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Comments to the draft amendments to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-draft-amendments-to-the-it-rules-2021
<b>The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) presented its comments on the draft amendments to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 (‘the rules’), which were released on 6 June, 2022 for public comments.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These comments examine whether the proposed amendments are in adherence to established principles of constitutional law, intermediary liability and other relevant legal doctrines. We thank the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MEITY) for allowing us this opportunity. Our comments are divided into two parts. In the first part, we reiterate some of our comments to the existing version of the rules, which we believe holds relevance for the proposed amendments as well. And in the second part, we provide issue-wise comments that we believe need to be addressed prior to finalising the amendments to the rules.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">To access the full text of the Comments to the draft amendments to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-draft-amendments-to-it-rules-2021.pdf" class="internal-link">click here</a></p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-draft-amendments-to-the-it-rules-2021'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-draft-amendments-to-the-it-rules-2021</a>
</p>
No publisherAnamika Kundu, Digvijay Chaudhary, Divyansha Sehgal, Isha Suri and Torsha SarkarDigital MediaInternet GovernanceIntermediary LiabilityInformation Technology2022-07-07T02:39:28ZBlog EntryComments on the Draft Rules under the Information Technology Act
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-draft-rules
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society commissioned an advocate, Ananth Padmanabhan, to produce a comment on the Draft Rules that have been published by the government under the Information Technology Act. In his comments, Mr. Padmanabhan highlights the problems with each of the rules and presents specific recommendations on how they can be improved. These comments were sent to the Department of Information and Technology.</b>
<h2><em>Comments on the Draft Rules under the Information Technology Act as Amended by the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008</em></h2>
<p><em><strong>Submitted by the Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore</strong></em></p>
<p><em><strong>Prepared by Ananth Padmanabhan, Advocate in the Madras High Court</strong></em></p>
<h2>Interception, Monitoring and Decryption</h2>
<h3>Section 69</h3>
<p>The section says:</p>
<ol><li>Where the Central Government or a State Government or any of its officer specially authorised by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, in this behalf may, if satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above or for investigation of any offence, it may subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order, direct any agency of the appropriate Government to intercept, monitor or decrypt or cause to be intercepted or monitored or decrypted any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource. </li><li>The procedure and safeguards subject to which such interception or monitoring or decryption may be carried out, shall be such as may be prescribed.</li><li>The subscriber or intermediary or any person in-charge of the computer resource shall, when called upon by any agency referred to in sub-section (1), extend all facilities and technical assistance to-</li></ol>
<p> (a) provide access to or secure access to the computer resource
generating transmitting, receiving or storing such information; or</p>
<p>
(b) intercept, monitor, or decrypt the information, as the case may be; or</p>
(c) provide information stored in computer resource.
<ol><li>The subscriber or intermediary or any person who fails to assist the agency referred to in sub-section (3) shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. <br /></li></ol>
<p><strong><br /></strong></p>
<p><strong>Recommendation #1</strong><br />Section 69(3) should be amended and the following proviso be inserted:</p>
<p class="callout">Provided that only those intermediaries with respect to any information or computer resource that is sought to be monitored, intercepted or decrypted, shall be subject to the obligations contained in this sub-section, who are, in the opinion of the appropriate authority, prima facie in control of such transmission of the information or computer resource. The nexus between the intermediary and the information or the computer resource that is sought to be intercepted, monitored or decrypted should be clearly indicated in the direction referred to in sub-section (1) of this section.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Reasons for the Recommendation </strong><br />In the case of any information or computer resource, there may be more than one intermediary who is associated with such information. This is because “intermediary” is defined in section 2(w) of the amended Act as,</p>
<p class="callout">“with respect to any electronic record means any person who on behalf of another person receives, stores or transmits that record or provides any service with respect to that record, including telecom service providers, network service providers, internet service providers, webhosting service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online-auction sites, online-market places and cyber cafes”. </p>
<p><br />The State or Central Government should not be given wide-ranging powers to enforce cooperation on the part of any such intermediary without there being a clear nexus between the information that is sought to be decrypted or monitored by the competent authority, and the control that any particular intermediary may have over such information.</p>
<p>To give an illustration, merely because some information may have been posted on an online portal, the computer resources in the office of the portal should not be monitored unless the portal has some concrete control over the nature of information posted in it. This has to be stipulated in the order of the Central or State Government which authorizes interception of the intermediary. </p>
<p><br /><strong>Recommendation #2</strong><br />Section 69(4) should be repealed.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Reasons for the Recommendation</strong><br />The closest parallels to Section 69 of the Act are the provisions in the Telegraph Rules which were brought in after the decision in PUCL v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301, famously known as the telephone tapping case.</p>
<p>Section 69(4) fixes tremendous liability on the intermediary for non-cooperation. This is violative of Article 14. Similar provisions in the Indian Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, which demand cooperation from members of the public as regards production of documents, letters etc., and impose punishment for non-cooperation on their part, impose a maximum punishment of one month. It is bewildering why the punishment is 7 years imprisonment for an intermediary, when the only point of distinction between an intermediary under the IT Act and a member of the public under the IPC and CrPC is the difference in the media which contains the information.</p>
<p>Section 69(3) is akin to the duty cast upon members of the public to extend cooperation under Section 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by way of providing information as to commission of any offence, or the duty, when a summons is issued by the Court or the police, to produce documents under Sections 91 and 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The maximum punishment for non-cooperation prescribed by the Indian Penal Code for omission to cooperate or wilful breach of summons is only a month under Sections 175 and 176 of the Indian Penal Code. Even the maximum punishment for furnishing false information to the police is only six months under Section 177 of the IPC. When this is the case with production of documents required for the purpose of trial or inquiry, it is wholly arbitrary to impose a punishment of six years in the case of intermediaries who do not extend cooperation for providing access to a computer resource which is merely apprehended as being a threat to national security etc. A mere apprehension, however reasonable it may be, should not be used to pin down a liability of such extreme nature on the intermediary.</p>
<p>This would also amount to a violation of Articles 19(1)(a) as well as 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, not to mention Article 20(3). To give an example, much of the information received from confidential sources by members of the press would be stored in computer resources. By coercing them, through the 7 year imprisonment threat, to allow access to this computer resource and thereby part with this information, the State is directly infringing on their right under Article 19(1)(a). Furthermore, if the “subscriber” is the accused, then section 69(4) goes against Article 20(3) by forcing the accused to bear witness against himself.</p>
<p> </p>
<h3>Draft Rules under Section 69 <br /></h3>
<p><strong>Rule 3</strong><br />Directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource under sub- section (2) of section 69 of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) shall not be issued except by an order made by the concerned competent authority who is Union Home Secretary in case of Government of India; the Secretary in-charge of Home Department in a State Government or Union Territory as the case may be. In unavoidable circumstances, such order may be made by an officer, not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India, who has been duly authorised by the Union Home Secretary or by an officer equivalent to rank of Joint Secretary to Government of India duly authorised by the Secretary in-charge of Home Department in the State Government or Union Territory, as the case may be:</p>
<p>Provided that in emergency cases – <br />(i) in remote areas, where obtaining of prior directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of information is not feasible; or <br />(ii) for operational reasons, where obtaining of prior directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource is not feasible;</p>
<p>the required interception or monitoring or decryption of any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource shall be carried out with the prior approval of the Head or the second senior most officer of the Security and Law Enforcement Agencies (hereinafter referred to as the said Security Agencies) at the Central Level and the officers authorised in this behalf, not below the rank of Inspector General of Police or an officer of equivalent rank, at the State and Union Territory level. The concerned competent authority, however, shall be informed of such interceptions or monitoring or decryption by the approving authority within three working days and that such interceptions or monitoring or decryption shall be got confirmed by the concerned competent authority within a period of seven working days. If the confirmation from the concerned competent authority is not received within the stipulated seven working days, such interception or monitoring or decryption shall cease and the same information shall not be intercepted or monitored or decrypted thereafter without the prior approval of the concerned competent authority, as the case may be. </p>
<p><br /><strong>Recommendation #3</strong><br />In Rule 3, the following proviso may be inserted:</p>
<p class="callout">“Provided that in the event of cooperation by any intermediary being required for the purpose of interception, monitoring or decryption of such information as is referred to in this Rule, prior permission from a Supervisory Committee headed by a retired Judge of the Supreme Court or the High Courts shall be obtained before seeking to enforce the Order mentioned in this Rule against such intermediary.”</p>
<p><strong><br /></strong></p>
<p><strong>Reasons for the Recommendation </strong><br />Section 69 and the draft rules suffer from absence of essential procedural safeguards. This has come in due to the blanket emulation of the Telegraph Rules. Additional safeguards should have been prescribed to ensure that the intermediary is put to minimum hardship when carrying on the monitoring or being granted access to a computer resource. Those are akin to a raid, in the sense that it can stop an online e-commerce portal from carrying out operations for a day or even more, thus affecting their revenue. It is therefore recommended that in any situation where cooperation from the intermediary is sought, prior judicial approval has to be taken. The Central or State Government cannot be the sole authority in such cases.</p>
<p>Furthermore, since access to the computer resource is required, an executive order should not suffice, and a search warrant or an equivalent which results from a judicial application of the mind (by the Supervisory Committee, for instance) should be required.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Recommendation #4</strong><br />The following should be inserted after the last line in Rule 22:</p>
<p class="callout">The Review Committee shall also have the power to award compensation to the intermediary in cases where the intermediary has suffered loss or damage due to the actions of the competent authority while implementing the order issued under Rule 3.</p>
<p><strong><br /></strong></p>
<p><strong>Reasons for the Recommendation</strong><br />The Review Committee should be given the power to award compensation to the loss suffered by the intermediary in cases where the police use equipment or software for monitoring/decryption that causes damage to the intermediary’s computer resources / networks. The Review Committee should also be given the power to award compensation in the case of monitoring directions which are later found to be frivolous or even worse, borne out of mala fide considerations. These provisions will act as a disincentive against the abuse of power contained in Section 69. </p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Blocking of Access to Information</h2>
<h3>Section 69A</h3>
<p>The section provides for blocking of websites if the government is satisfied that it is in the interests of the purposes enlisted in the section. It also provides for penalty of up to seven years for intermediaries who fail to comply with the directions under this section. <br />The rules under this section describe the procedure which have to be followed barring which the review committee may, after due examination of the procedural defects, order an unblocking of the website.</p>
<p> </p>
<p><strong>Section 69A(3)</strong><br />The intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and also be liable to fine.</p>
<p> </p>
<p><strong>Recommendation #5</strong><br />The penalty for intermediaries must be lessened.</p>
<p> </p>
<p><strong>Reasons for Recommendations </strong><br />The penal provision in this section which prescribes up to seven years imprisonment and a fine on an intermediary who fails to comply with the directions so issued is also excessively harsh. Considering the fact that various mechanisms are available to escape the blocking of websites, the intermediaries must be given enough time and space to administer the block effectively and strict application of the penal provisions must be avoided in bona fide cases.</p>
<p>The criticism about Section 69 and the draft rules in so far as intermediary liability is concerned, will also apply mutatis mutandis to these rules as well as Section 69A.</p>
<p> </p>
<h3>Draft Rules under Section 69A</h3>
<p><strong>Rule 22: Review Committee</strong><br />The Review Committee shall meet at least once in two months and record its findings whether the directions issued under Rule (16) are in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 69A of the Act. When the Review Committee is of the opinion that the directions are not in accordance with the provisions referred to above, it may set aside the directions and order for unblocking of said information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in a computer resource for public access.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Recommendation #6</strong><br />A permanent Review Committee should be specially for the purposes of examining procedural lapses. </p>
<p><br /><strong>Reasons for Recommendation </strong><br />Rule 22 provides for a review committee which shall meet a minimum of once in every two months and order for the unblocking of a site of due procedures have not been followed. This would mean that if a site is blocked, there could take up to two months for a procedural lapse to be corrected and it to be unblocked. Even a writ filed against the policing agencies for unfair blocking would probably take around the same time. Also, it could well be the case that the review committee will be overborne by cases and may fall short of time to inquire into each. Therefore, it is recommended that a permanent Review Committee be set up which will monitor procedural lapses and ensure that there is no blocking in the first place before all the due procedural requirements are met. <br /><br /></p>
<h2>Monitoring and Collection of Traffic Data</h2>
<h3>Draft Rules under Section 69B</h3>
<p>The section provides for monitoring of computer networks or resources if the Central Government is satisfied that conditions so mentioned are satisfied.</p>
<p>The rules provide for the manner in which the monitoring will be done, the process by which the directions for the same will be issued and the liabilities of the intermediaries and monitoring officers with respect to confidentiality of the information so monitored.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Grounds for Monitoring </strong><br /><strong>Rule 4</strong><br />The competent authority may issue directions for monitoring and collection of traffic data or information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource for any or all of the following purposes related to cyber security:<br />(a) forecasting of imminent cyber incidents;<br />(b) monitoring network application with traffic data or information on computer resource;<br />(c) identification and determination of viruses/computer contaminant;<br />(d) tracking cyber security breaches or cyber security incidents;<br />(e) tracking computer resource breaching cyber security or spreading virus/computer contaminants;<br />(f) identifying or tracking of any person who has contravened, or is suspected of having contravened or being likely to contravene cyber security;<br />(g) undertaking forensic of the concerned computer resource as a part of investigation or internal audit of information security practices in the computer resource;<br />(h) accessing a stored information for enforcement of any provisions of the laws relating to cyber security for the time being in force;<br />(i) any other matter relating to cyber security.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Rule 6</strong><br />No direction for monitoring and collection of traffic data or information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource shall be given for purposes other than those specified in Rule (4).</p>
