Centre for Internet and Society

Copyright Amendment Bill in Parliament

nirmita — 2011-08-30T09:26:44Z

The Copyright Amendment Bill is expected to be presented in the Rajya Sabha by the Minister for Human Resource and Development, Kapil Sibal today afternoon. The much awaited Bill (since it has been in the offing since 2006) has undergone significant changes since its initial appearance.

Given below is a very quick first cut highlight of the Bill from a public interest perspective. A more detailed analysis will follow after the session discussions.

Parallel imports: The parallel imports clause which had been put in as sec 2(m) has now been dropped from the present draft. This is a big setback because educational institutions, libraries and archives, second hand book, etc., were looking to this provision to bring down the prices and hasten the availability of books. This also affects persons with disabilities since they will be unable to import books in accessible formats.
Persons with disabilities: There are two provisions relating to persons with disabilities which have been introduced. Section 52 (1) (zb) relates to the conversion, reproduction, issues of copies or communication to the public of any work in any accessible format, provided that these activities are meant to enable access to persons with disabilities and sufficient safeguards are taken to ensure that these materials do not enter the mainstream market. This section in a sense is broader and more encompassing than some provisions found in other countries, which relate exclusively to the blind or visually impaired. This section would adequately cover persons with other disabilities who cannot read print. A new section 31B also provides for compulsory licensing for profit entities wishing to convert and distribute works in accessible formats, provided that they are primarily working for persons with disabilities and are registered under sec 12A of the Income Tax Act or under chapter X of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995.
Many exceptions under 52 (1) (i) relating to fair dealing have been extended to all works except computer programmes. New sections 52 (1) (b) and (c) protect transient and incidental storage from being classified as infringing copies, which offers protection to entities such as online intermediaries.
The scope of compulsory licensing under sec 31 has been expanded from ‘any Indian work’ to ‘any work’. Three new sections 31 B, 31C and 31 D have been introduced. Section 31 B has already been described in the paragraph on persons with disabilities. Section 31 C lays down strict measures relating to statutory licensing in case of cover version, being a sound recording of a literary, dramatic or musical work. Section 31 D relates to statutory licenses for broadcasting organizations wishing to broadcast a literary or musical work or sound recording.
Non commercial public libraries can now store electronic copies of any non digital works they own (52(n)).
The new Bill introduces Technological protection measures (65A and 65B) and makes circumvention and distribution of works in which rights managements systems have been removed an offence which is punishable with imprisonment upto two years as well as fine. In addition the copyright owner can also avail of civil remedies. As such India is not really required to have these provisions in the copyright legislation since we are not yet a signatory to the WCT or the WPPT and such provisions will hamper consumer interests.
Terms of copyright have been increased significantly without reason, thus preventing works from falling into the public domain. For instance, the term of photographs has been increased from 60 years to life of the photographer plus 60 years. This is far in excess of the minimum term stipulated by international treaties.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/copyright-bill-parliament

Copy, Left And Right

praskrishna — 2012-05-23T06:37:53Z

Copyright laws are becoming more rigid and anti-sharing. But copyleft has a solution.

The article by Shruti Yadav was published in Outlook Business on February 19, 2011. Pranesh Prakash was quoted in this article.

Underlying some of the most ancient Indian literature is a unique concept—sruti, or divine revelation. Much of this Vedic literature is supposed to have been revealed by the Gods to sages, who then passed it on orally from generation to generation till the formation of the written word, when it was codified. By claiming this divine connection, the authors didn’t just immortalise themselves and their works, they also renounced ownership of it. They presented themselves as humble storytellers, who needed the audience to tell the story again and again to keep it alive, just like the Gods needed them to tell it for the first time.

The transfer of knowledge freely wasn’t limited to India. In the ancient systems of medicine, schools of art, mythology and folklore, there is striking and frequent cross-referentiality across civilisations. Of course, knowledge was at a premium even in these societies, but no one claimed ownership of it.

Then, as increasing democratisation of knowledge threatened established political, religious and commercial interests, the western world awoke to the necessity of copyright, which evolved as a protection for monopolies over technology, research and works of art, and now is strangling even those who produce the work in the first place. So, after transferring the copyrights to their work, people often find that their lives are dictated to by studios, publishers and software companies, through complex and rigorous laws that concentrate on profiteering to the exclusion of everything else, including the freedoms of the author and the user.

It is in the assertion of the freedom, of both the source of the work, and its users, that copyleft is becoming the voice of a growing number of people. The copyleft movement can be said to have been started by Richard Stallman, founder of the Free Software Foundation (FSF), who developed the GNU operating system that, with the incorporation of the Linux kernel made free by its proprietor Linus Torvalds, became Gnu/Linux. His General Public Licence (GPL) is the byword in protecting user freedom.

So, what is copyleft? It is a form of copyright, but unlike copyright that reserves all rights related to a work, copyleft allows users to copy, modify and distribute the work, with the rider that the resulting copies come with the same freedom. Creative Commons, the non-profit global organisation that helps people copyleft their work, calls this ShareAlike.

Sharing is a contentious issue today. Because of digital technology, which allows us to copy and share virtually free of cost, knowledge and art are easily and cheaply accessible. Unfortunately, this has resulted in a stricter regime that routinely criminalises schoolchildren for downloading the latest songs from the Internet. If you buy a car, and lend it your friend, can the car company claim you are a criminal? But it is the technicality of making a copy for the purpose of sharing that makes a vice out of a natural human impulse. As Karsten Gerloff, President, FSF Europe, puts it, “When laws clash with common sense, on such an enormous, global scale, we don’t need to change common sense. We need to change the laws.” A purist when it comes to freedom, Stallman echoes this sentiment in stronger words, “Laws against sharing are attacks on society. "Anyone who tries to stop people from sharing has declared himself the enemy of us all.”

Richard Stallman, Founder and President, Free Software Foundation

Copyright Protects Work... Or Does It?

Two arguments often misused to justify the strict, all-rights-reserved policy of copyright are that it prevents plagiarism and incentivises innovation and creativity. The argument of plagiarism can easily be dismissed. As Pranesh Prakash, Programme Manager, Centre For Internet And Society points out, “No licence can take away the right of a person to be identified with his or her work. The moral rights of a person are non-transferable.” The second argument is more insidious.

When Nina Paley released her critically acclaimed animation film, Sita Sings The Blues, she chose a Creative Commons By-SA licence. This means anybody could copy, modify and distribute the work under the same licence. Paley says, “I wanted my film to reach the widest audience...ShareAlike would prevent the work from being ever locked up. It’s better than Public Domain; works are routinely removed from the Public Domain via privatised derivatives.” So copyright doesn’t really protect the work; often people who decide its destiny have not even made it in the first place. In fact, Gerloff points out, “Copyright makes it possible for individuals to appropriate traditional stories and mythical characters as Disney has done with the folk tales collected by the Brothers Grimm and others. Anyone who tries to return those characters to the popular imagination is immediately torn apart by a screaming horde of Disney lawyers.” So, is it an incentive for the artist, the software-maker, or the scientist?

Of course, there is a financial aspect of the question. Most people who use copyleft licences do not become millionaires overnight. But they do make money. Within a year of her film’s release, Paley made $132,000, recovering about half the cost of production. The money came from donations, awards, screenings, merchandising and sharing of revenue by people who made derivative works. Best of all, Paley could choose her revenue models, without restricting her audience. Compare this with lyricist Javed Akhtar being banned by the Film Federation of India for lobbying in Parliament for better royalty for lyricists and composers—the new law proposes to improve their lot by giving them 12.5% each, while 75% still goes to the producers.

How Copyleft Helps

On the economic side of the argument for copyleft is also the fact that making a work available for others to modify leads to improved quality and saves costs of duplication of work. Android is an example of sharing driving innovation, though, according to Stallman, it compromises the spirit of free software, as many phones with Android systems don’t let users install modified versions of the software but let software companies do so. Finally, free market logic should make absolute copyright redundant. As Paley points out, “Copyright is an artificial monopoly. Monopolies are inherently at odds with competition and free trade."

While knowledge-based economies are still reluctant to give up their old habits, legislators in countries like India have to make a choice. Shishir K Jha, Project Leader, Creative Commons India, says, “We need to take a view: do we want to make information scarce or easily available? Because this has implications in many areas—education, health, R&D."

Artists who copyleft their work do make money; they distribute their work without restricting its audience.

In the Mahabharata, the tribal boy Eklavya wants to learn archery from Dronacharya—the teacher of the Pandavas and Kauravas—who has vowed to teach only the royal princes. Determined, Eklavya makes a clay statue of his revered teacher and learns on his own, soon becoming the best archer in the kingdom, even better than Arjun, Dronacharya’s favourite student. So what does the teacher do when he finds out? As guru-dakshina, (the obligatory payment for teaching), he asks for Eklavya’s right thumb, thus cutting him off (literally) from his self-taught skill.

Those seeking to establish a knowledge monopoly often operate through a set of cruel and unfair laws. Should we stop sharing?

Licences for Freedom

Bridging the gap between Copyright and Public Domain.

Art Libre: Allows users to copy, modify and incorporate a creative work, including for commercial use, as long as subsequent versions are licenced under the same or a compatible licence. The user must specify if the original is modified and credit the original artist. A creative work may be physical or digital—text, sound, video—anything over which the maker has a copyright.

GNU/ GPL: Allows users to copy, modify and incorporate the work, including for commercial purposes. The licence is passed on automatically with subsequent versions. A person can’t compromise user freedom by using a GPL software as part of a version that is licenced under conditions (or is subject to legislations) that infringe on the rights granted by the GPL licence. In case of a clash, the use of the GPL software is simply invalid.

Creative Commons (CC) has several licences, which are essentially combinations of a few standard criteria:

Attribution: Maker’s name.
Share-alike: The stipulation that copies, modifications or derivatives be passed on under the same conditions.
Derivatives: The licencee can chose whether or not to allow derivatives of his work.
Comercial use: The licencee can choose whether or not to allow copies, derivatives and subsequent versions to be used for commercial use.

As a result, we have six types of licences:

CC BY or Attribution
CC BY-SA or Attribution-ShareAlike
CC BY-ND or Attribution-NoDerivatives
CC BY-NC or Attribution-NonCommercial
CC BY-NC-SA or Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike
CC BY-NC-ND or Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives

Paley warns: Use a truly Free licence, such as ShareAlike or ArtLibre. NEVER use a “non-commercial” or “no-derivatives” licence. Those are not copyleft and are incompatible with Free Culture.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/copy-left-and-right

Consumers International IP Watchlist 2012 — India Report

pranesh — 2012-08-16T10:23:36Z

Pranesh Prakash prepared the India Report for Consumers International IP Watchlist 2012. The report was published on the A2K Network website.

