Centre for Internet and Society

My Experiment with Scam Baiting

sahana — 2012-03-13T10:43:28Z

Today, as I am sure many of you have experienced, Internet scams are widespread and very deceptive. As part of my research into privacy and the Internet, I decided to follow a scam and attempt to fully understand how Internet scams work, and what privacy implications they have for Internet users. Though there are many different types of scams that take place over the Internet —identity scams, housing scams, banking scams— just to name a few. I decided to look in depth at the lottery scam.

Day 1: July 4, 2011

On July 4, I received a spam mail from Shell BP Manchester England (lamarc65@cs.com). The e-mail informed me that my e-mail address had won a sum of $550,000 which was held on July 3, 2011 in England. In order to claim my prize the e-mail instructed me to confirm the receipt of the mail by submitting a few of my personal details to one Dr. Mohammed Al Maliki. This is an extract from the letter asking for my information:

Information Requested:

Your full Name:
Contact address:
Your Telephone:
Your Age:
Your occupation:
Your country of origin:

Congratulations.
Yours Sincerely,
Mrs Roseline Lott
Shell Prize announcer, England.

Deciding to reply to the email and see what happened, I responded to Dr. Mohammed Al Maliki (dr.mohamedmalik@gmail.com) with the information that the e-mail had asked, only I substituted my real information with the following fake information:

Shaiza Sarkar
B-196, CR Park, New Delhi - 110019
09916000603
23 yrs old
India

To my surprise he replied to my mail the same day at 4:59pm. In this mail he informed me that he had sent my details to Lloyds Bank who would be responsible for the payment of my prize. He asked me to inform him after I receive a mail from the bank. The e-mail contained a phone number for me to call. I tried to call the number mentioned in the mail but there was no reply.

Again to my surprise, I received a mail from Lloyds Bank at 6:58 p.m. the same day with a list of documents and details that I was supposed to send them to claim the prize money. Lloyds Bank had also attached a deposit certificate to ‘prove’ that Shell Petroleum Development Company had deposited the prize money in the bank. Below is an extraction of the e-mail I received from Lloyds Bank.

"FROM THE DESK OF DR. MOHAMED MALIK
REGIONAL CLAIMS AGENT,
SHELL PETROLEUM INTERNATIONAL LOTTERY PROGRAM.
Regional Office:
St James Court, Great Park Road,
Almondsbury Park, Bradley Stoke,
Bristol BS32 4QJ, England
Contact: +447035974608
“LLOYDS BANK PLC
ADMINISTRATIVE HEADQUARTERS.
LONDON, ENGLAND, UNITED KINGDOM.
REF...FILENOS2345/LTB
ATTENTION: SARKAR SHAIZA
*REGARDING YOUR PRIZE FROM SHELL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT COMPANY*
PLEASE SEND US THE DOCUMENTS BELOW;
1. A CERTIFICATE OF AWARD FROM SHELL PETROLEUM CONTACT DR MOHAMED MALIK
2. A SCANNED COPY OF EITHER YOUR DRIVERS LICENSE OR YOUR INTERNATIONAL PASSPORT OR WORK I.D CARD.
3. A SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF CLAIM FROM THE CROWN COURT HERE IN LONDON,YOU ARE REQUIRED TO CONTACT [DR MOHAMED MALIK]YOUR AGENT FOR ALL THIS.
SIR PAUL WISCONFIELD.
HEAD OF OPERATIONS.
LLOYDS TSB BANK PLC

Day 2: July 5, 2011

The next day I informed Dr. Mohammed Al Maliki of the above letter from the bank, as instructed to at 8:58 p.m. At 9:45 p.m., Dr. Mohammed Al Maliki emailed me back with the certificate of award from Shell Petroleum Development Company with my fake name printed on it.

Though the first two documents that Lloyds Bank required me to obtain were standard enough, the turning point in this entire scam was the third document that Lloyds Bank asked me to acquire. The third document asked me to present a sworn affidavit of claim from the Crown Court in London. Following the instructions given by the bank, I again emailed Dr. Mohammed Al Maliki. He replied with instructions for me to contact Barrister Wilson Burrows (ESQ) of Wilson and Co. Law Chambers for this document. I tried to search for Wilson and Co. Chambers on the Internet and found that no company with such a name exists.

This is the certificate of award provided to me by Dr. Mohammed Al Maliki:

Day 3: July 6, 2011

At 1:47 p.m. I mailed Wilson and Co. Law Chambers informing them about the sworn affidavit that I required in order to claim the lottery prize. The same day at 8:25 p.m. the Law Chambers sent me the following mail with an application form, and asked me to transfer 520 pounds through a Western Union Money Transfer to the Chamber’s Accountant Mr. Preston Doyle. I checked the address provided in the mail to see if it existed. The Google map showed that the given pin code “L14JJ”- London - was a pin code for Liverpool, Merseyside UK, which is not London , and not where Wilson and Co. Law Chambers claimed to be based. Additionally, the Law Chambers attached a form for the affidavit in this mail.

Below is an extract from the email I received from Wilson and Co. Law Chambers:
“The Principal Attorney
Wilson and co Chambers
#18 Harms Road Manchester
L14JJ - London.
Supreme Solicitors, Principal Attorneys and Property Managers
Kind Attention: Client,
As stated in the attached form, the completed form should be returned with the Court Oath Fee. For further processing, see below fees;
Court Oath Fee: 250 Pounds
Attorney Fee: 270 Pounds
------------------------------------------
Total Fee: 520 Pounds
-----------------------------------------
To send this money, go to any WESTERN UNION MONEY TRANSFER OFFICE nearest to you and make the payment to the Chamber's Accountant - Mr. Preston Doyle with the following details -
Receiver's Name: Mr. Preston Doyle
Receiver's Location: London, United Kingdom.
Receiver's Address: #18 Harms Road Manchester, L14JJ – London
Amount: £ 520.00 (Five Hundred and Twenty Pounds)
Regards,
Mrs.Wilson Burrows(ESQ)
(Registrar)
Mrs. Ivon Samuel (KBE) (Secretary)”

Day 4: July 7, 2011

After receiving the e-mail asking for a money transfer, I was curious and wished to probe more. Thus, I wrote to Wilson and Co Law Chambers and explained that a Western Union Transfer was not available in my village. The same day at 6:48 p.m. the Law Chambers sent me a mail saying that the Honourable Chamber recognizes only Western Union Transfer as the safest mode for transactions. I did not reply to this mail, as I knew I would not be able to go any further with my investigation. Though I was disappointed because this was the end to my investigation into lottery scams, and I still had questions that I wanted answered, the last e-mail the Law Chambers sent me was very interesting. In the last email sent to me by the Law Chambers requested (in a very pushy tone) that I should not tell anyone about my prize money, and that it was in fact in my best interest not to tell anyone.

Below is the extract of this mail:

“So do not discuss your winning with anybody until your prize has been transferred to you. It is for your own good. And it is at that time alone that you can be used for advert purposes by our company. So the success of this transfer lies sorely in your hands. These are the exact words from the Director this morning.”

Regards,

Mrs.Wilson Burrows (ESQ)

(Registrar)

His Lordship, Justice Ivon Samuel (KBE) (Secretary)

Day 5: July 8, 2011

Originally I wrote to the Law Chambers telling them I did not have access to a Western Union for the purpose of seeing if they use other mediums to receive money. Surprisingly, at 1:47 p.m. Wilson and Co. Law Chambers emailed me. The e-mail said that they would grant me the privilege of using a direct deposit of the 250 pounds into their correspondents account in India. In the mail they asked me to confirm that I would use this method of payment, and that once confirmed, that they would furnish me with their correspondent’s account details. Interested, I confirmed. After my e-mail confirmation at 9:47 p.m. they emailed me the details of their correspondent in India.

Below are the details of the account that I was supposed to transfer the money into:

This is the account details you will deposit the money into:
Account Name: L. MOHAN SINGH
Bank name: HDFC BANK
Branch: DELHI
Account number: 0609190004391
Ifsc Code : HDFC0000609
Pan Card: DDMPS9075M

Day 6: July 11, 2011

I did not deposit the money (obviously) and I did not e-mail the bank or the Law Chambers, I did receive a mail from Wilson and Co. Law Chambers informing me that their reputable organization would not tolerate my laxity. Unfortunately, because I could not pay the fee to their correspondent and obtain the affidavit, I was unable to follow the scam any further. Despite this dead end I was curious to know if they would provide me with the phone number of their Indian correspondent. Thus, I wrote them a mail to humbly apologise for the delay. I further asked them to provide me with the correspondent’s phone number claiming that the bank was rejecting his profile due to security protocols.

Day 7: July 12, 2011

The Law Chambers responded, informing me that they did not wish to give the correspondents number. In their e-mail they made it quite clear that for online banking all that is needed is the IFSC code. Therefore, I had to stop here.

This is the extract of the mail they sent me when I asked for the phone number:

The Principal Attorney
Wilson and co Chambers
#18 Harms Road Manchester
L14JJ - London.
Supreme Solicitors, Principal Attorneys and Property Managers

Kind Attention: Client,
This Honorable Chambers is in receipt of your mail. It is very important for you to know that laxity will not be accepted anymore. For the online transfer of this payment, you do not need any phone number, all you need is the IFSC Code already supplied to you. Once more, the IFSC Code is HDFC0000609. That is all you need to make an online transfer.

While I stopped following the scam at this point, many people might have continued with the process without any knowledge of it being a scam. Thus, one should be very sceptical about individuals or organizations who ask for personal and banking information.

Conclusions

In my experiment with scam baiting, I realized that:

They introduced me to various parties to make this entire scheme look professional. I initially assumed that I would have to carry out the process with the Shell Petroleum Development Company alone.
In the beginning of the experiment I initially thought the scam was about taking my account number and hacking into it. During my experiment I realized that the scam was not designed to make money by emptying my bank account, but instead was designed to profit off of the various admission fees such as the Sworn Affidavit.
Due to the speed by which they were able to respond to my emails, I realized that they had pre-prepared fake documents – ready to send to anyone who emailed them regarding claiming the offered lottery prize.
Throughout all of our e-mail exchanges I noticed that the individuals behind the scam only used a G-mail account. Curious, I checked their IP address – hoping to find out more information and possibly track their location – but found that Google does not reveal senders IP address information (which is in fact a very good thing in terms of privacy protection!)

For a detailed understanding of different types of scams visit here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/scam-baiting

UID: Nothing to Hide, Nothing to Fear?

shilpa — 2011-09-28T11:44:21Z

Isn’t it interesting that authorities ask you about your identity and you end up showing your proof of existence! Isn’t this breaching into one’s personal life? Why so much transparency only from the public side? Why can’t the government be equally transparent to the public?, asks Shilpa Narani.

Before I get into an argument, I would like to share with you that my research is based on a comparative study of articles published on UID in leading newspapers like the Times of India, the Indian Express, the Hindustan Times, and its supplement LiveMint, Business Standard, Asian Age, DNA India, Bangalore Mirror, Deccan Chronicle and Deccan Herald. My research shows that the government officials and the individuals working for the UIDAI, who are involved in proposing identity system, are in fact hide their own identity from the public.

Background

A pan-India project to “identify” each resident was formally inaugurated in 2009, with the establishment of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) as an office attached to the Planning Commission.[1] The goal of the Unique ID project is to issue a unique identity number to every resident in the country. The Unique Identification number (UID) will be linked to every resident’s basic demographic and biometric details, and stored in the UIDAI central database.[2] Now a 12 digit number will henceforth decide whether you exist or not? It will decide whether you remain a known or an unknown person? With this blog I would like to highlight the irony in the UIDAI's attempt to establish if a person is known or is unknown with a 12 digit number.

An identity card virus seems to be spreading across India. Everyone is praising the UID and the social, economic, and political improvements it will bring. “The aim of the UID scheme is to bring transparency in the system,'' says Sonia Gandhi.[3] One has to wonder though — if the aim of the UID is to bring transparency, why it is that government and UIDAI officials are not transparent themselves?

Findings

According to my research, in 55 news articles taken from different newspapers mentioned above, there are 66 persons who shared their views on UID only on the condition of anonymity. Most of these individuals were public servants who themselves did not wish to be identified. For instance, one individual was from the department of information technology, who is working on the UID project and with the UIDAI itself.

Total Anonymous

As one can see from the graph above, the total number of anonymous people sharing their perspectives on the UID are more than the total number of identified people sharing their perspective on the UID. Below is a detailed review of UID articles from each newspaper:

Times of India: Out of 13 articles, Times of India quoted nine anonymous sources in which there were HRD officials, civic sources, sources from census operation department, collectorate sources, senior postal officials, UIDAI officials, and unclassified individuals. Times of India only quoted four identified sources.

Indian Express: Out of 10 articles, the Indian Express quoted twelve anonymous sources including sources from senior officials of the AADHAR office, senior Delhi government officials and some unclassified sources. Again only four identified sources were quoted.

LiveMint: Out of 7 articles, the Live Mint quoted 15 anonymous sources including sources from the Information Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA), UIDAI, Bank of India, a senior SEBI official, sources from ministry, etc. Only 11 sources revealed their identity.

Hindustan Times: Out of 3 articles, there were 6 anonymous sources, and 5 sources that were identified. Anonymous sources were from UIDAI, finance ministry, and other government officials.

Deccan Herald: Out of 11 articles, there were 14 anonymous sources and only 6 were identified. Anonymous sources included UIDAI officials, banks, senior officials from government, and unclassified sources as well.

Asian Age: Out of 4 articles, there were 5 anonymous sources. Anonymous sources included government officials and some unclassified officials.

Power of Identity: Why is anonymity important?

UID has the potential to threaten an individual’s ability to be anonymous in society. Anonymity results when the personal identity or personally identifiable information of a person is not known. As demonstrated above, a certain amount of anonymity already exists in India today, but with the coming of the UID there is the potential that this will be changed.

Conclusion

As Sonia Gandhi herself said, the UID's aim is to bring transparency in the system. Though the government is eager to make the Indian public transparent in their everyday lives, clearly from the analysis above, individuals working for the government and UIDAI are not comfortable being transparent to the public. It is ironic that the individuals developing and working for this scheme are not willing to voice their opinion and be identified, but private individuals are. Though the UID scheme is being promoted as a way to make the people accountable and visible in the eyes of the government, from the very start of the project the UIDAI and government have kept themselves under a cloud of secrecy. The government’s non-transparent attitude towards this project and the unawareness of its use on the people makes the whole scheme shady and unnecessary.

Notes

[1]http://uidai.gov.in/UID_PDF/Front_Page_Articles/Documents/Strategy_Overveiw-001.pdf

[2]http://uidai.gov.in/UID_PDF/Working_Papers/UID_and_iris_paper_final.pdf

[3]http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-09-30/india/28243557_1_uid-number-unique-id-numbers-tembhli

Download the UID Summary Grid here [Excel, 19kb]

For the summary of articles in newspapers, click here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/uid-nothing-to-hide-fear

An Interview with Activist Shubha Chacko: Privacy and Sex Workers

elonnai — 2012-03-28T06:26:03Z

On February 20th I had the opportunity to speak with Shubha Chacko on privacy and sex workers. Ms. Chacko is an activist who works for Aneka, an NGO based in Bangalore, which fights for the human rights of sexual minorities. In my interview with Ms. Chacko I tried to understand how privacy impacts the lives of sex workers in India. The below is an account of our conversation.

