Centre for Internet and Society

Workshop on Innovation, Economic Development and IP in India and China

Anubha Sinha and Rohini Lakshané — 2016-10-09T04:41:38Z

Anubha Sinha and Rohini Lakshané presented at the SMU-JINDAL-RENMIN Workshop on “Innovation, Economic Development, and IP in India and China,” co-organised by the Singapore Management University, O.P. Jindal Global University, and Renmin University of China, in Delhi during September 27-28, 2016. Amitabh Kant, Chief Executive Officer, NITI Aayog, delivered the inaugural address at the workshop.

Workshop Brochure: Download (PDF)

Anubha Sinha - "Investigating Limits to Innovation and Peer Production in India's Mobile Apps Economy"

Slides: Download (PDF)

Rohini Lakshané - "Exploring Open Hardware in Mass Produced Mobile Phones"

Slides: Download (PDF)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/news/workshop-on-innovation-economic-development-and-ip-in-india-and-china

Tweak the Make in India Recipe

rohini — 2016-06-04T04:02:01Z

As an erstwhile journalist covering electronics technologies and IT a few years ago, I was privy to a litany of manufacturers' woes and their causes: Tangled tax laws and regulations, red tape, corruption, licence raj, unreliable infrastructure such as power and roads, and lack of skilled labour.

The article was published by Business Today on June 3, 2016.

Unlike China, which raked in profits by keeping margins low and volumes high, every entity in the supply and distribution chain in India wanted a 30 per cent cut. India, they said, was no country for manufacturers. The only real electronics manufacturing was that of low-end or low-precision products. Where the products were of higher quality, they were merely assembled in India, often with the intent of circumventing taxes and of employing cheap labour.

Walking around the IT and Electronics pavilion at the Make in India Week in Mumbai early this year, I could see that not much has changed. As if symbolic of the scenario, there was one Indian company. The rest were MNCs based in Taiwan, China, Sweden, Japan, the US, and Germany. The push for indigenous manufacturing is nevertheless apparent from the flurry of proposed incentives, large infrastructural investments, and facilities made available to manufacturers and new entrepreneurs by the government. The Make in India mix, however, needs more than subsidies, tax waivers, reimbursement of duties, or monetary grants.

A pet peeve of brand owners and manufacturers with large patent portfolios operating in India is that research and development (R&D) in the country largely happens only in public research institutions and universities. Indian firms don't invest in R&D and subsequently fill patents. A patenting landscaping exercise conducted by us at the Centre for Internet and Society last year showed that all Indian patents, nearly 4,000 in number, pertaining to mobile technologies are owned by non-Indian companies. Out of approximately 19,500 patent applications, a meagre 18 were filed by Indian companies.

India's premier educational institutions also apply for far less patents within the country and abroad than their foreign counterparts. For example, the National Academy of Inventors has published a list of "Top 100 worldwide universities granted US utility patents in 2013" and another in 2014. One Indian school features on these lists - the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) - with 21 patents in 2013. Within India, the IITs and IISc file up to 200 applications every year; MIT files nearly 4,000 in the US. Several large MNCs run R&D facilities in India, hiring some of the best talent in the country. The patents for their work are first registered to these companies abroad, contributing to royalty outflows. One way to correct the famine of locally owned intellectual property is for the government to urge top Indian companies and academic institutions to push the envelope in terms of R&D and patenting. A promising development is that the Indian government has pledged start-up funds. So have companies such as Qualcomm, which has committed $150 million to a strategic venture fund in India.

Another gripe is that the manufacturing units in India are in reality assembly lines that only put together imported parts and components and generally make copied products. While the government has provided sops to encourage actual manufacturing to truly reduce dependence on 'screwdriver technologies', it needs to incentivise foreign corporations operating in India to transfer their technology to Indian entities, instead of only assembling here using automated or human labour. Moreover, India-manufactured products are infamously substandard. These products need to pass quality checks if India aspires for an export market and leverage in asking for transfer of technology.

To benefit from the transfer of technology, the workforce needs to learn to use it and assimilate it in its work life. Despite the intake of students in engineering schools in India being more than that in the US and China put together, a major chunk of newly graduated engineers in India is unemployable. The repairmen at Nehru Place's electronics market learn the ropes through an informal education system comprising their friends, peers and employers in small-time garage shops. Rookie engineers who secure the holy grail of college placement are trained from scratch by their employers, such as Infosys with its plush training campus located in Mysore. In either case, the employer is saddled with training new recruits. There is little in terms of professional excellence that institutions of formal education seem to impart. Prime Minister Modi believes that Indias human power would be among its largest exports by 2030, but monikers such as "coding coolies" only point to low valuation of its services. Unless quality vocational education produces professionals in different rungs of the manufacturing ecosystem - from technicians to production personnel to designers to ideators - manufacturing in the country will stay deprived of the benefits of the newest technologies.

Next would come developing indigenous technologies (governed by technical standards and otherwise) in order to reduce dependence on technologies owned by foreign rights holders. India's remote sensing capabilities are among the best in the world. Like GPS developed by the US and GLONASS by Russia, NAVIC is Indias own satellite navigation system. Where GPS in India becomes spotty or inaccurate, NAVIC is likely to be much more reliable and accurate. Mobile handsets sold in India are not equipped yet with the receivers needed to work with NAVIC. When they are, it will be a fillip for both manufacturing and location-based services in the country. There is also a need for diffusion of these technologies. India's public research organisations produce several potentially life-changing inventions, which unfortunately, almost never reach mass implementation.

With the emergence of new technologies comes a greater need for access to patenting. A patent is a monopoly granted to its owner for 20 years in return for publicly disclosing an invention. Without the ability to enforce it, such a monopoly is not of much use. Patenting is also expensive and time-consuming, especially for an individual innovator without the backing of an employer that has the wherewithal for it. Many opt for filing patents via large companies while retaining their names as the inventors. The company thus owns the patent. Small manufacturers without the resources to apply for a patent prefer to zealously guard their inventions. Instead of risking their unpatented inventions being stolen, they limit their use to their own establishments, and sometimes take the inventions with them to the grave.

Make in India was unveiled at a time when manufacturing worldwide was starting to experience the ongoing slump. China, so difficult to beat at its own game, has been facing the heat. There is a tiny window of opportunity for India, which may be akin to the guns made by Indian Ordnance Factories (IoF). These guns - exorbitantly priced and of low build quality - are notorious for backfiring. In the truly Indian spirit of jugaad, they are taken to gunsmiths by their buyers for big and small tweaks that would prevent unfortunate endings. Like the IoF guns, the Make in India recipe needs its own set of tweaks.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/business-today-rohini-lakshane-june-3-2016-tweak-the-make-in-india-recipe

The new Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions are a big win for FOSS in India!

sinha — 2016-02-24T06:30:37Z

India is one of the few countries which permits patenting of software – a monopolization that has only benefited established corporations and largely throttled innovation in the software industry, worldwide. CIS has consistently advocated against patentablity of software and in a major victory last week, software patenting in India died a little more. This happened via the newly issued Guidelines for the Examination of Computer Related Inventions, which introduces a new test to restrict software patenting – in essence the same legal test that CIS had been proposing since 2010. This post highlights the new test and other noteworthy changes in the Guidelines.

When the Guidelines for examination of Computer Related Inventions(“ 2015 Guidelines”) were released last year, it became obvious that they would have an adverse impact on innovation in the Indian software industry. Further, the 2015 Guidelines were legally defective since they ran counter to the object of Section 3(k) of the Patents Act, 1970, which is to unconditionally exclude mathematical and business methods, computer programs per se, and algorithms from patentable subject matter. To stop and prevent egregious harms, civil society organisations collectively wrote to the Prime Minister's Office flagging off the defects and requested for a recall of the Guidelines. In December 2015, the Indian Patent Office promptly recalled the 2015 Guidelines and held a consultation to discuss the concerns raised in the letter.

Based on submissions by various stakeholders, the Patent Office released a new set of Guidelines(“Guidelines”), which are not only a staggering improvisation from all previous versions, but also introduce a new three step test to determine applicability of section 3(k), an area of Indian patent law that has been notoriously full of uncertainties:

5. Tests/ Indicators to determine Patentability of CRIs (“Computer Related inventions”):

Examiners may rely on the following three stage test in examining CRI applications:

(1) Properly construe the claim and identify the actual contribution;

(2) If the contribution lies only in mathematical method, business method or algorithm, deny the claim;

(3) If the contribution lies in the field of computer programme, check whether it is claimed in conjunction with a novel hardware and proceed to other steps to determine patentability with respect to the invention. The computer programme in itself is never patentable. If the contribution lies solely in the computer programme, deny the claim. If the contribution lies in both the computer programme as well as hardware, proceed to other steps of patentability.

CIS had proposed the exact same test in its earlier submissions(2010) to the Patent Office, albeit worded differently. We submitted:

"We propose a new part to the above test to make the clause clearer. The Manual should specify that “the computer programme portions of any claimed invention should be treated as if it were covered by prior art and patentability should thus be determined with respect to the other features of the invention”. This way, we can ensure that an invention which merely uses or implements a computer programme is not granted patent on the basis of the inventiveness of the computer programme per se."

Further, the Guidelines also recognise that CRIs may fall under sections 3(k), 3(l), 3(m) and 3(n):

2.2. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2002 also introduced explicit exclusions from patentability under section 3 for CRIs as under:

3(k) a mathematical or business method or a computer programme per se or algorithms;

(l) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or any other aesthetic creation whatsoever including cinematographic works and television productions;

(m) a mere scheme or rule or method of performing mental act or method of playing game;

(n) a presentation of information;

And thus CRIs as such cannot be patentable, if they fall in either of the above mentioned exclusions. Overall, the new Guidelines offer more clarity and stick to the Patents Act, 1970's intention of disqualifying patentability of computer programmes per se. We will soon post a detailed analysis of the Guidelines. In the meantime, you may read CIS' research on the subject in the section below.

CIS' Research and Submissions against Software Patenting

Over the past years, CIS has produced research and consistently made submissions advocating the roll- back of software patenting:

Arguments Against Software Patents in India, 2010

CIS Submission on Draft Patent Manual, 2010

Comments on the Draft Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions, 2013

Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions: Mapping the Stakeholders' Response, 2014

Comments on the Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions (CRIs), 2015

CIS' submission to Indian Patent Office on Examples of Excluded Patentable subject-matter under Section 3(k) for incorporation in the yet-to-be-released Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions, 2016

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-new-guidelines-for-computer-related-inventions-are-a-big-win-for-foss-in-india

The Game of IPR: Insights from the 6th Global Intellectual Property Convention in Hyderabad

samantha — 2014-01-31T09:56:10Z

IP practitioners and IP creators were among the 1700 participants to gather at the Hyderabad International Convention Centre earlier this month. Here, CIS had the opportunity of listening in on perspectives around the “Optimization of economic value of innovation & IPR in the global market” while attending numerous talks and sessions that were held over the course of the convention’s three days.

One of the event's speakers, Mr. Narendra Sabharwal, IPR-Chair of FICCI, speaks of the immense value of IPR, while serving as protection as well as collateral for investors. (Photo credit: GIPC 2014)

This year’s Global Intellectual Property Convention (GIPC) was held in Hyderabad January 16-18, 2014 by ITAG Business Solutions Ltd. in association with the Institute of International Trade (iitrade). As the 6th of its kind, the event was held in hopeful contribution “towards society with the active support and cooperation of the IP fraternity,” says ITAG Founder and Director, Dr. D. R. Agarwal, while offering a “good opportunity for learning and business networking through one to one interaction in a pre-arranged manner under a conducive environment.”

The theme at bay had been “Optimizing the economic value of innovation & IPR in global market.” In respect of this central focus, common themes across panel discussions and workshops included IP management, monetisation, application drafting, and litigation, with particular emphasis on India’s ‘Pharma’ industry. Over 100 speakers and panelists shared their personal knowledge from experience in the industry, and largely consisted of representatives from law firms, IP consultancies, pharmaceutical companies, and business organisations; all of which from India, Europe and the USA. As an attendee representing the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS), a research institute that works to address issues related to intellectual property (IP) reform, I had the privilege of listening to such perspectives on intellectual property from an alternative outlook.

On the other hand, if exploiting too much by “abusing one’s monopoly, you are [setting] certain conditions, which are neither germane nor connected to the patent, and more than what is statutory permissible.” Kumaran stresses the necessity for the intellectual property right (IPR) holder to comply to the rights given by statutory law.

The name of the game is the quality of drafting. It is the first and last chance." Vaidya D.P.,

Lakshmi Kumaran & Sridharan

Mr. Narendra Sabharwal, Panellist and IPR-Chair for the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce (FICCI), sought to demonstrate the immense value of innovation and IPR in technology, arts and culture globally, in explaining that a large portion of the EU’s GDP (39%), and employment (26%) are derived from IP-intensive industries (See study by European Patent Office here). Also argued was that enterprises and institutions can increase value through licensing of products and services, while also serving as protection, and which can then become “excellent collateral for investors,” he says. Among other points made, Sabharwal mentioned the need for more incubators in India. Currently, India acquires 200 new incubators each year compared to China’s 8000 new incubators annually. Opening more incubators will encourage innovation, he argues, leading to more marketable products and solutions.

Mr. William H. Manning, Partner of Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P (USA), took on the role of the story teller while sharing particularly interesting cases of previous clients. Manning had explained the necessity to ask one question over and over throughout the entire IPR application process; that question being: “What difference does the invention make?”

In doing so, Manning was even able to take what would have been an ‘incremental’ patent—which is just distinct enough from prior art to get by—and turn it into a ‘foundational’ patent—generally adopted by the industry for 10-20 years before moving to a different technology. The better of these two types, however, is the ‘pioneering’ patent, an inventive leap in itself. This client success story definitely affirmed Speaker and Director of Lakshmi Kumaran & Sridharan, Vaidya D. P., when he said that “the name of the game is the quality of drafting. It is the first and last chance.” Manning had also claimed that 99.9% of patent in India are said to be incremental patents, with none being pioneering—at least not from the patent applications he’s seen in his 34 years of experience, anyway.

Also a rule of this game is the “Take now—pay later” rule, according to Manning, in which enterprises may “ignore the problem for now and move ahead with the product. If somebody sues you for patent litigation…. Take now—pay later.” Here, he makes reference to the judgements enterprises may make when misusing or infringing upon an IPR, while assessing the worth of doing so with the risks that may lie ahead. Often, an enterprise may find that it is more worthwhile to misuse or infringe and reap the benefits in the “now” while knowing there may be a chance they will have to “pay later.”

Throughout the convention, what I expected to be the elephant in the auditorium was surprisingly addressed quite often. Best said by Panellist, Mr. Mohan Dewan, “IPR only becomes an asset when it is misused or infringed upon.” Principal to R K Dewan & Co., Dewan compares IP rights with car insurance, which can only be cashed in when the car is stolen.

Applying for an IPR is a game in itself, that requires much knowledge of how it is played. Grab those power-ups or get eaten.	He then posed the question “how can we increase the economic value of an asset?”—presumingly so that one can capitalize when opportunity comes knocking—and responded to it in recommending the following measures: 1) ensuring one’s IPR is as strong as possible by drafting it according to national standards, 2) optimal protection—it is easier to register more than one at once! 3) diligence in auditing and licensing, and 4) staying alert and questioning what people are doing around you. These are only a few excerpts of the event’s many talks and panel discussions, yet these insights alone help to reveal the nature of the system where intellectual property rights reign. This is surely a system to be familiar with if it is within one’s interest to receive IPR for protection, yet I find it difficult to stop at the word “protection.” When you must learn how to play the game to ensure that you stay in it, I would say that IPR can extend well beyond protection, to be better off referred to as strategy. A strategy that enables you to reach a higher level and protects you from your opponents’ wrath. The higher the level, the more power-ups in reach and the higher you go. All the while undermining their chances of climbing up to where you are, and knocking them to even lower levels when possible. Lucky for you the majority of players are still stuck at level 1, but the nasty ones may be right behind you.

Applying for an IPR is a game in itself, that requires much knowledge of how it is played. Grab those power-ups or get eaten.

He then posed the question “how can we increase the economic value of an asset?”—presumingly so that one can capitalize when opportunity comes knocking—and responded to it in recommending the following measures: 1) ensuring one’s IPR is as strong as possible by drafting it according to national standards, 2) optimal protection—it is easier to register more than one at once! 3) diligence in auditing and licensing, and 4) staying alert and questioning what people are doing around you.

These are only a few excerpts of the event’s many talks and panel discussions, yet these insights alone help to reveal the nature of the system where intellectual property rights reign. This is surely a system to be familiar with if it is within one’s interest to receive IPR for protection, yet I find it difficult to stop at the word “protection.” When you must learn how to play the game to ensure that you stay in it, I would say that IPR can extend well beyond protection, to be better off referred to as strategy.

A strategy that enables you to reach a higher level and protects you from your opponents’ wrath. The higher the level, the more power-ups in reach and the higher you go. All the while undermining their chances of climbing up to where you are, and knocking them to even lower levels when possible. Lucky for you the majority of players are still stuck at level 1, but the nasty ones may be right behind you.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-game-of-ipr-insights-from-the-6th-global-intellectual-property-convention-in-hyderabad

Standard Essential Patents on Low-Cost Mobile Phones in India: A Case to Strengthen Competition Regulation?

nehaa — 2016-04-24T04:42:52Z

The realization of the promise of the sub hundred dollar mobile device as a facilitator of access to knowledge is contingent inter alia on its availability in the market place. In turn, the market availability of the sub hundred dollar mobile device is influenced by the existence of an enabling environment for producers to produce, and consumers to consume. From a regulatory perspective, the enabling environment itself is a function of existing laws and policies, and the ‘developmental effects’ of certain laws and policies (Saraswati, 2012).

This article seeks to examine one such legal and policy lever and the role of a regulator in the development of an enabling environment for access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. This paper is founded on four assumptions: first, that access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices is influenced by their price; second, that the question of access necessitates conversation between the intellectual property regime and several other actors, sites and tools; third, that one of the fundamental goals of regulatory reform is the creation of a ‘stable, open and future- proof environment’ (Guermazi and Satola, 2005) that encourages access to these devices; and fourth, that there exist public law implications of intellectual property that justify the involvement of State actors and regulators in matters that may arise out of private transactions.

