include - (a) measures to ensure managerial, organizational, business practices and technical systems are designed in a manner to anticipate, identify, and avoid harm to the data principal (b) the obligations mentioned in Chapter II are embedded in organisational and business practices (c) technology used in the processing of personal data is in accordance with commercially accepted or certified standards (d) legitimate interests of business including any innovation is achieved without compromising privacy interests (e) privacy is protected throughout processing from the point of collection to deletion of personal data (f) processing of personal data is carried out in a transparent manner (g) the interest of the data principal is accounted for at every stage of processing of personal data.

A number of these (a, d, e, and g) require that the interest of the data principal is accounted for throughout the processing of personal data, This will be significant for systems driven by artificial intelligence as a number of the harms that have arisen from the use of AI include discrimination, denial of service, or loss of employment - have been brought under the definition of harm within the Bill. Placing the interest of the data principal first is also important in protecting against unintended consequences or harms that may arise from AI.^{^[15]} If enacted, it will be important to see what policies and measures emerge in the context of AI to comply with this principle. It will also be important to see what commercially accepted or certified standard companies rely on to comply with (c.)

Data Protection Impact Assessment: Requires data fiduciaries to undertake a data protection impact assessment when implementing new technologies or large scale profiling or use of sensitive personal data. Such assessments need to include a detailed description of the proposed processing operation, the purpose of the processing and the nature of personal data being processed, an assessment of the potential harm that may be caused to the data principals whose personal data is proposed to be processed, and measures for managing, minimising, mitigating or removing such risk of harm. If the Authority finds that the processing is likely to cause harm to the data principles, it may direct the data fiduciary to undertake processing in certain circumstances or entirely. This requirement applies to all significant data fiduciaires and all other data fiduciaries as required by the DPA.^{^[16]}

This principle will apply to companies implementing AI systems. For AI systems, it will be important to see how much information the DPA will require under the requirement of data fiduciaries providing detailed descriptions of the proposed processing operation and purpose of processing.

Classification of data fiduciaries as significant data fiduciaries: The Authority has the ability to notify certain categories of data fiduciaries as significant data fiduciaries based on 1. The volume of personal data processed, 2. The sensitivity of personal data processed, turnover of the data fiduciary, risk of harm resulting from any processing being undertaken by the fiduciary, use of new technologies for processing, and other factor relevant for causing harm to any data principal. If a data fiduciary falls under the ambit of any of these conditions they are required to register with the Authority. All significant data fiduciaries must undertake data protection impact assessments, maintain records as per the bill, under go data audits, and have in place a data protection officer.

As per this provision - companies deploying artificial intelligence would come under the definition of a significant data fiduciary and be subject to the principles of privacy by design etc. articulated in the chapter. The exception to this will be if the data fiduciary comes under the definition of ‘small entity’ found in section 48.^{^[17]}

Restrictions on cross border transfer of personal data: Requires that all data fiduciaries must store a copy of personal data on a server or data centre located in India and notified categories of critical personal data must be processed in servers located in India.

It is interesting to note that in the context of cross border sharing of data, the Bill is creating a new category of data that can be further defined beyond personal and sensitive personal data. For companies implementing artificial intelligence, this provision may prove cumbersome to comply with as many utilize cloud storage and facilities located outside of India for the processing of larger amounts of data.^{^[18]}

Powers and functions of the Authority: The Bill lays down a number of functions of the Authority one being to monitor technological developments and commercial practices that may affect protection of personal data.

By assumption, this will include monitoring of technological developments in the field of Artificial Intelligence.^{^[19]}

Fair and reasonable processing: Requires that any person processing personal data owes a duty to the data principal to process such personal data in a fair and reasonable manner that respects the privacy of the data principal. In the Srikrishna Committee report, the committee explains that the principle of the fair and reasonable is meant to address 1. Power asymmetries between data subjects and data fiduciaries - recognizing that data fiduciaires have a responsibility to act in the best interest of the data principal 2. Situations where processing may be legal but not necessary fair or in the best interest of the data principal 3. Developing trust between the data principal and the data fiduciary.^{^[20]}

This is in contrast to the GDPR which requires processing to simultaneously meet the three conditions of fairness, lawfulness, and transparency.

Purpose Limitation: Personal data can only be processed for the purposes specified or any other purpose that the data principal would reasonably expect.