<p><br /><strong>Recommendation #7</strong><br />Clauses (a), (b), (c), and (i) of Rule 4 must be repealed.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Reasons for Recommendations </strong><br />The term “cyber incident” has not been defined, and “cyber security” has been provided a circular definition. Rule 6 clearly states that no direction for monitoring and collection of traffic data or information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource shall be given for purposes other than those specified in Rule 4. Therefore, it may prima facie appear that the government is trying to lay down clear and strict safeguards when it comes to monitoring at the expense of a citizens' privacy. However, Rule 4(i) allows the government to monitor if it is satisfied that it is “any matter related to cyber security”. This may well play as a ‘catch all’ clause to legalise any kind of monitoring and collection and therefore defeats the purported intention of Rule 6 of safeguarding citizen’s interests against arbitrary and groundless intrusion of privacy. Also, the question of degree of liability of the intermediaries or persons in charge of the computer resources for leak of secret and confidential information remains unanswered. <br /><br /><strong>Rule 24: Disclosure of monitored data </strong><br />Any monitoring or collection of traffic data or information in computer resource by the employee of an intermediary or person in-charge of computer resource or a person duly authorised by the intermediary, undertaken in course of his duty relating to the services provided by that intermediary, shall not be unlawful, if such activities are reasonably necessary for the discharge his duties as per the prevailing industry practices, in connection with :<br />(vi) Accessing or analysing information from a computer resource for the purpose of tracing a computer resource or any person who has contravened, or is suspected of having contravened or being likely to contravene, any provision of the Act that is likely to have an adverse impact on the services provided by the intermediary.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Recommendation #8</strong><br />Safeguards must be introduced with respect to exercise of powers conferred by Rule 24(vi). </p>
<p><br /><strong>Reasons for Recommendations </strong><br />Rule 24(vi) provides for access, collection and monitoring of information from a computer resource for the purposes of tracing another computer resource which has or is likely to contravened provisions of the Act and this is likely to have an adverse impact on the services provided by the intermediary. Analysis of a computer resource may reveal extremely confidential and important data, the compromise of which may cause losses worth millions. Therefore, the burden of proof for such an intrusion of privacy of the computer resource, which is first used to track another computer resource which is likely to contravene the Act, should be heavy. Also, this violation of privacy should be weighed against the benefits accruing to the intermediary. The framing of sub rules under this clearly specifying the same is recommended. </p>
<p><br />The disclosure of sensitive information by a monitoring agency for purposes of ‘general trends’ and ‘general analysis of cyber information’ is uncalled for as it dissipates information among lesser bodies that are not governed by sufficient safeguards and this could result in outright violation of citizen’s privacy.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Manner of Functioning of CERT-In</h2>
<h3>Draft Rules under Section 70B(5)</h3>
<p>Section 70B provides for an Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) which shall serve as a national agency for performing duties as prescribed by clause 4 of this section in accordance to the rules as prescribed.<br />The rules provide for CERT-In’s authority, composition of advisory committee, constituency, functions and responsibilities, services, stakeholders, policies and procedures, modus operandi, disclosure of information and measures to deal with non compliance of orders so issued. However, there are a few issues which need to be addressed as under:</p>
<p><br /><strong>Definitions</strong><br />In these Rules, unless the context otherwise requires, “Cyber security incident” means any real or suspected adverse event in relation to cyber security that violates an explicit or implied security policy resulting in unauthorized access, denial of service/ disruption, unauthorized use of a computer resource for processing or storage of information or changes to data, information without authorization.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Recommendation #9</strong><br />The words ‘or implied’’ must be excluded from rule 2(g) which defines ‘cyber security incident’, and the term ‘security policy’ must be qualified to state what security policy is being referred to.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Reasons for Recommendation</strong><br />“Cyber security incident” means any real or suspected adverse event in relation to cyber security that violates an explicit or implied security policy resulting in unauthorized access, denial of service/disruption, unauthorized use of a computer resource for processing or storage of information or changes to data, information without authorization. </p>
<p><br />Thus, the section defines any circumstance where an explicit or implied security policy is contravened as a ‘cyber security incident’. Without clearly stating what the security policy is, an inquiry into its contravention is against an individual’s civil rights. If an individual’s actions are to be restricted for reasons of security, then the restrictions must be expressly defined and such restrictions cannot be said to be implied.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Rule 13(4): Disclosure of Information </strong><br />Save as provided in sub-rules (1), (2), (3) of rule 13, it may be necessary or expedient to so to do, for CERT-In to disclose all relevant information to the stakeholders, in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence relating to cognizable offence or enhancing cyber security in the country.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Recommendation #10</strong><br />Burden of necessity for disclosure of information should be made heavier. </p>
<p><br /><strong>Reasons for the Recommendation</strong><br />Rule 13(4) allows the disclosure of information by CERT-In in the interests of ‘enhancing cyber security’. This enhancement however needs to be weighed against the detriment caused to the individual and the burden of proof must be on the CERT-In to show that this was the only way of achieving the required. </p>
<p><br /><strong>Rule 19: Protection for actions taken in Good Faith </strong><br />All actions of CERT-In and its staff acting on behalf of CERT-In are taken in good faith in fulfillment of its mandated roles and functions, in pursuance of the provisions of the Act or any rule, regulations or orders made thereunder. CERT-In and its staff acting on behalf of CERT-In shall not be held responsible for any unintended fallout of their actions.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Recommendation #11</strong><br />CERT-In should be made liable for their negligent action and no presumption of good faith should be as such provided for. </p>
<p><br /><strong>Reasons for the Recommendation </strong><br />Rule 19 provides for the protection of CERT-In members for the actions taken in ‘good faith’. It defines such actions as ‘unintended fallouts’. Clearly, if information has been called for and the same is highly confidential, then this rule bars the remedy for any leak of the same due to the negligence of the CERT-In members. This is clearly not permissible as an agency that calls for delicate information should also be held responsible for mishandling the same, intentionally or negligently. Good faith can be established if the need arises, and no presumption as to good faith needs to be provided.</p>
<p> </p>
<h3>Draft Rules under Section 52</h3>
<p>These rules, entitled the “Cyber Appellate Tribunal (Salary, Allowances and Other Terms and Conditions of Service of Chairperson and Members) Rules, 2009” are meant to prescribe the framework for the independent and smooth functioning of the Cyber Appellate Tribunal. This is so because of the specific functions entrusted to this Appellate Tribunal. Under the IT Act, 2000 as amended by the IT (Amendment) Act, 2008, this Tribunal has the power to entertain appeals against orders passed by the adjudicating officer under Section 47.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Recommendation #12</strong><br />Amend qualifications Information Technology (Qualification and Experience of Adjudicating Officers and Manner of Holding Enquiry) Rules, 2003, to require judicial training and experience.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Reasons for the Recommendation</strong><br />It is submitted that an examination of these rules governing the Appellate Tribunal cannot be made independent of the powers and qualifications of Adjudicating Officers who are the original authority to decide on contravention of provisions in the IT Act dealing with damage to computer system and failure to furnish information. Even as per the Information Technology (Qualification and Experience of Adjudicating Officers and Manner of Holding Enquiry) Rules, 2003, persons who did not possess judicial experience and training, such as those holding the post of Director in the Central Government, were qualified to perform functions under Section 46 and decide whether there has been unauthorized access to a computer system. This involves appreciation of evidence and is not a merely administrative function that could be carried on by any person who has basic knowledge of information technology.</p>
<p>Viewed from this angle, the qualifications of the Cyber Appellate Tribunal members should have been made much tighter as per the new draft rules. The above rules when read with Section 50 of the IT Act, as amended in 2008, do not say anything about the qualification of the technical members apart from the fact that such person shall not be appointed as a Member, unless he is, or has been, in the service of the Central Government or a State Government, and has held the post of Additional Secretary or Joint Secretary or any equivalent post. Though special knowledge of, and professional experience in, information technology, telecommunication, industry, management or consumer affairs, has been prescribed in the Act as a requirement for any technical member.</p>
<p> </p>
<h3>Draft Rules under Section 54</h3>
<p>These Rules do not suffer any defect and provide for a fair and reasonable enquiry in so far as allegations made against the Chairperson or the members of the Cyber Appellate Tribunal are concerned.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Penal Provisions</h2>
<h3>Section 66A</h3>
<p>Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,<br /> (a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or<br /> (b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device,<br /> (c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages,<br />shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.<br />Sec. 32 of the 2008 Act inserts Sec. 66A which provides for penal measures for mala fide use of electronic resources to send information detrimental to the receiver. For the section to be attracted the ‘information’ needs to be grossly offensive, menacing, etc. and the sender needs to have known it to be false.</p>
<p>While the intention of the section – to prevent activities such as spam-sending – might be sound and even desirable, there is still a strong argument to be made that words is submitted that the use of words such as ‘annoyance’ and ‘inconvenience’ (in s.66A(c)) are highly problematic. Further, something can be grossly offensive without touching upon any of the conditions laid down in Article 19(2). Without satisfying the conditions of Article 19(2), this provision would be ultra vires the Constitution.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Recommendation #13</strong><br />The section should be amended and words which lead to ambiguity must be excluded.</p>
<p><br /><strong>Reasons for the Recommendation </strong><br />A clearer phrasing as to what exactly could convey ‘ill will’ or cause annoyance in the electronic forms needs to be clarified. It is possible in some electronic forms for the receiver to know the content of the information. In such circumstances, if such a possibility is ignored and annoyance does occur, is the sender still liable? Keeping in mind the complexity of use of electronic modes of transmitting information, it can be said that several such conditions arise which the section has vaguely covered. Therefore, a stricter and more clinical approach is necessary. </p>
<p><br /><strong>Recommendation #14</strong><br />A proviso should be inserted to this section providing for specific exceptions to the offence contained in this section for reasons such as fair comment, truth, criticism of actions of public officials etc. </p>
<p> </p>
<p><strong>Reasons for the Recommendation </strong><br />The major problem with Section 66A lies in clause (c) as per which any electronic mail or electronic mail message sent with the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience is covered within the ambit of offensive messages. This does not pay heed to the fact that even a valid and true criticism of the actions of an individual, when brought to his notice, can amount to annoyance. Indeed, it may be brought to his attention with the sole purpose of causing annoyance to him. When interpreting the Information Technology Act, it is to be kept in mind that the offences created under this Act should not go beyond those prescribed in the Indian Penal Code except where there is a wholly new activity or conduct, such as hacking for instance, which is sought to be criminalized.</p>
<p>Offensive messages have been criminalized in the Indian Penal Code subject to the conditions specified in Chapter XXII being present. It is not an offence to verbally insult or annoy someone without anything more being done such as a threat to commit an offence, etc. When this is the case with verbal communications, there is no reason to make an exception for those made through the electronic medium and bring any electronic mail or message sent with the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience within the purview of an offensive message.</p>
<p> </p>
<h3>Section 66F</h3>
<p>The definition of cyber-terrorism under this provision is too wide and can cover several activities which are not actually of a “terrorist” character. <br />Section 66F(1)(B) is particularly harsh and goes much beyond acts of “terrorism” to include various other activities within its purview. As per this provision, <br />“[w]hoever knowingly or intentionally penetrates or accesses a computer resource without authorisation or exceeding authorised access, and by means of such conduct obtains access to information, data or computer database that is restricted for reasons for the security of the State or foreign relations, or any restricted information, data or computer database, with reasons to believe that such information, data or computer database so obtained may be used to cause or is likely to cause injury to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, group of individuals or otherwise, commits the offence of cyber terrorism.”</p>
<p>This provision suffers from several defects and hence ought to be repealed. </p>
<p><br /><strong>Recommendation #15</strong><br />Section 66F(1)(B) has to be repealed or suitably amended to water down the excessively harsh operation of this provision. The restrictive nature of the information that is unauthorisedly accessed must be confined to those that are restricted on grounds of security of the State or foreign relations. The use to which such information may be put should again be confined to injury to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, or public order. A mere advantage to a foreign nation cannot render the act of unauthorized access one of cyber-terrorism as long as such advantage is not injurious or harmful in any manner to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, or public order. A mens rea requirement should also be introduced whereby mere knowledge that the information which is unauthorisedly accessed can be put to such uses as given in this provision should not suffice for the unauthorised access to amount to cyber-terrorism. The unauthorised access should be with the intention to put such information to this use. The amended provision would read as follows:</p>
<p class="callout">“[w]hoever knowingly or intentionally penetrates or accesses a computer resource without authorisation or exceeding authorised access, and by means of such conduct obtains access to information, data or computer database that is restricted for reasons for the security of the State or foreign relations, with the intention that such information, data or computer database so obtained may be used to cause injury to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, or public order, commits the offence of cyber terrorism.”</p>
<p class="callout"> </p>
<p><strong>Reasons for the Recommendation </strong><br />The ambit of this provision goes much beyond information, data or computer database which is restricted only on grounds of security of the State or foreign relations and extends to “any restricted information, data or computer database”. This expression covers any government file which is marked as confidential or saved in a computer used exclusively by the government. It also covers any file saved in a computer exclusively used by a private corporation or enterprise. Even the use to which such information can be put need not be confined to those that cause or are likely to cause injury to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, or friendly relations with foreign States. Information or data which is defamatory, amounting to contempt of court, or against decency / morality, are all covered within the scope of this provision. This goes way beyond the idea of a terrorist activity and poses serious questions. While there is no one globally accepted definition of cyberterrorism, it is tough to conceive of slander as a terrorist activity.</p>
<p>To give an illustration, if a journalist managed to unauthorisedly break into a restricted database, even one owned by a private corporation, and stumbled upon information that is defamatory in character, he would have committed an act of “cyber-terrorism.” Various kinds of information pertaining to corruption in the judiciary may be precluded from being unauthorisedly accessed on the ground that such information may be put to use for committing contempt of court. Any person who gains such access would again qualify as a cyber-terrorist. The factual situations are numerous where this provision can be put to gross misuse with the ulterior motive of muzzling dissent or freezing access to information that may be restricted in nature but nonetheless have a bearing on probity in public life etc. It is therefore imperative that this provision may be toned down as recommended above. <br /><br /></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-draft-rules'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-draft-rules</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshIT ActEncryptionIntellectual Property RightsIntermediary LiabilityPublicationsCensorship2011-09-21T06:13:42ZBlog EntryCIS Para-wise Comments on Intermediary Due Diligence Rules, 2011
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/intermediary-due-diligence
<b>On February 7th 2011, the Department of Information Technology, MCIT published draft rules on its website (The Information Technology (Due diligence observed by intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011) in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 87(2)(zg), read with Section 79(2) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Comments were invited from the public before February 25th 2011. Accordingly, Privacy India and Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore have prepared the following para-wise comments for the Ministry’s consideration.</b>
<h2>A. General Objections</h2>
<p>A number of the provisions under these Rules have no nexus with their parent provision, namely s.79(2). Section 79(1) provides for exemption from liability for intermediaries. Section 79(2) thereupon states:</p>
<blockquote></blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>79. Intermediaries not to be liable in certain cases—</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply if—</p>
<blockquote>
<blockquote></blockquote>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(a) the function of the intermediary is limited to providing access to a communication system over which information made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored or hasted; or</p>
<p>(b) the intermediary does not—</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(i) initiate the transmission,</p>
<p>(ii) select the receiver of the transmission, and</p>
<p>(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission;</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<blockquote></blockquote>
</blockquote>
<p>(c) the intermediary observes due diligence while discharging his duties under this Act and also observes such other guidelines as the Central Government may prescribe in this behalf.</p>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<blockquote></blockquote>
<p> </p>