Introduction

In our research we have been exploring where and how privacy is found in different areas of Indian society, law, and culture. As part of our research we have been holding public conferences across the country to raise awareness and gather opinions around privacy. One area that was discussed in the public conference in Bangalore was the privacy of sex workers. Shubha Chacko, who is from Aneka - an NGO located in Bangalore which fights for the human rights of sexual minorities, made a presentation that focused on the privacy challenges that sex workers in India face. In our interview Ms. Chacko pointed out many misconceptions that society holds about sex workers’ lives. She also detailed the challenges of stigma and discrimination that sex workers face, and described the precarious position that sex workers find themselves in as their work is constantly being pushed out of the public sphere by the law and society. I later interviewed Ms. Chacko to follow up on her presentation on privacy and sex workers. During the interview I had the opportunity to speak with both Ms. Chacko and a board member from the Karnataka Sex Workers Union. The following is meant to provide a perspective on how and in what ways society, law, media and tradition invades the privacy of sex workers. Though the piece is focused on the lives of sex workers, many of the issues raised are not limited to only sex workers, but characterize other marginalized communities as well.

When I began the interview with Ms. Chacko I was hoping to do a piece that looked at the different elements of a sex worker’s life, and identified the points at which their privacy was invaded – such as in contacting a client, going to the doctors, etc. After I began my interview only, I realized how privacy impacts sex workers is much more complicated than a life cycle analysis. Among other things, privacy issues for sex workers prompt questions challenging social definitions of public and private, having the right to an identity and a recognized profession, and having the autonomy to control decisions about oneself.

Basic Facts and Background Information:

Karnataka has been found to have 85,000 sex workers, and India has an estimated 2 million female sex workers [1]

Sex work is not against the law in India, but any commercialized aspect of the trade is prohibited – including running a brothel or soliciting a client.

Sex work is a multi-faceted profession with many positive and negative complexities that are rarely known to the public.

Understanding the Challenge of the Public and the Private

My interview with Ms. Chacko began with my seeking an understanding of the challenges that traditional notions of the public sphere and the private sphere pose for sex workers. Ms. Chacko explained that to understand how privacy impacts the life of a sex worker, it is important to first understand that sex workers by profession confront and question traditional conceptions of the public and the private. Sex and everything associated with it is seen as something that is to be kept only in the private sphere. The work of sex workers brings sex into the public sphere, and thus the workers are seen as being public women not entitled to privacy, because they stand on street corners and conduct their work in the public. This notion that sex workers are public women without a right to privacy shows through in the way they are treated by the media, the police, NGOs, and researchers. An example of this tension and society’s response can be seen in the recent elections. On April 6th, a Times of India news article reported that the election commission will be setting up “special booths” for sex workers to vote in because “while the sex workers had been waiting in queues to cast their votes, common people were not comfortable with that”[2]

What is the Challenge of the Public and the Private?

“It starts with a conception of issues around privacy vis-à-vis sex workers. The general perception is that sex workers are considered “public women”, because they are considered available to the public and because they sell sexual services on the streets (and are seen in contrast to the “good” woman who is confined to the private world of the home This then leads people to assume that then sex workers have are not entitled to privacy. Also sex workers are forced to reckon with issues of sex and sexuality, and if you talk about issues of sexuality - issues that are considered private are forced into the public domain, so sex workers by their presence force these issues into the public domain. So notions of privacy become complicated by this challenge of what is public and private, because the sex workers’ presence brings into the public domain what is private.”

How does this tension of the public and the private translate into privacy violations?

"Due to the stigma around sex work all rights of sex workers are seriously compromised; with impunity. Thus, privacy is a threshold issue.

The violation of privacy happens at various points, for example the way the media deals with them – publishing their photographs, outing them without their consent, talking about them without their consent. There are the police who are often engaged in so called “rescue and rehabilitation” work, but in the process of rescuing the sex workers, disregard the harmful impacts that compromising their right to privacy will do to them. The HIV prevention intervention programs that are in place now that target sex workers (along with other ‘high risk groups”) also erode their right to confidentiality. Besides intimate details of their lives being recorded, their address and other coordinates are noted. This information along with other sensitive information including their HIV status, is often accessible to a host of people and is a potential threat to their privacy and anonymity. Researchers and NGOs too often quiz sex workers about a range of intimate details about their lives with little sensitivity and expect them to be totally candid. These interviews also raise questions that relate to privacy."

Stigma, Discrimination, and Identity

Ms. Chacko also spoke about how the stigma and discrimination that sex workers face invades their privacy. Society views sex workers in one light – as immoral women. This stigma is attached to them permanently and is a source of violence and discrimination in the home, from the state, and from society. The sex workers’ right to anonymity and identity is also restricted because of the stigma attached to their work. Sex workers do not have the ability to control information about themselves, and they face challenges in obtaining official documents like a PAN card or a passport. This stigma and its consequences impedes sex workers from functioning comfortably in society and creates a difficult tension for sex workers to live with. Society denies the presence of sex workers, and police patrol parks and other public areas chasing away individuals whom they believe to be sex workers. The increased passivisation of public spaces – parks, (for example) and the over gentrification of the neighborhoods squeeze them out

In New York, one way that sex workers have overcome this constant and sometimes violent confrontation with society is through the use of mobile phones. Sex workers will contact clients only through mobile phones. This allows them to find their clients in private and anonymous ways, and it eliminates the need of a pimp or other type of ring leader. When I asked Ms. Chacko if sex workers are using this same technique in India, she recognized that they are, but said that it is not a yet widely practiced - especially among women in rural areas.

How Restricting is the Stigma?

“Huge - hardly ever does a person’s entire identity get conflated with her with occupation or livelihood option; the way it does with sex workers. … I mean, for example, if you go to a movie - people would not say; oh, look, there is a researcher come to see a movie - people would call you by name, but if a sex worker goes to a movie they always say: oh, look, there is a sex worker. There is only one side to her identity according to society. And everyone wants to know the same thing - How did they get into sex work. There is an excessive interest in this aspect alone (and generally they are seeking simple answers) - they never ask other questions about them as a person, only about them as a sex worker. Thus, real issues of violence and exploitation are never dealt with”.

HIV Initiatives, Medical Counseling , and Privacy

Medical consultations, especially those related to HIV/AIDS, in many ways violate the privacy of sex workers.

HIV Initiatives

HIV initiatives run by the Government are often invasive and function off of privacy-violating techniques. The government runs many HIV initiatives where sex workers are employed to be “peer educators.” A peer educator’s job is to spread awareness about HIV, distribute condoms, and bring sex workers for HIV testing. The privacy and anonymity of peer educators is compromised in the job title itself. Everyone in the community knows that to be a peer educator, one must also be a sex worker. Thus, if a person is a peer educator or with a peer educator, she is immediately outed and identified as a sex worker. Furthermore, HIV testing is compulsory for sex workers, though on paper it looks as though it is a choice. Because there are quotas that must be filled, sex workers often go through HIV testing without full consent.

How do Government HIV Initiatives Violate Privacy?

“The whole HIV intervention itself violates sex workers’ privacy. Both in the sense that people get jobs as peer educators and they have to carry condoms around and talk to other sex workers, and everyone thinks that if you are a peer educator then you are a sex worker, and there is no protection for these people even though it is sponsored by the state government.”

Line Listing

The HIV programs and testing centers also violate the privacy of sex workers. The clinics have a system known as line listing, which is meant to ensure that there are no duplications in data. In order to ensure this they collect identifying information from sex workers including address and phone number. The information is not protected and is easily accessible to whoever wishes to see it.

Line Listing and Privacy

“HIV programs have a process called line listing, which is to ensure that there is no duplication. So they take all your facts from you, and from that a sex workers address and such go out, and it’s put out with no safeguards.”

HIV Counselors and Doctors

HIV counselors also violate the privacy of sex workers. Though a patient’s HIV status is only supposed to be known to the counselor at the testing clinic and the lab technician, it often becomes the case that HIV results are widely shared. As per protocol, doctors and counselors must follow up with sex workers every three months if a sex worker is HIV negative. This is to ensure that they are still HIV negative, and to provide them treatment at the soonest if they do contract the disease. To carry out this follow-up work, counselors keep a list of patients whom they have seen. This list is supposed to be confidential, but other personnel in the hospital are assigned to do the follow-up phone calls, and thus the list is in fact easily accessible. If a person’s name disappears from the list, it is obvious that the person is now HIV positive, and that person’s privacy is violated and her status known.

How does HIV Counseling compromise Privacy?

“…only the counselor and the lab technician is supposed to know about it, but it turns out a whole number of people know about it, because of follow up. The counselor is supposed to follow up on the list with people every three months for further testing, but if you are positive then you do not need to follow up. Plus, these results are shared with everyone. Because of the stigma attached to HIV there is a need for privacy to be protected, so confidentiality is routinely violated.”

Media and Research

Media

Media was another area of contention that Ms.Chacko pointed out. Though the media plays an important role as being a channel for the voice of sex workers, it can also be intrusive on the sex worker by publishing stories without their consent, or reporting in ways that can be misconstrued. Through their coverage, the media can also deepen the stigma against sex workers and place them under an unwanted social spotlight. For example, a news article in The Hindu spoke about the World Cup bringing an “off day” for sex workers.

“With hoards of supporters glued to their television screens for the World Cup cricket final between India and Sri Lanka on Saturday, sex workers are anticipating a slow day, but they are not disappointed. It is a rare weekend for them with their children. The prospects of fewer clients coming in only buoyed the enthusiasm of the women in Sonagachi, the largest red-light area in the city…”[3]

The media is also often a part of raids by cover stories of brothels being uncovered, and in doing so expose the lives of sex workers, often printing sensitive information, including addresses, while portraying the sex workers as victims. The media, along with NGOs and the police will conduct raids that severely violate the privacy of sex workers. For example, in an Express India article a raid was described that took place in Pune with NGOs and the police in which sex workers were dragged out, beaten, and molested by the police against their will [4].

How does the media violate the privacy of sex workers?

“The media conducts raids, and so do NGOs in an attempt to rescue them. Once they are rescued and taken back with police escorts to their village, the whole village knows that she was in sex work, and then her privacy is violated because she was publicly returned. My problem is not about them being rescued, but they need to have consent from the person. If a person wants to do sex work – this decision needs to be respected. The media is difficult because you don’t want to ask for a ban, so we don’t ask for banning, but we do put pressure on the media to be more responsible in their reporting.”

Research/Films

Ms. Chacko also spoke about how research often violates the privacy of sex workers, in ways that range from the words that are used to describe sex workers to the one-sided victim story that is too often used to describe the lives of sex workers, to the methods researchers use to find their facts. Thus, perhaps without meaning to, research can de-legitimatize the work that sex workers do, and can work to increase the amount of violence or abuse that they are exposed to.

Research and Privacy

“Researchers who are writing a report on sex workers - land up in some village and end up violating their privacy as everyone in the village wants to know why the researchers came. The researchers also ask invasive questions. They want to know details about the sex workers’ lives: what kind of sex they have and with whom? What do they experience with their clients? What is their relationship with their partners? What is the status of their relationship.? They do not have a sense of whether the workers will want to talk about their lives or not…Some people make films and some make them in extremely exploitative ways. Films are also often incorrect and invasive of privacy in that way as well.”

The Role of a Privacy Legislation

In our research, we are looking at how a privacy legislation could help remedy the challenges to privacy that different people face in society; or ,if a privacy legislation cannot offer a solution, if there are other ways in which a legislation or society can offer solutions. When I asked Ms. Chacko if a privacy legislation or the right to privacy could improve the lives of sex workers, she was not certain if a privacy legislation would make a difference directly, and thought it might in fact overlook sex workers because currently they are seen in society as immoral women that are not to be afforded the right to privacy. In fact, it is the law and enforcers of the law itself that is invading their privacy. For example, in a study done by the World Health Organization it was found that in India 70 per cent of sex workers in a survey reported being beaten by the police, and more than 80 per cent had been arrested without evidence [5]. Thus, before a right to privacy can apply to sex workers, sex work itself must be decriminalized and recognized as a legitimate profession worthy of labor rights and other rights. Furthermore the debate around sex work needs to move away from the traditional dialogue of who is having sex and who is not to one that looks at what rights should be protected for every person. At that point perhaps a law which protects dignity and regulates the use of information could be useful. On another note, the UID (the Unique Identification Project) could be a potential benefit for sex workers as it would serve as identity that would give only a yes or no response at the time of a transaction.

Could a Privacy Legislation help?

“Some of the privacy is violated by the raids that happen by the police. So those raids are problematic. What kind of laws would help? One would be to decriminalize sex work itself and also work with society to gain understanding and perspective. Because now people think: they are immoral women ,so what privacy do they deserve? The sexual debate should not be about who is having sex and who is not, but about who has the power…”

The Current Law

In India, the Immoral Trafficking prevention Act ( ITPA) is the law that governs sex work. The ITPA does not make prostitution illegal, but instead tries to target the commercialized aspects of the trade such as brothel keeping, pimping, and soliciting. Though the law does not attack the sex workers as individuals, and its stated purpose is to prevent the trafficking of sex workers, the law has become a tool of harassment and abuse by law enforcement agencies. Sections 5A, 5B, 5C, which pertain to trafficking are the most troublesome, because the clauses do not distinguish between trafficking and sex work, but instead defines them as the same[6]. Thus, the new definitions of prostitution and trafficking leave room for reading all sex work as within the meaning of trafficking, and thus criminalizing sex work by defacto.[7] In addition, under the new Section 5C, clients visiting or found in a brothel will face imprisonment and/or fines [8]. Penalization of clients is a significant modification to the the ITPA, which formally targeted 'third parties' profiting from prostitution and not sex workers or clients themselves [9]. Sex workers have fought for a long time to overturn the ITPA. In June 2008, sex workers went on a hunger strike in the hopes of forcing the bill to be discarded [10]. In 2010 sex workers demonstrated against the amendment of the ITPA that would hold the clients of sex workers liable. Despite their protests and demands for their occupation to be treated equally, the Indian courts are slow to move forward and recognize sex work as a dignified profession. “A woman is compelled to indulge in prostitution not for pleasure but because of abject poverty,” the court said last month. “If such woman is granted opportunity to avail some technical or vocational training, she would be able to earn her livelihood by such vocational training and skill instead of selling her body.” The court has also promised to initiate a program in May for vocational training of sex workers [11]. Unfortunately, vocational training fails to address the actual issues and violations that sex workers face – a fact that was demonstrated by one sex worker’s saying: “If we can’t solicit clients without getting arrested, we will naturally rely on pimps to carry on our trade…What we need are practical measures that free us from exploitation created by the law itself.”

Solutions

One of the most impactful source of aid for sex workers currently is the sex workers union. I had the opportunity to speak with a member from the board of the Karnataka Sex Workers
union. She spoke about the challenges that sex workers face and how the Union provides assistance to the sex workers. The union helps them obtain benefits, helps with enrolling their children in schools, and answers questions that they would not be able to seek legal or other assistance on. The union is a confidential and safe space for sex workers to function in society. The person interviewed feels as though the information about herself that should be kept confidential is: her medical information, her clients, where she meets her clients, and information about her family. Ms. Chacko also spoke about the positives that an identity scheme like the UID could have on sex workers, because the transactions would be done through a yes/ no response, and no one will be denied a UID number. Most importantly, Ms. Chacko stressed that it is important to recognize sex work as a legitimate profession,and focus on the actual problems, rather than limiting the debate to stigmas around sex. The interview with Ms. Chacko demonstrated that protection of sex workers’ and sexual minorities’ privacy cannot be addressed simply by a law, but must be embodied by an ethos and a culture before that law is meaningful.

