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Where Does ICANN’s Money Come From? We Asked; They Don’t Know
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know
<b>Just how transparent is ICANN? How responsive are they to requests for information? At CIS, we sent ICANN ten questions seeking information about, inter alia, their revenues, commitment to the NETmundial Principles, Globalisation Advisory Groups and organisational structure. Geetha Hariharan wonders at ICANN's reluctance to respond. </b>
<p> </p>
<h3>Why Is ICANN Here?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (<a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann.org">ICANN</a>) is responsible for critical backbones of the Internet. It manages the root server system, the global allocation of IP addresses, protocol registries and the domain name system (management of gTLDs, ccTLDs, as well as the newly rolled-out “new gTLDs”).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN was incorporated in California in 1998, and was intended as the technical coordination body for the backbone of the Internet. That is, it was to administer the Internet’s domain names and IP addresses, and also manage the Internet root servers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As a result of <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/iana-functions-purchase-order">an agreement</a> with the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) in the US Department of Commerce, ICANN is the IANA functions operator. It carries out the <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-factsheet-24mar14-en.pdf">IANA functions</a>, which include making changes to the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_root_zone">root zone file</a> (the backbone of the domain name system), allocation of IP address blocks to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), and maintaining protocol parameter registries in collaboration with the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). The RIRs are responsible for allocating IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6) to national and local Internet registries. The IETF develops Internet standards and protocols, such as those within <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_protocol_suite">the TCP/IP suite</a>. To be clear, ICANN does not make policy for the IP address or Internet standards/protocols; those are the domains of RIRs and the IETF, respectively.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN, Domain Names and All That Buried Treasure</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN is the <i>de facto</i> policy-making body for domain names. Through ICANN’s community Supporting Organisations and Advisory Committees (SOACs) – largely a multi-stakeholder community – ICANN determines policies for dispute resolution (see, for instance, <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/help/dndr/udrp-en">the UDRP</a> for domain name disputes), maintaining the <a href="http://whois.icann.org/">WHOIS database</a>, etc. for domain names.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Under its contracts with Top Level Domain (TLD) Registries, ICANN receives payment for all registrations and/or renewals of domain names. For instance, under <a href="https://www.icann.org/sites/default/files/tlds/bharti/bharti-agmt-pdf-09jan14-en.pdf">the <strong>.bharti </strong>Registry Agreement</a>, ICANN receives a fixed annual registry free of US $6250. If there are more than 50,000 registrations or renewals of domain names under a TLD (say, <strong>.bharti</strong>) in a quarter, then ICANN also receives an amount equal to (No. of registrations or renewals <span>X</span> US $0.25). <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/registries/registries-en">TLD Registries</a> “own” TLDs like <strong>.com</strong>, and they maintain a list of all the domain names registered under that TLD. There are around <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/registries/registries-agreements-en">816 such Registry Agreements</a>, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $47 million in Registry fees [<i>see </i><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun14-en.pdf">page 7</a>].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Similar agreements exist between ICANN and domain name Registrars accredited by it, too. Domain name Registrars are entities like <a href="https://in.godaddy.com/">Go Daddy</a> and <a href="http://www.bigrock.in/">Big Rock</a>, from whom people like you and me (or companies) can register domain names. Only Registrars accredited by ICANN can register domain names that will be included in the ICANN DNS, the most frequently used DNS on the Web. Each Registrar pays a <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/approved-with-specs-2013-09-17-en#raa">yearly accreditation fee</a> of US $4000 to ICANN (see <span>Clause 3.9</span>). Each Registrar also <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/financials-55-2012-02-25-en">pays to ICANN</a> fees for every domain name registration or renewal. There are <a href="https://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accredited-list.html">over 500 ICANN-accredited Registrars</a>, and in FY14, ICANN received over US $34.5 million in Registrar fees [<i>see </i><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun14-en.pdf">page 7</a>].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Now, apart from this, in its IANA operator role, ICANN is responsible for the global allocation of IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6). From the global pool of IP addresses, ICANN allocates to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which then allocate to National Internet Registries like the National Internet Exchange of India (<a href="http://www.nixi.in/en/contact-us/103-irinn">NIXI as IRINN</a>), local Internet registries or ISPs. For this, ICANN receives a combined contribution of US $823,000 each year as revenue from RIRs [<i>see, ex.</i>:<i> </i><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun09-en.pdf">FY09 Financial Statements, page 3</a>].</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>And this isn’t all of it! With its </span><a href="http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/">new gTLD program</a><span>, ICANN is sitting on a large treasure trove. Each gTLD application cost US $185,000, and there were 1930 applications in the first round (that’s US $357 million). Where there arose disagreements as to the same or similar strings, ICANN initiated an auction process. Some new gTLDs were auctioned for </span><a href="http://www.circleid.com/posts/20141129_icann_new_gtld_auction_proceeds_approaching_30_million/">as high as US $6 million</a><span>.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So ICANN is sitting on a great deal of treasure (US $355 million in revenues in FY14 and growing). It accumulates revenue from a variety of quarters; the sources identified above are by no means the only revenue-sources. But ICANN is unaware of, or unwilling to disclose, all its sources of revenue.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's Troubling Scope-creep and Does Transparency Matter?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At CIS, we are concerned by ICANN’s unchecked influence and growing role in the Internet governance institutional space. For instance, under its CEO Fadi Chehade, ICANN was heavily involved backstage for NETmundial, and has set aside over US $200,000 for Mr. Chehade’s brainchild, the NETmundial Initiative. Coupled with its lack of transparency and vocal interests in furthering <i>status quo </i>(for instance, both the names and numbers communities’ proposals for IANA transition want ICANN to remain the IANA functions operator, without stringent safeguards), this makes for a dangerous combination.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The clearest indication lies in the money, one might say. <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions">As we have written before</a>, ICANN budgets for less than US $10 million for providing core Internet functions out of a US $160 million strong budget (<a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/adopted-opplan-budget-fy15-01dec14-en.pdf">Budget FY15, page 17</a>). It has budgeted, in comparison, US $13 million for travel and meetings alone, and spent over US $18 million on travel in FY14 (<a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/adopted-opplan-budget-fy15-01dec14-en.pdf">Budget FY15, page 11</a>).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To its credit, ICANN <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/financials-en">makes public</a> its financial statements (current and historic), and community discussions are generally open. However, given the understandably complex contractual arrangements that give ICANN its revenues, even ploughing through the financials does not give one a clear picture of where ICANN’s money comes from.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So one is left with questions such as the following: Which entities (and how many of them) pay ICANN for domain names? What are the vendor payments received by ICANN and who pays? Who all have paid ICANN under the new gTLD program, and for what purposes? Apart from application fees and auctions, what other heads of payment exist? How much does each RIR pay ICANN and what for, if <a href="https://www.arin.net/policy/nrpm.html#six41">IP addresses are not property to be sold</a>? For how many persons (and whom all) does ICANN provide pay for, to travel to meetings and other events?<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">You may well ask why these questions matter, and whether we need greater transparency. <span>To put it baldly: ICANN’s transparency is crucial. ICANN is today something of a monopoly; it manages the IANA functions, makes policy for domain names and is increasingly active in Internet governance. It is without greater (effective) accountability than a mere review by the NTIA, and some teething internal mechanisms like the </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">Documentary Information Disclosure Policy</a><span> (DIDP), </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/accountability/ombudsman-en">Ombudsman</a><span>, </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reconsideration-and-independent-review-icann-bylaws-article-iv-accountability-and-review">Reconsideration and Independent Review</a><span> and the </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-recommendations-31dec13-en.pdf">Accountability and Transparency Review</a><span> (ATRT). I could elaborate on why these mechanisms are inadequate, but this post is already too long. Suffice it to say that by carefully defining these mechanisms and setting out their scope, ICANN has stifled their effectiveness. For instance, a Reconsideration Request can be filed if one is aggrieved by an action of ICANN’s Board or staff. Under ICANN’s By-laws (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#IV">Article IV, Section 2</a><span>), it is the Board Governance Committee, comprising ICANN Board members, that adjudicates Reconsideration Requests. This simply violates the principles of natural justice, wherein one may not be a judge in one’s own cause (</span><i>nemo debet esse judex in propria causa</i><span>).</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Moreover, ICANN serves corporate interests, for it exists on account of contractual arrangements with Registries, Registrars, the NTIA and other sundry entities. ICANN has also troublingly reached into Internet governance domains to which it was previously closed, such as the NETmundial Initiative, the NETmundial, the IGF and its Support Association. It is unclear that ICANN was ever intended to overreach so, a point admitted by Mr. Chehade himself at the <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cio31nsqK_A">ICANN Open Forum</a> in Istanbul (IGF 2014).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Finally, despite its professed adherence to multi-stakeholderism, there is evidence that ICANN’s policy-making and functioning revolve around small, cohesive groups with multiple professional inter-linkages with other I-Star organisations. For instance, a <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door">revolving door study</a> by CIS of the IANA Coordination Group (ICG) found that 20 out of 30 ICG members had close and longterm ties with I-Star organisations. This surely creates concern as to the impartiality and fairness of the ICG’s decision-making. It may, for instance, make a pro-ICANN outcome inevitable – and that is definitely a serious worry.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But ICANN is <i>intended </i>to serve the public interest, to ensure smooth, stable and resilient running of the Internet. Transparency is crucial to this, and especially so during the IANA transition phase. <a href="http://singapore52.icann.org/en/schedule/sun-iana-stewardship-accountability">As advisor Jan Scholte asked at ICANN52</a>, what accountability will ICANN exercise after the transition, and to whom will it be accountable? What, indeed, does accountability mean? The CCWG-Accountability is <a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/564269949237985280">still asking that question</a>. But meanwhile, one among our cohorts at CIS <a href="http://openup2014.org/privacy-vs-transparency-attempt-resolving-dichotomy/">has advocated</a> transparency as a check-and-balance for power.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The DIDP process at ICANN may prove useful in the long run, but does it suffice as a transparency mechanism?</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's Responses to CIS' DIDP Requests</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Over December ’14 and January ’15, CIS sent 10 DIDP requests to ICANN. Our aim was to test and encourage transparency from ICANN, a process crucial given the CCWG-Accountability’s deliberations on ways to enhance ICANN’s accountability. We have received responses for 9 of our requests. <b>We summarise ICANN’s responses in a table: <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file">please go here</a></b>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A glance at the table above will show that ICANN’s responses are largely negative. In 7 requests out of 9, ICANN provides very little new information. Though the responses are detailed, the majority of information they provide is already identified in CIS’ requests. For instance, in the response to the <b><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/20141228-1-netmundial-2015-01-28-en">NETmundial Request</a></b>, ICANN links us to blogposts written by CEO Fadi Chehade, where he notes the importance of translating the NETmundial Principles into action. They also link us to the Final Report of the Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and Governance Mechanism, and ICANN’s involvement in the NETmundial Initiative.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, to the query on ICANN’s own measures of implementing the NETmundial Principles – principles that it has lauded and upheld for the entire Internet governance community – ICANN’s response is surprisingly evasive. Defending lack of action, they note that “ICANN is not the home for implementation of the NETmundial Principles”. But ICANN also responds that they <i>already implement</i> the NETmundial Principles: “Many of the NETmundial Principles are high-level statements that <i>permeate through the work of any entity </i>– particularly a multistakeholder entity like ICANN – that is interested in the upholding of the inclusive, multistakeholder process within the Internet governance framework” (emphasis provided). One wonders, then, at the insistence on creating documents involving such high-level principles; why create them if they’re already implemented?<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Responses to other requests indicate that the DIDP is, in its current form, unable to provide the transparency necessary for ICANN’s functioning. For instance, in the response to the <b><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/20141228-1-ombudsman-2015-01-28-en">Ombudsman Request</a></b>, ICANN cites confidentiality as a reason to decline providing information. Making Ombudsman Requests public would violate ICANN Bylaws, and topple the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These are, perhaps, valid reasons to decline a DIDP request. But it is also important to investigate these reasons. ICANN’s Ombudsman is appointed by the ICANN Board for 2 year terms, under <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#V">Clause V of ICANN’s Bylaws</a>. The Ombudsman’s principal function is to “provide an independent internal evaluation of complaints by members of the ICANN community who believe that the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body has treated them unfairly”. The Ombudsman reports only to the ICANN Board, and all matters before it are kept confidential, including the names of parties and the nature of complaints. The Ombudsman reports on the categories of complaints he receives, and statistics regarding decisions in his <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reports-96-2012-02-25-en">Annual Reports</a>; no details are forthcoming for stated reasons of confidentiality and privacy.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This creates a closed circle in which the Ombudsman operates. The ICANN Board appoints the Ombudsman. He/she listens to complaints about unfair treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituency. He/she reports to the ICANN Board alone. However, neither the names of parties, the nature of complaints, nor the decisions of the Ombudsman are publicly available. Such a lack of transparency throws doubt on the functioning of the Ombudsman himself – and on his independence, neutrality and the extent of ICANN’s influence on him/her. An amendment of ICANN’s Bylaws would then be imperative to rectify this problem; this matter is squarely within the CCWG-Accountability’s mandate and should be addressed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As is clear from the above examples, ICANN’s DIDP is an inadequate tool to ensure transparency functioning. The Policy was crafted without community input, and requires substantial amendments to make it a sufficient transparency mechanism. CIS’ suggestions in this regard shall be available in our next post.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>CIS' Annual Reports are <a href="http://cis-india.org/about/reports">here</a>. Our audit is ongoing, and the Annual Report for 2013-14 will be up shortly. <i>Pranav Bidare (<i style="text-align: justify; ">3rd year)</i> of the National Law School, Bangalore assisted with research for this post, and created the table of CIS' DIDP requests and responses.</i></i></p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaAccountabilityICANNIANA TransitionTransparencyDIDP2015-03-05T07:43:45ZBlog EntryUnderstanding IANA Stewardship Transition
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/understanding-iana-transition
<b>Smarika Kumar describes the process of the IANA stewardship transition, and enumerates what the NTIA announcement does and does not do. </b>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA Announcement and ICANN-convened Processes:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On 14 March 2014, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) of the US Government <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">announced</a> “<i>its intent to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community</i>”. These key Internet domain name functions refer to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions. For this purpose, the NTIA <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">asked</a> the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to “<i>convene global stakeholders to develop a proposal to transition the current role played by NTIA in the coordination of the Internet’s domain name system (DNS)</i>”. This was welcome news for the global Internet community, which has been criticising unilateral US Government oversight of Critical Internet Resources for many years now. NTIA further announced that IANA transition proposal must have broad community support and should address the following four principles:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;</li>
<li>Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;</li>
<li>Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and</li>
<li>Maintain the openness of the Internet.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Subsequently, during ICANN49 in Singapore (March 23-27, 2014), ICANN held flurried discussions to gather initial community feedback from participants to come up with a Draft Proposal of the Principles, Mechanisms and Process to Develop a Proposal to Transition NTIA’s Stewardship of the IANA Functions on 8 April 2014, which was open to public comments until 8 May 2014, which was further extended to 31 May 2014. Responses by various stakeholders were collected in this very short period and some of them were incorporated into a Revised Proposal issued by ICANN on 6th June 2014. ICANN also unilaterally issued a Scoping Document defining the scope of the process for developing the proposal and also specifying what was not part of the scope. This Scoping Document came under severe criticism by various commentators, but was not amended.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN <a href="https://www.icann.org/public-comments/enhancing-accountability-2014-05-06-en">also initiated</a> a separate but parallel process to discuss enhancement of its accountability on 6 May 2014. This was launched upon widespread distress over the fact that ICANN had excluded its role as operator of IANA functions from the Scoping Document, as well as over questions of accountability raised by the community at ICANN49 in Singapore. In the absence of ICANN’s contractual relationship with NTIA to operate the IANA functions, it remains unclear how ICANN will stay accountable upon the transition. The accountability process looks to address the same through the ICANN community. The issue of ICANN accountability is then envisioned to be coordination within ICANN itself through an ICANN Accountability Working Group comprised of community members and a few subject matter experts.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">What are the IANA Functions?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, or IANA functions consist of <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-transition-scoping-08apr14-en.pdf">three separate tasks</a>:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Maintaining a central repository for protocol name and number registries used in many Internet protocols.</li>
<li>Co-ordinating the allocation of Internet Protocol (IP) and Autonomous System (AS) numbers to the Regional Internet Registries, who then distribute IP and AS numbers to ISPs and others within their geographic regions.</li>
<li>Processing root zone change requests for Top Level Domains (TLDs) and making the Root Zone WHOIS database consisting of publicly available information for all TLD registry operators.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The first two of the abovementioned functions are operated by ICANN in consonance with policy developed at the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and Address Supporting Organisation (ASO) respectively, both of which exist under the ICANN umbrella.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The performance of last of these functions is distributed between ICANN and Verisign. NTIA has a Cooperative Agreement with Verisign to perform the related root zone management functions. The related root zone management functions are the management of the root zone “zone signing key” (ZSK), as well as implementation of changes to and distribution of the DNS authoritative root zone file, which is the authoritative registry containing the lists of names and addresses for all top level domains.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Currently, the US Government oversees this entire set of operations by contracting with ICANN as well as Verisign to execute the IANA functions. Though the US Government does not interfere generally in operations of either ICANN or Verisign in their role as operators of IANA functions, it cannot be denied that it exercises oversight on both the operators of IANA functions, through these contracts.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Import of the NTIA Announcement:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The NTIA announcement of 14th March intends to initiate the withdrawal of such oversight of IANA functions by the NTIA in order to move towards global multistakeholder governance. NTIA has asked ICANN to initiate a process to decide upon what such global multistakeholder governance of IANA functions may look like. The following diagram presents the current governance structure of IANA functions and the areas that the NTIA announcement seeks to change:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/Untitled.png/@@images/160cccd1-af49-43fe-aeb2-a60153b6a07c.png" alt="NTIA Announcement" class="image-inline" title="NTIA Announcement" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The IANA Oversight Mechanism (<a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-transition-scoping-08apr14-en.pdf">Source</a>)</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">What does the NTIA Announcement NOT DO?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The NTIA announcement DOES NOT frame a model for governance of IANA functions once it withdraws its oversight role. NTIA has asked ICANN to convene a process, which would figure the details of IANA transition and propose an administrative structure for IANA functions once the NTIA withdraws its oversight role. But what this new administrative structure would look like has not itself been addressed in the NTIA announcement. As per the NTIA announcement, the new administrative structure is yet to be decided by a global multistakeholder community in accordance with the four principles outlined by the NTIA through a process, which ICANN shall convene.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The NTIA announcement DOES NOT limit discussions and participation in IANA transition process to within the ICANN community. NTIA has asked ICANN to convene “global stakeholders to develop a proposal to transition” IANA functions. This means all global stakeholders participation, including that of Governments and Civil Society is sought for the IANA transition process. ICANN has been asked “to work collaboratively with the directly affected parties, including the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), the Internet Society (ISOC), the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), top level domain name operators, VeriSign, and other interested global stakeholders”, in the NTIA announcement. This however does not signify that discussions and participation in development of proposal for IANA transition needs to be limited to the ICANN community or the technical community. In fact, ICANN has itself said that the list of events provided as “Timeline of Events” in <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/draft-proposal-2014-04-08-en">its Draft Proposal</a> of 8 April 2014 for engagement in development of a proposal for IANA transition is <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-06-06-en">non-exhaustive</a>. This means proposal for IANA transition can be developed by different stakeholders, including governments and civil society in different fora appropriate to their working, including at the IGF and WSIS+10.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The NTIA announcement DOES NOT mean devolution of IANA functions administration upon ICANN. NTIA chooses ICANN and Verisign to operate the IANA functions. If NTIA withdraws from its role, the question whether ICANN or Verisign should operate the IANA functions at all becomes an open one, and should be subject to deliberation. By merely asking ICANN to convene the process, the NTIA announcement in no way assigns any administration of IANA functions to ICANN. It must be remembered that the NTIA announcement says that key Internet domain name functions shall transition to the global multistakeholder community, and not the ICANN community.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The NTIA announcement DOES NOT prevent the possibility of removal of ICANN from its role as operator of IANA functions. While ICANN has tried to frame the Scoping Document in a language to prevent any discussions on its role as operator of IANA functions, the question whether ICANN should continue in its operator role remains an open one. There are at least 12 submissions made in response to ICANN’s Draft Proposal by varied stakeholders, which in fact, call for the separation of ICANN’s role as policy maker (through IETF, ASO, gNSO, ccNSO), and ICANN’s role as the operator of IANA functions. Such calls for separation come from private sector, civil society, as well as the technical community, among others. Such separation was also <a href="http://netmundial.org/netmundial-multistakeholder-statement/">endorsed</a> in the final NETmundial outcome document (paragraph 27). Governments have, in general, expressed no opinion on such separation in response to ICANN’s Draft Proposal. It is however urged that governments express their opinion in favour of such separation to prevent consolidation of both policy making and implementation within ICANN, which would lead to increased potential situations for the ICANN Board to abuse its powers.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><i>Smarika Kumar is a graduate of the National Law Institute University, Bhopal, and a member of the Alternative Law Forum, a collective of lawyers aiming to <span> integrate alternative lawyering with critical research, alternative dispute resolution, pedagogic interventions and sustained legal interventions in social issues</span>. Her <span>areas of interest include interdisciplinary research on the Internet, issues affecting indigenous peoples, eminent domain, traditional knowledge and pedagogy. </span></i></span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/understanding-iana-transition'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/understanding-iana-transition</a>