As a note, the Srikrishna Committee Bill does not include ‘scientific purposes’ as an exception to the principle of purpose limitation as found in the GDPR,^{^[21]} and instead creates an exception for research, archiving, or statistical purposes.^{^[22]} The DPA has the responsibility of developing codes defining research purposes under the act.^{^[23]}

Security Safeguards: Every data fiduciary must implement appropriate security safeguards including the use of methods such as de-identification and encryption, steps to protect the integrity of personal data, and steps necessary to prevent misuse, unauthorised access to, modification, and disclosure or destruction of personal data.^{^[24]}

Unlike the GDPR which explicitly refers to the technique of pseudonymization, the Srikrishna uses Bill uses term de-identification. The Srikrishna Report clarifies that the this includes techniques like pseudonymization and masking and further clarifies that because of the risk of re-identification, de-identified personal data should still receive the same level of protection as personal data. The Bill further gives the DPA the authority to define appropriate levels of anonymization. ^{^[25]}

Technical perspectives of Privacy and AI

There is an emerging body of work that is looking at solutions to the dilemma of maintaining privacy while employing artificial intelligence and finding ways in which artificial intelligence can support and strengthen privacy. For example, there are AI driven platforms that leverage the technology to help a business to meet regulatory compliance with data protection laws^{^[26]}, as well as research into AI privacy enhancing technologies.^{^[27]} Standards setting bodies like IEEE have undertaken work on the ethical considerations in the collection and use of personal data when designing, developing, and/or deploying AI through the standard ‘Ethically Aligned Design’.^{^[28]} . In the article Artificial Intelligence and Privacy by Datatilsynet - the Norwegian Data Protection Authority^{^[29]} break such methods into three categories:

Techniques for reducing the need for large amounts of training data: Such techniques can include

Generative adversarial networks (GANs): GANs are used to create synthetic data and can address the need for large volumes of labelled data without relying on real data containing personal data. GANs could potentially be useful from a research and development perspective in sectors like healthcare where most data would quality as sensitive personal data.
Federated Learning: Federated learning allows for models to be trained and improved on data from a large pool of users without directly using user data. This is achieved by running a centralized model on a client unit and subsequently improved on local data. Changes from the improvements are shared back with the centralized server. An average of the changes from multiple individual client units becomes the basis for improving the centralized model.
Matrix Capsules: Proposed by Google researcher Geoff Hinton, Matrix Capsules improve the accuracy of existing neural networks while requiring less data.^{^[30]}

Techniques that uphold data protection without reducing the basic data set

Differential Privacy: Differential privacy intentionally adds ‘noise’ to data when accessed. This allows for personal data to be accessed with revealing identifying information.
Homomorphic Encryption: Homomorphic encryption allows for the processing of data while it is still encrypted. This addresses the need to access and use large amounts of personal data for multiple purposes
Transfer Learning: Instead of building a new model, transfer learning relies builds upon existing models that are applied to new related purposes or tasks. This has the potential to reduce the amount of training data needed.
RAIRD: Developed by Statistics Norway and the Norwegian Centre for Research Data, RAIRD is a national research infrastructure that allows for access to large amounts of statistical data for research while managing statistical confidentiality. This is achieved by allowing researchers access to metadata. The metadata is used to build analyses which are then run against detailed data without giving access to actual data.^{^[31]}

Techniques to move beyond opaque algorithms

Explainable AI (XAI): DARPA in collaboration with Oregon State University is researching how to create explainable models and explanation interface while ensuring a high level of learning performance in order to enable individuals to interact with, trust, and manage artificial intelligence.^{^[32]} DARPA identifies a number of entities working on different models and interfaces for analytics and autonomy AI.^{^[33]}
Local Interpretable Model Agnostic Explanations: Developed to enable trust between AI models and humans by generating explainers to highlight key aspects that were important to the model and its decision - thus providing insight into the rationale behind a model.^{^[34]}

Public Sector use of AI and Privacy

The role of AI in public sector decision making has been gradually growing globally across sectors such as law enforcement, education, transportation, judicial decision making and healthcare. In India too, use of automated processing in electronic governance under the Digital India mission, domestic law enforcement agencies monitoring social media content and educational schemes is being discussed and gradually implemented. Much like the potential applications of AI across sub-sectors, the nature of regulatory issues are also diverse.