Bibliography

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/privacy_privacyandsexworkers

Limits to Privacy

Prashant Iyengar — 2012-12-14T10:28:55Z

In his research article, Prashant Iyengar examines the limits to privacy for individuals in light of the provisions of the Constitution of India, public interest, security of state and maintenance of law and order. The article attempts to build a catalogue of all these justifications and arrive at a classification of all such frequently used terms invoked in statutes and upheld by courts to deprive persons of their privacy.

Introduction

In 1965, the Supreme Court of India heard and decided State of UP v. Kaushaliya[1], a case which involved the question of whether women who are engaged in prostitution can be forcibly removed from their residences and places of occupation, or whether they were entitled, along with other citizens of India, to the fundamental right to move freely throughout the territory of India, and to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India [under Article 19(1)(d) and (e) of the Constitution of India]. In other words, did these women possess an absolute right of privacy over their decisions in respect to their occupation and place of residence? In its decision, the Supreme Court denied them this right holding that "the activities of a prostitute in a particular area... are so subversive of public morals and so destructive of public health that it is necessary in public interest to deport her from that place." In view of their 'subversiveness', the statutory restrictions imposed by the Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act on prostitutes, were upheld by the court as constitutionally-permissible “reasonable restrictions” on their movements.

The legal alibis that the State employs to justify its infringement of our privacy are numerous, and range from ‘public interest’ to 'security of the state' to the 'maintenance of law and order'. In this chapter we attempt to build a catalogue of these various justifications, without attempting to be exhaustive, with the objective of arriving at a rough taxonomy of such frequently invoked terms. In addition we also examine some the more important justifications such as 'public interest' and 'security of the state' that have been invoked in statutes and upheld by courts to deprive persons of their privacy.

The statutory venues of deprivation of privacy by the state being many – strictly, any statute that imposes any restriction on movement, or authorizes the search or examination of any residence or book, or the interception of communication may be read as a violation of a privacy right — tracking each of these down would not only be an impossible exercise, but also contribute little to the analytical exercise we are attempting here. Instead, in this chapter we only list provisions from a few statutes that are the familiar instruments by which the state impinges on our privacy. This is done with the limited object of arriving at a rough inventory of the common technologies which the state employs to impinge on our privacy.

Even if intrusions into our privacy are statutorily authorised, these statutes must withstand constitutional scrutiny. We therefore, begin this chapter with a discussion of the constitutional framework within which these statutes operate, and against which the severity of their incursions must be measured.

Constitutional Jurisprudence on Privacy

The 'right to privacy' has been canvassed by litigants before the higher judiciary in India by including it within the fold of two fundamental rights: the right to freedom under Article 19 and the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21.

It would be instructive to provide a brief background to each of these Articles before delving deeper into the privacy jurisprudence expounded by the courts under them.

Part III of the Constitution of India (Articles 12 through 35) is titled ‘fundamental rights’ and lists out several rights which are regarded as fundamental to all citizens of India (some apply all persons in India whether citizens or not). Article 13 forbids the State from making “any law which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by this Part”.

Thus, Article 19(1) (a) stipulates that "all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression". However this is qualified by Article 19(2) which states that this will not "affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right … in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence".

Thus, the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) is not absolute, but a qualified right that is susceptible, under the Constitutional scheme, to being curtailed under specified conditions.

The other important fundamental right from the perspective of privacy jurisprudence is Article 21 which reads "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law."

Where Article 19 contains a detailed list of conditions under which freedom of expression may be curtailed, by contrast Article 21 is thinly-worded and only requires a "procedure established by law" as a pre-condition for the deprivation of life and liberty. However, the Supreme Court has held in a celebrated case Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India [2] that any procedure "which deals with the modalities of regulating, restricting or even rejection of a fundamental right falling within Article 21 has to be fair, not foolish, carefully designed to effectuate, not to subvert, the substantive right itself. Thus, understood, 'procedure' must rule out anything arbitrary, freakish or bizarre."

Four decisions by the Supreme Court have established the right to privacy in India as flowing from Articles 19 and 21.

The first was a seven-judge bench judgment in Kharak Singh vs The State of U.P.[3] The question for consideration before this court was whether 'surveillance' under Chapter XX of the U.P. Police Regulations constituted an infringement of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Regulation 236(b) which permitted surveillance by 'domiciliary visits at night' was held to be violative of Article 21.The word ‘life’ and the expression ‘personal liberty’ in Article 21 were elaborately considered by this court in Kharak Singh`s case. Although the majority found that the Constitution contained no explicit guarantee of a ‘right to privacy’, it read the right to personal liberty expansively to include a right to dignity. It held that "an unauthorised intrusion into a person's home and the disturbance caused to him thereby, is as it were the violation of a common law right of a man —an ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very concept of civilization."

In a minority judgment in this case, Justice Subba Rao held that "the right to personal liberty takes is not only a right to be free from restrictions placed on his movements, but also free from encroachments on his private life. It is true our Constitution does not expressly declare a right to privacy as a fundamental right but the said right is an essential ingredient of personal liberty. Every democratic country sanctifies domestic life; it is expected to give him rest, physical happiness, peace of mind and security. In the last resort, a person's house, where he lives with his family, is his 'castle' it is his rampart against encroachment on his personal liberty." This case, especially Justice Subba Rao’s observations, paved the way for later elaborations on the right to privacy using Article 21.

In 1972, the Supreme Court decided a case — one of the first of its kind — on wiretapping. In R. M. Malkani vs State of Maharashtra [4] the petitioner’s voice had been recorded in the course of a telephonic conversation where he was attempting blackmail. He asserted in his defence that his right to privacy under Article 21 had been violated. The Supreme Court declined his plea holding that “the telephonic conversation of an innocent citizen will be protected by courts against wrongful or high handed interference by tapping the conversation. The protection is not for the guilty citizen against the efforts of the police to vindicate the law and prevent corruption of public servants.”

The third case, Govind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [5] , by a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court is regarded as being a setback to the right to privacy jurisprudence. Here, the court was evaluating the constitutional validity of Regulations 855 and 856 of the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulation which provided for police surveillance of habitual offenders including domiciliary visits and picketing. The Supreme Court desisted from striking down these invasive provisions holding that "It cannot be said that surveillance by domiciliary visit, would always be an unreasonable restriction upon the right of privacy. It is only persons who are suspected to be habitual criminals and those who are determined to lead criminal lives that are subjected to surveillance."

The court went on to make some observations on the right to privacy under the Constitution:

"Too broad a definition of privacy will raise serious questions about the propriety of judicial reliance on a right that is not explicit in the Constitution. The right to privacy will, therefore, necessarily, have to go through a process of case by case development. Hence, assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right to move freely throughout India and the freedom of speech create an independent fundamental right of privacy as an emanation from them it could not he absolute. It must be subject to restriction on the basis of compelling public interest. But the law infringing it must satisfy the compelling state interest test. It could not be that under these freedoms that the Constitution-makers intended to protect or protected mere personal sensitiveness."

The next case in the series was R. Rajagopal vs. State of Tamil Nadu [6] which involved a balancing of the right of privacy of citizens against the right of the press to criticize and comment on acts and conduct of public officials. The case related to the alleged autobiography of Auto Shankar who was convicted and sentenced to death for committing six murders. In the autobiography, he had commented on his contact and relations with various police officials. The right of privacy of citizens was dealt with by the Supreme Court in the following terms: -

The right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21. It is a "right to be let alone". A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, childbearing and education among other matters. None can publish anything concerning the above matters without his consent — whether truthful or otherwise and whether laudatory or critical. If he does so, he would be violating the right to privacy of the person concerned and would be liable in an action for damages. Position may, however, be different, if a person voluntarily thrusts himself into controversy or voluntarily invites or raises a controversy.
The rule aforesaid is subject to the exception, that any publication concerning the aforesaid aspects becomes unobjectionable if such publication is based upon public records including court records. This is for the reason that once a matter becomes a matter of public record, the right to privacy no longer subsists and it becomes a legitimate subject for comment by press and media among others. We are, however, of the opinion that in the interests of decency [Article 19(2)] an exception must be carved out to this rule, viz., a female who is the victim of a sexual assault, kidnap, abduction or a like offence should not further be subjected to the indignity of her name and the incident being publicised in press/media.

Elsewhere in the same decision, the court took a cautionary stance and held that "the right to privacy...will necessarily have to go through a process of case-by-case development."

The final case that makes up the 'privacy quintet' in India was the case of PUCL v. Union of India [7] in which the court was called upon to consider whether wiretapping was an unconstitutional infringement of a citizen’s right to privacy. The court held:

The right privacy — by itself — has not been identified under the Constitution. As a concept it may be too broad and moralistic to define it judicially. Whether right to privacy can be claimed or has been infringed in a given case would depend on the facts of the said case. But the right to hold a telephone conversation in the privacy of one’s home or office without interference can certainly be claimed as a ‘right to privacy’. Conversations on the telephone are often of an intimate and confidential character. Telephone conversation is a part of modern man's life. It is considered so important that more and more people are carrying mobile telephone instruments in their pockets. Telephone conversation is an important facet of a man's private life. Right to privacy would certainly include telephone-conversation in the privacy of one's home or office. Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law.

The court also read this right to privacy as simultaneously deriving from Article 19. "When a person is talking on telephone, he is exercising his right to freedom of speech and expression", the court observed, and therefore "telephone-tapping unless it comes within the grounds of restrictions under Article 19(2) would infract Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution."

However, the court in this case made two observations which would have a lasting impact on privacy jurisprudence in India –firstly, it rejected the contention that 'prior judicial scrutiny' should be mandated before any wiretapping could take place and accepted the contention that administrative safeguards would be sufficient.

Thus, to conclude this section of this chapter, it may be observed that the right to privacy in India is, at its foundations a limited right rather than an absolute one. In the sections that follow, it will become apparent that this limited nature of the right provides a somewhat unstable assurance of privacy since it is frequently made to yield to all manners of competing interests which happen to have a more pronounced legal standing.

Vocabularies of Privacy Limitation

Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) defines privacy in the following terms:

"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."

Similarly, Article 17 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (to which India is a party) declares that:

"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home and correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation."

In this section, we look briefly at sections in some statutes that authorize the deprivation of privacy. These statutes have been classified under three headings, following the aforementioned international covenants, each dealing with a) our communications, b) our homes and c) bodily privacy.

Privacy of Communications

Communications laws

All laws dealing with mediums of inter-personal communication — post, telegraph and telephony and email – contain similarly worded provisions permitting interception under specified conditions.

Thus, section 26 of the India Post Office Act 1898 confers powers of interception of postal articles for the 'public good'. According to this section, this power may be invoked "On the occurrence of any public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety or tranquillity". The section further clarifies that “a certificate from the State or Central Government” would be conclusive proof as to the existence of a public emergency or interest of public safety or tranquillity.

Similarly, section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act authorizes the interception of any message

on the occurrence of any public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety; and
if satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence,

Thus, the events that trigger an action of interception are the occurrence of any ‘public emergency’ or in the interests of ‘public safety’.

Most recently, section 69 of the Information Technology Act 2008 contains a more expanded power of interception which may be exercised "when they [the authorised officers] are satisfied that it is necessary or expedient" to do so in the interest of:

sovereignty or integrity of India,
defence of India,
security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States or
public order or
preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above or
for investigation of any offence,

[More details of the occasions and the mandatory procedural safeguards before these powers may be exercised are contained in our briefing notes on Privacy and Telecommunications and Privacy and the IT Act]

From a plain reading of these sections, there appears to be a gradual loosening of standards from the Post Office Act to the latest Information Technology Act. The Post Office Act requires the existence of a ‘state of public emergency’ or a ‘threat to public safety and tranquillity’ as a precursor to the exercise of the power of interception. This requirement is continued in the Telegraph Act with the addition of a few more conditions, such as expediency in the interests of sovereignty, etc. Under the most recent IT Act, the requirement of a public emergency or a threat to public safety is dispensed with entirely – here, the government may intercept merely if it feels it ‘necessary or expedient’.

How much of a difference does it make?

In Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India and ors [8] , the Supreme Court was required to interpret the meaning of ‘public emergency’. Here, the court was required to consider whether disconnection of a telephone could be ordered due to an ‘economic emergency’. The Government of Delhi had ordered the disconnection of the petitioner’s telephones due to their alleged involvement, through the use of telephones, in (then forbidden) forward trading in agricultural commodities. According to the government, this constituted an ‘economic emergency’ due to the escalating prices of food. Declining this contention, the Supreme Court held that:

a 'public emergency' within the contemplation of this section is one which raises problems concerning the interest of the public safety, the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or the prevention of incitement to the commission of an offence.

Economic emergency is not one of those matters expressly mentioned in the statute. Mere 'economic emergency'— as the high court calls it—may not necessarily amount to a 'public emergency' and justify action under this section unless it raises problems relating to the matters indicated in the section.

In addition the other qualifying term, 'public safety' was interpreted in an early case by the Supreme Court to mean "security of the public or their freedom from danger. In that sense, anything which tends to prevent dangers to public health may also be regarded as securing public safety. The meaning of the expression must, however, vary according to the context."[9]

Thus, the words ‘public emergency’ and 'public safety' does provide some legal buffer before the government may impinge on our privacy in the case of post and telecommunications. In a sense, they operate both as limits on our privacy as well as limits on the government’s ability to impinge on our privacy — since the government must demonstrate their existence to the satisfaction of the court, failing which their actions would be illegal.

However, as mentioned, even these requirements have been dispensed with in the case of electronic communications falling under the purview of the Information Technology Act where sweeping powers of interception have been provided extending from matters affecting the sovereignty of the nation, to the more mundane 'investigation of any offence'.

Privileged Communications

In addition to laying down procedural safeguards which restrict the conditions under which our communication may be intercepted, the law also safeguards our privacy in certain contexts by taking away the evidentiary value of certain communications.

Thus, for instance, under the Evidence Act, communications between spouses and communications with legal advisors are accorded a special privilege.

Section 122 of the Evidence Act forbids married couples from disclosing any communications made between them during marriage without the consent of the person who made it. This however, does not apply in suits “between married persons, or proceedings in which one married person is prosecuted for any crime committed against the other.”

This rule was applied in a case before the Kerala High Court, T.J. Ponnen vs M.C. Varghese [10] where a man sued his son-in-law for defamation based on statements about him written in a letter addressed to his daughter. The trial court held that the prosecution was invalid since it was based on privileged communications between the couple. This was upheld by the high court. The petitioner had attempted to argue that it was immaterial how he gained possession of the letter. The high court disagreed with this contention holding that this would defeat the purpose of section 122.