<p>Therefore, by not observing any of the provisions of the Rules, the intermediary opens itself up for liability for actions of its users. However, many of the provisions of the Rules have no rational nexus with due diligence to be observed by the intermediary to absolve itself from liability.</p>
<h2>B. Specific Objections</h2>
<h3>Rule 2(b), (c), and (k)</h3>
<blockquote></blockquote>
<blockquote></blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(b) “Blog” means a type of website, usually maintained by an individual with regular entries of commentary, descriptions of events, or other material such as graphics or video. Usually blog is a shared on-line journal where users can post diary entries about their personal experiences and hobbies;</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote></blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(c) “Blogger” means a person who keeps and updates a blog;</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(k) “User” means any person including blogger who uses any computer resource for the purpose of sharing information, views or otherwise and includes other persons jointly participating in using the computer resource of intermediary</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote></blockquote>
<h3><strong>Comments</strong></h3>
<p> It is unclear why it is necessary to specifically target bloggers as users, leaving out other users such as blog commenters, social network users, microbloggers, podcasters, etc. It makes the rules technologically non-neutral.</p>
<h3><strong>Recommendation</strong></h3>
<p>We recommend that these 3 sub-rules be deleted.</p>
<h3> Rule 3(2)</h3>
<blockquote></blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>3. <strong>Due Diligence observed by intermediary</strong>.— The intermediary shall observe following due diligence while discharging its duties.</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(2) The intermediary shall notify users of computer resource not to use, display, upload, modify, publish, transmit, update, share or store any information that : —</p>
<blockquote>
<p>(a) belongs to another person;</p>
<p>(b) is harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, blasphemous, objectionable, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, pornographic, paedophilic, libellous, invasive of another’s privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable, disparaging, relating or encouraging money laundering or gambling, or otherwise unlawful in any manner whatever;</p>
<p>(c) harm minors in any way;</p>
<p>(d) infringes any patent, trademark, copyright or other proprietary rights;</p>
<p>(e) violates any law for the time being in force;</p>
<p>(f) discloses sensitive personal information of other person or to which the user does not have any right to;</p>
<p>(g) causes annoyance or inconvenience or deceives or misleads the addressee about the origin of such messages or communicates any information which is grossly offensive or menacing in nature;</p>
<p>(h) impersonate another person;</p>
<p>(i) contains software viruses or any other computer code, files or programs designed to interrupt, destroy or limit the functionality of any computer resource;</p>
<p>(j) threatens the unity, integrity, defence, security or sovereignty of India, friendly relations with foreign states, or or public order or causes incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence or prevents investigation of any offence or is insulting any other nation.</p>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
</blockquote>
<blockquote>
<blockquote></blockquote>
</blockquote>
<h3><strong>Comments</strong></h3>
<p>Firstly, such ‘standard’ terms of use [1] might make sense for one intermediary, but not for all. For instance, an intermediary such as site with user-generated content (e.g., Wikipedia) would need different terms of use from an intermediary such as an e-mail provider (e.g., Hotmail), because the kind of liability they accrue are different. This is similar to how the liability that a newspaper publisher accrues is different from that accrued by the post office. However, forcing standard terms of use negates this difference. Thus, these are impractical.</p>
<p>Secondly, read with the legal obligation of the intermediary to remove such information (contained in rule 3(3)), they vest an extraordinary power of censorship in the hands of the intermediary, which could easily lead to the stifling of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech online. Analogous restrictions do not exist in other fields, e.g., against the press in India or against courier companies, and there is no justification to impose them on content posted online. Taken together, these provisions make it impossible to publish critical views about anything without the risk of being summarily censored.</p>
<p>Thirdly, while it is possible to apply Indian law to intermediaries, it is impracticable to require all intermediaries (whether in India or not) to have in their terms of use India-specific clauses such as rule 3(2)(j). Instead, it is better to merely require them to ask their users to follow all relevant laws.</p>
<p>Individual instances of how these rules are overly broad are contained in an appendix to this submission.</p>
<h3><strong>Recommendation</strong></h3>
<p>We strongly recommend the deletion of this sub-rule, except clause (e).</p>
<h3>Rule 3(3)</h3>
<blockquote>
<p>(3) The intermediary shall not itself host or publish or edit or store any information or shall not initiate the transmission, select the receiver of transmission, and select or modify the information contained in the transmission as specified in sub-rule (2).</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><strong>Comments</strong></h3>
<p>This sub-rule is ultra vires s.79 of the IT Act, which does not require intermediaries not to “host or publish or edit or store any information”. If fact, s.79(2) merely states that by violating the provisions of s.79(2), the intermediary loses the protection of s.79(1). It does not however make it unlawful to violate s.79(2), as rule 3(3) does. This makes rule 3(3) ultra vires the Act.</p>
<h3><strong>Recommendation</strong></h3>
<p>This sub-rule should be deleted.</p>
<h3><strong>Rule 3(4)</strong></h3>
<blockquote>
<p>(4) The intermediary upon obtaining actual knowledge by itself or been brought to actual knowledge by an authority mandated under the law for the time being in force in writing or through email signed with electronic signature about any such information as mentioned in sub-rule (2) above, shall act expeditiously to work with user or owner of such information to remove access to such information that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. Further the intermediary shall inform the police about such information and preserve the records for 90 days</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><strong>Comments</strong></h3>
<p>This rule is also ultra vires s.69A of the IT Act as well as the Constitution of India. Section 69A states all the grounds on which an intermediary may be required to restrict access to information [2]. It does not allow for expansion of those grounds, because it has been carefully worded to maintains its constitutional validity vis-a-vis Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(2) of the Constitution of India. The rules framed under s.69A prescribe an elaborate procedure before such censorship may be ordered. The rules under s.69A will be rendered nugatory if any person could get content removed or blocked under s.79(2).<strong><br /></strong></p>
<p>This rule requires an intermediary to immediately take steps to remove access to information merely upon receiving a written request from “any authority mandated under the law”. Thus, for example, any authority can easily immunize itself from criticism on the internet by simply sending a written notice to the intermediary concerned. This is directly contrary to, and completely subverts the legislative intent expressed in Section 69B which lays down an elaborate procedure to be followed before any information can be lawfully blocked.</p>
<p>If any person is aggrieved by information posted online, they may seek their remedies—including the relief of injunction—from courts of law, under generally applicable civil and criminal law. Inserting a rule such as this one would take away the powers of the judiciary in India to define the line dividing permissible and impermissible speech, and vest it instead in the whims of each intermediary. This can only have a chilling effect on debates in the public domain (of which the Internet is a part) which is the foundation of any democracy.</p>
<h3><strong>Recommendation</strong></h3>
<p>This rule should modified so that an intermediary is obliged to take steps towards removal of content only when (a) backed by an order from a court or (b) a direction issued following the procedure prescribed by the rules framed under Section 69A.</p>
<h3>Rule 3(5) & (7) & (8) & (10)</h3>
<blockquote></blockquote>
<blockquote>
<p>(5) The Intermediary shall inform its users that in case of non-compliance with terms of use of the services and privacy policy provided by the Intermediary, the Intermediary has the right to immediately terminate the access rights of the users to the site of Intermediary;</p>
<p>(7) The intermediary shall not disclose sensitive personal information;</p>
<p>(8) Disclosure of information by intermediary to any third party shall require prior permission or consent from the provider of such information, who has provided such information under lawful contract or otherwise;</p>
<p>(10) The information collected by the intermediary shall be used for the purpose for which it has been collected.</p>
</blockquote>
<blockquote></blockquote>
<h3><strong>Comments</strong></h3>
<p>These sub-rules have no nexus with intermediary liability or non-liability under s.79(2). For instance, it is unreasonable to say that an intermediary may be held liable for the actions of its users if it does not inform its users about its right to terminate access by the user to its services. Furthermore, not all intermediaries need be websites, as sub-rule 5 assumes. An intermediary can even be an “internet service provider” or a “cyber cafe” or a “telecom service provider”, as per rule 2(j) read with s.2(1)(w) of the IT Act.</p>
<p>The requirements under sub-rules (7), (8), and (10) are rightfully the domain of s.43A and the rules made thereunder, and not s.79(2) nor these rules.</p>
<h3><strong>Recommendation</strong></h3>
<p>These sub-rules should be deleted, and sub-rules (7), (8), and (10) may placed instead in the rules made under s.43A.</p>
<h3>Rule 3(9)</h3>
<blockquote>
<p>(9) Intermediary shall provide information to government agencies who are lawfully authorised for investigative, protective, cyber security or intelligence activity. The information shall be provided for the purpose of verification of identity, or for prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, cyber security incidents and punishment of offences under any law for the time being in force, on a written request stating clearly the purpose of seeking such information.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><strong>Comments</strong></h3>
<p>This provision is ultra vires ss.69 and 69B. Rules have already been issued under ss.69 and 69B which stipulate the mechanism and procedure to be followed by the government for interception, monitoring or decrypting information in the hands of intermediaries. Thus under the Interception Rules 2009 framed under Section 69, permission must first be obtained from a “competent authority” before an intermediary can be directed to provide access to its records and facilities. The current rule completely removes the safeguards contained in s.69 and its rules, and would make intermediaries answerable to virtually any request from any government agency. This is contrary to the legislative intent expressed in Section 69.</p>
<h3><strong>Recommendation</strong></h3>
<p>We recommend this sub-rule be deleted.</p>
<h3><strong>Rule 3(12)</strong></h3>
<blockquote>
<p>(12) The intermediary shall report cyber security incidents and also share cyber security incidents related information with the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><strong>Comments</strong></h3>
<p>The rules relating to how and when the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team may request for information from intermediaries is rightfully the subject matter of s.70B(5) [3] and the rules made thereunder by virtue of the rule making power granted by s.87(2)(yd). The subject matter of rule 3(12) is not liability of intermediaries for third-party actions, hence there is no nexus between the rule-making power, and the rule.</p>
<h3><strong>Recommendations</strong></h3>
<p>We recommend that this sub-rule be deleted.</p>
<h3>Rule 3(14)</h3>
<blockquote>
<p>(14) The intermediary shall publish on its website the designated agent to receive notification of claimed infringements.</p>
</blockquote>
<h3><strong>Comments</strong></h3>
<p>It is unclear what “infringements” are being referred to in this sub-rule. Neither s.79 nor these rules provide for “infringements”. The same reasoning applied for rule 3(4) would also apply here. It would be better to require the intermediary to publish on its website a method of providing judicial notice.</p>
<h3><strong>Recommendations</strong></h3>
<p>Delete, and replace with a requirement for the intermediary to publish on its website a method of providing judicial notice.<strong><br /></strong></p>
<h2>Footnotes <br /></h2>
<ol><li>
<p>For instance, the Section B(1) of the World of Warcraft Code of Conduct “When engaging in Chat, you may not: (i) Transmit or post any content or language which, in the sole and absolute discretion of Blizzard, is deemed to be offensive, including without limitation content or language that is unlawful, harmful, threatening, abusive, harassing, defamatory, vulgar, obscene, hateful, sexually explicit, or racially, ethnically or otherwise objectionable.</p>
</li><li>
<p>It is only “in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India. defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above” that intermediaries may be issued directions to block access to information.</p>
</li><li>
<p>70B(5) sates that the The manner of performing functions and duties of the agency referred to in sub-section (1) shall be such as may be prescribed.</p>
</li></ol>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/intermediary-due-diligence'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/intermediary-due-diligence</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshFreedom of Speech and ExpressionIT ActIntermediary Liability2012-07-11T10:27:26ZBlog EntryChilling Effects and Frozen Words
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/chilling-effects-frozen-words
<b>What if the real danger is not that we lose our freedom of speech and expression but our sense of humour as a nation? Lawrence Liang's op-ed was published in the Hindu on April 30, 2012. </b>
<p>While freedom of speech and expression is an individual right, its actualisation often relies on a vast infrastructure of intermediaries.</p>
<p>In the offline world, this includes newspapers, television channels, public auditoriums, etc. It is often assumed that the internet has created a more robust public sphere of speech by doing away with many structural barriers to free speech. But the fact of the matter is that even if the internet enables a shift from a ‘few to many' to a ‘many to many' model of communication, intermediaries continue to remain important players in facilitating free speech. Can one imagine free speech on the internet being the same without Twitter, social networks or Youtube?</p>
<p>One way of thinking of the infrastructure of communication is in terms of ecology, and in the ecology of speech — as in the environment — an adverse impact on any component threatens the well-being of all. The idea of cyberspace as a commons is a much cherished myth and in the early days of the internet we were perhaps given a glimpse into its utopian possibility. But we would be deluding ourselves if we believed that the problems that plague free speech in the offline world (including ownership of the avenues of speech) are absent in cyberspace. Recall in recent times that one of the most effective ways in which various governments retaliated to the leaking of official secrets on WikiLeaks was by freezing Julian Assange's PayPal account.</p>
<h3>Direct & Indirect Controls</h3>
<p>It may be useful to distinguish between direct controls on free speech and indirect or structural controls on free speech. India has had a long history of battling direct and indirect controls on free speech and with a few exceptions the interests of the press have often coincided with the interests of a robust public sphere of debate and criticism.</p>
<p>In the late 1950s and early 1960s, a number of large media houses battled restrictions imposed on the press by way of control of the number of pages of a newspaper, regulation of the size of advertisements and the price of imported newsprint. On the face of it, some of these restrictions may have seemed like commercial disputes but the Supreme Court rightly recognised that indirect controls could adversely impact the individual's right to express himself or herself as well as to receive information freely.</p>
<p>In the online context, there has also been a similar recognition of the role of intermediaries in providing platforms of speech and it is with this view in mind that a number of countries have incorporated safe harbour provisions in their information technology laws.</p>
<p>Section 79 of the Information Technology Act is one such safe harbour provision in India which provides that intermediaries shall not be liable for any third party action if they are able to prove that the offence or contravention was committed without their knowledge or that they had exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence or contravention. But this safe harbour has effectively been undone with the passing of the Information Technology (Intermediaries guidelines) Rules, 2011.</p>
<p>The rules clarify what standard of due diligence has to be met by intermediaries and Sec. 3(2) of the rules obliges intermediaries to have rules and conditions of usage which ensure that users do not host, display, upload, modify, publish, transmit, update or share any information that is in contravention of the Section. This includes the all too familiar ones (defamatory, obscene, pornographic content) but also a whole host of new categories which could be invoked to restrict speech (“grossly harmful,” “blasphemous,” “harassing,” “hateful”).</p>
<p>As is well known, any restriction on speech in India has to comply with both the test of reasonableness under Article 19(2) of the Constitution, as well as ensuring that the grounds of censorship are located within 19(2). Even though there are laws regulating hate speech in India, blasphemy is not a category under Art. 19(2) and has hitherto not been a part of Indian law. Some of the other categories such as “grossly harmful” suggest the people who drafted the rules seem to have taken a constitutional nap at the drafting board.</p>
<p>Sec. 3(4) of the rules provides that any intermediary who receives a notice by an aggrieved person about any violation of sub rule (2) will have to act within 36 hours and where applicable will ensure that the information is disabled. In the event that it fails to act or to respond, the intermediary cannot claim exemption for liability under Sec. 70 of the IT Act. It is worth noting that most intermediaries receive from hundreds to thousands of requests from individuals on a daily basis asking for the removal of objectionable material. The Centre for Internet and Society conducted a “sting operation” to determine whether the criteria, procedure and safeguards for administration of the takedowns as prescribed by the Rules lead to a chilling effect on free expression.</p>
<p>In the course of the study, frivolous takedown notices were sent to seven intermediaries and their response to the notices was documented. Different policy factors were permuted in the takedown notices in order to understand at what points in the process of takedown, free expression is being chilled. The takedown notices which were sent by the researcher were intentionally defective as they did not establish how they were interested parties, did not specifically identify and discuss any individual URL on the websites, or present any cause of action, or suggest any legal injury. Of the seven intermediaries to which takedown notices were sent, six over-complied with the notices, despite the apparent flaws in them.</p>