</p>
No publisherSmarika KumarNTIA AnnouncementICANNIANA TransitionInternet Governance2014-06-22T03:23:37ZBlog EntryThe 'Global Multistakholder Community' is Neither Global Nor Multistakeholder
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder
<b>CIS research shows how Western, male, and industry-driven the IANA transition process actually is.</b>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In March 2014, the <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">US government announced that they were going to end the contract they have with ICANN</a> to run something called the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), and hand over control to the “global multistakeholder community”. They insisted that the plan for transition had to come through a multistakeholder process and have stakeholders “across the global Internet community”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Analysis of the process since then shows how flawed the “global multistakeholder community” that converges at ICANN has not actually represented the disparate interests and concerns of different stakeholders. CIS research has found that the discussions around IANA transition have not been driven by the “global multistakeholder community”, but mostly by males from industry in North America and Western Europe.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">CIS analysed the five main mailing lists where the IANA transition plan was formulated: ICANN’s <a href="http://mm.ianacg.org/pipermail/icg-forum_ianacg.org/">ICG</a> <a href="https://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/">Stewardship</a> and <a href="https://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/">CCWG Accountability</a> lists; IETF’s <a href="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/ianaplan/">IANAPLAN</a> list; and the NRO’s <a href="https://www.nro.net/pipermail/ianaxfer/">IANAXFER</a> list and <a href="https://www.nro.net/pipermail/crisp/">CRISP</a> lists. What we found was quite disheartening.</p>
<ul>
<li>A total of <em>239 individuals</em> participated cumulatively, across all five lists.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><em>Only 98 substantively contributed to the final shape of the ICG proposal</em>, if one takes a count of 20 mails (admittedly, an arbitrary cut-off) as a substantive contribution, with 12 of these 98 being ICANN staff some of whom were largely performing an administrative function.</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We decided to look at the diversity within these substantive contributors using gender, stakeholder grouping, and region. We relied on public records, including <a href="https://community.icann.org/display/gnsosoi/">GNSO SOI statements</a>, and extensive searches on the Web. Given that, there may be inadvertent errors, but the findings are so stark that even a few errors wouldn’t affect them much.</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>2 in 5</strong> (39 of 98, or 40%) were from a single country: the <strong>United States of America</strong>.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>4 in 5</strong> (77 of 98) were from countries which are part of the WEOG UN grouping (which includes <em>Western Europe, US, Canada, Israel, Australia, and New Zealand</em>), which only has developed countries.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>None</strong> were from the EEC (Eastern European and Russia) group, and only <strong>5 of 98</strong> from all of GRULAC (Latin American and Caribbean Group).</li>
<li><strong>4 in 5</strong> (77 of 98) were <em>male</em> and 21 were female.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>4 in 5</strong> (76 of 98) were from industry or the technical community, and only 4 (or 1 in 25) were identifiable as primarily speaking on behalf of governments.</li></ul>
<p>This shows also that the process has utterly failed in achieving the recommendation of Paragraph 6 of the <a href="http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf>NETMundial outcome document</a>, which states:
<blockquote>
<p>In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement of US Government with regard to its intent to transition the stewardship of IANA functions, the discussion about mechanisms for guaranteeing the transparency and accountability of those functions after the US Government role ends, has to take place through an open process with the participation of all stakeholders <b>extending beyond the ICANN community</b>.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Beyond the IANA transition, one notes that even the communities within ICANN are not very diverse. For instance:</p>
<ul>
<li style="><strong>3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of America</strong> (624 out of 1010, as of March 2014, according to ICANN's </a><a href="https://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accreditation-qualified-list.html">accredited registrars list</a>), with only 0.6% being from the 54 countries in Africa (7 out of 1010).</p>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>45% of all the registries are from the United States of America</strong>! (307 out of 672 registries listed in <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/listing-2012-02-25-en">ICANN’s registry directory</a> in August 2015.)</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>66% (34 of 51) of <a href="http://www.bizconst.org/members/">the Business Constituency</a> at ICANN are from a single country: the United States of America</strong>. (N.B.: This page doesn’t seem to be up-to-date.)</li>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This shows that businesses from the United States of America continues to dominate ICANN to a very significant degree, and this is also reflected in the nature of the dialogue within ICANN, including the fact that the proposal that came out of the ICANN ‘global multistakeholder community’ on IANA transition proposes a clause that requires the ‘IANA Functions Operator’ to be a US-based entity. For more on that issue, see this post on the jurisdiction issue at ICANN (or rather, on the lack of a jurisdiction issue at ICANN).</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshMulti-stakeholderICANNIANA TransitionInternet Governance2016-11-03T10:42:53ZBlog EntrySubmission by the Centre for Internet and Society on Revisions to ICANN Expected Standards of Behavior
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/submission-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-revisions-to-icann-expected-standards-of-behavior
<b>Prepared by Vidushi Marda, with inputs from Dr. Nirmita Narasimhan and Sunil Abraham.</b>
<p> </p>
<p>We at the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) are grateful for the opportunity to comment on the proposed revisions to ICANN’s Expected Standards of Behavior (“Standards”).</p>
<p>Before providing specific comments on the proposed revisions, CIS would like to state for the record our extreme disappointment while noting that there is no indication of the intention to draft and adopt a dedicated anti - harassment policy. We are of the firm opinion that harassment, and particularly sexual harassment, is not only a sensitive topic, but also a deeply complex one. Such a policy should consider scope, procedural questions, redressal and remedies in cases of harassment in general and sexual harassment in particular. A mere change in language to these Standards, however well intentioned, cannot go too far in preventing and dealing with cases of harassment in the absence of a framework within which such instances can be addressed.</p>
<p>Some of the issues that arose at ICANN55 were confusion surrounding the powers and limits of the Ombudsman’s office in dealing with cases of harassment, the exact procedure to be followed for redressal surrounding such incidents, and the appropriate conduct of parties to the matter. There will be no clarity in these respects, even if these proposed changes are to be adopted.</p>
<p>Specifically, the proposed language is problematic and completely inadequate for the following reasons:</p>
<ol><li>
<p><strong>Vague</strong></p>
<p>Terms like “professional conduct” and “appropriate behavior” mean little in the absence of a definition that entails such conduct. These terms could mean vastly different things to each community member and such language will only encourage a misalignment of expectation of conduct between community members. The “general” definition of harassment is at best, an ineffective placeholder, as it does not encompass exactly what kind of behavior would fall under its definition.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Fails to consider important scenarios</strong></p>
<p>The proposed language fails to consider situations where some attempts or advances at communication, sexual or otherwise, occur. For example, consider a situation in which one community member stalks another online, and catalogues his/her every move. This is most certainly foreseeable, but will not be adequately covered by the proposed language. Further, terms like “speech or behavior that is sexually aggressive or intimidates” could or could not include types of speech such as art, music, photography etc, depending on who you ask. It also does not explain the use of the word behavior - physical, emotional, professional, online behavior are all possible, but the scope of this term would depend on the interpretation one chooses to apply. In part 4 below, we will demonstrate how ICANN has applied a far more detailed framework for harassment elsewhere.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Ignores complexity</strong></p>
<p>In discussions surrounding the incident at ICANN55, a number of issues of arose. These included, inter alia, the definition of harassment and sexual harassment, what constituted such conduct, the procedure to be followed in such cases, the appropriate forum to deal with such incidents and the conduct that both parties are expected to maintain. These questions cannot, and have not been answered or addressed in the proposed change to the Standards. CIS emphasizes the need to understand this issue as one that must imbibe differences in culture, expectation, power dynamics, and options for redressal. If ICANN is to truly be a safe space, such issues must be substantively and procedurally fair for both the accused and the victim. This proposed definition is woefully inadequate in this regard.</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Superficial understanding of harassment, sexual harassment</strong></p>
<p>The proposed changes do not define harassment, and sexual harassment in an adequate fashion. The change currently reads, “Generally, harassment is considered unwelcome hostile or intimidating behavior -- in particular, speech or behavior that is sexually aggressive or intimidates based on attributes such as race, gender, ethnicity, religion, age, color, national origin, ancestry, disability or medical condition, sexual orientation, or gender identity.” These are subject to broad interpretation, and we have already highlighted the issues that may arise due to this in 1, above. Here, we would like to point to a far more comprehensive definition.</p>
</li></ol>
<p>ICANN’s own Employment Policy includes within the scope of sexual harassment “verbal, physical and visual conduct that creates an intimidating, offensive or hostile working environment, or interferes with work performance.” The policy also states:</p>
<blockquote>Harassing conduct can take many forms and includes, but is not limited to, the following:<br />
<ol><li>Slurs, jokes, epithets, derogatory comments, statements or gestures;</li>
<li>Assault, impeding or blocking another’s movement or otherwise physically interfering with normal work;</li>
<li>Pictures, posters, drawings or cartoons based upon the characteristics mentioned in the first paragraph of this policy.</li></ol>
Sexually harassing conduct includes all of the above prohibited actions, as well as other unwelcome conduct, such as requests for sexual favors, conversation containing sexual comments, and unwelcome sexual advances.”</blockquote>
<p>This definition is not perfect, it does not comprehensively consider advances or attempts at communication, sexual or otherwise, which are unwelcome by the target. Nonetheless, CIS believes that this is a far more appropriate definition that does not include vague metrics that the proposed changes do. Since it is one ICANN has already adopted, it can act as an important stepping stone towards a comprehensive framework.</p>
<p>Like ICANN, UNESCO’s organisational approach has been to adopt a comprehensive <a href="http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/UN_system_policies/(UNESCO)Anti-harassment_Policy.pdf">Anti-Harassment Policy</a> which lays down details of definition, prevention, complaint procedure, investigations, sanctions, managerial responsibility, etc. Acknowledging the cultural sensitivity of harassment particularly in international situations, the policy also recognizes advances or attempts at communication, sexual or otherwise. Most importantly, it states that for conduct to come within the definition of sexual harassment, it “must be unwelcome, i.e. unsolicited and regarded as offensive or undesirable by the victim.”</p>
<h3>Conclusion</h3>
<p>In conclusion, we would like to reiterate the importance of adopting and drafting a dedicated anti-harassment policy and framework. The benefits of safety, certainty and formal redressal mechanisms in cases of harassment cannot be over emphasized.</p>
<p>Importantly, such measures have already been taken elsewhere. The IETF has adopted an <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7776">instrument</a> to address issues of harassment that occur at meetings, mailing lists and social events. This instrument contemplates in detail, problematic behavior, unacceptable conduct, the scope of the term harassment, etc. It further envisages a framework for redressal of complaints, remediation, and even contemplates issues that may arise with such remediation. It is particularly important to note that while it provides a definition of harassment, it also states that "[a]ny definition of harassment prohibited by an applicable law can be subject to this set of procedures, recognising harassment as a deeply personal and subjective experience, and thus encouraging members to take up issues of harassment as per their cultural norms and national laws, which are then considered as per procedures laid down."</p>
<p>A similar effort within the ICANN community is critical.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/submission-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-revisions-to-icann-expected-standards-of-behavior'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/submission-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-revisions-to-icann-expected-standards-of-behavior</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiPublic AccountabilityInternet GovernanceFeaturedICANNIANA TransitionHomepage2016-06-30T06:07:37ZBlog EntryRevolving Door Analysis: IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door
<b>The IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) is the body that will accept and coordinate different proposals for IANA transition. It will make the global Internet community's final proposal for transition to the NTIA. Lakshmi Venkataraman finds that a majority of the ICG's membership have had longstanding affiliations with I-star organisations. What will this mean for IANA transition? </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Following the <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">NTIA’s announcement</a> of its decision to not renew the IANA Functions contract, ICANN instituted a process in search of an alternative oversight mechanism. The <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/stewardship/coordination-group">IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG)</a>, comprising 30 individuals, is the body set up to accept and coordinate proposals for IANA transition, and after this, to make a final proposal to the NTIA. <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/coordination-group-2014-06-17-en">ICANN claims</a> that the ICG comprises individuals representing 13 different communities and the interests of different stakeholders (direct and indirect), including those of governments, technical community and non-commercial users.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The communities represented in the ICG are as follows:</p>
<ul>
<li><span>ALAC – At-Large Advisory Committee to </span><strong>ICANN</strong></li>
<li><span>ASO – Policy making body of </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span> w.r.t. IP addresses</span></li>
<li><span>ccNSO – Policy making body of </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span> w.r.t. ccTLDs</span></li>
<li><span>GNSO – Makes recommendations on gTLDs to the </span><strong>ICANN </strong><span>Board</span></li>
<li><span>IAB – Deals with technical and engineering aspects of the </span><strong>ISOC</strong></li>
<li><span>IETF – Deals with the development of standards under the </span><strong>ISOC</strong></li>
<li><span>NRO – Policy Advisor to </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span> w.r.t. IP addresses</span></li>
<li><span>SSAC – Advisory body of </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span>, w.r.t. security of naming systems</span></li>
<li><span>RSSAC – Advisory body of </span><strong>ICANN</strong><span>, w.r.t. operation, security and integrity of the Internet’s Root Server System</span></li>
</ul>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Now, the ICG has been set up to devise and present to the NTIA, an IANA transition proposal that incorporates views and concerns of diverse stakeholders of the global Internet community. The composition of the ICG is, for this purpose, an indicator of the <i>nature</i> of proposals that may find final favour.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At CIS, we examined the affiliations of ICG members with this in mind. Our assumptions are two-fold: (1) greater the diversity in ICG membership, greater the chance of diverse views being heard and represented, including those departing from the <i>status quo</i>; (2) conversely, if the ICG members have histories of affiliations to existing centres of power in global Internet governance (say, the I* organisations), chances of <i>status quo</i> being maintained are greater.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Our findings are presented in tabular format below:</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(X – Unknown number of years spent in the organization)</span></p>
<table class="grid listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>
<p style="text-align: center; ">I-star Organisation</p>
<p style="text-align: center; ">________________</p>
<p style="text-align: center; ">Name of person</p>
</th><th style="text-align: center; ">ICANN</th><th style="text-align: center; ">IETF </th><th style="text-align: center; ">IAB </th><th>W3C </th><th>ISOC </th><th>AfriNIC</th><th>ARIN </th><th>APNIC</th><th>LACNIC</th><th>RIPE-NCC</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrik Faltstrom</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">3</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">3</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Wilson</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">16</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lynn St. Amour</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">13</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">16</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jari Arkko</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">8</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">1</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td style="text-align: left; ">Keith Davidson</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">2</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demi Getschko</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">11</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russell Housley</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">6</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">1.5</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiaodong Lee</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">2</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elise Gerich</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartmut Glaser</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">14</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">2</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolf Ulrich Knobben</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russ Mundy</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuo-Wei Wu</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">15</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">11</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narelle Clark</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">4</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Karrenberg</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">6</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed el Bashir</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">8</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Boyle</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">X</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith Drazek</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">3</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean Jacques Subrenat</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">7</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Bladel</td>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center; "><strong><span>†</span></strong></p>
</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
<td style="text-align: center; ">-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: -webkit-center; "><b>(†</b> - To serve on the GNSO Council from November 2015.)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>As you will have noticed, 20 out of 30 ICG members (66.67%) have occupied positions in seemingly</span><i> </i><span>different organizations, but in actuality, these are organisations with very close links to each other. We see not 13, but 2 organizations</span><strong> </strong><span>that all the communities seem to be affiliated to, i.e., ICANN and ISOC. It seems all too ironic that the body that has been allocated the task of the IANA functions’ transition, in line with the ‘multi-stakeholder’ model, is itself representative of only 2 organizations.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A prodding into the histories of these 30 members from ‘varied’ backgrounds reveals that most of them have <i>rotationally</i> served in the I-Star organizations. A close reading of their bio-data (from their ICANN and LinkedIn pages) reveals our findings on the number of years several of the members of the IANA Stewardship Transition Cooperation Group, have spent at the I-Star organizations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is not rocket science to recognise the power the I* organisations have over Internet governance today. Indeed, ICANN tells us that the <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/governance-06feb13-en.pdf">I* run the Internet</a>. They are the leaders of the <i>status quo</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But the IANA transition is anything <i>but</i> an affirmation of the <i>status quo</i>. Stakeholders and participants in IANA transition (in the <a href="https://community.icann.org/x/37fhAg">CWG</a>, <a href="https://www.nro.net/nro-and-internet-governance/iana-oversight/consolidated-rir-iana-stewardship-proposal-team-crisp-team">CRISP</a> and <a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ianaplan-icg-response-06">IETF</a>) have raised serious concerns about the <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/04/16/icann-anything-that-doesnt-give-iana-to-me-is-out-of-scope/">desirability of IANA continuing within ICANN</a>, and about ICANN’s (inadequate) <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/10/19/cauldron-part-2-is-the-names-iana-compatible-with-the-others/">accountability</a> and <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability">transparency</a>. True, ICANN has instituted processes to enable discussion on these issues, and the ICG is part of the process. It is entrusted with the momentous task of shifting from the <i>status quo</i> of the IANA Functions contract to a new mechanism of oversight. Given its composition, an assumption that the ICG may have vested interests in maintaining <i>status quo</i> is not out-of-the-way. In fact, some members of the ICG have <a href="http://isoc-ny.org/919">previously made statements</a> to the effect that Internet is not broken, and it does not need fixing. This poses a real danger to the IANA transition process and the global Internet community must demand safeguards.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Lakshmi Venkataraman performed the revolving door analysis on the ICG. She is a IV year at NALSAR University of Law and an intern at CIS during December 2014. Geetha Hariharan assisted in writing this post. </i></p>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door</a>