This article will examine whether there is a role to be played by competition law in this narrative of innovation, intellectual property and access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. In light of increasing litigation around standard essential patents, and the inability of FRAND and International Standard Setting Organizations to find a comprehensive solution, this paper will question the efficacy of competition law as an ex post solution to a problem that might be better addressed by ex ante regulation from a specialized body.

In an attempt to address these questions, this article will examine the role of the Competition Commission of India and the Indian Judiciary. Orders of the Competition Commission will be studied from its inception till March, 2015, in order to draw conclusions about the role that the Commission identifies for itself and the nature of disputes it adjudicates. This article will also examine the role of similarly placed institutions in the United States of America as well as some member states of the European Union.

It will be argued that while Competition Law might address some of the issues arising out of litigation around standard essential patents, and might be a tool to increase access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices, its efficacy as a long term solution in light of its nature as an ex post solution, is questionable. Consequently, it might be prudent to have a conversation leaning towards exante regulation of the market place by a specialized regulator.

The paper was published by Socio Legal Review (National Law School of India University). Download the PDF here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-socio-legal-review-nehaa-chaudhari-standard-essential-patent-on-low-cost-mobile-phones-in-india

Pre-Budget Consultation 2016 - Submission to the IT Group of the Ministry of Finance

sumandro — 2016-01-12T13:34:41Z

The Ministry of Finance has recently held pre-budget consultations with different stakeholder groups in connection with the Union Budget 2016-17. We were invited to take part in the consultation for the IT (hardware and software) group organised on January 07, 2016, and submit a suggestion note. We are sharing the note below. It was prepared and presented by Sumandro Chattapadhyay, with contributions from Rohini Lakshané, Anubha Sinha, and other members of CIS.

It is our distinct honour to be invited to submit this note for consideration by the IT Group of the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, as part of the pre-budget consultation for 2016-17.

The Centre for Internet and Society is (CIS) is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with diverse abilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security. We receive financial support from Kusuma Trust, Wikimedia Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, IDRC, and other donors.

We have divided our suggestions into the different topics that our organisation has been researching in the recent years.

Free/Libre and Open Source Software (FLOSS) is the Basis for Digital India

We congratulate the policies introduced by the government to promote use of free/libre and open source software and that of open APIs for all e-governance projects and systems. This is not only crucial for the government to avoid vendor lock-in when it comes to critical software systems for governance, but also to ensure that the source code of such systems is available for public scrutiny and do not contain any security flaws.

We request the government to empower the implementation of these policies by making open sharing of source code a necessity for all software vendors hired by government agencies a necessary condition for awarding of tenders. The 2016-17 budget should include special support to make all government agencies aware and capable of implementing these policies, as well as to build and operate agency-level software repositories (with version controlling system) to host the source codes. These repositories may function to manage the development and maintenance of software used in e-governance projects, as well as to seek comments from the public regarding the quality of the software.

Use of FLOSS is not only important from the security or the cost-saving perspectives, it is also crucial to develop a robust industry of software development firms that specialise in FLOSS-based solutions, as opposed to being restricted to doing local implementation of global software vendors. A holistic support for FLOSS, especially with the government functioning as the dominant client, will immensely help creation of domestic jobs in the software industry, as well as encouraging Indian programmers to contribute to development of FLOSS projects.

An effective compliance monitoring and enforcement system needs to be created to ensure that all government agencies are Strong enforcement of the 2011 policy to use open source software in governance, including an enforcement task force that checks whether government departments have complied with this or not.

Open Data is a Key Instrument for Transparent Decision Making

With a wider set of governance activities being carried out using information systems, the government is increasingly acquiring a substantial amount of data about governance processes and status of projects that needs to be effectively fed back into the decision making process for the same projects. Opening up such data not only allows for public transparency, but also for easier sharing of data across government agencies, which reduces process delays and possibilities of duplication of data collection efforts.

We request the 2016-17 budget to foreground the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy and the Open Government Data Platform of India as two key enablers of the Digital India agenda, and accordingly budget for modernisation and reconfiguration of data collection and management processes across government agencies, so that those processes are made automatic and open-by-default. Automatic data management processes minimise the possibility of data loss by directly archiving the collected data, which is increasingly becoming digital in nature. Open-by-default processes of data management means that all data collected by an agency, once pre-recognised as shareable data (that is non-sensitive and anonymised), will be proactively disclosed as a rule.

Implementation of the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy has been hindered, so far, by the lack of preparation of a public inventory of data assets, along with the information of their collection cycles, modes of collection and storage, etc., by each union government agency. Specific budgetary allocation to develop these inventories will be crucial not only for the implementation of the Policy, but also for the government to get an extensive sense of data collected and maintained currently by various government agencies. Decisions to proactively publish, or otherwise, such data can then be taken based on established rules.

Availability of such open data, as mentioned above, creates a wider possibility for the public to know, learn, and understand the activities of the government, and is a cornerstone of transparent governance in the digital era. But making this a reality requires a systemic implementation of open government data practices, and various agencies would require targeted budget to undertake the required capacity development and work process re-engineering. Expenditure of such kind should not be seen as producing government data as a product, but as producing data as an infrastructure, which will be of continuous value for the years to come.

As being discussed globally, open government data has the potential to kickstart a vast market of data derivatives, analytics companies, and data-driven innovation. Encouraging civic innovations, empowered by open government data - from climate data to transport data - can also be one of the unique initiatives of budget 2016-17.

For maximising impact of opened up government data, we request the government to publish data that either has a high demand already (such as, geospatial data, and transport data), or is related to high-net-worth activities of the government (such as, data related to monitoring of major programmes, and budget and expenditure data for union and state governments).

Promotion of Start-ups and MSMEs in Electronics and IT Hardware Manufacturing

In line with the Make in India and Digital India initiatives, to enable India to be one of the global hubs of design, manufacturing, and exporting of electronics and IT hardware, we request that the budget 2016-17 focus on increasing flow of fund to start-ups and Medium and Small-Scale Manufacturing Enterprises (MSMEs) in the form of research and development grants (ideally connected to government, especially defense-related, spending on IT hardware innovation), seed capital, and venture capital.

Generation of awareness and industry-specific strategies to develop intellectual property regimes and practices favourable for manufacturers of electronics and IT hardware in India is an absolutely crucial part of promotion of the same, especially in the current global scenario. Start-ups and MSMEs must be made thoroughly aware of intellectual property concerns and possibilities, including limitations and exceptions, flexibilities, and alternative models such as open innovation.

We request the budget 2016-17 to give special emphasis to facilitation of technology licensing and transfer, through voluntary mechanisms as well as government intervention, such as compulsory licensing and government enforced patent pools.

Applied Mathematics Research is Fundamental for Cybersecurity

Recent global reports have revealed that some national governments have been actively involved in sponsoring distortion in applied mathematics research so as to introduce weaknesses in encryption standards used in for online communication. Instead of trying to regulate key-length or mandating pre-registration of devices using encryption, as suggested by the withdrawn National Encryption Policy draft, would not be able to address this core emerging problem of weak cybersecurity standards.

For effective and sustainable cybersecurity strategy, we must develop significant expertise in applied mathematical research, which is the very basis of cybersecurity standards development. We request the budget 2016-17 to give this topic the much-needed focus, especially in the context of the Digital India initiative and the upcoming National Encryption Policy.

Along with developing domestic research capacity, a more immediately important step for the government is to ensure high quality Indian participation in global standard setting organisations, and hence to contribute to global standards making processes. We humbly suggest that categorical support for such participation and contribution is provided through the budget 2016-17, perhaps by partially channeling the revenues obtained from spectrum auctions.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/pre-budget-consultation-2016-submission-to-the-ministry-of-finance

Patented Games

sunil — 2012-03-08T12:14:22Z

Some prefer Steve Jobs, patron saint of perfection, others prefer Nicholas Negroponte, messiah of the masses. While Mr Jobs may be guilty of contributing to the digital divide, Mr Negroponte may have contributed to bridging it with his innovation: the One Laptop Per Child, also known as the $100 laptop or XO. Sunil Abraham's column was published in the Economic Times on 8 March 2012.

Much ink has been spilt celebrating the contributions of both, but if we were to judge them by utilising evidence from the market, their technologies are used by a rather thin section of the pyramid.

For this writer, however, the real heroes are entrepreneurs from China and Taiwan who make technology that is used by millions of Indians and other consumers across the globe. Sometimes it comes with domestic branding and with all the right peripherals - for example, in India, the Popkorn, which costs only Rs 6,699. It features support for two SIM cards, a receiver for analogue terrestrial television, a receiver for FM radio, a 3.2-megapixel camera, boom-box style internal speakers and, most impressively, a pica projector. It ships with a tripod stand, external speakers, a torch and a laser pointer. It is a classroom in a box. At other times, it comes as a Shanzhai clone of a branded product - for example, the Blackcherry, at one-sixth the price-point with twice the number of cameras as the Blackberry. Some Shanzhai phones support four SIM cards and ship with a spare battery.

Dual- and quad-SIM support is critical in developing countries, especially Africa, where regulation has failed to rationalise interconnection costs. Most of the global south is yet to harvest the digital dividend, so TV reception is very useful indeed. And the additional battery is invaluable for rural entrepreneurs who are not sure whether their next halt will sync with the local load-shedding schedule.

The same with the focus on audio capabilities, reflecting the communal usage patterns. Unlike many expensive big-brand phones that require purchase of additional software, these phones often have in-built support for a wide variety of proprietary and open file formats.

These products are unavailable in the US and Europe because they would be sued out of the market by rights-holders or snuffed out by enforcement activities. David Drummond, Google's chief legal officer, says "smartphones might involve as many as 2,50,000 (largely questionable) patent claims". But there are three important differences for the Indian consumer. One, many of these patents are registered in the US, Europe and Japan and, therefore, prevent others from securing those patents in other jurisdictions. But it does not prevent Indian or Chinese entrepreneurs from using the patents. Two, unlike the US patent law, the Indian Patent Act does not consider "mathematical or a business method or computer program per se or algorithms" as inventions. And three, Indian courts, unlike their US and European counterparts, are less likely to grant injunctions preventing sale or use of any device.

Patent pools are a century-old policy tool for reducing royalties and uncertainty for manufacturers and consumers. In 1917, the US government forced aircraft patent-holders, including the famous Wright Brothers, into a patent pool that allowed 60 firms to produce planes at reduced royalty costs without worrying about litigation. Since then, the US government has issued thousands of compulsory licences in many different domains. Patent pools do exist in some areas of mobile technologies such as GSM and video file formats, but more patent pools are needed.

The Chinese government has used standards policy in the past to reduce outgoing royalties on information and communication technologies. They promoted or mandated indigenous standards either as a negotiating tactic with rights-holders or to benefit from cross-licensing of domestic IP. Some standards include TD-SCDMA, as an alternative to Qualcomm's CDMA, EVD as an alternative to the DVD standard, and CBHD as an alternative to Sony's Blu-ray. The potential savings were quite significant. In the words of Ma Jun, Deutsche Bank's chief China economist, "There is almost no profit for Chinese DVD makers as they have to pay about $7 in licensing fees to foreign patent holders per DVD player, which are sold at around $20 only - both at home and abroad."

In addition to patent and standards policy, royalty caps have been used to ensure access to innovative technologies. Till the end of 2009, the Indian government had imposed a royalty cap of 5% on domestic sales and 8% on exports. If a company wanted to pay higher royalties, permission had to be secured from an inter-ministerial Project Approval Board. Between 1991 and 2009, only 8,062 approvals were granted, indicating our government was keen to reduce outgoing royalties. Policymakers could reconsider reintroducing such royalty caps for devices that cost less than $200.

(The author is with the Centre for Internet and Society)

Read the original published in the Economic Times

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/patented-games

Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products: An Empirical Assessment of India's Form 27 Practice and Compliance

rohini — 2017-10-13T04:32:49Z

India requires every patentee to file an annual statement, also known as “Form 27”, describing the working of each of its issued Indian patents. If a patent is not locally worked within three years of its issuance, any person may request a compulsory license, and if the patent is not adequately worked within two years of the grant of such a compulsory license, it may be revoked. The research paper on Form 27 practices and compliance by patentees authored by Prof Jorge L. Contreras, University of Utah, and Rohini Lakshané, Centre for Internet and Society has been accepted for publication in the NYU Journal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law.

The research paper by Prof Jorge L. Contreras, University of Utah, and Rohini Lakshané, Centre for Internet and Society was published on SSRN on July 17, 2017. The paper has been accepted for publication in the NYU Journal of Intellectual Property and Entertainment Law.

The potency of India’s patent working requirement was demonstrated by the 2012 issuance of a compulsory license for Bayer’s patented drug Nexavar. In order to provide the public with information about patent working, India requires every patentee to file an annual statement on “Form 27” describing the working of each of its issued Indian patents.

We conducted the first comprehensive and systematic study of all Forms 27 filed with respect to a key industry sector: mobile devices. We obtained from public online records 4,916 valid Forms 27, corresponding to 3,126 mobile device patents. These represented only 20.1% of all Forms 27 that should have been filed and corresponded to only 72.5% of all mobile device patents for which Forms 27 should have been filed. Forms 27 were missing for almost all patentees, and even among Forms 27 that were obtained, almost none contained useful information regarding the working of the subject patents or fully complying with the informational requirements of the Indian Patent Rules. Patentees adopted drastically different positions regarding the definition of patent working, while several significant patentees claimed that they or their patent portfolios were simply too large to enable the reporting of required information. Many patentees simply omitted required descriptive information from their Forms without explanation.

The Indian government has made little or no effort to monitor or police compliance with Form 27 filings, undoubtedly leading to significant non-compliance. However, some of the complaints raised by patentees and industry observers may have merit. Namely, that patents covering complex, multi-component products that embody dozens of technical standards and thousands of patents are not necessarily amenable to the individual-level data requested by Form 27. We hope that this study will contribute to the ongoing conversation in India regarding the most appropriate means for collecting and disseminating information regarding the working of patents.

Download the Paper

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Patent Valuation and License Fee Determination in Context of Patent Pools

vikrant — 2014-07-09T09:46:16Z

The focus of this research paper is on an extremely limited though important aspect of patent pools — that of patent valuation and license fee determination. It is important to bear in mind that the concept of patent valuation and license fee determination as it exists independently is modified when it is applied in context of patent pools.

I. Introduction

A patent pool is essentially “An agreement between two or more patent owners to aggregate (pool) their patents and to license them to one another or third parties. Pools usually offer standard licensing terms to licensees and allocate a portion of the licensing fees (royalties) to patent owners according to a pre-set formula or procedure.[1]

A patent pool particularly faces intense scrutiny by way of competition/ antitrust law and each step of structuring of a patent pool has to be done keeping the prevalent norms of antitrust law in context. This article merely brushes with the antitrust aspect, as a discussion on that topic is beyond the scope of this particular article. However, suffice is to say that like other aspects of structuring of a patent pool, patent valuation and licensing fee determination is also subject to antitrust law concerns.

Part II of this research paper is a discussion as regards factors which determine patent value in context of a patent pool. Similarly, Part III is a discussion as regards factors that determine license fee in context of a patent pool. Thereafter, Part IV discusses the methods which are applied for patent valuation and license fee determination. A number of these methods are independent evaluation methods and hence their dynamics when applied in context of patent pools may need to be altered in light of the discussion in Parts II and III. Part V discusses certain aspects of actual patent pools in the technological field to better understand the principles which have been discussed in Parts II-IV. Finally, Part VI concludes this research paper.

II. Determination of Patent Value in a Patent Pool

One of the prominent pillars of a patent pool is an appropriate patent valuation process. Patent valuation is a difficult and subjective task.[2] Moreover, the result of a patent valuation independently outside of a pool might be quite different from when it is part of a pool transaction. A “pool regularizes the valuation of individual patents - making, as the United States Supreme Court put it, ‘a division of royalties according to the value attributed by the parties to their respective patent claims’”.[3] However, this value attribution process is not an arbitrary one but incredibly dynamic, and constantly evolving. This difficulty is furthered by the fact that the term “patent value” itself is subject to interpretation. Patent value essentially comprises of the economic benefit that the patent can bestow.[4]

A number of factors as discuss hereinafter determine the value of a patent. It is not necessary though that all the factors would come into play in context of every exercise of valuation of a patent in a pool. The factors determining patent value can be largely classified into a discussion as regards the types of patents in a patent pool in context of their relative importance and other complementary factors which further affect such importance.

A. Categories of Patents in a Patent Pool

Patents in a pool can be classified based on their necessity and quality. Thus, arises the concept of essential and non-essential patents and strong and weak patents.

Essential and Non-Essential Patents
As the terms indicate, essential patents are those which are imperative for the success of pool creation and thus naturally have considerably more value. Non-essential patents on the other hand are patents which though not imperative may bring efficiency advantages to the pool. However, what exactly comprises an essential patent is a subjective and constantly evolving definition determined by each patent pool according to its commercial needs and capabilities. For example, the number of patents in the MPEG-2 pool, all of which are declared to be essential to the MPEG-2 standard, increased from 27 in 1997 to more than 900 in 2010.[5]

Essential patents naturally have more economic value than non-essential patents.[6] “A pool that includes non-essential patents can increase prices for some consumers, while decreasing prices for other consumers.”[7] Also, inclusion of inessential patents can raise potential concerns about foreclosure of alternative technologies and higher royalties for some licenses than would have occurred if these patents were excluded from the pool.[8] These concerns though should be balanced against the costs of excluding potentially essential patents from the pool.[9] Such concerns were raised in context of the DVD 3C patent pool.[10] Thus, it has to be decided on a case by case scenario as to whether the patent pool will include only essential patents or both essential as well as non-essential patents.