<h3>Caution</h3>
<p>Even in cases where the intermediaries challenged the validity of the takedowns, they erred on the side of caution and took down the material. While a number of intermediaries would see themselves as allies in the fight against censorship, more often than not intermediaries are also large commercial organisations whose primary concern is the protection of their business interests. In the face of any potential legal threat, especially from the government, they prefer to err on the side of caution. The people whose content was removed were not told, nor was the general public informed that the content was removed.</p>
<p>The procedural flaws (subjective determination, absence of the right to be heard, the short response time) coupled with the vague grounds on which such takedowns can be claimed, clearly point to a highly flawed situation in which we will see many more trigger happy demands for offending materials to be taken down.</p>
<p>We have already slipped into a state of being a republic of over sensitivity where any politician, religious group or individual can claim their sentiments have been hurt or they have been portrayed disparagingly, as evidenced by the recent attack and subsequent arrest of Professor Ambikesh Mahapatra of Jadavpur University for posting cartoons lampooning Mamata Banerjee.</p>
<h3>Nervous State</h3>
<p>In the era of global outsourcing it was inevitable that the state censorship machinery would also learn a lesson or two from the global trends and what better way of ensuring censorship than outsourcing it to individuals and to corporations. The renowned anthropologist, Michael Taussig, once compared the state to a nervous system and it seems that the Intermediary rules live up to the expectations of a nervous state ever ready to respond to criticism and disparaging cartoons.</p>
<p>What if the real danger is not even that we lose our freedom of speech and expression but we lose our sense of humour as a nation?</p>
<p>The evident flaws of the rules have been acknowledged even by lawmakers, with P. Rajeeve, the CPI(M) M.P., introducing a motion for the annulment of the rules. The annulment motion is going to be debated in the coming weeks and one hopes that the parliamentarians will seriously reconsider the rules in their current form.</p>
<p>When faced with conundrums of the present it is always useful to turn to history and there is reason to believe that while censorship has a very respectable genealogy in Indian thought, it has also been accompanied in equal measure by a tradition of the right to offend.</p>
<p>In his delightful reading of the <em>Arthashastra</em>, Sibaji Bandyopadhay alerts us to the myriad restrictions that existed to control Kusilavas (the term for entertainers which included actors, dancers, singers, storytellers, minstrels and clowns). These regulations ranged from the regulation of their movement during monsoon to prohibitions placed on them, ensuring that they shall not “praise anyone excessively nor receive excessive presents”. While some of the regulations appear harsh and unwarranted, Bandyopadhay says that in contrast to Plato's <em>Republic</em>, which banished poets altogether from the ideal republic, the <em>Arthashastra</em> goes so far as to grant to Kusilavas what we could now call the right to offend. Verse 4.1.61 of the <em>Arthashastra</em> says, “In their performances, [the entertainers] may, if they so wish, make fun of the customs of regions, castes or families and the practices or love affairs (of individuals)”. One hopes that our lawmakers, even if they are averse to reading the Indian Constitution, will be slightly more open to the poetic licence granted by Kautilya.</p>
<p><a class="external-link" href="http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article3367917.ece?homepage=true">Click</a> for the original published in the Hindu on April 30, 2012. Lawrence Liang is a lawyer and researcher based at Alternative Law Forum, Bangalore. He can be contacted at <a class="external-link" href="mailto:lawrence@altlawforum.org">lawrence@altlawforum.org</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/chilling-effects-frozen-words'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/chilling-effects-frozen-words</a>
</p>
No publisherLawrence LiangFreedom of Speech and ExpressionPublic AccountabilityInternet GovernanceIntermediary LiabilityCensorship2012-04-30T07:32:17ZBlog EntryCentre for Internet and Society joins the Dynamic Coalition for Platform Responsibility
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-joins-dynamic-coalition-for-platform-responsibility
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) has joined the multistakeholder cooperative engagement amidst stakeholders towards creating Due Diligence Recommendations for online platforms and Model Contractual Provisions to be enshrined in ToS. This blog provides a brief background of the role of dynamic coalitions within the IGF structure, establishes the need for the coalition and provides an update on the action plan and next steps for interested stakeholders.</b>
<p class="callout" style="text-align: justify; ">"Identify emerging issues, bring them to the attention of the relevant bodies and the general public, and, where appropriate, make recommendations."<br />Tunis Agenda (Para 72.g)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The first United Nations Internet Governance Forum (IGF), in 2006 saw the emergence of the concept of Dynamic Coalition and a number of coalitions have been established over the years. The IGF is structured to bring together multistakeholder groups to,</p>
<p class="callout" style="text-align: justify; ">"Discuss public policy issues related to key elements of Internet governance in order to foster the sustainability, robustness, security, stability and development of the Internet."<br />Tunis Agenda (Para 72.a)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While IGF workshops allow various stakeholders to jointly analyse "hot topics" or to examine progress that such issues have undertaken since the previous IGF, dynamic coalitions are informal, issue-specific groups comprising members of various stakeholder groups. With no strictures upon the objects, structure or processes of dynamic coalitions claiming association with the IGF, and no formal institutional affiliation, nor any access to the resources of the IGF Secretariat, IGF Dynamic Coalitions allow collaboration of anyone interested in contributing to their discussions. Currently, there are eleven active dynamic coalitions at the IGF and can be divided into three distinct types—networks, working groups and Birds of Feather (BOFs).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Workshops at the IGF are content specific events that, though valuable in informing participants, are limited in their impact by being confined to the launch of a report or by the issues raised within the conference room. The coalitions on the other hand are expected to have a broader function, acting as a coalescing point for interested stakeholders to gather and analyse progress around identified issues and plan next steps. The coalitions can also make recommendations around issues, however, no mechanism has been developed so far, by which the recommendations can be considered by the plenary body. The long-term nature of coalition is perhaps, most suited to engage stakeholders in heterogeneous groups, towards understanding and cooperating around emerging issues and to make recommendations to inform policy making.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Platform Responsibility</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Social networks and other interactive online services, give rise to 'cyber-spaces' where individuals gather, express their personalities and exchange information and ideas. The transnational and private nature of such platforms means that they are regulated through contractual provisions enshrined in the platforms' Terms of Service (ToS). The provisions delineated in the ToS not only extend to users in spite of their geographical location, the private decisions undertaken by platform providers in implementing the ToS are not subject to constitutional guarantees framed under national jurisdictions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While ToS serve as binding agreement online, an absence of binding international rules in this area despite the universal nature of human rights represented is a real challenge, and makes it necessary to engage in a multistakeholder effort to produce model contractual provisions that can be incorporated in ToS. The concept of 'platform responsibility' aims to stimulate behaviour in platform providers to provide intelligible and solid mechanisms, in line with the principles laid out by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and equip platform users with common and easy-to-grasp tools to guarantee the full enjoyment of their human rights online. The utilisation of model contractual provisions in ToS may prove instrumental in fostering trust in online services for content production, use and dissemination, increasing demand of services and ultimately consumer demand may drive the market towards human rights compliant solutions.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The Dynamic Coalition on Platform Responsibility</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To nurture a multi-stakeholder endeavour aimed at the elaboration of model contractual-provisions, Mr. Luca Belli, Council of Europe / Université Paris II, Ms Primavera De Filippi, CNRS / Berkman Center for Internet and Society and Mr Nicolo Zingales, Tilburg University / Center for Technology and Society Rio, initiated and facilitated the creation of the Dynamic Coalition on Platform Responsibility (DCPR). DCPR has over fifty individual and organisational members from civil society organisations, academia, private sector organisations and intergovernmental organisations and held its first meeting at the IGF in Istanbul. The meeting began with an overview of the concept of platform responsibility, highlighting relevant initiatives from Council of Europe, Global Network Initiative, Ranking Digital Rights and the Center for Democracy and Technology have undertaken in this regard. Existing issues such as difficulty in comprehension and lack of standardization of redress across rights were raised along with the fundamental lack of due process in terms of transparency across existing mechanisms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Online platforms compliance to human rights is often framed around the duty of States to protect human rights and often, Internet companies do not sufficient consideration of the effects of their business practices on users fundamental rights undermining trust.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The meeting focused it efforts with a call to identify issues of process and substance and specific rights and challenges to be addressed by the DCPR. The procedural issues raised concerned 'responsibility' in decision-making e.g., giving users the right to be heard and an effective remedy before an impartial decision-making body, and obtaining their consent for changes in the contractual terms. The concerns raised around substantive rights such as privacy and freedom of expression eg., disclosure of personal information and content removal and need to promote 'responsibility' through establishing concrete mechanisms to deal with such issues.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It was suggested that concept of responsibility including in case of conflict between different rights could be grounded in Human Rights case law eg., from European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence. It was also established that any framework that would evolve from this coalition would consider the distinction between users (eg., adults, children, and people with or without continuous access to the Internet) and platforms (eg., in terms of size and functionality).</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Action Plan</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The participants at the DCPR meeting agreed to establish a multistakeholder cooperative engagement amidst stakeholders that will go beyond dialogue and produce concrete proposals. Particularly, participants suggested developing:</p>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Due Diligence Recommendations: Recommendations to online platforms with regard to processes of compliance with internationally agreed human rights standards.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Model Contractual Provisions: Elaboration of a set of principles and provisions protecting platform users’ rights and guaranteeing transparent mechanisms to seek redress in case of violations.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">DCPR will ground the development of these frameworks in the preliminary step of compilation of existing projects and initiatives dealing with the analysis of ToS compatibility with human rights standards. Members, participants and interested stakeholders are invited to highlight and share relevant initiatives by 10th October regarding:</p>
<ol>
<li>Processes of due diligence for human rights compliance;</li>
<li>The evaluation of ToS cocompliance with human rights standards;</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Further to this compilation, a first recommendation draft regarding online platforms' due diligence will be circulated on the mailing list by 30th October 2014. CIS will be contributing to the drafting which will be led and elaborated by the DCPR coordinators. This draft will be open for comments via the DCPR mailing list until 30th November 2014 and we encourage you to sign up to the mailing list (<a class="external-link" href="http://lists.platformresponsibility.info/listinfo/dcpr">http://lists.platformresponsibility.info/listinfo/dcpr</a>).<br /><br />A second draft will be developed compiling the comments expressed via the mailing-list and shared for comments by 10 December 2014. The final version of the recommendation will be drafted by 30 December. Subsequently, the first set of model contractual provisions will be elaborated building upon such recommendation. A call for inputs will be issued in order to gather suggestions on the content of these provisions.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-joins-dynamic-coalition-for-platform-responsibility'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-joins-dynamic-coalition-for-platform-responsibility</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiHuman RightsPrivacyInternet Governance ForumData ProtectionTerms of ServiceInternet GovernancePlatform ResponsibilityIntermediary Liability2014-10-07T10:54:03ZBlog EntryAnalyzing the Latest List of Blocked Sites (Communalism and Rioting Edition) Part II
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/analyzing-the-latest-list-of-blocked-sites-communalism-and-rioting-edition-part-ii
<b>Snehashish Ghosh does a further analysis of the leaked list of the websites blocked by the Indian Government from August 18, 2012 till August 21, 2012 (“leaked list”). </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Unnecessary Blocks and Mistakes:</b></p>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">http://hinduexistance.files.wordpress.com/..., which appears on the leaked list, does not exist because the URL is incorrect. However, the correct URL does contain an image which, in my opinion, can be considered to be capable of inciting violence. It has not been blocked due to a spelling error in the order. Instead of blocking hinduexist<b><i>e</i></b>nce.wordpress.com/... the DoT has ordered the blocking of hinduexist<b><i>a</i></b>nce.wordpress.com/..., which does not exist.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Two URLs in the block order are from the website of the High Council for Human Rights, Judiciary of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The reason for blocking these two links from this particular website is unclear.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">The website of the Union of NGOs of the Islamic World was blocked. Again, the reason for blocking this website remains unclear.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">URLs such as, http://farazahmed.com/..., mumblingminion.blogspot.com, were blocked. The content on these URLs was in fact debunking the fake photographs.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify; ">Certain blocked Facebook pages did not have any bearing on the North East exodus which was the main reason behind the blocks. For example, Facebook link leading to United States Institute for Peace page was blocked.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Duration of the Block</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Department of Telecommunications (DoT) did not specify the period for which the block has been implemented in its orders. As a result of which certain URLs still remain blocked while a majority of the links in the leaked list can be accessed. Lack of clear directions from the DoT has resulted in haphazard blocking and certain internet service providers (ISPs) have lifted the block on certain links whereas some other ISPs have continued with a complete block.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>How have the intermediaries reacted to the block orders?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Going by the leaked list of websites blocked by DoT, it issued the block orders to ‘all internet service licensees’. Intermediaries that do not fall in the category of 'internet service licensees’ were also sent a separate set of requests for taking down third party content. However, it is unclear under which provision of the law such request was made by the Government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Internet Service Licensees</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/chart_1.png" alt="Implementation of the order at the ISP level" class="image-inline" title="Implementation of the order at the ISP level" /><br /></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The internet service licensee or the ISPs have not followed any uniform system to notify that a particular URL or website in the leaked list is blocked according to DoT’s orders. The lack of transparency in the implementation of the block orders, have a chilling effect on free speech.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For instance, BSNL returns the following messages:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"This website/URL has been blocked until further notice either pursuant to Court orders or on the Directions issued by the Department of Telecommunications" or “This site has been blocked as per instructions from Department of Telecom (DOT).”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, these messages are not uniform across all the URLs/websites in the leaked list. BSNL does not generate any response for the majority of the URLs in the leaked list. This results in ‘invisible censorship’ as the person who is trying to access the blocked URL does not have any means to know whether a particular URL is unavailable or certain sites are blocked by government orders.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Lack of notification does not only infringes upon the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression but also violates the fundamental right to a constitutional remedy guaranteed under Article 32 of our Constitution. The person aggrieved by such block orders cannot approach the Court for a remedy because there is no means to figure out:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(a) Description of the content blocked?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(b) Who has issued the block order/request?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(c) Under which provision of the law such block order/request has been issued?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(d) Who has implemented the block order/request? and</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(e) What was the reason for the block?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The intermediaries should provide with the above notification details while implementing a block order issued by the Government. </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Intermediaries hosting third party content: </b></p>