Aside from the accountability framework discussed in the Srikrishna Committee report, the Puttaswamy judgment also provides a basis for governance of AI with respect to its concerns for privacy, in limited contexts. The sources of right to privacy as articulated in the Puttaswamy judgments included the terms ‘personal liberty’ under Article 21 of the Constitution. In order to fully appreciate how constitutional principles could apply to automated processing in India, we need to look closely at the origins of privacy under liberty. In the famous case of AK Gopalan there is a protracted discussion on the contents of the rights under Article 21. Amongst the majority opinions itself, the opinion was divided. While Sastri J. and Mukherjea J. took the restrictive view that limiting the protections to bodily restraint and detention, Kania J. and Das J. take a broader view for it to include the right to sleep, play etc. Through RC Cooper^{^[35]} and Maneka^{^[36]}, the Supreme Court took steps to reverse the majority opinion in Gopalan and it was established that that the freedoms and rights in Part III could be addressed by more than one provision. The expansion of ‘personal liberty’ has began in Kharak Singh where the unjustified interference with a person’s right to live in his house, was held to be violative of Article 21. The reasoning in Kharak Singh draws heavily from Munn v. Illinois^{^[37]} which held life to be “more than mere animal existence.” Curiously, after taking this position Kharak Singh fails to recognise a fundamental right to privacy (analogous to the Fourth Amendment protection in US) under Article 21. The position taken in Kharak Singh was to extrapolate the same method of wide interpretation of ‘personal liberty’ as was accorded to ‘life’. Maneka which evolved the test for enumerated rights within Part III says that the claimed right must be an integral part of or of the the same nature as the named right. It says that the claimed must be ‘in reality and substance nothing but an instance of the exercise of the named fundamental right’. The clear reading of privacy into ‘personal liberty’ in this judgment is effectively a correction of the inherent inconsistencies in the positions taken by the majority in Kharak Singh.

The other significant change in constitutional interpretation that occurred in Maneka was with respect to the phrase ‘procedure established by law’ in Article 21. In Gopalan, the majority held that the phrase ‘procedure established by law’ does not mean procedural due process or natural justice. What this meant was that, once a ‘procedure’ was ‘established by law’, Article 21 could not be said to have been infringed. This position was entirely reversed in Maneka. The ratio in Maneka said that ‘procedure established by law’ must be fair, just and reasonable, and cannot be arbitrary and fanciful. Therefore, any infringement of the right to privacy must be through a law which follows the principles of natural justice, and is not arbitrary or unfair. It follows that any instances of automated processing for public functioning by state actors or others, must meet this standard of ‘fair, just and reasonable’.

While there is a lot of focus internationally on what ethical AI must be, it is important that when we consider use of AI by the state, we pay heed to the existing constitutional principles which determine how AI must be evaluated against these standards. These principles however extend only to limited circumstances for protections under Article 21 are not horizontal in nature but only applicable against the state. Whether a party is the state or not is a question that has been considered several times by the Supreme Court and must be determined by functional tests. In our submission of the Justice Srikrishna Committee, we clearly recommended that where automated decision making is used for discharging of public functions, the data protection law must state that such actions are subject the the constitutional standards and are ‘just, fair and reasonable’ and satisfy the tests for both procedural and substantive due process. To a limited extent, the committee seems to have picked up the standards of ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ and made it applicable to all forms of processing, whether public or private. It is as yet unclear whether fairness and reasonableness as inserted in the bill would draw from the constitutional standard under Article 21. The report makes a reference to the twin principles of acting in a manner that upholds the best interest of the privacy of the individual, and processing within the reasonable expectations of the individual, which do not seem to cover the fullest essence of the legal standard under Article 21.

Conclusion

The Srikrishna Committee Bill attempts to create an accountability framework for the use of emerging technologies including AI that is focused on placing the responsibility on companies to prevent harm. Though not as robust as found in the GDPR, the protections have been enabled through requirements such as fair and reasonable processing, ensuring data quality, and implementing principles of privacy of design. At the sametime, the Srikrishna Bill does not include provisions that can begin to address the consumer facing ‘black box’ of AI by ensuring that individuals have information about the potential impact of decisions taken by automated means. In contrast, the GDPR has already taken important steps to tackle this by requiring companies to explain the logic and potential impact of decisions taken by automated means.

Most importantly, the Bill gives the Data Protection Authority the necessary tools to hold companies accountable for the use of AI through the requirements of data protection audits. If enacted, it will have to be seen how these audits and the principle of privacy by design are implemented and enforced in the context of companies using AI. Though the Bill creates a Data Protection Authority consisting of members that have significant experience in data protection, information technology, data management, data science, cyber and internet laws, and related subjects, these requirements can be further strengthened by having someone from a background of ethics and human rights.

One of the responsibilities of the DPA under the Srikrishna Bill will be to monitor technological developments and commercial practices that may affect protection of personal data and promote measures and undertake research for innovation in the field of protection of personal data. If enacted, we hope that AI and solutions towards enhancing privacy in the context of AI like described above will be one of these focus areas of the DPA. It will also be important to see how the DPA develops impact assessments related to AI and what tools associated with the principle of Privacy by Design emerge to address AI.