“Whether a patent pool improves a market’s transactional efficiency depends on the competitive characteristics of the patents included within the pool’s offering.”[11] Properly demarcating all required patents for a technology is important during patent pool formation. Otherwise it may create a “hold out” problem where a patent owner will “hold out” for higher royalties, “knowing that the manufacturer has individually negotiated for and already acquired the rest of the necessary … patent licenses, and that the value of all those licenses depends on obtaining a license to its own patent.”[12] Essentiality of a patent can be determined based on certain characteristics of patents:

a. Blocking Patents
Blocking patents comprise of improvement patents on an existing technology. Thus, the improvement patent is deemed to be “subservient” to the earlier, “dominant’ patent”[13] and the subservient and dominant patents are said to block one another.[14] This is so because, the subservient patent cannot be exploited without infringing upon the dominant patent.[15] Likewise, the dominant patent cannot be developed in the improved embodiment without permission from the subservient patentee.[16] For example, the Wright brothers patents for aeroplane wings were improved upon by Glenn Curtiss and Alexander Graham Bell by using a set of wing flaps, or ailerons. The Curtiss patent, however, was found to infringe upon the Wright patent. As a result, Curtiss had no legal right to make, use, or sell his ailerons without a license from the Wright brothers, and the Wright brothers had no legal right to make, use, or sell Curtiss's commercially successful form of the stabilizing device. Their patents mutually infringed and blocked one another and they had to form a patent pool.[17] Similarly, public key encryption method was devised and patented at Stanford University, and licensed to Cylink. Soon thereafter, a team of scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology developed and patented an algorithm, and licensed its use to RSA. The RSA algorithm was successfully commercialized and became an industry standard. Cylink and RSA constituted blocking rival patents and the issue was resolved by formation of a patent pool.[18]

b. Complementary Patents
Complementary patents cover technologies that are largely lacking or inefficient absent a license to a separate patented product.[19] They occur as a consequence of independent invention. Thus, value of complementary patents increases when combined with a separate patented invention; they act synergistically, each increasing the value of the other.[20] “Two products or technologies are complements if an increase in the price of one of them reduces the demand for the other.”[21] For example, production of a light bulb requires patent rights to both the vacuum bulb as well as the filament.[22] A patent pool that only contains complementary patents may have substantial market power if the pool does not face competition from alternative or substitutable technology.[23] This though, could lead to the occurrence of royally stacking i.e. double-marginalization, which can occur when firms sell or license complementary products or technologies and demand is sensitive to price.[24] It refers to the addition of successive mark-ups by suppliers in a vertical relationship.[25]

c. Competing Patents

Competing patents result when there exist totally novel products or processes that provide market substitutes for patented goods, or when inventors sufficiently modify existing patented goods so that the original patent is deemed “invented around” and not infringed.[26] “Two products or technologies are substitutes if an increase in the price of one of them increases the demand for the other.”[27] A patent pool may obtain market power by obtaining control over substitutable patents too.[28] An individual who acquires the rights to a competing patent eliminates or significantly lessens his need for competing patents within or outside of the pool.[29] Thus, the value of a pool consisting of competing patents increases with acquisition of substitute patents.[30]

Strong and Weak Patents
A patent pool can comprise of strong as well as weak patents. The value accorded to the patents would naturally be in accordance with its “strength.” “‘Low patent quality’ is shorthand for such problems as overlapping claims, inappropriately broad claims, slow patent prosecution, and patents on obvious inventions.”[31] Patents are “probabilistic rights”[32] Their scope and extent often remains probabilistic until their claim determination which may often be done only upon adjudication. Similarly in situations of a patent flood,[33] the overall quality of patents may become lower.[34] The additional protection of the pool affords a weak patent enforcement rights that it may not have secured standing alone.[35] Thus, even weak and invalid patents become important and can be used to exclude competitors, for example for litigation threats.[36]

Some patent pools contain explicit agreements to support weak patents, such as covenants not to challenge patents, joint defense agreements, and allocation of patent rights to parties who are best able to defend them.[37] Some patent pools achieve a similar effect not by explicit agreements, but by creating an institutional environment where patentees find that it is mutually advantageous to recognize each other’s patents.[38]

B. Other Factors Determining Patent Value in Context of Patent Pool

Besides the patents themselves, other complementary criteria impact on patent value. These comprise of the holistic environment in which the patents subsist, as discussed hereinafter.

Subject matter of Invention
“Value is highly dependent upon the subject matter of the invention.”[39] Certain subject matter fields or innovations do not have sufficient commercial importance or market demand to warrant investments.

Scope of Invention
A particular subject where there is extensive minefield of patents already in existence is less likely to have considerable patent value due to the limited patent scope as opposed to a field where patents are relatively lacking and there is possibility of a broader patent scope. Analogously, “value of a patent is derived from an ability to preclude others from practicing the unique innovation described by the words of the patent’s claims.”[40] “Generalizing, a patent employing broad claim language is typically more valuable than a patent of narrowly written claims in the same technology arena.”[41]

Size of Patent Pool
The size of a patent pool i.e. the number of its members and their patents is an important facet in determining the value of patents involved. Greater the number more are the governance issues as well as royalty determination issues, which in turn affect the valuation of the patents. This though does not imply that pools should be of a specific size, only that their size should meet efficiency demands.

Value of Patent Pool
The patents under the purview of a patent pool determine the pool’s value which in turn determines the value of the patents within as well as out of the pool. Value of a patent pool may be limited if certain holders of essential patents are not members.[42] This may occur due to various reasons such as if it was perceived that the patent may have more value as an independent entity, or due to strategic interests, or choice of joining different pools.[43] Correspondingly, if the patent pool does not contain all the patents it cannot curtail royalty stacking issues for the users. For example, Alcatel-Lucent pursued infringement claims for patents that it alleged covered the MPEG-2 standard and were not in the pool.[44]

While it is evident that collecting all necessary patents where the end product or standards is determined is extremely difficult, it becomes considerably more difficult where there is no predetermined or identifiable end-product.[45]

Patent Portfolio
Certain academic studies are of the opinion that “the real value of patents lies not in their individual significance, but instead in their aggregation into a patent portfolio: a strategic collection of distinct-but-related individual patents that, when combined, confer an array of important advantages upon the portfolio holder.”[46] This theory has been applied to explain the patent paradox where the patent intensity, i.e. patents obtained per research and development dollar has risen dramatically even as the expected value of individual patents has diminished.[47] Thus, greater the control of an entity over a portfolio of patents, more would be its negotiation power in context of valuation.

Signaling
It has been opined that the value of patents inheres not so much in the exclusivity they confer upon inventors, but rather in their ability to serve as credible signals.[48] Firms use patents to credibly convey information about the invention to the market who otherwise might not be willing to expend the costs necessary to obtain the information.[49]

Defensive Aspect
Patent value is also ascertained based on its use to serve as an insurance, whereby competing firms use them as “bargaining chips” to negotiate and secure certain niches in the marketplace.[50] This is so especially from the negotiation as well as the litigation viewpoint.

Valuation Dynamics
In context of certain subject matters, inability of the patents to be valued or possibility of dynamic changes in value creates problems in structuring the patent pool, or it might lead to issues of according over-value or under-value. For example, in the process of biological research, where hypotheses are often adjusted and experimentation continually refined, it is impossible to anticipate the particular value of a given research tool for an investigative procedure.[51] Similarly, in context of the Human Genome Sciences, the patent for the gene that encodes CCR5 protein, was likely not valued very highly, because of unsurity of its utility, which changed when independent research established its importance in the fight against HIV.[52]

C. Role of Independent Evaluator

Often, independent experts in the relevant technology are employed for patent valuation purposes. Their role includes the responsibility of providing a mechanism for determining the market value of each participating patent for the purpose of setting appropriate royalty rates within the patent pool.[53] Also, they would evaluate the current state of the art and determine which patents are essential and which aren’t.[54] An evaluator’s is a continuing responsibility throughout the existence of the duration of the patent pool to monitor developments in the field so as to ensure each patent’s essentiality and incorporate additional patents if necessary.[55] Concerns though have been expressed as regards the expert’s ability and impartiality.[56]

III. Determination of License Fee for a Patent Pool

Theorists, have suggested criteria to gauge viability of patent pools.[57] The various elements involved in structuring of a patent pool do not function in a vacuum. Each has an impact on the other and ultimately they determine in totum, the licensing fees.

A. Pool Dynamics

The factors catalyzing pool creation impact on the licensing fee that is set. A patent pool may primarily be structured due to government influence,[58] court influence,[59] commercial and business perspective,[60] to achieve or pursuant to standard setting,[61] and social objectives.[62] Accordingly, riders may be placed on creation of the pool and setting of licensing fees.

Analogously, members comprising the patent pool affect royalty determinations. Different perspectives can be observed in commercial entities as opposed to research entities or voluntary organizations. Similarly, the negotiation capabilities are different for established commercial conglomerates as opposed to entrepreneurs, or smaller entities.[63] Similarly, patent pools may distinguish between patent contributing licensees and mere licensees in fixing royalty rates.[64]

Furthermore, pool governance as well as nature of the pool would have an impact on royalty determination. Pools can essentially be of two types based on regulation of members or licensing- open and closed.[65] Correspondingly, the patent holders themselves may have different perspectives or expectations of their rights.

The negotiating entity too has an impact on royalty determination. “Agreements between the members of the patent pool and third parties can be established directly through patentees and licensees or indirectly through an entity specifically created to administer the pool.”[66] There are a considerable number of business models involved in context of a patent pool that define the parameters of the relationship between what are primarily classified as IP creators and IP consumers.[67] These dynamics have considerably altered with the strong and prolific emergence of IP intermediaries; they in turn affect the royalty rate negotiations.[68]

B. Negotiation Dynamics

License negotiations involve complicated factors, such as uncertain outcomes, asymmetric information about the values of technologies and the contributions of licensees to a technology's value, the credibility of disagreements, differential bargaining power and skill, and the individual circumstances of licensors and licensees.[69] Royalty determination depends on “the bargaining skills of patentees, their licensing objectives, the qualities of their patents, opportunity costs that patentees may have if they choose not to license their patents, the likelihood of injunctions, and the methods that courts apply to calculate infringement damages.” [70] Pool members act strategically to maximize their share of the pool’s revenues.[71] “The defining characteristic of patent ownership has been described as the right to extract royalties ‘as high as [one] can negotiate with the leverage’ of exclusivity.”[72] “The patent holder can ask for a high starting price; the potential infringer can counter by pointing to potential substitute technologies; and ultimately the process should yield a price that accurately reflects the marginal advantages of the patented technology.”[73] Again, negotiation strategies include deploying a number of tactics by corporates to whittle down an independent inventor’s patience and his price, thus reducing the licensing fee from the desired amount.[74] Correspondingly, there is no average length of time or amount of money needed for successfully creating a patent pool; it depends on the number of members involved in the negotiations and their commitment and willingness to negotiate an appropriate price.[75]

Timing of the license negotiation too has an impact on determination of the royalty scheme. Licensing can occur in two primary settings: ex ante licensing, i.e. prior to pool formation; and ex post, i.e. post pool formation. In ex ante licensing, the manufacturer has a choice to alter existing products to incorporate the patented features, and can thus perform a rational cost-benefit analysis prior to making any product alterations.[76] Analogously, a holdout who demands royalties prior to the final organization of the pool can only demand a royalty that reflects the additional value that his new patent adds to the collection.[77] If he demands more than this value, the pool will work around the holdout’s patent by adopting a different standard, adjusting the patent pool to cover slightly different technology, or dissolving itself.[78] In ex post licensing, on the other hand, a holdout is in a stronger negotiating position, and can demand not only the marginal value of his patent, but also the switching costs that would be incurred if the established standard or licensing regime were limited by a court injunction.[79] Complicating this situation are licenses that are granted ex ante but negotiated ex post.

Furthermore, patent pools are generally voluntary collaborations; however, it is also possible to compel parties to join the pool or risk losing revenue from a large segment of the industry.[80] Depending on the situation, the negotiation dynamics and hence the royalty scheme would be affected.

Rules governing damages for patent infringement also affect patentees’ decision to join a pool or to license independently, as the threat of injunctive relief can provide a patentee with bargaining power that can be disproportional to the number of patents he owns.[81]

C. Terms of License

The terms of the license considerably influence royalty determination. These include, nature of licensed products,[82] character of license- whether exclusive or non-exclusive,[83] granting clause, geographic scope of the license, field of use governed by the license, provision of sublicensing, grantback provisions, future usage governance, non-assertion clauses, reach-through provisions, termination clause, and licensee’s ability to challenge patents in the pool.

Included herein too would be the treatment of after-acquired patents, which in turn can be classified into two types: (1) improvement patents based on a patented technology licensed by another member of the patent pool; and (2) patents unrelated to patented technologies licensed to the members of the patent pool.[84]

License governance in context of graduated and progressive licensing would also influence royalty determination. This would include “provisions for pool members to license their patents without licensing all the patents in a pool”[85] And the freedom “to license their patents bilaterally, i.e., outside of the pool structure.”[86]

IV. Methods for Patent Valuation and License Fee Determination

There are three basic methods of valuation: the cost method,[87] the market method,[88] and the income method.[89] In context of patent valuation, these methods find varied expressions. “A truly accurate assessment of patent value requires intensive legal and technical evaluation of individual patents.”[90] The economics literature, however, has also proposed several proxies for patent value based on objective and readily available information.[91]

In context of patent pools the dynamics of patent valuation methods is altered and they need to be viewed through the prism of factors discussed in Part II. This doesn’t imply that approaches to objective patent valuation are not relevant.[92] “However, such valuation approaches focus only on characteristics of patents at the time of issue and neglect to consider what happens afterwards.”[93] “Technology developments or price fluctuations, among many factors, may alter the relationship between two patents … In turn, this may decrease the value of any static analysis conducted by experts.”[94]

Determination of the licensing fee of a patent pool is based on the joint affect of certain transactions. Again, as with patent valuation, so also with licensing fee determination, in context of patent pools, the factors discussed in Part III need to be given heed. The transactions influencing licensing fee determination essentially comprise of valuation of the patent, which in turn is used to set a royalty rate pertaining to allocation of various fees received by licensing of the pool patents. Thus, royalty payment is comprised of two components: a royalty rate and a royalty base, upon which the rate is applied.[95]

A. Determining an Appropriate Royalty Base

The scope of the royalty base can be determined in two principal ways- apportionment and entire market value rule.

The apportionment principle implies that when a patent reads on the entirety of an infringing product, the royalty base should be the total value of the sales (or use) of that product.[96] When the patent at issue covers only a component of the infringing product, the value of the sales or uses of that item must be apportioned between the patented invention and the remaining unpatented components.[97] Thus, the principle aims at allocating awards in proportion to contribution, and is not based on any value attributable to the infringer’s or third parties’ inventions.[98] Thus, essentially, a licensor garners a royalty fee in proportion to the number of infringed patents owned by him.

The entire market value rule, recognizes that the economic value added to a product by a patented component may be greater than the value of the component alone.[99] Thus, this rule focuses on whether the patented component drives demand for the entire product, and if it is so, then the patentee may treat all revenue from the infringing product as an appropriate royalty base.[100]

B. Setting Royalty Rates

Royalty rates are typically a percentage rate and thus reflects the proportion of the base value that the patented technology contributes.[101] Various approaches have emerged in determining royalty rates; these could be adapted in context of patent pools.

Rule of Thumb
This approach suggests that the licensor should receive 25 percent of the licensee’s gross profit from the licensed technology.[102]Thus, this rule’s purpose is not the valuation of a technology per se, but rather the apportionment of a technology’s value between the licensor and licensee.[103] The percentage split between the licensor and licensee should be adjusted upwards or downwards to take into account the parties’ respective investment and risk in the licensed technology.[104]

Numerical Proportionality
According to this approach, royalty entitlement of the holder of patents essential to a standard should be calculated in light of the proportional contribution of that patent owner’s essential patents compared to the total contribution of all other essential patents reading on the standard.[105] This method rests on the proposition that every patent is of equal value.[106]

Industry Standards / Market or Comparable Technology Method
Under this approach, the worth of a patent is determined by examining the royalty rates garnered in similar past transactions.[107]

Discounted Cash Flow
This approach proposes that patent price can be expressed as the present value of the future stream of economic benefits derived from ownership, which includes projected sales of products (or components) based on the patent over its expected life or any increased share of sales as compared to competitors, net of any capital requirements of production.[108] To implement it, one must determine (1) the future cash flows generated by the patent in question and (2) an appropriate discount rate.[109]

Ranking
This approach compares the intellectual property asset to be valued to comparable intellectual property assets on a subjective or objective scale.[110] There are five components to a ranking method: (i) scoring criteria; (ii) scoring system; (iii) scoring scale; (iv) weighting factors; and (v) decision table; these components are used to calculate a composite score for an asset, which is then compared to the average score for a comparable intellectual property asset to determine the relative value.[111]

Cost-based Rate Setting
This approach proposes that the patent holder’s cost of obtaining the invention and its patent forms the basis of the royalty rate; a profit margin is simply tacked onto the innovation cost.[112]

Surrogate Measures
Surrogate measures value patents by reference to the patents themselves.[113] They can be largely categorized into: (1) the number of patents issued to a company; (2) payment of patent maintenance fees i.e. patents which are regularly renewed are more valuable; (3) prior art citations i.e. more a patent is cited, more is its value; (4) characteristics of litigated patents i.e. patents which are the subject matter of litigation are more valuable.[114]

Disaggregation Methods
There are two basic types of disaggregation methods - value disaggregation and income disaggregation.[115] The former apportions some fraction of total value to intellectual property assets by setting the value of intangible assets equal to the value of a firm minus the firm’s monetary and tangible assets from to determine the value of the intangible assets.[116] The latter apportions some fraction of total earnings of a firm, based upon various factors, to intellectual property assets.[117]

Option Methods
This approach views an investment in intellectual property as an option to develop the intellectual property further, or to abandon the intellectual property, depending upon future technical and market information.[118]

Competitive Advantage Valuation (R)
The major premise of the CAV method is that intellectual property assets have no inherent value; the value of intellectual property assets resides entirely in the value of the tangible assets which incorporate them.[119] The minor premise of the CAV method is that the value of a given intellectual property asset can best be measured by the competitive advantage which that asset contributes to a product, process, or service.[120] In its most general form, CAV method consists of following six basic steps[121]:

The intellectual property asset to be valued (IPA) is associated with a product and the product’s net present value is calculated.
The product's net present value is apportioned among tangible assets, intangible advantages and intellectual property assets. (There are three groups of intellectual property assets: technical [utility patents, functional software copyrights and technical trade secrets]; reputational [trademarks, service marks and brand names]; and operational [business method patents and proprietary business processes].
The product is associated with competition parameters which can be used to compare the product to substitute products and competition parameter weights are calculated. (There are three groups of competition parameters: technical [price and performance], reputational [recognition and impression], and operational [cost and efficiency]. Weights are calculated for each parameter group and for individual parameters within each group).
The IPA is associated with an individual competition parameter and the IPA's competitive advantage relative to substitute intellectual property assets is calculated. (Substitute intellectual property assets are assets which are incorporated in substitute products and associated with the same competition parameter as the IPA).
The IPA is associated with complementary intellectual property assets and the IPA's competitive advantage relative to complementary intellectual property assets is calculated. (Complementary intellectual property assets are assets which are incorporated in the same product and associated with the same parameter group as the IPA).
The value of the IPA is calculated by apportioning a share of the product's intellectual property asset value to the IPA based upon the IPA's competitive advantage contribution relative to substitute and complementary intellectual property assets. If the IPA is associated with multiple products, the IPA's relative competitive advantage contribution to each product is calculated and these contributions are summed to calculate the total value of the IPA. If the IPA is associated with multiple parameters, the IPA's relative competitive advantage contribution for each parameter is calculated and these contributions are summed to calculate the total value of the IPA.