<p align="right" style="text-align: justify; ">More than 100 out of the 309 blocks are Facebook (http and https) URLs. Facebook has not informed its users about the reasons behind unavailability of certain pages or content. This is another instance of invisible censorship. However, YouTube, a Google service, has maintained certain level of transparency, and informs the user that the content has been blocked as per ‘government removal request’. It is interesting to note that certain YouTube user accounts were terminated as well. It is unclear whether this was as a result of the block order. Furthermore, links associated with blogger.com, which is another service provided by Google, have been removed.</p>
<hr />
<p align="right" style="text-align: justify; ">This was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.medianama.com/2012/09/223-analyzing-the-latest-list-of-blocked-sites-communalism-rioting-edition-part-ii/">re-posted</a> by Medianama on September 26, 2012.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/analyzing-the-latest-list-of-blocked-sites-communalism-and-rioting-edition-part-ii'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/analyzing-the-latest-list-of-blocked-sites-communalism-and-rioting-edition-part-ii</a>
</p>
No publishersnehashishIT ActSocial mediaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionPublic AccountabilityInternet GovernanceIntermediary LiabilitySocial Networking2012-09-27T10:42:30ZBlog EntryAnalysis of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2012
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/analysis-copyright-amendment-bill-2012
<b>There are some welcome provisions in the Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2012, and some worrisome provisions. Pranesh Prakash examines five positive changes, four negative ones, and notes the several missed opportunities. The larger concern, though, is that many important issues have not been addressed by these amendments, and how copyright policy is made without evidence and often out of touch with contemporary realities of the digital era.</b>
<p>The <a class="external-link" href="http://164.100.24.219/BillsTexts/RSBillTexts/PassedRajyaSabha/copy-E.pdf">Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2012</a> has been passed by both Houses of Parliament, and will become law as soon as the President gives her assent and it is published in the Gazette of India. While we celebrate the passage of some progressive amendments to the Copyright Act, 1957 — including an excellent exception for persons with disabilities — we must keep in mind that there are some regressive amendments as well. In this blog post, I will try to highlight those provisions of the amendment that have not received much public attention (unlike the issue of lyricists’ and composers’ ‘right to royalty’).</p>
<h2>Welcome Changes</h2>
<h3>Provisions for Persons with Disabilities</h3>
<p>India now has amongst the most progressive exception for persons with disabilities, alongside countries like Chile. Under the amendments, sections 51(1)(zb) and 31B carve out exceptions and limitations for persons with disabilities. Earlier s.52(1)(zb) dealt only with formats that were “special designed only for the use of persons suffering from visual, aural, or other disabilities”. Thanks to a campaign mounted by disability rights groups and public interest groups such as CIS, it now covers “any accessible format”. Section 52(1)(zb) allows any person to facilitate access by persons with disabilities to copyrighted works without any payment of compensation to the copyright holder, and any organization working the benefit of persons with disabilities to do so as long as it is done on a non-profit basis and with reasonable steps being taken to prevent entry of reproductions of the copyrighted work into the mainstream. Even for-profit businesses are allowed to do so if they obtain a compulsory licence on a work-by-work basis, and pay the royalties fixed by the Copyright Board. The onerousness of this provision puts its utility into question, and this won’t disappear unless the expression “work” in s.31B is read to include a class of works.</p>
<p>Given that the Delhi High Court has — wrongly and <a class="external-link" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Per_incuriam">per incuriam</a>, since it did not refer to s.14(a)(ii) as it was amended in 1994 — held parallel importation to be barred by the Copyright Act, it was important for Parliament to clarify that the Copyright Act in fact follows international exhaustion. Without this, even if any person can facilitate access for persons with disabilities to copyrighted works, those works are restricted to those that are circulated in India. Given that not many books are converted into accessible formats in India (not to mention the costs of doing so), and given the much larger budgets for book conversion in the developed world, this is truly restrictive.</p>
<h3>Extension of Fair Dealing to All Works</h3>
<p>The law earlier dealt with fair dealing rights with regard to “literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works”. Now it covers all works (except software), in effect covering sound recordings and video as well. This will help make personal copies of songs and films, to make copies for research, to use film clips in classrooms, etc.</p>
<h3>Creative Commons, Open Licensing Get a Boost</h3>
<p>The little-known s.21 of the Copyright Act, which deals with the right of authors to relinquish copyright, has been amended. While earlier one could only relinquish parts of one’s copyright by submitting a form to the Registrar of Copyrights, now a simple public notice suffices. Additionally, s.30 of the Act, which required licences to be in writing and signed, now only requires it to be in writing. This puts Creative Commons, the GNU Public Licence, and other open licensing models, on a much surer footing in India.</p>
<h3>Physical Libraries Should Celebrate, Perhaps Virtual Libraries Too</h3>
<p>Everywhere that the word “hire” occurs (except s.51, curiously), the word “commercial rental” has been substituted. This has been done, seemingly, to bring India in conformance with the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The welcome side-effect of this is that the legality of lending by non-profit public libraries has been clarified. The amendment states:</p>
<p class="discreet">"2(1)(fa) “commercial rental” does not include the rental, lease or lending of a lawfully acquired copy of a computer programme, sound recording, visual recording or cinematograph film for non-profit purposes by a non-profit library or non-profit educational institution."</p>
<p>Even after this, the overwhelming majority of the ‘video lending libraries’ that you see in Indian cities and towns continue to remain illegal.</p>
<p>Another welcome provision is the amended s.52(1)(n), which now allows “non-commercial public libraries” to store an electronic copy of a work if it already has a physical copy of the work. However, given that this provision says that the storage shall be “for preservation”, it seems limited. However, libraries might be able to use this — in conjunction with the fact that under s.14 of the Copyright Act lending rights of authors is limited to “commercial rental” and s.51(b) only covers lending of “infringing copies” — to argue that they can legally scan and lend electronic copies of works in the same manner that they lend physical copies. Whether this argument would succeed is unclear. Thus, India has not boldly gone where the European Commission is treading with talks of a European Digital Library Project, or where scholars in the US are headed with the Digital Public Library of America. But we might have gone there quietly. Thus, this amendment might help foster an Indian <a class="external-link" href="http://internetarchive.org/">Internet Archive</a>, or help spread the idea of the <a class="external-link" href="http://openlibrary.org/">Open Library</a> in India.</p>
<p>On a final note, different phrases are used to refer to libraries in the amendment. In s.2(1)(fa), it talks about "non-profit library"; in s.52(1)(n) and (o), it refers to "non-commercial public library"; and in s.52(1)(zb), it talks of "library or archives", but s.52(1)(zb) also requires that the works be made available on a "non-profit basis". The differentiation, if any, that is sought to be drawn between these is unclear.</p>
<h3>Limited Protection to Some Internet Intermediaries</h3>
<p>There are two new provisions, s.52(1)(b) and 52(1)(c), which provide some degree of protection to 'transient or incidental' storage of a work or performance. Section 52(1)(b) allows for "the transient or incidental storage of a work or performance purely in the technical process of electronic transmission or communication to the public", hence applying primarily to Internet Service Providers (ISPs), VPN providers, etc. Section 52(1)(c) allows for "transient or incidental storage of a work or performance for the purpose of providing electronic links, access or integration, where such links, access or integration has not been expressly prohibited by the right holder, unless the person responsible is aware or has reasonable grounds for believing that such storage is of an infringing copy". This seems to make it applicable primarily to search engines, with other kinds of online services being covered or not covered depending on one’s interpretation of the word 'incidental'.</p>
<h3>Compulsory Licensing Now Applies to Foreign Works Also</h3>
<p>Sections 31 ("compulsory licence in works withheld from public") and 31A ("compulsory licence in unpublished Indian works") used to apply to Indian works. Now they apply to all works, whether Indian or not (and now s.31A is about "compulsory licence in unpublished or published works", mainly orphan works). This is a welcome amendment, making foreign works capable of being licensed compulsorily in case it is published elsewhere but withheld in India. Given how onerous our compulsory licensing sections are, especially sections 32 and 32A (which deal with translations, and with literary, scientific or artistic works), it is not a surprise that they have not been used even once. However, given the modifications to s.31 and s.31A, we might just see those starting to be used by publishers, and not just radio broadcasters.</p>
<h2>Worrisome Changes</h2>
<h3>Term of Copyright for Photographs Nearly Doubled</h3>
<p>The term of copyright for photographs has now gone from sixty years from publication to sixty years from the death of the photographer. This would mean that copyright in a photograph clicked today (2012) by a 20 year old who dies at the 80 will only expire on January 1, 2133. This applies not only to artistic photographs, to all photographs because copyright is an opt-out system, not an opt-in system. Quite obviously, most photoshopping is illegal under copyright law.</p>
<p>This has two problems. First, there was no case made out for why this term needed to be increased. No socio-economic report was commissioned on the effects of such a term increase. This clause was not even examined by the Parliamentary Standing Committee. While the WCT requires a ‘life + 50′ years term for photographs, we are not signatories to the WCT, and hence have no obligation to enforce this. We are signatories to the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, which require a copyright term of 25 years for photographs. Instead, we have gone even above the WCT requirement and provide a life + 60 years term.</p>
<p>The second problem is that it is easier to say when a photograph was published than to say who the photographer was and when that photographer died. Even when you are the subject of a photograph, the copyright in the photograph belongs to the photographer. Unless a photograph was made under commission or the photographer assigned copyright to you, you do not own the copyright in the photographs. (Thanks to <a href="http://deviantlight.blogspot.com">Bipin Aspatwar</a>, for pointing out a mistake in an earlier version, with "employment" and "commission" being treated differently.) This will most definitely harm projects like Wikipedia, and other projects that aim at archiving and making historical photographs available publicly, since it is difficult to say whether the copyright in a photograph still persists.</p>
<h3>Cover Versions Made More Difficult: Kolaveri Di Singers Remain Criminals</h3>
<p>The present amendments have brought about the following changes, which make it more difficult to produce cover versions:</p>
<ol>
<li> Time period after which a cover version can be made has increased from 2 years to 5 years.</li>
<li>Requirement of same medium as the original. So if the original is on a cassette, the cover cannot be released on a CD.</li>
<li>Payment has to be made in advance, and for a minimum of 50000 copies. This can be lowered by Copyright Board having regard to unpopular dialects.</li>
<li>While earlier it was prohibited to mislead the public (i.e., pretend the cover was the original, or endorsed by the original artists), now cover versions are not allowed to "contain the name or depict in any way any performer of an earlier sound recording of the same work or any cinematograph film in which such sound recording was incorporated".</li>
<li>All cover versions must state that they are cover versions.</li>
<li>No alterations are allowed from the original song, and alteration is qualified as ‘alteration in the literary or musical work’. So no imaginative covers in which the lyrics are changed or in which the music is reworked are allowed without the copyright owners’ permission. Only note-for-note and word-for-word covers are allowed.</li>
<li>Alterations were allowed if they were "reasonably necessary for the adaptation of the work" now they are only allowed if it is "technically necessary for the purpose of making of the sound recording".</li>
</ol>
<p>This ignores present-day realities. Kolaveri Di was covered numerous times without permission, and each one of those illegal acts helped spread its popularity. The singers and producers of those unlicensed versions could be jailed under the current India Copyright Act, which allows even non-commercial copyright infringers to be put behind bars. Film producers and music companies want both the audience reach that comes from less stringent copyright laws (and things like cover versions), as well as the ability to prosecute that same behaviour at will. It is indeed ironic that T-Series, the company that broke HMV’s stranglehold over the Indian recording market thanks to cover versions, is itself one of the main movers behind ever-more stringent copyright laws.</p>
<h3>Digital Locks Now Provided Legal Protection Without Accountability</h3>
<p>As I have covered the issue of Technological Protection Measures (TPM) and Rights Management Information (RMI), which are ‘digital locks’ also known as Digital Rights Management (DRM), <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/tpm-copyright-amendment" class="external-link">in great detail earlier</a>, I won’t repeat the arguments at length. Very briefly:</p>
<ol>
<li>It is unclear that anyone has been demanding the grant of legal protection to DRMs in India, and We have no obligation under any international treaties to do so. It is not clear how DRM will help authors and artists, but it is clear how it will harm users.</li>
<li>While the TPM and RMI provisions are much more balanced than the equivalent provisions in laws like the US’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMC), that isn’t saying much. Importantly, while users are given certain rights to break the digital locks, they are helpless if they aren’t also provided the technological means of doing so. Simply put: music and movie companies have rights to place digital locks, and under some limited circumstances users have the right to break them. But if the locks are difficult to break, the users have no choice but to live with the lock, despite having a legal right.</li>
</ol>
<h3>Removal of Parallel Importation</h3>
<p>In past blog posts I have covered <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/parallel-importation-of-books" class="external-link">why allowing parallel imports makes sense in India</a>. And as explained above, the Delhi High Court acted per incuriam when holding that the Copyright Act does not allow parallel importation. The Copyright Act only prohibits import of infringing copies of a work, and a copy of a book that has been legally sold in a foreign country is not an “infringing copy”. The government was set to introduce a provision making it clear that parallel importation was allowed. The Parliamentary Standing Committee heard objections to this proposal from a foreign publishers’ association, but decided to recommend the retention of the clause. Still, due to pressure from a few publishing companies whose business relies on monopolies over importation of works into India, the government has decided to delete the provision. However, thankfully, the HRD Minister, Kapil Sibal, has assured both houses of Parliament that he will move a further amendment if an<a class="external-link" href="http://www.ncaer.org/"> NCAER</a> report he has commissioned (which will be out by August or September) recommends the introduction of parallel imports.</p>
<h3>Expansion of Moral Rights Without Safeguards</h3>
<p>Changes have been made to author’s moral rights (and performer’s moral rights have been introduced) but these have been made without adequate safeguards. The changes might allow the legal heir of an author, artist, etc., to object to ‘distortion, mutilation, modification, or other act’ of her ancestors work even when the ancestor might not have. By this amendment, this right continues in perpetuity, even after the original creator dies and even after the work enters into the public domain. It seems Indian policymakers had not heard of <a class="external-link" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_James_Joyce">Stephen Joyce</a>, the grandson of James Joyce, who has “brought numerous lawsuits or threats of legal action against scholars, biographers and artists attempting to quote from Joyce’s literary work or personal correspondence”. Quoting from his Wikipedia page:</p>
<p class="callout">In 2004, Stephen threatened legal action against the Irish government when the Rejoyce Dublin 2004 festival proposed public reading of excerpts of Ulysses on Bloomsday. In 1988 Stephen Joyce burnt a collection of letters written by Lucia Joyce, his aunt. In 1989 he forced Brenda Maddox to delete a postscript concerning Lucia from her biography Nora: The Real Life of Molly Bloom. After 1995 Stephen announced no permissions would be granted to quote from his grandfather’s work. Libraries holding letters by Joyce were unable to show them without permission. Versions of his work online were disallowed. Stephen claimed to be protecting his grandfather’s and families reputation, but would sometimes grant permission to use material in exchange for fees that were often "extortionate".</p>
<p>Because in countries like the UK and Canada the works of James Joyce are now in the public domain, Stephen Joyce can no longer restrict apply such conditions. However now, in India, despite James Joyce’s works being in the public domain, Stephen Joyce’s indefensible demands may well carry legal weight.</p>
<h3>Backdoor Censorship</h3>
<p>As noted above, the provision that safeguard Internet intermediaries (like search engines) is very limited. However, that provision has an extensive removal provision:</p>
<p class="callout">Provided that if the person responsible for the storage of the copy has received a written complaint from the owner of copyright in the work, complaining that such transient or incidental storage is an infringement, such person responsible for the storage shall refrain from facilitating such access for a period of twenty-one days or till he receives an order from the competent court refraining from facilitating access and in case no such order is received before the expiry of such period of twenty-one days, he may continue to provide the facility of such access;</p>
<p>There are two things to be noted here. First, that without proof (or negative consequences for false complaints) the service provider is mandated to prevent access to the copy for 21 day. Second, after the elapsing of 21 days, the service provider may 'put back' the content, but is not mandated to do so. This would allow people to file multiple frivolous complaints against any kind of material, even falsely (since there is no penalty for false compalaints), and keep some material permanently censored.</p>