Similarly section 126 forbids “barristers, attorneys, pleaders or vakils” from disclosing, without their client’s express consent “any communication made to him in the course and for the purpose of his employment as such barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil... or to state the contents or condition of any document with which he has become acquainted in the course and for the purpose of his professional employment or to disclose any advice given by him to his client in the course and for the purpose of such employment.”

As with section 122, this privilege also comes with exceptions. Thus, the following kinds of communications are exempted from the privilege:

any communication made in furtherance of any illegal purpose,
any fact observed by any barrister, pleader, attorney or vakil, in the course of his employment as such showing that any crime or fraud has been committed since the commencement of his employment.

Section 127 extends the scope attorney-client privilege to include any interpreters, clerks and servants of the attorney or barrister. They are also not permitted to disclose the contents of any communication between the attorney and her client.

Section 129 enacts a reciprocal protection and provides that clients shall not be compelled to disclose to the court any "confidential communication which has taken place between him and his legal professional adviser."

Section 131 of the Evidence Act further cements the legal protection afforded to married couples, attorneys and their clients by providing that "No one shall be compelled to produce documents in his possession, which any other person would be entitled to refuse to produce if they were in his possession" unless that person consents to the production of such documents.

Note that these privileges do not limit the ability of the state to intercept communications – they merely negate the evidentiary value of any communications so intercepted.

Privacy of the Home: Search and Seizure Provisions

Under what circumstances may the State invade the privacy of our homes? What are the limits of these powers? Technically, any law that authorizes “search and seizure” can be said to authorize an invasion of our privacy. Many laws permit searches, for various grounds — ranging from the Income Tax Act which authorizes searches to recover undisclosed income, to the Narcotics Act which prescribes a procedure to search and sieze drugs, to the Excise Act and the Customs Act which do so in order to discover goods that are manufactured or imported in violation of those respective statutes. In this section we deal only with the general provisions for search and seizure under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) provides that a house or premises may be searched either under a search warrant issued by a court, or, in the absence of a court-issued-warrant, by a police officer in the course of investigation of offences.

Thus, a court may issue a search warrant where

it has reason to believe that a person to whom a summons has been, or might be, addressed, will not or would not produce the document or thing as required by such summons; or
where such document or thing is not known to the court to be in the possession of any person, or
where the court considers that the purposes of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code will be served by a general search or inspection,

Similarly, section 165 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits for searches to be conducted by “police officers in charge of police station or a police officer making an investigation” without first obtaining a warrant. Such a search may be conducted if he has “reasonable grounds for believing that anything necessary for the purposes of an investigation into any offence which he is authorised to investigate may be found in any place within the limits of the police station of which he is in charge, or to which he is attached”, and if, in his opinion, such thing cannot “be otherwise obtained without undue delay”.

Such officer must record in writing the grounds of his belief and specify “so far as possible” the thing for which search is to be made.

In both cases, the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the search to conform to procedures including the presence of "two or more independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality”. The preparation, in their presence, of “a list of all things seized in the course of such search, and of the places in which they are respectively found", the delivery of this list to the occupant of the place being searched.

However, in reality, these requirements are observed more in the breach. Courts have consistently held that not following these provisions would not make evidence obtained inadmissible — it would make the search irregular, not unlawful. Thus, in State of Maharashtra v. Natwarlal Damodardas Soni [11], where a search was conducted under the Customs Act to recover smuggled gold, the Supreme Court held that

Assuming that the search was illegal it would not affect either the validity of the seizure and further investigation by the customs authorities or the validity of the trial which followed on the complaint of the Assistant Collector of Customs.

In a different case, Radhakrishan v. State of U.P. [12] which involved an illegal search in contravention of the Code of Criminal Procedure , the Supreme Court held that:

"So far as the alleged illegality of the search is concerned, it is sufficient to say that even assuming that the search was illegal the seizure of the Articles is not vitiated. It may be that where the provisions of ... Code of Criminal Procedure, are contravened the search could be resisted by the person whose premises are sought to be searched. It may also be that because of the illegality of the search the Court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding the seizure. But beyond these two consequences no further consequence ensues."

India inherits the common law notion that a man’s house is his castle. In the light of the cases discussed above, this claim certainly appears to be lofty. However, there is still hope. In a recent case, the Supreme Court struck down provisions of a legislation on grounds that it was too intrusive of citizens’ right to privacy. The case involved an evaluation of the Andhra Pradesh Stamp Act which authorized the collector to delegate “any person” to enter any premises in order to search for and impound any document that was found to be improperly stamped. Thus, for instance, banks could be compelled to cede all documents in their custody, including clients documents, for inspection on the mere chance that some of them may be improperly stamped. These banks were then compelled under law to pay the deficit stamp duty on the documents, even if they themselves were not party to the transactions recorded in the documents.

After an exhaustive analysis of privacy laws across the world, and in India, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of any safeguards as to probable or reasonable cause or reasonable basis, this provision was violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy, both of the house and of the person. [13]

The case marks a welcome redrawing of the boundaries of the right to privacy against state intrusion.

Privacy of the Body

To what extent do we have a right to privacy that protects what we may do with our own bodies and may be done to them? This section deals with this question in the context of four issues that have arisen before courts:

the ability of the state to order persons to undergo medical-examination,
to undergo a range of 'truth technologies' including narco analysis, brain mapping, etc.,
to submit to DNA testing and d) to abortion. In most cases, as we shall see, the right to privacy cedes ground to any available competing interest.

Court-ordered Medical Examinations

Can courts compel persons to undergo medical examinations against their will? In the case of Sharda v. Dharmpal[14], decided in 2003, the Supreme Court held that they could. Here a man filed for divorce on that grounds that his wife suffered from a mental illness. In order to establish his case, he requested the court to direct his wife to submit herself to a medical examination. The trial court and the high court both granted his application. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the woman contested the order on grounds firstly, that compelling a person to undergo a medical examination by an order of the court would be violative of her right to 'personal liberty' guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Secondly, in absence of a specific empowering provision, a court dealing with matrimonial cases cannot subject a party to undergo medical examination against his her volition. The court could merely draw an adverse inference.

The Supreme Court rejected these contentions holding that the right to privacy in India was not absolute. If the "respondent avoids such medical examination on the ground that it violates his/her right to privacy or for a matter right to personal liberty as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, then it may in most of such cases become impossible to arrive at a conclusion. It may render the very grounds on which divorce is permissible nugatory."

The court upheld the rights of matrimonial courts to order a person to undergo medical test. Such an order, the court held, would not be in violation of the right to personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. However, this power could only be exercised if the applicant had a strong prima facie case, and there was sufficient material before the court. Crucially, the court held that if, despite the order of the court, the respondent refused to submit herself to medical examination, the court would be entitled to draw an adverse inference against him.

Thus, oddly, one limitation on the right to privacy appears to be the statutory rights of others. One is entitled to the privacy of one’s body, to the extent that another person is not, thereby, deprived of a statutory right – as in this case, to divorce.

Reproductive Rights

Ahmedabad: A 13-year-old girl, who conceived after being repeatedly raped, has moved the Gujarat High Court and sought permission to medically terminate her pregnancy after a sessions court rejected her plea.

Express India(April 2010) [15]

To what extent do pregnant women enjoy a right to privacy over their bodies and their reproductive decisions? Are there circumstances when the State can intervene and either order or forbid an abortion?

According to the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 a pregnancy may be terminated before the twentieth week if:

the continuance of the pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or of grave injury to her physical or mental health; or
there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities to be seriously handicapped.
where any pregnancy is alleged by the pregnant woman to have been caused by rape,
where any pregnancy occurs as a result of failure of any device or method used by any married woman or her husband for the purpose of limiting the number of children.

Consent for termination needs to be obtained from the guardian in cases of minors or women who are mentally ill. In all other cases, the woman herself must consent.

Beyond the period of 20 weeks, the pregnancy may only be terminated if there is immediate danger to the life of the woman.

In August 2009, the Supreme Court heard an expedited appeal that was filed on behalf of a destitute mentally retarded woman who had become pregnant consequent to having been raped at a government run shelter. The government had approached the high court seeking permission to terminate her pregnancy, which had been granted by that court despite the finding by an ‘expert body’ of medical practitioners that she was keen on continuing the pregnancy. On appeal the Supreme Court held, very curiously, that the woman was not ‘mentally ill’, but ‘mentally retarded’, and consequently her consent was imperative under the Act. [16] However, not content to stop there, the court made several puzzling and contradictory observations:

Firstly, the court took the opportunity to affirm, generally, women’s rights to make reproductive choices as a dimension of their `personal liberty' as guaranteed by Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty) of the Constitution of India. The court observed:

“It is important to recognise that reproductive choices can be exercised to procreate as well as to abstain from procreating. The crucial consideration is that a woman's right to privacy, dignity and bodily integrity should be respected. This means that there should be no restriction whatsoever on the exercise of reproductive choices such as a woman's right to refuse participation in sexual activity or alternatively the insistence on use of contraceptive methods. Furthermore, women are also free to choose birth-control methods such as undergoing sterilisation procedures. Taken to their logical conclusion, reproductive rights include a woman's entitlement to carry a pregnancy to its full term, to give birth and to subsequently raise children. (emphasis mine) [17]

However, the court went on to affirm, in language that curiously imitates Roe v Wade,[18] that there was “a `compelling state interest' in protecting the life of the prospective child.[19]

Secondly, the Supreme Court upheld the woman’s consent as determinative and in doing so, categorically rejected the high court approach. The court held that since she suffered from `mild mental retardation' this did not render her "incapable of making decisions for herself". Simultaneously, however, the Supreme Court proceeded gratuitously to apply the common law doctrine of `parens patriae' to resume jurisdiction over the woman in her “best interests”. According to a court-appointed expert committee, her mental age was “close to that of a nine-year old child” and she was capable of “learning through rote memorisation and imitation” and of performing “basic bodily functions”.[20] In this light, the court deemed in her ‘best interests’, as defined by an expert committee, to defer to her wishes.

The findings recorded by the expert body indicate that her mental age is close to that of a nine-year old child and that she is capable of learning through rote-memorisation and imitation. Even the preliminary medical opinion indicated that she had learnt to perform basic bodily functions and was capable of simple communications. In light of these findings, it is the `best interests' test alone which should govern the inquiry in the present case and not the `substituted judgment' test. [21]

If one disregards the liberalism of its outcome, there are various problems with this decision. Chiefly, the Supreme Court relied on the woman’s expressed consent to deny the legitimacy of the high court’s decision in favour of abortion. Inexplicably, however, in the same move, the Supreme Court reserved to itself the right to adjudicate the ‘best interests’ of the woman. Thus, in relation to abortion, mentally retarded women are more autonomous than minor girls (since their own consent is determinative, rather than their guardians) but they are still less autonomous than ‘normal’ women (since their decisions are subject to adjudication based on what the court thinks is in their best interests)!

DNA Tests in Civil Suits

Do we have a right to privacy over the interiors of our body – our blood, our tissue, our DNA? There is, by now, a strong line of cases decided by the Supreme Court in which our right to ‘bodily integrity’ has been held to not be absolute, and may be interfered with in order to settle many terrestrial issues. In most cases, this question has arisen in the context of the determination of paternity – either in divorce or maintenance proceedings. Central in the determination of these issues is section 112 of the Evidence Act which stipulates that birth of a child during the continuance of a valid marriage (or within 280 days of its dissolution) would be conclusive proof of legitimacy of that child, “unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.”

As is evident, this section creates a strong legal presumption of legitimacy that leaves no room for a scientific rebuttal. Various litigants have, nevertheless, sought the courts’ indulgence in accepting medical evidence to displace this formidable legal presumption. These efforts have yielded a measure of success, and a steady line of precedents since the early 1990s now affirms the right of courts to direct medical evidence in cases they consider fit. In these cases, the court has frequently invoked privacy rights as an important consideration to be weighed before ordering a person to submit to any test.

In one of the earliest and most frequently invoked cases, Goutam Kundu vs State of West Bengal and Anr (1993) [22] the Supreme Court laid down guidelines governing the power of courts to order blood tests. The court held:

courts in India cannot order blood test as matter of course;

wherever applications are made for such prayers in order to have roving inquiry, the prayer for blood test cannot be entertained.

There must be a strong prima facie case in that the husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the presumption arising under section 112 of the Evidence Act.

The court must carefully examine as to what would be the consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the mother as an unchaste woman.

No one can be compelled to give sample of blood for analysis.

On the particular facts of this case, the Supreme Court refused to order the respondent to submit to the test, since in its view, there was no prima facie case made out that cast doubts on the legal presumption of legitimacy.

These guidelines have been frequently invoked in subsequent cases. In a complex set of facts, in Ms. X vs Mr. Z and Anr (2001), [23] the Delhi High Court was called to consider whether a foetus had a ‘right to privacy’ – or whether the mother of the foetus could assert a right to privacy on it’s behalf. A woman had given birth to a still-born child and tissues from the foetus had been stored at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences. Her husband approached to obtain an order permitting a DNA test to be carried out to determine if he was the father. In her defence, the woman claimed that this would offend her right to privacy. The high court reaffirmed the guidelines laid down in the Gautam Kundu case (supra), and also upheld the petitioner’s right to privacy over her own body. However, the court took the stance that she did not have a right of privacy over the foetus once it had been discharged from her body:

"The petitioner indeed has a right of privacy but is being not an absolute right, therefore, when a foetus has been preserved in All India Institute of Medical Science, the petitioner, who has already discharged the same cannot claim that it affects her right of privacy.

However, if the petitioner was being compelled to subject herself to blood test or otherwise, she indeed could raise a defense that she cannot be compelled to be a witness against herself in a criminal case or compelled to give evidence against her own even in a civil case but the position herein is different. The petitioner is not being compelled to do any such act. Something that she herself has discharged, probably with her consent, is claimed to be subjected to DNA test. In that view of the matter, in the peculiar facts, it cannot be termed that the petitioner has any right of privacy."

The decision has wide-ranging implications since it virtually divests control and ownership over any material that has been discarded from the body – from nails to hair to tissue samples. In an interesting case in the US, Moore v. Regents of the University of California [24], the Supreme Court of California was faced with a suit to determine whether a man retained ownership over cells that had been removed from his body through a surgical procedure. In this case, cells from a patient’s spleen were used to conduct research which resulted in the patenting of a cell-line by the defendant. The patient sued for a share in the profits, but this was rejected by the court which held that he had no property rights to his discarded cells or any profits made from them. The court specifically rejected the argument that his spleen should be protected as property as an aspect of his privacy and dignity. The court held these interests were already protected by informed consent.

In a sense the Ms. X vs Mr. Z case arrives at identical conclusions without as much deliberation on its implications. It would be interesting to see how subsequent courts interpret and apply this precedent.