Summary

India's Copyright Act is a relatively balanced instrument that recognises the interests of consumers through its broad private use exception, and by facilitating the compulsory licensing of works that would otherwise be unavailable. However, the compulsory licensing provision have not been utilized so far, because of both a lack of knowledge and more importantly because of the stringent conditions attached to them. Currently, the Indian law is also a bit out of sync with general practices as the exceptions and limitations allowed for literary, artistic and musical works are often not available with sound recordings and cinematograph films. There are numerous other such inconsistencies. Positively retrogressive provisions, such as criminalisation of individual non-commercial infringement also exist. India's Copyright Act is a relatively balanced instrument that recognises the interests of consumers through its broad private use exception, and by facilitating the compulsory licensing of works that would otherwise be unavailable. However, the compulsory licensing provision have not been utilized so far, because of both a lack of knowledge and more importantly because of the stringent conditions attached to them. Currently, the Indian law is also a bit out of sync with general practices as the exceptions and limitations allowed for literary, artistic and musical works are often not available with sound recordings and cinematograph films. There are numerous other such inconsistencies. Positively retrogressive provisions, such as criminalisation of individual non-commercial infringement also exist.

It is unfortunate that the larger public interest in copyright-related issues are never foregrounded in India. For instance, the Standing Committee tasked with review of the Copyright Amendment Bill has held hearings without calling a single consumer rights organization, and without seeking any civil society engagement, except for the issue of access for persons with disabilities. This was despite a number of civil society organizations, including consumer rights organizations, sending in a written submission to the Standing Committee.

This lopsidedness in terms of policy influence is resulting in greater imbalance in the law, as evidenced by the government's capitulation to a handful of influential multinational book publishers on the question of allowing parallel importation of copyrighted works. Furthermore, pressure from the United States and the European Union, in the form of the Special 301 report and the India-EU free trade agreement that is being negotiated are leading to numerous negative changes being introduced into Indian law, despite us not having any legal obligation under any treaties. Such influence only works in one direction: to increase the rights granted to rightsholders, and has so far never included any increase in user rights.

It is true that copyright infringement, particularly in the form of physical media, is widespread in India. However this must be taken in the context that India, although fast-growing, remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Although India's knowledge and cultural productivity over the centuries and to the present day has been rich and prodigious, its citizens are economically disadvantaged as consumers of that same knowledge and culture. Indeed, most students, even in the so-called elite institutions, need to employ photocopying and other such means to be able to afford the requisite study materials. Visually impaired persons, for instance, have no option but to disobey the law that does not grant them equal access to copyrighted works. Legitimate operating systems (with the notable exception of most free and open source OSes) add a very high overhead to the purchase of cheap computers, thus driving users to pirated software. Thus, these phenomena need to be addressed not at the level of enforcement, but at the level of supply of affordable works.

Source URL: http://bit.ly/QEJf5l
Click to download the report [PDF, 201 Kb]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/consumers-international-ip-watchlist-report-2012

Comparative Transparency Review of Collective Management Organisations in India, United Kingdom and the United States

maggie — 2015-08-21T17:12:10Z

This Transparency Review seeks to compare the publicly available information on the websites of music collective management organizations (“CMOs”) operating within India, the United States, and the United Kingdom. A total of 10 CMOs were selected, which included a range of non-profit, government registered organizations to for-profit, private organizations, managing works on behalf of record labels, publishers, composers, lyricists, and music performers. This exercise intends to contribute to the growing body of research on the relationship between transparency and effectiveness of CMOs. It concludes with recommendations and learnings which may lead to more transparent and effective functioning of copyright societies in India, and management of music copyright overall.

The research paper was co-authored by Maggie Huang, Arpita Sengupta, Paavni Anand.

Taking into account the needs of users and members of CMOs, the following pieces of information was determined to be useful to report on the websites: : membership lists, governing directors, user types, tariff rates, royalty distribution schemes, and annual revenue reports. Collectively, the presence of these became rough parameters for transparency. The authors then reviewed each website to determine whether this information was made publicly available, and whether such disclosure was voluntary or mandated by law. As a proxy for effectiveness, percentage of revenue distributed as royalties was calculated for those who made their annual revenue report available.

Broadly, the review found that India's 2012 Copyright Amendment Act and 2013 Copyright Rules were by far the most stringent regarding registration, operations, rate setting, and reporting. Despite India's strict laws, it appears there is little compliance, particularly by PPL which failed to report the mandated tariff rates, royalty distribution policy, and its annual revenue report. ISRA had all the information sought on their website except for the crucial annual revenue report. IPRS however clearly made an effort to comply, with all information sought, provided.

Relative to India, CMOs in the United Kingdom were regulated less strictly, with U.K.'s 2014 Copyright Regulations allowing self regulation provided CMOs follow guidelines to comply with the operating code of conduct. All six indicators were available on websites of both UK PPL and PRS for Music, although the latter required user authorization to access membership/repertoire data.

In comparison, the U.S. seems to have the most lax reporting standards of the three, really only mandating basic reporting for CMOs administering statutory licenses. However, similar to India, rate-setting in the U.S. for certain digital broadcasts are subject to significant government control, in addition to anticompetetive measures which prevent partial withdrawal of rights from certain CMOs’ blanket licenses. Availability of information varied, with BMI and Sound Exchange complying with the more demanding parts of US legislation and disclosing all information sought, while ASCAP and HFA were missing tariff rates and user types respectively. SESAC was the least informative, with governing directors absent, and more crucially, their annual revenue report.

To determine relative efficiency, the authors calculated the percentage of royalties distributed per total revenue for those CMOs which published their revenue reports. All distributed royalties ranged between 80%-90%. Though not necessarily the most accurate measure, there appeared no significant correlation between the percentage of distributed royalties, and amount of information found; therefore a correlation between effectiveness and information transparency remain unknown.

However, throughout the exercise, the limitations of the research design became clear, leading to its own learnings for future research. Methodologically, the more attention should have been paid to spanning a wider spectrum of legal control, drawing clear lines of which types of CMOs to include in the study, being careful not to equate presence of information with usability or effectiveness, deeper assessment of the legal provisions, and the inclusion of membership exclusive data as part of the exercise.

Nevertheless, the comparative review process did produce several learnings that Indian CMOs could adopt for enhanced transparency and potentially improved effectiveness as well. These recommendations are as follows:

Publish the full repertoire of works the CMO is authorized to license, and its corresponding rights holder information in a searchable format;
Provide a platform for collectively identifying the rights-holder of orphan works (works which are registered whose royalties are collected, but ownership information is unknown);
Guide new users and potential members through a more user-friendly designed page with simplified, accessible introduction to music licensing;
Increase clarity surrounding royalty distribution policies;
Publish updated annual revenue reports; and
Clarify the dispute resolution processes.

This review concludes by suggesting future research through stronger methodological design, further exploring membership exclusive data, assessing effectiveness outcomes between multiple, competing licensing bodies versus a single, state-granted monopoly society, and the possibility of alternative compensation schemes for music financing and production.

MOTIVATIONS FOR RESEARCH: MUSIC COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT IN THE MOBILE MUSIC AGE for the PERVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT

Managing copyright in the digital age is one of the most contentious issues today amongst music industries globally. Innovation in digital technologies has opened up formerly restricted production and distribution channels, resulting in a proliferation of music like never before.

The mobile phone is one of these innovations, particularly since becoming the most preferred music listening device in India. [1] The overarching utility of the mobile phone has made it the object of study for the Centre for Internet and Society's Pervasive Technologies project[2], which seeks to identify intellectual property levers which can enhance access to affordable mobile devices' hardware, software, and content within India and China.

Access to music content[3] via the mobile phone is one of the chapter's primary focus, with a research objective of balancing access to music for internet and mobile consumers, while ensuring the protection of rights and remuneration for artists and creators.

The initial phases of this research found that new stakeholders such as device manufacturers, telecom operators, and streaming services were developing business models based on a free, ad-supported service with a paid premium tier, ultimately resulting in high royalty payouts and low profit margins. However, artists in India and worldwide are raising grievances due to decreasing royalty revenue, putting to question whether these business models are sustainable in the long term.

We had hoped to answer these questions within the Indian context, but the findings were ultimately inconclusive. This was primarily due to two reasons: 1) lack of data transparency at multiple levels of the music distribution chain, and 2) a copyright management system heavily in flux due to poor enforcement of the ambiguous 2012 Copyright Amendment Act. The copyright societies in India embodied both these issues in India, resulting in a need to study these institutions further as one of the main objects of research.

INTRODUCTION to COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS and the NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY

Music copyright societies, commonly referred to as collecting agencies or collective management organizations ("CMOs") provides music rights holders (authors, owners, and performers of lyrics, compositions, and sound recordings) the ability to authorize the licensing of their copyrighted works to another body (the CMO) who can collect royalties from the numerous sources of usage on behalf of its members. If the law allows, these CMOs are also able to collectively negotiate for rates as well. Royalties derived from these licenses are often collected and distributed by CMOs as a source of income for the creators of musical works, after administrative costs are deducted.

CMOs and their rights-holder members represent a principle-agent relationship as agent-CMOs collects royalties from users on behalf of its principle rightsholder-members. However, if a conflict of interest arises, the inherent information asymmetry may give rise to abuse. In the case of CMOs, this standard principle-agent problem has manifested in forms ranging from inefficient administration overhead, to more dubious acts of corruption and collusion.

Economic theory tells us that the key to a free and fair market is "perfect information", or when stakeholders are equipped with the relevant information needed to make market decisions. Information enforces accountability, an idea that sparked the Right to Information movement in India. This is why transparency is especially critical in the music industry, characterized by complex revenue and consumption patterns, an intricate copyright law framework and stakeholders with varying levels of bargaining power.

Given many CMOs operate as state-granted monopolies which exclusively administer specific class of works, it is important that the collection and distribution of royalties occur in a transparent manner so members and regulators can scrutinize its functioning to ensure greatest effectiveness. For countries which allow competition between CMOs, transparency in operations and revenue data can provide users and members the ability to make an informed choice, and the opportunity for other competing players to enter the market.

Within India, transparency has been a recurring issue due to allegations of mismanagement and corruption[4] of the copyright societies. This was one of the motivations for the 2012 Copyright Amendment and subsequent2013 Copyright Rules which attempted to address, amongst other issues, regulations around transparency for registered copyright societies in India.

Thus, in light of new transparency and operations regulations for India, and inconclusive research findings due to sparse data, the authors sought to review the transparency of various CMO websites and their corresponding regulatory measures in the hopes of answering the following questions:

1. How does India's level of CMO transparency compare to other countries?

2. Is disclosure of information a result of regulatory pressures or voluntary?

3. What kind of learnings and recommendations can be made from the voluntary information disclosure and/or legal regulatory environments of other countries?