<h2>Missed Opportunities</h2>
<h3>Fair Dealing Guidelines, Criminal Provisions, Government Works, and Other Missed Opportunities</h3>
<p>The following important changes should have been made by the government, but haven’t. While on some issues the Standing Committee has gone beyond the proposed amendments, it has not touched upon any of the following, which we believe are very important changes that are required to be made.</p>
<ul>
<li> Criminal provisions: Our law still criminalises individual, non-commercial copyright infringement. This has now been extended to the proposal for circumvention of Technological Protection Measures and removal of Rights Management Information also.</li>
<li>Fair dealing guidelines: We would benefit greatly if, apart from the specific exceptions provided for in the Act, more general guidelines were also provided as to what do not constitute infringement. This would not take away from the existing exceptions, but would act as a more general framework for those cases which are not covered by the specific exceptions.</li>
<li>Government works: Taxpayers are still not free to use works that were paid for by them. This goes against the direction that India has elected to march towards with the Right to Information Act. A simple amendment of s.52(1)(q) would suffice. The amended subsection could simply allow for “the reproduction, communication to the public, or publication of any government work” as being non-infringing uses.</li>
<li>Copyright terms: The duration of all copyrights are above the minimum required by our international obligations, thus decreasing the public domain which is crucial for all scientific and cultural progress.</li>
<li>Educational exceptions: The exceptions for education still do not fully embrace distance and digital education.</li>
<li>Communication to the public: No clear definition is given of what constitute a ‘public’, and no distinction is drawn between commercial and non-commercial ‘public’ communication.</li>
<li>Internet intermediaries: More protections are required to be granted to Internet intermediaries to ensure that non-market based peer-production projects such as Wikipedia, and other forms of social media and grassroots innovation are not stifled. Importantly, after the terrible judgment passed by Justice Manmohan Singh of the Delhi High Court in the Super Cassettes v. Myspace case, any website hosting user-generated content is vulnerable to payment of hefty damages even if it removes content speedily on the basis of complaints.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Amendments Not Examined</h2>
<p>For the sake of brevity, I have not examined the major changes that have been made with regard to copyright societies, lyricists and composers, and statutory licensing for broadcasters, all of which have received considerable attention by copyright experts elsewhere, nor have I examined many minor amendments.</p>
<h2>A Note on the Parliamentary Process</h2>
<p>Much of the discussions around the Copyright Act have been around the rights of composers and lyricists vis-à-vis producers. As this has been covered elsewhere, I won’t comment much on it, other than to say that it is quite unfortunate that the trees are lost for the forest. It is indeed a good thing that lyricists and composers are being provided additional protection against producers who are usually in a more advantageous bargaining position. This fact came out well in both houses of Parliament during the debate on the Copyright Bill.<br /><br />However, the mechanism of providing this protection — by preventing assignment of “the right to receive royalties”, though the “right to receive royalties” is never mentioned as a separate right anywhere else in the Copyright Act — was not critically examined by any of the MPs who spoke. What about the unintended consequences of such an amendment? Might this not lead to new contracts where instead of lump-sums, lyricists and music composers might instead be asked to bear the risk of not earning anything at all unless the film is profitable? What about a situation where a producer asks a lyricist to first assign all rights (including royalty rights) to her heirs and then enters into a contract with those heirs? The law, unfortunately at times, revolves around words used by the legislature and not just the intent of the legislature. While one cannot predict which way the amendment will go, one would have expected better discussions around this in Parliament.</p>
<p>Much of the discussion (in both <a class="external-link" href="http://164.100.47.5/newdebate/225/17052012/Fullday.pdf">the Rajya Sabha</a> and <a class="external-link" href="http://164.100.47.132/newdebate/15/10/22052012/Fullday.pdf">the Lok Sabha</a>) was rhetoric about the wonders of famous Indian songwriters and music composers and the abject penury in which some not-so-famous ones live, and there was very little discussion about the actual merits of the content of the Bill in terms of how this problem will be overcome. A few MPs did deal with issues of substance. Some asked the HRD Minister tough questions about the Statement of Objects and Reasons noting that amendments have been brought about to comply with the WCT and WPPT which were “adopted … by consensus”, even though this is false as India is not a signatory to the WCT and WPPT. MP P. Rajeeve further raised the issue of parallel imports and that of there being no public demand for including TPM in the Act, but that being a reaction to the US’s flawed Special 301 reports. Many, however, spoke about issues such as the non-award of the Bharat Ratna to Bhupen Hazarika, about the need to tackle plagiarism, and how the real wealth of a country is not material wealth but intellectual wealth.</p>
<p>This preponderance of rhetoric over content is not new when it comes to copyright policy in India. In 1991, when an amendment was presented to increase term of copyright in all works by ten years (from expiring 50 years from the author’s death to 60 years post-mortem), the vast majority of the Parliamentarians who stood up to speak on the issue waxed eloquent about the greatness of Rabindranath Tagore (whose works were about to lapse into the public domain), and how we must protect his works. Little did they reflect that extending copyright — for all works, whether by Tagore or not — will not help ‘protect’ the great Bengali artist, but would only make his (and all) works costlier for 10 additional years. Good-quality and cheaper editions of Tagore’s works are more easily available post-2001 (when his copyright finally lapsed) than before, since companies like Rupa could produce cheap editions without seeking a licence from Visva Bharati. And last I checked Tagore’s works have not been sullied by them having passed into the public domain in 2001.</p>
<p>Further, one could find outright mistakes in the assertions of Parliamentarians. In both Houses, DMK MPs raised objections with regard to parallel importation being allowed in the Bill — only in the version of the Bill they were debating, parallel importation was not being allowed. One MP stated that “statutory licensing provisions like these are not found anywhere else in the world”. This is incorrect, given that there are extensive statutory licensing provision in countries like the United States, covering a variety of situations, from transmission of sound recordings over Internet radio to secondary transmission of the over-the-air programming.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, though that MP did not raise this issue, there is a larger problem that underlies copyright policymaking in India, and that is the fact that there is no impartial evidence gathered and no proper studies that are done before making of policies. We have no equivalent of the Hargreaves Report or the Gowers Report, or the studies by the Productivity Council in Australia or the New Zealand government study of parallel importation.</p>
<p>There was no economic analysis conducted of the effect of the increase in copyright term for photographs. We have evidence from elsewhere that copyright terms <a class="external-link" href="http://williampatry.blogspot.in/2007/07/statute-of-anne-too-generous-by-half.html">are already</a> <a class="external-link" href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2024588">too long</a>, and all increases in term are what economists refer to as <a class="external-link" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deadweight_loss">deadweight losses</a>. There is no justification whatsoever for increasing term of copyright for photographs, since India is not even a signatory to the WCT (which requires this term increase). In fact, we have lost precious negotiation space internationally since in bilateral trade agreements we have been asked to bring our laws in compliance with the WCT, and we have asked for other conditions in return. By unilaterally bringing ourselves in compliance with WCT, we have lost important bargaining power.</p>
<h2>Users and Smaller Creators Left Out of Discussions</h2>
<p>Thankfully, the Parliamentary Standing Committee went into these minutiae in greater detail. Though, as I have noted elsewhere, the Parliamentary Standing Committee did not invite any non-industry groups for deposition before it, other than the disability rights groups which had campaigned really hard. So while changes that would affect libraries were included, not a single librarian was called by the Standing Committee. Despite comments having been submitted <a href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/publications/copyright-bill-submission" class="external-link">to the Standing Committee on behalf of 22 civil society organizations</a>, none of those organizations were asked to depose. Importantly, non-industry users of copyrighted materials — consumers, historians, teachers, students, documentary film-makers, RTI activists, independent publishers, and people like you and I — are not seen as legitimate interested parties in the copyright debate. This is amply clear from the the fact that only one MP each in the two houses of Parliament raised the issue of users’ rights at all.</p>
<h2>Concluding Thoughts</h2>
<p>What stands out most from this process of amendment of the copyright law, which has been going on since 2006, is how out-of-touch the law is with current cultural practices. Most instances of photoshopping are illegal. Goodbye Lolcats. Cover versions (for which payments have to be made) have to wait for five years. Goodbye Kolaveri Di. Do you own the jokes you e-mail to others, and have you taken licences for quoting older e-mails in your replies? Goodbye e-mail. The strict laws of copyright, with a limited set of exceptions, just do not fit the digital era where everything digital transaction results in a bytes being copied. We need to take a much more thoughtful approach to rationalizing copyright: introduction of general fair dealing guidelines, reduction of copyright term, decriminalization of non-commercial infringement, and other such measures. If we don’t take such measures soon, we will all have to be prepared to be treated as criminals for all our lives. Breaking copyright law shouldn’t be as easy as breathing, yet thanks to outdated laws, it is.</p>
<p><a class="external-link" href="http://infojustice.org/archives/26243">This was reposted in infojustice.org on May 25, 2012</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/analysis-copyright-amendment-bill-2012'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/analysis-copyright-amendment-bill-2012</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshAccess to KnowledgeFair DealingsPiracyIntellectual Property RightsEconomicsIntermediary LiabilityFeaturedTechnological Protection Measures2013-11-12T14:13:04ZBlog EntryAn Evidence based Intermediary Liability Policy Framework: Workshop at IGF
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/igf-workshop-an-evidence-based-intermediary-liability-policy-framework
<b>CIS is organising a workshop at the Internet Governance Forum 2014. The workshop will be an opportunity to present and discuss ongoing research on the changing definition of intermediaries and their responsibilities across jurisdictions and technologies and contribute to a comprehensible framework for liability that is consistent with the capacity of the intermediary and with international human-rights standards.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Centre for Internet and Society, India and Centre for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School, USA, will be organising a workshop to analyse the role of intermediary platforms in relation to freedom of expression, freedom of information and freedom of association at the Internet Governance Forum 2014. <span>The aim of the workshop is to highlight the increasing importance of digital rights and broad legal protections of stakeholders in an increasingly knowledge-based economy. The workshop will discuss public policy issues associated with Internet intermediaries, in particular their roles, legal responsibilities and related liability limitations in context of the evolving nature and role of intermediaries in the Internet ecosystem. distinct</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Online Intermediaries: Setting the context</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Internet has facilitated unprecedented access to information and amplified avenues for expression and engagement by removing the limits of geographic boundaries and enabling diverse sources of information and online communities to coexist. Against the backdrop of a broadening base of users, the role of intermediaries that enable economic, social and political interactions between users in a global networked communication is ubiquitous. Intermediaries are essential to the functioning of the Internet as many producers and consumers of content on the internet rely on the action of some third party–the so called intermediary. Such intermediation ranges from the mere provision of connectivity, to more advanced services such as providing online storage spaces for data, acting as platforms for storage and sharing of user generated content (UGC), or platforms that provides links to other internet content.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Online intermediaries enhance economic activity by reducing costs, inducing competition by lowering the barriers for participation in the knowledge economy and fuelling innovation through their contribution to the wider ICT sector as well as through their key role in operating and maintaining Internet infrastructure to meet the network capacity demands of new applications and of an expanding base of users.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Intermediary platforms also provide social benefits, by empowering users and improving choice through social and participative networks, or web services that enable creativity and collaboration amongst individuals. By enabling platforms for self-expression and cooperation, intermediaries also play a critical role in establishing digital trust, protection of human rights such as freedom of speech and expression, privacy and upholding fundamental values such as freedom and democracy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, the economic and social benefits of online intermediaries are conditional to a framework for protection of intermediaries against legal liability for the communication and distribution of content which they enable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Intermediary Liability</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Over the last decade, right holders, service providers and Internet users have been locked in a debate on the potential liability of online intermediaries. The debate has raised global concerns on issues such as, the extent to which Internet intermediaries should be held responsible for content produced by third parties using their Internet infrastructure and how the resultant liability would affect online innovation and the free flow of knowledge in the information economy?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Given the impact of their services on communications, intermediaries find themselves as either directly liable for their actions, or indirectly (or “secondarily”) liable for the actions of their users. Requiring intermediaries to monitor the legality of the online content poses an insurmountable task. Even if monitoring the legality of content by intermediaries against all applicable legislations were possible, the costs of doing so would be prohibitively high. Therefore, placing liability on intermediaries can deter their willingness and ability to provide services, hindering the development of the internet itself.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Economics of intermediaries are dependent on scale and evaluating the legality of an individual post exceeds the profit from hosting the speech, and in the absence of judicial oversight can lead to a private censorship regime. Intermediaries that are liable for content or face legal exposure, have powerful incentives, to police content and limit user activity to protect themselves. The result is curtailing of legitimate expression especially where obligations related to and definition of illegal content is vague. Content policing mandates impose significant compliance costs limiting the innovation and competiveness of such platforms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">More importantly, placing liability on intermediaries has a chilling effect on freedom of expression online. Gate keeping obligations by service providers threaten democratic participation and expression of views online, limiting the potential of individuals and restricting freedoms. Imposing liability can also indirectly lead to the death of anonymity and pseudonymity, pervasive surveillance of users' activities, extensive collection of users' data and ultimately would undermine the digital trust between stakeholders.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thus effectively, imposing liability for intermediaries creates a chilling effect on Internet activity and speech, create new barriers to innovation and stifles the Internet's potential to promote broader economic and social gains. To avoid these issues, legislators have defined 'safe harbours', limiting the liability of intermediaries under specific circumstances.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Online intermediaries do not have direct control of what information is or information are exchanged via their platform and might not be aware of illegal content per se. A key framework for online intermediaries, such limited liability regimes provide exceptions for third party intermediaries from liability rules to address this asymmetry of information that exists between content producers and intermediaries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, it is important to note, that significant differences exist concerning the subjects of these limitations, their scope of provisions and procedures and modes of operation. The 'notice and takedown' procedures are at the heart of the safe harbour model and can be subdivided into two approaches:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">a. Vertical approach where liability regime applies to specific types of content exemplified in the US Digital Copyright Millennium Act</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">b. Horizontal approach based on the E-Commerce Directive (ECD) where different levels of immunity are granted depending on the type of activity at issue</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Current framework </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Globally, three broad but distinct models of liability for intermediaries have emerged within the Internet ecosystem:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">1. Strict liability model under which intermediaries are liable for third party content used in countries such as China and Thailand</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">2. Safe harbour model granting intermediaries immunity, provided their compliance on certain requirements</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">3. Broad immunity model that grants intermediaries broad or conditional immunity from liability for third party content and exempts them from any general requirement to monitor content. <b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While the models described above can provide useful guidance for the drafting or the improvement of the current legislation, they are limited in their scope and application as they fail to account for the different roles and functions of intermediaries. Legislators and courts are facing increasing difficulties, in interpreting these regulations and adapting them to a new economic and technical landscape that involves unprecedented levels user generated content and new kinds of and online intermediaries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The nature and role of intermediaries change considerably across jurisdictions, and in relation to the social, economic and technical contexts. In addition to the dynamic nature of intermediaries the different categories of Internet intermediaries‘ are frequently not clear-cut, with actors often playing more than one intermediation role. Several of these intermediaries offer a variety of products and services and may have number of roles, and conversely, several of these intermediaries perform the same function. For example , blogs, video services and social media platforms are considered to be 'hosts'. Search engine providers have been treated as 'hosts' and 'technical providers'.