</p>
No publisherLakshmi VenkataramanICANNIANA Transition2014-12-16T05:44:40ZBlog EntryResponse by the Centre for Internet and Society to the Draft Proposal to Transition the Stewardship of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions from the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/response-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-to-the-draft-proposal-to-transition-the-stewardship-of-the-internet-assigned-numbers-authority-iana-functions-from-the-u-s-commerce-department2019s-national-telecommunications-and-information-administration
<b>This proposal was made to the Global Multistakeholder Community on August 9, 2015. The proposal was drafted by Pranesh Prakash and Jyoti Panday. The research assistance was provided by Padmini Baruah, Vidushi Marda, and inputs from Sunil Abraham.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For more than a year now, the customers and operational communities performing key internet functions related to domain names, numbers and protocols have been negotiating the transfer of IANA stewardship. India has dual interests in the ICANN IANA Transition negotiations: safeguarding independence, security and stability of the DNS for development, and promoting an effective transition agreement that internationalizes the IANA Functions Operator (IFO). Last month the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG) set in motion a public review of its combined assessment of the proposals submitted by the names, numbers and protocols communities. In parallel to the transition of the NTIA oversight, the community has also been developing mechanisms to strengthen the accountability of ICANN and has devised two workstreams that consider both long term and short term issues. This 2 is our response to the consolidated ICG proposal which considers the proposals for the transition of the NTIA oversight over the IFO.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-response-to-draft-proposal-to-transition-the-stewardship-of-the-internet-assigned-numbers-authority-iana-functions-from-the-u-s-commerce-department2019s-national-telecommunications-and-information-administration" class="internal-link">Click to download</a> the submission.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/response-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-to-the-draft-proposal-to-transition-the-stewardship-of-the-internet-assigned-numbers-authority-iana-functions-from-the-u-s-commerce-department2019s-national-telecommunications-and-information-administration'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/response-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-to-the-draft-proposal-to-transition-the-stewardship-of-the-internet-assigned-numbers-authority-iana-functions-from-the-u-s-commerce-department2019s-national-telecommunications-and-information-administration</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshIANAInternet GovernanceIANA Transition2015-11-29T06:35:12ZBlog EntryJurisdiction: The Taboo Topic at ICANN
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo-topic-at-icann
<b>The "IANA Transition" that is currently underway is a sham since it doesn't address the most important question: that of jurisdiction. This article explores why the issue of jurisdiction is the most important question, and why it remains unaddressed.</b>
<br />
<p>In March 2014, the <a href="https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">US government announced</a> that they were going to end the contract they have with ICANN to run the <a href="https://www.iana.org/">Internet Assigned Numbers Authority</a> (IANA), and hand over control to the “global multistakeholder community”. They insisted that the plan for transition had to come through a multistakeholder process and have stakeholders “across the global Internet community”.</p>
<h2 id="why-is-the-u.s.-government-removing-the-ntia-contract">Why is the U.S. government removing the NTIA contract?</h2>
<p>The main reason for the U.S. government's action is that it will get rid of a political thorn in the U.S. government's side: keeping the contract allows them to be called out as having a special role in Internet governance (with the Affirmation of Commitments between the U.S. Department of Commerce and ICANN, the IANA contract, and the cooperative agreement with Verisign), and engaging in unilateralism with regard to the operation of the root servers of the Internet naming system, while repeatedly declaring that they support a multistakeholder model of Internet governance.</p>
<p>This contradiction is what they are hoping to address. Doing away with the NTIA contract will also increase — ever so marginally — ICANN’s global legitimacy: this is something that world governments, civil society organizations, and some American academics have been asking for nearly since ICANN’s inception in 1998. For instance, here are some demands made <a href="https://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/pc3/contributions/sca/hbf-29.doc">in a declaration by the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus at WSIS, in 2005</a>:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“ICANN will negotiate an appropriate host country agreement to replace its California Incorporation, being careful to retain those aspects of its California Incorporation that enhance its accountability to the global Internet user community. "ICANN's decisions, and any host country agreement, must be required to comply with public policy requirements negotiated through international treaties in regard to, inter alia, human rights treaties, privacy rights, gender agreements and trade rules. … "It is also expected that the multi-stakeholder community will observe and comment on the progress made in this process through the proposed [Internet Governance] Forum."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>In short: the objective of the transition is political, <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/">not technical</a>. In an ideal world, we <em>should</em> aim at reducing U.S. state control over the core of the Internet's domain name system.<a href="#fn1" class="footnoteRef" id="fnref1"><sup>1</sup></a></p>
<p>It is our contention that <strong>U.S. state control over the core of the Internet's domain name system is <em>not</em> being removed</strong> by the transition that is currently underway.</p>
<h2 id="why-is-the-transition-happening-now">Why is the Transition Happening Now?</h2>
<p>Despite the U.S. government having given commitments in the past that were going to finish the IANA transition by "September 30, 2000", (the <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/white-paper-2012-02-25-en">White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses</a> states: "The U.S. Government would prefer that this transition be complete before the year 2000. To the extent that the new corporation is established and operationally stable, September 30, 2000 is intended to be, and remains, an 'outside' date.") and later by "fall of 2006",<a href="#fn2" class="footnoteRef" id="fnref2"><sup>2</sup></a> those turned out to be empty promises. However, this time, the transition seems to be going through, unless the U.S. Congress manages to halt it.</p>
<p>However, in order to answer the question of "why now?" fully, one has to look a bit at the past.</p>
<p>In 1998, through the <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/white-paper-2012-02-25-en">White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses</a> the U.S. government <a href="http://www.icannwatch.org/archive/mueller_icann_and_internet_governance.pdf">asserted it’s control over the root</a>, and asserted — some would say arrogated to itself — the power to put out contracts for both the IANA functions as well as the 'A' Root (i.e., the Root Zone Maintainer function that Network Solutions Inc. then performed, and continues to perform to date in its current avatar as Verisign). The IANA functions contract — a periodically renewable contract — was awarded to ICANN, a California-based non-profit corporation that was set up exclusively for this purpose, but which evolved around the existing IANA (to placate the Internet Society).</p>
<p>Meanwhile, of course, there were criticisms of ICANN from multiple foreign governments and civil society organizations. Further, despite it being a California-based non-profit on contract with the government, domestically within the U.S., there was pushback from constituencies that felt that more direct U.S. control of the DNS was important.</p>
<p>As Goldsmith and Wu summarize:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>"Milton Mueller and others have shown that ICANN’s spirit of “self-regulation” was an appealing label for a process that could be more accurately described as the U.S. government brokering a behind-the-scenes deal that best suited its policy preferences ... the United States wanted to ensure the stability of the Internet, to fend off the regulatory efforts of foreign governments and international organizations, and to maintain ultimate control. The easiest way to do that was to maintain formal control while turning over day-to-day control of the root to ICANN and the Internet Society, which had close ties to the regulation-shy American technology industry." [footnotes omitted]</p>
</blockquote>
<p>And that brings us to the first reason that the NTIA announced the transition in 2014, rather than earlier.</p>
<h3 id="icann-adjudged-mature-enough">ICANN Adjudged Mature Enough</h3>
<p>The NTIA now sees ICANN as being mature enough: the final transition was announced 16 years after ICANN's creation, and complaints about ICANN and its legitimacy had largely died down in the international arena in that while. Nowadays, governments across the world send their representatives to ICANN, thus legitimizing ICANN. States have largely been satisfied by participating in the Government Advisory Council, which, as its name suggests, only has advisory powers. Further, unlike in the early days, there is <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/05/24/threat-analysis-of-itus-wcit-part-1-historical-context/">no serious push for states assuming control of ICANN</a>. Of course they grumble about the ICANN Board not following their advice, but no government, as far as I am aware, has walked out or refused to participate.</p>
<h3 id="laffaire-snowden">L'affaire Snowden</h3>
<p>Many within the United States, and some without, believe that the United States not only plays an exceptional role to play in the running of the Internet — by dint of historical development and dominance of American companies — but that <em>it ought to</em> have an exceptional role because it is the best country to exercise 'oversight' over 'the Internet' (often coming from <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303563304579447362610955656">clueless commentators</a>), and from dinosaurs of the Internet era, like <a href="http://www.circleid.com/posts/20140316_if_the_stakeholders_already_control_the_internet_netmundial_iana/">American IP lawyers</a> and <a href="http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/03/who-controls-the-internet-address-book-icann-ntia-and-iana/">American 'homeland' security hawks</a>, Jones Day, who are ICANN's lawyers, and other <a href="http://homepages.wmich.edu/~cooneys/poems/cummings.nextto.html">jingoists</a> and those policymakers who are controlled by these narrow-minded interests.</p>
<p>The Snowden revelations were, in that way, a godsend for the NTIA, as it allowed them a fig-leaf of <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4529516c-c713-11e3-889e-00144feabdc0.html">international</a> <a href="https://www.rt.com/usa/nsa-fallout-relinquish-internet-oversight-002/">criticism</a> <a href="https://twitter.com/carolinegreer/status/454253411576598528">with which</a> to counter these domestic critics and carry on with a transition that they have been seeking to put into motion for a while. The Snowden revelations led Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, to state in September 2013, at the 68th U.N. General Assembly, that Brazil would "present proposals for the establishment of a <a href="https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf">civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet</a>", and as <a href="https://icannwiki.com/Diego_Canabarro">Diego Canabarro</a> points out this catalysed the U.S. government and the technical community into taking action.</p>
<p>Given this context, a few months after the Snowden revelations, the so-called <a href="https://www.apnic.net/community/ecosystem/i*orgs">I* organizations</a> met — seemingly with the blessing of the U.S. government<a href="#fn3" class="footnoteRef" id="fnref3"><sup>3</sup></a> — in Montevideo, and put out a <a href="https://www.apnic.net/publications/news/2013/montevideo-statement-on-future-of-internet-cooperation">'Statement on the Future of Internet Governance'</a> that sought to link the Snowden revelations on pervasive surveillance with the need to urgently transition the IANA stewardship role away from the U.S. government. Of course, the signatories to that statement knew fully well, as did most of the readers of that statement, that there is no linkage between the Snowden revelations about pervasive surveillance and the operations of the DNS root, but still they, and others, linked them together. Specifically, the I* organizations called for "accelerating the globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in which all stakeholders, including all governments, participate on an equal footing."</p>
<p>One could posit the existence of two other contributing factors as well.</p>
<p>Given political realities in the United States, a transition of this sort is probably best done before an ultra-jingoistic President steps into office.</p>
<p>Lastly, the ten-yearly review of the World Summit on Information Society was currently underway. At the original WSIS (as seen from the civil society quoted above) the issue of US control over the root was a major issue of contention. At that point (and during where the 2006 date for globalization of ICANN was emphasized by the US government).</p>
<h2 id="why-jurisdiction-is-important">Why Jurisdiction is Important</h2>
<p>Jurisdiction has a great many aspects. <em>Inter alia</em>, these are:</p>
<ul>
<li>Legal sanctions applicable to changes in the root zone (for instance, what happens if a country under US sanctions requests a change to the root zone file?)</li>
<li>Law applicable to resolution of contractual disputes with registries, registrars, etc.</li>
<li>Law applicable to labour disputes.</li>
<li>Law applicable to competition / antitrust law that applies to ICANN policies and regulations.</li>
<li>Law applicable to disputes regarding ICANN decisions, such as allocation of gTLDs, or non-renewal of a contract.</li>
<li>Law applicable to consumer protection concerns.</li>
<li>Law applicable to financial transparency of the organization.</li>
<li>Law applicable to corporate condition of the organization, including membership rights.</li>
<li>Law applicable to data protection-related policies & regulations.</li>
<li>Law applicable to trademark and other speech-related policies & regulations.</li>
<li>Law applicable to legal sanctions imposed by a country against another.</li>
</ul>
<p>Some of these, but not all, depend on where bodies like ICANN [the policy-making body], the IANA functions operator [the proposed "Post-Transition IANA"], and the root zone maintainer are incorporated or maintain their primary office, while others depend on the location of the office [for instance, Turkish labour law applies for the ICANN office in Istanbul], while yet others depend on what's decided by ICANN in contracts (for instance, the resolution of contractual disputes with ICANN, filing of suits with regard to disputes over new generic TLDs, etc.).</p>
<p>However, an issue like sanctions, for instance, depends on where ICANN/PTI/RMZ are incorporated and maintain their primary office.</p>
<p>As <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-globalizing-iana-four-principles-and-a-proposal-for-reform-a-submission-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/96">Milton Mueller notes</a>, the current IANA contract "requires ICANN to be incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and perform the IANA functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to U.S. law and provides America with greater political influence over ICANN."</p>
<p>He further notes that:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>While it is common to assert that the U.S. has never abused its authority and has always taken the role of a neutral steward, this is not quite true. During the controversy over the .xxx domain, the Bush administration caved in to domestic political pressure and threatened to block entry of the domain into the root if ICANN approved it (Declaration of the Independent Review Panel, 2010). It took five years, an independent review challenge and the threat of litigation from a businessman willing to spend millions to get the .xxx domain into the root.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Thus it is clear that even if the NTIA's role in the IANA contract goes away, jurisdiction remains an important issue.</p>
<h2 id="u.s.-doublespeak-on-jurisdiction">U.S. Doublespeak on Jurisdiction</h2>
<p>In March 2014, when NTIA finally announced that they would hand over the reins to “the global multistakeholder community”. They’ve laid down two procedural condition: that it be developed by stakeholders across the global Internet community and have broad community consensus, and they have proposed 5 substantive conditions that any proposal must meet:</p>
<ul>
<li>Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;</li>
<li>Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;</li>
<li>Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and,</li>
<li>Maintain the openness of the Internet.</li>
<li>Must not replace the NTIA role with a solution that is government-led or an inter-governmental organization.</li>
</ul>
<p>In that announcement there is no explicit restriction on the jurisdiction of ICANN (whether it relate to its incorporation, the resolution of contractual disputes, resolution of labour disputes, antitrust/competition law, tort law, consumer protection law, privacy law, or speech law, and more, all of which impact ICANN and many, but not all, of which are predicated on the jurisdiction of ICANN’s incorporation), the jurisdiction(s) of the IANA Functions Operator(s) (i.e., which executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need to obey), and the jurisdiction of the Root Zone Maintainer (i.e., which executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need to obey).</p>
<p>However, Mr. Larry Strickling, the head of the NTIA, in his <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8v-yWye5I0w&feature=youtu.be">testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology</a>, made it clear that,</p>
<blockquote>
<p>“Frankly, if [shifting ICANN or IANA jurisdiction] were being proposed, I don't think that such a proposal would satisfy our criteria, specifically the one that requires that security and stability be maintained.”</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Possibly, that argument made sense in 1998, due to the significant concentration of DNS expertise in the United States. However, in 2015, that argument is hardly convincing, and is frankly laughable.<a href="#fn4" class="footnoteRef" id="fnref4"><sup>4</sup></a></p>
<p>Targetting that remark, in ICANN 54 at Dublin, we asked Mr. Strickling:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>"So as we understand it, the technical stability of the DNS doesn't necessarily depend on ICANN's jurisdiction being in the United States. So I wanted to ask would the US Congress support a multistakeholder and continuing in the event that it's shifting jurisdiction."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>Mr. Strickling's response was:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>"No. I think Congress has made it very clear and at every hearing they have extracted from Fadi a commitment that ICANN will remain incorporated in the United States. Now the jurisdictional question though, as I understand it having been raised from some other countries, is not so much jurisdiction in terms of where ICANN is located. It's much more jurisdiction over the resolution of disputes.</p>
<p>"And that I think is an open issue, and that's an appropriate one to be discussed. And it's one I think where ICANN has made some movement over time anyway.</p>
<p>"So I think you have to ... when people use the word jurisdiction, we need to be very precise about over what issues because where disputes are resolved and under what law they're resolved, those are separate questions from where the corporation may have a physical headquarters."</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As we have shown above, jurisdiction is not only about the jurisdiction of "resolution of disputes", but also, as Mueller reminds us, about the requirement that ICANN (and now, the PTI) be "incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and perform the IANA functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to U.S. law and provides America with greater political influence over ICANN."</p>
<p>In essence, the U.S. government has essentially said that they would veto the transition if the jurisdiction of ICANN or PTI's incorporation were to move out of the U.S., and they can prevent that from happening <em>after</em> the transition, since as things stand ICANN and PTI will still come within the U.S. Congress's jurisdiction.</p>
<h2 id="why-has-the-icg-failed-to-consider-jurisdiction">Why Has the ICG Failed to Consider Jurisdiction?</h2>
<p>Will the ICG proposal or the proposed new ICANN by-laws reduce existing U.S. control? No, they won't. (In fact, as we will argue below, the proposed new ICANN by-laws make this problem even worse.) The proposal by the names community ("the CWG proposal") still has a requirement (in Annex S) that the Post-Transition IANA (PTI) be incorporated in the United States, and a similar suggestion hidden away as a footnote. Further, the proposed by-laws for ICANN include the requirement that PTI be a California corporation. There was no discussion specifically on this issue, nor any documented community agreement on the specific issue of jurisdiction of PTI's incorporation.</p>
<p>Why wasn't there greater discussion and consideration of this issue? Because of two reasons: First, there were many that argued that the transition would be vetoed by the U.S. government and the U.S. Congress if ICANN and PTI were not to remain in the U.S. Secondly, the ICANN-formed ICG saw the US government’s actions very narrowly, as though the government were acting in isolation, ignoring the rich dialogue and debate that’s gone on earlier about the transition since the incorporation of ICANN itself.</p>
<p>While it would be no one’s case that political considerations should be given greater weightage than technical considerations such as security, stability, and resilience of the domain name system, it is shocking that political considerations have been completely absent in the discussions in the number and protocol parameters communities, and have been extremely limited in the discussions in the names community. This is even more shocking considering that the main reason for this transition is, as has been argued above, political.</p>
<p>It can be also argued that the certain IANA functions such as Root Zone Management function have a considerable political implication. It is imperative that the political nature of the function is duly acknowledged and dealt with, in accordance with the wishes of the global community. In the current process the political aspects of the IANA function has been completely overlooked and sidelined. It is important to note that this transition has not been a necessitated by any technical considerations. It is primarily motivated by political and legal considerations. However, the questions that the ICG asked the customer communities to consider were solely technical. Indeed, the communities could have chosen to overlook that, but they did not choose to do so. For instance, while the IANA customer community proposals reflected on existing jurisdictional arrangements, they did not reflect on how the jurisdictional arrangements should be post-transition , while this is one of the questions at the heart of the entire transition. There were no discussions and decisions as to the jurisdiction of the Post-Transition IANA: the Accountability CCWG's lawyers, Sidley Austin, recommended that the PTI ought to be a California non-profit corporation, and this finds mention in a footnote without even having been debated by the "global multistakeholder community", and subsequently in the proposed new by-laws for ICANN.</p>
<h2 id="why-the-by-laws-make-things-worse-why-work-stream-2-cant-address-most-jurisdiction-issues">Why the By-Laws Make Things Worse & Why "Work Stream 2" Can't Address Most Jurisdiction Issues</h2>
<p>The by-laws could have chosen to simply stayed silent on the matter of what law PTI would be incorporated under, but instead the by-law make the requirement of PTI being a California non-profit public benefit corporation part of the <em>fundamental by-laws</em>, which are close to impossible to amend.</p>
<p>While "Work Stream 2" (the post-transition work related to improving ICANN's accountability) has jurisdiction as a topic of consideration, the scope of that must necessarily discount any consideration of shifting the jurisdiction of incorporation of ICANN, since all of the work done as part of CCWG Accountability's "Work Stream 1", which are now reflected in the proposed new by-laws, assume Californian jurisdiction (including the legal model of the "Empowered Community"). Is ICANN prepared to re-do all the work done in WS1 in WS2 as well? If the answer is yes, then the issue of jurisdiction can actually be addressed in WS2. If the answer is no — and realistically it is — then, the issue of jurisdiction can only be very partially addressed in WS2.</p>
<p>Keeping this in mind, we recommended specific changes in the by-laws, all of which were rejected by CCWG's lawyers.</p>