METHODOLOGY

Selecting countries for comparison

Since one of the broader goals of this review was to identify legal and/or industry led proposals for increased CMO effectiveness in India, the authors wanted to select case study country samples which were relevant and useful for the Indian context, while also considering differing legal and regulatory regimes.

The United States was chosen due to its competitive CMO structure where multiple CMOs administering the same class of musical works, and representing similar kinds of rights-holders can co-exist as private entities. Aside from statutory rate-setting of sound recording broadcasts, and anticompetitive consent decrees for ASCAP and BMI, the United States seem to have little to no regulation overall surrounding CMO operations and management.

The United Kingdom was selected due to its recent growing interests in the Indian music industry. This was demonstrated by the high volume of British attendants at recent Indian music industry conferences , several of which were directly sponsored by UK Trade & Investment as a music trade export mission.[5] In addition, U.K.'s CMO structure seemed to be more streamlined, with class of works separately managed under two main music CMOs.

Indian research participants of ongoing research also expressed interest in registering their musical works with CMOs in the U.S. and U.K. given increasing market demand, higher currency exchange, and increased reliability of royalty receipts. This was further indication of relevant country case studies for a comparison with India.

Identifying the Relevant CMOs

Due to challenges enforcing India's 2012 Copyright Amendment Act, and subsequent ambiguity of copyright societies' registration statuses, the selection criteria for CMOs consisted of those organizations which generally issued music licenses and collected royalty revenue on behalf of other rights-holder members.

In India, the following three CMOs were identified for this review: the Indian Performing Right Society ("IPRS") which collects on behalf of composers, lyricists, and publisher-members[6]; the Phonographic Performance Limited ("PPL") which exclusively controls public performance and broadcasting rights for its music label members[7]; and the Indian Singers Rights Association ("ISRA") which is currently the sole officially registered copyright society collecting on behalf of singers for their Performer's Rights. [8]

The status of IPRS and PPL as registered societies are ambiguous due to recent reports of registration withdrawal [9]; therefore compliance to Section 33 of the Copyright Act is uncertain. However, the authors chose to uphold the same standards in this review due to similarity in purpose and functioning.

In the U.S., the identified CMOs included the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP"), Broadcast Music, Inc, ("BMI") and SESAC (originally the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers) which are all competing Performing Rights Organizations collecting on behalf of songwriters and music publishers for public performance rights. SoundExchange is responsible for managing digital sound recordings for copyright owners (mostly music labels) and performing artists; while Harry Fox Agency ("HFA") collects mechanical royalties on behalf of publishers and songwriters when their compositions are reproduced.

In the U.K., two CMOs were identified: PRS for Music which manages public performance rights on behalf of songwriters, composers, and music publishers; and Phonographic Performance Limited ("PPL-UK"), which manages the rights of performers and record producers. Unlike the United States and India, each society exclusively manages separate categories of works. Although technically a compulsory collective licensing scheme is mandated under Indian copyright law for musical works incorporated in cinematograph films or sound recordings, ambiguity in India remains due to the unregistered/deregistered yet still functioning licensing bodies.

Identifying the comparative parameters

To compare CMOs transparency, the authors sought to develop a feasible proxy to determine their website's degree of disclosure. This was done considering two main stakeholders who most often access CMO websites: rights-holders, and users. The rights holders are owners and/or authors of a copyright or related right (i.e. performer's right) who is a member, has sought membership, or is a potential member of the CMO. The user is any person or organization who seeks to use the copyrighted work and is hence made to pay a fee for such use. This fee is generally based on the licensing agreement, struck between the CMO and the user on behalf of their collective rights holders.

Thus, the following information was identified to be useful for comparative assessment: list of members, governing directors, usage types, tariff rates, royalty distribution policy, annual revenue report, and percentage of distributed royalties. The justifications, and comparative findings are outlined below.

FINDINGS

List of members

Publishing members lists is useful for potential users since it can collectively reduce search costs for ownership information, making the process of licensing and royalty collection more efficient overall. In addition, users approached for licensing payment can also verify that the CMO is indeed authorized to administer those works. This has been a recurring issue in recent history for CMOs in both the United States [10] and India[11], which have reported extortion-like licensing demands for songs which may not have been even owned by their member rights-holders. Some have been alleged to demand licenses for broad, undefined catalogs like entire genres of music.[12] Having members lists published can prevent these discrepancies.

In India, all identified CMOs published their membership lists in accordance with Rule 66, section 1(c) of the Copyright Rules, which mandates the disclosure of members lists explicitly on the website.

In the U.S., all CMOs have published their membership data either as full lists or in the form of a searchable repertoire database corresponding with the specific work. This presentation format was similar in the U.K. although PRS for Music restricted access to authorized users. Nevertheless, this disclosure went beyond U.K.'s Copyright Regulations which only require the number of rights holders represented, whether as members or non-member rights holders to be published in the annual report. To the authors' knowledge, the U.S. does not seem to have an equivalent law as such.

Several CMO websites in the U.S. and U.K. also feature a search for owners of orphan works - copyrighted songs within their catalog in which the due rights-holders are unable to be contacted, or simply unknown due to a multitude of reasons, including lack of data collection, transfer of rights, unknown inheritance from deceased rights holders, amongst others. Many of these CMOs hold undistributed royalties for these works, bringing to question whether rights-holder members truly give genuine authorization for their continued licensing.

India's CMOs could enhance their transparency by adopting the repertoire format of membership disclosure which corresponds with each copyrighted work. It could also provide a platform to collectively identify orphan works' due rights-holders.

Country	CMO	List of Members Available on Website?	Regulation?
India	IPRS	Yes	Copyright Rules, 2013, Rule 66 Code of Conduct for Copyright Societies. Section (1): Every society shall make available on its website... c) List of all members in the general body
	PPL	Yes
	ISRA	Yes
United States	ASCAP	Yes, members can be searched through a database[13]	N/A
	BMI	Yes, members can be searched through a database.[14]
	SESAC	Yes, member list available through repertoire search and as downloadable full list.[15]
	SoundExchange	Yes
	HFA	Yes, artists can be individually searched via HFA's 'Songfile' database[16] but not available as a whole
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Yes, repertoire search database including member/label search exists.[17]	The Copyright (Regulation of Relevant Licensing Bodies )Regulations , 2014 Reporting Requirements 6. The code of practice shall require the relevant licensing body to publish an annual report which includes: a) the number of right holders represented, whether as members or through representative arrangements including, where possible and if applicable, an estimate of the number of non-member right holders represented by any Extended Collective Licensing Scheme
	PRS for Music	A database exists but restricted to authorized users

Governing directors

For rights holder members, knowledge of the governing members directing the functioning of the CMO can help ensure decision making occurs in a representative, accountable manner. In 2011, it was found that IPRS and PPL of India were governed by the same Board of Directors [18], despite theoretically managing distinct sets of rights and representing different rights-holder members. Stopps (2013) in WIPO's 'How to Make a Living from Music' states that democratic governance is highly desirable if not essential, since the board structure should ideally reflect the rights they administer.[19]

In India, all CMOs comply with the 2013 Copyright Rules which mandates the publishing of Governing Council members on its website. All CMOs in the United States, with the exception of SESAC have published information on their governing or executive board. SESAC does highlight the appointment of the CEO within its 'news' section, but not in an easily accessible location.

In the UK, the governing directors are disclosed, though not explicitly mandated for disclosure on the website. Copyright Regulations does require the appointment procedure of the Directors and their remuneration be included in the Annual Report. India's 2014 Copyright Rules appears relatively stringent in comparison given the process is specified in detail rather than a self-regulated process.

Country	CMO	Governing Directors Available on Website?	Regulation?
India	IPRS	Yes	Copyright Rules, 2013, Rule 66 Code of Conduct for Copyright Societies. Section (1): Every society shall make available on its website… d) Names and address of chairman, other members of the Governing Council and other officers in the society Copyright Rules 59 Management of Copyright Society (1) Every copyright society shall have… a) General body…b) Governing Council with Chairman… c) a CEO… (3) The Chairman shall be elected by two third of the majority….
	PPL	Yes
	ISRA	Yes
United States	ASCAP	Yes	N/A
	BMI	Yes, management
	SESAC	Appointment of CEO announced under 'News' section.[20] No other members found
	SoundExchange	Yes
	HFA	Yes
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Yes	Copyright (Regulation of Relevant Licensing Bodies) Regulations, 2014 requires the procedure for appointment of Directors, and the list of remuneration of the Directors to be included in the Annual Report.
	PRS for Music	Yes

User Categories

The categorization of users simply allow potential licensees to understand when they would be legally required to purchase a music license given the scope and scale of their business/usage. User categories can range from restaurants, internet streaming, radio broadcasting, and live performance; to the physical reproduction of a musical composition or sound recording (for example through photocopying of sheet music or burning of CDs).

All CMOs identified had user categories displayed on the websites, with some presenting the distinctions through search options while others outlined usage types as a general list. Only India's Copyright Rules mandated the publishing of different categories of users as part of their tariff scheme.
U.S.'s HFA did not not distinguish licensing requirements by user type, but did communicate when a license would be needed through simple questions regarding usage.

Country	CMO	User categories Available on Website?	Regulation?
India	IPRS	Yes	According to Rule 56 of the Copyright Rules, 2013, it is mandatory for Indian CMOs to publish on their website the different categories of users in their Tariff Scheme
	PPL	Yes
	ISRA	Yes
United States	ASCAP	Yes	N/A
	BMI	Yes, Search bar for user types available
	SESAC	Yes
	SoundExchange	Yes
	HFA	Not specifically, but section on 'What kind of license do I need' delineates user types
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Yes	N/A
	PRS for Music	Yes

Tariff Rates

Tariff rates are the costs of licenses issued by the CMOs. The calculation of these rates are done in a myriad of ways, ranging from being fixed by statutory provisions, set collectively by CMOs, or negotiated privately in a willing buyer-willing seller market. Some rate-setting considerations have included anticipated number of listeners, physical size of establishment, time of music use, number of loudspeakers, etc. Due to similarities in mode and scale of usage, most fixed tariff rates such as blanket licenses offered by CMOs are distinguished by different categories of users, most fixed tariff rates are divided accordingly.

In a market like the U.S. where CMOs compete to sublicense similar kinds of rights, publishing tariff rates can enable comparison of licensing fees for the most cost effective choice.[21] It can also allow users to forecast licensing expenses and adjust their business models or anticipated usage accordingly. Lastly, transparent cost calculations as opposed to hidden negotiated rates can prevent price and user discrimination, since licensees can verify the accuracy of their license charge.