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This limitations of existing models in recognising that different types of intermediaries perform different functions or roles and therefore should have different liability, poses an interesting area for research and global deliberation. Establishing classification of intermediaries, will also help analyse existing patterns of influence in relation to content for example when the removal of content by upstream intermediaries results in undue over-blocking.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Distinguishing intermediaries on the basis of their roles and functions in the Internet ecosystem is critical to ensuring a balanced system of liability and addressing concerns for freedom of expression. Rather than the highly abstracted view of intermediaries as providing a single unified service of connecting third parties, the definition of intermediaries must expand to include the specific role and function they have in relation to users' rights. A successful intermediary liability regime must balance the needs of producers, consumers, affected parties and law enforcement, address the risk of abuses for political or commercial purposes, safeguard human rights and contribute to the evolution of uniform principles and safeguards.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Towards an evidence based intermediary liability policy framework</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This workshop aims to bring together leading representatives from a broad spectrum of stakeholder groups to discuss liability related issues and ways to enhance Internet users’ trust.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Questions to address at the panel include:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">1. What are the varying definitions of intermediaries across jurisdictions?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">2. What are the specific roles and functions that allow for classification of intermediaries?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">3. How can we ensure the legal framework keeps pace with technological advances and the changing roles of intermediaries?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">4. What are the gaps in existing models in balancing innovation, economic growth and human rights?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">5. What could be the respective role of law and industry self-regulation in enhancing trust?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">6. How can we enhance multi-stakeholder cooperation in this space?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Confirmed Panel:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Technical Community: Malcolm Hutty: Internet Service Providers Association (ISPA)<br />Civil Society: Gabrielle Guillemin: Article19<br />Academic: Nicolo Zingales: Assistant Professor of Law at Tilburg University<br />Intergovernmental: Rebecca Mackinnon: Consent of the Networked, UNESCO project<br />Civil Society: Anriette Esterhuysen: Association for Progressive Communication (APC)<br />Civil Society: Francisco Vera: Advocacy Director: Derechos Digitale<br />Private Sector: Titi Akinsanmi: Policy and Government Relations Manager, Google Sub-Saharan Africa<br />Legal: Martin Husovec: MaxPlanck Institute</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Moderator(s): </span><span>Giancarlo Frosio, Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) and </span><span>Jeremy Malcolm, Electronic Frontier Foundation </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>Remote Moderator: </span><span>Anubha Sinha, New Delhi</span></span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/igf-workshop-an-evidence-based-intermediary-liability-policy-framework'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/igf-workshop-an-evidence-based-intermediary-liability-policy-framework</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotihuman rightsDigital Governanceinternet governanceFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet Governance ForumHuman Rights OnlineIntermediary LiabilityPoliciesMulti-stakeholder2014-07-04T06:41:10ZBlog EntryA trust deficit between advertisers and publishers is leading to fake news
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindustan-times-sunil-abraham-september-24-2018-a-trust-deficit-between-advertisers-and-publishers-is-leading-to-fake-news
<b>Transparency regulations is need of the hour. And urgently for election and political advertising. What do the ads look like? Who paid for them? Who was the target? How many people saw these advertisements? How many times? Transparency around viral content is also required.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article was published in <a class="external-link" href="https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/a-trust-deficit-between-advertisers-and-publishers-is-leading-to-fake-news/story-SVNH9ot3KD50XRltbwOyEO.html">Hindustan Times</a> on September 24, 2018.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Traditionally, we have depended on the private censorship that intermediaries conduct on their platforms. They enforce, with some degree of success, their own community guidelines and terms of services (TOS). Traditionally, these guidelines and TOS have been drafted keeping in mind US laws since historically most intermediaries, including non-profits like Wikimedia Foundation were founded in the US.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Across the world, this private censorship regime was accepted by governments when they enacted intermediary liability laws (in India we have Section 79A of the IT Act). These laws gave intermediaries immunity from liability emerging from third party content about which they have no “actual knowledge” unless they were informed using takedown notices. Intermediaries set up offices in countries like India, complied with some lawful interception requests, and also conducted geo-blocking to comply with local speech regulation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For years, the Indian government has been frustrated since policy reforms that it has pursued with the US have yielded little fruit. American policy makers keep citing shortcomings in the Indian justice systems to avoid expediting the MLAT (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties) process and the signing of an executive agreement under the US Clout Act. This agreement would compel intermediaries to comply with lawful interception and data requests from Indian law enforcement agencies no matter where the data was located.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The data localisation requirement in the draft national data protection law is a result of that frustration. As with the US, a quickly enacted data localisation policy is absolutely non-negotiable when it comes to Indian military, intelligence, law enforcement and e-governance data. For India, it also makes sense in the cases of health and financial data with exceptions under certain circumstances. However, it does not make sense for social media platforms since they, by definition, host international networks of people. Recently an inter ministerial committee recommended that “criminal proceedings against Indian heads of social media giants” also be considered. However, raiding Google’s local servers when a lawful interception request is turned down or arresting Facebook executives will result in retaliatory trade actions from the US.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While the consequences of online recruitment, disinformation in elections and fake news to undermine public order are indeed serious, are there alternatives to such extreme measures for Indian policy makers? Updating intermediary liability law is one place to begin. These social media companies increasingly exercise editorial control, albeit indirectly, via algorithms to claim that they have no “actual knowledge”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But they are no longer mere conduits or dumb pipes as they are now publishers who collect payments to promote content. Germany passed a law called NetzDG in 2017 which requires expedited compliance with government takedown orders. Unfortunately, this law does not have sufficient safeguards to prevent overzealous private censorship. India should not repeat this mistake, especially given what the Supreme Court said in the Shreya Singhal judgment.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Transparency regulations are imperative. And they are needed urgently for election and political advertising. What do the ads look like? Who paid for them? Who was the target? How many people saw these advertisements? How many times? Transparency around viral content is also required. Anyone should be able to see all public content that has been shared with more than a certain percentage of the population over a historical timeline for any geographic area. This will prevent algorithmic filter bubbles and echo chambers, and also help public and civil society monitor unconstitutional and hate speech that violates terms of service of these platforms. So far the intermediaries have benefitted from surveillance — watching from above. It is time to subject them to sousveillance — watched by the citizens from below.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Data portability mandates and interoperability mandates will allow competition to enter these monopoly markets. Artificial intelligence regulations for algorithms that significantly impact the global networked public sphere could require – one, a right to an explanation and two, a right to influence automated decision making that influences the consumers experience on the platform.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The real solution lies elsewhere. Google and Facebook are primarily advertising networks. They have successfully managed to destroy the business model for real news and replace it with a business model for fake news by taking away most of the advertising revenues from traditional and new news media companies. They were able to do this because there was a trust deficit between advertisers and publishers. Perhaps this trust deficit could be solved by a commons-based solutions based on free software, open standards and collective action by all Indian new media companies.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindustan-times-sunil-abraham-september-24-2018-a-trust-deficit-between-advertisers-and-publishers-is-leading-to-fake-news'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindustan-times-sunil-abraham-september-24-2018-a-trust-deficit-between-advertisers-and-publishers-is-leading-to-fake-news</a>
</p>
No publishersunilInternet GovernanceIntermediary LiabilityCensorship2018-10-02T06:44:55ZBlog EntryA look at two problematic provisions of the draft Anti-trafficking bill
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/a-look-at-two-problematic-provisions-of-the-draft-anti-trafficking-bill
<b>This post examines two badly drafted provisions of the new Anti-Trafficking bill that have the potential to severely impinge upon the Freedom of Expression, including through a misunderstanding of intermediary liability. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal">On 28 Feb 2018, the Union Cabinet approved ‘The Trafficking of Persons (Prevention, Protection and Rehabilitation) Bill, 2018’ (‘the bill’) for introduction to the Parliament. This comes after a series of consultations on an earlier 2016 draft bill, that had faced its fair share of <a href="https://scroll.in/article/813268/six-counts-on-which-the-draft-anti-trafficking-bill-fails-short" target="_blank">criticism</a>. As per the Press Information Bureau <a href="http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=176878" target="_blank">announcement</a>, the Ministry of Women and Child Development met with various stakeholders including 60 NGOs and have incorporated many of the suggestions put forth. They’ve also stated that ‘the new law will make India a leader among South Asian countries to combat trafficking.’</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal">However, at first glance, there appear to be several issues with overbroad or vague language used in the drafting of the bill, that stretch it into potentially problematic areas. This current post will focus on two such provisions that could lead to a deleterious effect on the Freedom of Expression. As the bill is currently not publicly available, a stakeholder’s copy of the draft is being used to source these provisions. The relevant sections have been reproduced below for convenience. (Emphasis in bold is as provided by the author).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal"><em>Section 39: Buying or Selling of any person</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal"><em>39. (l) Whoever buys or sells any person for a consideration, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal"><em>(2) Whoever solicits or publicises electronically, taking or distributing obscene photographs or videos or providing materials or soliciting or guiding tourists or using agents or any other form <strong>which may lead to the trafficking of a person shall be punished</strong> with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than fifty thousand rupees but which may extend to one lakh rupees.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal">The grammatical acrobatics of section 39(2) aside, this anti-solicitation provision is severely problematic in that it mandates punishment even for a vaguely defined action or actions that may not actually be connected to the trafficking of a person. In other words, the provision doesn’t require any of the actions to be connected to trafficking in their intent or even outcome, but only in <em>potential</em> <em>connection</em> to the outcome. At the same time, it says these ‘shall’ be punished!</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal">This vagary that ignores actual or even probabilistic causation flies in the face of standard criminal law which requires <em>mens rea</em> along with <em>actus rea</em>. The excessively wide scope of this badly drafted provision leaves it prone to abuse. For example, currently the provision allows the following interpretation to be included: ‘Whoever publicizes electronically, by providing materials in any form, which may lead to trafficking of a person shall be punished…’. Even the electronic publicizing of an academic study on trafficking could fall under the provision as it currently reads, if it is argued that publishing studies that show the prevalence of trafficking ‘may lead to the trafficking of a person’! It is not hard to imagine that an academic study that shows trafficking numbers at embarrassingly high rates could be threatened with this provision. Similarly, any of our vast number of self-appointed moral guardians could also pull within this provision any artistic work that they may personally find offensive or ‘obscene’. Simply put, without any burden of showing a causal connect, it could be argued that <em>anything</em> ‘may lead’ to the trafficking of a person. Needless to say, this paves the way for a severe chilling effect on free speech, especially on critical speech around trafficking issues.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal"><em>Section 41: Offences related to media</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal"><em>41. (l) Whoever commits trafficking of a person with the aid of media, including, but not limited to print, internet, digital or electronic media, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal"><em>(2) Whoever <strong>distributes, or sells or stores</strong>, in any form in any electronic or printed form showing incidence of sexual exploitation, sexual assault, or rape for the purpose of exploitation or for coercion of the victim or his family members, or for unlawful gain <strong>shall be punished</strong> with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal">The drafters of this bill have perhaps overlooked the fact that unlike the physical world, the infrastructure of the electronic / digital world requires 3rd party intermediaries to handle information during most forms of electronic activities, whether it is transmission, storage or display. As it is not feasible, desirable or even practically possible for intermediaries to verify the legality of every bit of data that gets transferred or stored by the intermediary, ‘safe harbours’ are provided in law for intermediaries, protecting them from liability of the information being transmitted through them. These ensure that entities that act as architectural requirements and intermediary platforms are able to operate smoothly and without fear. If intermediaries are not granted this protection, it puts them in the unenviable position of having to monitor un-monitorable amounts of data, and face legal action for the slip-ups that are bound to happen regularly. Furthermore, there are several levels of free speech and privacy issues associated with having multiple gatekeepers on the expression of speech online. A charitable reading of the intent of a provision which does not recognise safe harbours for 3rd party intermediaries, would be that the drafters of the bill have simply not realised that users who upload and initiate transfer of information online, are not the same parties who do the actual transmission of the information.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal">Distribution, selling or storing of information online would require the transmission of information over intermediaries, as well as the temporary storage of such information on intermediary platforms. In India, intermediaries engaging with transmission or temporary storage of information are provided safe harbour<a href="imap://prasad@mail.cis-india.org:143/fetch%3EUID%3E/INBOX%3E176833#_ftn1">[1]</a> by Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (‘IT Act’), so long as they:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal">(i) act as a mere ‘conduit’ and do not initiate the transmission, select the receiver of the transmission, or select or modify the information contained in the transmission.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal">(ii) exercise due diligence while discharging duties under this Act, and observes other guidelines that the Central Government may prescribe.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal">The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011, list out the nature of the due diligence to be followed by intermediaries to claim exemption under Section 79 of the IT Act.