Georgia Pacific
The fifteen factors enumerated in the Georgia Pacific case, several of which repeat approaches discussed above, are used in royalty rate determination:[122]

The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit.
The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold.
The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain its patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether they are inventor and promoter.
The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of its non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.
The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial success; and its current popularity.
The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.
The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention.
The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that use.
The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions.
The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
The opinion testimony of qualified experts.

The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee-which desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention-would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.

Academics have prescribed modification to the approach towards these factors analyzing that the relevant questions in calculating a reasonable royalty fall into four basic categories: (1) whether the patentee in fact produces a product in the market; (2) the contribution made by the patented technology compared to the next best alternative; (3) the number and importance of other inputs necessary to make that technology work; and (4) evidence of how the market has actually valued the patent, to the extent it differs from the outcome of (1), (2), and (3).[123]

V. Patent Pool Examples

The following discussion highlights certain aspects of patent pools from real world examples. These examples are restricted to the technological field. Study of these aspects is of value in understanding the concepts discussed hereinbefore.

A. Manufacturers Aircraft Association (MAA)

The MAA was formed in 1917 in U.S.

Apart from the “foundational” patents of Glenn Curtiss and the Wright Brothers, which had substantial royalty rates, most licensing was conducted on a royalty-free basis, with mutual forbearance from infringement suits as the real payment for the exchange.[124]

The MAA was open to anyone who wished to use the Wright-Curtiss designs for a $1000 initiation fee and a licensing fee of $200 per aircraft built; these funds were to be distributed primarily between the Wright and Curtiss interests until each received a sum of $2,000,000 or their key patents expired.[125] MAA retained $ 25 (12.5%) to cover its administrative expenses, $ 135 (67.5%) was paid to the Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation and $ 40 (20%) was paid to the Curtiss-Burgess Airplane & Motor Corporation.[126]

Patents added to the pool after its formation were divided into two classes- normal patents were licensed into the pool for all to use, with no special royalty payout going to the inventor or firm; exceptional patents earned ongoing royalties, in an amount determined by a formal arbitration procedure.[127]

The MAA also included a grant-back provision that applied to after-acquired patents.[128]

MAA’s members could license their patents to non-members if the terms were no more favorable than to members and any MAA member could withdraw at any time, but its patents in the pool at the time of withdrawal would remain.[129]

B. Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG)

MPEG technology allows for transmission and storage of digital video and audio signals. It was formed by the Trustees of Columbia University, Fujitsu Limited, General Instrument Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Philips Electronics N.C., Scientific Atlanta, Inc., and Sony Corp. in 1997. The patent pool for the MPEG-2 standard is administered by a common license administrator- MPEG-LA

MPEG-LA is required to grant licenses to any potential licensees, without discrimination and at a reasonable royalty rate.

MPEG LA offers a portfolio of MPEG-2 systems licenses with a fixed royalty for each licensed mobile MPEG-2 systems signal receiver and a different fixed royalty for all other MPEG-2 systems devices.[130] Additional patents, not included in the portfolio, are available for specific implementations.[131]

The pool offers a standardized five-year license to all prospective licensees.[132] The licensing royalties do not change if patents are added to the portfolio during the five-year licensing period, although the royalty rate may increase by up to 25% in a license renewal.[133] Each patent in the pool is valued equally.[134]

The license has a grant-back provision that requires the licensee to grant to the licensor and other portfolio licensees a nonexclusive license, under fair and reasonable terms and conditions, on any essential patent that the licensee has a right to license.[135]

There exists a partial termination right given to licensors, who may request that MPEG-LA terminate the license of that licensor’s IPR to a particular licensee, if that licensee has sued the licensor for infringement of an MPEG-2 essential or “related” patent or refused to license a related patent on fair and reasonable terms.[136]

C. DVD

Sony, Philips and Pioneer organized the DVD3C patent pool in 1998 for the licensing of patents that are “essential” to comply with the DVD-Video or DVD-ROM standard specifications.

Royalty payments are allocated under guidelines set by the Ground Rules for Royalty

Allocation rather than on subjective analysis by an expert.[137] The royalty rate in standard licenses is not related to fluctuations in the market price of a licensed product; also, the royalty rate is not computed on a per-patent basis and does not fluctuate as patents are added or removed, therefore, the same royalty rate is payable when using one essential patent as when using several.[138]

Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Time Warner, Toshiba, and Victor organized the DVD6C patent pool in 1999 again for the licensing of patents that are “essential” to comply with the DVD-Video or DVD-ROM standard specifications.

The DVD6C pool is also governed by the “Ground Rules for Royalty Allocation” guidelines.[139] The royalties are 4% of the net selling price of the product or U.S. $4.00 per product, whichever is higher. Royalties for DVD decoders are 4% of the net selling price of the product or U.S. $1.00 per product, whichever is higher.[140]

The DVD6C agreement contains a grant-back clause, which, requires licensees to grant each of the licensing companies of DVD6C (and their licensees) a non-exclusive license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to use any of their patents that are deemed essential for the manufacture, use or sale of DVD Products; this grantback is restricted only to those DVD products actually licensed to the licensee.[141]

D. 3G Mobile Telephony

The 3G Patent Platform Partnership was formed in 1999. The purpose of the 3G Patent Platform Partnership is to allow for “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” access to rights essential for implementing the W-CDMA 3GPP standard.[142]

There are three form contracts associated with the Platform: the Framework Agreement, the Standard License, and the Interim License.[143] The Framework Agreement gives each member the choice either to license its essential patents according to the Standard License or to negotiate terms directly with a licensee.[144] The Standard License prescribes standardized royalties for licenses, to be determined by an independent commission.[145] If the patent owner foregoes the Standard License and fails to come to terms in bilateral negotiations, the Interim License comes into effect which has the same royalty terms as the Standard License.[146]

E. Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG)

The Bluetooth SIG was formed in 1997 to provide a technology for interconnection of mobile phones, computers, laptops, printers, PDAs, and other devices via a short-range radio frequency band; SIG oversees the development of Bluetooth standards and its licensing.[147]

SIG’s member companies are divided into three different classes- (1) promoter company, which are intensely engaged in the strategic and technical development of Bluetooth wireless technology; they include Agere, Ericsson, Intel, Lenovo, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, and

Toshiba; (2) associate members, who are licensed to use Bluetooth specifications and trademarks; (3) adopted members, which use published specifications and trademarks, but do not influence the specification process, nor do they have early access to unpublished specifications.[148]

SIG licenses to member companies on a royalty-free basis, but, associate members pay an annual fee based on their company’s annual revenue, with “small” associates (less than $100 million USD/year) paying $7,500 USD/year and “large” associates (more than $100 million USD/year) paying $35,000 USD/year; adopted members are not required to pay an annual fee.[149]

VI. Conclusion

As is evident, patent valuation and license fee determination are extremely subjective and case based. Moreover, their dynamics alter according to the situation, as in the context of patent pools. This dynamism is furthered by the fact that there are no strict or universal formulas or procedures which can be applied in such determinations. Furthermore, such determinations cannot be made in a vacuum but are subject to the cascading effect of a multitude of factors comprised of the holistic technological environment that may not be just restricted to the innovation in question.

[1] Krista L. Cox, The Medicines Patent Pool: Promoting Access and Innovation for Life-Saving Medicines Through Voluntary Licenses 4 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 293 (Summer, 2012) citing IGWG Briefing Paper on Patent Pools: Collective Management of Intellectual Property--The Use of Patent Pools to Expand Access to Essential Medical Technologies, Knowledge Ecology International, (June 3, 2007) quoting Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property, Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 123 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).

[2] Jer Rutton Kavasmaneck v Gharda Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. (Suit No.2932 of 2011; Decided On: 20.03.2012) Bombay H.C. (Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) including the patent right is valuable right for all the commercial purposes. These intangible assets play important role in any financial assessment of the trade/commercial or the market. It changes from time to time, market to market, person to person based upon the situations. If valuation is always a complex and flexible issue and a matter of discussion and debate in business strategies. The patent valuation involves many described and undescribed elements).

[3]Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1293 (October 1996) citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931).

[4] Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Portfolios Through Analytical Techniques 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 463 (Spring, 2007).

[5] Richard J. Gilbert, Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools 77 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2010) MPEG LA Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (June 26, 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf; MPEG LA, MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License Briefing (Aug. 4, 2010).

[6] See Kramer, supra n.4 at 463 (essential patents of technical standards are more valuable, on average, than the general population of patents).

[7] Gilbert, supra n.5.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.citing DVD 3C Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Dec. 16, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf.

[11]R. Justin Koscher, A Patent Pool's White Knight: Individual Licensing Agreements And The Procompetitive Presumption 20 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 53 (Fall, 2009).

[12] Daniel Lin, Research versus Development: Patent Pooling, Innovation And Standardization In The Software Industry 1 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 274 (2002).

[13] Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma 16 Yale J. on Reg. 359 (Summer, 1999).

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Michael A. Sanzo, Antitrust Law And Patent Misconduct In The Proprietary Drug Industry 39 Vill. L. Rev. 1209 (1994).

[21] Gilbert, supra n.5.

[22] Carlson, supra n.13.

[23] Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment Of Current Law And Policy 38 Rutgers L. J. 539 (Winter, 2007).

[24] Gilbert, supra n.5.

[25] Id.

[26] Carlson, supra n.13.

[27] Gilbert, supra n.5.

[28] Nelson, supra n.23.

[29] David S. Taylor, The Sinking Of The United States Electronics Industry Within Japanese Patent Pools 26 GW J. Int'l L. & Econ. 181 (1992).

[30] Id.

[31] Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 309 (2002).

[32] Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991 (June, 2007).

[33] Meurer, supra n.31 (A patent flood occurs when many inventors apply for patents on similar inventions during an interval of a few years).

[34] Id.

[35] Robert P. Greenspoon and Catherine M. Cottle, Don't Assume A Can Opener: Confronting Patent Economic Theories With Licensing And Enforcement Reality 12 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 194 (2011).

[36] Meurer, supra n.31.

[37] Gilbert supra n.5 citing the cross-licensing arrangement between the Singer Manufacturing Company and Gegauf, contained provisions by which each of the parties agreed not to bring any infringement action against the other. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 178 (1963).

[38] Gilbert supra n.5.

[39] Kramer, supra n.4.

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42] Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Patents, and the National Smart Grid 32 Pace L. Rev. 641 (Summer Issue, 2012).

[43] Gilbert, supra n.5 (To the extent that a patent pool successfully lowers total royalties relative to independent licensing, this leaves ‘headroom’ available for an independent licensor outside the pool to charge a high royalty for its patent).

[44] Id. citing Multimedia Patent Trust v. Microsoft Corp., et al., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

[45] Chase A. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis: Current Solutions To The Anticommons Threat 12 J. High Tech. L. 487 (2012); Damien Geradin and Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Value Apportionment Rules for Complex, Multi-Patent Products 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 763 (2010 / 2011) (the typical semiconductor chip likely involves hundreds, perhaps more, patents. In turn, that chip may be intended for use in a laptop computer, the other components of which involve hundreds, or more, patents. Without knowing how many patents actually read on a product, and how many have holders who will actively seek licensing fees, it can be exceedingly difficult to assign the contributed value to those that are known).

[46] Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (November, 2005); Elizabeth M. Bailey, Gregory K. Leonard and Mario A. Lopez, Making Sense Of “Apportionment” In Patent Damages 12 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 255 (2011) (combining patented technologies typically creates value that is greater than the sum of the parts. For example, patent pools often bring together various technologies that are necessary to create the product in question. The stand-alone value of any one patent in the pool may be low or close to zero unless combined with the other patents in the pool).

[47] Parchomovsky and Wagner, supra n.46.

[48] Id.

[49] Id.

[50] Id.

[51] Scott Iyama, The USPTO's Proposal of a Biological Research Tool Patent Pool Doesn't Hold Water 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1223 (March, 2005).

[52] Bradley J. Levang, Evaluating the Use of Patent Pools For Biotechnology: A Refutation to the USPTO White Paper Concerning Biotechnology Patent Pools 19 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 229 (December, 2002).

[53] Courtney C. Scala, Making the Jump From Gene Pools to Patent Pools: How Patent Pools Can Facilitate the Development of Pharmacogenomics 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1631 (July, 2009).

[54] Id.

[55] Id.

[56] R. Justin Koscher, A Patent Pool's White Knight: Individual Licensing Agreements And The Procompetitive Presumption 20 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 53 (Fall, 2009) citing DVD-6 Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to Carey R. Ramos, Esq., of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm.

[57] Alexander Lee, Examining the Viability of Patent Pools for the Growing Nanotechnology Patent Thicket, 3 Nanotechnology L. & Bus. 317 (2006) suggests that to determine the viability of using a patent pool in a market, companies should ponder the following list of nine criteria: (1) product development driven by standards; (2) moderate fragmentation of patent landscape; (3) at least five pool members; (4) each member working on specific subcomponent of a product; (5) willingness of patent holders to negotiate; (6) commitment by members to create the pool; (7) an industry that is in the later stages of product development; (8) certainty of patent ownership; and (9) a patent pool clear of potential antitrust violations.

[58] See Gilbert, supra n.5 discussing the Manufacturers Aircraft Association, where the U.S. government used the threat of compulsory licensing to compel the pioneers of the aircraft industry to form a patent pool in 1917. The industry was enmeshed in litigation over the scope and validity of patents, and some patentees, particularly the Wright-Martin Company, were demanding royalties that the government and other aircraft manufacturers deemed excessive. Creation of the Manufacturers Aircraft Association patent pool resolved the litigation chaos. The government negotiated a portfolio license from the pool with a royalty of $ 200 per aircraft, which was a fraction of the royalty that Wright-Martin was demanding for a single patent ($ 1,000 per aircraft).

[59] See Carlson, supra n.13 discussing that pool agreements are frequently employed as a means of settling existing litigation, and citing examples including patent pools in the laser eye surgery, and the public key encryption industries;

also see Lemley & Shapiro, Frontiers of Intellectual Property, supra n.32 discussing that the average royalty rate granted in all reasonable-royalty cases is 13.13% of the price of the infringing product, which is much higher than that of patent licenses negotiated without litigation.

[60] See Greenspoon and Cottle, supra n.35 discussing the value of patents as a form of currency that can be used to further goals unrelated to market creation or entry. Such goals can be to improve a firm's competitive position when trying to acquire start-up funds, to improve negotiating terms when licensing other patents, and to reduce the chance of paying excessive royalties to external patent owners;

also see, Gilbert, supra n.5 discussing how different business strategies can cause firms to pool their patents with some firms, but not with others, citing the example of emergence of two pools to license DVD patents as a consequence of differing approaches to industry standards. One explanation offered for the existence of two separate pools is that the two groups could not reach an accord about their respective shares of joint royalty payments.

[61] See Gilbert, supra n.5 discussing how some pools license their patents royalty-free or at royalties that are deliberately held below profit-maximizing levels in an effort to promote adoption of new technologies covered by their patents, citing the example of the Bluetooth Special Interest Group and the Multimedia Home Platform. The article also discusses patent pools formed to license patents that are necessary to implement a defined standard, such as MPEG encoding, DVDs, or mobile telephony.

[62] See Gilbert, supra n.5 discussing pools that limit royalties to promote social objectives rather than to profit from new products citing examples of companies, universities, and research organizations such as Syngenta- an agricultural technology company, the Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture, the SARS IP Working Group, and the UNITAID pool for AIDS medications.

[63] Yuichi Watanabe, Patent Licensing And The Emergence Of A New Patent Market 9 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 445 (2009) (The current state of affairs shows that the patent licensing market strongly favors larger corporations over smaller ones, enabling the larger corporations to reap much of the market opportunities and benefits while limiting them to smaller patentees).

[64] Roger B. Andewelt, Practical Problems In Counseling And Litigating: Analysis Of Patent Pools Under The Antitrust Laws 53 Antitrust L.J. 611 (October 11, 1984/October 12, 1984) (Pools typically contain restrictions on those who join the pool by contributing patents and/or those who take licenses under the pooled patents).

[65]Chase A. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis: Current Solutions To The Anticommons Threat 12 J. High Tech. L. 487 (2012).

[66] Ann Weilbaecher, PSY.D., Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries: How to Incentivize Innovation 18 Ann. Health L. 281 (Summer, 2009).

[67] Greenspoon and Cottle, supra n.35 identify five general types of entities that license and enforce patents: (1) Individual inventors with a single patent; (2) Individual serial inventors; (3) Non-Practicing Entities; (4) Operating companies who practice inventions acquired from others; and (5) Operating companies who practice inventions developed in-house.