^{^[1]} https://privacyinternational.org/topics/artificial-intelligence

^{^[2]} https://www.wired.com/story/our-machines-now-have-knowledge-well-never-understand/

^{^[3]} https://iapp.org/news/a/ai-offers-opportunity-to-increase-privacy-for-users/

^{^[4]} https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/GDPR_Study_Maldoff.pdf

^{^[5]} https://gdpr-info.eu/art-22-gdpr/

^{^[6]} https://gdpr-info.eu/art-14-gdpr/

^{^[7]} https://www.datatilsynet.no/globalassets/global/english/ai-and-privacy.pdf

^{^[8]} https://www.datatilsynet.no/globalassets/global/english/ai-and-privacy.pdf

^{^[9]} https://gdpr-info.eu/art-25-gdpr/

^{^[10]} https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/data-protection-impact-assessments/

^{^[11]} https://gdpr-info.eu/art-21-gdpr/

^{^[12]} https://gdpr-info.eu/art-22-gdpr/

^{^[13]} https://gdpr-info.eu/art-14-gdpr/

^{^[14]}Draft Data Protection Bill 2018 - Chapter II section 9

^{^[15]} Draft Data Protection Bill 2018 - Chapter VII section 29

^{^[16]} Draft Data Protection Bill 2018 - Chapter VII section 33

^{^[17]} Draft Data Protection Bill 2018 - Chapter VII section 38

^{^[18]} Draft Data Protection Bill 2018 - Chapter VIII section 40

^{^[19]} Draft Data Protection Bill 2018 - Chapter X section 60

^{^[20]} Draft Data Protection Bill 2018 - Chapter II section 4

^{^[21]} Draft Data Protection Bill 2018 - Chapter II section 5

^{^[22]} Draft Data Protection Bill 2018 - Chapter IX Section 45

^{^[23]} Draft Data Protection Bill 2018 - Chapter XIV section 97

^{^[24]} Draft Data Protection Bill 2018 - Chapter VII section 31

^{^[25]} Srikrishna Committee Report on Data Protection pg. 36 and 37. Available at: http://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Data%20Protection/Committee%20Report%20on%20Draft%20Personal%20Data%20Protection%20Bill,%202018.pdf

^{^[26]} https://www.ciosummits.com/Online_Assets_DocAuthority_Whitepaper_-_Guide_to_Intelligent_GDPR_Compliance.pdf

^{^[27]} https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/assets/articlePDFs/v31/31HarvJLTech217.pdf

^{^[28]} https://standards.ieee.org/content/dam/ieee-standards/standards/web/documents/other/ead_personal_data_v2.pdf

^{^[29]} https://www.datatilsynet.no/globalassets/global/english/ai-and-privacy.pdf

^{^[30]} https://www.artificial-intelligence.blog/news/capsule-networks

^{^[31]} http://raird.no/about/factsheet.html

^{^[32]} https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/XAIProgramUpdate.pdf

^{^[33]} https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/XAIProgramUpdate.pdf

^{^[34]} https://www.oreilly.com/learning/introduction-to-local-interpretable-model-agnostic-explanations-lime

^{^[35]} R C Cooper v. Union of India, 1970 SCR (3) 530.

^{^[36]} Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, 1978 SCR (2) 621.

^{^[37]} 94 US 113 (1877).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-srikrishna-committee-data-protection-bill-and-artificial-intelligence-in-india

The Spies We Trust: Third Party Service Providers and Law Enforcement Surveillance

praskrishna — 2012-07-31T04:47:48Z

Christopher Soghoian's dissertation was submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree "Doctor of Philosophy" in the School of Informatics, Department of Computer Science, Indiana University

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/spies-we-trust

The Short-lived Adventure of India’s Encryption Policy

bhairav — 2015-11-29T09:03:42Z

Written for the Berkeley Information Privacy Law Association (BIPLA).

During his recent visit to Silicon Valley, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said his government was “giving the highest importance to data privacy and security, intellectual property rights and cyber security”. But a proposed national encryption policy circulated in September 2015 would have achieved the opposite effect.

The policy was comically short-lived. After its poorly-drafted provisions invited ridicule, it was swiftly withdrawn. But the government has promised to return with a fresh attempt to regulate encryption soon. The incident highlights the worrying assault on communications privacy and free speech in India, a concern compounded by the enormous scale of the telecommunications and Internet market.

Even with only around 26 percent of its population online, India is already the world’s second-largest Internet user, recently overtaking the United States. The number of Internet users in India is set to grow exponentially, spurred by ambitious governmental schemes to build a ‘Digital India’ and a country-wide fiber-optic backbone. There will be a corresponding increase in the use of the Internet for communicating and conducting commerce.

Encryption on the Internet

Encryption protects the security of Internet users from invasions of privacy, theft of data, and other attacks. By applying an algorithmic cipher (key), ordinary data (plaintext) is encoded into an unintelligible form (ciphertext), which is decrypted using the key. The ciphertext can be intercepted but will remain unintelligible without the key. The key is secret.