In India, IPRS and ISRA complies to Rule 56 (2) of the Copyright Rules 2014 which mandates the publication of rates distinguished by categories of users, mode of exploitation, user group, durations of use, and territory. In U.K., both CMOs comply with Section 5(c) of their Copyright Regulations 2014 which mandates the publication of 'tariff rates in a uniform format' on the website as part of the monitoring and reporting requirements. In the U.S., all CMOs with the exception of ASCAP publish their tariff rates.

Although the U.S. does not seem to mandate the explicit disclosure of rates, both U.S. and India set statutory rates for certain uses of sound recordings. In the U.S. for example, the rates for ephemeral sound recordings akin to non-interactive, radio-like services are set by the Copyright Royalty Board under S17 USC 112 and 114. Similarly, in India, a statutory rate is also fixed by the Copyright Board for radio broadcasting.

As an anticompetitive measure, music consent decrees in the U.S. also mandate that ASCAP and BMI provide licenses on equivalent, non exclusive terms. This means that while its members can still individually refrain from joining a CMO in its entirety, partial withdrawing of their works from blanket licenses are not allowed.[22]

Despite fairly affordable statutory rates for use in non-interactive services, interactive streaming which seeks to host popular content often still requires direct licensing agreements from major record label conglomerates. Due to the importance of acquiring that content, these labels are often able to negotiate exclusive deals with hidden terms. Evolving music consumption patterns and an inconsistent rate-setting landscape have raised grievances, particularly amongst songwriters. In the U.S., this has led to the Copyright Office's review and reconsideration of the music licensing landscape in recent months, while in India, the cost of content acquisition remain a source of debate by the services.

Country	CMO	Tariff Rates Available on Website?	Regulation?
India	IPRS	Yes, listed as per usage types	Section 33A of the Copyright Act, 1957 and Rule 56 of the Copyright Rules, 2013: ...must indicate separate for categories of users, media of exploitation, user group, durations of use and territory, etc.
	PPL	No
	ISRA	Yes
United States	ASCAP	No, must request	No regulation mandating the disclosure of tariff rates. Consent decrees for BMI/ASCAP as an anticompetitive measure mandates offering of licenses to services on equivalent, non exclusive terms. Statutory rates set by the Copyright Royalty Board under 17 U.S.C. 112 and 114.
	BMI	Yes
	SESAC	Yes
	SoundExchange	Yes
	HFA	Yes, rate charts published[23]
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Yes	The Copyright (Regulation of Relevant Licensing Bodies) Regulations 2014 Section 5 of its Specified Criteria mandates 'provide details of tariffs in a uniform format on its website.
	PRS for Music	Yes

Royalty distribution policy

The royalty distribution policy typically outlines the process and manner of royalty distribution, specifying how royalty is split between member-rights holders and the CMO. It usually notes the frequency of payments as well. Since one of the main reasons a rights-holder seeks membership within a CMO is to ensure their royalties are received on a consistent basis without themselves having to track down all users of their work, a transparent distribution policy is of utmost importance.

In India, IPRS and ISRA published the distribution policy on their website in compliance with Rule 58 of the Copyright Rules. Upon review of both, it was interesting to note the lack of detail in India's policies. Although it is specified in the Act, ISRA does not convey on its website clearly the distribution of percentages, nor the administrative cut it seeks to take. IPRS was very unclear about their frequency of payments, noting that "The distribution of Royalties shall be carried out promptly from time to time", despite the Copyright rules stipulating that the frequency be set at every quarter.

In the U.S., S . 370.5 (c )of the Code of Federal Regulations for statutorily set sound recordings do state that online-published Annual Reports must have information on how royalties are collected, distributed, and spent as administrative expenses. All CMOs seem to comply.

In the UK, Section 6 of the 2014 Copyright Regulations Specified Criteria mandates reporting of the distribution policy in its annual report. Both identified CMOs comply.

Country	CMO	Royalty Distribution Policy Available on Website?	Regulation?
India	IPRS	Yes, although quite vague, unclear frequency of payments[24]	Rule 58 of the Copyright Rules 2013 outline the terms of the Royalty Distribution Policy
	PPL	No
	ISRA	Yes, but vague, unclear re: distribution of percentages and administrative deduction.
United States	ASCAP	Yes, it outlines exactly how it is calculated	For designated collection and distribution companies for use of sound recordings under statutory licenses: S . 370.5 ( c ) of the Code of Federal Regulations , as part of the annual Report, Collectives must indicate how royalties are collected and distributed.
	BMI	Yes, in the Royalty Policy Manual
	SESAC	Yes
	SoundExchange	Yes
	HFA	Yes, rate charts[25] and commission rates revealed.
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Yes	The Copyright (Regulation of Relevant Licensing Bodies) Regulations 2014 Section 6 Reporting Requirements of its Specified Criteria mandates the publishing of the distribution policy in its annual report.
	PRS for Music	Yes

Annual revenue report

The annual revenue report provides an overview of total income, which is particularly important for a CMO acting as a non-profit organization. Rightsholders can assess what the rest of the revenue is being used for, and cross-verify whether the self-reported data is true. For market and policy researchers, the annual revenue report can also provide the breakdown of which licensing services or catalogs are being used. An externally audited revenue report also enhances trust in the organization and ensures reliable financial transparency. Thus, the publication of the annual revenue report forms one of the most important benchmarks of transparency.

In India, only IPRS has published their 2013-14 annual revenue report in compliance with Rule 66 of the Copyright Rules which mandates the publishing of an annual report and audited accounts on their website. None of the other CMOs seem to have done this.

In the United States,S . 370.5 (c ) of the Code of Federal Regulations mandates that CMOs collecting and distributing for statutorily licensed sound recordings must publish their annual revenue report. CMO SoundExchange complies, while HFA does so voluntarily. ASCAP and BMI also post their reports on occasion with a few years missing, but SESAC's report seems to be absent, possibly due to private incorporated company status.

In the UK, both CMOs comply with the 2014 Copyright Regulations under Rule 6 mandating the publication of an annual report.

Country	CMO	Annual Revenue Report Available on Website?	Regulation?
India	IPRS	Yes, for year '13-'14	Rule 66 of the Copyright Rules, 2013, CMOs mandate the publishing of an annual report and audited accounts on their website.
	PPL	No
	ISRA	No
United States	ASCAP	Yes, until 2013	For designated collection and distribution companies for use of sound recordings under statutory licenses: S . 370.5 ( c ) of the Code of Federal Regulations .
	BMI	Sporadically posted
	SESAC	No (possibly because privately held company?)
	SoundExchange	Yes
	HFA	Yes
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Yes, until 2013	In UK, the Copyright (Regulation of Relevant Licensing Bodies) Regulations, 2014 under Rule 6 requires that every CMO publish an annual report containing the annual financial statements, collections from the different licenses and the distribution of royalties.
	PRS for Music	Yes, until 2014

Percentage of Revenue as Distributed Royalties

Given the main function of CMOs are to secure royalties for rights-holders, the percentage of revenue as distributed royalties was calculated using numbers from the latest published annual revenue reports. Although there are differences in CMO mandates and subsequently their investment on litigation and advocacy for example, the proportion of revenue as distributed royalties was used as a simplified proxy of effectiveness for this review. [26]

For those CMOs who published their annual revenue reports, it was found that the percentage of revenue as distributed royalties seemed to range between 80-90%. Given the controversies surrounding collecting societies in India, it was admittedly surprising that IPRS' distributed royalty percentage averaged almost 1% higher than comparable societies in the UK. It is also interesting that the United States seem to have the most efficient CMOs, with two rounding to 90%.

Country	CMO	Data reported on Website	Percentage of Revenue as Distributed Royalties
India	IPRS	From 2013/14 annual revenue report: Net royalties payable: Rs 396743413 / License fees total revenue Rs 470934348:	0.84246013204 = 84.25%
	PPL	N/A	N/A
	ISRA	N/A	N/A
United States	ASCAP	Self reported 88cents/dollar goes back to artists. 2014 Revenue Report: Total receipts: 945 385 Total distribution to members: 850 984	850 984/945 385 = 0.90014544339 90.01%
	BMI	Self reported numbers from press release: "For the fiscal year ending June 30, 2012, BMI reported revenues of $898.7 million and royalty distributions to our affiliates totaling $749.8 million."	749.8 / 898.7 = 0.83431623456 83.43%
	SESAC	N/A
	SoundExchange	Self reported from pre-audit 2013 fiscal report[27]: Total Royalties Collected $656 Total gross distributions $590	590 / 656 = 0.8993902439 89.94%
	HFA	N/A but self reported 11.5% commission[28]	N/A
United Kingdom	PPL UK	Self reported from 2013 financial statement:[29] Total license fee income: £176.9 m Net distributable revenue: £148.4m	0.83889202939 83.89%
	PRS for Music	Self-reported from 2014 annual revenue report[30]: Our royalty revenues for the year were £664.3m, of which we distributed £565.6m to members.	565.6/664.3 = 0.85142255005 85.14%

LIMITATIONS & LEARNINGS

The major limitation of this review is rooted in its various methodological weaknesses, ranging from the sampling of countries, inclusion of ambiguous CMOs, possible bias towards Indian copyright law during the parameter design, limitations of distributed royalties percentage as an effectiveness proxy, lack of measurable factors when attempting to evaluate 'ease of website use', and somewhat shallow legal research. Nevertheless, these were part and parcel of the learnings which stemmed from this review.

Limitations in Country Selection Process

The selection of countries to be assessed was not very methodologically sound. After further literature review, it seems a more representative sample could have been selected. Dr. Fabrice Rochelandet in his 1996 conference paper ' Are Collecting Societies Efficient? An evaluation of collective administration of copyright in Europe' categorized legal supervision systems in the following spectrum: lack of control, control at request, setting up control, permanent control, and extreme control. [31]

Rochelandet (1996) identifies UK as having 'control at request' since decisions surrounding operations are generally left up to the CMO themselves, exemplified by the freedom to develop their own functioning and code of practices, which then must be approved. Control at request is also demonstrated by rights-holder members ability to procure certain documentation upon request, and call upon the tribunals for dispute resolution if desired.

Using this taxonomy, India would likely span across 'setting up control', 'control at request', and possibly 'permanent control'. Setting up control is fitting since the 2012 Copyright Amendment mandates the registration of any organization in the business of issuing and granting licenses for underlying musical works (composition and lyrics) as a 'copyright society'. Typically this requires extensive documentation on procedural and governance matters, most of which is predetermined in detail in the 2012 Copyright Act and 2014 Rules. Permanent control may also apply since the Central Government has powers to cancel the registration of any copyright society and legally cease its functioning. Additionally, quite substantial regulations determine rate setting process and even calculation, as well as distribution of royalties. Lastly, control at request may also be fitting since similar to the UK system, an internal dispute resolution is legally mandated. However, any dispute can also be brought to the quasi-judicial Copyright Board if unable to settle matters internally.