[68] See, Raymond Millien and Ron Laurie, A Survey Of Established & Emerging IP Business Models 9 Sedona Conf. J. 77 (2008) discussing various models, viz. Patent Licensing and Enforcement Companies, Institutional IP Aggregators/Acquisition Funds, IP/Technology Development Companies, Licensing Agents, Litigation Finance/Investment Firms, IP Brokers, IP-Based M&A Advisory Firms, IP Auction Houses, On-Line IP/Technology Exchanges, Clearinghouses, Bulletin Boards, and Innovation Portals, IP-Backed Lending, Royalty Stream Securitization Firms, Patent Rating Software and Valuation Services, University Technology Transfer Intermediaries, IP Transaction Exchanges & Trading Platforms/IP Transaction Best Practices Development Communities, Defensive Patent Pools, Funds and Alliances, Technology/IP Spinout Financing, and Patent-Based Public Stock Indexes.

[69] Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations In Standard-Setting Organizations 77 Antitrust L.J. 855 (2011).

[70] Gilbert, supra n.5

[71] Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra n.3.

[72] Alan Devlin, Standard-Setting And The Failure Of Price Competition 65 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 217 (2009) citing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).

[73]Doug Lichtman, Understanding The Rand Commitment 47 Hous. L. Rev. 1023 (2010).

[74] Peter N. Detkin, Leveling The Patent Playing Field 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 636 (Summer, 2007).

[75] Lee, infra n.57.

[76] Kelce Wilson, The Four Phases of Patent Usage 40 Cap. U.L. Rev. 679 (Summer, 2012).

[77]Gavin D. George, What is Hiding in the Bushes? eBay's Effect on Holdout Behavior in Patent Thickets, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 557 (2007).

[78] Id.

[79] Id

[80]Daniel R. Cahoy and Leland Glenna, Private Ordering and Public Energy Innovation Policy 36 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 415 (Spring, 2009).

[81] Gilbert, supra n.5; See for example, Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra n.3 describing how in the airplane cross-licensing agreement, it provides that a board of arbitrators may decide in any case what reward should be paid to individual patent owners and this is based not upon the official determination of patentability by the Patent Office, but upon the unofficial determination of the importance of the invention by a board of arbitrators.

[82] See Andewelt, supra n.64 (The scope and variety of patents included vary considerably from pool to pool. Some pools are limited to patents covering a single commercial device. Others contain numerous and diverse patents relating to different devices in different markets).

[83] See, Scala, supra n.53 discussing how the non-exclusive character of a license is particularly important for those firms holding patents whose full utility is unascertainable at the time of the formation of the pool.

[84] Dustin R. Szakalski, Progress In The Aircraft Industry And The Role Of Patent Pools And Cross-Licensing Agreements 2011 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 1 (Spring 2011).

[85] Ed Levy, et. al, Patent Pools And Genomics: Navigating A Course To Open Science? 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75 (Winter, 2010).

[86] Id.

[87] Ted Hagelin, Technology and Legal Practice Symposium Issue: Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets: An Overview 52 Syracuse L. Rev. 1133 (2002) (The cost method of valuation measures the value of an asset by the cost to replace the asset with an identical or equivalent asset. The assumption underlying the cost method of valuation is that the cost to purchase or develop a new asset is commensurate with the economic value that the asset can provide during its life).

[88] Id. (The market method values an asset based upon comparable transactions between unrelated parties).

[89] Id. (The income method values an asset based upon the present value of the net economic benefit (net future income stream) expected to be received over the life of the asset).

[90] Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls Or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis Of Nonpracticing Entities 110 Colum. L. Rev. 114 (January, 2010).

[91]Id.

[92]Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System 62 Hastings L.J. 297 (December, 2010).

[93] Id.

[94]R. Justin Koscher, A Patent Pool's White Knight: Individual Licensing Agreements And The Procompetitive Presumption 20 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 53 (Fall, 2009).

[95] Geradin and Layne-Farrar, supra n.45.

[96] Id.

[97] Id.

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] Id.

[101] Id.

[102] Hagelin, supra n.87; also see, Geradin and Layne-Farrar, supra n.45.

[103] Id.

[104] Id.

[105] Geradin and Layne-Farrar, supra n.45.

[106] Id.

[107] Hagelin, supra n.87; also see, Geradin and Layne-Farrar, supra n.45.

[108] Geradin and Layne-Farrar, supra n.45.

[109] Malcolm T. "Ty" Meeks & Charles A. Eldering, PhD, Patent Valuation: Aren’t We Forgetting Something? Making the Case for Claims Analysis in Patent Valuation by Proposing a Patent Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific Discount Rate Using the CAPM 9 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 194 (Fall, 2010).

[110] Hagelin, supra n.87.

[111] Id.

[112] Geradin and Layne-Farrar, supra n.45.

[113] Hagelin, supra n.87.

[114] Id.; Meeks & Eldering, supra n.109.

[115] Hagelin, supra n.87.

[116] Id.

[117] Id.

[118] Id.

[119] Id.

[120] Id.

[121] Id.

[122] Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

[123] Daralyn J. Durie and Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach To Calculating Reasonable Royalties 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 627 (Summer, 2010).

[124] Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra n.3.

[125] Michael Mattioli, Communities Of Innovation 106 Nw. U.L. Rev. 103 (Winter, 2012).

[126] Szakalski, supra n.84.

[127] Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra n.3.

[128] Mattioli, supra n.125.

[129] Szakalski, supra n.84.

[130] Gilbert, supra n.5.

[131] Carlson, supra n.13.

[132] Id.

[133] Id.

[134] Id.

[135] Lin, supra n.12.

[136] Dorothy Gill Raymond, Benefits and Risks Of Patent Pooling For Standard-Setting Organizations 16 Antitrust ABA 41 (Summer, 2002).

[137] David Serafino, Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management Structures, KEI Research Note 2007:6, Knowledge Ecology International, 4 June 2007.

[138] Id.

[139] Id.

[140] Id.

[141] Id.

[142] Id.

[143] Michael R. Franzinger, Latent Dangers in a Patent Pool: The European Commission's Approval of the 3G Wireless Technology Licensing Agreements 91 Calif. L. Rev. 1693 (December, 2003).

[144] Id.

[145] Id.

[146] Id.

[147] David Serafino, Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management Structures, KEI Research Note 2007:6, Knowledge Ecology International, 4 June 2007.

[148] Id.

[149] Id.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-valuation-and-license-fee-determination-in-context-of-patent-pools

National IPR Policy Series : Comments on the Proposed Intellectual Property Rights Policy to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion

nehaa — 2015-04-12T11:39:16Z

On 13 November, 2014, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion had released a Call for Suggestions for India's proposed National IPR Policy. This is the Centre for Internet and Society's (CIS) submission for the same.

Submitted by CIS with inputs from Pranesh Prakash, Director, Nehaa Chaudhari, Programme Officer, Anubha Sinha, Programme Officer and Amulya P., Intern. Click to view the PDF.

I. Preliminary

I.1. This submission presents comments from the Centre for Internet and Society ("CIS")[1] on the proposed National Intellectual Property Rights Policy ("National IPR policy") to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. ("DIPP").

I.2. CIS commends the DIPP for this initiative, and appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the National IPR Policy. CIS' comments are as stated hereafter.

II. Principles

II.1.1. The characterization of intellectual property rights may be two- fold- first, at their core, intellectual property rights, are temporary monopolies granted to inter alia, authors and inventors; and second, they are a tool to ensure innovation, social, scientific and cultural progress and further access to knowledge. This dual nature and purpose of intellectual property protection is particularly critical in developing economies such as India. Excessive intellectual property protection could result in stunted innovation and negatively impact various stakeholders. [2] It is therefore our submission that the development of the IPR Policy be informed by broader principles of fairness and equity, balancing intellectual property protections with limitations and exceptions/user rights such as those for research, education and access to medicines.

II.1.2. These comments will evaluate the recent developments in the intellectual property regime in India and point out instances for possible reform.

II.1.3. These comments have been divided into five sections, dealing with patents, openness, open access to scholarly works, copyright, and negotiating free trade agreements in that order.

III. Detailed Comments

III.1. Patents

III.1.1. Key Issues Regarding Patents

III.1.1.1. The key issues involving patents in India include compulsory licensing, uncertainty in software patenting, slow pace of examination of patent applications, inter alia.

III.1.1.2. CIS submits that the Indian intellectual property regime contains numerous safeguards to ensure that monopolies of intellectual property are not exercised to the detriment of the public and that the National IPR Policy should continue to reflect these ideals.

III.1.2. Software Patents and Dual Monopoly

III.1.2.1. Presently, software in India may be copyrighted and computer related inventions are patentable. CIS is of the opinion that this results in an ambiguity that could potentially result in a dual monopoly over the same subject matter. This ambiguity around the legality of software patents and the scope of patents on computer related inventions has existed since the Parliament introduced the term "per se" to section 3(k) through the Patent (Amendment) Act, 2002, persisting despite repeated attempts[3] to bring about clarity in the law (the most recent one being the Draft Guidelines on Computer Related Inventions, released in 2013 by the Indian patent office).

III.1.2.2. CIS believes that software is currently adequately protected under copyright, and does not merit patent protection. The software industry in its infancy grew by leaps and bounds in the absence of patents, and imposing twenty year monopolies is stunting the development of software, especially, in an industry where technology changes every two to five years.

III.1.2.3. Therefore, CIS is of the opinion that the National IPR Policy should recognise the danger of software patenting, and encourage the adoption of and development of alternatives to a strict intellectual property regime, for instance, Free/Open Source/Libre Software.

III.1.3. Compulsory Licensing of Patents

III.1.3.1. CIS believes that the current regime allowing for compulsory licensing of patents in India helps achieve a balance between the two concerns of rewarding inventions and making them available to the public during times of need, of the rights of the patent holder with his obligations to ensure availability of products at a reasonable price by allowing third parties who do not own the patent to license the use of the patent during the term of protection.[4] CIS believes that such a balance cannot be arrived at merely by market mechanisms. CIS further believes that achieving such a balance is important for a developing country like India as we have special concerns regarding access to healthcare and access to technologies that will protect our national interest.[5]

III.1.3.2. Therefore CIS submits that the National IPR policy should continue to make positive allowances for government involvement in this space, through the compulsory licensing of patents in certain situations.

III.1.4. Alternative Licensing Mechanisms

III.1.4.1. CIS believes that government participation in the patenting regime ensures that all interests are taken on board and the social costs of patents are kept in mind. CIS is of the opinion that the National IPR policy should be formed after careful consideration of alternative patent licensing mechanisms that could help achieve a balance between the interests of different stakeholders particularly because as a developing economy we have greater needs for access to medicines and technologies to ensure economic development.[6]

III.1.4.2. On patent pools: In the interests of ensuring development of technology and innovation while balancing the social costs of patents, CIS submits that the National IPR Policy should consider alternative licensing mechanisms such as patent pools which present an efficient legal arrangement to the different problems that arise when companies have complementary intellectual property rights and these rights are essential to new technologies being used and employed[7]. Such a licensing could be done with government participation to ensure standard royalty rates and standard agreements.

III.1.4.3. On tailoring patent strengths: Our patent system provides for a one size first all approach to patent terms. CIS believes that the National IPR Policy could suggest the adoption of a more studied approach to differential patent strengths that properly balances out the benefits of the innovation against social costs of patents both in the form of monopoly pricing and threats to subsequent pricing is required to ensure that our patent system is fair equitable and in our national interest.[8]

III.1.4.4. On royalty caps: CIS believes that the National IPR policy could encourage bringing back royalty caps for certain sectors as a means of regulating the market and ensuring that access to technologies is unharmed. CIS believes that this will serve the larger national interest and ensure technological development.[9]

III.2. Openness

III.2.1. Free and Open Source Software

III.2.1.1. Free and Open Source Software ("FOSS") has emerged as a key agent in information technology policy making in India. There has been an increased importance of free and open source software in education, governmental agencies, as recently demonstrated by the Indian Government's decision to shift to open source software, in sync with the Digital India initiative.[10]

III.2.1.2. CIS believes that the IPR policy should encourage free and open software in education, governmental agencies etc. CIS believes that this shift in open source software is necessary to keep our IPR policy in sync with developments in the digital world.

III.3. Open Access to Scholarly Works

III.3.1. Open Access Policies and Scientific and Scholarly Works

III.3.1.1. The benefits of implementing an open access policy with regard to scientific and scholarly works are manifold. Providing open access to scholarly research will ensure percolation of cutting edge research into the society. It has been often argued that restricted access to government funded research is unethical, since scientific research conducted by government agencies is partly, if not entirely, funded by the taxpayers' money.

III.3.1.2. Government Initiatives Towards Open Access

III.3.1.2.1. CIS believes that the steps taken in this regard by the Department of Biotechnology and Department of Science to make scientific research publicly available by developing an open access policy are laudable, especially from the view of increasing access to research undertaken at these institutions.

III.3.1.2.2. There are several other government agencies which have implemented open access policies, namely, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Indian Council of Agricultural Research and Institute of Mathematical Sciences. CIS believes that this is step in the right direction

III.3.1.2.3. Copyright is the key instrument to effect open access policies. CIS believes that the work should be appropriately copyrighted to allow for free and open access to any interested person.

III.4. Copyright

III.4.1. Exceptions for Fair Dealings

III.4.1.1. The 2012, Amendment Act extended fair dealing exceptions in several ways; to sound recordings, videos, to the making of three dimensional works from two dimensional works,[11] to storing of electronic copies at non-commercial public libraries, [12] to rights of commercial rental.[13] While the Act touched upon some of the burning issues with regard to limitations and exceptions to copyright, CIS believes that it did miss out on laying down clear rules for issues like exceptions for educational institutions, libraries and archives which is currently being negotiated at the standing committee of the WIPO as an international instrument,[14] parallel importation of books for non-commercial libraries, and extending the current exceptions for education to distance education and digital education. CIS is of the opinion that while this was a step in the right direction the IPR policy should continue the trend of extending exceptions for fair dealing and should encourage forming general guidelines for fair dealings as it would help achieve goals of education and scientific and cultural progress.

III.4.1.2. CIS believes that it would be beneficial if general guidelines for fair dealing were provided for. These guidelines must not take away from existing fair dealing exceptions under the law, but should act as a framework to understand what constitutes fair dealing. CIS submits that this coupled with support for the International Treaty for Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives[15] and for International Treaty for Limitations and Exceptions for Educational and Research Institutions [16]would help serve national interest as it would help reduce the freezing effect by reducing the costs of using copyrighted work legitimately and ensure social and cultural progress. CIS submits that the National IPR policy should encourage the international instruments aimed at providing for exceptions and limitations for fair dealings.

III.4.2. Exceptions for Government Produced Works

III.4.2.1. CIS believes that the current exceptions for use of government produced works are far too limited and taxpayers must be free to use the works that they have paid for.[17] CIS submits that the National IPR policy should encourage the broadening of exceptions with regard to government produced works.

III.4.3. Compulsory Licensing

III.4.3.1. The Act allowed for compulsory licensing of foreign works[18] and put in place statutory licenses for broadcasters[19] CIS believes that this was a positive step that will encourage cultural and scientific education in India. CIS submits that compulsory licenses for copyrighted works help achieve goals of education, of scientific and cultural progress. CIS submits that the National IPR policy should encourage compulsory licensing of copyrighted works in certain situations for the promotion of access to knowledge and information.

III.4.4. Protection of Authors/ Performers Rights

III.4.4.1. The Act allowed for protection of author's rights regarding storing of their work in electronic medium[20] and for protection of rights of performers both commercial [21] and moral.[22] CIS believes that while this is in itself a positive step, there is need to ensure that such moral rights are not abused by authors or rights holders to stop discourse or to stop fair use and adequate measures to ensure the same must be put in place to avoid excessive intellectual property rights. CIS submits that the National IPR policy should discuss limitations to moral rights of authors and performers to make room for fair dealings.

III.4.5. Users Rights Regarding Cover Versions Of Songs

III.4.5.1. The Act allows for users to make cover versions of a sound recording required provided they comply with rules regarding notices and royalties. CIS believes that this is potentially problematic as even recording companies have acknowledged that the non-commercial cover versions help in increasing the popularity of the original and therefore help in the growth of the film and music industry and this new law could possibly stop individuals from making such cover versions due to fear of violating the law and therefore harm the film and music industry. Therefore, CIS believes that the National IPR policy should consider measures to provide more rights to the users in order to ensure development of the music and film industry; CIS believes that this is an instance of excessive intellectual property and is harmful to all stakeholders involved.

III.4.6. Relinquishment of Copyright and Creative Commons

III.4.6.1. The amended Section 21 of the Act now only requires a simply public notice from the author to relinquish his copyright as opposed to an application to the registrar of copyrights. CIS believes that this is a positive step as now the requirement under the rules can easily be satisfied by using a Creative Commons Zero license.[23] CIS submits that the National IPR policy should undertake similar steps to encourage the usage of creative commons licenses and thereby facilitate access to knowledge.

III.4.7. Term of Protection of Copyrights

III.4.7.1. The Act provided for an extension of term of copyright for photographs to almost double its earlier duration, [24] CIS believes that this is possibly harmful as it could lead to copyrighted works not entering the public domain for unnecessarily long periods of time and thereby harm progress in science and culture. In this regard CIS further believes that since the term of protections provided under our copyright law for all works extends beyond our international obligations, The National IPR policy should try to ensure that scientific and cultural development are not hindered by excessive terms of protection that go beyond the minimum owed under our international obligations.

III.4.8. Protection Of Rights Management Information

III.4.8.1. The amendment Act provided for protection of rights management information (RMI) and provided for both criminal and civil remedies in instances of unauthorised alteration or removal of RMIs.[25] CIS believes that these provisions are unnecessary as India does not have obligations to do so under international treaties and there is no actual demand for these rights as it is yet unclear how these rights help authors or performers. CIS submits that these provisions increase the costs for users who want to legitimately break these digital locks to obtain accessible formats for the information and that so long as the rights holder does not have an obligation to ensure that their works are accessible, provisions such as these cripple creativity and stunt industry growth.[26] Therefore CIS submits that the National IPR policy should help achieve a balance of concerns of users who want to legitimately break these digital locks on the one hand and the need to prevent digital piracy on the other.