<h2 id="the-transition-plan-fails-the-netmundial-statement">The Transition Plan Fails the NETmundial Statement</h2>
<p>The <a href="http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf">NETmundial Multistakeholder Document</a>, which was an outcome of the NETmundial process, states:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement of US Government with regard to its intent to transition the stewardship of IANA functions, the discussion about mechanisms for guaranteeing the transparency and accountability of those functions after the US Government role ends, has to take place through an open process with the participation of all stakeholders extending beyond the ICANN community</p>
<p>[...]</p>
<p>It is expected that the process of globalization of ICANN speeds up leading to a truly international and global organization serving the public interest with clearly implementable and verifiable accountability and transparency mechanisms that satisfy requirements from both internal stakeholders and the global community.</p>
<p>The active representation from all stakeholders in the ICANN structure from all regions is a key issue in the process of a successful globalization.</p>
</blockquote>
<p>As our past analysis has shown, the IANA transition process and the discussions on the mailing lists that shaped it <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-multistakeholder-community-neither-global-nor-multistakeholder">were neither global nor multistakeholder</a>. The DNS industry represented in ICANN is largely US-based. 3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of America, whereas less than 1% of ICANN-registered registrars are from Africa. Two-thirds of the Business Constituency in ICANN is from the USA. While ICANN-the-corporation has sought to become more global, the ICANN community has remained insular, and this will not change until the commercial interests involved in ICANN can become more diverse, reflecting the diversity of users of the Internet, and a TLD like .COM can be owned by a non-American corporation and the PTI can be a non-American entity.</p>
<h2 id="what-we-need-jurisdictional-resilience">What We Need: Jurisdictional Resilience</h2>
<p>It is no one's case that the United States is less fit than any other country as a base for ICANN, PTI, or the Root Zone Maintainer, or even as the headquarters for 9 of the world's 12 root zone operators (Verisign runs both the A and J root servers). However, just as having multiplicity of root servers is important for ensuring technical resilience of the DNS system (and this is shown in the uptake of Anycast by root server operators), it is equally important to have immunity of core DNS functioning from political pressures of the country or countries where core DNS infrastructure is legally situated and to ensure that we have diversity in terms of legal jurisdiction.</p>
<p>Towards this end, we at CIS have pushed for the concept of "jurisdictional resilience", encompassing three crucial points:</p>
<ul>
<li>Legal immunity for core technical operators of Internet functions (as opposed to policymaking venues) from legal sanctions or orders from the state in which they are legally situated.</li>
<li>Division of core Internet operators among multiple jurisdictions</li>
<li>Jurisdictional division of policymaking functions from technical implementation functions</li>
</ul>
<p>Of these, the most important is the limited legal immunity (akin to a greatly limited form of the immunity that UN organizations get from the laws of their host countries). This kind of immunity could be provided through a variety of different means: a host-country agreement; a law passed by the legislature; a U.N. General Assembly Resolution; a U.N.-backed treaty; and other such options exist. We are currently investigating which of these options would be the best option.</p>
<p>And apart from limited legal immunity, distribution of jurisdictional control is also valuable. As we noted in our submission to the ICG in September 2015:</p>
<blockquote>
<p>Following the above precepts would, for instance, mean that the entity that performs the role of the Root Zone Maintainer should not be situated in the same legal jurisdiction as the entity that functions as the policymaking venue. This would in turn mean that either the Root Zone Maintainer function be taken up Netnod (Sweden-headquartered) or the WIDE Project (Japan-headquartered) [or RIPE-NCC, headquartered in the Netherlands], or that if the IANA Functions Operator(s) is to be merged with the RZM, then the IFO be relocated to a jurisdiction other than those of ISOC and ICANN. This, as has been stated earlier, has been a demand of the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus. Further, it would also mean that root zone servers operators be spread across multiple jurisdictions (which the creation of mirror servers in multiple jurisdictions will not address).</p>
</blockquote>
<p>However, the issue of jurisdiction seems to be dead-on-arrival, having been killed by the United States government.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, despite the primary motivation for demands for the IANA transition being those of removing the power the U.S. government exercises over the core of the Internet's operations in the form of the DNS, what has ended up happening through the IANA transition is that these powers have not only not been removed, but in some ways they have been entrenched further! While earlier, the U.S. had to specify that the IANA functions operator had to be located in the U.S., now ICANN's by-laws themselves will state that the post-transition IANA will be a California corporation. Notably, while the Montevideo Declaration speaks of "globalization" of ICANN and of the IANA functions, as does the NETmundial statement, the NTIA announcement on their acceptance of the transition proposals speaks of "privatization" of ICANN, and not "globalization".</p>
<p>All in all, the "independence" that IANA is gaining from the U.S. is akin to the "independence" that Brazil gained from Portugal in 1822. Dom Pedro of Brazil was then ruling Brazil as the Prince Regent since his father Dom João VI, the King of United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves had returned to Portugal. In 1822, Brazil declared independence from Portugal (which was formally recognized through a treaty in 1825). Even after this "independence", Dom Pedro continued to rule Portugal just as he had before indepedence, and Dom João VI was provided the title of "Emperor of Brazil", aside from being King of the United Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves. The "indepedence" didn't make a whit of a difference to the self-sufficiency of Brazil: Portugal continued to be its largest trading partner. The "independence" didn't change anything for the nearly 1 million slaves in Brazil, or to the lot of the indigenous peoples of Brazil, none of whom were recognized as "free". It had very little consequence not just in terms of ground conditions of day-to-day living, but even in political terms.</p>
<p>Such is the case with the IANA Transition: U.S. power over the core functioning of the Domain Name System do not stand diminished after the transition, and they can even arguably be said to have become even more entrenched. Meet the new boss: same as the old boss.</p>
<div class="footnotes">
<hr />
<ol>
<li id="fn1"><p>It is an allied but logically distinct issue that U.S. businesses — registries and registrars — dominate the global DNS industry, and as a result hold the reins at ICANN.<a href="#fnref1">↩</a></p></li>
<li id="fn2"><p>As Goldsmith & Wu note in their book <em>Who Controls the Internet</em>: "Back in 1998 the U.S. Department of Commerce promised to relinquish root authority by the fall of 2006, but in June 2005, the United States reversed course. “The United States Government intends to preserve the security and stability of the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System (DNS),” announced Michael D. Gallagher, a Department of Commerce official. “The United States” he announced, will “maintain its historic role in authorizing changes or modifications to the authoritative root zone file.”<a href="#fnref2">↩</a></p></li>
<li id="fn3"><p>Mr. Fadi Chehadé revealed in an interaction with Indian participants at ICANN 54 that he had a meeting "at the White House" about the U.S. plans for transition of the IANA contract before he spoke about that when <a href="http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-22/news/43288531_1_icann-internet-corporation-us-centric-internet">he visited India in October 2013</a> making the timing of his White House visit around the time of the Montevideo Statement.<a href="#fnref3">↩</a></p></li>
<li id="fn4"><p>As an example, <a href="https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/nsd/">NSD</a>, software that is used on multiple root servers, is funded by a Dutch foundation and a Dutch corporation, and written mostly by European coders.<a href="#fnref4">↩</a></p></li>
</ol>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo-topic-at-icann'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo-topic-at-icann</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshIANAInternet GovernanceFeaturedICANNIANA Transition2016-06-29T07:51:05ZBlog EntryIf the DIDP Did Its Job
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/if-the-didp-did-its-job
<b></b>
<p dir="ltr"> </p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Over the course of two years, the Centre for Internet and Society sent 28 requests to ICANN under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP). A part of ICANN’s accountability initiatives, DIDP is “intended to ensure that information contained in documents concerning ICANN's operational activities, and within ICANN's possession, custody, or control, is made available to the public unless there is a compelling reason for confidentiality.”</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Through the DIDP, any member of the public can request information contained in documents from ICANN. We’ve written about the process <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-documentary-information-disclosure-policy-2013-i-didp-basics">here</a>, <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp">here</a> and <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii">here</a>. As a civil society group that does research on internet governance related topics, CIS had a variety of questions for ICANN. The 28 DIDP requests we have sent cover a range of subjects: from revenue and financial information, to ICANN’s relationships with its contracted parties, its contractual compliance audits, harassment policies and the diversity of participants in its public forum. We have blogged about each DIDP request where we have summarized ICANN’s responses.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Here are the DIDP requests we sent in:</p>
<div dir="ltr">
<table><colgroup><col width="147"><col width="137"><col width="152"><col width="119"><col width="135"></colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Dec 2014</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Jan/Feb 2015</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Aug/Sept 2015</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Nov 2015</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Apr/May 2016</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-1-icanns-expenditures-on-travel-meetings">ICANN meeting expenditure</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-6-revenues-from-gtld-auctions">Revenue from gTLD auction</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-11-netmundial-principles">Implementation of NETmundial principles</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-19-icann2019s-role-in-the-postponement-of-the-iana-transition">IANA transition postponement</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-22-reconsideration-requests-from-parties-affected-by-icann-action">Board Governance Committee Reports</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2">Granular revenue statements</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-7-globalisation-advisory-groups">Globalisation Advisory Groups</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-12-revenues">Raw data - Granular income data</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-20-is-presumptive-renewal-of-verisign2019s-contracts-a-good-thing">Presumptive renewal of registries</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-23-icann-does-not-know-how-diverse-its-comment-section-is">Diversity Analysis</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-3-cyber-attacks-on-icann">ICANN cyber attacks</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-8-organogram">Organogram</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-13-keeping-track-of-icann2019s-contracted-parties-registries">Compliance audits - registries</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-21-icann2019s-relationship-with-the-rirs">ICANN-RIR relationship</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Compliance audits</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-4-icann-and-the-netmundial-principles">Implementation of NETmundial outcome document</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-9-exactly-how-involved-is-icann-in-the-netmundial-initiative">Involvement in NETmundial Initiative</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-14-keeping-track-of-icann2019s-contracted-parties-registrars">Compliance audits - registrars</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-25-curbing-sexual-harassment-at-icann">Harassment policy</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1">Complaints to ICANN ombudsman</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-10-icann-does-not-know-how-much-each-rir-contributes-to-its-budget">RIR contract fees</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-16-icann-has-no-documentation-on-registrars2019-201cabuse-contacts201d">Registrar abuse contact</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">DIDP statistics *</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-15-what-is-going-on-between-verisign-and-icann">Verisign Contractual violations</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-27-on-icann2019s-support-to-new-gtld-applicants">gTLD applicant support program </a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-17-how-icann-chooses-their-contractual-compliance-auditors">Contractual auditors</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-28-icann-renews-verisign2019s-rzm-contract">Root Zone Maintenance agreements</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-18-icann2019s-internal-website-will-stay-internal">Internal website</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN’s responses were analyzed and rated between 0-4 based on the amount of information disclosed. The reasons given for the lack of full disclosure were also studied.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<div dir="ltr">
<table><colgroup><col width="73"><col width="568"></colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">DIDP response rating</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">0</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">No relevant information disclosed</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">1</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Very little information disclosed; DIDP preconditions and/or other reasons for nondisclosure used.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">2</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Partial information disclosed; DIDP preconditions and/or other reasons for nondisclosure used.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">3</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Adequate information disclosed; DIDP preconditions and/or other reasons for nondisclosure used.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">4</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">All information disclosed</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN has defined a set of preconditions under which they are not obligated to answer a request. These preconditions are generously used by ICANN to justify their lack of a comprehensive answer. The wording of the policy also allows ICANN to dodge answering a request if it doesn’t have the relevant documents already in its possession. The responses were also classified by the number of times a particular DIDP condition for non-disclosure was invoked. We will see why these weaken ICANN’s accountability initiatives. </p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<div dir="ltr"><br /><img src="https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/1o_D1vsv4byFYcXE1BfpcMtIe_ZxSAWwxZ-QMIQ0OlZ3y0UzANNyepK64ktsqNF-HmkIyw1rgnESLv_1PrHMuH3WKRQhnEaLhoghGCU3eWofqhBiBLjbu3Wz6nrmVdAw9GEH-2K2" alt="null" height="303" width="368" /></div>
<p dir="ltr">Of the 28 DIDP requests, only 14% were answered fully, without the use of the DIDP conditions of non-disclosure. Seven out of 28 or 40% of the DIDPs received a 0-rated answer which reflects extremely poorly on the DIDP mechanism itself. Of the 7 responses that received 0-rating, 4 were related to complaints and contractual compliance. We had asked for details on the complaints received by the ombudsman, details on contractual violations by Verisign and abuse contacts maintained by registrars for filing complaints. We received no relevant information.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">We have earlier written about the extensive and broad nature of the 12 conditions of non-disclosure that ICANN uses. These conditions were used in 24 responses out of 28. ICANN was able to dodge from fully answering 85% of the DIDP requests that they got from CIS. This is alarming especially for an organization that claims to be fully transparent and accountable. The conditions for non-disclosure have been listed in <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3sI8lQtXMDTMmJoLXoxazFOVlU/view?usp=sharing">this document</a> and can be referred to while reading the following graph.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">On reading the conditions for non-disclosure, it seems like ICANN can refuse to answer any DIDP request if it so wished. These exclusions are numerous, vaguely worded and contain among them a broad range of information that should legitimately be in the public domain: Correspondence, internal information, information related to ICANN’s relationship with governments, information derived from deliberations among ICANN constituents, information provided to ICANN by private parties and the kicker - information that would be too burdensome for ICANN to collect and disseminate.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><img src="https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/CojQ-raMh1nblMO2TGtEJmrRE3MLKHSqltij-nrTdL4Cx2rzVtwzXZQBYBv0qpqxlZ_e0Ce1St7nnY6dN6dAn6G2VH-93iq2htQRQxmejjs-lXhUWNlGiPo9HpZlS69YbCFKEe7J" alt="null" height="425" width="624" /></p>
<p dir="ltr"> </p>
<p dir="ltr">As we can see from the graph, the most used condition under which ICANN can refuse to answer a DIDP request is F. Predictably, this is the most vaguely worded DIDP condition of the lot: “Confidential business information and/or internal policies and procedures.” It is up to ICANN to decide what information is confidential with no justification needed or provided for it. ICANN has used this condition 11 times in responding to our 28 requests.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">It is also necessary to pay attention to condition L which allow ICANN to reject “Information requests: (i) which are not reasonable; (ii) which are excessive or overly burdensome; (iii) complying with which is not feasible; or (iv) are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual.” This is perhaps the weakest point in the entire list due its subjective nature. Firstly, on whose standards must this information request be reasonable? If the point of a transparency mechanism is to make sure that information sought by the public is disseminated, should they be allowed to obfuscate information because it is too burdensome to collect? Even if this is fair given the time constraints of the DIDP mechanism, it must not be used as liberally as has been happening. The last sub point is perhaps the most subjective. If a staff member dislikes a particular requestor, this point would justify their refusal to answer a request regardless of its validity. This hardly seems fair or transparent. This condition has been used 9 times in our 28 requests.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Besides the DIDP non-disclosure conditions, ICANN also has an excuse built into the definition of DIDP. Since it is not obliged to create or summarize documents under the DIDP process, it can simply claim to not have the specific document we request and thus negate its responsibility to our request. This is what ICANN did with one of our requests for raw financial data. For our research, we required raw data from ICANN specifically with regard to its expenditure on staff and board members for their travel and attendance at meetings. As an organization that is answerable to multiple stakeholders including governments and the public, it is justified to expect that they have financial records of such items in a systematic manner. However, we were surprised to learn that ICANN does not in fact have these stored in a manner that they can send as attachments or publish. Instead they directed us to the audited financial reports which did little for our research. However, in response to our later request for granular data on revenue from domain names, ICANN explained that while they do not have such a document in their possession, they would create one. This distinction between the two requests seems arbitrary to us since we consider both to be important to public.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Nevertheless, there were some interesting outcomes from our experience filing DIDPs. We learnt that there has been no substantive work done to inculcate the NETmundial principles at ICANN, that ICANN has no idea which regional internet registry contributes the most to its budget, and that it does not store (or is not willing to reveal) any raw financial data. These outcomes do not contribute to a sense of confidence in the organization.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN has an opportunity to reform this particular transparency mechanism at its Workstream 2 discussions. ICANN must make use of this opportunity to listen and work with people who have used the DIDP process in order to make it useful, effective and efficient. To that effect, we have some recommendations from our experience with the DIDP process.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">That ICANN does not currently possess a particular document is not an excuse if it has the ability to create one. In its response to our questions on the IANA transition, ICANN indicated that it does not have the necessary documents as the multi stakeholder body that it set up is the one conducting the transition. This is somewhat justified. However, in response to our request for financial details, ICANN must not be able to give the excuse that it does not have a document in its possession. It and it alone has the ability to create the document and in response to a request from the public, it should.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN must also revamp its conditions for non-disclosure and make it tighter. It must reduce the number of exclusions to its disclosure policy and make sure that the exclusion is not done arbitrarily. Specifically with respect to condition F, ICANN must clarify how information was classified as confidential and why that is different from everything else on the list of conditions.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Further, ICANN should not be able to use condition L to outright reject a DIDP request. Instead, there must be a way for the requester and ICANN to come to terms about the request. This could happen by an extension of the 1 month deadline, financial compensation by requester for any expenditure on ICANN’s part to answer the request or by a compromise between the requester and ICANN on the terms of the request. The sub point about requests made “by a vexatious or querulous individual” must be removed from condition L or at least be separated from the condition so that it is clear why the request for disclosure was denied.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN should also set up a redressal mechanism specific to DIDP. While ICANN has the Reconsideration Requests process to rectify any wrongdoing on the part of staff or board members, this is not adequate to identify whether a DIDP was rejected on justifiable grounds. A separate mechanism that deals only with DIDP requests and wrongful use of the non-disclosure conditions would be helpful. According to the icann bylaws, in addition to Requests for Reconsideration, ICANN has also established an independent third party review of allegations against the board and/or staff members. A similar mechanism solely for reviewing whether ICANN’s refusal to answer a DIDP request is justified would be extremely useful.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">A strong transparency mechanism must make sure that its objective are to provide answers, not to find ways to justify its lack of answers. With this in mind, we hope that the revamp of transparency mechanisms after workstream 2 discussions leads to a better DIDP process than we are used to.</p>
<p><span id="docs-internal-guid-b9e801b8-28c6-b8f5-d9ad-ac67daa46694"></span></p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/if-the-didp-did-its-job'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/if-the-didp-did-its-job</a>
</p>
No publisherasvathaIANATransparency and AccountabilityInternet GovernanceICANNIANA TransitionTransparency2016-11-07T12:57:18ZBlog EntryICANN accountability, IANA transition and open questions
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions
<b>On February 3, 2015, the Centre for Communication Governance (NLU, Delhi) hosted a pre-event briefing in light of ICANN52 (Singapore, February 7-12, 2015). Geetha Hariharan attended the event.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At a briefing on ICANN52 organized by the Centre for Communication Governance (NLU, Delhi) on 3 February, 2015 (‘CCG Briefing Event’), consensus was seen on two broad things: ICANN’s processes on IANA transition and accountability are crucial for Internet governance this year, and India’s participation (both municipal and international) is wanting. The meeting, which saw discussion following the Chatham House rules, was attended by members from industry associations, government and civil society. A light parsing of the current proposals from the CWG-Names and CRISP (the names and numbers communities) for IANA transition brought the composition of the transition proposals under scrutiny.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">CRISP and the proposed Service Level Agreements:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <a href="https://www.nro.net/wp-content/uploads/ICG-RFP-Number-Resource-Proposal-1_IO20150119.txt">proposal from the numbers community</a>, the CRISP, suggests that ICANN and the five RIRs enter into Service Level Agreements. Under the proposal, existing accountability, oversight and policy development mechanisms remain unchanged, with ICANN agreeing to perform IANA functions to meet requisite service levels. If it fails to meet such standards, the RIRs may terminate the contract or refuse to renew it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The CRISP proposal does not look beyond ICANN for an IANA functions operator, and places its faith entirely in ICANN’s past performance of numbering IANA functions. As so many have said before, the CRISP proposal is blithe in its lack of review mechanism or safeguards, having even fewer safeguards than the CWG-Names proposal. Doubtless, a cause for concern.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">CWG-Names and the Four New Entities:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cwg-naming-transition-01dec14-en.pdf">CWG-Names proposal</a> suggests that four new entities be created to replace the NTIA’s role under the IANA Functions Contract. Under the proposal, ICANN will continue to be the IANA Functions Operator for the present. It will enter into an IANA Functions Contract with <strong>“Contract Co.”</strong>, a new shell entity which will replace NTIA as the contracting party. Contract Co. is to be a lightweight entity, with few staff or administrative capabilities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At present, the NTIA performs what it considers a <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/16/this_is_how_the_us_government_runs_the_internet/">“clerical role”</a> in its oversight of the DNS. However, the IANA Functions Contract also includes review functions, such as the rebidding and renewal process to determine whether ICANN (or some other entity) ought to continue as the IANA functions operator. Under the CWG-Names proposal, these review functions, which also include budget reviews, reporting, etc. are to be carried out by a <strong>“Multi-stakeholder Review Team (MRT)”</strong>, the terms of whose composition are as yet undecided.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The composition of the MRT is crucial to an independent and representative oversight of IANA. At the CCG Briefing Event, concerns were raised as to the representation of ccTLDs on the MRT. Not all ccTLDs are represented in the ICANN ecosystem, in the ccNSO; 152 ccTLDs are <a href="http://ccnso.icann.org/about/members.htm">members</a> of the ccNSO. Of course, one may argue that this concern exists under the present IANA functions contract as well. But the devil is in the details, or lack thereof. We don’t know, for instance, who will populate the MRT, whether they will enjoy immunities normally reserved for diplomatic or consular agents, or most importantly, what relationship the MRT will enjoy with ICANN. Will there be a contract with ICANN, or a memorandum of understanding that sets out ICANN’s responsibilities, failing which the IANA contract may be terminated?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The third new creation of the CWG-Names proposal is the <strong>“Customer Standing Committee (CSC)”</strong>. While the CSC’s composition is also nebulous, its functions are to work with the MRT to establish Service Levels and Performance Indicators for the naming functions, and to receive performance reports from the IANA operator (ICANN). Clause C.2.8 of the present IANA functions contract requires that the IANA operator (ICANN) develop performance standards for all enumerated IANA functions (see Clause C.2.9.1 to C.2.9.4), and also to report on them (Clause C.4). Presumably, the CSC will fill the role of the NTIA’s Contracting Officer’s Representative in receiving these performance reports.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The fourth and final new entity is the <strong>“Independent Appeals Panel (IAP)”</strong>, the composition of which is also undecided. The IAP is intended to hear and adjudicate all actions related to the root zone or root zone WHOIS, and under the present proposal, the CWG-Names suggests it should be constituted from time to time in the manner of a binding arbitration process. However, it should be noted that the CWG-Names proposal is unclear whether the IAP decisions are binding on or advisory to the ICANN Board. Concerns of the IAP’s composition aside, dangers of making its decisions only advisory to the ICANN Board loom large and real, and the CCG Briefing Event reflected this.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Already, the ICANN Board wields extensive power with regard to policy decisions. For instance, policies developed under the global policy development process by Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/review-procedures-2012-02-25-en">may be rejected</a> by the ICANN Board by a 2/3rds majority vote. Such a rejection may result in a mediation process according to agreed procedure. Another instance is the change in the ICANN Board’s treatment of GAC advice. Prior to the amendment to ICANN’s Bye-laws, the Board was not required to provide reasons for its rejection of GAC advice. In its present form, Article XI, Section 2(1) of ICANN’s Bye-laws make such reasons mandatory. How ought IAP decisions be treated, as binding or advisory? If they are to be binding, ICANN or any other IANA functions operator will have to enter into a legal arrangement (by contract or MoU, or in the best case, an amendment to ICANN Bye-laws).</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Dodging the real issues: ICANN incumbency, IANA separation and where will all the money come from?</h3>
<p><span style="text-align: justify; ">Both the CWG-Names and CRISP proposals skim past certain issues relating to ICANN’s incumbency in the IANA role. The </span><strong>first concern</strong><span style="text-align: justify; ">, of course, is whether ICANN should continue to be the IANA functions operator. Both proposals accept ICANN’s role, suggesting no change. While there are compelling reasons for ICANN’s continued role as IANA functions operator, unquestioning incumbency is equal to lack of accountability. And as neither proposal sets out a review process (the CWG-Names proposal only mentions that the MRT shall have this function), it is a concern.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Perhaps the </span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/acctcrosscomm/CCWG+on+Enhancing+ICANN+Accountability">CCWG-Accountability</a><span>, convened under the Enhancing ICANN Accountability process, is better equipped to provide suggestions. However, the CCWG-Accountability is hard-pressed for time. Its two Workstreams, dealing with IANA transition related accountability mechanisms and ICANN’s internal accountability, are unlikely to see desired progress before the transition deadline of September 2015. For instance, within the CCWG-Accountability, a debate is ongoing as to ICANN’s composition. At the time of its incorporation, a suggestion that ICANN ought to have statutory members was floated, but turned down. The suggestion has </span><a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/12/19/icann-accountability-a-coup-or-a-contract/">reared its head again</a><span> in the CCWG-Accountability, to consider checks and balances on the ICANN Board.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <strong>second concern</strong> relates to IANA’s continued existence within ICANN, without separation of policy and implementation. This concern has been clamouring for attention for many months. Milton Mueller, for instance, has recommended <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/03/03/a-roadmap-for-globalizing-iana/">structural separation</a> of IANA and ICANN, as did I and others during the course of the face-to-face meetings of the CWG-Names (I attended remotely).<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A structural separation is beneficial for many reasons. It enforces a simple separation of powers. “When”, as Montesquieu stated, “the legislative and the executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may rise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner”. Tyranny is speaking in terms too extreme for ICANN, perhaps, it is undeniable that ICANN has grown larger in scope and size from its original incorporation. It was incorporated, as Professor DeNardis has noted [<i>Protocol Politics</i>, 161], to perform technical coordination of the global DNS and other functions performed originally by Jon Postel as IANA.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Today, in addition to technical coordination and policy-setting for names and numbers (through the gPDP), ICANN is a major player in the Internet governance institutional space; its involvement in and aggressive marketing of the NETmundial Initiative is but an example. For instance, ICANN budgets for less than US $10 million for providing core Internet functions out of a US $160 million strong budget (FY2015). It has budgeted, in comparison, US $13 million for travel and meetings alone (FY2015). Separating IANA from ICANN will, as others have suggested, protect it from political or other influences within ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In any event, once the NTIA terminates the IANA functions contract, IANA is not strictly required to be within the US. At the moment, Clause C.2.1 of the IANA functions contract requires that the IANA functions operator be “a wholly U.S. owned and operated firm or fully accredited United States University or College operating in one of the 50 states of the United States or District of Columbia; b) incorporated within one of the fifty (50) states of the United States or District of Columbia; and c) organized under the laws of a state of the United States or District of Columbia”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Were structural separation to be achieved, IANA could be incorporated in another, neutral jurisdiction. Not only would be assuage optical considerations and ensure separation of powers, but as our experience with filtering on the Internet shows (see, for instance, the Open Net Initiative’s <a href="https://opennet.net/">research</a>), unilateral controls are much harder to enforce when the apparatus is decentralized.<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <strong>third concern</strong> raised at the CCG Briefing Event concerned the funding of the new entities proposed by the CWG-Names. Would these entities be self-financing, or perhaps ICANN would support them? While some participants felt ICANN could also provide financial support, this would, in my view, bring ICANN too close to its oversight entities, and increase chances of influence.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-accountability-iana-transition-and-open-questions</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaICANNIANA Transition2015-02-06T11:39:21ZBlog EntryIANA Transition: Suggestions for Process Design
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design
<b>With analysis of community-input and ICANN processes, Smarika Kumar offers concrete suggestions for process design. She urges the Indian government to take a stronger position in matters of IANA transition. </b>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Introduction:</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On 14 March 2014, the NTIA of the US Government <a class="external-link" href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">announced</a> its intention to transition key internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community. These key internet domain name functions comprise functions executed by Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which is currently contracted to ICANN by the US government. The US Government delineated that the IANA transition proposal must have broad community support and should address the following four principles:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<ol>
<li><span>Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;</span></li>
<li><span>Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;</span></li>
<li><span>Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and</span></li>
<li><span>Maintain the openness of the Internet.</span></li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Additionally, the US Government asked ICANN to convene a multistakeholder process to develop the transition plan for IANA. In April 2014, ICANN issued a <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-transition-scoping-08apr14-en.pdf">Scoping Document</a> for this process which outlined the scope of the process, as well as, what ICANN thinks, should <i>not </i>be a part of the process. In the spirit of ensuring broad community consensus, ICANN issued a <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/draft-proposal-2014-04-08-en">Call for Public Input</a><span> on the Draft Proposal of the Principles, Mechanisms and Process to Develop a Proposal to Transition NTIA’s Stewardship of IANA Functions on 8 April 2014, upon which the Government of India made its <a class="external-link" href="http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/ianatransition/attachments/20140507/8a49e95f/2014-4-16-India-Ministry-ICT.pdf">submission</a>. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN is currently deliberating the process for the development of a proposal for transition of IANA functions from the US Government to the global multistakeholder community, a step which would have implications for internet users all over the world, including India. The outcome of this process will be a proposal for IANA transition. The Scoping Document and process for development of the proposal are extremely limited and exclusionary, hurried, and works in ways which could potentially further ICANN’s own interests instead of global public interests. Accordingly, the Government of India is recommended take a stand on the following key points concerning the suggested process.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Submissions by the Government of India thus far, have however, failed to comment on the process being initiated by ICANN to develop a proposal for IANA transition. While the actual outcome of the process in form of a proposal for transition is an important issue for deliberation, we hold that it is of immediate importance that the Government of India, along with all governments of the world, <span>pay particular attention to the way ICANN is conducting the process itself</span> to develop the IANA transition proposal. The scrutiny of this process is of immense significance in order to ensure that democratic and representative principles sought by the GoI in internet governance are being upheld within the process of developing the IANA transition proposal. How the governance of the IANA functions will be structured will be an outcome of this process. Therefore if one expects a democratic, representative and transparent governance of IANA functions as the outcome, it is <span>absolutely essential to ensure that the process itself is democratic, representative and transparent</span>.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Issues and Recommendations:</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Ensuring adequate representation and democracy of all stakeholders in the process for developing the proposal for IANA transition is essential to ensuring representative and democratic outcomes. Accordingly, one must take note of the following issues and recommendations concerning the process.</p>
<h3><span>Open, inclusive deliberation by global stakeholders must define the Scope of the Process for developing proposal for IANA transition:</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The current Scoping Document was issued by ICANN to outline the scope of the process by which the proposal for IANA transition would be deliberated. The Scoping Document was framed unilaterally by ICANN, without involvement of the global stakeholder community, and excluding all governments of the world including USA. Although this concern was voiced by a number of submissions to the Public Call by ICANN on the Draft Proposal, such concern was not reflected in ICANN’s <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-06-06-en">Revised Proposal</a> of 6 June 2014. It merely states that the Scoping Document outlines the “<i>focus of this process</i>.” Such a statement is not enough because the focus as well as the scope of the process needs to be decided in a democratic, unrepresentative and transparent manner by the global stakeholder community, including all governments.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This unilateral approach to outline which aspects of IANA transition should be allowed for discussion, and which aspects should not, itself defeats the multistakeholder principle which ICANN and the US government claim the process is based on. Additionally, global community consensus which the US Govt. hopes for the outcome of such process, cannot be conceivable when the scope of such process is decided in a unilateral and undemocratic manner. Accordingly, the <span>current Scoping Document should be treated only as a draft</span>, and should be made <span>open to public comment and discussion</span> by the global stakeholder community in order that the scope of the process reflects concerns of global stakeholders, and not just of the ICANN or the US Government.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Accountability of ICANN must be linked to IANA Transition within Scope of the Process:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Accountability must not run merely as a parallel process, since ICANN accountability has direct impact on IANA transition. The current Scoping Document states, “<i>NTIA exercises no operational role in the performance of the IANA functions. Therefore, ICANN’s role as the operator of the IANA functions is not the focus of the transition: it is paramount to maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS, and uninterrupted service to the affected parties</i>.” However this rationale to exclude ICANN’s role as operator of IANA from the scope of the process is not sound because NTIA does choose to appoint ICANN as the operator of IANA functions, thereby playing a vicarious operational role in the performance of IANA functions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The explicit exclusion of ICANN’s role as operator of IANA functions from the scope of the process works to serve ICANN’s own interests by preventing discussions on those alternate models where ICANN does not play the operator role. Basically, this presumes that in absence of NTIA stewardship ICANN will control the IANA functions. Such presumption raises disturbing questions regarding ICANN’s accountability as the IANA functions operator. If discussions on ICANN’s role as operator of IANA functions is to be excluded from the process of developing the proposal for IANA transition, it also implies exclusion of discussions regarding ICANN’s accountability as operator of these functions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Although ICANN announced a process to enhance its accountability on 6 May 2014, this was designed as a separate, parallel process and de-linked from the IANA transition process. As shown, ICANN’s accountability, its role as convenor of IANA transition process, and its role as current and/or potential future operator of IANA functions are intrinsically linked, and must not be discussed in separate, but parallel process. It is recommended that <span>ICANN accountability in the absence of NTIA stewardship, and ICANN’s role as the operator of IANA functions must be included within the Scoping Document</span> as part of the scope of the IANA transition process. This is to ensure that no kind of IANA transition is executed without ensuring ICANN’s accountability as and if as the operator of IANA functions so that democracy and transparency is brought to the governance of IANA functions.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Misuse or appearance of misuse of its convenor role by ICANN to influence outcome of the Process must not be allowed:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN has been designated the convenor role by the US Govt. on basis of its unique position as the current IANA functions contractor and the global co-ordinator for the DNS. However it is this unique position itself which creates a potential for abuse of the process by ICANN. As the current contractor of IANA functions, ICANN has an interest in the outcome of the process being conducive to ICANN. In other words, ICANN prima facie is an interested party in the IANA transition process, which may tend to steer the process towards an outcome favourable to itself. ICANN has already been attempting to set the scope of the process to develop the proposal for IANA transition unilaterally, thus abusing its position as convenor. ICANN has also been trying to separate the discussions on IANA transition and its own accountability by running them as parallel processes, as well as attempting to prevent questions on ICANN’s role as operator of IANA functions by excluding it from the Scoping Document. Such instances provide a strong rationale for defining the limitations of the role of ICANN as convenor.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Although ICANN’s Revised Proposal of 6 June 2014 stating that ICANN will have a neutral role, and the Secretariat will be independent of ICANN staff is welcome, additional safeguards need to be put in place to avoid conflicts of interest or appearance of conflicts of interest. The Revised Proposal itself was unilaterally issued, whereby ICANN incorporated some of the comments made on its Proposed Draft, in the revised Draft, but excluded some others without providing rationale for the same. For instance, comments regarding inclusion of ICANN’s role as the operator of IANA functions within the Scoping Document, were ignored by ICANN in its Revised Proposal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is accordingly suggested that <span style="text-decoration: underline;">ICANN should limit its role to merely facilitating discussions</span> and not extend it to reviewing or commenting on emerging proposals from the process. ICANN should further <span style="text-decoration: underline;">not compile comments on drafts to create a revised draft</span> at any stage of the process. Additionally, <span style="text-decoration: underline;">ICANN staff must not be allowed to be a part of any group or committee</span> which facilitates or co-ordinates the discussion regarding IANA transition.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Components of Diversity Principle should be clearly enunciated in the Draft Proposal:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Diversity Principle was included by ICANN in the Revised Proposal of 6 June 2014 subsequent to submissions by various stakeholders who raised concerns regarding developing world participation, representation and lack of multilingualism in the process. This is laudable. However, past experience with ICANN processes has shown that many representatives from developing countries as well as from stakeholder communities outside of the ICANN community are unable to productively involve themselves in such processes because of lack of multilingualism or unfamiliarity with its way of functioning. This often results in undemocratic, unrepresentative and non-transparent decision-making in such processes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In such a scenario, merely mentioning diversity as a principle is not adequate to ensure abundant participation by developing countries and non-ICANN community stakeholders in the process. Concrete mechanisms need to be devised to include <span style="text-decoration: underline;">adequate and fair geographical, gender, multilingual and developing countries’ participation</span> and representation on all levels so that the process is not relegated merely to domination by North American or European entities. Accordingly, <span style="text-decoration: underline;">all the discussions in the process should be translated</span> into multiple native languages of participants <i>in situ</i>, so that everyone participating in the process can understand what is going on. <span style="text-decoration: underline;">Adequate time must be given for the discussion issues to be translated and circulated</span> widely amongst all stakeholders of the world, before a decision is taken or a proposal is framed. To concretise its diversity principle, <span style="text-decoration: underline;">ICANN should also set aside funds</span> and develop a programme with community support for capacity building for stakeholders in developing nations to ensure their fruitful involvement in the process.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">The Co-ordination Group must be made representative of the global multistakeholder community:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Currently, the Co-ordination Group includes representatives from ALAC, ASO, ccNSO, GNSO, gTLD registries, GAC, ICC/BASIS, IAB, IETF, ISOC, NRO, RSSAC and SSAC. Most of these representatives belong to the ICANN community, and is not representative of the global multistakeholder community including governments. This is not representative of even a multistakeholder model which the US Govt. has announced for the transition; nor in the multistakeholder participation spirit of NETmundial.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is recommended that the Co-ordination Group then must be made democratic and representative to include larger global stakeholder community, including Governments, Civil Society, and Academia, with suitably diverse representation across geography, gender and developing nations. Adequate number of seats on the Committee must be granted to each stakeholder so that they can each co-ordinate discussions within their own communities and ensure wider and more inclusive participation.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Framing of the Proposal must allow adequate time:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All stakeholder communities must be permitted adequate time to discuss and develop consensus. Different stakeholder communities have different processes of engagement within their communities, and may take longer to reach a consensus than others. If democracy and inclusiveness are to be respected, then each stakeholder must be allowed enough time to reach a consensus within its own community, unlike the short time given to comment on the Draft Proposal. The process must not be rushed to benefit a few.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><i>Smarika Kumar is a graduate of the National Law Institute University, Bhopal, and a member of the Alternative Law Forum, a collective of lawyers aiming to <span>integrate alternative lawyering with critical research, alternative dispute resolution, pedagogic interventions and sustained legal interventions in social issues</span>. Her <span>areas of interest include interdisciplinary research on the Internet, issues affecting indigenous peoples, eminent domain, traditional knowledge and pedagogy.</span></i></span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design</a>
</p>
No publisherSmarika KumarICANNIANA TransitionInternet GovernanceTransparency and Accountability2014-06-22T09:15:21ZBlog EntryIANA Transition: A Case of the Emperor’s New Clothes?