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal">Intermediaries will not be granted safe harbour if they have conspired, abetted, aided or induced commission of the unlawful act, or if they do not remove or disable access to information upon receiving actual knowledge, or notice from the Government, of the information that is transmitted or stored by the intermediary being used for unlawful purposes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal">Thus it can be seen that the IT Act already provides an in-depth regime for intermediary liability, and given its <em>non-obstante </em>clause which states that Section 79 of the IT Act would apply “Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force” , as well as the reiteration of the IT Act’s overriding effect via Section 81, which states that the provisions of the Act ‘shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force’ (barring the exercise of copyright or patent rights), it is generally considered the appropriate legal framework for this issue. However, it appears that the drafters of the 2018 Anti-trafficking bill have not considered this aspect at all, since they have not referenced the IT Act in this context in the bill, and have additionally added their own <em>non-obstante </em>clause in Section 59 of the bill:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal">59.<em> The provisions of this Act, shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force and, in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of this Act shall have overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the extent of the inconsistency.</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="normal">So the regime as prescribed by the IT Act allows for safe harbours, whereas the regime as prescribed by the Anti-Trafficking bill does not allow for safe harbours, and both say that they would an overriding effect for any conflicting law. This legislative bumble could potentially be solved by using the settled principle that a special Act prevails over a general legislation. This is still a little tricky as they are technically both special Acts. It could be argued that given the context of the Anti-trafficking bill as focusing on trafficking, and the context of the IT Act focusing on the interface of law and technology, that for the purposes of Section 41(2) of the Anti-trafficking bill, the IT Act is the special legislation. And thus Section 79 of the IT Act should make redundant the relevant portion of Section 41(2) of the Anti-trafficking bill. This reading would require the bill to be modified so as to remove the redundancy and the conflicting portion of Section 41(2).</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify;">[1] In 2016, a division bench of the Delhi High Court held in the case of Myspace Inc vs Super Cassettes Industries Ltd that a safe harbour immunity for intermediaries was necessary as it was not technically feasible to pre-screen content from third parties, and that tasking intermediaries with this responsibility could have a chilling effect on free speech, It held that their responsibility was limited to the extent of acting upon receiving ‘actual knowledge’. Earlier, in determining what ‘actual knowledge’ refers to, in 2015 the Supreme Court of India in the landmark case of Shreya Singhal vs Union of India, required this to be in the form of a notice via a court or government order. Thus under our current law, intermediaries are granted a safe harbour from liability so long as they act upon court or government orders which notify them of content that is required to be taken down.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Clarification (18th August, 2018): A letter sent to the Ministry of Women and Child Development mentioned the Centre for Internet & Society as instituionally endorsing a critique of the The Trafficking of Persons (Prevention, Protection and Rehabilitation) Bill, 2018. We seek to clarify that the Centre for Internet & Society did not endorse the letter to the Ministry.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/a-look-at-two-problematic-provisions-of-the-draft-anti-trafficking-bill'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/a-look-at-two-problematic-provisions-of-the-draft-anti-trafficking-bill</a>
</p>
No publisherswarajFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceIntermediary Liability2018-08-18T09:21:55ZBlog EntryA Guide to Key IPR Provisions of the Proposed India-European Union Free Trade Agreement
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/a-guide-to-the-proposed-india-european-union-free-trade-agreement
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society presents a guide for policymakers and other stakeholders to the latest draft of the India-European Union Free Trade Agreement, which likely will be concluded by the end of the year and may hold serious ramifications for Indian businesses and consumers. </b>
<div class="visualClear">In its ongoing negotiation for a FTA with the EU, a process that began in 2007 and is expected to end sometime this year, India has won several signicant IP-related concessions. But there remain several IP issues critical to the maintenance of its developing economy, including its robust entrepreneurial environment, that India should contest further before ratifying the treaty. This guide covers the FTA's IP provisions that are within the scope of CIS' policy agenda and on which India has negotiated favorable language, as well as those provisions that it should re-negotiate or oppose.</div>
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<div class="visualClear">Download the guide <a title="A Guide to the Proposed India-European Union FTA" class="internal-link" href="http://www.cis-india.org/a2k/publications/CIS%20Open%20Data%20Case%20Studies%20Proposal.pdf">here</a>, and please feel free to comment below.</div>
<div class="visualClear"> </div>
<div class="visualClear">You may also download a <a title="India-EU FTA TRIPS Comparison Chart" class="internal-link" href="http://www.cis-india.org/advocacy/ipr/upload/India-EU_FTA_Chart.odt">chart</a> comparing the language proposed by India and the EU respectively with that included in the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).</div>
<div class="visualClear"> </div>
<div class="visualClear">Following is a summary of CIS' findings:</div>
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<div class="visualClear">
<ul><li>India has become a de facto leader of developing countries at the WTO, and an India-EU FTA seems likely to provide a model for FTAs between developed and developing states well into the future.</li><li>The EU has proposed articles on reproduction, communication, and broadcasting rights which could seriously undermine India's authority to regulate the use of works under copyright as currently provided for in the Berne Convention, as well as narrowing exceptions and limitations to rights under copyright.</li><li>The EU asserts that copyright includes "copyright in computer programs and in databases," without indicating whether such copyright exceeds that provided for in the Berne Convention. Moreover, by asserting that copyright "includes copyright in computer programs and in databases," the EU has left open the door for the extension of copyright to non-original databases.</li><li>India should explicitly obligate the EU to promote and encourage technology transfer -- an obligation compatible with and derived from TRIPS -- as well as propose a clear definition of technology transfer.</li><li>The EU has demanded India's accession to the WIPO Internet Treaties, the merits of which are currently under debate as India moves towards amending its Copyright Act, as well as several other international treaties that India either does not explicitly enforce or to which it is not a contracting party.</li><li>In general, the EU's provisions would extend terms of protection for material under copyright, within certain constraints, further endangering India's consumer-friendly copyright regime.</li><li>An agreement to establish arrangements between national organizations charged with collecting and distributing royalty payments may obligate such organizations in India collect royalty payments for EU rights holders on the same basis as they do for Indian rights holders, and vice versa in the EU, but more heavily burden India.</li><li>The EU has proposed a series of radical provisions on the enforcement of IPRs that are tailored almost exclusively to serve the interests of rights holders, at the expense of providing safety mechanisms for those accused of infringing or enabling infringers. </li><li>The EU has proposed, under cover of protecting intermediate service providers from liability for infringement by their users, to increase and/or place the burden on such providers of policing user activity.</li></ul>
</div>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/a-guide-to-the-proposed-india-european-union-free-trade-agreement'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/a-guide-to-the-proposed-india-european-union-free-trade-agreement</a>
</p>
No publishergloverDevelopmentConsumer RightsCopyrightAccess to KnowledgeDiscussionEconomicsAnalysisTechnological Protection MeasuresIntermediary LiabilityinnovationIntellectual Property RightsPatentsPublications2011-08-30T13:06:03ZBlog EntryA Deep Dive into Content Takedown Timeframes
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/torsha-sarkar-november-30-2019-a-deep-dive-into-content-takedown-timeframes
<b>Since the 1990s, internet usage has seen a massive growth, facilitated in part, by growing importance of intermediaries, that act as gateways to the internet. Intermediaries such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), web-hosting providers, social-media platforms and search engines provide key services which propel social, economic and political development. However, these developments are also offset by instances of users engaging with the platforms in an unlawful manner. The scale and openness of the internet makes regulating such behaviour challenging, and in turn pose several interrelated policy questions.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In this report, we will consider one such question by examining the appropriate time frame for an intermediary to respond to a government content removal request. The way legislations around the world choose to frame this answer has wider ramifications on issues of free speech and ease of carrying out operations for intermediaries. Through the course of our research, we found, for instance:</p>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify;">An one-size-fits-all model for illegal content may not be productive. The issue of regulating liability online contain several nuances, which must be considered for more holistic law-making. If regulation is made with only the tech incumbents in mind, then the ramifications of the same would become incredibly burdensome for the smaller companies in the market. </li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">Determining an appropriate turnaround time for an intermediary must also consider the nature and impact of the content in question. For instance, the Impact Assessment on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online cites research that shows that one-third of all links to Daesh propaganda were disseminated within the first one-hour of its appearance, and three-fourths of these links were shared within four hours of their release. This was the basic rationale for the subsequent enactment of the EU Terrorism Regulation, which proposed an one-hour time-frame for intermediaries to remove terrorist content.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">Understanding the impact of specific turnaround times on intermediaries requires the law to introduce in-built transparency reporting mechanisms. Such an exercise, performed periodically, generates useful feedback, which can be, in turn used to improve the system.</li></ol>
<div style="text-align: justify;"> </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Corrigendum: </strong>Please note that in the section concerning 'Regulation on Preventing the Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online', the report mentions that the Regulation has been 'passed in 2019'. At the time of writing the report, the Regulation had only been passed in the European Parliament, and as of May 2020, is currently in the process of a trilogue. </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;"> </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Disclosure</strong>: CIS is a recipient of research grants from Facebook India. </div>
<div style="text-align: justify;"> </div>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/a-deep-dive-into-content-takedown-frames">Click to download the research paper</a> by Torsha Sarkar (with research assistance from Keying Geng and Merrin Muhammed Ashraf; edited by Elonnai Hickok, Akriti Bopanna, and Gurshabad Grover; inputs from Tanaya Rajwade)</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/torsha-sarkar-november-30-2019-a-deep-dive-into-content-takedown-timeframes'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/torsha-sarkar-november-30-2019-a-deep-dive-into-content-takedown-timeframes</a>
</p>
No publishertorshaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceIntermediary Liability2020-06-26T11:59:06ZBlog EntryA beauty’s blog creates furore
https://cis-india.org/news/beauty-blog-creates-furore
<b>Her first Tamil poetry anthology Otraiyilaiyena (As a single leaf) saw three editions and the second one Ulagin Azhagiya Muthal Penn (The first beautiful woman in the world) invited mixed reactions like Iyal Poetry Award and a call for a ban by Hindu Makkal Katchi. Parathaiyarul Raani (Queen of sluts) her third collection was a reaction to all the moral policing. </b>
<p><a class="external-link" href="http://www.deccanchronicle.com/tabloid/chennai/beauty%E2%80%99s-blog-creates-furore-333">Lakshmi Krupa's article was published in Deccan Chronicle on April 10, 2012</a></p>
<p>While her film Sengadal The Dead Sea was stopped from being screened to the public, until the Supreme Court’s Appellate tribunal intervened with regional censor board for the film clearance, groups like the Makkal Kalai Ilakiya Kazhagam attacked her beliefs. Adding to this list is the latest revelation that the Principal Secretary of IT Department of the Tamil Nadu government requested that her blog be blocked along with a host of others.</p>
<p>In a text sent from A.K. Kaushik, Additional Director & CPIO Cyber Laws & E-Security in response to an RTI petition on Website Blocking, it was reported that Leena’s blog http://ulaginazhagiyamuthalpenn.blogspot.com was requested to be blocked on 21.07.2010 by the Principal Secretary, IT Department.</p>
<p>This recent revelation has led to an outrage over the fact that artists and activists like Leena have had to constantly knock on the doors of the legal system to exercise the most basic of their rights. In an interview from London where she is currently the Charles Wallace Visiting Scholar at the University of London, Leena says, “Center for Internet and Society in Bengaluru that works towards upholding Civil Liberties Online, had obtained a list of all websites that were sought to be blocked by Governmental authorities with the use of Right to Information Act.</p>
<p>They sent me all the details on how my blog was one amongst them as the Principal Secretary, IT Department, Govt of TN had asked for it to be blocked. As the Internet’s role in free speech becomes increasingly prevalent, tactics to control the Internet are growing more refined each year. Methods of accessing private data and censoring content vary between countries, but all maintain an element of oppression. We, who are concerned about civil liberties should wake up to the secret missions of our government on Internet Censorship and protect freedom of speech online.”</p>
<p>Leena’s blog has been in the center of controversies before too. “Hindu Makkal Katchi, the right wing moral police lodged a police complaint to ban my poetry collections and ban my blog ulaginazhagiyamuthalpenn. blogspot.com. They went to every possible media house and were making threat calls and there were discussions on the alleged obscenity in my poems. They even wanted the Iyal International Poetry Prize and Sirpi Literary Awards to be revoked.”<br /><br />Leena’s poetry challenges fanatic minds. “My poetry has a feminist agenda and it is just not about equal rights for women. It is a socialist, anti-institutional political movement which calls for women to break the code, destroy capitalism, live their sexuality and witch hunt every possible patriarchal design. I am not amused about the fact that my poetry gave jitters to ultra blasphemous right and left wingers,” she concludes.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/news/beauty-blog-creates-furore'>https://cis-india.org/news/beauty-blog-creates-furore</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaInternet GovernanceIntermediary LiabilityCensorship2012-04-11T03:50:47ZNews Item2019 International Asia Conference
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/2019-international-asia-conference
<b>ITECHLAW organized the 2019 edition of International Asia Conference at JW Marriott hotel in Bangalore on January 31, 2019 and February 1, 2019. Sunil Abraham was a panelist in the session "Policy Making for the Emerging Tech in India".</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The rush of emerging technologies of Machine Learning, Internet of Things (IoT) and Virtual Reality (VR) is revolutionising the landscape in which humans exist. Innovators of the generation are ambitious, and their contributions have significantly impacted on various fields like healthcare, media and entertainment, agriculture, and other service models. As these technology advancements are driving new business and service models, there is a need for stakeholders and governments to ensure security and stability of the market without stifling innovations, stigmatising incentives or creating obstacles. Rapid spreading technology applications are resulting in drastic changes in today’s regulatory model, posing the difficult challenges for regulators. In India, the expeditiously developing start-up ecosystem and online consumer base, has stirred the regulators.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Intermediary liability, surveillance, data and privacy, digital taxation, data governance and sovereignty are the dominating debatable topics in India. The debates are not only between regulators and stakeholders, but consumers also joining in it. As the competition between Indian and Foreign Technology intensifies in the turf, the debate on tech-policy is considerably being mentioned in run-up of political parties to the general elections as well. Over the past one year, the country has witnessed some landmark judgments and contentious government proposals related to data and privacy, implications of which have affected over-the-top (“OTT”) services, online media, social media, e-commerce platforms, IoT services etc. The Indian regulatory framework on tech-policy is becoming stricter due to a very disruptive phase last year. The tech-giants like Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Amazon are themselves realising their enormous market influence. After the episodes of lynching, hate speeches etc., they are participating in policy-making efforts related to fake news and digital malfeasance. In this process legal industry is making considerable lobbying efforts for corporations to work with government to curb the menace of digital malpractice and make the internet safer.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As the legal industry is participating in the process of creating an innovators-friendly regulatory regime, they are also striving to understand the disruptive technologies and adopt them for their own convenience. However, legal firms must understand that the technology cannot do their job for clients but can only upgrade the business model for them. The traditional law firm business model is not in sync with legal buyers. Effective deployment of technology will ameliorate the factor of its approachability to its clients.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">With the growing technology-based start-ups in India, it is going to be a hub for investments by big corporations. In order to keep attracting the investors there is a need for government to remove the potential hindrances that may make investors double-think. The government should prepare a level-playing field in the market by making citizens aware of the standard tech-policies and fostering the innovators-friendly regulatory regime.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For more info <a class="external-link" href="https://www.itechlaw.org/Bangalore2019">see the website</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/2019-international-asia-conference'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/2019-international-asia-conference</a>
</p>
No publisherAdminInternet GovernanceIntermediary Liability2019-02-19T00:23:43ZNews Item