III.4.9. Intermediary Liability

III.4.9.1. CIS submits that due to the IT (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011, there is a freezing effect on free speech on the internet as these rules are procedurally flawed and go against the principles of natural justice.[27] CIS believes that such a restraint on free speech harms creativity and innovation, to this end CIS submits that the National IPR policy should ensure free speech is not unfairly hindered by rules regarding copyright infringement.

III.4.10. Criminalization of Copyright Infringement

III.4.10.1. Individual non-commercial infringement of copyright is a crime under Section 63A of the Copyright Act [28] and is punishable by imprisonment which can extend to three years or a fine that can extend up to rs. 2,00,000/- CIS believes that this is an instance of excessive intellectual property protection; CIS is of the opinion that the civil remedies available for copyright enforcement are enough for copyright protection and that the criminal remedies under the Copyright Act, 1957 function only to ensure that there are obstacles to free and legitimate use of copyrighted material. CIS believes that such provisions are harmful for innovation within India and impose unnecessary costs on users.[29] Therefore CIS believes the National IPR policy should reconsider the question of criminalisation of copyright infringement and should ensure that any penal consequences are proportional to the act committed.

III.4.11. Concluding Remarks on Copyrights

III.4.11.1. In conclusion while India has what some call the most balanced approach to intellectual property law in the world today, [30] one that balances both the interests of the author and the copyrights holder as well as the end user and the overall public interest, there is room for improvement as far as adapting to the internet age is concerned, especially considering the easy appeal of forming an intellectual property regime that is excessive and in the end harms all the concerned stakeholders.

III.5. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)

III.5.1. Need for Transparency Regarding FTA Negotiations

III.5.1.1. India has lately been negotiating Free Trade Agreements with several developed nations, these are closed door negotiations and the texts of the meetings are not available to the public. CIS believes that these texts should be made available to the public to ensure transparency and to ensure all stakeholders know of any developments, CIS believes that public knowledge of the positions of various actors in any negotiation process will help ensure that such positions are taken keeping in mind the interests of all stakeholders and will ensure that any outcome from such negotiations will be in national interest.[31] CIS therefore submits that the National IPR policy should encourage transparency with regards to negotiations for free trade agreements.

III.5.2. FTAs with Developed Nations and TRIPS Plus Standards

III.5.2.1. Leaked drafts of the European Union- India FTA negotiations have revealed that provisions on intellectual property protection were extensive and affected the pharmaceuticals sector, these provisions, if agreed upon, could go well beyond India's obligations under the WTO and under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. In fact, developed countries including the US [32] and EU[33] have tried time again and again to encourage developing countries to adopt standards of IP protection in bilateral or regional trade investment agreements that go beyond TRIPS [34]

India has repeatedly indicated to the WTO that it was not willing to commit to an agreement beyond TRIPS.[35] These commitments could include data exclusivity protection measures, ever-greening of patents etc. [36]

CIS believes that despite the growing pressure from developed nations regarding various FTAs,[37] India must hold its ground and ensure that concerns about India's national interest and the difference in the development levels of the European Union or other developed countries and developing countries like India are kept in mind while negotiating obligations under international agreements. Therefore CIS believes that the National IPR policy should ensure that TRIPS plus standards are not acceptable to India as they will undermine our national interest and hinder development at the national level.[38]

III.5.3. Shift from Multilateral Forums to Bilateral FTA negotiations

III.5.3.1. CIS believes that the trend of shift in negotiations from a multilateral forum such as the WIPO or the WTO to a bilateral or a regional forum [39] is harmful as certain flexibilities are built into the TRIPS and therefore multilateral negotiations based on TRIPS will help pursue India's interests better. And therefore when possible, India must prefer negotiations at multilateral forums as opposed to bilateral or regional treaties, CIS believes that the National IPR policy should reflect the same preferences. [40]

IV. Concluding observations

IV.1. On patents, CIS submits that the National IPR policy reconsider software patenting, that encourage open source software, continue and strengthen that compulsory licensing and consider and study alternative licensing mechanisms as means to achieve a balancing of the interests of different stakeholders.

IV.2. On openness, CIS submits that the IPR policy should encourage free and open software in education, governmental agencies etc.

IV.3. On open access to scholarly work, CIS commends the work done by government agencies so far and submits that the IPR policy should encourage open access to scholarly works.

IV.4. On copyright, CIS submits that the IPR policy work toward strengthening and extending fair dealings provisions, supporting international instruments that strengthen fair dealing, encourage compulsory licensing. CIS submits that the IPR policy should work towards ensuring that protections for copyright such as terms of protection, intermediary liability, protection of rights management information, criminalisation of copyright infringement etc., do not harm other legitimate interests of users or unnecessarily restrict free speech.

IV.5. On FTAs, CIS submits that the IPR policy encourage transparency with regard to FTA negotiations, ensure that TRIPS plus standards are not accepted as they would harm national interest and to encourage multilateral negotiations over bilateral free trade agreements.

IV.6. CIS welcomes the initiative of the DIPP to form a National IPR policy, CIS believes that it is essential that such an IPR policy avoid excessive intellectual property rights protection and is formed keeping in mind goals of development and national interest.

IV.7. CIS is thankful to the DIPP for the opportunity to provide comments on the National IPR policy and would be privileged to work with the government on this and other matters in these areas.

[1] www.cis-india.org (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[2] The Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and Public Interest concluded after the Global Congress on Intellectual property and Public Interest in August 2011 attended by over 180 experts from 32 countries articulate this position perfectly. Available at: http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Washington-Declaration.pdf (Last Accessed:29/11/14)

[3] Shashank Singh, Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions: Mapping the Stakeholders' Response, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/guidelines-for-examination-of-computer-related-inventions (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[4] N.S. Gopalakrishnan, Compulsory License Under Indian Patent Law, MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Vol.22, 2015, pp.11-42.

[5] Raadhika Gupta, Compulsory Licensing under TRIPS: How Far it Addresses Public Health Concerns in Developing Nations, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, Vol.15, September 2010, pp.357-363. Available at: http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789/10211/1/JIPR%2015(5)%20357-363.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[6] Id.

[7] Nehaa Chaudhari, Pervasive Technologies: Patent Pools, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[8] One of the measures along which we could have differential patent strengths could be the time for the invention to reach the market, see, Benjamin N Roin, The case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on the Time-to-Market of Inventions, UCLA Law Review, Vol.61, 2013, Available at: http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/10612849/Case%20for%20Tailoring%20Patent%20Awards%203-15-13.pdf?sequence=1 (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[9] Sunil Abraham, Patented Games, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/patented-games (Last Accessed: 30/11/14.

[10] See Nabi Hasan, Issues and Challenges in Open Source Software Environment with Special Reference to India, Available at: http://crl.du.ac.in/ical09/papers/index_files/ical-43_144_317_1_RV.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[11] Section 52(1), the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[12] Section 52(1) (n), the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[13] Zakir Thomas, Overview of Changes to the Indian Copyright Law, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, Vo.17, July 2012, pp.324-334.

[14] See conclusions of the chair at the 23^rd session of the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights at the WIPO, Available at: http://www.eifl.net/wipo-sccr23-conclusions (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[15] For draft proposal of the treaty see IFLA, Treaty proposal on Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives, Available at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_27/sccr_27_2_rev.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[16] See The Draft WIPO Treaty on Exceptions and Limitations for the Persons with Disabilities, Educational and Research Institutions, Libraries and Archives, proposal by the African Group (document SCCR/22/12).Available at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_22/sccr_22_12.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[17] See Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act, 1957.

[18] Section 31 and 31A, the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[19] Section 31D, the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[20] Section 14(1), the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[21] Id.

[22] Section 38B, the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[23] CIS, Comments on Draft Copyright Rules, 2012, available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/feedback-to-draft-copyright-rules-2012 (Last Accessed: 29/11/14).

[24] See Pranesh Prakash, Analysis of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2012, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/analysis-copyright-amendment-bill-2012

[25] Section 65B, The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[26] Pranesh Prakash, Technological Protection Measures in the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/tpm-copyright-amendment (Last Accessed: 29/11/14).

[27] Rishabh Dara, Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet, 2011, Available at: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/intermediary-liability-in-india.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[28] Section 63A, Copyright Act 1957.

[29] See Right to Share: Principles on Freedom of Expression and Copyright in the Digital Age, Article19, Available at: http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3716/en/ (Last Accessed: 29/11/14).

[30] V Premanath, S Sivaram, Intellectual Property Systems in India: Progressing towards Greater Maturity and Diversity, Available at: http://iimahd.ernet.in/users/anilg/files/Articles/Emerging%20IPR%20Consciousness,%20vikalpa.pdf (Last Accessed: 29/11/14).

[31] Jan Wouters, Idesbald Goddeeries, Bregt Natens etc, Some Critical Issues in the EU -India Free Trade Agreement Negotiation, Working Paper No.102,KU Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp101-110/wp102-wouters-goddeeris-natens.pdf , February 2013, p.16.

Monika Ermert, Lack of Transparency in EU-India FTA Talks Spurs Requests for Halt, ip-watch, Available at: http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/09/03/lack-of-transparency-in-eu-india-fta-talks-spurs-requests-for-halt/ .

[32] The current policy of the US Trade Representative is seen to be reflected in the 2002 Trade Act available here: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hr3009enr/pdf/BILLS-107hr3009enr.pdf See HR3009.

[33] The current trade strategy for the EU can be found here http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152643.pdf .

[34] Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, Available at: http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ciprfullfinal.pdf , p.174.

[35] C. Correa, 'Negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement European Union-India: Will India Accept Trips-Plus

Protection?', (2009) Oxfam Deutschland and Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst Analysis,

http://www.oxfam.de/files/20090609_negotiationofafreetradeaggrementeuindia_218kb.pdf .

[36] S. Sharma, 'the EU-India FTA: Critical Considerations in a Time of Crisis', (2009) Centad Working Paper.

[37] Asit Ranjan Mishra, India to negotiate FTAs with emerging market nations, Livemint, Available at: http://www.livemint.com/Politics/RlJNxUXovjNVaRzQt9KXmO/India-to-negotiate-FTAs-with-emerging-market-nations.html .

[38] Sisule F Musungu and Graham Dutfield, Commission Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS -Plus Word: the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), Available at: http://www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/WIPO_Musungu_Dutfield.pdf.

[39] For Trends, See Beginda Pakpahan, Deadlock in the WTO: What is next? Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum12_e/art_pf12_e/art19.htm .

[40] See Amit Sengupta, Do not trade away our lives, Vo.9, No.2, Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, 2012, Available at: http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/index.php/ijme/article/view/88/1047 .

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-on-proposed-ip-rights-policy-to-dipp

Methodology: Statements of Working (Form 27) of Indian Mobile Device Patents

rohini — 2017-09-10T15:19:51Z

In India, if a patent is not locally worked within three years of its issuance, any person may request a compulsory license, and if the patent is not adequately worked within two years of the grant of such a compulsory license, it may be revoked. In order to provide the public with information about patent working, India requires every patentee to file an annual statement on “Form 27” describing the working of each of its issued Indian patents. We conducted the first comprehensive and systematic study of all Forms 27 filed with respect to mobile devices. We tried to empirically establish the extent to which patentees and licensees comply with the statutory requirement to declare information about the working of their patents. Research assistance was provided by interns Anna Liz Thomas and Nayana Dasgupta.

The research paper on patent landscape, Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey, [PDF] was published in the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2017).

The research paper on "Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products: An Empirical Assessment of India's Form 27 Practice and Compliance" has been published here (July 2017).

The dataset of all the Form 27 studied for this paper has been published here.

Research Questions

How many annual Form 27 submissions have been made to the Indian Patent Office for 4,419 granted patents identified in the landscape of mobile device patents in India?
How many patents have no corresponding Form 27 filed yet?
How many Form 27 submissions from those found are defective?
Is there an identifiable pattern in the defects and discrepancies?
Is there any discernible trend in filing of Form 27 over time and with respect to patent owners?

The objective of this paper is to quantitatively determine the extent to which patentees and licensees comply with the statutory requirement to declare information about the working of their patents according to Section 146(2) of the Patents Act, 1970 read with Rule 131 of the Patent Rules, 2003.

Section 146(2): Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), every patentee and every licensee (whether exclusive or otherwise) shall furnish in such manner and form and at such intervals (not being less than six months) as may be prescribed statements as to the extent to which the patented invention has been worked on a commercial scale in India.

Rule 131: Form and manner in which statements required under section 146(2) to be furnished

The statements shall be furnished by every patentee and every licensee under sub-section (2) of section 146 in Form 27 which shall be duly verified by the patentee or the licensee or his authorised agent.
The statements referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be furnished in respect of every calendar year within three months of the end of each year.
The Controller may publish the information received by him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 146.

Object

The research object is Form 27 submissions made annually to the Indian Patent Office for the 4,419 granted patents.

4,052 of these patents were identified in the landscape (“the patent landscape”) developed by the Centre for Internet and Society as a part of ongoing research on patents pertaining to sub-USD-100 mobile devices sold in India. The dataset of the patent landscape can be accessed here. Another 367 patents pertaining to mobile technology identified during the landscaping exercise but excluded from it, were added to the initial set of 4,052 patents.

A blank copy of Form 27 is available here. The pro forma is defined as per Schedule II of Patent Rules, 2003.

Research Methods

[Corresponding research questions

How many annual Form 27 submissions have been made to the Indian Patent Office for 4,419 granted patents identified in the landscape of mobile device patents in India?
How many patents have no corresponding Form 27 filed yet?
How many Form 27 submissions from those found are defective?]

Outsourcing the searching of the submitted copies of Form 27 to a contractor

Owing to the repetitive nature of the process for collecting the forms, as well the large scale of the project, the task of searching was outsourced to a contractor. Price quotations were invited from five data entry operators and two firms of patent attorneys. On the basis of the quotation, deliverable time, scope and nature of the results delivered, and quality assurance, the contract was awarded to one firm. The firm offered the best price for a commensurate deliverable time and assured quality of results.

Form 27 retrieval online

Form 27 were searched from IPAIRS (Indian Patent Information Retrieval System) and InPASS (Indian Patent Advanced Search System) public databases of the Indian Patent Office.

InPASS has two features: Application Status and E-Register. We checked both features, in case forms not found through one could be located through the other. We indeed found that, sometimes, the forms not available on E-register could be found through the Application Status table, and vice versa.

Case 1: Accessing form 27 using Application Status tab on INPASS

A search portal is located at ipindiaservices.gov.in/publicsearch.

Enter the patent number in the “Patent Number” search field without the kind codes (IN) and click on “Search”. E.g., for patent number IN263932B, enter ‘263932’ in the “Patent Number” field.
Once the queried patent is displayed, select the “Application Status” tab to access the list of documents that were filed for the requested patent.

In the Application Status tab, scroll down to the bottom to view “Application Status table”. Click on the “View Documents” button to access the list of the documents filed for the queried patent. A pop-up window opens with the results.

In the window, a list of hyperlinks to various documents is displayed. Sometimes Form 27/ working statement is explicitly named so. At other times, it may have a different title. Once you click on the form 27 link, a PDF file opens in a new tab. There may be more than one Form 27 in the list of documents as Form 27 is an annual submission.

Case 2: No record of Form 27 found (Application status tab)

If the form is not present on InPASS, that is, if it has not been uploaded to the website, or if it has not been submitted to the Indian Patent Office (IPO), then it will not be displayed in the list of documents described in Case 1, step 5. Such instances have been logged as “No record found”.

Case 3: Accessing form 27 using E-Register tab on INPASS

At http://ipindiaservices.gov.in/publicsearch, a patent search portal is displayed. Enter the patent number by following the same steps as described in Case 1 until the queried patent is displayed. Select the “E-register” tab to access the e-register data corresponding to the queried patent.

In the “E-register” tab, scroll to the bottom to view the “Information u/s 146” table. The “Information u/s 146” table includes a list of Form 27 filed for the queried patent. As visible in the screenshot below, on clicking the “261762_2015” hyperlink, Form 27 for the queried patent opens. There could be multiple form 27s corresponding to different years.

Case 4: No record of Form 27 found (E-register)

If the form is not present in the E-register, that is, if it has not been uploaded to the website or if it has not been submitted to the IPO, then the E-Register tab displays “Eregister Not Available”.

Case 5: Searching on IPAIRS

Both InPASS and IPAIRS fetch forms from the same URL. However, we observed that one search engine sometimes displays the forms when the other doesn’t. The IPAIRS search engine was used when Form 27 was not found on InPASS.

IPAIRS patent search homepage: http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/search/index.aspx On the home page, in the Application Status tab, enter the full patent application number and CAPTCHA.
A window containing information pertaining to the patent application opens. At the bottom of the window, there is a “View Documents” button.

On clicking on “View Documents”, a new window with list of hyperlinked documents opens as described in Case 1, Step 5.

The URL for the new window displayed via “View Documents” on IPAIRS is the same as the URL displayed via “View Documents” in the “Application Status” tab on InPASS. For example, for patent number 263932, the URL for this window is the same on IPAIRS and InPASS: http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/GrantedSearch/viewdoc.aspx?id=Bx6eZ7YQLgsl3yH1LqKHjg==&loc=wDBSZCsAt7zoiVrqcFJsRw==

Form 27 retrieval via Right To Information (RTI) requests

CIS filed two requests under the RTI Act, 2005 with the Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks in Mumbai.

CIS' RTI application to the Indian Patent Office in Mumbai, March 2016 [PDF]. The IPO's reply, April 2016 [PDF].

(View text: https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-request-to-indian-patents-office-for-form-27-statement-of-working-of-patents-march-2016)

CIS' RTI application to the IPO in Mumbai, June 2015 [PDF]. The IPO's reply, June 2015 [PDF].

(View text: https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-request-to-indian-patents-office-for-form-27-statement-of-working-of-patents-2015)

InPASS and IPAIRS yielded Form 27 for 1,999 patents out of 4,419. For Form 27 pertaining to 61 of the remaining patents, CIS made a request in March 2016 under the Right to Information Act (2005) to the office of the Indian Patent Office located in Mumbai.