One of the most critical factors, consistently weighed by courts alongside the privacy rights implicated, is the ‘best interests’ of the child. Thus, in Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Convenor Secretary, Orissa State Commission for Women & Anr.[25], the Supreme Court quashed a high court-mandated DNA test to determine the paternity of an unborn child in a woman’s womb. In doing so, the SC observed:

“In a matter where paternity of a child is in issue before the court, the use of DNA is an extremely delicate and sensitive aspect. One view is that when modern science gives means of ascertaining the paternity of a child, there should not be any hesitation to use those means whenever the occasion requires. The other view is that the court must be reluctant in use of such scientific advances and tools which result in invasion of right to privacy of an individual and may not only be prejudicial to the rights of the parties but may have devastating effect on the child. Sometimes the result of such scientific test may bastardise an innocent child even though his mother and her spouse were living together during the time of conception. In our view, when there is apparent conflict between the right to privacy of a person not to submit himself forcibly to medical examination and duty of the court to reach the truth, the court must exercise its discretion only after balancing the interests of the parties and on due consideration whether, for a just decision in the matter, DNA is eminently needed. (emphasis added)

A strong trend, evident in this case, is the bussing of the interests of the child (in not being declared illegitimate), along with the privacy rights of the mother. The two create a composite interest opposed to that of the putative father, which the courts have been reluctant to interfere with except for the most compelling reasons. But what happens when then the interests of the child conflict with the privacy rights of either parent?

In a high profile case in 2010, Shri Rohit Shekhar vs Shri Narayan Dutt Tiwari[26], the Delhi High was called upon to determine whether a man had a right to subject the person he named as his biological father to a DNA test. Contrary to the trend in the preceding cases, it was the biological father who pleaded his right to privacy in this case. The court relied on international covenants to affirm the “right of the child to know of her (or his) biological antecedents” irrespective of her (or his) legitimacy. The court ruled:

There is of course the vital interest of child to not be branded illegitimate; yet the conclusiveness of the presumption created by the law in this regard must not act detriment to the interests of the child. If the interests of the child are best sub-served by establishing paternity of someone who is not the husband of her (or his) mother, the court should not shut that consideration altogether.

The protective cocoon of legitimacy, in such case, should not entomb the child’s aspiration to learn the truth of her or his paternity.

The court went on to draw a distinction between legitimacy and paternity that may both "be accorded recognition under Indian law without prejudice to each other. While legitimacy may be established by a legal presumption [under section 112 of the Evidence Act], paternity has to be established by science and other reliable evidence"[27] The court, however, reaffirmed that the same considerations would apply as was laid down in previous cases – i.e., the plaintiff would have to establish a prima facie case and weigh the competing interests of privacy and justice before it could order a DNA test. In this case, the petitioner was able to produce DNA evidence that excluded the possibility that his legal father was his biological father. In addition, photographic and testimonial evidence suggested that the respondent could be his biological father. On these grounds the Delhi High Court ordered the respondent to undergo a DNA test. This was upheld in an appeal to the Supreme Court.

So from the foregoing cases, it appears that it is the ‘best interests of the child’ that undergrids the right to privacy of either parent. When the two are in conflict it is the former that will, the case law suggests, invariably prevail.

Bodily Effects — Fingerprints, handwriting samples, photographs, Irises, narco-analysis, brain maps and DNA

The human body easily betrays itself. We are incessantly dropping residues of our existence wherever we go – from shedding hair and fingernails, to fingerprints and footprints, handwriting – which, through use of modern technology, can implicate our bodies, and identify us against our will. Not even our thoughts are immune as new technologies like brain mapping pretend to be able to harvest psychic clues from our physiology.

In this section we explore occasions when the state may compel us to 'perform' our existence for instance, by submitting to photography, providing finger impressions or handwriting samples, submit to narco-analysis and truth tests, and more recently to provide iris scan data or our DNA.

Section 73 of the Evidence Act stipulates that the court "may direct any person present in the court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person."

This section was interpreted by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Ram Babu Misra [28] where it was held that there must be “some proceeding before the court in which...it might be necessary... to compare such writings”. This specifically excludes, say, a situation where the case is still under investigation and there is no present proceeding before the court. “The language of section 73 does not permit a court to give a direction to the accused to give specimen writings for anticipated necessity for comparison in a proceeding which may later be instituted in the court.”

The pre-independence Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 provides for the mandatory taking, by police officers, of 'measurements' and photograph of persons arrested or convicted for any offence punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year of upwards or ordered to give security for his good behaviour under section 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [29] The Act also empowers a magistrate to order a person to be measured or photographed if he is satisfied that it is required for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. [30]

The Act also provides for the destruction of all photographs and records of measurements on discharge or acquittal. [31]

In addition, the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in 2005 to enable the collection of a host of medical details from accused persons upon their arrest. Section 53 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that upon arrest, an accused person may be subjected to a medical examination if there are “reasonable grounds for believing” that such examination will afford evidence as to the crime. The scope of this examination was expanded in 2005 to include “the examination of blood, blood-stains, semen, swabs in case of sexual offences, sputum and sweat, hair samples and finger nail clippings by the use of modern and scientific techniques including DNA profiling and such other tests which the registered medical practitioner thinks necessary in a particular case.”

In a case in 2004, the Orissa High Court affirmed the legality of ordering a DNA test in criminal cases to ascertain the involvement of persons accused. Refusal to co-operate would result in an adverse inference drawn against the accused.

After weighing the privacy concerns involved, the court laid down the following considerations as relevant before the DNA test could be ordered:

the extent to which the accused may have participated in the commission of the crime;
the gravity of the offence and the circumstances in which it is committed;
age, physical and mental health of the accused to the extent they are known;
whether there is less intrusive and practical way of collecting evidence tending to confirm or disprove the involvement of the accused in the crime;
the reasons, if any, for the accused for refusing consent [32]

Most recently the draft DNA Profiling Bill pending before the Parliament attempts to create an ambitious centralized DNA bank that would store DNA records of virtually anyone who comes within any proximity to the criminal justice system. Specifically, records are maintained of suspects, offenders, missing persons and “volunteers”. The schedule to the Bill contains an expansive list of both civil and criminal cases where DNA data will be collected including cases of abortion, paternity suits and organ transplant. Provisions exist in the bill that limit access to and use of information contained in the records, and provide for their deletion on acquittal. These are welcome minimal guarantors of privacy.

It is evident that the utility of this mass of information – fingerprints, handwriting samples and photographs, DNA data – in solving crimes is immense. Without saying a word, it is possible for a person to be convicted based on these various bodily affects – the human body constantly bears witness and self-incriminates itself. Both handwriting and finger impressions beg the question of whether these would offend the protection against self-incrimination contained in Article 20(3) of our Constitution which provides that “No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” This argument was considered by the Supreme Court in the State of Bombay vs Kathi Kalu Oghad and Ors. [33] The petitioner contended that the obtaining of evidence through legislations such as the Identification of Prisoners Act amounted to compelling the person accused of an offence "to be a witness against himself" in contravention of Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The court held that “there was no infringement of Article 20(3) of the Constitution in compelling an accused person to give his specimen handwriting or signature, or impressions of his thumb, fingers, palm or foot to the investigating officer or under orders of a court for the purposes of comparison. ...Compulsion was not inherent in the receipt of information from an accused person in the custody of a police officer; it will be a question of fact in each case to be determined by the court on the evidence before it whether compulsion had been used in obtaining the information.” [34]

Over the past two decades, forensics has shifted from trying to track down a criminal by following the trail left by her bodily traces, to attempting to apply a host of invasive technologies upon suspects in an attempt to ‘exorcise’ truth and lies directly from their body. One statement by Dr M.S. Rao, Chief Forensic Scientist, Government of India captures this shift:

Forensic psychology plays a vital role in detecting terrorist cases. Narco-analysis and brainwave fingerprinting can reveal future plans of terrorists and can be deciphered to prevent terror activities⁄ Preventive forensics will play a key role in countering terror acts. Forensic potentials must be harnessed to detect and nullify their plans. Traditional methods have proved to be a failure to handle them. Forensic facilities should be brought to the doorstep of the common man⁄ Forensic activism is the solution for better crime management. [35]

Although there are several such 'technologies' which operate on principles ranging from changes in respiration, to mapping the electrical activity in different areas of the brain, what is common to them all, in Lawrence Liang’s words is that they “maintain that there is a connection between body and mind; that physiological changes are indicative of mental states and emotions; and that information about an individual’s subjectivity and identity can be derived from these physiological and physiological measures of deception” [36]

So, how legal are these technologies, in view of the constitutional protections against self-incrimination? In a case in 2004 the Bombay High Court upheld these technologies by applying the logic of the Kathi Kalu Oghad case discussed above. The court drew a distinction between ‘statements’ and ‘testimonies’ and held that what was prohibited under Article 20(3) were only ‘statements’ that were made under compulsion by an accused. In the court’s opinion, “the tests of Brain Mapping and Lie Detector in which the map of the brain is the result, or polygraph, then either cannot be said to be a statement”. At the most, the court held, “it can be called the information received or taken out from the witness.” [37]

This position was however overturned recently by the Supreme Court in Selvi v. State of Karnataka (2010)[38]. In contrast with the Bombay High Court, the Supreme Court expressly invoked the right of privacy to hold these technologies unconstitutional.

“Even though these are non- invasive techniques the concern is not so much with the manner in which they are conducted but the consequences for the individuals who undergo the same. The use of techniques such as 'Brain Fingerprinting' and 'FMRI-based Lie-Detection' raise numerous concerns such as those of protecting mental privacy and the harms that may arise from inferences made about the subject's truthfulness or familiarity with the facts of a crime.”

Further down, the court held that such techniques invaded the accused’s mental privacy which was an integral aspect of their personal liberty.

“There are several ways in which the involuntary administration of either of the impugned tests could be viewed as a restraint on 'personal liberty' ... the drug-induced revelations or the substantive inferences drawn from the measurement of the subject's physiological responses can be described as an intrusion into the subject's mental privacy”

Following a thorough-going examination of the issue, the Supreme Court directed that “no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty.” The court however, left open the option of voluntary submission to such techniques and endorsed the following guidelines framed by the National Human Rights Commission:

No Lie Detector Tests should be administered except on the basis of consent of the accused. An option should be given to the accused whether he wishes to avail such test.
If the accused volunteers for a Lie Detector Test, he should be given access to a lawyer and the physical, emotional and legal implication of such a test should be explained to him by the police and his lawyer.
The consent should be recorded before a judicial magistrate.
During the hearing before the magistrate, the person alleged to have agreed should be duly represented by a lawyer.
At the hearing, the person in question should also be told in clear terms that the statement that is made shall not be a `confessional' statement to the magistrate but will have the status of a statement made to the police.
The magistrate shall consider all factors relating to the detention including the length of detention and the nature of the interrogation.
The actual recording of the lie detector test shall be done by an independent agency (such as a hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer. 250
A full medical and factual narration of the manner of the information received must be taken on record.

Although the right against self-incrimination and the inherent fallaciousness of the technologies were the main ground on which decision ultimately rested, this case is valuable for the court’s articulation of a right of ‘mental privacy’ grounded on the fundamental right to life and personal liberty. It remains to be seen whether this articulation will find resonance in other determinations in domains such as, say, communications.

Privacy of Records

Since at least the mid-nineteenth century, we have been living in what Nicholas Dirks has termed an 'ethnographic state' — engaged relentlessly and fetishistically in the production and accumulation of facts about us. From records of birth and death, to our academic records, most of our important transactions, our income tax filings, our food entitlements and our citizenship, most of us have assuredly been documented and lead a shadow existence somewhere on the files. Not only does the government keep records about us, but a host of private service providers including banks, hospitals, insurance and telecommunications companies maintain volumes of records about us. In this last section of this paper, we look at the privacy expectation of records both maintained by the government and the private sector.

Various statutes require records to be maintained of activities conducted under their authority and entire bureaucracies exist solely in service of these documents. Thus, for instance, the Registration Act requires various registers to be kept which record documents which have been registered under the Act. [39]; Once registered under this Act, all documents become public documents and State Rules typically contain provisions enabling the public to obtain copies of all documents for a fee. Similarly, a number of legislation – typically dealing with land records at the state level contain enabling provisions that allow the public to access them upon payment of a fee.

Where no provisions are provided within the statute itself that enable the public to obtain records, two recourses are still available.

Firstly, the Evidence Act enables courts to access records maintained by any government body. Secondly, private citizens may access records kept in public offices through the Right to Information Act. Each of these avenues is described in some details below:

Section 74 of the Evidence Act defines 'public documents' as including the following

Documents forming the acts, or records of the acts

Of the sovereign authority,
Of Official bodies and the Tribunals, and
Of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India or of the Commonwealth, or of a foreign country.

Public records kept in any state of private documents

It is clear from this definition that most records maintained by any government body are regarded as public documents. Section 76 mandates that every public officer "having custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefor together with a certificate written at the foot of such copy that it is a true copy of such document or part thereof".

Since there is no legislative guidance within the Evidence Act to indicate who may be said to possess "a right to inspect", this has been interpreted to mean that where the right to inspect and take a copy is not expressly conferred by a statute (as in the Registration Act mentioned above), “the extent of such right depends on the interest which the applicant has in what he wants to copy, and what is reasonably necessary for the protection of such interest". So it isn’t any officious meddler who may access such records – only persons with genuine interests in the matter, either personal or pecuniary, may obtain copies through this route.

In addition to the Evidence Act, copies of documents may also be obtained under the Right to Information Act 2005 which confers on citizens the right to inspect and take copies of any information held by or under the control of any public authority. Information is defined widely to include "any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, logbooks, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material held in any electronic form and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law for the time being in force".

Section 8 (j) of the Act exempts "disclosure of personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual” unless the relevant authority “is satisfied that the larger public interest justifies the disclosure of such information".

In an interesting case Mr. Ansari Masud A.K vs Ministry of External Affairs (2008)[40] , the Central Information Commission has held that “details of a passport are readily made available by any individual in a number of instances, example to travel agents, at airline counters, and whenever proof of residence for telephone connections etc. is required. For this reason, disclosure of details of a passport cannot be considered as causing unwarranted invasion of the privacy of an individual and, therefore, is not exempted from disclosure under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.” This is despite the fact that nothing in the Passport Act itself authorizes disclosure of any documents under any circumstances.

However, the Right to Information Act isn’t as convenient a vehicle for privacy abuse as this case may suggest. The RTI adjudicatory apparatus has on several occasions upheld the denial of information on grounds of privacy violation – most famously in a case where an applicant sought information from the Census Department on the ‘religion and faith’ of Sonia Gandhi – the President of the largest party currently in power in India. Both the Central Information Commission – the apex body adjudicating RTI appeals as well as the Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the denial of information as it would otherwise lead to an unwarranted incursion into her privacy.[41]

A similar concept of 'public interest' would seem to apply when private companies disclose personal information without a person’s consent. Without delving into the issue in too much detail, it would suffice here to mention one of the most important cases to have come up on the issue. In Mr. X vs Hospital Z[42] , a person sued a hospital for having disclosed his HIV status to his fiancé without his knowledge resulting in their wedding being called off. The Supreme Court held that the hospital was not guilty of a violation of privacy since the disclosure was made to protect the public interest. While affirming the duty of confidentiality owed to patients, the court ruled that the right to privacy was not absolute and was "subject to such action as may be lawfully taken for the prevention of crime or disorder or protection of health or morals or protection of rights and freedom of others."

Conclusion

Reflecting on the volume of case law that we have in India on privacy, one is struck at once, both by the elasticity of the concept of privacy — spanning, as it does, diverse fields from criminal law to paternity suits to wiretapping —as well as its fragility — the flag of privacy is constantly being raised only to be ultimately overridden on pretexts that range from security of state, to a competing private interest.