The United States appears as if it would deviate from former examples of more involved legal supervision since it would likely be characterized by 'lack of control'. Few requirements exist regarding specific operations of licensing bodies, with the exception of rate setting for ephemereal sound recordings and anticompetitive consent decrees, the U.S. does provide a contrasting comparative system.

Although these examples do span across part of the spectrum of legal control, a future case study country could include one which mandates complete control such as in the case of Italy with a single state granted monopolist or New Zealand in which a single clearance license is offered to reduce complexity and transaction costs for music users.[32]

Limitations of CMO Identification

Throughout the methodology design, one of the main challenges was deciding which CMOs to include in the review. Due to lack of in-depth knowledge of U.S. and U.K.'s music licensing space, the initial survey and selection included bodies irrelevant to music licensing specifically. Due to the ambiguity in India, all organizations who were involved in some form collective licensing were initially included, including private entities like Novex Communications, and the South Indian Music Companies Association, due to their seeming similarities in functioning. However, they were eventually excluded in the final review to include only those which have received registered society status, or are currently registered as such.

There was also a lack of distinction made between licensing bodies specifically managing underlying works like music composition and lyrics, sound recording (phonographic rights), and performance rights. Although interesting insights may have been able to be drawn between similarly managed members and rights, the disaggregated rights management in the U.S. made these categorizations and comparisons challenging.

Part of the confusion stemmed from the vast variety of CMO systems and characteristics. Ficsor (2003) distinguishes these differences from four varying viewpoints: the level of collectivization, rights' owners freedom of choice, scope of rights and rights-owners covered, and the freedom of CMOs to set rates and other licensing terms.[33] The level of collectivization range in terms of representation, authorization, and even distribution of royalties/returns. The freedom of rights owners' have range in the ability to choose joint management of rights, or even which CMO to manage their rights -- assuming the option is not restricted by their respective copyright laws. The scope of rights and rights owners covered by a CMO varies from exclusively managing its own members rights, occasionally managing other members rights, and occasionally managing all similar members rights with no ability to opt out. Lastly, the freedom of CMOs to set rates and licensing terms range from free negotiations with the possibility of an arbitration body, to legally fixed predetermined rates and conditions.

The tremendous variety of CMO characteristics and the lack of bright lines in defining control factors for this review's selection meant that major music publishers, music services who directly issue payment, and even content aggregators who collate and distribute works for a certain fee could have been included. However, the decision to include only those officially recognized and legally registered as CMOs enhanced the feasibility of this review.

Limitations of Parameter Selection

While reviewing the parameters for transparency, it soon became clear that there were several limitations to the information identified. These include heavy influence in its development from India's context and legal provisions, an assumed value in transparency for transparency's sake, lack of specificity when surveying 'ease of website use', overly simplified proxy for efficiency measurement, a relatively shallow review of the law, and lack of assessment of membership data.

While selecting the comparative parameters, the process of developing a feasible transparency proxy may have been tilted towards the context and legal developments of India. This appeared to be the case when the first round of data collection was inconsistent with further reviews due to what appeared to be differences in the terms being sought - terms used in the Indian Copyright Act - rather than the substance of the content. This is indicative of how India's laws heavily influenced the development of the parameters.

Exposure to mistrust and lack of data in the Indian context may have also led authors to a somewhat presumed ideal of transparency for transparency's sake, implying in a weak correlation between publicly available information, the more effective the website and possibly the CMO . However, Schroff (2014) noted that information overload could occur if a potential licensee is uncertain what they are looking for.[34] From an efficiency point of view, search costs may actually decrease if less information is provided upfront, but better presented in more accessible language and format to guide the user to the relevant information.

Following review of the websites for a list of members, it appears that a more fruitful parameter may have been the publication of actual works and affiliated creators, rather than only the rights-holder members themselves. A grievance occasionally raised is the lack of recognition of composers and producers within a song, since it is typically the singer (or in the case of Indian film music, the actor and the film) who the audience associates with the work. Thus, a full repertoire list could be a useful addition for Indian websites to consider.

The selection of governing directors as a marker of transparency may have also been influenced by India's recent concerns surrounding copyright societies' leadership. Although it is a useful indicator, private, for-profit CMOs which have exclusive membership does not necessarily have the same burdens of a compulsory collective licensing scheme in which representation is necessary. What may be more useful for members is ensuring a dispute resolution process is easily accessible so that any grievances can be taken up through proper channels.

Identifying a relatively simple proxy for effectiveness and efficiency was also challenging. Many CMOs in their annual reports highlighted figures such as 'administrative costs', 'operation costs', 'cost to income ratios', and other similar indicators to report expenses outside of royalty licensing, collection, and distribution. However, due to differences in calculations, a simplified proxy was developed to assess the effectiveness of their core purpose of royalty distribution. However, this calculation does not account for absolute sums, year on year growth, taxation, and other non-monetary benefits. In addition, the differing years, geographies, and class of works makes comparison not very methodologically sound.

The authors had initially included 'ease of website use' as part of the review. However, this parameter was not very clearly developed and defined, and thus reviewed subjectively by different research assistants with varying assessments. Nevertheless, closer attention was paid to web design and user interface to enable greater efficiency in searching for relevant information. Future assessments could measure the number of clicks or amount of time it takes to find a certain piece of oft-sought information.

The assessment of each country's relevant laws was based on whether reporting the information online was mandated by law. However, throughout the exercise it soon became clear that beyond reporting standards, more interesting distinctions such as the level of control and specificity to which the law sought to determine functioning and operations of the CMOs. Although this was briefly touched upon throughout the review, further research should be explored in this area.

Lastly, data the authors did not seek due to logistical limitations were membership-exclusive information. Recent complaints about royalties of streaming services have resulted in the publishing of
numerous HFA and SoundExchange royalty reports by their rights-owners. These reports outline the services and songs from which they have received their royalties, allowing for more informed debate and discussion of royalty payouts and business models of the various digital services. Ongoing research surrounding copyright management in India have found that detailed reports on how royalty was calculated, or from which works/services they were generated are often absent upon receipt of their royalty cheques.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite India's strict legal provisions and control regarding registration, operations, rate setting, and reporting, it appears there is little enforcement and even less compliance, particularly by Phonographic Performance Limited which failed to report tariff rates, royalty distribution policy, and its annual revenue report. The Indian Singers Rights Association published all parameters sought with the exception of their annual revenue report, leaving authors without data needed to calculate the percentage of distributed royalty. The Indian Performing Rights Association provided all information sought in this review, with an 84.25% of revenue as distributed royalties as calculated from its 2013/14 annual revenue report.

Relative to India, CMOs in United Kingdom were regulated less strictly, allowing self-developed codes of conduct providing adherence to certain broad guidelines on operations and reporting. It appears the government only imposes rules in the absence of adequate self-regulation. U.K.'s Phonographic Performance Limited displayed all six indicators sought, with 83.9% as distributed revenues from its 2013 financial statement. PRS for Music did not make its members list and repertoire open to the general public, but did publish all other parameters with 85.1% of distributed revenues as calculated from its 2014 annual revenue report.

To the authors' knowledge, the U.S. has the least operations regulation for CMOs with the exception of reporting laws for those issuing statutory licenses. Anticompetitive consent decrees also prevent partial withdrawal from blanket licenses to ensure non-discrimination towards select services. Despite relaxed regulation, BMI and SoundExchange reported all identified parameters, while ASCAP and HFA reported five, with SESAC only having four. ASCAP, Sound Exchange, and BMI were the only ones to have published their annual revenue report, with percentage of revenue royalty calculated to 90.0%, 89.9%, and 83.4% respectively.

It is important to reiterate however that information transparency demonstrated by CMOs website does not necessarily indicate effectiveness. Though not necessarily the most accurate indicator, there appeared no significant correlation between the percentage of distributed royalties, and amount of information found. All three countries have recently, or are currently undergoing regulatory reviews and reform to enhance copyright management. India's Copyright Amendment Act and Copyright Rules was a response to allegations of corruption and collusion of copyright societies. The legal status of certain CMOs and other private authorized agents not included here are ambiguous. Though they seem to function similarly to private CMOs in the US, whether they will be obliged to comply with copyright societies regulation is uncertain. The United States' Copyright Office has recently undergone a major study of the music licensing landscape. One of the major grievances highlighted was the disparity between negotiated sound recording rates and statutory rates of licenses for works of composers and publishers for the rapidly growing use of internet radio streaming. This disparity is furthered by the aforementioned Consent Decrees. In early 2014, the European Commission had also adopted the Collective Rights Management Directive with the main objectives of increasing transparency and efficiency of CMOs, and to facilitate cross-border licensing for music online. Thus, transparency and increased effectiveness of CMOs particularly in light of the digital age are being made a priority within legislation; and hopefully, in execution as well.

Recommendations

Through reviewing other CMO websites, a few learnings were found which could be adopted by Indian CMOs for enhanced transparency and effectiveness:

Publish a full repertoire of works the CMO is authorized to license with corresponding rights holder information. This recommendation stems from other CMO websites which present their administrable works in a searchable database, allowing users the ability to efficiently identify whether the work they seek to use are covered by the license.
Provide a platform for collectively identifying the due rights-holder of orphan works. This recommendation was a feature found in several other websites which lost contact with the rights holder through failure to update ownership information in the case of rights transfer, changes in contact details ,passing of the original author, unknown inheritance, and more.
Guide new users and potential members through a more user-friendly designed page with simplified, accessible introduction to music licensing. As exemplified by the layout of other websites, the webpage could be subdivided between information useful for prospective or current licensees, and prospective or current member rights-holders. Basic questions framed in accessible language can guide the website user to the correct information.
Increase clarity surrounding royalty distribution policies. During the review, IPRS and ISRA's royalty distribution scheme were noticeably vague. Although ISRA noted the most crucial elements, certain details like how "reliable statistical data" were to be procured and calculated in the case of missing log sheets was absent. IPRS was even more obscure, noting their frequency of royalty distribution would occur "promptly, from time to time."
Publish updated annual revenue reports. This document is probably one of the key indicators of how a CMO is doing financially, and it is important that these are made available so CMOs remain transparent and accountable to its rights-holder members and users.
Clarify dispute resolution processes. This is important particularly for those jurisdictions which do not allow much choice, if at all, between various institutions and rate-setting processes. Membership and representation would ideally provide and promote proper channels for raising and addressing grievances prior to seeking legal remedies.