How the 61 patents were chosen
37 of the 50 companies in the patent landscape owned granted patents. We took one patent from each of the 37 companies. [See Annexure 4 (PDF)of Methodology: Patent landscaping in the Indian mobile device market] The remaining were patents litigated in India, as well as patents transferred from one of the companies in the landscape to another.

IPO’s reply to the March 2016 RTI application
The IPO replied in April 2016 that it could provide CIS with forms for eleven of the requested patents. As for the rest of the forms, the IPO stated, “As thousand [sic] of Form-27 are filed in this office, it is very difficult to segregate Form-27 for the patent numbers enlisted in your RTI application as it needs diversion of huge official/ staff manpower and it will affect day to day [sic] work of this office.”

Repeating the Form 27 search online

A few days after CIS received the reply from the IPO, Form 27 pertaining to patents in the landscape started appearing on InPASS and IPAIRS E-register portal. CIS’ contractor repeated the search for forms for all 4,419 patents as some forms filed in 2016 and 2015 were found. Forms for additional 1,003 patents were found, taking the number of patents with at least one corresponding form to 3,002.

Of the 1,417 patents for which forms were not found, 481 are either expired or there is no log corresponding to them in the E-Register.

Schema for the results

Information from the Form 27 was logged into a spreadsheet with the following heads:
Serial Number -- Assignee -- Patent Number -- Status -- Application Date -- Grant Date -- Title -- Application Number -- Form 27 presence -- Multiple Forms -- Number of years -- Year -- If Worked -- Working/ Non-working Status -- Working/ Non-working Information -- Licensing Status -- Licensing Information -- Comments.

Detailed legend and process of logging the results

Assignee: Name of the company that owns the patent. Annexure 4 [PDF] lists 50 companies studied for the patent landscape. 37 of those companies owned patents in India. Thus, the assignee could be one of 37 companies among the 50 in Annexure 4. Where two assignees are mentioned, the patent was transferred from the second assignee to the first on account of sale of the patent, company merger, etc. For example, "Huawei|NEC" indicates that a patent that belonged to NEC was transferred to Huawei.

Form 27 presence: Whether or not Form 27 was found. Entries in this column are either “Yes” or “No”. If case Form 27 was not found, the subsequent columns are unpopulated.

Multiple Forms: If more than one Form 27 was found, the number of years for which it was found. In some cases, more than one form was found for the same patent for the same year. We have considered these instances as a single form for the same year and noted the defect in the “Comments” column.

Year: The year for which the form was filed. This information was found in #2 of the pro forma of Form 27. In the case of patents with Form 27 filed for more than one year, the entries for different years have been logged into consecutive rows.

If Worked: This information was found in 3(i) of the pro forma. Depending on whether the text of Form 27 states that the patent was “worked” or “not worked”, results have been logged as either “Yes” or “No”. In instances where it is not explicitly stated whether the patent has been worked or not, or where 3(i) is blank, the results are logged as “Not disclosed” with a description of the defect in the “Comments” column.

Working/ Non-working status: Corresponds to 3(i)a in the case of patents stated as “worked” and to 3(i)b in the case of those stated as “not worked”. The results have been marked as:

Description is generic (future use)
Description is generic (present use)
Description is specific
No description

Description is generic (future use): No specific information been provided as required by 3(i)a or 3(i)b. The description indicates that in the future the patentee might “work” or license the patent or do both. E.g: “May be worked in the future depending on the market demand and when technology is mature.”

“We are still assessing the commercial and technological aspects of working of this patent in India and negotiating marketing and distribution of patented product with related parties.”

“Technical developments [sic] are still continuing” or “Negotiations and technical developments [sic] are still continuing”.

Description is generic (present use): No specific information been provided as required by 3(i)a or 3(i)b. The description indicates that the patentee may be “working” the patent. E.g:, “DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE INVENTION, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE ACCURATELY WHETHER THE PATENTED INVENTION HAS BEEN WORKED IN INDIA OR NOT. Improvements in the invention are continuing to be made. The Patentee is actively looking for licensees and customers to commercialise the invention in the Indian environment.”

“... This patent is among a large number of patents in the patentee’s complex portfolio which may cover the products services and embedded technologies provided by the patentee or its licensee(s) in India. This patent might worked [sic] in India in some of the patentee(s) existing or future products, services and embedded technologies. Given the extremely Iarge number of patents that may apply to any given product or service of the patentee, it is very difficult to Identify and accurately update which of those patents would apply to the numerous products, services and embedded technologies.”

Description is specific: Specific information has been provided as required in 3(i)a or 3(i)b.

E.g, “Quantum of the patented product-303520 and value of the patented product in INR-2790524299”.

No description: 3(i)a and 3(i)b are blank.

Working/non-working information: Contains the full text of the descriptions mentioned in “Working/non-working status” column. These have been reproduced verbatim from Form 27 filings.

Licensing status: States whether or not the patent has been licensed as per 3(ii) of the pro forma for Form 27. Results are logged as “Yes” (licensed), “No” (no-licensed), “Cross-licensed” and “Not disclosed”.

“Not disclosed” indicates that the response to 3(ii) is either blank or there is an explicit statement that licensing information would not be disclosed on Form 27. E.g: “As all the licenses are confidential in nature, the details pertaining to the same are not being disclosed herein and may be provided to the Patent Office as and when the same is specifically directed by the Patent Office under sealed cover so that such details are not laid open in public domain.”

Licensing information: Contains the full text of the response reproduced verbatim from 3(ii). (Blank fields when there is no text in 3(ii))

For patents marked as licensed, this column contains the names and addresses of licensees and/ or sub-licensees.

For patents marked as not-licensed, this column is either blank or contains statements such as, “Information Not readily available; efforts will be made to collect and submit further information, if asked for.”, “None”, “No licensees”.

For patents marked as “cross-licensed”, the patentee states that it has a cross-licensing agreement with its licensees. E.g: “There is a cross license agreement between <company name> and at least one licensee, giving mutual rights to produce despite monopoly afforded by patents that are hold by any of the companies. There is no information available on whether the technology of said patent is included products sold by such licensee. As all the licenses are confidential in nature, the details pertaining to the same shall be provided under specific directions from the Patent Office.”

Comments: Contains information about defects and notable observations from the Form 27 submissions.

Validation of results

Validation of the results was done via deduplication first and then random sampling of 10% of the results.

Analysis of results

[Corresponding research questions:
4. Is there an identifiable pattern in the defects and discrepancies?
5. Is there any discernible trend in filing of Form 27 over time and with respect to patent owners?]

The results logged into the spreadsheet were analysed to find a pattern in the defects in the submissions. Visualisations will be created, if necessary.

Prior Art

Extraordinary writ petition in the matter of a public interest litigation, filed in the High Court of Delhi, Shamnad Basheer vs Union of India and others, C.M. No. 5590 of 2015 http://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FORM-27-WP-1R-copy.pdf

The petitioner(s) “sought to investigate the commercial working of certain patented inventions in India, particularly in relation to three key areas”. One of these areas include telecommunications technology. Para 53 to 58 of the writ elucidate on the petitioners’ observations and findings on “High technology patents and trolls”, while para 59 and 60 refer to the linkage between patents and products. Annexure P-8 of this petition contains copies of Form 27 filed by Ericsson in India. Annexure P-11 contains a “summary of findings of Form 27 investigations conducted by the petitioner”. Annexure P-4 (II. Telecommunications Sector) contains a list of 58 patents pertaining to the telecommunications domain in India. 21 of these are coincide with the patent landscape mentioned in “Research Object”.
Basheer had published a report in 2011 based on the findings of his RTI investigation of Form 27 pertaining to pharmaceutical patents in India. The report titled “RTI Applications and “Working” of Foreign Drugs in India?” is available at: http://www.spicyip.com/docs/Workingpatents.doc The report sheds light on lack of filing, incomplete filing and violation of patent working norms by pharmaceutical companies. He states having encountered difficulties during the RTI process: The RTI process was a very arduous one, with the patent office refusing information or claiming missing files in some cases. We had to resort to the appellate procedure in almost all cases. And in one case concerning the drugs Tarceva and Sutent, both the CPIO (Delhi office) and the appellate authority refused to provide information. We had to then take the matter up directly with Controller General PH Kurian who immediately ordered that the information be provided. Upon his instructions, the information was provided within 24 hours. However, we received this information only on the 4^th of April 2011, more than 6 months since we began the RTI process! (Source: Drug Firms and Patent "Working": Extent of Compliance with Form 27 http://spicyip.com/2011/04/drug-firms-and-patent-working-extent-of.html

Limitations

If Form 27 is not found on InPASS or INPAIRS, it is not possible to determine if the form has not been submitted to the IPO or it has been submitted but the IPO has not uploaded it. There is no publicly available database or log where such information is available.
Technical issues with the IPAIRS website hampered the speed of searching for and downloading Form 27. At the time of trial run in May 2015, the website was not available for nearly a week. Technical issues also lead to conflicting search results on IPAIRS and INPASS at times. For example, the form may be available via one search engine but not via another, even though they are fetched the files from the same database. Runtime errors occur due to browser caching.

Edited, September 10, 2017: To add -- URLs of the research paper on Form 27 published in July 2017, and of the dataset containing raw data, which was published and licensed CC-BY-SA 4.0.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-statements-of-working-form-27-of-indian-mobile-device-patents

Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low-cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licenses

nehaa — 2013-06-27T08:06:50Z

On June 27, 2013, CIS sent a letter for establishment of a patent pool for low cost access devices through compulsory licenses.

M. Mangapati Pallam Raju
Minister for Human Resource Development
Shastri Bhavan
New Delhi 110 001

27 June 2013

Dear Dr. Pallam Raju,

Subject: Establishment of a Patent Pool for Low-Cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licences

We at the Centre for Internet and Society would like to commend you for the progressive stand you have adopted that while the government is committed to low-cost access devices, students should be able to decide “on which device, whether it is a mobile phone or iPad or Aakash or regular com-puter, they access the content”. It is imperative, though, that low-cost access devices (LCAD) be available to students, and thus the Mehta Committee report rightly acknowledges the importance of the Aakash project as central to the National Mission on Education through Information and Com-munications Technology (NMEICT). We propose a solution that would ensure both easy access to affordable devices for students to enable the NMEICT mission, as well as ensure that the MHRD focus more on educational content than devices.

We would urge you to enable access to LCADs by establishing a patent pool of essential technolo-gies (the ‘Aakash patent pool’) through the issue of compulsory licences. There are, at present in-ternationally, thousands of granted patents and tens of thousands of other intellectual property claims in respect of mobile and tablet technologies. The multiplicity of claims and cross-claims makes it impossible to manufacture, without exposure to adverse claims, generic and affordable tab-let devices. As you know, the assertion of multiple adverse and competing intellectual property claims is one of the main reasons that the Aakash tablet project is stalled. Already the multi-billion dollar patent wars in the US and Europe between Apple, Samsung, and other device manufacturers, are coming to India with Ericsson suing Micromax, India’s second-largest seller of phones and tab-lets, for Rs. 100 crore just a few weeks ago.

The establishment of a patent pool of essential technologies will redress this imminent failure and will enable the manufacturing of affordable tablet devices in compliance with the NMEICT. To es-tablish such a patent pool, the current patents applicable to mobile and tablet devices must be com-pulsorily licensed to a common pool and manufacturers who wish to sell their devices at an afford-able price would be allowed, at uniform terms and conditions, to utlise these patented technologies. This will simultaneously ensure that all patent-holders will benefit from royalty payments and that all manufacturers will gain access to the requisite patented technologies in a fair manner without adverse claims. The manufacturers who benefit from the pool could be required to give the Indian government credit by displaying the Aakash logo on their devices.

In order to establish such a patent pool, it is necessary to, firstly, identify the relevant technologies, and all patent-holders of such technologies, and secondly, compulsorily licence the patents in re-spect of the identified relevant technologies to the patent pool for fair and uniform consideration. Once the patent pool is established, rules may be issued to govern access to the pooled patents, regulate the manufacturing process and prevent misuse. The Patent Act, 1970 contains provisions to permit compulsory licensing of patents by the Controller of Patents on an application made in this behalf. Section 84(1)(b) read with section 84(4) of the Patents Act, 1970 enables the issue of a com-pulsory licence in respect of a patented invention if it “is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price”.[1]

The establishment of a patent pool will directly promote public interest by advancing and deepening education in India and will also facilitate the realisation of the NMEICT.[2]

Establishing a patent pool for tablet technologies will also stimulate manufacturing in the informa-tion technology and electronics sectors in India. The National Manufacturing Policy, 2011 identifies information technology hardware and electronics and telecommunication equipment as industries of strategic significance that demand special encouragement. The Policy calls for “sector-specific pol-icy interventions” in special focus sectors where India enjoys the benefit of cost competitiveness. It is possible that, if implemented, the patent pool and the Aakash project will become global symbols of India's technological ability. While the farsightedness of the Indian Patent Act and policymakers has resulted in India becoming the “pharmacy of the world”, similar farsightedness may now result in India becoming the “electronics hub of the world”.

Forming such a patent pool for affordable access devices will prove to be a huge opportunity for education, and the credit for that would go to the Indian government and to the MHRD in particular. Further, some of the most important patent pools of the past have only come into existence after government intervention, such as the avionics patent pool proposed by the Secretary of the U.S. Navy during World War I and the radio patent pool, also created as a result of intervention by the U.S. Government. For these and other reasons, we urge you to consider establishing a patent pool for technologies relevant to the manufacture of affordable tablets and other similar devices. We will be happy to meet you, at your convenience, to talk about the legal and other issues involved in such a project.

Thank you.

Yours sincerely,

Sunil Abraham
Executive Director

Copies to:

Dr. Shashi Tharoor, Hon’ble Minister of State for Human Resource Development;
Shri Jitin Prasada, Hon’ble Minister of State for Human Resource Development;
Shri Ashok Thakur, Secretary;
Smt. Amita Sharma, Additional Secretary;
Shri Amit Khare, Joint Secretary.

[1].Compulsory licensing has long been favoured in India to enable public access to essential technologies. The Report on the Revision of the Patent Law, 1959 by a Committee headed by Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar advocated a strong compulsory licensing regime that formed the basis for the unamended Patents Act, 1970. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of India in the matter of Novartis v. Union of India (CA 2706-2716 of 2009) creates a judicially enforceable precedent in respect of enabling affordable access to patented technologies in the public interest.

[2]. In addition, the decision of the Controller of Patents, Mumbai, in NATCO Pharma and Bayer Corporation (CL Application 1 of 2011) that upheld the issue of a compulsory licence in respect of a particular pharmaceutical promotes the principle of affordable access to essential technologies. The issuance of a compulsory licence to establish a patent pool will not violate India's commitments under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organisation.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices

Joining the Dots in India's Big-Ticket Mobile Phone SEP Litigation

Rohini Lakshané and Shweta Mohandas — 2019-07-06T01:42:35Z

Rohini Lakshané and Shweta Mohandas have published their last update to this paper that chronicles mobile device SEP litigation in India. All developments in the lawsuits filed in the Delhi High Court and complaints made to the CCI that were published in reliable sources till 20 September 2018 are mentioned in this paper. The paper was an output under the Pervasive Technologies project.

Abstract

Nearly three years after litigation over patents and designs associated with big-ticket mobile technology started in the US, the first salvo in the patent wars was fired in India. Sweden-based Ericsson, a provider of communications infrastructure and services, sued home-grown budget smartphone manufacturer Micromax in early 2013. Patent litigation in the arena of mobile phone technology has steadily risen since. Lei Jun, the chairman of China's largest smartphone manufacturer Xiaomi once said that facing a patent lawsuit "can be considered a rite of passage for a company that is coming of age". The first part of this paper, "Compilation of lawsuits" is an attempt to chronicle the significant developments in big-ticket lawsuits pertaining to mobile technology patents filed in India. The second part, "Commonalities and differences in the lawsuits" is an attempt to join the dots between the developments that were either remarkably common or notably different. All information presented in this paper has been gathered from publicly available sources and is up-to-date till the time of writing (October 31, 2017). This paper has been published as a part of the Pervasive Technologies project at the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS). Invaluable research assistance was provided by Nayana Dasgupta, Sampada Nayak and Suchisubhra Sarkar (in alphabetical order).

Click to download the paper

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rohini-lakshane-and-shweta-mohandas-june-30-2019-joining-the-dots-in-india-s-big-ticket-mobile-phone-sep-litigation

Interviews with App Developers: [dis]regard towards IPR vs. Patent Hype – Part II

samantha — 2014-08-19T03:51:39Z

The following is a second post within a series reporting on interviews conducted with 10 of Bangalore's mobile app developers and other industry stakeholders. Within this research, CIS attempts to understand how they engage with the law within their practice, particularly with respect to IP. Here we examine how these developers responded to a question on legal protection for their works.

Before one can identify the solution, one must first identify the problem. Yet, in order to understand the problem, we must first understand the individuals involved and the how the problem affects these individuals. We hope that the findings of this preliminary research initiative will provide sufficient groundwork to understand the problems that exist and the different ways of approaching them before determining the most suitable prospective option in changes at the policy level. In this case, the individuals under study are the key contributors to the mobile app space within India; and the problem, being those faced by them as they attempt to navigate an emerging and ambiguous ecosystem.

Previously, we looked at responses that were given across these mobile app developers interviewed which revealed how they orient notions of intellectual property within their practice and own products, specifically. Findings that were made included deductions that the majority of those interviewed developed mobile app products for clients, and in turn assigned ownership of their products to their clients. Just as well, they commonly shared an interest in leaving the services sector to create products of their own, with some of them already having made the transition within their business model.

Question 2: “How is your IP protected?”

Next, we asked how they go about protecting their intellectual property to get a feel of who is protecting their apps and who is not. In asking this question, we hoped to learn how they go about protecting their work via legal means. Across their various responses, we observed many patterns and contradictions which are conveyed here with reference to comments made across interviews. It is important to note, however, that no causal relations intend for be argued for, only suggested correlations.