On the one hand, one marvels at the success of the concept, only a few decades old in Indian law, in insinuating itself into legal arguments across diverse contexts. On the other hand, one is dismayed by the fact that rarely does the concept seem to score a victory. There is an almost ritual quality to the way in which the “right to privacy” is invoked in these cases - always named as a relevant factor; it never seems to substantially influence the outcome of the case at hand.

The right to privacy in India was an Oops baby, born on the ventilator of a minority decision of the Supreme Court, and nourished in the decades that followed by sympathetic judges, who never failed to point out that this right was contingent — not absolute, not meant to be under the Constitution, but carved out anyway. Some five decades after its first invocation by the Supreme Court, one gets the feeling that the right to privacy, conceptually, hasn’t moved, and is still what it was then. We don’t, today, for the many times it has been invoked by courts, have a thicker, more robust concept of privacy than we started out with. So the question, that one is stuck with is, what work does this concept of privacy do?

One of the failings of the concept of privacy in India is that it doesn’t exist as a positive right, but is merely a resistive right against targeted intrusion. So for instance, the right to privacy would be useless as a concept to resist something like generalized street video surveillance – as long as a citizen is not singled out for a disadvantage, this right would be of no use. So this right to privacy is a negative right to not be interfered with. Under it one does not have the right to be as private as one wishes, but only no less than the next person. Still, even this limited concept could be useful, if it were applied more rigorously.

Unfortunately, as the case law indicates, the right to privacy cedes too quickly to competing interests. An incomplete rough catalog of these competing rights, drawn from the case law surveyed in this paper include:

public emergency and public safety (communications)
criminal investigation (search and seizure/communications)
competing private interests (divorce proceedings)
best interests of the child (paternity suits)
public interest (Right to Information)
competing fundamental rights (HIV status)

One may perhaps add judicial inactivity as one of the limiting factors on privacy. By holding that violations of procedure by investigating agencies would not vitiate trials, the judiciary has been complicit in perhaps some of the more damaging incursions into privacy. Once a person is implicated in any manner in the criminal justice system – either as a victim, a witness or an offender, investigating agencies are immediately invested with plenary powers. They can search his house without warrant. They can place him arrest. Subject him to ‘medical examinations’, take his fingerprints and DNA and hold it in a bank and there is nothing you can do. In this context, perhaps the strongest privacy safeguard can come from a reform in criminal procedure alone.

Notes

[1].The State of Uttar Pradesh V. Kaushaliya and Others AIR 1964 SC 416

[2].(1978) 2 SCR 621

[3]. 1 SCR 332

[4].AIR 1973 SC 157, 1973 SCR (2) 417

[5].(1975) 2 SCC 148

[6].(1994) 6 S.C.C. 632

[7].AIR 1997 SC 568

[8].AIR 1976 SC 789,1976 SCR (2)1060, (1976) 2 SCC 128

[9].Romesh Thappar vs The State Of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124 , 1950 SCR 594

[10].1966 AIR 1967 Ker 228, 1967 CriLJ 1511

[11].AIR 1980 SC 593 , 1980 SCR (2) 340

[12].[1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 408

[13].Distt. Registrar & Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara bank etc. AIR 2005 SC 186

[14].(2003) 4 SCC 493

[15].13-yr-old rape victim to HC: let me abort -, EXPRESS INDIA, April 21, 2010, http://tinyurl.com/13yrindian (last visited May 2, 2010).

[16].Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration, (2009) 9 SCC 1. http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/temp/dc%201798509p.txt (last visited May 2, 2010).

[17].Ibid

[18].410 U.S. 113 (1973)

[19].Article 21 does not limit the abridgement of the right to life by the state to only cases where the state has compelling state interest. The Article reads “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal librty except according to procedure established by law”

[20].Ibid

[21].Ibid

[22].AIR 1993 SC 2295, 1993 SCR (3) 917 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1259126/>

[23].AIR 2002 Delhi 217 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/627683/>

[24].51 Cal. 3d 120; 271 Cal. Rptr. 146; 793 P.2d 479

[25].AIR 2010 SC 2851 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/486945/>

[26].23 December, 2010 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/504408/>

[27].Ibid

[28].AIR 1980 SC 791 , 1980 SCR (2)1067 , (1980) 2 SCC 343

[29].Sections 3 & 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920

[30].Ibid, Section 5

[31].Section 7

[32].Thogorani Alias K. Damayanti vs State Of Orissa And Ors 2004 Cri L J 4003 (Ori) < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/860378/>

[33].AIR 1961 SC 1808 < http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1626264/>

[34].Ibid

[35].Keynote address given to the 93rd Indian Science Congress. See http://mindjustice.org/india2-06.htm, cited in Liang, L., 2007. And nothing but the truth, so help me science. In Sarai Reader 07 - Frontiers. Delhi: CSDS, Delhi, pp. 100-110. Available at: http://www.sarai.net/publications/readers/07-frontiers/100-110_lawrence.pdf [Accessed April 11, 2011].

[36].Ibid

[37].Ramchandra Ram Reddy v. State of Maharashtra [1 (2205) CCR 355 (DB)

[38].(2010) 7 SCC 263 http://indiankanoon.org/doc/338008/

[39].See Section 52 of the Registration Act 1908

[40].CIC/OK/A/2008/987/AD dated December 22, 2008 <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1479476/>

[41].Anon, 2010. High Court dismisses appeal seeking information on Sonia Gandhi’s religion. NDTV Online. Available at: http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/high-court-dismisses-appeal-seeking-information-on-sonia-gandhi-s-religion-69356 [Accessed April 12, 2011].

[42].(2003) 1 SCC 500 40

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Video Surveillance and Its Impact on the Right to Privacy

Vaishnavi Chillakuru — 2011-09-29T05:35:56Z

The need for video surveillance has grown in this technologically driven era as a mode of law enforcement. Video Surveillance is very useful to governments and law enforcement to maintain social control, recognize and monitor threats, and prevent/investigate criminal activity. In this regard it is pertinent to highlight that not only are governments using this system, but residential communities in certain areas are also using this system to create a safer environment.

However, this move is fundamentally opposed by many civil rights and privacy groups across different jurisdictions and have expressed concern that by allowing continual increases in government surveillance of citizens that we will end up in a mass surveillance society, with extremely limited, or non-existent political and/or personal freedoms.

European Union

The Data Protection Directive [1]of 1995, a Directive was issued by the European Union (EU) to regulate the processing and free movement of personal data. In pursuance with this Directive, every country of the EU passed a legislation to govern the protection of personal data. In this regard, the United Kingdom (UK) enacted the Data Protection Act (DPA) in 1998 and the same was brought into force in the year 2001.

The DPA sets forth eight, Data Protection Principles (DPP)[2] to protect personal data in the public sphere. Although video surveillance has not been explicitly referred to in the legislation, the definition given by the DPA is broad enough to encompass it. The application of these principles to video surveillance has been made explicit through the publication of the CCTV Code of Practice (CoP) by the information commissioner. The CoP does not apply to surveillance cameras used for household purposes. Images captured for recreational purposes with a camera, video recorder, etc., are also exempt. The main features of the CoP have been summarized below:

It is important to ascertain who has the responsibility for the control of the images i.e., deciding what is to be recorded, how the images should be used and to whom they may be disclosed. The body which makes these decisions is called the data controller and is responsible for the compliance with the DPA. The body has to notify the information commissioner as to who the data controller is.
An impact assessment should be done to evaluate the scheme’s impact on the privacy rights of the public. While conducting such an assessment, the data controller should take into account what benefits can be gained, whether better solutions exist, and what effect it may have on individuals. The results of the assessment should be used to determine whether video surveillance is justified and if so, how it should be operated.
The camera equipment should be chosen so as to fulfill the purposes for which the surveillance is being carried out. They should have the necessary technical specification so that the images are of appropriate quality. The camera should be positioned in such a way that only those areas which are intended to be the subject of surveillance are covered.
Viewing of live feed must be restricted to authorized personnel only. The data controller should try and protect the images from public view. Disclosure of recorded images should also be controlled and limited to the purpose for which the surveillance was set up. All other requests for viewing images should be considered carefully and balanced against the privacy rights of other individuals who may be affected by the disclosure of the images.
The DPA does not prescribe any minimum or maximum period of retention. It should be ascertained keeping in mind the purpose for which the surveillance system was set up. However, the images should not be kept for longer than is strictly necessary.
There should be prominently placed signs to let people know that they are in an area which is under video surveillance. This can be supplemented by an audio announcement in places where public announcements are already being used, such as in stations. Systems in public spaces and shopping centres should have signs giving the name and contact details of the company, organisation or authority responsible.
Staff operating the system needs to be aware of the rights of the individual under the DPA.

Canada

Canada has two federal laws which deal with privacy — the Privacy Act, 1985 and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 (PIPEDA). The former protects privacy rights by limiting the collection, use and disclosure of personal information by the federal government departments and agencies whereas the latter deals with the collection, use and disclosure of personal information by private sector organizations. In addition to these two legislations, every province or territory has their own privacy legislations.

A privacy commissioner is appointed to receive and investigate complaints filed by Canadian citizens pertaining to allegations of violation of the Acts. They also conduct research into privacy issues and promote awareness. The privacy commissioner reports directly to the House of Commons and the Senate. Every province or territory may also have its own commissioner or ombudsman authorized to investigate complaints. The Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC) published two sets of guidelines in order to define and circumscribe the use of video surveillance and ensure that the impact on privacy is minimized.

The first set of guidelines is meant to guide the regulation of video surveillance (by law enforcement agencies) in public spaces i.e., in places where there is free and unrestricted access to everyone. These guidelines were drawn up after extensive discussions between the OPC and the Royal Canadian Mount Police (RCMP). However, these guidelines are to be considered merely as an aid and notwithstanding anything stated in the guidelines, the RCMP has the right to carry out its functions as it deems fit. Some of the important pointers are[3]

Video surveillance should only be used to address a "real and pressing problem" which is of sufficient in magnitude so as to warrant the overriding of the privacy rights of citizens. Hence, there should be "real and verifiable" instances of crime or concern for public safety.
Video surveillance should be conducted only as a last resort i.e., in circumstances where there in no other less privacy-intrusive alternative.
A "privacy impact assessment" should be conducted beforehand to assess the degree of interference that will result due to the video surveillance.
Relevant stakeholders (for example, members of the communities that will be affected by the surveillance systems) should be considered before arriving at a decision.
Video surveillance must comply with all applicable laws including over arching laws such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The video surveillance should be conducted in such a way that impact on the privacy rights of citizens is minimized. For example, limited use of video surveillance (e.g., for limited periods of day, public festivals, peak periods) should be preferred to be always on surveillance if it will achieve substantially the same result.
The public should be informed that they are under surveillance. Clear signs should be put up mentioning the perimeter of the surveillance areas, the person responsible for surveillance and his contact details in case of any queries.
Security of the equipment and images should be assured.
People whose images are recorded should be able to request access to their recorded personal information.

The second set of guidelines is with respect to video surveillance in private sector organizations. These guidelines apply to overt video surveillance of the public by private sector organizations in publicly accessible areas. They do not apply to covert video surveillance nor do they apply to the surveillance of employees.

"Determine whether a less privacy-invasive alternative to video surveillance would meet your needs.
Establish the business reason for conducting video surveillance and use video surveillance only for that reason.
Develop a policy on the use of video surveillance.
Limit the use and viewing range of cameras as much as possible.
Inform the public that video surveillance is taking place.
Store any recorded images in a secure location, with limited access, and destroy them when they are no longer required for business purposes.
Be ready to answer questions from the public. Individuals have the right to know who is watching them and why, what information is being captured, and what is being done with recorded images.
Give individuals access to information about themselves. This includes video images.
Educate camera operators on the obligation to protect the privacy of individuals.
Periodically evaluate the need for video surveillance."

United States of America

Statutory laws governing the regulation of video surveillance in America are scarce. While there are some state laws which regulate aspects of public video surveillance, there are virtually no federal laws which directly deal with it. However, video surveillance implicates certain constitutional doctrines — especially the first and the fourth amendments. Although it cannot be denied that the liberties enshrined by these amendments can be severely affected by continuous surveillance, so far, the American courts and jurisprudence on the subject have been very permissive.

Another important directive is the "Fair Information Practices" (FIP) originating from the recommendations written by the United States Government which provide certain rights to individuals with respect to the use and dissemination of personal information. Although these guidelines do not have the force of law, they can prove to be a valuable guide for the treatment of any government-held record containing personally identifiable information. The rights of individuals listed by the FIP, in their most basic form, have been given below:[4]

"Notice and awareness of the purpose of data collection, and how such information is used;
Consent to the collection of personal information, and choice concerning how it is used;
Access to and participation in the process of data collection and use, including the right to correct errors;
Integrity and security adequate to protect the information against loss or misuse; and
Redress and accountability for injury resulting from loss or misuse of personal information."

Also, the American Bar Association, in 1999, published standards for technologically-assisted physical surveillance, including video surveillance. Some of the key points of these guidelines are given below:

While regulating the use of video surveillance for law enforcement purposes, certain factors should be kept in mind. For example, the nature of the law enforcement objective or objectives sought to be achieved, the extent to which the surveillance will achieve the law enforcement objectives, the nature and extent of the crime involved, etc.
The extent to which the surveillance invades privacy should be assessed. While conducting such an assessment, care should be taken to enhance the privacy of the location under surveillance by taking into consideration the nature of the place, activity, condition, or location.
Alternate measures should be preferred over video surveillance in order to maintain a balance between the right to privacy and the need for surveillance.
Notice of the surveillance should be given when appropriate.
The scope of the surveillance should be limited to its authorized objectives and be terminated when those objectives are achieved.

Australia

Neither the Australian Federal Constitution nor the Constitutions of the six states and two territories contain any express provisions relating to privacy. However, there are several state and federal privacy laws governing specific sectors and aspects. The primary federal statute is the Privacy Act of 1988 (PA). This statute was enacted in a bid to give effect to Australia's commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). There are four key areas of application of the Act out of which only two are relevant in the context of video surveillance. The first is the eleven Information Privacy Principles (IPPs), based on the OECD Guidelines. These principles are applicable to federal government agencies. The second is the National Privacy Principles (NPP) which regulates private sector organizations. However, private organizations can set forth their own "code of practice" and get it approved by the privacy commissioner as long as it does not go against the broad framework laid down by the NPPs.

Apart from the PA, each state or territory may have its own laws or practices regarding video surveillance. For instance, covert video surveillance in New South Wales is governed by the Workplace Video Surveillance Act, 1998. The Government of New South Wales also published a report on CCTV in public places. Similarly, Victoria is governed by the Surveillance Devices Act, 1999 and Western Australia by the Surveillance Devices Act, 1998. However, South Australia, Tasmania, Northern Territory and Australian Capital Region have no legislation dealing with the use of video surveillance.

Japan

The Constitution of Japan does not contain any express provisions guaranteeing the right to privacy. Till 2003, even statutory law in the field of data protection was non-existent and the government followed a policy of self regulation. It was only in 2003 that the Japanese Parliament enacted the Protection of Personal Information Act. The law underlying privacy in Japan[6] protects only personal information that is obtained and held by administrative agencies, private agencies. It seeks to set forth penal provisions in order to curb leakage of personal information by the government. The subsequent amendments to this Act have widened its scope to cover data that is paper based as well as computerized. Therefore, it can be said that the instant legislation is broad enough to encompass video surveillance data as well.