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/digital-asia-hub-october-6-2016-vidushi-marda-iana-transition
<b>Transparency is key to engaging meaningfully with ICANN. CIS has filed the most number of Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP) requests with ICANN, covering a range of subjects including its relationships with contracted parties, financial disclosure, revenue statements, and harassment policies. Asvatha Babu, an intern at CIS, analysed all responses to our requests and found that only 14% of our requests were answered fully.</b>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The post was published by <a class="external-link" href="https://www.digitalasiahub.org/2016/10/06/iana-transition-a-case-of-emperor-in-new-clothes/?utm_content=buffer48f31&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer">Digital Asia Hub</a> on October 6, 2016.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify;" />
<p style="text-align: justify;">In March 2014, the US Government committed to ending its contract with ICANN to run the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), and also announced that it would hand over control to the “global multistakeholder community”. The conditions for this handover were that the changes must be developed by stakeholders across the globe, with broad community consensus.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Further, it was indicated that any proposal must support and enhance the multistakeholder model; maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet Domain Name System (DNS); meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services and maintain the openness of the Internet. Further, it must not replace the NTIA role with a solution that is government-led or by an inter-governmental organisation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="p1"><span class="s1">These conditions were met, ICANN’s Supporting Organisations (SO’s) and Advisory Committees (ACs) accepted transition proposals, and these proposals were then accepted by the ICANN Board as well, putting the transition in motion. But not quite. The “global multistakeholder community” still had to wait for approval from the NTIA and the US government, both of whom eventually approved the proposal. The latter’s approval was confirmed after considerable uncertainty due to <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/04/05/cruz_slams_dns_overseer_icann_again/"><span class="s2">Senator Ted Cruz</span><span class="s3">’</span><span class="s2">s efforts</span></a> to stop the transition, due to his belief that the transition was an exercise of the US government handing over control of the internet to foreign governments. Notwithstanding this, on 29th September, the US Senate passed a short term bill to keep the US Government funded till the end of the year, without a rider on the IANA transition. The next hurdle was a lawsuit filed in federal court in Texas by the attorney generals of four states to stop the handover of the IANA contract. As on the 30</span><span class="s4"><sup>th</sup></span><span class="s1"> of September, the court <a href="http://www.circleid.com/pdf/iana_hearing_minute_160930.pdf"><span class="s5">denied</span></a> the Plaintiffs’ Application, thus allowing the transition to proceed. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="p1"><span class="s1">What does this transition mean? What does it change? The transition, while a welcome step, leaves much to be desired in terms of tangible change, primarily because it fails to address the most important question, that of ICANN jurisdiction. It is important to have the Internet’s core Domain Name System (DNS) functioning free from the pressures and control of a single country or even a few countries; the transition does not ensure this, as the Post Transition IANA entity (PTI) will be under Californian jurisdiction, just like ICANN was pre-transition. The entire ICANN community has been witness to a single American political figure <a href="https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2795"><span class="s5">almost derailing</span></a> its meticulous efforts simply because he could; and in many ways these events cemented the importance of having diversity in terms of legal jurisdiction of ICANN, the PTI and the root zone maintainer.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">My colleague Pranesh Prakash has identified <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo-topic-at-icann"><span class="s5">11 reasons</span></a> why the question of jurisdiction is important to consider during the IANA transition. Some of these issues depend on where ICANN, the PTI and the root zone maintainer are situated, some depend on the location of the office in question and still others depend on contracts that ICANN enters into. ICANN’s new bylaws state that it <em>will be situated in California</em>, the post transition IANA entities bylaws also make a Californian jurisdiction <em>integral</em> to its functioning. As an alternative, the Centre for Internet & Society has called for the “jurisdictional resilience” of ICANN, encompassing three crucial points: legal immunity for core technical operators of Internet functions (as opposed to policymaking venues) from legal sanctions or orders from the state in which they are legally situated, division of core Internet operators among multiple jurisdictions, and jurisdictional division of policymaking functions from technical implementation functions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="p1"><span class="s1">Transparency is also key to engaging meaningfully with ICANN. CIS has filed the most number of Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP) requests with ICANN, covering a range of subjects including its relationships with contracted parties, financial disclosure, revenue statements, and harassment policies. Asvatha Babu, an intern at CIS, analysed all responses to our requests and found that only 14% of our requests were answered fully. 40% of our requests had no relevant answers disclosed at all (these were mostly to do with complaints and contractual compliance). To illustrate the importance of engaging with ICANN transparency, CIS has focused on understanding ICANN’s sources of income since 2014. This is because we believe that conflict of interest can only be properly understood by following the money in a granular fashion. This information was not publicly available, and in fact, it seemed like <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know"><span class="s2">ICANN didn</span><span class="s3">’</span><span class="s2">t know where it got its money from, either</span></a>. It is only through the DIDP process that we were able to <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014"><span class="s5">get ICANN to disclose</span></a> sources of income, and figures along with those sources for a single financial year. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="p1"><span class="s1">ICANN prides itself on being transparent and accountable, but in reality it is not. The most often used exception to avoid answering DIDP requests has been “Confidential business information and/or internal policies and procedures”, which in itself is a testament to ICANN’s opacity. Another condition for non-disclosure allows ICANN to reject answering “Information requests: (i) which are not reasonable; (ii) which are excessive or overly burdensome; (iii) complying with which is not feasible; or (iv) are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual.”. These exemptions are not only vague, they are also extremely subjective: again, demonstrative of the need for enhanced accountability and transparency within ICANN. Key issues have not been addressed even at the time that the transition is formally underway. The grounds for denying DIDP requests are still vague and wide, effectively giving ICANN the discretion to decline answering difficult questions, which is unacceptable from an entity that is at the center of the multi-billion dollar domain name industry. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="p1"><span class="s1">ICANN’s jurisdictional resilience and enhanced accountability are particularly vital for countries in Asia. Its policies, processes and functioning have historically been skewed towards western and industry interests, and ICANN can neither be truly global nor multistakeholder till such countries can engage meaningfully with it in a transparent fashion. The IANA transition is, of course, largely political, and may <em>symbolise </em>a transition to the global multistakeholder community, but in reality, it changes very little, if anything. </span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/digital-asia-hub-october-6-2016-vidushi-marda-iana-transition'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/digital-asia-hub-october-6-2016-vidushi-marda-iana-transition</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiIANAInternet GovernanceIANA Transition2016-11-03T06:20:46ZBlog EntryIANA Transition Stewardship & ICANN Accountability (II)
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-stewardship-and-icann-accountability-2
<b>This paper is the second in a multi-part series, in which we provide an overview of submitted proposals and highlight areas of concern that will need attention moving forward. The series is a work in progress and will be updated as the processes move forward. It is up for public comments and we welcome your feedback.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The discussions and the processes established for transition plan have moved rapidly, though not fast enough—given the complicated legal and technical undertaking it is. ICG will be considering the submitted proposals and moving forward on consultations and recommendations for pending proposals. ICANN53 saw a lot of discussion on the implementation of the proposals from the numbers and protocols community, while the CWG addressed the questions related to the 2<sup>nd</sup> draft of the names community proposal. The Protocol Parameters (IANA PLAN Working Group) submitted to ICG on 6 January 2015, while the Numbering Resources (CRISP Team) submitted on 15 January 2015. The Domain Names (CWG-Stewardship) submitted its second draft to ICG on 25 June 2015. The ICG had a face-to-face meeting in Buenos Aires and their proposal to transition the stewardship of the IANA functions is expected to be out for public comment July 31 to September 8, 2015. Parallelly, the CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability offered its first set of proposals for public comment in June 2015 and organised two working sessions at ICANN'53. More recently, the CCWG met in Paris focusing on the proposed community empowerment mechanisms, emerging concerns and progress on issues so far.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Number and Protocols Proposals</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The numbering and the protocol communities have developed and approved their plans for the transition. Both communities are proposing a direct contractual relationship with ICANN, in which they have the ability to end the contract on their terms. The termination clause has seen push back from ICANN and teams involved in the negotiations have revealed that ICANN has verbally represented that they will reject any proposed agreement in which ICANN is not deemed the sole source prime contractor for IANA functions in perpetuity.<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> The emerging contentious negotiations on the issue of separability i.e., the ability to change to a different IANA functions operator, is an important issue.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> As Milton Mueller points out, ICANN seems to be using these contract negotiations to undo the HYPERLINK "http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-monopoly-and-its-willing-to-wreck-the-transition-process-to-get-it/#comment-40045"community process and that ICANN’s staff members are viewing themselves, rather than the formal IANA transition process shepherded by the ICG, as the final authority on the transition.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a> The attempts of ICANN Staff to influence or veto ideas regarding what solutions will be acceptable to NTIA and the Congress goes beyond its mandate to facilitate the transition dialogue. The ARIN meeting<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a> and the process of updating MoU with IETF which mandates supplementary SLAs<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a> are examples of ICANN leveraging its status as the incumbent IANA functions operator, with which all three operational communities must negotiate, to ensure that the outcome of the IANA transition process does not threaten its control.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Names Proposal</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Recently, the CWG working on recommendations for the names related functions provided an improved 2nd draft of their earlier complex proposal which attempts to resolve the internal-external debate with a middle ground, with the creation of Post-Transition IANA (PTI). PTI a subsidiary/affiliate of the current contract-holder, ICANN, will be created and handed the IANA contract and its related technology and staff. Therefore, ICANN takes on the role of the contracting authority and PTI as the contracted party will perform the names-related IANA functions. <b><i>Importantly, under the new proposal CWG has done away altogether with the requirement of “authorisation” to root zone changes and the reasons for this decision have not been provided.</i></b> The proposal also calls for creation of a Customer Standing Committee (CSC) to continuously monitor the performance of IANA and creation a periodic review process, rooted in the community, with the ability to recommend ICANN relinquishing its role in names-related IANA functions, if necessary. A key concern area is the external oversight mechanism Multistakeholder Review Team– has been done away with. This is a significant departure from the version placed for public comment in December 2014. It is expected that clarification will be sought from the CWG on how it has factored in inputs from the first round of public comments.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Consensus around the CWG 2nd Draft</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There is a growing consensus around the model proposed—the numbers community has commented on the proposal that it does "not foresee any incompatibility between the CWG's proposal”.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a> On the IANA PLAN list, members of the protocols community have also expressed willingness to accept the new arrangement to keep all the IANA functions together in PTI during the transition and view this as merely a reorganization.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a> However, acceptance of the proposal is pending till clarification related to how the PTI will be set up and its legal standing and scope are provided.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Structure of PTI</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Presently, two corporate forms are being considered for the PTI, a nonprofit public benefit corporation (PBC) or a limited liability corporation (LLC), with a single member, ICANN, at its outset. Milton Mueller has advocated for the incorporation of PTI as a PBC rather than as a LLC, with its board composed of a mix of insiders and outsiders.<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a> He is of the view that LLC form makes the implementation of PTI much more complex and risky as the CWG would need to debate mechanisms of control for the PTI as part of the transition process. <b><i>The choice of structure is important as it will define the limitations and responsibilities that will be placed on the PTI Board—an important and necessary accountability mechanism.</i></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Broadly, the division of views is around selection of the Board Members that is if they should be chosen either by IANA's customers or representative groups within ICANN or solely by the Board. The degree of autonomy which the PTI has given the existing ICANN structure is also a key developing question. <b><i>Debate on autonomy of PTI are broadly centered around two distinct views of PTI being incorporated in a different country, to prevent ICANN from slowly subsuming the organization. The other view endorsed by ICANN states that a high degree of autonomy risks creates additional bureaucracy and process for no discernible improvement in actual services.</i></b></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Functional Separability</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Under the CWG-Stewardship draft proposal, ICANN would assume the role currently fulfilled by NTIA (overseeing the IANA function), while PTI would assume the role currently played by ICANN (the IANA functions operator). A divisive area here is that the goal of “functional separation” is defeated with PTI being structured as an “affiliate” wholly owned subsidiary, as it will be subject to management and policies of ICANN. From this view, while ICANN as the contracting party has the right of selecting future IANA functions operators, the legal and policy justification for this has not been provided. It is expected that ICANN'53 will see discussions around the PTI will focus on its composition, legal standing and applicability of the California law.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Richard Hill is of the view that the details of how PTI would be set up is critical for understanding whether or not there is "real" separation between ICANN and PTI leading to the conclusion of a meaningful contract in the sense of an agreement between two separate entities.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a> This functional separation and autonomy is granted by the combination of a legally binding contract, CSC oversight, periodic review and the possibility of non-renewal of the contract.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Technical and policy roles - ICANN and PTI</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The creation of PTI splits the technical and policy functions between ICANN and PTI. The ICANN Board comments on CWG HYPERLINK "http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfrIUO5F9nY4.pdf"PrHYPERLINK "http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfrIUO5F9nY4.pdf"oHYPERLINK "http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfrIUO5F9nY4.pdf"posal also confirm PTI having no policy role, nor it being intended to in the future, and that while it will have control of the budget amounts ceded to it by ICANN the funding of the PTI will be provided by ICANN as part of the ICANN budgeting process.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a> <b>The comments from the Indian government on the proposal</b> <b>states this as an issue of concern, as it negates ICANN's present role as a merely technical coordination body. The concerns stem from placing ICANN in the role of the perpetual contracting authority for the IANA function makes ICANN the sole venue for decisions relating to naming policy as well as the entity with sole control over the PTI under the present wholly subsidiary entity.</b><a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Key areas of work related to the distinction between the PTI and ICANN policy and technical functions include addressing how the new PFI Board would be structured, what its role would be, and what the legal construction between it and ICANN. The ICANN Board too has sought some important clarifications on its relationship as a parent body including areas where the PTI is separate from ICANN and areas where CWG sees shared services as being allowable (shared office space, HR, accounting, legal, payroll). It also sought clarification on the line of reporting, duties of the PTI Directors and alignment of PTI corporate governance with that of ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Swedish government has commented that the next steps in this process would be clarification of the process for designing the PTI-IANA contract, a process to establish community consent before entering the contract, explicit mention of whom the contracting parties are and what their legal responsibilities would be in relation to it.<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Internal vs External Accountability</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The ICANN Board, pushing for an internal model of full control of IANA Functions is of the view that a more independent PTI could somehow be "captured" and used to thwart the policies developed by ICANN. However, others have pointed out that under proposed structure PTI has strong ties to ICANN community that implements the policies developed by ICANN.<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14">[14]</a> With no funding and no authority other than as a contractor of ICANN, if PTI is acting in a manner contrary to its contract it would be held in breach and could be replaced under the proposal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Even so, as the Indian government has pointHYPERLINK "http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfJGK6yVohdU.pdf"edHYPERLINK "http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfJGK6yVohdU.pdf" out from the point of view of institutional architecture and accountability, this model is materially worse off than the status quo.<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15">[15]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The proposed PTI and ICANN relationship places complete reliance on internal accountability mechanisms within ICANN, which is not a prudent institutional design. <b><i>The Indian government anticipates a situation where, in the event there is customer/ stakeholder dissatisfaction with ICANN’s role in naming policy development, there would be no mechanism to change the entity which fulfils this role. </i></b>They feel that the earlier proposal for the creation of a Contract Co, a lightweight entity with the sole purpose of being the repository of contracting authority, and award contracts including the IANA Functions Contract provided a much more effective mechanism for external accountability. While the numbers and protocol communities have proposed a severable contractual relationship with ICANN for the performance of its SLAs no such mechanism exists with respect to ICANN's role in policy development for names.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Checks and Balances</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Under the current proposal the Customer Standing Committee (CSC) has the role, of constantly reviewing the technical aspects of the naming function as performed by PTI. This, combined with the proposed periodic IANA Function Review (IFR), would act as a check on the PTI. The current draft proposal does not specify what will be the consequence of an unfavourable IANA Functions Review.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some other areas of focus going forward relate to the IFR team inclusion in ICANN bylaws along the lines of the AOC established in 2009.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16">[16]</a> Also, ensuring the IFR team clarifies the scope of separability. The circumstances and procedures in place for pulling the IANA contract away if it has been established that ICANN is not fulfilling it contractual agreements. This will be a key accountability mechanism and deterrent for ICANN controlling the exercise of its influence.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">CCWG Accountability</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Work Stream (WS1)</b>: Responsible for drafting a mechanism for enhancing ICANN accountability, which must be in place before the IANA stewardship transition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Work Stream (WS2)</b>: Addressing long term accountability topics which may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The IANA transition was recognized to be dependent on ICANN’s wider accountability, and this has exposed the trust issues between community and leadership and the proposal must be viewed in this context. The CCWG Draft Proposal attempts 4 significant new undertakings:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A. Restating ICANN’s Mission, Commitments, and Core Values, and placing those into the ICANN Bylaws. The CCWG has recommended that some segments of the Affirmation of Commitments (AOC)– a contract on operating principles agreed upon between ICANN and the United States government – be absorbed into the Corporation’s bylaws.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">B. Establishing certain bylaws as “Fundamental Bylaws” <b>that cannot be altered by the ICANN</b> Board acting unilaterally, but over which stakeholders have prior approval rights;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">C. Creating a <b>formal “membership” structure for ICANN</b>, along with “community empowerment mechanisms”. Some of the community empowerment mechanisms including (a) remove individual Board members, (b) recall the entire Board, (c) veto or approve changes to the ICANN Bylaws, Mission Statement, Commitments, and Core Values; and (d) to veto Board decisions on ICANN’s Strategic Plan and its budget;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">D. <b>Enhancing and strengthening ICANN's Independent Review Process (IRP)</b> by creating a standing IRP Panel empowered to review actions taken by the corporation for compliance both with stated procedures and with the Bylaws, and to issue decisions that are binding upon the ICANN Board.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The key questions likely to be raised at ICANN 53 on several of these proposals will likely concern how these empowerment mechanisms affect the “legal nature” of the community.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Membership and Accountability</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At the heart of the distrust between the ICANN Board and the community is the question of membership. ICANN as a corporation is a private sector body that is largely unregulated, with no natural competitors, cash-rich and directly or indirectly supports many of its participants and other Internet governance processes. Without effective accountability and transparency mechanisms, the opportunities for distortion, even corruption, are manifold. In such an environment, placing limitations on the Board’s power is critical to invoke trust. Three keys areas of accountability related to the Board include: no mechanisms for recall of individual board directors; the board’s ability to amend the company’s constitution (its bylaws), and the track record of board reconsideration requests.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17">[17]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">With no membership, ICANN’s directors represent the end of the line in terms of accountability. While there is a formal mechanism to review board decisions, the review is conducted by a subset of the same people. The CCWG’s proposal to create SOs/ACs as unincorporated “members” with Articles of Association has met with a lot of discussion, especially in the Governmental Advisory Council (GAC).<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18">[18]</a> The GAC has posed several critical questions on this set up, some of which are listed here:</p>
<ol>
<li>Can a <b><i>legal person created and acting on behalf of the GAC become a member of ICANN</i></b>, even though the GAC does not appoint Board members?</li>
<li>If GAC <b><i>does not wish to become a member, how could it still be associated to the exercise of the 6 (community empowerment mechanisms) powers</i></b>?</li>
<li>It is still unclear what the <b><i>liability of members </i></b>of future “community empowered structures” would be.</li>
<li>What are the <b><i>legal implications on rights, obligations and liabilities of an informal group like the GAC</i></b> creating an unincorporated association (UA) and taking decisions as such UA, from substantial (like exercising the community powers) to clerical (appointing its board, deciding on its financing) and whether there are implications when the members of such an UA are Governments? </li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Any proposal to strengthen accountability of ICANN needs to provide for membership so that there is ability to remove directors, creates financial accountability by receiving financial accounts and appointing editors and can check the ICANN’s board power to change bylaws without recourse to a higher authority.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Constitutional Undertaking</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">David Post and Danielle Kehl have pointed out that the CCWG correctly identifies the task it is undertaking – to ensure that ICANN’s power is adequately and appropriately constrained – as a “constitutional” one.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19">[19]</a> Their interpretation is based on the view that even if ICANN is not a true “sovereign,” it can usefully be viewed as one for the purpose of evaluating the sufficiency of checks on its power. Subsequently, the CCWG Draft Proposal, and ICANN’s accountability post-transition, can be understood and analyzed as a constitutional exercise, and that the transition proposal should meet constitutional criteria. Further, from this view the CCWG draft reflects the reformulation of ICANN around the broadly agreed upon constitutional criteria that should be addressed. These include:</p>
<ol>
<li>A clear enumeration of the powers that the corporation can exercise, and a clear demarcation of those that it cannot exercise.</li>
<li>A division of the institution’s powers, to avoid concentrating all powers in one set of hands, and as a means of providing internal checks on its exercise.</li>