How they responded

When asked, those interviewed responded with a variance in answers. Some simply stated that their work is not protected, while a few mentioned that they acquired trademark or intend to apply for trademark protection. One interviewee had a patent pending in India and the US, as well. In many of our conversations, developers mentioned that their code for their apps is under open source licenses, and a couple others entailed sharing that the content is under creative commons licenses, “individual licenses,” or joint copyright. Additionally, within one interview, one mentioned the use of encryption tools as a technical means of protection for their work.

“The concept of securing IP is relatively new within the Indian context... it becomes a question of priority between innovation and protection" — Aravind Krishnaswamy, Levitum

Of the developers interviewed, many exhibited some sort of confusion or misunderstanding related to the protection of their works by means of intellectual property rights (IPR). Those interviewed seemed to either express an interest to acquire IPR in the future for their products in the forms of patent or trademark protection, or expressed their appreciation for openness source licensing—or both! Beneath these immediate responses, however, many repeated patterns, as well as contradictions, are revealed. Conversations that followed within these interviewed entailed the opportunity to hear from personal experiences and opinions on different areas within their practice intersecting IPR.

Reasons for IPR protection

If a startup or SME is bootstrapped with very little cash flow to begin with, what would provoke or inspire one to pursue the process of acquiring patent protection then? Aravind Krishnaswamy of startup, Levitum, considers “the concept of securing IP is relatively new within the Indian context.” So if this is the case, why did so many developers interviewed express an interest in IPR?

For those who did express interest in acquiring IPR as protection for their mobile app products, most seemed to express an interest in proving ownership over their work, or preventing problems in the future. One developer's commented on how the mobile app market is a “new and potentially volatile area for software development.” For this reason, it was imperative that he and his team attempted to avoid trouble in the future, and ensure that they going about mobile app development the right and moral way.

Within another interview, developer, John Paul of mobile app SME, Plackal, explains his motives for seeking to acquire patent protection, the application for which is currently pending in India and the US: "For us, applying for a patent is primarily defensive. And if it does get infringed upon, it would give us a good opportunity to generate revenue from it." For the company's trademark, they sought to be able to enforce their ownership over their product's brand: “As a precautionary, we've trademarked the app so that should there be a situation where the app is pirated, we can claim ownership for that app.”

Security not so easily attainable

“To some extent, IPR law is only accessible after moving away from the startup phase."—John Paul, Plackal

However, for the startup especially, such protection does not come without a cost. For this reason, IPR is generally perceived as a gamble or tradeoff. It becomes a “question of priority between innovation and protection,” says Krishnaswamy. He continues in saying that, "I feel like even if it’s a great idea if someone else copies it, that’s some level of validation, but as a small company I’d rather be nimble in terms of how we build it up and get it to a certain point. We're trying to move fast and get something going, and then figure it out.” For Krishnaswamy and his team, securing a patent on an area where they feel they feel they have unique work is on their list of things to do, “It's something for us to revisit in the future.”

Paul explains that he and his team didn't always have IPR within reach: “To some extent, IPR law is only accessible after moving away from the startup phase.” So what discourages startups from acquiring IPR, or simply seeking it out?

Patent attorney and IP consultant, Arjun Bala explains that “there is a lot to figure out. One aspect is filling it out, the other is how you write it so that it is easily granted and gives you the right sort of patent protection you are looking for. It is a very complex process that requires a lot of technical and legal expertise.” But even if one successfully manoeuvres the IPR system, is protection guaranteed?

Business Financial Strategist of Out Sourced CFO & Business Advisory Services, Jayant Tewari, illustrates the lack of security for the SME in the patent system, specifically, in saying, “Since a patent becomes public domain on filing, it can be effectively infringed based on the filing, even before it is granted.” Tewari continues in stressing the irrelevance of patents for SMEs due to the difficulty of enforcement: “the infringement will be adjudicated after 2 years at an immense cost to the SME patent-holder, who will go commercially belly-up due to the infringement. The regime does not protect the SME at all.”

“It is easy to say 'this is the method and no once can copy', but unless the look and feel is the same, it is very hard to demonstrate that you have been infringed on.”
—Samuel Mani, Mani Chengappa & Mathur

Nevermind enforcement...

Not only did our interviews shed light on the difficulty for a startup developer to apply for and be granted protection for their intellectual property, but also for the enforcement of such. Partnering Lawyer, Samuel Mani, of technology-focused law firm, Mani Chengappa & Mathur, speaks to us about the extensive procedure required to prove one's ownership over their IP: “To demonstrate copyright infringement, it requires going into millions of lines of code—unless it is the interface that is copied, which is easily visible.” Mani continues on the enforcement of patent protection by saying, “For a patent, the scope is even wider. It is easy to say 'this is the method and no once can copy', but unless the look and feel is the same, it is very hard to demonstrate that you have been infringed on.”

Planting the initial seed

If there is arguably so much risk associated with applying for IPR protection, as well with enforcement, what specifically gets startups thinking about IPR initially within their practice? What experiences help them formulate their opinions on the matter, and which forms of IPR do they seek out?

Across interviews conducted, one particular observation entailed the tendency for developers to have worked in the past for corporate employers that have dealt with cases of infringement or have acquired IP protection. Almost half of those interviewed shared the fact that they worked for a corporate employer and became better familiar with different notions of intellectual property through that experience. It may not be too farfetched to suggest, then, that for the developer the idea of acquiring IPR protection is one that may be reinforced from previous employers or other successful development companies with IPR of their own.

Cofounder and developer for a medium-sized software development enterprise, Anoop[1] explained that it wasn't until after the success of his enterprise's first application with $1 million in sales, that they started thinking about intellectual property and began to understand the value of it. This newly attained understanding, however, had not been enough to sufficiently equip his team with the knowledge to properly secure protection. For them, going after patent protection turned out to be a pursuit in vain.

Loss of faith in patents for SMEs

Anoop shares his disappointing experience after attempting to secure a patent for one of their mobile apps:

“We burned our fingers with patents. We spent a lot of money for a game we invented about 3 years ago. We had a law firm in the US to help us. We applied for it, and it went through 3-4 revisions, costing us $25-30,000. We finally closed the file when we could not get it due to an existing patent. We were really surprised."

After much disappointment from not being successful in their attempts to acquire patent protection, however, Anoop came out of the experience with a new outlook on patents and their role for SMEs:

“They're meant for large companies as means to bully your competitor. Only big players with the capacity to file for a patent as soon as it takes off benefit. The existing system doesn’t really work for startup companies. In India and anywhere. It’s an expensive process. If you’re a startup who’s just bootstrapping, there’s no guarantee that you will get it. It’s going to take you years.”

Patent hype
Anoop is a prime example of developers in the startup space that fall victim to the promises of the patent system—only to be spat back out having exhausted their time and earnings. Already being aware of the probability for failure, Mani strongly discourages going after patent protection as a means of staying in the race. “With people spending millions on litigation, it is a recipe for disaster, especially considering the inherent delay of the Indian system.” For this reason, Mani stresses the importance of applying for the right protection.

Mani also suggests that the patent debate is driven by self-interest—people who simply make money off of application filing, regardless of whether or not the case succeeds. As a lawyer in the IT space, Mani claims to have turned away several prospective clients looking to patent their products when he insisted that such means of protection was not suitable for their product and interests...which brings us to an additional area of heated debate: the patentability of mobile apps.

Can mobile apps be patented?[2]

One concept that seemed to receive contested responses across interviews is that of the patentability of mobile apps in the first place. When asked if mobile apps could be patented, former lawyer and startup founder, Vivek Durai, of HumblePaper, put it blatantly in responding, “absolutely not.” Others offered explanations of the Indian Patent Law nuances regarding when a mobile app is patentable and when one is not.

While consulting a SME with their own patent application, Bala explains their approach to ensure the mobile app's eligibility for patent protection, while providing some insight into the Indian patent system:

“One approach that we've taken to getting a patent in India is it's not just a pure software, but a software plus a hardware—as in it requires a specific hardware to function. If [the software] makes the hardware perform better, then it has a technical effect... In which case, we have a better chance of getting a patent in India. If your software is agnostic to hardware, however, it is much more difficult to receive a patent in India.”

To patent or not to patent? (or any IPR for that matter)
To Tewari, on the other hand, the question of whether a mobile app can be patented is one entirely irrelevant. The question Tewari introduces into the developer's market strategy is not 'can I patent my app?' but instead, 'should I do so?' In response to which; he would predominantly reply: No.

“How [startup] mobile app developers regard IP laws—or better yet, disregard—is fine for their sake,” argues Tewari. Alternatively, he suggests developers learn how to maneuver the laws, to prevent themselves from arriving at any sticky situations after unknowingly using another's code. To his clients who have mobile apps of their own, he advises to use an open source equivalent of a piece of code if they do not have the rights to it. Doing so will help keep infringement upon others at a minimal and prevent litigation against oneself.

“How [startup] mobile app developers regard IP laws—or better yet, disregard—is fine for their sake."—Jayant Tewari, Out Sourced CFO & Business Advisory Services

Not all developers interviewed, however, aspired to acquiring patent protection. In fact, some strongly opposed software patents, while expressing their appreciation for openness across the developer community. The other side to the IPR-Open Source dichotomy will be examined in the blog post to follow, after which, we will then look at accounts of infringement and threats of litigation across mobile app developers interviewed.

To recap

By looking closely at the individual experiences across mobile app developers interviewed, we hope to begin to map out the mobile app ecosystem and the ways in which industry players engage with each other regarding their IPR. We also hope to begin to shed light on the different attitudes towards the law within one's practice, and how they shape their decisions related to their work. Only after doing so, may we be able to sufficiently assess how India's current IP laws govern this landscape.

Stay tuned for the next in this blog series! We hope that you may benefit from our findings in your own practice as a mobile app industry player or enthusiast, as well.

Notes:
[1] Name changed to protect the interviewee's identity

[2] In conducting interviews, our goal was not to test the legitimacy of responses, but instead, to map them out across various industry stakeholders. For this reason, this blog series will not be able to sufficiently respond to legal question, such as whether or not mobile apps are patentable to begin with. We intend to, however, undergo legal analysis of the Indian IPR system at its intersection with the mobile app space in India at a later stage in this project.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-app-developers-dis-regard-towards-ipr-vs-patent-hype-2013-part-ii

Indian Patent Office updates Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions, yet again

sinha — 2017-07-05T07:42:44Z

By discarding a test brought into force last year, the updated Guidelines take no concrete position to help clarify the ambiguity around patentability of software inventions in India.

The Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks (CGPDTM) issued new Guidelines on Examination of Computer Related Inventions (CRIs) on 30^th June, making it easier to obtain a software patent in India (as compared to standards set in the 2016 Guidelines).

New Changes

The most important change is removal of a test notified in 2016 which made CRIs patent eligible provided there was a novel hardware component in the patent application. Accordingly, references in the guidelines which aided interpretation of the 2016 test have been deleted. Additionally, the new guidelines exclude the layout of integrated circuits as patentable subject matter in CRIs.

The CGPDTM has refrained from prescribing a new test to determine patentability of CRIs.

In the absence of specific guidance, it is likely that examiners will heavily rely on section 3(k) of the Patents Act, 1970, the Manual of Patent Practice and Procedure, and the views expressed by the Joint Parliamentary Committee in respect of "per se":

"In the new proposed clause (k) the words ''per se" have been inserted. This change has been proposed because sometimes the computer programme may include certain other things, ancillary thereto or developed thereon. The intention here is not to reject them for grant of patent if they are inventions. However, the computer programmes as such are not intended to be granted patent. This amendment has been proposed to clarify the purpose."

Policymaking re Guidelines on Examination of CRIs

After years of deliberation, the Indian Patent Office first proposed a test in 2015 which was met with disapproval as it lowered the bar for patentability of CRIs. After a stakeholder consultation, the IPO revised the test in 2016, raising the bar of patent eligibility of CRIs, which was favorable to the growth of small and medium enterprises in the Indian IT industry. The present 2017 guidelines are a result of streamlining stakeholder consultations conducted in response to the 2016 guidelines as per a circular by the IPO.

In the following table, I list the substantive changes made in the new guidelines (in comparison to the 2016 Guidelines) and make some preliminary remarks:

Type of Change

Change

Remarks

Inserted in 2.1, Legal Provisions relating to CRIs and Deleted in 4.1, Novelty

Section 2 (1)(l) defines “new invention” in The Indian Patents Act, 1970 as follows: "New invention" means any invention or technology which has not been anticipated by publication in any document or used in the country or elsewhere in the world before the date of filing of patent application with complete specification, i.e. the subject matter has not fallen in public domain or that it does not form part of the state of the art

Added in 2.2, List of explicit exclusions from patentability under section 3 for CRIs

Section 3(o) topography of integrated circuits

Contemplates layout of integrated circuits as subject matter relating to CRIs

Parts deleted in 4.3, Industrial Applicability

Industry herein is to be understood broadly having any useful and practical activity while excluding intellectual or aesthetic activity. Claims relating to “Method of playing games” and “computer programming languages” are not considered to be industrially applicable. A method for effecting introductions with a view to making friends is not industrially applicable even though it could be carried out by a commercial enterprise. The determination of industrial applicability in case of CRIs is very crucial since applications relating to CRIs may contain only abstract theories, lacking in industrial application.

Only an explanation of industrial applicability in the general context of patent law remains.

Deleted in 4.4, Sufficiency of Disclosure (strikethrough indicates deleted part)

4.4.1 Fully and particularly (What): 1. If the patent application relates to apparatus/system/device i.e hardware based inventions, each and every feature of the invention shall be described with suitable illustrative drawings. If these system/device/apparatus claims are worded in such a way that they merely and only comprise of a memory which stores instructions to execute the previously claimed method and a processor to execute these instructions, then this set of claims claiming a system/device /apparatus may be deemed as conventional and may not fulfil the eligibility criteria of patentability. If, however, the invention relates to ‘method’, the necessary sequence of steps should clearly be described so as to distinguish the invention from the prior art with the help of the flowcharts and other information required to perform the invention together with their modes/means of implementation. […]

Loosened the disclosure requirement

Deleted in 4.4, Sufficiency of Disclosure (strikethrough indicates deleted part)

4.4.4 Form and substance: […] Even when the issue is related to hardware/software relation, ~~(e.g., when the claims recite ‘processor is programmed to… or ‘apparatus comprising a processor and configured / programmed to…..)~~ the expression of the functionality as a ‘method’, is judged on its substance. It is well established that, in patentability cases, the focus should be on the underlying substance of the invention, not the particular form in which it is claimed. The Patents Act clearly excludes computer programmes per se and the exclusion should not be allowed to be avoided merely by camouflaging the substance of the claim by wording ~~(e.g. different subroutines are performed in different physical locations such as processors will not suffice).~~

Removed illustrations

Replaced in 4.4, Sufficiency of Disclosure (strikethrough indicates deleted part)

4.4.5 Means Plus Function:

Further, if the specification supports ~~implementation~~ of the invention solely by the computer program then in that case means plus function claims shall be rejected as these means are nothing but computer programme per se.

Where no structural features of those means are disclosed in the specification and specification supports ~~implementation~~ of the invention solely by the software then in that case means in the “means plus function” claims are nothing but software.

Replaced both struck out words by performing the invention

Added in 4.5, Determination of excluded subject matter relating to CRIs

[…] Hence, along with determining the merit of invention as envisaged under Sections 2(1) (j), (ja) and (ac), the examiner should also determine whether or not they are patentable inventions under Section 3 of the Act.

Parts deleted in 4.5.1. Claims directed as “Mathematical Method”:

[…] Some examples which will attract exclusion: acts of mental skill. e.g. A method of calculation, formulation of equations, finding square roots, cube roots and all other methods directly involving mathematical methods like solving advanced equations of mathematics. merely manipulates abstract idea or solves a purely mathematical problem without specifying a practical application.

Added in in 4.5.1. Claims directed as “Mathematical Method” (emphasis supplied)

4.5.1. Claims directed as “Mathematical Method”: Mathematical methods are a particular example of the principle that purely abstract or intellectual methods are not patentable. Mathematical methods like method of calculation, formulation of equations, finding square roots, cube roots and all other similar acts of mental skill are therefore, not patentable. Similarly mere manipulations of abstract idea or solving purely mathematical problem/equations without specifying a practical application also attract the exclusion under this category. However, mere presence of a mathematical formula in a claim, to clearly specify the scope of protection being sought in an invention, may not necessarily render it to be a “mathematical method” claim. Also, such exclusions may not apply to inventions that include mathematical formulae and resulting in systems for encoding, reducing noise in communications/ electrical/electronic systems or encrypting/ decrypting electronic communications.

Illustrations added to show that CRIs that include mathematical formulae and result in systems for encoding, reducing noise in communications/ electrical/electronic systems or encrypting/ decrypting electronic communications, will not be ineligible merely by virtue of presence of mathematical formulae. They will not necessarily construe a claim on mathematical method.

Part deleted in 4.5.4, Claims directed as “Computer Programme per se”

The computer programme per se is excluded from patentability under section 3(k) apart from mathematical or business method and algorithm

Inserted in 4.5, Determination of excluded subject matter relating to CRIs (emphasis supplied)

4.5.8. Topography of integrated circuits The above criterion is to be judged as per the procedures as laid out in chapter 08.03.05.14 of the Manual

Contemplates layout of integrated circuits as subject matter relating to CRIs

Parts deleted in 5, Tests/Indicators to determine Patentability of CRIs

5. Tests/Indicators to determine Patentability of CRIs: Examiners may rely on the following three stage test in examining CRI applications: (1) Properly construe the claim and identify the actual contribution; (2) If the contribution lies only in mathematical method, business method or algorithm, deny the claim; (3) If the contribution lies in the field of computer programme, check whether it is claimed in conjunction with a novel hardware and proceed to other steps to determine patentability with respect to the invention. The computer programme in itself is never patentable. If the contribution lies solely in the computer programme, deny the claim. If the contribution lies in both the computer programme as well as hardware, proceed to other steps of patentability.

Implication is that this test is no longer in force for examination of patentability of CRIs

Deleted 6, Illustrative examples of Claims which are not patentable

Refer to 2016 Guidelines

Note: This post has been updated to reflect the change in point 4.4.5, which was previously missed by the author.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/indian-patent-office-issues-updated-guidelines-for-computer-related-inventions-yet-again