There are several methods of encryption. SSL/TLS, a family of encryption protocols, is commonly used by major websites. But while some companies encrypt sensitive data, such as passwords and financial information, during its transit through the Internet, most data at rest on servers is largely unencrypted. For instance, email providers regularly store plaintext messages on their servers. As a result, governments simply demand and receive backdoor access to information directly from the companies that provide these services. However, governments have long insisted on blanket backdoor access to all communications data, both encrypted and unencrypted, and whether at rest or in transit.

On the other hand, proper end-to-end encryption – full encryption from the sender to recipient, where the service provider simply passes on the ciphertext without storing it, and deletes the metadata – will defeat backdoors and protect privacy, but may not be profitable. End-to-end encryption alarms the surveillance establishment, which is why British Prime Minister David Cameron wants to ban it, and many in the US government want Silicon Valley companies to stop using it.

Communications privacy

Instead of relying on a company to secure communications, the surest way to achieve end-to-end encryption is for the sender to encrypt the message before it leaves her computer. Since only the sender and intended recipient have the key, even if the data is intercepted in transit or obtained through a backdoor, only the ciphertext will be visible.

For almost all of human history, encryption relied on a single shared key; that is, both the sender and recipient used a pre-determined key. But, like all secrets, the more who know it, the less secure the key becomes. From the 1970s onwards, revolutionary advances in cryptography enabled the generation of a pair of dissimilar keys, one public and one private, which are uniquely and mathematically linked. This is asymmetric or public key cryptography, where the private key remains an exclusive secret. It offers the strongest protection for communications privacy because it returns autonomy to the individual and is immune to backdoors.

For those using public key encryption, Edward Snowden’s revelation that the NSA had cracked several encryption protocols including SSL/TLS was worrying. Brute-force decryption (the use of supercomputers to mathematically attack keys) questions the integrity of public key encryption. But, since the difficulty of code-breaking is directly proportional to key size, notionally, generating longer keys will thwart the NSA, for now.

The crypto-wars in India

Where does India’s withdrawn encryption policy lie in this landscape of encryption and surveillance? It is difficult to say. Because it was so badly drafted, understanding the policy was a challenge. It could have been a ham-handed response to commercial end-to-end encryption, which many major providers such as Apple and WhatsApp are adopting following consumer demand. But curiously, this did not appear to be the case, because the government later exempted WhatsApp and other “mass use encryption products”.

The Indian establishment has a history of battling commercial encryption. From 2008, it fought Blackberry for backdoor access to its encrypted communications, coming close to banning the service, which dissipated only once the company lost its market share. There have been similar attempts to force Voice over Internet Protocol providers to fall in line, including Skype and Google. And there is a new thrust underway to regulate over-the-top content providers, including US companies.

The policy could represent a new phase in India’s crypto-wars. The government, emboldened by the sheer scale of the country’s market, might press an unyielding demand for communications backdoors. The policy made no bones of this desire: it sought to bind communications companies by mandatory contracts, regulate key-size and algorithms, compel surrender of encryption products including “working copies” of software (the key generation mechanism), and more.

The motives of regulation

The policy’s deeply intrusive provisions manifest a long-standing effort of the Indian state to dominate communications technology unimpeded by privacy concerns. From wiretaps to Internet metadata, intrusive surveillance is not judicially warranted, does not require the demonstration of probable cause, suffers no external oversight, and is secret. These shortcomings are enabling the creation of a sophisticated surveillance state that sits ill with India’s constitutional values.

Those values are being steadily besieged. India’s Supreme Court is entertaining a surge of clamorous litigation to check an increasingly intrusive state. Only a few months ago, the Attorney-General – the government’s foremost lawyer – argued in court that Indians did not have a right to privacy, relying on 1950s case law which permitted invasive surveillance. Encryption which can inexpensively lock the state out of private communications alarms the Indian government, which is why it has skirmished with commercially-available encryption in the past.

On the other hand, the conflict over encryption is fueled by irregular laws. Telecoms licensing regulations restrict Internet Service Providers to 40-bit symmetric keys, a primitively low standard; higher encryption requires permission and presumably surrender of the shared key to the government. Securities trading on the Internet requires 128-bit SSL/TLS encryption while the country’s central bank is pushing for end-to-end encryption for mobile banking. Seen in this light, the policy could simply be an attempt to rationalize an uneven field.

Encryption and freedom

Perhaps the government was trying to restrict the use of public key encryption and Internet anonymization services, such as Tor or I2P, by individuals. India’s telecoms minister stated: “The purport of this encryption policy relates only to those who encrypt.” This was not particularly illuminating. If the government wants to pre-empt terrorism – a legitimate duty, this approach is flawed since regardless of the law’s command arguably no terrorist will disclose her key to the government. Besides, since there are very few Internet anonymizers in India who are anyway targeted for special monitoring, it would be more productive for the surveillance establishment to maintain the status quo.