<li>Mechanism(s) to enforce the constraints of (1) and (2) in the form of meaningful remedies for violations.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Their comments reflect that they support CCWG in their approach and progress made in designing a durable accountability structure for a post-transition ICANN. However, they have stressed that a number of important omissions and/or clarifications need to be addressed before they can be confident that these mechanisms will, in practice, accomplish their mission. One such suggestion relates to ICANN’s policy role and PTI technical role separability. Given ICANN’s position in the DNS hierarchy gives it the power to impose its policies, via the web of contracts with and among registries, registrars, and registrants, on all users of the DNS, a <b><i>constitutional balance for the DNS must preserve and strengthen the separation between DNS policy-making and policy-implementation</i></b>. Importantly, they have clarified that even if ICANN has the power to choose what policies are in the best interest of the community it is not free to impose them on the community. ICANN's role is a critical though narrow one: to organize and coordinate the activities of that stakeholder community – which it does through its various Supporting Organizations, Advisory Committees, and Constituencies – and to implement the consensus policies that emerge from that process. Their comments on the CCWG draft call for stating this clarification explicitly and institutionalizing separability to be guided by this critical safeguard against ICANN’s abuse of its power over the DNS.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">An <b><i>effective implementation of this limitation will help clarify the role mechanisms being proposed such as the PTI and is critical for creating sustainable mechanisms, post-transition</i></b>. More importantly, <b><i>clarifying ICANN’s mission</i></b> would ensure that in the post-transition <b><i>communities could challenge its decisions</i></b> on the basis that it is not pertaining to the role outlined or based on strengthening the stability and security of the DNS. Presently, it is very unclear where ICANN can interfere in terms of policymaking and implementation.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Other Issues</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Other issues expected to be raised in the context of ICANN's overall accountabiltiy will likey concern the following:</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Strengthening financial transparency and oversight</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Given the rapid growth of the global domain name industry, one would imagine that ICANN is held up to the same standard of accountability as laid down in the right to information mechanisms countries such as India. CIS has been raising this issue for a while and has managed to received the list of ICANN’s current domain name revenues.<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20">[20]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">By sharing this information, ICANN has shown itself responsive to repeated requests for transparency however, the shared revenue data is only for the fiscal year ending June 2014, and historical revenue data is still not publicly available. Neither is a detailed list (current and historical) of ICANN’s expenditures publicly available. Accountability mechanisms and discussions must seek that ICANN provide the necessary information during its regular Quarterly Stakeholder Reports, as well as on its website.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Strengthening transparency</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A key area of concern is ICANN's unchecked influence and growing role as an institution in the IG space. Seen in the light of the impending transition, the transparency concerns gain significance and given ICANN's vocal interests in maintaining the status quo of its role in DNS Management. While financial statements (current and historic) are public and community discussions are generally open, the complexity of the contractual arrangements in place tracking the financial reserves available to ICANN through these processes are not sufficient.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Further, ICANN as a monopoly is presently constrained only by the NTIA review and few internal mechanisms like the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP)<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21">[21]</a>, Ombudsman<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22">[22]</a>, Reconsideration and Independent Review<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23">[23]</a> and the Accountability and Transparency Review (ATRT)<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24">[24]</a>. These mechanisms are facing teething issues and some do not conform to the principles of natural justice. For example, a Reconsideration Request can be filed if one is aggrieved by an action of ICANN’s Board or staff. Under ICANN’s By-laws, it is the Board Governance Committee, comprising ICANN Board members, that adjudicates Reconsideration Requests.<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25">[25]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Responses to the DIDP requests filed by CIS reveal that the mechanism in its current form, is not sufficient to provide the transparency necessary for ICANN’s functioning. For instance, in the response to DIDP pertaining to the Ombudsman Requests<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26">[26]</a>, ICANN cites confidentiality as a reason to decline providing information as making Ombudsman Requests public would violate ICANN Bylaws, toppling the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman. Over December ’14 and January ’15, CIS sent 10 DIDP requests to ICANN with an aim was to test and encourage discussions on transparency from ICANN. We have received responses for 9 of our requests, and in 7 of those responses ICANN provides very little new information and moving forward we would stress the improvements of existing mechanisms along with introduction of new oversight and reporting parameters towards facilitating the transition process.<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27">[27]</a></p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a>John Sweeting and others, 'CRISP Process Overview' (ARIN 35, 2015) <a href="https://regmedia.co.uk/2015/04/30/crisp_panel.pdf">https://regmedia.co.uk/2015/04/30/crisp_panel.pdf</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a>Andrew Sullivan, <i>[Ianaplan] Update On IANA Transition & Negotiations With ICANN</i> (2015), Email <a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a>Milton Mueller, ‘ICANN WANTS AN IANA FUNCTIONS MONOPOLY – WILL IT WRECK THE TRANSITION PROCESS TO GET IT?’ (<i>Internet Governance Project</i>, 28 April 2015) http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-monopoly-and-its-willing-to-wreck-the-transition-process-to-get-it/#comment-40045</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a>Tony Smith, 'Event Wrap: ICANN 52' (<i>APNIC Blog</i>, 20 February 2015) <a href="http://blog.apnic.net/2015/02/20/event-wrap-icann-52/">http://blog.apnic.net/2015/02/20/event-wrap-icann-52/</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a>Internet Engineering Task Force, 'IPROC – IETF Protocol Registries Oversight Committee' (2015) <a href="https://www.ietf.org/iana/iproc.html">https://www.ietf.org/iana/iproc.html</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a>Axel Pawlik, <i>Numbers Community Proposal Contact Points With CWG’S Draft IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal</i> (2015), Email <a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/msg00003.html">http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/msg00003.html</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a>Jari Arkko, <i>Re: [Ianaplan] CWG Draft And Its Impact On The IETF</i> (2015), Email <a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01843.html">http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01843.html</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a>Milton Mueller, <i>Comments Of The Internet Governance Project</i> (2015), Email <a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/msg00021.html">http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/msg00021.html</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a>Richard Hill, <i>Initial Comments On CWG-Stewardship Draft Proposal</i> (2015), Email <a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/msg00000.html">http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/msg00000.html</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a>Brenden Kuerbis, 'Why The Post-Transition IANA Should Be A Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation' (<i>Internet Governance Project</i>, 18 May 2015) <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/05/18/why-the-post-transition-iana-should-be-a-nonp">http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/05/18/why-the-post-transition-iana-should-be-a-nonp</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a><i>ICANN Board Comments On 2Nd Draft Proposal Of The Cross Community Working Group To Develop An IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal On Naming Related Functions</i> (20 May 2015) <a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfrIUO5F9nY4.pdf">http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfrIUO5F9nY4.pdf</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a><i>Comments Of Government Of India On The ‘2nd Draft Proposal Of The Cross Community Working Group To Develop An IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal On Naming Related Functions’</i> (2015) <a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfJGK6yVohdU.pdf">http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfJGK6yVohdU.pdf</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a>Anders Hektor, <i>Sweden Comments To CWG-Stewardship</i> (2015), Email <a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/msg00016.html">http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/msg00016.html</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a>Brenden Kuerbis, 'Why The Post-Transition IANA Should Be A Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation |' (<i>Internet Governance Project</i>, 18 May 2015) <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/05/18/why-the-post-transition-iana-should-be-a-nonprofit-public-benefit-corporation/">http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/05/18/why-the-post-transition-iana-should-be-a-nonprofit-public-benefit-corporation/</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a><i>Comments Of Government Of India On The ‘2nd Draft Proposal Of The Cross Community Working Group To Develop An IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal On Naming Related Functions’</i> (2015) <a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfJGK6yVohdU.pdf">http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfJGK6yVohdU.pdf</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">[16]</a>Kieren McCarthy, 'Internet Kingmakers Drop Ego, Devise Future Of DNS, IP Addys Etc' (<i>The Register</i>, 24 April 2015) <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/24/internet_kingmakers_drop_ego_devise_future_of_the_internet/">http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/24/internet_kingmakers_drop_ego_devise_future_of_the_internet/</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17">[17]</a>Emily Taylor, <i>ICANN: Bridging The Trust Gap</i> (Paper Series No. 9, Global Commission on Internet Governance March 2015) <a href="https://regmedia.co.uk/2015/04/02/gcig_paper_no9-iana.pdf">https://regmedia.co.uk/2015/04/02/gcig_paper_no9-iana.pdf</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18">[18]</a>Milton Mueller, 'Power Shift: The CCWG’S ICANN Membership Proposal' (<i>Internet Governance Project</i>, 4 June 2015) <a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/06/04/power-shift-the-ccwgs-icann-membership-proposal/">http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/06/04/power-shift-the-ccwgs-icann-membership-proposal/</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19">[19]</a>David Post, <i>Submission Of Comments On CCWG Draft Initial Proposal</i> (2015), Email <a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00050.html">http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00050.html</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20">[20]</a> Hariharan, 'ICANN reveals hitherto undisclosed details of domain names revenues', 8 December, 2014 See: <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014">http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21">[21]</a> ICANN, Documentary Information Disclosure Policy See: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22">[22]</a> ICANN Accountability, Role of the Ombudsman https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/accountability/ombudsman-en</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23">[23]</a> ICANN Reconsideration and independent review, ICANN Bylaws, Article IV, Accountability and Review https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reconsideration-and-independent-review-icann-bylaws-article-iv-accountability-and-review</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24">[24]</a> ICANN Accountability and Transparency Review Final Recommendations https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-recommendations-31dec13-en.pdf</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25">[25]</a> ICANN Bylaws Article iv, Section 2 https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#IV</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26">[26]</a> ICANN Response to DIDP Ombudsman https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/20141228-1-ombudsman-2015-01-28-en</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27">[27]</a> Table of CIS DIDP Requests See: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-stewardship-and-icann-accountability-2'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-stewardship-and-icann-accountability-2</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiICANNIANA TransitionInternet Governance2015-07-31T15:47:20ZBlog EntryIANA Transition Stewardship & ICANN Accountability (I)
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transitition-stewardship-icann-accountability-1
<b>This paper is the first in a multi-part series, in which we provide a background to the IANA transition and updates on the ensuing processes. An attempt to familiarise people with the issues at stake, this paper will be followed by a second piece that provides an overview of submitted proposals and areas of concern that will need attention moving forward. The series is a work in progress and will be updated as the processes move forward. It is up for public comments and we welcome your feedback.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In developing these papers we have been guided by Kieren McCarthy's writings in The Register, Milton Mueller writings on the Internet Governance Project, Rafik Dammak emails on the mailings lists, the constitutional undertaking argument made in the policy paper authored by Danielle Kehl & David Post for New America Foundation.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Introduction</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The 53rd ICANN</b> conference in Buenos Aires was pivotal as it marked the last general meeting before the IANA transition deadline on 30th September, 2015. The multistakeholder process initiated seeks communities to develop transition proposals to be consolidated and reviewed by the the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG). The names, number and protocol communities convened at the conference to finalize the components of the transition proposal and to determine the way forward on the transition proposals. The Protocol Parameters (IANA PLAN Working Group) submitted to ICG on 6 January 2015, while the Numbering Resources (CRISP Team) submitted on 15 January 2015. The Domain Names (CWG-Stewardship) submitted its second draft to ICG on 25 June 2015. The ICG had a face-to-face meeting in Buenos Aires and their proposal to transition the stewardship of the IANA functions is expected to be out for public comment July 31 to September 8, 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Parallelly, the CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability offered its first set of proposals for public comment in June 2015 and organised two working sessions at ICANN'53. More recently, the CCWG met in Paris focusing on the proposed community empowerment mechanisms, emerging concerns and progress on issues so far. <b><i>CIS reserves its comments to the CCWG till the second round of comments expected in July.</i></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This working paper explains the IANA Transition, its history and relevance to management of the Internet. It provides an update on the processes so far, including the submissions by the Indian government and highlights areas of concern that need attention going forward.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">How is IANA Transition linked to DNS Management?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The IANA transition presents a significant opportunity for stakeholders to influence the management and governance of the global network. The Domain Name System (DNS), which allows users to locate websites by translating the domain name with corresponding Internet Protocol address, is critical to the functioning of the Internet. The DNS rests on the effective coordination of three critical functions—the allocation of IP Addresses (the numbers function), domain name allocation (the naming function), and protocol parameters standardisation (the protocols function).</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">History of the ICANN-IANA Functions contract</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Initially, these key functions were performed by individuals and public and private institutions. They either came together voluntarily or through a series of agreements and contracts brokered by the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and funded by the US government. With the Internet's rapid expansion and in response to concerns raised about its increasing commercialization as a resource, a need was felt for the creation of a formal institution that would take over DNS management. This is how ICANN, a California-based private, non-profit technical coordination body, came at the helm of DNS and related issues. Since then, ICANN has been performing the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions under a contract with the NTIA, and is commonly referred to as the IANA Functions Operator.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">IANA Functions</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In February 2000, the NTIA entered into the first stand-alone IANA Functions HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/sf_26_pg_1-2-final_award_and_sacs.pdf"contract<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> with ICANN as the Operator. While the contractual obligations have evolved over time, these are largely administrative and technical in nature including:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>(1) the coordination of the assignment of technical Internet protocol parameters;</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>(2) the allocation of Internet numbering resources; and</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>(3) the administration of certain responsibilities associated with the Internet DNS root zone management;</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>(4) other services related to the management of the ARPA and top-level domains.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN has been performing the IANA functions under this oversight, primarily as NTIA did not want to let go of complete control of DNS management. Another reason was to ensure NTIA's leverage in ensuring that ICANN’s commitments, conditional to its incorporation, were being met and that it was sticking to its administrative and technical role.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Root Zone Management—Entities and Functions Involved</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA' s involvement has been controversial particularly in reference to the Root Zone Management function, which allows allows for changes to the<a href="http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/The%20Internet%20Domain%20Name%20System%20Explained%20for%20Non-Experts%20(ENGLISH).pdf"> </a><a href="http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/The%20Internet%20Domain%20Name%20System%20Explained%20for%20Non-Experts%20(ENGLISH).pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/The Internet Domain Name System Explained for Non-Experts (ENGLISH).pdf"</a>highest level of the DNS namespace<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> by updating the databases that represent that namespace. DNS namespace is defined to be the set of names known as top-level domain names or TLDs which may be at the country level (ccTLDs or generic (gTLDs). This<a href="https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf"> </a><a href="https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf">HYPERLINK "https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf"</a>function to maintain the Root was split into two parts<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a>—with two separate procurements and two separate contracts. The operational contract for the Primary (“A”) Root Server was awarded to VeriSign, the IANA Functions Contract—was awarded to ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These contracts created contractual obligations for ICANN as IANA Root Zone Management Function Operator, in co-operation with Verisign as the Root Zone Maintainer and NTIA as the Root Zone Administrator whose authorisation is explicitly required for any requests to be implemented in the root zone. Under this contract, ICANN had responsibility for the technical functions for all three communities under the IANA Functions contract.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN also had policy making functions for the names community such as developing<a href="https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files"> </a><a href="https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files">HYPERLINK "https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files"</a>rules and procedures and policies under <a href="https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files">HYPERLINK "https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files"</a>which any changes to the Root Zone File<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a> were to be proposed, including the policies for adding new TLDs to the system. The policy making of numbers and protocols is with IETF and RIRs respectively.<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf"</a>NTIA role in root zone management<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a> is clerical and judgment free with regards to content. It authorizes implementation of requests after verifying whether procedures and policies are being followed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This contract was subject to extension by mutual agreement and failure of complying with predefined commitments could result in the re-opening of the contract to another entity through a Request For Proposal (RFP). In fact, in 2011<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf"</a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">NTIA issued a RFP pursuant to ICANN</a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf"</a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">'</a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf"</a>s Conflict of Interest Policy.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Why is this oversight needed?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The role of the Administrator becomes critical for ensuring the security and operation of the Internet with the Root Zone serving as the directory of critical resources. In December 2014,<a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/"> </a><a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/">HYPERLINK "http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/"</a>a report revealed 300 incidents of internal security breaches<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a> some of which were related to the Centralized Zone Data System (CZDS) – where the internet core root zone files are mirrored and the WHOIS portal. In view of the IANA transition and given ICANN's critical role in maintaining the Internet infrastructure, the question which arises is if NTIA will let go of its Administrator role then which body should succeed it?</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Transition announcement and launch of process</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On 14 March 2014, the NTIA <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"</a>announced<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a> “<i>its intent to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community”</i>. These key Internet domain name functions refer to the IANA functions. For this purpose, the NTIA<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"</a>asked<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a> the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to convene a global multistakeholder process to develop a transition proposal which has broad community support and addresses the following four principles:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;</li>
<li>Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;</li>
<li>Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and</li>
<li>Maintain the openness of the Internet.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The transition process has been split according to the three main communities naming, numbers and protocols.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Structure of the Transition Processes</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN performs both technical functions and policy-making functions. The technical functions are known as IANA functions and these are performed by ICANN are for all three communities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>I.<i> Naming function:</i></b> ICANN performs <b><i>technical and policy-making</i></b> for the names community. The technical functions are known as IANA functions and the policy-making functions relates to their role in deciding whether .xxx or .sucks should be allowed amongst other issues. There are two parallel streams of work focusing on the naming community that are crucial to completing the transition. The first, <b><i>Cross-Community Working Group to Develop an IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal on Naming Related Functions </i></b>will enable NTIA to transition out of its role in the DNS. Therefore, accountability of IANA functions is the responsibility of the CWG and accountability of policy-making functions is outside its scope. CWG has submitted its second draft to the ICG.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The second, <b><i>Cross-Community Working Group on Accountability (CCWG-Accountability)</i></b> is identifying necessary reforms to ICANN’s bylaws and processes to enhance the organization’s accountability to the global community post-transition. Therefore accountability of IANA functions is outside the scope of the CCWG. The CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability offered its first set of proposals for public comment in June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>II.<i> Numbers function:</i></b> ICANN performs only technical functions for the numbers community. The policy-making functions for numbers are performed by RIRs. CRISP is focusing on the IANA functions for numbers and has submitted their proposal to the ICG earlier this year.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>III.<i> Protocols function:</i></b> ICANN performs only technical functions for the protocols community. The policy-making functions for protocols are performed by IETF. IETF-WG is focusing on the IANA functions for protocols and has submitted their proposal to the ICG earlier this year.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Role of ICG</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">After receiving the proposals from all three communities the ICG must combine these proposals into a consolidated transition proposal and then seek public comment on all aspects of the plan. ICG’s role is crucial, because it must build a public record for the NTIA on how the three customer group submissions tie together in a manner that ensures NTIA’s<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"</a>criteria<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a> are met and institutionalized over the long term. Further, ICG's final submission to NTIA must include a plan to enhance ICANN’s accountability based on the CCWG-Accountability proposal.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA Leverage</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Reprocurement of the IANA contract is <a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">HYPERLINK "http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/"</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">essential for ICANN</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">HYPERLINK "http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/"</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">'</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">HYPERLINK "http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/"</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">s</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">HYPERLINK "http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/"</a> legitimacy<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a> in the DNS ecosystem and the authority to reopen the contract and in keeping the policy and operational functions separate meant that, NTIA could simply direct VeriSign to follow policy directives being issued from the entity replacing ICANN if they were deemed to be not complying. This worked as an effective leverage for ICANN complying to their commitments even if it is difficult to determine how this oversight was exercised. Perceptually, this has been interpreted as a broad overreach particularly, in the context of issues of sovereignty associated with ccTLDs and the gTLDs in their influence in shaping markets. However, it is important to bear in mind that the NTIA authorization comes after the operator, ICANN—has validated the request and does not deal with the substance of the request rather focuses merely on compliance with outlined procedure.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA's role in the transition process</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA in its<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_second_quarterly_iana_report_05.07.15.pdf"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_second_quarterly_iana_report_05.07.15.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_second_quarterly_iana_report_05.07.15.pdf"</a>Second Quarterly Report to the Congress<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a> for the period of February 1-March 31, 2015 has outlined some clarifications on the process ahead. It confirmed the flexibility of extending the contract or reducing the time period for renewal, based on community decision. The report also specified that the NTIA would consider a proposal only if it has been developed in consultation with the multi-stakeholder community. The transition proposal should have broad community support and does not seek replacement of NTIA's role with a government-led or intergovernmental organization solution. Further the proposal should maintain security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS, the openness of the Internet and must meet the needs and expectations of the global customers and partners of the IANA services. NTIA will only review a comprehensive plan that includes all these elements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Once the communities develop and ICG submits a consolidated proposal, NTIA will ensure that the proposal has been adequately “stress tested” to ensure the continued stability and security of the DNS. NTIA also added that any proposed processes or structures that have been tested to see if they work, prior to the submission—will be taken into consideration in NTIA's review. The report clarified that NTIA will review and assess the changes made or proposed to enhance ICANN’s accountability before initiating the transition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Prior to ICANN'53, Lawrence E. Strickling Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information and NTIA Administrator HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/stakeholder-proposals-come-together-icann-meeting-argentina"has posed some questions for consideration<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a> by the communities prior to the completion of the transition plan. The issues and questions related to CCWG-Accountability draft are outlined below:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Proposed <b><i>new or modified community empowerment tools—</i></b>how can the CCWG ensure that the creation of new organizations or tools will not interfere with the security and stability of the DNS during and after the transition? Do these new committees and structures <b><i>create a different set of accountability questions</i></b>?</li>
<li>Proposed membership model for community empowerment—have <b><i>other possible models</i></b> been thoroughly examined, detailed, and documented? Has CCWG designed stress tests of the various models to address how the multistakeholder model is preserved <b><i>if individual ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees opt out</i></b>?</li>
<li>Has CCWG developed stress tests to address the <b><i>potential risk of capture and barriers to entry for new participants</i></b> of the various models? Further, have stress tests been considered to address <b><i>potential unintended consequences of “operationalizing” groups</i></b> that to date have been advisory in nature?</li>
<li>Suggestions on improvements to the current Independent Review Panel (IRP) that has been criticized for its lack of accountability—how does the CCWG proposal <b><i>analyze and remedy existing concerns with the IRP</i></b>?</li>
<li>In designing a plan for improved accountability, should the CCWG consider what exactly is the <b><i>role of the ICANN Board within the multistakeholder model</i></b>? Should the <b><i>standard for Board action</i></b> be to confirm that the community has reached consensus, and if so, what <b><i>accountability mechanisms are needed</i></b> to ensure the Board operates in accordance with that standard?</li>
<li>The proposal is primarily focused on the accountability of the ICANN Board—has the CCWG considered <b><i>accountability improvements</i></b> that would apply to <b><i>ICANN management and staff or to the various ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees</i></b>?</li>