Further Questions

Although a few insights were found through this review, the numerous limitations indicate a better designed exercise asking different, more nuanced questions may uncover some more fruitful conclusions. Future research could explore membership-exclusive data, and how reporting is presented across CMOs. From a legal standpoint, a more detailed analysis of regulations across different jurisdictions may shed light on different international standards of transparency and reporting. Additionally, given that the highest percentage of distributed royalties were from CMOs based in the U.S., the correlation leads to the question of whether more relaxed reporting requirements, or perhaps a competitive CMO structure can actually contribute to increased effectiveness? Lastly, given the increasingly complex licensing environment and continued creation of rights due to technological innovations, the feasibility of this system to monitor and finance music should be questioned as well. Further research on alternative compensation schemes considering tax-based, or patron-based financing will increasingly become more feasible and important systems to explore.

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[1] FICCI & KPMG. "The Stage Is Set: FICCI-KPMG Indian Media and Entertainment Industry Report 2014." https://www.kpmg.com/IN/en/Topics/FICCI-Frames/Documents/FICCI-Frames-2014-The-stage-is-set-Report-2014.pdf

[2] Centre for Internet and Society. "Research Proposal: Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace.," http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fcis-india.org%2Fa2k%2Fpervasive-technologies-research-proposal.pdf&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNF4hnAUXGIRMcUozZfs5QOFwvO55A.

[3] Huang, Maggie. "Copyright Management in the Age of Mobile Music," December 26, 2014. http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/copyright-management-in-age-of-mobile-music.

[4] Reddy, Prashant. "The Background Score to the Copyright (Amendment) Act." NUJS Review 5, no. 4 (2012). http://nujslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/01_prashant.pdf.

[5] Smirke, Richard. "U.K. Music Industry Sets Trade Mission to India." Billboard, Sept 4, 2014. http://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6243633/ukti-aim-bpi-trade-mission-india-mumbai.

[6] IPRS. "The Indian Performing Right Society Limited.," http://www.iprs.org/cms/.

[7] PPL. "About Us." Phonographic Performance LImited, n.d. http://www.pplindia.org/aboutus.aspx.

[8] ISRA. "About ISRA." ISRA Copyright, n.d. http://isracopyright.com/about_isra.php.

[9] Agarwal, Devika. "After IPRS, PPL next to Claim It Is Not a 'Copyright Society.'" SpicyIP, Mar 30 2015. http://spicyip.com/2015/03/after-iprs-ppl-next-to-claim-that-it-is-not-a-copyright-society.html.

[10] Reid, Harvey. "ASCAP & BMI - Protectors of Artists or Shadowy Thieves?" Wooedpecker.com, 1993. http://www.woodpecker.com/writing/essays/royalty-politics.html.

[11] Basheer, Shamnad. "Indian Copyright Collecting Societies and Foreign Royalties: Whither Transparency?," November 18, 2008. http://spicyip.com/2008/11/indian-copyright-collecting-societies.html.

[12] Philipes, Richard Hayes. "How One Independent Musician Defeated BMI." Woodpecker.com, 2003. http://www.woodpecker.com/writing/essays/phillips.html.

[13] ASCAP. "Ascap Clearance Express (ACE) Search." ASCAP We Create Music, https://www.ascap.com/Home/ace-title-search/index.aspx.

[14] BMI. "BMI Search." BMI http://www.bmi.com/search.

[15] SESAC. "Repertory Seearch." SESAC, https://www.sesac.com/repertory/RepertorySearch.aspx?x=100&y=22.

[16] Harry Fox. "Songfile Search." Songfile,

https://secure.harryfox.com/songfile/termsofuse/publictermsofuse.do.

[17] PPL. "PPL Member/Label Search," http://repsearch.ppluk.com/ars/faces/pages/licenseSearch.jspx?_afrWindowMode=0&_afrLoop=6609527708771000&_adf.ctrl-state=17ajb42h7o_4.

[18] Reddy, Prashant. "Did the Big Music Companies on IPRS & PPL Collude to Deny Lyricists and Composers Crores of Rupees in 'Ringtone Royalties? - An Investigation." http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/2011/02/did-big-music-companies-on-iprs-ppl.html. Spicy IP, Feb 14 2011.

[19] Stopps, David. "How to Make a Living from Music." Creative Industries. WIPO, 2013. http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/939/wipo_pub_939.pdf.

[20] SESAC. "SESAC Announces the Appointment of John Josephson as Chairman and CEO of SESAC," July 31, 2014. http://www.sesac.com/News/News_Details.aspx?id=2109.

[21] Although it is important to note that each work can only be registered exclusively to one society, so the catalogs won't be identical.

[22] Future of Music Coalition. "ASCAP - BMI Consent Decrees." Future of Music Coalition, October 3, 2014. https://futureofmusic.org/article/fact-sheet/ascap-bmi-consent-decrees.

[23] HFA. "Rate Charts," 2014. https://www.harryfox.com/find_out/rate_charts.html.

[24] IPRS. "Distribution Scheme As Per 17-5-2013." Indian Performing Right Association, 2012. http://www.iprs.org/cms/IPRS/DistributionScheme.aspx.

[25] HFA. "Rate Charts," 2014. https://www.harryfox.com/find_out/rate_charts.html.

[26] However, it is important to note the major limitations of these numbers in making any sort of conclusions due to data acquired from different years, varying geographies, without accounting for differing mandates and non-royalty collection activities. More reflections on this in the Limitations and Learnings Section

[27] "Sound Exchange Draft Annual Report 2013." Annual Report. Sound Exchange, 2013. http://www.soundexchange.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2013-Fiscal-Report-PRE-AUDIT.pdf.

[28] "HFA Commission Rates." HFA, https://www.harryfox.com/publishers/commission_rate.html.

[29] PPL UK. "Annual Review 2014." Annual Revenue Report, 2014. http://www.ppluk.com/Documents/Annual%20reviews/PPL_Annual_Report_2014.pdf.

[30] PRS for Music. "PRS for Music 2014 Review." Annual Review, 2014. https://www.prsformusic.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/About%20MCPS-PRS/financial-results/prs-for-music-financial-review-2014.pdf.

[31] Rochelandet, Fabrice. "Are Copyright Collecting Societies Efficient? An Evaluation of Collective Administration of Copyright in Europe." Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2002.

[32] Resnikoff, Paul. "New Zealand Invents the 'Single Music License' for ALL Performances…." Digital Music News, September 30, 2013. http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2013/09/30/newzealand.

[33] Ficsor, Mihali. Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights. Geneva: WIPO, 2002. http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/855/wipo_pub_855.pdf.

[34] Andrew. "Transparency and the Collective Management Organisations." CREATe, October 1, 2014. http://www.create.ac.uk/blog/2014/10/01/transparency-and-the-collective-management-organisations.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comparative-transparency-review-of-collective-management-organisations-in-india-uk-usa

Comments on the Draft Copyright (Amendment) Rules, 2019 concerning Statutory Licensing

sinha — 2019-07-11T07:04:35Z

The Centre for Internet & Society gave its comments on the proposed rules 29,30,31 of the Draft Copyright (Amendment) Rules, 2019. The comments were made in response to Notification G.S.R 393(E) published in the Gazette of India on May 30, 2019.

Preliminary

1. This submission presents comments to the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (“DPIIT”), Ministry of Commerce and Industry pertaining to the notification G.S.R 393(E) containing the draft Copyright (Amendment) Rules, 2019 issued on 30^th May 2019.

2. We commend DPIIT on the release of the draft Copyright (Amendment) Rules, 2019 (“Draft Rules”) and are thankful for the opportunity to put forth its views via this public consultation.

3. This submission is divided into three main parts. This part, ‘Preliminary’, introduces the document; the second part provides an overview of the organization and its research in the field of intellectual property rights; and the third part contains CIS’ comments on the Draft Rules 29, 30, 31.

4. The third part contains two sections. In the first section, we discuss the legal validity of the Draft Rules 29,30,31. In the second part we discuss the general implications of extending the legal regime of broadcasting rights under the Indian Copyright Act, 1957 (“Act”) to works on the Internet.

About The Centre for Internet and Society

5. The Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus in respect of intellectual property rights include research on domestic copyright and patent laws, international trade agreements and treaties pertaining to these subjects, promotion of creators’ and users’ rights with a view to furthering access to knowledge and openness in the public interest. CIS has also been participating at WIPO-SCCR negotiations in the capacity of an Observer since 2009.

6. CIS values the fundamental principles of justice, equality, freedom and economic development. This submission is consistent with CIS' commitment to these values including the safeguarding of general public interest. Accordingly, the comments in this submission aim to further these principles.

Comments

7. Draft Rules 29, 30 and 31 pertain to section 31D of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957. The proposed change in Rule 29 seeks to expand the modes of broadcast for which notice for invoking statutory license under section 31D may be issued - which previously was restricted to only radio and TV modes of broadcasting; and the change in Rule 31 will permit the Appellate Board to determine royalties for all modes of broadcast.

8. In view of current state of technological advancement, it is safe to deduce that the new mode of broadcasting whose inclusion is being contemplated in relation to s. 31D via the changes is “internet broadcasting”. The changes will allow entities that operate over the Internet medium to apply for a statutory license under s. 31D of the Act. In the following part, we submit our specific comments in respect of Draft Rules 29,30,31.

a) Legal validity of the Rules: Vires vis á vis the Parent Act

As per s. 78(2)(cD), the power of the Central Government to make rules in respect of s. 31D expressly exists in respect of “the manner in which prior notice may be given by a broadcasting organisation under sub-section (2) of section 3ID.” Apart from this clause, a general rule-making power is conferred via s. 78(1) only for carrying out the purposes of the Act. We submit that this general power should be exercised within limits of rule-making in the nature of administrative and procedural detail, and should be in consonance with purposes of the Act. In respect of s. 31D especially, the purpose can be inferred from the legislative history of the provision. This was analysed by the Bombay High Court in Tips Industries v. Wynk Music,[1] where the court noted that the concerns raised before the Rajya Sabha Parliamentary Standing Committee (on the Copyright Amendment Bill (2010)) related to radio and television industries only, and in the court’s opinion those two modes specifically were contemplated while introducing s. 31D.[2] Primarily basis this rationale, the court concluded that “internet broadcasters” offering on demand streaming services cannot avail of s. 31D. Further, s.31D(3) expressly permits the Appellate Board to fix royalty rates only in respect of radio broadcasting and television broadcasting.

Hence, we submit that there is no power under s.78 or any other provision in the Act afforded to the Central Government to expand the scope of s.31D, directly or indirectly. In State of Karnataka v. Ganesh Kamath[3] the Supreme Court held that “it is a well settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the conferment of rule-making power by an Act does not enable the rule-making authority to make a rule which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act or which is inconsistent there with or repugnant thereto”.