This leaves harmless encrypters – businesses, journalists, whistle blowers, and innocent privacy enthusiasts. For this group, impediments to encryption interferes with their ability to freely communicate. There is a proportionate link between encryption and the freedom of speech and expression, a fact acknowledged by Special Rapporteur David Kaye of the UN Human Rights Council, where India is a participating member. Kaye notes: “Encryption and anonymity are especially useful for the development and sharing of opinions, which often occur through online correspondence such as e-mail, text messaging, and other online interactions.”

This is because encryption affords privacy which promotes free speech, a relationship reiterated by the previous UN Special Rapporteur, Frank La Rue. On the other hand, surveillance has a “chilling effect” on speech. In 1962, Justice Subba Rao’s famous dissent in the Indian Supreme Court presciently connected privacy and free speech:

The act of surveillance is certainly a restriction on the [freedom of speech]. It cannot be suggested that the said freedom…will sustain only the mechanics of speech and expression. An illustration will make our point clear. A visitor, whether a wife, son or friend, is allowed to be received by a prisoner in the presence of a guard. The prisoner can speak with the visitor; but, can it be suggested that he is fully enjoying the said freedom? It is impossible for him to express his real and intimate thoughts to the visitor as fully as he would like. To extend the analogy to the present case is to treat the man under surveillance as a prisoner within the confines of our country and the authorities enforcing surveillance as guards. So understood, it must be held that the petitioner’s freedom under [the right to free speech under the Indian] Constitution is also infringed.

Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1964) 1 SCR 332, pr. 30.

Perhaps the policy expressed the government’s discomfort at individual encrypters escaping surveillance, like free agents evading the state’s control. How should the law respond to this problem? Daniel Solove says the security of the state need not compromise individual privacy. On the other hand, as Ronald Dworkin influentially maintained, the freedoms of the individual precede the interests of the state.

Security and trade interests

However, even when assessed from the perspective of India’s security imperatives, the policy would have had harmful consequences. It required users of encryption, including businesses and consumers, to store plaintext versions of their communications for ninety days to surrender to the government upon demand. This outrageously ill-conceived provision would have created real ‘honeypots’ (originally, honeypots are decoy servers to lure hackers) of unencrypted data, ripe for theft. Note that India does not have a data breach law.

The policy’s demand for encryption companies to register their products and give working copies of their software and encryption mechanisms to the Indian government would have flown in the face of trade secrecy and intellectual property protection. The policy’s hurried withdrawal was a public relations exercise on the eve of Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Silicon Valley. It was successful. Modi encountered no criticism of his government’s visceral opposition to privacy, even though the policy would have severely disrupted the business practices of US communications providers operating in India.

Encryption invites a convergence of state interests between India and US as well: both countries want to control it. Last month’s joint statement from the US-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue pledges “further cooperation on internet and cyber issues”. This innocuous statement masks a robust information-gathering and -sharing regime. There is no guarantee against the sharing of any encryption mechanisms or intercepted communications by India.

The government has promised to return with a reworked proposal. It would be in India’s interest for this to be preceded by a broad-based national discussion on encryption and its links to free speech, privacy, security, and commerce.

Click to read the post published on Free Speech / Privacy / Technology website.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-short-lived-adventure-of-india2019s-encryption-policy

The Second IJLT-CIS Lecture Series at National Law School, Bangalore

praskrishna — 2011-05-13T11:03:04Z

The Indian Journal of Law and Technology and the Centre for Internet and Society, present the second IJLT- CIS Lecture Series, an event comprised of an intensive series of lectures by luminaries with expertise in law and technology to give students, professionals and anyone interested in a comprehensive idea about the theme, "Emerging Issues in Privacy law".

The focus will be on contemporary sub-issues of critical relevance such as:

The Unique Identification Project and Challenges to Privacy
Cloud Computing and Behavioural Tracking
The State and Privacy: Electronic Surveillance

Speakers

The following delegates would be speaking at the conference:

Usha Ramanathan
Malavika Jayaram
Vivek Durai
Prof. Sudhir Krishnaswamy

Profiles of the Speakers

Usha Ramanathan

Dr. Usha Ramanathan is an internationally recognized expert on law and poverty. She studied law at Madras University, the University of Nagpur and Delhi University. She is a frequent adviser to non-governmental organisations and international organizations. She is a member of Amnesty International's Advisory Panel on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and has been called upon by the World Health Organisation as a expert on mental health on various occasions. Her research interests include human rights, displacement, torts and environment. She has published extensively in India and abroad.