<li>NTIA has also asked the CCWG to <b><i>build a public record and thoroughly document</i></b> how the NTIA criteria have been met and will be maintained in the future.</li>
<li>Has the CCWG identified and <b><i>addressed issues of implementation </i></b>so that the community and ICANN can implement the plan as expeditiously as possible once NTIA has reviewed and accepted it.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA has also sought community’s input on timing to finalize and implement the transition plan if it were approved. The Buenos Aires meeting became a crucial point in the transtion process as following the meeting, NTIA will need to make a determination on extending its current contract with ICANN. Keeping in mind that the community and ICANN will need to implement all work items identified by the ICG and the Working Group on Accountability as prerequisites for the transition before the contract can end, the community’s input is critical.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA's legal standing</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On 25th February, 2015 the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation on 'Preserving the Multi-stakeholder Model of Internet Governance'<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14">[14]</a> heard from NTIA head Larry Strickling, Ambassador Gross and Fadi Chehade. The hearing sought to plug any existing legal loopholes, and tighten its administrative, technical, financial, public policy, and political oversight over the entire process no matter which entity takes up the NTIA function. The most important takeaway from this Congressional hearing came from Larry Strickling’s testimony<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15">[15]</a> who stated that NTIA has no legal or statutory responsibility to manage the DNS.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If <b><i>the NTIA does not have the legal responsibility to act, and its role was temporary; on what basis is the NTIA driving the current IANA Transition process without the requisite legal authority or Congressional mandate?</i></b> Historically, the NTIA oversight, effectively devised as a leverage for ICANN fulfilling its commitments have not been open to discussion.<a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/pdfnOquQlhsmM.pdf"> </a><a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/pdfnOquQlhsmM.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/pdfnOquQlhsmM.pdf"</a>Concerns have also been raised<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16">[16]</a> on the lack of engagement with non-US governments, organizations and persons prior to initiating or defining the scope and conditions of the transition. Therefore, any IANA transition plan must consider this lack of consultation, develop a multi-stakeholder process as the way forward—even if the NTIA wants to approve the final transition plan.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Need to strengthen Diversity Principle</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Following submissions by various stakeholders raising concerns regarding developing world participation, representation and lack of multilingualism in the transition process—the Diversity Principle was included by ICANN in the Revised Proposal of 6 June 2014. Given that representatives from developing countries as well as from stakeholder communities outside of the ICANN community are unable to productively involve themselves in such processes because of lack of multilingualism or unfamiliarity with its way of functioning merely mentioning diversity as a principle is not adequate to ensure abundant participation. As CIS has pointed out<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17">[17]</a> before issues have been raised about the domination by North American or European entities which results in undemocratic, unrepresentative and non-transparent decision-making in such processes. Accordingly, all the discussions in the process should be translated into multiple native languages of participants in situ, so that everyone participating in the process can understand what is going on. Adequate time must be given for the discussion issues to be translated and circulated widely amongst all stakeholders of the world, before a decision is taken or a proposal is framed. This was a concern raised in the recent CCWG proposal which was extended as many communities did not have translated texts or adequate time to participate.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Representation of the global multistakeholder community in ICG</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Currently, the Co-ordination Group includes representatives from ALAC, ASO, ccNSO, GNSO, gTLD registries, GAC, ICC/BASIS, IAB, IETF, ISOC, NRO, RSSAC and SSAC. Most of these representatives belong to the ICANN community, and is not representative of the global multistakeholder community including governments. This is not representative of even a multistakeholder model which the US <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">HYPERLINK "http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design"</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">g</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">HYPERLINK "http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design"</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">ov</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">HYPERLINK "http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design"</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">ernment </a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">HYPERLINK "http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design"</a>has announced<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18">[18]</a> for the transition; nor in the multistakeholder participation spirit of NETmundial. Adequate number of seats on the Committee must be granted to each stakeholder so that they can each coordinate discussions within their own communities and ensure wider and more inclusive participation.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's role in the transition process</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Another issue of concern in the pre-transition process has been ICANN having been charged with facilitating this transition process. This decision calls to question the legitimacy of the process given that the suggestions from the proposals envision a more permanent role for ICANN in DNS management. As Kieren McCarthy has pointed out <a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19">[19]</a>ICANN has taken several steps to retain the balance of power in managing these functions which have seen considerable pushback from the community. These include an attempt to control the process by announcing two separate processes<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20">[20]</a> – one looking into the IANA transition, and a second at its own accountability improvements – while insisting the two were not related. That effort was beaten down<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21">[21]</a> after an unprecedented letter by the leaders of every one of ICANN's supporting organizations and advisory committees that said the two processes must be connected.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Next, ICANN was accused of stacking the deck<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22">[22]</a> by purposefully excluding groups skeptical of ICANN’s efforts, and by trying to give ICANN's chairman the right to personally select the members of the group that would decide the final proposal. That was also beaten back. ICANN staff also produced a "scoping document"<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23">[23]</a>, that pre-empt any discussion of structural separation and once again community pushback forced a backtrack.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24">[24]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These concerns garner more urgency given recent developments with the community working <a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html">HYPERLINK "http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html"</a>groups<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25">[25]</a> and ICANN divisive view of the long-term role of ICANN in DNS management. Further, given HYPERLINK "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGwbYljtNyI#t=1164"ICANNHYPERLINK "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGwbYljtNyI#t=1164" HYPERLINK "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGwbYljtNyI#t=1164"President Chehade’s comments that the CWG is not doing its job<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26">[26]</a>, is populated with people who do not know anything and the “IANA process needs to be left alone as much as possible”. Fadi also specified that ICANN had begun the formal process of initiating a direct contract with VeriSign to request and authorise changes to be implemented by VeriSign. <b><i>While ICANN may see itself without oversight in this relationship with VeriSign, it is imperative that proposals bear this plausible outcome in mind and put forth suggestions to counter this.</i></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The<a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html"> </a><a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html">HYPERLINK "http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html"</a>update from IETF on the ongoing negotiation with ICANN on their proposal<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27">[27]</a> related to protocol parameters has also flagged that ICANN is unwilling to cede to any text which would suggest ICANN relinquishing its role in the operations of protocol parameters to a subsequent operator, should the circumstances demand this. ICANN has stated that agreeing to such text now would possibly put them in breach of their existing agreement with the NTIA. Finally,<a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712"> </a><a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712">HYPERLINK "https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712"</a><a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712">ICANN </a><a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712">HYPERLINK "https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712"</a>Board Member, Markus Kummer<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28">[28]</a> stated that if ICANN was to not approve any aspect of the proposal this would hinder the consensus and therefore, the transition would not be able to move forward.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN has been designated the convenor role by the US government on basis of its unique position as the current IANA functions contractor and the global coordinator for the DNS. However it is this unique position itself which creates a conflict of interest as in the role of contractor of IANA functions, ICANN has an interest in the outcome of the process being conducive to ICANN. In other words, there exists a potential for abuse of the process by ICANN, which may tend to steer the process towards an outcome favourable to itself.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><i>Therefore there exists a strong rationale for defining the limitations of the role of ICANN as convenor.</i></b> The community has suggested that ICANN should limit its role to merely facilitating discussions and not extend it to reviewing or commenting on emerging proposals from the process. Additional safeguards need to be put in place to avoid conflicts of interest or appearance of conflicts of interest. ICANN should further not compile comments on drafts to create a revised draft at any stage of the process. Additionally, ICANN staff must not be allowed to be a part of any group or committee which facilitates or co-ordinates the discussion regarding IANA transition.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">How is the Obama Administration and the US Congress playing this?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Even as the issues of separation of ICANN's policy and administrative role remained unsettled, in the wake of the Snowden revelations, NTIA initiated the long due transition of the IANA contract oversight to a global, private, non-governmental multi-stakeholder institution on March 14, 2014. This announcement immediately raised questions from Congress on whether the transition decision was dictated by technical considerations or in response to political motives, and if the Obama Administration had the authority to commence such a transition unilaterally, without prior open stakeholder consultations. Republican<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-internet-icann-idUSKBN0OI2IJ20150602"> </a><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-internet-icann-idUSKBN0OI2IJ20150602">HYPERLINK "http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-internet-icann-idUSKBN0OI2IJ20150602"</a>lawmakers have raised concerns about the IANA transition plan <a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29">[29]</a>worried that it may allow other countries to capture control.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">More recently,<a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2251"> </a><a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2251">HYPERLINK "https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2251"</a>Defending Internet Freedom Act<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30">[30]</a> has been re-introduced to US Congress. This bill seeks ICANN adopt the recommendations of three internet community groups, about the transition of power, before the US government relinquishes control of the IANA contract. The bill also seeks ownership of the .gov and .mil top-level domains be granted to US government and that ICANN submit itself to the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a legislation similar to the RTI in India, so that its records and other information gain some degree of public access.It has also been asserted by ICANN that neither NTIA nor the US Congress will approve any transition plan which leaves open the possibility of non-US IANA Functions Operator in the future.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Funding of the transition</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Obama administration is also<a href="http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393"> </a><a href="http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393">HYPERLINK "http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393"</a>fighting a Republican-backed Commerce, Justice, Science, and <a href="http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393">HYPERLINK "http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393"</a>Related Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 2578)<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31">[31]</a> which seeks to block NTIA funding the IANA transition. One provision of this bill restricts NTIA from using appropriated dollars for IANA stewardship transition till the end of the fiscal year, September 30, 2015 also the base period of the contact in function. This peculiar proviso in the Omnibus spending bill actually implies that Congress believes that the IANA Transition should be delayed with proper deliberation, and not be rushed as ICANN and NTIA are inclined to.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The IANA Transition cannot take place in violation of US Federal Law that has defunded it within a stipulated time-window. At the Congressional Internet Caucus in January 2015, NTIA head Lawrence Strickling clarified that NTIA will “not use appropriated funds to terminate the IANA functions...” or “to amend the cooperative agreement with Verisign to eliminate NTIA's role in approving changes to the authoritative root zone file...”. This implicitly establishes that the IANA contract will be extended, and Strickling confirmed that there was no hard deadline for the transition.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">DOTCOM Act</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Communications and Technology Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/markup/communications-and-technology-subcommittee-vote-dotcom-act"> </a><a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/markup/communications-and-technology-subcommittee-vote-dotcom-act">HYPERLINK "http://energycommerce.house.gov/markup/communications-and-technology-subcommittee-vote-dotcom-act"</a>amended the DOTCOM Act<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32">[32]</a>, a bill which, in earlier drafts, would have halted the IANA functions transition process for up to a year pending US Congressional approval. The bill in its earlier version represented unilateral governmental interference in the multistakeholder process. The new bill reflects a much deeper understanding of, and confidence in, the significant amount of work that the global multistakeholder community has undertaken in planning both for the transition of IANA functions oversight and for the increased accountability of ICANN. The amended DOTCOM Act would call for the NTIA to certify – as a part of a proposed GAO report on the transition – that <i>“the required changes to ICANN’s by-laws contained in the final report of ICANN’s Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and the changes to ICANN’s bylaws required by ICANN’s IANA have been implemented.” </i>The bill enjoys immense bipartisan support<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33">[33]</a>, and is being lauded as a prudent and necessary step for ensuring the success of the IANA transition.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> IANA Functions Contract <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/sf_26_pg_1-2-final_award_and_sacs.pdf> accessed 15th June 2015</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Daniel Karrenberg, The Internet Domain Name System Explained For Nonexperts <http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/The%20Internet%20Domain%20Name%20System%20Explained%20for%20Non-Experts%20(ENGLISH).pdf> accessed 15 June 2015</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> David Post and Danielle Kehl, Controlling Internet Infrastructure The “IANA Transition” And Why It Matters For The Future Of The Internet, Part I (1st edn, Open Technology Institute 2015) <https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Iana.org, 'IANA — Root Files' (2015) <https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files> accessed 11 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> 'NTIA's Role In Root Zone Management' (2014). <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> <i>Contract</i> ( 2011) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> Kieren McCarthy, 'Confidential Information Exposed Over 300 Times In ICANN Security Snafu' <i>The Register</i> (2015) <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> NTIA, ‘NTIA Announces Intent To Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions’ (2014) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> NTIA, ‘NTIA Announces Intent To Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions’ (2014) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a> NTIA, ‘NTIA Announces Intent To Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions’ (2014) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a> David Post and Danielle Kehl, <i>Controlling Internet Infrastructure The “IANA Transition” And Why It Matters For The Future Of The Internet, Part I</i> (1st edn, Open Technology Institute 2015) <https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a> National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 'REPORT ON THE TRANSITION OF THE STEWARDSHIP OF THE INTERNET ASSIGNED NUMBERS AUTHORITY (IANA) FUNCTIONS' (NTIA 2015) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_second_quarterly_iana_report_05.07.15.pdf> accessed 10 July 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a> Lawrence Strickling, 'Stakeholder Proposals To Come Together At ICANN Meeting In Argentina' <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/stakeholder-proposals-come-together-icann-meeting-argentina> accessed 19 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a> Philip Corwin, 'NTIA Says Cromnibus Bars IANA Transition During Current Contract Term' <http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150127_ntia_cromnibus_bars_iana_transition_during_current_contract_term/> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a> Sophia Bekele, '"No Legal Basis For IANA Transition": A Post-Mortem Analysis Of Senate Committee Hearing' <http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150309_no_legal_basis_for_iana_transition_post_mortem_senate_hearing/> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">[16]</a><i> Comments On The IANA Transition And ICANN Accountability Just Net Coalition</i> (2015) <http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/pdfnOquQlhsmM.pdf> accessed 12 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17">[17]</a> The Centre for Internet and Society, 'IANA Transition: Suggestions For Process Design' (2014) <http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18">[18]</a> The Centre for Internet and Society, 'IANA Transition: Suggestions For Process Design' (2014) <http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19">[19]</a> Kieren McCarthy, 'Let It Go, Let It Go: How Global DNS Could Survive In The Frozen Lands Outside US Control Public Comments On Revised IANA Transition Plan' <i>The Register</i> (2015) <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/05/26/iana_icann_latest/> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20">[20]</a> Icann.org, 'Resources - ICANN' (2014) <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-08-14-en> accessed 13 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21">[21]</a> <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/crocker-chehade-to-soac-et-al-18sep14-en.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22">[22]</a> Richard Forno, '[Infowarrior] - Internet Power Grab: The Duplicity Of ICANN' (<i>Mail-archive.com</i>, 2015) <https://www.mail-archive.com/infowarrior@attrition.org/msg12578.html> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23">[23]</a> ICANN, 'Scoping Document' (2014) <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-transition-scoping-08apr14-en.pdf> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24">[24]</a> Milton Mueller, 'ICANN: Anything That Doesn’T Give IANA To Me Is Out Of Scope |' (<i>Internetgovernance.org</i>, 2014) <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/04/16/icann-anything-that-doesnt-give-iana-to-me-is-out-of-scope/> accessed 12 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25">[25]</a> Andrew Sullivan, '[Ianaplan] Update On IANA Transition & Negotiations With ICANN' (<i>Ietf.org</i>, 2015) <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> accessed 14 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26">[26]</a> <i>DNA Member Breakfast With Fadi Chehadé (2015-02-11)</i> (The Domain Name Association 2015).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27">[27]</a> Andrew Sullivan, '[Ianaplan] Update On IANA Transition & Negotiations With ICANN' (<i>Ietf.org</i>, 2015) <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> accessed 14 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28">[28]</a> Mobile.twitter.com, 'Twitter' (2015) <https://mobile.twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712> accessed 12 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29">[29]</a> Alina Selyukh, 'U.S. Plan To Cede Internet Domain Control On Track: ICANN Head' <i>Reuters</i> (2015) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-internet-icann-idUSKBN0OI2IJ20150602> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30">[30]</a> 114th Congress, 'H.R.2251 - Defending Internet Freedom Act Of 2015' (2015).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31">[31]</a> John Eggerton, 'House Bill Blocks Internet Naming Oversight Handoff: White House Opposes Legislation' <i>Broadcasting & Cable</i> (2015) <http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32">[32]</a> <i>Communications And Technology Subcommittee Vote On The DOTCOM Act</i> (2015).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33">[33]</a> Timothy Wilt, 'DOTCOM Act Breezes Through Committee' <i>Digital Liberty</i> (2015) <http://www.digitalliberty.net/dotcom-act-breezes-committee-a319> accessed 22 June 2015.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transitition-stewardship-icann-accountability-1'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transitition-stewardship-icann-accountability-1</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiICANNIANAInternet GovernanceIANA Transition2015-07-31T14:56:26ZBlog EntryIANA Transition & ICANN Accountability Process and India' s Position
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/iana-transition-icann-accountability-process-indian-position
<b>Jyoti Panday participated in the workshop organized by CCAOI on "IANA Transition & ICANN Accountability Process and India' s Position" on May 30, 2015. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Dr Ajay Kumar launched the IANA Transition Report and set the context for the workshop. Dr Mahesh Uppal was the moderator of the panel and other participants included Mr Samiran Gupta, ICANN providing an overview of the current status on the transition, Mr Parminder Singh, IT for Change and Mr Rahul Sharma, DSCI sharing concerns of different stakeholders.<br /><br />The panel also saw discussion on issues in the transition process that are of relevance to India and what should their position going forward including ensuring the efficiency of ICANN Functions included in the CWG draft proposal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS raised issues around financial accountability and the role of ICANN in shaping markets therefore the urgent need for improving transparency and accountability measures.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The report launched at the workshop is <a class="external-link" href="http://www.ccaoi.in/UI/links/fwresearch/Study%20on%20the%20Indian%20Perspective%20on%20IANA%20transition.pdf">available here</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/iana-transition-icann-accountability-process-indian-position'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/iana-transition-icann-accountability-process-indian-position</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiICANNIANAInternet GovernanceIANA Transition2015-08-23T09:26:06ZNews ItemDo we need a Unified Post Transition IANA?
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/do-we-need-a-unified-post-tranistion-iana
<b>As we stand at the threshold of the IANA Transition, we at CIS find that there has been little discussion on the question of how the transition will manifest. The question we wanted to raise was whether there is any merit in dividing the three IANA functions – names, numbers and protocols – given that there is no real technical stability to be gained from a unified Post Transition IANA. The analysis of this idea has been detailed below.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Internet Architecture Board, in a submission to the NTIA in 2011 claims that splitting the IANA functions would not be desirable.<a href="#fn1" name="fr1">[1] </a>The IAB notes, “There exists synergy and interdependencies between the functions, and having them performed by a single operator facilitates coordination among registries, even those that are not obviously related,” and also that that the IETF makes certain policy decisions relating to names and numbers as well, and so it is useful to have a single body. But they don’t say why having a single email address for all these correspondences, rather than 3 makes any difference: Surely, what’s important is cooperation and coordination. Just as IETF, ICANN, NRO being different entities doesn’t harm the Internet, splitting the IANA function relating to each entity won’t harm the Internet either. Instead will help stability by making each community responsible for the running of its own registers, rather than a single point of failure: ICANN and/or “PTI”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A number of commentators have supported this viewpoint in the past: Bill Manning of University of Southern California’s ISI (who has been involved in DNS operations since DNS started), Paul M. Kane (former Chairman of CENTR's Board of Directors), Jean-Jacques Subrenat (who is currently an ICG member), Association française pour le nommage Internet en coopération (AFNIC), the Internet Governance Project, InternetNZ, and the Coalition Against Domain Name Abuse (CADNA).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Internet Governance Project stated: “IGP supports the comments of Internet NZ and Bill Manning regarding the feasibility and desirability of separating the distinct IANA functions. Structural separation is not only technically feasible, it has good governance and accountability implications. By decentralizing the functions we undermine the possibility of capture by governmental or private interests and make it more likely that policy implementations are based on consensus and cooperation.”<a href="#fn2" name="fr2">[2]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Similarly, CADNA in its 2011 submission to NTIA notes that that in the current climate of technical innovation and the exponential expansion of the Internet community, specialisation of the IANA functions would result in them being better executed. The argument is also that delegation of the technical and administrative functions among other capable entities (such as the IETF and IAB for protocol parameters, or an international, neutral organization with understanding of address space protocols as opposed to RIRs) determined by the IETF is capable of managing this function would ensure accountability in Internet operation. Given that the IANA functions are mainly registry-maintenance function, they can to a large extent be automated. However, a single system of automation would not fit all three.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Instead of a single institution having three masters, it is better for the functions to be separated. Most importantly, if one of the current customers wishes to shift the contract to another IANA functions operator, even if it isn’t limited by contract, it is <i>limited by the institutional design</i>, since iana.org serves as a central repository. This limitation didn’t exist, for instance, when the IETF decided to enter into a new contract for the RFC Editor role. This transition presents the best opportunity to cleave the functions logically, and make each community responsible for the functioning of their own registers, with IETF, which is mostly funded by ISOC, taking on the responsibility of handing the residual registries, and a discussion about the .ARPA and .INT gTLDs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">From the above discussion, three main points emerge:</p>
<ul>
<li>Splitting of the IANA functions allows for technical specialisation leading to greater efficiency of the IANA functions.</li>
<li>Splitting of the IANA functions allows for more direct accountability, and no concentration of power.</li>
<li>Splitting of the IANA functions allows for ease of shifting of the {names,number,protocol parameters} IANA functions operator without affecting the legal structure of any of the other IANA function operators.</li>
</ul>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr1" name="fn1">1</a>]. IAB response to the IANA FNOI, July 28, 2011. See: https://www.iab.org/wp-content/IAB-uploads/2011/07/IANA-IAB-FNOI-2011.pdf</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">[<a href="#fr2" name="fn2">2</a>]. Internet Governance Project, Comments of the Internet Governance Project on the NTIA's "Request for Comments on the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions" (Docket # 110207099-1099-01) February 25, 2011 See: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/federal-register-notices/2011/request-comments-internet-assigned-numbers-authority-iana-functions</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/do-we-need-a-unified-post-tranistion-iana'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/do-we-need-a-unified-post-tranistion-iana</a>
</p>
No publisherPranesh Prakash, Padmini Baruah and Jyoti PandayIANAInternet GovernanceIANA Transition2015-10-27T00:46:37ZBlog Entry