Thus, the extent to which the Draft Rules 29,30,31 alter the intent and scope of s.31D clearly leaves them ultra vires the parent Act. Rules that are ultra vires the parent Act for exceeding the limits of subordinate executive power are void.[4] Hence, the proposed Draft Rules 29,30,31 are both ultra vires their parent Act and void.

b) Implications of extending legal regime of broadcasting rights to works on the public Internet

The release of the Draft Rules 29,30,31 is another attempt to extend the statutory licensing to “internet broadcasters”. The first attempt was when the Central Government released an Office Memorandum[5] (dated 5^th September 2016) to extend statutory licensing under s.31D to “internet broadcasting” companies. We submit that this was based on an incorrect statutory construction by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (“DIPP”) and was arbitrary in nature. Noted academics and scholars have highlighted several constitutional infirmities in respect of this memorandum.[6] Unfortunately, the current Draft Rules (29,30,31) raise similar concerns.

Separately, in the context of introducing a broadcasting right for works shared over the Internet – we submit that if the line of argument taken by DIPP that s. 2(dd) read with s. 2(ff) supports the inclusion of “internet broadcasting” is taken to its logical conclusion, any person/ entity communicating to the general public via the public Internet can claim protection of their broadcasters’ reproduction right under our Copyright Act. This “broadcast” will happen via multiple platforms such as YouTube, Facebook Watch, live-streaming platforms, on-demand platforms, etc., and such entities will be entitled to enjoyment of this right. This will lead to a dangerous accumulation of undeserved property rights in Internet giants; unlike traditional broadcasters these companies never put up initial upfront economic investment to distribute works to the public. They were launched on the public internet, and currently thrive primarily off user-generated content. Even in respect of protecting content that is actually created with their investment, copyright law will suffice with its remedies for infringement. Hence, there is currently very little economic and legal basis for extending the legal regime of broadcasting rights for works on the Internet. Thus, we submit that in the domestic approach to modernising our copyright legislation, we must refrain from considering distribution of born-digital/ digitised works over the public Internet equivalent to the function of broadcasting works over cable/ satellite.

9. We are thankful to DPIIT and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for the opportunity to make these submissions. It would be our pleasure and privilege to discuss these submissions and recommendations in detail with members of DPIIT if the opportunity presents itself.

[1] See Bom (HC) judgment in Case No. NMCD/72/2019

[2] See 227^th Report of the Rajya Sabha Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Copyright Amendment Bill (2010) available at http://164.100.47.5/newcommittee/reports/EnglishCommittees/Committee%20on%20HRD/227.pdf

[3] (1983) 2 SCC 40

[4] See Supreme Court Welfare Association (1989) 4 SCC 187 and State of Karnataka (1983) 2 SCC 402.

[5] See ‘Office Memorandum’ available at https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/OM_CopyrightAct_05September2016.pdf

[6] See Letter to Government on Internet Broadcasts (2016) by Shamnad Basheer available at https://spicyip.com/2016/09/letter-to-government-on-internet-broadcasts.html ; and Licensing of Internet Broadcasts under the Copyright Act: Key Constitutional Issues (2019) available at https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2019/01/25/guest-post-licensing-of-internet-broadcasts-under-the-copyright-act-key-constitutional-issues/

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-on-the-draft-copyright-amendment-rules-2019-concerning-statutory-licensing

Comments on the Cinematograph (Amendment) Bill, 2021

Tanvi Apte, Anubha Sinha and Torsha Sarkar — 2021-07-05T05:59:52Z

In this submission, we examine the constitutionality and legality of the Cinematograph (Amendment) Bill, 2021, which was released by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

This submission presents comments by CIS on the Cinematograph (Amendement) Bill, 2021 (“the Bill”) which were released on 18 June 2021 for public comments. These comments examine whether the proposed amendments are compatible with established constitutional principles, precedents, previous policy positions and existing law. While we appreciate the opportunity to submit comments, we note that the time allotted for doing so was less than a month (the deadline for submission was 2 July 2021). Given the immense public import in the proposed changes, and the number of stakeholders involved, we highlight that the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB) should have provided more time in the final submission of comments.

Read our full submission here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-cinematograph-amendment-bill-2021

Comments on the Broadcast Treaty and Exceptions and Limitations for Libraries and Archives

smita — 2012-12-04T23:11:34Z

This November at WIPO the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights was witness to a tough negotiation on the proposed Treaty providing access to copyrighted materials to visually impaired persons. In between these discussions, the SCCR also found time to have two short plenary sessions on the proposed broadcast treaty as well as working documents on exceptions for libraries and archives.

Although we were unable to make a statement at the SCCR due to logistical constraints, CIS had the following comments prepared on both these issues:

Treaty for the Protection of Broadcasting Organizations:

The Centre for Internet and Society would like to reiterate the statement on principles provided in the 22nd SCCR by many civil society non-governmental organizations, cable casters and technology companies opposing a rights-based Broadcast Treaty. While we are encouraged by the inclusion of more suitable alternatives in many of the areas that civil society organizations had expressed concern, it is important that these alternatives be considered carefully. Some of the alternatives in the working document are not in keeping with the mandate of this Committee and we need to ensure that any new treaty provides a balanced protection to broadcast organizations.

We wish to enumerate a few key areas that need to be emphasized once again in this regard –

To begin with, the definition of ‘broadcast’ itself should not be too broad. The treaty needs a clear and precise definition that limits the protection to signals and does not extend to retransmissions or transmissions over computer networks.

Similarly, it is essential that the protection granted to a broadcasting organization should be limited to broadcast signals. The current working document extends this protection to public accessibility/performance of the broadcast signal and such restrictions might not be feasible in developing and least developed countries. One alternative even extends the protection available to fixations of the broadcasts and this is entirely unacceptable in a signals based treaty. The obligations with regard to technological protection measures, if any, should also be limited to protect only those broadcasts that are lawful.

Limitations and exceptions to the protections granted by this treaty are also of great importance, especially so in light of the Development Agenda. These exceptions and limitations should be made mandatory and be expanded to include issues of national interest and for free-to-air broadcast signals (such as the laws governing broadcast of cricket games in India).

Lastly, as pointed out many times already, we are of the opinion that a fixed term of protection, whether 20 or 50 years, is inconsistent with the idea of a signals based approach to the treaty.

Proposed Legal Instruments on Exceptions and Limitations for Libraries and Archives and Educational, Teaching and Research Institutions and Persons with Other Disabilities:

The Centre for Internet and Society would like to thank the Secretariat and the entire Committee for the hard work being put in this week at the SCCR.

International instruments that govern exceptions and limitations for libraries and archives as well as educational, teaching and research instruments and persons with other disabilities is key to ensure a balanced global copyright system that protects both right holders and users. Such instruments will not only allow the preservation of copyrighted works, but also provide greater access to these materials, especially in developing countries.

The working documents before us cover a number of issues and we would like to address a few of them today.

First, the three-step test. This has been a contentious issue with regard to all three instruments that are being discussed here this week. We would like to reiterate that a narrow interpretation of the three-step test should not be adopted, it is important that any and all flexibilities that can be made available to libraries and archives.

Second, libraries, archives, educational, research and teaching institutions should definitely be allowed to import and export copyrighted works and parallel trade in these works should be allowed. The language used in the current working document (SCCR/24/8) needs to be improved upon (Article 14, under 4.1 on page 12). This provision should indicate that as long as the copy of the work is lawfully produced, an educational institution, library, research organization or student is free to acquire, sell, import, export or otherwise dispose of that copy.

Thirdly, we wish to emphasize once again, the importance of protecting works that are in a digital format, as well as online libraries and archives. Additionally, the transmission of these works in a digital form as well as any internet service providers engaged in facilitating access to materials under this treaty should also be granted protection.

Thank you.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-on-broadcast-treaty-and-exceptions-and-limitations-for-libraries-and-archives

Comment by CIS at ACE on Presentation on French Charter on the Fight against Cyber-Counterfeiting

pranesh — 2011-12-01T11:59:45Z

The seventh session of the World Intellectual Property Organization's Advisory Committee on Enforcement is being held in Geneva on November 30 and December 1, 2011. Pranesh Prakash responded to a presentation by Prof. Pierre Sirinelli of the École de droit de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 on 'The French Charter on the Fight against Cyber-Counterfeiting of December 16, 2009' with this comment.

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society. First, I would like to congratulate you on your re-election.

And I would like to congratulate Prof. Sirenelli on his excellent presentation.

I would like to flag a few points, though:

One of the benefits of normal laws, as opposed to the soft/plastic laws, which he champions, is that normal laws are bound by procedures established by law, due process requirements, and principles of natural justice. Unfortunately, the soft/plastic laws, which in essence are private agreements, are not.
The report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Expression and Opinion made it clear in his report to the UN Human Rights Council that the Internet is now an intergral part of citizens exercising their right of freedom of speech under national constitutions and under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That report highlights that many initiatives on copyright infringement, including that of the French government with HADOPI and the UK, actually contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The right of privacy is also flagged by many as something that will have to be compromised if such private enforcement of copyright is encouraged.

I'd like to know Prof. Sirinelli's views on these three issues: due process, right of freedom of speech, and the right to privacy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ace-7-french-charter-cis-comment

CODE Session

praskrishna — 2016-01-13T13:39:43Z

CODE Project is an IDRC funded project, and CIS is a partner institution, along with PIJIP at American University Washington College of Law, USA, Karisma Foundation, Colombia, Derechos Digitale, Chile, American Assembly, Columbia University, USA and FGV, Rio.

At this session held in New Delhi on December 17, 2015, CIS presented some preliminary research and sought input on methodology as well as content. The project broadly studies law and policy environment that facilitates/hinders content creation online in Brazil, US, India, Colombia and Chile. A second part of the project, led by PIJIP is developing a copyright index, to chart copyright law developments in many countries around the world. Nehaa Chaudhari and Anubha Sinha participated in the open session.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/news/code-session

CIS's Statement at SCCR 24 on the Treaty for the Visually Impaired

pranesh — 2012-07-22T12:01:28Z

This was the statement read out by Pranesh Prakash at the 24th meeting of the WIPO Standing Committee for Copyright and Related Rights in Geneva, on Friday, July 20, 2012.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to associate CIS with the statements made by the WBU, eIFL, IFLA, KEI, ISOC, and CLA.

We NGOs been making statements at SCCR on this the topic of a treaty for the reading-disabled since 2009 now.

In this room there are a number of organizations that work with and for persons with disabilities which come here to Geneva, SCCR after SCCR. They do not come here to watch the enactment of an elaborate ritual, but to seek solutions for the very real knowledge drought that is being faced by the reading-disabled everywhere, and particularly in developing countries.

The way work on this treaty — or rather this binding-or-non-binding international instrument — has been stalled by some member states is a matter of shame. In India our Parliament recently passed an amendment to our copyright law that grants persons with disabilities, and those who are working for them, a strong yet simply-worded right to have equal access to copyrighted works as sighted persons.