Malavika Jayaram

Malavika Jaya has an experience of more than 15 years as a lawyer with a specialization in information technology and intellectual property. She is a partner in Jayaram & Jayaram, Bangalore managing a portfolio of work that has a strong focus on IT/IP and commercial work, especially with an international angle and is a fellow of the Centre for Internet and Society. She works with CIS in its efforts to explore, understand, and affect the shape and form of the Internet, and its relationship with the cultural and social milieu of our time.

More info on Malavika Jayaram can be found here

Vivek Durai

Vivek G Durai is co-founder and managing partner at Atman Law Partners. He represents Indian and overseas clients in connection with their India entry strategies, venture capital and private equity investments, infrastructure projects, technology contracts, procurement and supply agreements and real estate investments.

More info on Vivek Durai can be found here

Professor (Dr.) Sudhir Krishnaswamy

Prof. Sudhir Krishnaswamy graduated from National Law School Bangalore with a BA LLB (Hons) degree. He then went onto finish a BCL and DPhil in Law from the University of Oxford on a Rhodes Scholarship. He has taught at National Law School, Bangalore and Pembroke College, University of Oxford among other places. His research interests include constitutional law, administrative law, intellectual property law, legal profession and reform of the legal system.

More info on Prof. Krishnaswamy can be found here

Admission will not charged but in order to enable us to ensure adequate seating, do register without fail by the 18th of May by email at editorialboard@ijlt.in.

Updates regarding the conference will be posted here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/events/ijlt-cis-lecture-series

The Quixotic Fight to Clean up the Web

sunil — 2012-01-26T20:53:02Z

The ongoing attempt to pre-screen online content won’t change anything. It will only drive netizens into the arms of criminals, writes Sunil Abraham in this article published in Tehelka Magazine, Vol 9, Issue 04, Dated 28 Jan 2012.

GOOGLE AND Facebook’s ongoing case in the Delhi High Court over offensive online content is curious in three ways. First, the complaint does not mention the IT Act, 2000. Prior to the 2008 amendment, intermediaries (in this case, Google, Facebook, etc) had no immunity. But after the amendment, intermediaries have significant immunity and are not considered liable unless takedown notices are ignored.

Second, it is curious that the complaint does not mention specific individuals or groups directly responsible for authoring the allegedly offensive material. Only intermediaries have been explicitly named. If specific content items have been submitted in court then it is curious that specific accounts and users have not been charged with the same offences.

Three, Delhi-based journalist Vinay Rai claims that takedown notices and requests for user information were ignored by the intermediaries. As yet, unpublished research at the Centre for Internet and Society has reached the exact opposite conclusion. We sent fraudulent takedown notices to seven of the largest intermediaries in India as part of a policy sting operation. Six of them over-complied and demonstrated no interest in protecting freedom of expression. Our takedown notices were complied with even though they were largely nonsensical. It is therefore curious that Rai’s takedown notices were ignored.

Under Section 79 of the IT Act, the intermediary must not “initiate the transmission”, “select the receiver of the transmission” and “select or modify the information contained in the transmission”. In other words, they must not possess “actual knowledge” of the content. This would be absolutely true if intermediaries acted as “dumb pipes” or “mere conduits”. But today, they have reactive “human filters” ensuring conformance to community guidelines that often go beyond constitutional limits on freedom of expression.

For example, Facebook deletes breastfeeding photographs if a certain proportion of the breast is visible, despite numerous protests. Intermediaries also use proactive “machine filters” to purge their networks of pornography and copyright infringing content. In order to retain immunity under the IT Act, intermediaries would have to demonstrate that they have no “actual knowledge”. This would also imply that they cannot proactively filter or pre-screen content without becoming liable for illegal content.

More sophisticated “machine filters” will continue to be built for social media platforms as computing speeds increase and costs decrease dramatically. But there will be significant collateral damage — the vibrancy of online Indian communities will be diminished as legitimate content will be removed and this in turn will retard Internet adoption rates. Free media, democratic governance, research and development, culture and the arts will all be fundamentally undermined. So whether pre-censorship is technically feasible is an irrelevant question. The real question is what limits on freedom of expression are reasonable in the Internet age.

The legal tussle is yet another chance for reflecting on the shortcomings of the IT Act

Censorship is like prohibition, illegal content will persist, the mafia will profit and ordinary citizens will be implicated in criminal networks. Use of anonymising proxies, circumvention tools and encryption technologies will proliferate, frustrating network optimisation efforts and law enforcement activities.