In this regard it is set forth that there exists no consolidated law to govern video-surveillance systems. Nevertheless, Japan uses video surveillance systems in order to assist the law enforcement agencies. The National Police Agency uses a video surveillance system called the "N system"[7] in order to record license plate numbers of vehicles on roads, highways, etc. This facilitates effective and efficacious law enforcement in Japan. Furthermore, Tokyo police have been operating surveillance cameras on utility poles and buildings to monitor pedestrians in the several densely populated districts of the city.[8] However, this mechanism has been challenged severely by litigants and many privacy groups in the court of law.

Conclusion

We have now moved into an age where security seems to be the primary issue for most countries and their citizens. Video surveillance is increasingly being used to assuage the fears of the citizens and bring perpetrators to justice. In such a scenario, the issue of privacy rights of individuals seems to have taken a backseat. While some countries such as Canada and Britain have attempted to strike a balance between the need for surveillance and the privacy rights of the people, other countries such as the United States of America and Japan do not seem to have made much progress in terms of creating video surveillance norms or regulations to protect the privacy rights of citizens.

Considering the pressing need for video surveillance to address national security issues, India surprisingly has no laws on the same. In this regard, India needs to draw from the experience of the United Kingdom and Canada. The first step is to enact laws permitting video surveillance.

These laws should be tightly worded and strictly connoted, considering the encroachment on civil liberties. Further, in order to balance security with privacy, the next step is to create an office for the information commissioner. It should be created and powers should be conferred to ensure that the privacy related disputes are handled efficiently and expeditiously. Furthermore, the misuse of the powers conferred upon surveillance authorities should be deterred by giving further powers to the commissioner to impose pecuniary liability.

Bibliography

European Union

Canada

United States of America:

Australia:

Japan

https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/phr2006-japan#[45]

Notes

[1]Directive 95/46/EC.

[2]See http://www.ico.gov.uk/for_organisations/data_protection/the_guide/the_principles.aspx (eight data protection principles)

[3]Full guidelines: http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/guide/vs_060301_e.cfm.

[4]Full guidelines: http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_taps_blk.html#9.

[5]http://www.proactivestrategies.com.au/library/Loss%20Prevention/Video%20Surveillance%20National%20article.PDF.

[6]This law extends to private businesses, government organizations and independent administrative agencies.

[7]540 locations on expressways and major highways throughout the country; it automatically records the license plate number of every passing car.

[8]This regime has also been litigated upon thoroughly with lawyers claiming the same to be unconstitutional.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/video-surveillance-privacy

When Data Means Privacy, What Traces Are You Leaving Behind?

Noopur Raval — 2011-11-24T09:24:03Z

How do you know yourself to be different from others? What defines the daily life that you live and the knowledge you produce in the span of this life? Is all that information yours or are you a mere stakeholder on behalf of the State whose subject you are? What does privacy really mean? In a society that is increasingly relying on information to identify people, collecting and archiving ‘personal’ details of your lives, your name, age, passport details, ration card number, call records etc, how private is your tweet, status update, text message or simply, your restaurant bill?

The CIC (central information commission) that arbitrates decisions on RTI appeals in case of conflict of interest provides interesting notions of what the State thinks is privacy. Ironically, the cornerstones of RTI that is privacy and its invasion are yet to be defined in the context of the judiciary. Then, how does the CIC decide what is private enough and what can be revealed to anyone? Of course, it relies on the discretion of its judges who attempt to draw from a range of sources that include the principles of natural justice drawn from western jurisprudence to quotes by Gandhi and Aristotle to the UK Data Protection Act, 1998 and US Torts that define invasion of privacy. To begin with, let us examine who constitutes the private sphere. As ruled in case of Mr. Ajeet Kumar Khanna vs Punjab & Sind Bank on 29 July, 2008 and Mr. G. Atchaiah vs State Bank of India on 22 August, 2008, the appellant can seek information only for himself/herself. Anyone outside the self, commonly believed as the personal connection, sons, daughters, parents or even spouse is not allowed information of a relative. One needs a distinct power of attorney for right to information. The contradiction is that one does not need to state the purpose for asking information, thereby making unnecessary any connection with the person you want information about.

CIC has been increasingly relying on the UK Data Protection Act, 1998 to make a correlation between data and privacy. Hence, to map privacy and its invasion, the RTI act depends on the UK Data Protection Act that classifies the following as sensitive personal data:

We have no equivalent of UK's Data Protection Act, 1998, Sec 2 of which, titled Sensitive Personal Data, reads as follows: In this Act "sensitive personal data" means personal data consisting of information as to:

The racial or ethnic origin of the data subject
His political opinions
His religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature
Whether he is a member of a Trade Union
His physical or mental health or condition
His sexual life
The commission or alleged commission by him of any offence
Any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been committed by him, the disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court in such proceedings.

While this blanket reference to sensitive personal data does not account for nuances in the Indian context, it also does not capture the essence of public-private interaction. It is mostly at the intersection of the public domain and the individual that the demarcation occurs. While personal family photographs lying in my attic may constitute a beautiful memory that can be proudly displayed on my walls, it is when one acknowledges the dual nature of any information source, the potential of these photographs to contribute to larger politicized information narratives, that their access and usage comes to define the real crux of the privacy debate.

The US Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, defines the Intrusion to Privacy more generally in the following manner: “One, who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Of course, we don’t know whether a father paying for bills and wanting access to his daughter’s cell phone records can be seen as highly offensive to a reasonable person in the Indian context. In the context of the recent Padmanabhswamy Templetreasure trove found in Kerala, since under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act 1958, such sites qualify as sites of ‘national importance’ and imply a certain larger public interest, would one be able to access such 'nationally personal data' pertaining to a temple (public space) owned by a family trust registered with the government (publicly private), containing a national treasure lying locked on geographical territory (public) that is rightly shared by all citizens?

Here’s how the CIC defined the personal and the extent of personal in the context of state as illustrated in Mr. Kanhiya Lal vs MCD, GNCT, Delhi on 13 June, 2011.To qualify for this exemption the information must satisfy the following criteria:

It must be personal information

Words in a law should normally be given the meanings given in common language. In common language we would ascribe the adjective 'personal' to an attribute which applies to an individual and not to an institution or a corporate. From this it flows that 'personal' cannot be related to Institutions, organizations or corporate. (Hence, we could state that section 8 (1) (j) cannot be applied when the information concerns institutions, organizations or corporate). The phrase 'disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest' means that the information must have some relationship to a public activity. Various public authorities in performing their functions routinely ask for 'personal' information from Citizens, and this is clearly a public activity. When a person applies for a job, or gives information about himself to a public authority as an employee, or asks for a permission, licence or authorisation, all these are public activities. The information sought in this case by the appellant has certainly been obtained in the pursuit of a public activity. We can also look at this from another aspect. The State has no right to invade the privacy of an individual. There are some extraordinary situations where the State may be allowed to invade on the privacy of a Citizen. In those circumstances special provisos of the law apply, always with certain safeguards. Therefore it can be argued that where the State routinely obtains information from Citizens, this information is in relationship to a public activity and will not be an intrusion on privacy.

In that case, does data at several layers demand for us to relook privacy from the subject positions we acquire at different levels and hence, the larger private collectives that we partake of?

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/when-data-is-privacy

Privacy & Media Law

Sonal Makhija — 2012-12-14T10:26:51Z

In her research, Sonal Makhija, a Bangalore-based lawyer, tries to delineate the emerging privacy concerns in India and the existing media norms and guidelines on the right to privacy. The research examines the existing media norms (governed by Press Council of India, the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 and the Code of Ethics drafted by the News Broadcasting Standard Authority), the constitutional protection guaranteed to an individual’s right to privacy upheld by the courts, and the reasons the State employs to justify the invasion of privacy. The paper further records, both domestic and international, inclusions and exceptions with respect to the infringement of privacy.

Introduction

Last year’s satirical release, Peepli [Live], accurately captured what takes place in media news rooms. The film revolves around a debt-ridden farmer whose announcement to commit suicide ensue a media circus. Ironically, in the case of the Radia tapes, the same journalists found themselves in the centre of the media’s frenzy-hungry, often intrusive and unverified style of reporting.[1] Exposés, such as, the Radia tapes and Wikileaks have thrown open the conflict between the right to information, or what has come to be called ‘informational activism’, and the right to privacy. Right to information and the right to communicate the information via media is guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India. In State of Uttar Pradesh v Raj Narain,[2] the Supreme Court of India held that Article 19(1) (a), in addition, to guaranteeing freedom of speech and expression, guarantees the right to receive information on matters concerning public interest. However, more recently concerns over balancing the right to information with the right to privacy have been raised, especially, by controversies like the Radia-tapes.

For instance, last year Ratan Tata filed a writ petition before the Supreme Court of India alleging that the unauthorised publication of his private conversations with Nira Radia was in violation of his right to privacy. The writ, filed by the industrialist, did not challenge the action of the Directorate-General of Income Tax to record the private conversations for the purpose of investigations. Instead, it was challenging the publication of the private conversations that took place between the industrialist and Nira Radia by the media. Whether the publication of those private conversations was in the interest of the public has been widely debated. What the Tata episode brought into focus was the need for a law protecting the right to privacy in India.

India, at present, does not have an independent statute protecting privacy; the right to privacy is a deemed right under the Constitution. The right to privacy has to be understood in the context of two fundamental rights: the right to freedom under Article 19 and the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution.

The higher judiciary of the country has recognised the right to privacy as a right “implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of this country by Article 21”. The Indian law has made some exceptions to the rule of privacy in the interest of the public, especially, subsequent to the enactment of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (RTI). The RTI Act, makes an exception under section 8 (1) (j), which exempts disclosure of any personal information which is not connected to any public activity or of public interest or which would cause an unwarranted invasion of privacy of an individual. What constitutes an unwarranted invasion of privacy is not defined. However, courts have taken a positive stand on what constitutes privacy in different circumstances.

The purpose of this paper is to delineate the emerging privacy concerns in India and the existing media norms and guidelines on the right to privacy. At present, the media is governed by disparate norms outlined by self-governing media bodies, like the Press Council of India, the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 and the Code of Ethics drafted by the News Broadcasting Standard Authority (NBSA). The paper examines the existing media norms, constitutional protection guaranteed to an individual’s right to privacy and upheld by courts, and the reasons the State employs to justify the invasion of privacy. The paper records, both domestic and international, inclusions and exceptions with respect to the infringement of privacy.

The paper traces the implementation of media guidelines and the meanings accorded to commonly used exceptions in reporting by the media, like, ‘public interest’ and ‘public person’. This paper is not an exhaustive attempt to capture all privacy and media related debates. It does, however, capture debates within the media when incursion on the right to privacy is considered justifiable. The questions that the paper seeks to respond to are: When is the invasion on the right to privacy defensible? How the media balances the right to privacy with the right to information? How is ‘public interest’ construed in day-to-day reporting? The questions raised are seen in the light of case studies on the invasion of privacy in the media, the interviews conducted with print journalists, the definition of the right to privacy under the Constitution of India and media’s code of ethics.

Constitutional Framework of Privacy

The right to privacy is recognised as a fundamental right under the Constitution of India. It is guaranteed under the right to freedom (Article 19) and the right to life (Article 21) of the Constitution. Article 19(1) (a) guarantees all citizens the right to freedom of speech and expression. It is the right to freedom of speech and expression that gives the media the right to publish any information. Reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right can be imposed by the State in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of the State, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. Article 21 of the Constitution provides, "No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." Courts have interpreted the right to privacy as implicit in the right to life. In R.Rajagopal v. State of T.N.[3]; and PUCL v. UOI[4], the courts observed that the right to privacy is an essential ingredient of the right to life.

For instance, in R. Rajagopal v State of Tamil Nadu, Auto Shankar — who was sentenced to death for committing six murders — in his autobiography divulged his relations with a few police officials. The Supreme Court in dealing with the question on the right to privacy, observed, that the right to privacy is implicit in the right to life and liberty guaranteed to the citizens of the country by Article 21. It is a ‘right to be left alone.’ "A citizen has a right to safeguard the privacy of his own, his family, marriage, procreation, motherhood, child-bearing and education among other matters.” The publication of any of the aforesaid personal information without the consent of the person, whether accurate or inaccurate and ‘whether laudatory or critical’ would be in violation of the right to privacy of the person and liable for damages. The exception being, when a person voluntarily invites controversy or such publication is based on public records, then there is no violation of privacy.

In PUCL v. UOI,[5]which is popularly known as the wire-tapping case, the question before the court was whether wire-tapping was an infringement of a citizen’s right to privacy. The court held that an infringement on the right to privacy would depend on the facts and circumstances of a case. It observed that, "telephone conversation is an important facet of a man's private life. Right to privacy would certainly include telephone-conversation in the privacy of one's home or office. Telephone-tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law." It further observed that the right to privacy also derives from Article 19 for "when a person is talking on telephone, he is exercising his right to freedom of speech and expression."

In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P,[6] where police surveillance was being challenged on account of violation of the right to privacy, the Supreme Court held that domiciliary night visits were violative of Article 21 of the Constitution and the personal liberty of an individual.

The court, therefore, has interpreted the right to privacy not as an absolute right, but as a limited right to be considered on a case to case basis. It is the exceptions to the right to privacy, like ‘public interest’, that are of particular interest to this paper.

International Conventions

Internationally the right to privacy has been protected in a number of conventions. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR) under Article 12 provides that:

"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, or to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."

The UDHR protects any arbitrary interference from the State to a person’s right to privacy. Similarly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1976 (ICCPR) under Article 17 imposes the State to ensure that individuals are protected by law against “arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. [7]

Thus, ensuring that States enact laws to protect individual’s right to privacy. India has ratified the above conventions. The ratification of the Conventions mandates the State to take steps to enact laws to protect its citizens. Although, human right activists have periodically demanded that the State take adequate measures to protect human rights of the vulnerable in society, the right to privacy has received little attention.

Similarly, Article 16 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides protection to a minor from any unlawful interference to his/her right to privacy and imposes a positive obligation on States who have ratified the convention to enact a law protecting the same. India does have safeguards in place to protect identity of minors, especially, juveniles and victims of abuse. However, there are exceptions when the law on privacy does not apply even in case of a minor.

The right to privacy, therefore, is not an absolute right and does not apply uniformly to all situations and all class of persons. For instance, privacy with respect to a certain class of persons, like a person in public authority, affords different protection as opposed to private individuals.

Public Person

In case of a representative of the public, such as a public person, the right to privacy afforded to them is not of the same degree as that to a private person. The Press Council of India (PCI) has laid down Norms of Journalistic Conduct, which address the issue of privacy. The PCI Norms of Journalistic Conduct, recognises privacy as an inviolable human right, but adds a caveat; that the degree of privacy depends on circumstances and the person concerned.

In the landmark judge’s asset case, CPIO, Supreme Court of India vs Subhash Chandra Agarwal,[8] the court recognised the tension between the right to information and the right to privacy, especially, with respect to public persons. The case arose from an application filed by a citizen who was seeking information under the RTI Act on whether judges of high courts and Supreme Court were filing asset declarations in accordance with full resolution of the Supreme Court. The court held that information concerning private individuals held by public authority falls within the ambit of the RTI Act. It remarked that whereas public persons are entitled to privacy like private persons, the privacy afforded to private individuals is greater than that afforded to those in public authority, especially in certain circumstances.