An instrument that lays down detailed guidelines on rules and procedures to be followed by authorized entities will not work. An instrument that subjects the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms by persons with visual impairments to market forces and bureaucratic practices will not work.

Importantly, an instrument that ignores realities of the world: that the vast majority of persons with visual impairment live in developing countries just will not work.

I implore the delegations here to keep up the constructive spirit I have seen most of them display in the past two days, and ensure that the 2012 General Assembly convenes a Diplomatic Conference on this topic.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-statement-sccr24-treaty-visually-impaired

CIS's Statement at SCCR 24 on Exceptions & Limitations for Libraries and Archives

pranesh — 2012-07-25T10:54:38Z

This was the statement delivered by Pranesh Prakash on Wednesday, July 25, 2012, at the 24th session of the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyrights and Related Rights on the issue of exceptions and limitations for libraries and archives.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

We would like to associate ourselves with the statements made by International Federation of Library Associations, Electronic Information for Libraries, Knowledge Ecology International, Conseil International des Archives, Library Copyright Alliance, Computer and Communications Industry Association, and the Canadian Library Association.

The Centre for Internet and Society would like to commend this house for adopting SCCR/23/8 as a working document on the issue of exceptions and limitations on libraries and archives. This issue is of paramount interest the world over, and particularly in developing countries. I would like to limit my oral intervention to three quick points, and will send a longer statement in via e-mail.

First, we feel that this committee should pay special attention to ensuring that digital works and online libraries and archives such as the Internet Archive, also receive the same protection as brick-and-mortar libraries.

Second, we are concerned that we have been seeing some delegations advancing a very narrow interpretation of the three-step test. Such a narrow interpretation is not supported by leading academics, nor by practices of member states. A narrow interpretation of the three-step test must be squarely rejected. In particular, I would like to associate CIS with the strong statements by IFLA and KEI to maintain flexibilities within exceptions and limitations, instead of overly prescriptive provisions encumbered by weighty procedures and specifications.

We have comments about parallel trade as well, drawing from our experience and research in India, and will send those in writing.

Libraries and archive enhance the value of the copyrighted works that they preserve and provide to the general public. They do not erode it. Exceptions and limitations that help them actually help copyright holders. The sooner copyright holders try not to muzzle libraries, especially when it comes to out-of-commerce works, electronic copies of works, and in developing countries, the better it will be for them, their commercial interests, as well as the global public interest.

Thank you.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-statement-sccr24-libraries-archives

CIS's Closing Statement at Marrakesh on the Treaty for the Blind

pranesh — 2013-07-03T12:01:25Z

Pranesh Prakash read out an abridged version of this statement as his closing remarks in Marrakesh, where the WIPO Treaty for the Blind (the "Marrakesh Treaty") has been successfully concluded. The Marrakesh Treaty aims to facilitate access to published works by blind persons, persons with visual impairment, and other print disabled persons, by requiring mandatory exceptions in copyright law to enable conversions of books into accessible formats, and by enabling cross-border transfer of accessible format books.

Thank you, Mr. President.

I am truly humbled to be here today representing the Centre for Internet and Society, an Indian civil society organization. If I may assume the privilege of speaking on behalf of my blind colleagues at CIS who led much of our work on this treaty, and the many blindness organizations we have been working with over the past five years who haven't the means of being here today, I would like to thank you and all the delegates here for this important achievement. And especially, I would like to thank the World Blind Union and Knowledge Ecology International who renewed focus on this issue more than 2 decades after WIPO and UNESCO first called attention to this problem and created a "Working Group on Access by the Visually and Auditory Handicapped to Material Reproducing Works Produced by Copyright".

While doing so, I would like to remember my friend Rahul Cherian — a young, physically impaired lawyer from India — who co-founded Inclusive Planet, was a fellow with the Centre for Internet and Society, and was a legal adviser to the World Blind Union. He worked hard on this treaty for many years, but very unfortunately did not live long enough to see it becoming a reality. His presence here is missed, but I would like to think that by concluding this treaty, all the distinguished delegations here managed to honour his memory and work.

I am grateful to all the distinguished delegations here for successfully concluding a reasonably workable treaty, but especially those — such as Brazil, India, Ecuador, Nigeria, Uruguay, Egypt, South Africa, Switzerland, and numerous others — who realized they were negotiating with blind people's lives, and regarded this treaty as a means of ensuring basic human rights and dignity of the visually impaired and the print disabled, instead of regarding it merely as "copyright flexibility" to be first denied and then grudgingly conceded. The current imbalance in terms of global royalty flows and in terms of the bargaining strength of richer countries within WIPO — many of who strongly opposed the access this treaty seeks to facilitate right till the very end — is for me a stark reminder of colonialism, and I see the conclusion of this treaty as a tiny victory against it.

It is historic that today WIPO and its members have collectively recognized in a treaty that copyright isn't just an "engine of free expression" but can pose a significant barrier to access to knowledge. Today we recognize that blind writers are currently curtailed more by copyright law than protected by it. Today we recognize that copyright not only may be curtailed in some circumstances, but that it must be curtailed in some circumstances, even beyond the few that have been listed in the Berne Convention. One of the original framers of the Berne Convention, Swiss jurist and president, Numa Droz, recognized this in 1884 when he emphasized that "limits to absolute protection are rightly set by the public interest". And as Debabrata Saha, India's delegate to WIPO during the adoption of the WIPO Development Agenda noted, "intellectual property rights have to be viewed not as a self contained and distinct domain, but rather as an effective policy instrument for wide ranging socio-economic and technological development. The primary objective of this instrument is to maximize public welfare."

When copyright doesn't serve public welfare, states must intervene, and the law must change to promote human rights, the freedom of expression and to receive and impart information, and to protect authors and consumers. Importantly, markets alone cannot be relied upon to achieve a just allocation of informational resources, as we have seen clearly from the book famine that the blind are experiencing. Marrakesh was the city in which, as Debabrata Saha noted, "the damage [of] TRIPS [was] wrought on developing countries". Now it has redeemed itself through this treaty.

This treaty is an important step in recognizing that exceptions and limitations are as important a part of the international copyright acquis as the granting of rights to copyright holders. This is an important step towards fulfilling the WIPO Development Agenda. This is an important step towards fulfilling the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This is an important step towards fulfilling Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and Article 30 of the UN Convention on Persons with Disabilities, all of which affirm the right of everyone — including the differently-abled — to take part in cultural life of the community.

While this treaty is an important part of overcoming the book famine that the blind have faced, the fact remains that there is far more that needs to be done to bridge the access gap faced by persons with disabilities, including the print disabled.

We need to ensure that globally we tackle societal and economic discrimination against the print disabled, as does the important issue of their education. This treaty is a small but important cog in a much larger wheel through which we hope to achieve justice and equity. And finally, blind people can stop being forced to wear an eye-patch and being pirates to get access to the right to read.

I also thank the WIPO Secretariat, Director General Francis Gurry, Ambassador Trevor Clark, Michelle Woods, and the WIPO staff for pushing transparency and inclusiveness of civil society organizations in these deliberations, in stark contrast to the way many bilateral and plurilateral treaties such as Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, the India-EU Free Trade Agreement, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement have been, and are being, conducted. I hope we see even more transparency, and especially non-governmental participation in this area in the future.

I call upon all countries, and especially book-exporting countries like the USA, UK, France, Portugal, and Spain to ratify this treaty immediately, and would encourage various rightholders organizations, and the MPAA who have in the past campaigned against this treaty and now welcome this treaty, to show their support for it by publicly working to get all countries to ratify this treaty and letting us all know about it.

I congratulate you all for the "Miracle of Marrakesh", which shows, as my late colleague Rahul Cherian said, "when people are demanding their basic rights, no power in the world is strong enough to stop them getting what they want".

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-closing-statement-marrakesh-treaty-for-the-blind

CIS Statement in WIPO SCCR 43

Shweta Mohandas and Anubha Sinha — 2023-03-28T14:12:21Z

Shweta Mohandas delivered a statement on behalf of CIS, on day 1 of the 43rd WIPO SCCR session on the Broadcast Treaty.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I’m speaking on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, India.

The second revised draft text for the WIPO Broadcasting Organisations Treaty presents certain concerns.

The absence of a provision on term allows perpetual rights to both traditional broadcasters and streamers. Further, the provision on limitations and exceptions is narrow, and not mandatory. It undermines the existence of open-licensing models on the internet. In the absence of a strong mandatory limitations and exceptions provision, the text gives broadcasters rights over openly-licensed content and works in the public domain.

Thank you.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-statement-in-wipo-sccr-43

CIS Statement at 27th SCCR on the WIPO Proposed Treaty for the Protection of Broadcasting Organizations

nehaa — 2014-05-01T14:27:48Z

The 27th Session of the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights is being held in Geneva from April 28, 2014 to May 2, 2014. Nehaa Chaudhari, on behalf of CIS made the following statement on April 29, 2014.

This statement was in response to the Chairperson seeking NGO inputs specifically on the Scope of the Treaty and the Rights of Broadcasting Organizations. The statement makes references to a specific Working Document available here. CIS statement is quoted in Knowledge Ecology International on April 29, 2014 and in the Intellectual Property Watch on May 1, 2014.

Thank you, Mister Chair.

We have some concerns regarding the intended scope and language of Article 9 in Working Document SCCR/27/2 Rev. We believe that this expands the scope of this proposed treaty and is likely to have the effect of granting broadcasters rights over the content being carried and not just the signal. On this issue, we have two brief observations to make:

First- Article 9 envisages fixation and post fixation rights for broadcasting organizations- for instance among others, those of reproduction, distribution and public performance This, we believe is not within the mandate of this Committee, being as it is, inconsistent with a signal based approach.

Second- we express our reservations on the inclusion of “communication to the public” reflected in Article 9 Alternative B, which also relates to the definition of communication to the public under alternative to d of Article 5 of this document. Communication to the public is an element of copyright and governs the content layer, as distinct from the “broadcast” or “transmission” of a signal. Therefore, attempts to regulate “communication to the public” would not be consistent with a signal based approach, which we believe is the mandate binding on this Committee.

That is all, Mr. Chair. Thank you very much.

In response to CIS' statement, the Chair had this to say:

Thank you, CIS,. That was a very clear statement and gave us a very clear explanation of the situation. We will indeed take due account of that in the course of this afternoon's further discussion.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-statement-27-sccr-on-wipo-proposed-treaty-for-protection-of-broadcasting-organizations

CIS RTI REQUEST TO DIPP - NUMBER 1 - FEBRUARY, 2015

nehaa — 2015-04-14T17:17:53Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-rti-request-to-dipp-number-1-february-2015