This is yet another opportunity for reflecting on the shortcomings of the ITAct. A lot of the confusion and anxiety today emerges from vague language, unconstitutional limits on freedom of expression, multi-tiered blanket surveillance provisions, blunt security policy measures contained in the statute and its associated rules. The next Parliament session is the last opportunity for MPs to ask for the rules for intermediaries, cyber cafes and reasonable security practices to be revisited. The MP who musters the courage to speak will be dubbed a superhero.

As told to Shonali Ghosal. Sunil Abraham is Executive director, centre for internet and society and can be contacted at sunil@cis-india.org. The original article was published in Tehelka.

Illustration by Sudeep Chaudhuri

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/quixotic-fight-to-clean-the-web

The Public Voice: Privacy Rights are a Global Challenge

praskrishna — 2012-10-22T14:28:09Z

October 21, 2012 is an important day for global civil society defending privacy and free speech. The Public Voice coalition will be hosting a global conference in Punta del Este, Uruguay, and you are invited to take part in the conversation and interact with the panelists. Malavika Jayaram is speaking at this event.

You can follow the live conversation here, and join the conversation by using #thepublicvoice hashtag, ask questions, participate in polls and interact with those covering the event in several languages. The conference aims to assess cultures and privacy perspectives from around the World, and members of civil society wil discuss the spread of Surveillance Technologies and its implications in societies, experts will explore Latin American policy, law, and technology perspectives on privacy governance and suggest to governments and private sector to safeguard citizens privacy.

You can read the program and follow the live Webcast in English and Spanish.

During the day the panelists will assess cultures and privacy perspectives from around the world. They will raise public awareness of surveillance technology and its consequences to consumers, for freedom of expression and human rights, and they will explore Latin American policy, law, and technology perspectives. It is the small window civil society has before the 34th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners comprising all the governmental agencies all over the World, webcast available here. It certainly can bring the relevant topics for citizens to the discussion table. I hope you join us.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/privacy-rights-are-a-global-challenge

The Privatisation of Censorship: The Online Responsibility to Protect Free Expression

praskrishna — 2012-12-09T01:48:13Z

Pranesh Prakash was a panelist at this workshop organised on November 5, 2012. It was organized by Index on Censorship.

Much is known about state censorship, but increasingly private corporations are implementing censorship either at the behest of governments, or as part of a ‘walled garden’ approach. This censorship takes many guises: whether the proactive take-down of entirely legal material, the blocking of websites by overly zealous ISPs, mobile filters that cut access to websites such as Index on Censorship and the use of surveillance technology on behalf of autocratic states. The combination of state-led censorship with the privatisation of censorship requires a debate on the responsibilities of corporations and the framework needed to protect free expression online.

This side session will focus on two key areas:
1. Take-down, blocking and filtering of content
2. The export of surveillance technology, privacy

The panel will explore the ways in which the above can affect free expression online, and how civil society, governments and corporations can and should approach these issues, addressing the following questions:

1. Whether, why and in what ways censorship and surveillance is either as or more pervasive, intrusive and chilling than offline, and the impact on free speech and press freedom?
2. The inappropriate, intrusive or excessive use of filters and firewalls including how these impact directly and indirectly on access to media and the nature of news provision
3. Criminalisation of free speech and free expression – chilling use of takedown requests (impacting on public online debates, on media freedom including investigative journalism), and constraints on comment and debate (twitter, trolls, comment threads etc);
4. Excessive and blanket surveillance and data-gathering
5. Regulations and laws including intermediary responsibility that curtail digital free speech

Chair:
Michael Harris, Head of Advocacy, Index on Censorship

Panelists:

Dr Hosein Badran, Regional Chief Technology Officer, Cisco Systems International, covering MENA
Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director at the Centre for Internet and Society
Abhilash Nair, Northumbria University, UK
Camino Manjon Sierra, International Relations Policy Officer, Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, European Commission
Andrew Puddephatt, Global Partners and Associates

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/privatisation-of-censorship

The Privacy (Protection) Bill 2013: A Citizen's Draft

bhairav — 2013-07-12T11:50:20Z

The Centre for Internet and Society has been researching privacy in India since 2010 with the objective of raising public awareness around privacy, completing in depth research, and driving a privacy legislation in India. As part of this work, Bhairav Acharya has drafted the Privacy (Protection) Bill 2013.

This research was undertaken as part of the 'SAFEGUARDS' project that CIS is undertaking with Privacy International and IDRC.

The Privacy (Protection) Bill 2013 contains provisions that speak to data protection, interception, and surveillance. The Bill also establishes the powers and functions of the Privacy Commissioner, and lays out offenses and penalties for contravention of the Bill. The Bill represents a citizen's version of a possible privacy legislation for India, and will be shared with key stakeholders including civil society, industry, and government.

Click to download a full draft of the Privacy (Protection) Bill, 2013.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy-protection-bill-2013-citizens-draft