The court commented:

"A private citizen's privacy right is undoubtedly of the same nature and character as that of a public servant. Therefore, it would be wrong to assume that the substantive rights of the two differ. Yet, inherent in the situation of the latter is the premise that he acts for the public good, in the discharge of his duties, and is accountable for them. The character of protection, therefore, afforded to the two classes — public servants and private individuals, is to be viewed from this perspective. The nature of restriction on the right to privacy is therefore, of a different order; in the case of private individuals, the degree of protection afforded is greater; in the case of public servants, the degree of protection can be lower, depending on what is at stake."

In testing whether certain information falls within the purview of the RTI Act, the court said one should consider the following three tests:

whether the disclosure of the personal information is with the aim of providing knowledge of the proper performance of the duties and tasks assigned to the public servant in any specific case;
whether the information is deemed to comprise the individual's private details, unrelated to his position in the organization, and,
whether the disclosure will furnish any information required to establish accountability or transparency in the use of public resources.

Would this rule hold true for information on relatives/ friends of public persons? The rule is that, unless, private information on relatives/friends of public person’s impacts public interest and accountability, the information should not be revealed.

In 2010, the media reported that Sunanda Pushkar, a close friend of the Minister of State for External Affairs, Shashi Tharoor, holds a significant holding in the IPL Kochi team. The media exposure led to the exit of Shashi Tharoor from the government. While the media’s questioning of Pushkar’s holdings was legitimate, the media’s reporting on her past relationships and how she dressed had no bearing on public interest or accountability.[9] The media accused Pushkar of playing proxy for Tharoor in the Rs. 70 crore sweat equity deal. Much of the media attention focussed on her personal life, as opposed to, how she attained such a large stake in the IPL Kochi team. It minutely analysed her successes and failures, questioned her ability and accused her of having unbridled ambition and greed for money and power.[10]

If one was to consider the rules of privacy set by the court in the judges assets’ case much of the personal information published by the media on Tharoor and Pushkar, failed to shed light on the IPL holdings or the establishment of the nexus between the IPL holdings and the government involvement.

The tests delineated by the court in considering what personal information regarding a public authority may be shared under the RTI Act, can be adopted by the media when reporting on public officials. If personal information divulged by the media does not shed light on the performance of a public official, which would be of public interest, then the information revealed violates the standards of privacy. Personal details which have no bearing on public resources or interests should not be published.

The media coverage of the Bombay terror attacks displayed the same lack of restraint, where the minutest details of a person’s last communication with his/her family were repeatedly printed in the media. None of the information presented by the media revealed anything new about the terror attack or emphasised the gravity of the attack.

A senior journalist, who talked off the record and reported on the Mumbai terror attacks, agreed that the media overstepped their limits in the Mumbai terror attacks. As per her, violation of privacy takes place at two stages: the first time, when you overstep your boundaries and ask a question you should not have, and the second, when you publish that information. Reflecting on her ten years of reporting experience, she said, “Often when you are covering a tragedy, there is little time to reflect on your reporting. Besides, if you, on account of violating someone’s privacy, choose not to report a story, some competing paper would surely carry that story. You would have to defend your decision to not report the story to your boss.” The competitiveness of reporting and getting a story before your competitor, she agreed makes even the most seasoned journalists ruthless sometimes. Besides, although PCI norms exist, not many read the PCI norms or recall the journalistic ethics when they are reporting on the field.[11]

The PCI Norms reiterate that the media should not intrude "the privacy of an individual, unless outweighed by genuine overriding public interest, not being a prurient or morbid curiosity."[12] The well accepted rule, however, is that once a matter or information comes in the public domain, it no longer falls within the sphere of the private. The media has failed to make the distinction between what is warranted invasion of privacy and what constitutes as an unwarranted invasion of privacy. For instance, identity of a rape or kidnap victim that would further cause discrimination is often revealed by the media.

Safeguarding Identity of Children

The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act lays down that the media should not disclose the names, addresses or schools of juveniles in conflict with the law or that of a child in need of care and protection, which would lead to their identification. The exception, to identification of a juvenile or child in need of care and protection, is when it is in the interest of the child. The media is prohibited from disclosing the identity of the child in such situations.

Similarly, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) stipulates that:

Article 16

No child shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honour and reputation.
The child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 40 of the Convention, states that the privacy of a child accused of infringing penal law should be protected at all stages of the proceedings.

Almost all media, print and broadcast, fail to observe these guidelines. Prashant Kulkarni[13] (name changed), who was a photographer with Reuters a few years ago, said that in Reuters photographs taken by photojournalists could not be altered or edited, to ensure authenticity.

As far as taking photographs of certain vulnerable persons is concerned, he admitted to photographing street children who are drug addicts on the streets of Mumbai. The photographs were published by Reuters. However, when he was on an assignment for an NGO working with children, the NGO cautioned him about photographing children who are drug addicts, to protect their identity. Similarly, identity of HIV and AIDS patients, including children, should be protected and not revealed. Children affected with HIV and AIDS should not be identified by name or photograph, even if consent has been granted by the minor’s parents/guardian.

As a rule, Kulkarni said, he does not seek consent of individuals when he is taking their photographs, if they are in a public place. If they do not object, the assumption is that they are comfortable with being photographed. The PCI norms do not expressly provide that consent of a person should be sought. But, journalists are expected to exercise restraint in certain situations. Likewise, identifying juveniles in conflict with law is restricted. This includes taking photographs of juveniles that would lead to their identification.

Kulkarni, who extensively covered the Bombay train blasts in 2006, explains, "At the time of the Bombay train explosions, I avoided taking pictures that were gory or where dead people could be identified. However, I did take photographs of those injured in the blast and were getting treated in government hospitals. I did not expressly seek their consent. They were aware of being photographed. That is the rule I have applied, even when I was on an assignment in West Africa. I have never been on an assignment in Europe, so am not sure whether I would have applied the same rule of thumb. Nonetheless, now as a seasoned photographer, I would refrain from taking pictures of children who are drug addicts."

Safeguarding Identity of Rape Victims

Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code makes disclosure of the identity of a rape victim punishable. In the recent Aarushi Talwar murder case and the rape of an international student studying at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) the media frenzy compromised the privacy of the TISS victim and besmirched the character of the dead person.[14] In the TISS case, the media did not reveal the name of the girl, but revealed the name of the university and the course she was pursuing, which is in violation of the PCI norms. In addition to revealing names of individuals, the PCI norms expressly states that visual representation in moments of personal grief should be avoided. In the Aarushi murder case, the media repeatedly violated this norm.

The media in both cases spent enough newsprint speculating about the crimes. Abhinav Pandey[15] (name changed), a senior journalist reporting on crime, agrees that the media crossed its boundaries in the TISS case by reporting sordid details of how the rape took place. "Names of victims of sexual crime cannot be reported. In fact, in many instances the place of stay and any college affiliation should also be avoided, as they could be easily identified. Explicit details of the offence drawn from the statement given by the victim to the police are irrelevant to the investigation or to the public at large. Similarly, names of minors and pictures, including those of juveniles, have to be safeguarded."

"Crime reporters receive most of their stories from the police. Therefore, one has to be careful before publishing the story. At times in the rigour of competitive journalism, if you decide to publish an unverified story, as a good journalist you should present a counter-point. As a seasoned journalist it is easy to sense when a story is being planted by the police. If you still want to carry the story, one has to be careful not to taint the character of a person," he adds.

"For instance, in my reporting if I find that the information will not add to the investigation, I will not include it in my copy. Last year, we had anonymous letters being circulated among crime reporters which alleged corruption among senior IPS officers. Instead of publishing the information contained in those letters with the names of the IPS officers, we published a story on corruption and cronyism on IPS officers. In the Faheem Ansari matter, who was an accused in the 26/11 trial, I had received his email account password. Accessing his account also amounts to violation of privacy. But, we only published the communication between him and some handlers in Pakistan, which we knew would have an impact on the investigation. Our job requires us to share information in the public domain, sometimes we would violate privacy. Nonetheless, one has to be cautious."

Trial by Media & Media Victimisation

The PCI norms lay down the guidelines for reporting cases and avoiding trial by media. The PCI warns journalists not to give excessive publicity to victims, witnesses, suspects and accused as that amounts to invasion of privacy. Similarly, the identification of witnesses may endanger the lives of witnesses and force them to turn hostile. Zaheera Sheikh, who was a key witness in the Gujarat Best Bakery case, was a victim of excessive media coverage and sympathy. Her turning hostile invited equal amount of media speculation and wrath. Her excessive media exposure possibly endangered her life. Instead, of focussing on the lack of a witness protection program in the country, the media focussed on the twists and turns of the case and the 19 year old’s conflicting statements. The right of the suspect or the accused to privacy is recognised by the PCI to guard against the trial by media.

Swati Deshpande,[16] a Senior Assistant Editor (Law) at the Times of India, Mumbai, observes that, “As a good journalist one will always have more information than required, but whether you publish that information or exercise restraint is up to you.” In a span of 11 years of court reporting, as per her, there have been instances when she has exercised the option of not reporting certain information that could be defamatory and cannot be attributed. If an allegation is made in a court room, but is not supported by evidence or facts, then it is advisable that it be dropped from the report.

"In the Bar Dancers’ case which was before the Bombay High Court, the petition made allegations of all kinds against certain ministers. I did not report that, although I could have justified it by saying it is part of the petition, and I was just doing my job. The allegation was neither backed by facts nor was it of public interest. As a rule one should report on undisputed facts. Then again, with court reporting one is treading on safer grounds, as opposed to other beats."

"In cases of rape when facts are part of the judgement, you report facts that are relevant to the judgement or give you an insight on why the court took a certain view and add value to the copy. One should avoid a situation where facts revealed are offensive or reveal the identity of the victim. The past history of both the victim and the accused should not be reported."

She admitted, that "Media reporting often gives the impression that the accused has committed the crime or the media through its independent investigation wing has found a particular fact. When in fact, it has relied entirely on the information given by the police and failed to question or verify the facts by an independent source. The result is that most crime reporting is one-sided, because the information received from the police is rarely questioned."

As per her, to a certain degree the publication of Tata–Radia conversations did violate Tata’s privacy. "Media needs to question itself prior to printing on how the information is of public interest. Of course, as a journalist you do not want to lose out on a good story, but there needs to be gate keeping, which is mostly absent in most of the media today."

In the Bofors pay-off case[17] the High Court of Delhi, observed that, “The fairness of trial is of paramount importance as without such protection there would be trial by media which no civilised society can and should tolerate. The functions of the court in the civilised society cannot be usurped by any other authority.”[18] It further criticised the trend of police or the CBI holding a press conference for the media when investigation of a crime is still ongoing. The court agreed that media awareness creates awareness of the crime, but the right to fair trial is as valuable as the right to information and freedom of communication.

The 200th report of the Law Commission dealt with the issue of Trial by media: Free Speech vs Fair Trial under Criminal Procedure. The report, focussed on the pre-judicial coverage of a crime, accused and suspects, and how it impacts the administration of justice. The Contempt of Courts Act, under section 2 defines criminal contempt as:

"…the publication, (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise), of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which
(i) … … … …
(ii) prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course
of any judicial proceedings; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any manner."

Section 3(1) of the Act exempts any publication and distribution of publication, "if the publisher had no reasonable grounds for believing that the proceeding was pending”. In the event, the person is unaware of the pendency, any publication (whether by words spoken or written or signs or visible representations) interferes or tends to interfere with or obstructs “the course of justice in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding pending at the time of publication, if at that time he had no reasonable grounds for believing that the proceeding was pending." The report emphasizes that publications during the pre-trial stage by the media could affect the rights of the accused. An evaluation of the accused’s character is likely to affect or prejudice a fair trial.

If the suspect’s pictures are shown in the media, identification parades of the accused conducted under Code of Civil Procedure would be prejudiced. Under Contempt of Court Act, publications that interfere with the administration of justice amount to contempt. Further, the principles of natural justice emphasise fair trial and the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. The rights of an accused are protected under Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to fair trial. This protects the accused from the over-zealous media glare which can prejudice the case. Although, in recent times the media has failed to observe restraint in covering high-profile murder cases, much of which has been hailed as media’s success in ensuring justice to the common man.

For instance, in the Jessica Lal murder case, the media took great pride in acting as a facilitator of justice. The media in the case whipped up public opinion against the accused and held him guilty even when the trial court had acquitted the accused. The media took on the responsibility of administering justice and ensuring the guilty are punished, candle light vigils and opinion polls on the case were organised by the media. Past history of the accused was raked up by the media, including photographs of the accused in affluent bars and pubs in the city were published after he was acquitted. The photographs of Manu Sharma in pubs insinuated how he was celebrating after his acquittal.

The Apex Court observed that the freedom of speech has to be carefully and cautiously used to avoid interference in the administration of justice. If trial by media hampers fair investigation and prejudices the right of defence of the accused it would amount to travesty of justice. The Court remarked that the media should not act as an agency of the court.[19]

The Court, commented, "Presumption of innocence of an accused is a legal presumption and should not be destroyed at the very threshold through the process of media trial and that too when the investigation is pending."[20]

Sting Operations

On 30 August, 2007 Live India, a news channel conducted a sting operation on a Delhi government school teacher forcing a girl student into prostitution. Subsequent to the media exposé, the teacher Uma Khurana[21] was attacked by a mob and was suspended by the Directorate of Education, Government of Delhi. Later investigation and reports by the media exposed that there was no truth to the sting operation. The girl student who was allegedly being forced into prostitution was a journalist. The sting operation was a stage managed operation. The police found no evidence against the teacher to support allegations made by the sting operation of child prostitution. In this case, the High Court of Delhi charged the journalist with impersonation, criminal conspiracy and creating false evidence. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting sent a show cause notice to TV-Live India, alleging the telecast of the sting operation by channel was “defamatory, deliberate, containing false and suggestive innuendos and half truths."[22]

Section 5 of the Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995 and the Cable Television Network Rules (hereafter the Cable Television Networks Act), stipulates that no programme can be transmitted or retransmitted on any cable service which contains anything obscene, defamatory, deliberate, false and suggestive innuendos and half truths. The Rules prescribes a programming code to be followed by channels responsible for transmission/re-transmission of any programme.

The programme code restricts airing of programmes that offend decency or good taste, incite violence, contains anything obscene, defamatory, deliberate, false and suggestive innuendos and half truths, criticises, maligns or slanders any individual in person or certain groups, segments of social, public and moral life of the country and affects the integrity of India, the President and the judiciary. The programme code provided by the Rules is exhaustive. The Act empowers the government to restrict operation of any cable network it thinks is necessary or expedient to do so in public interest.

The court observed that false and fabricated sting operations violate a person’s right to privacy. It further, observed, "Giving inducement to a person to commit an offence, which he is otherwise not likely and inclined to commit, so as to make the same part of the sting operation is deplorable and must be deprecated by all concerned including the media.” It commented that while “…sting operations showing acts and facts as they are truly and actually happening may be necessary in public interest and as a tool for justice, but a hidden camera cannot be allowed to depict something which is not true, correct and is not happening but has happened because of inducement by entrapping a person."[23]

The court criticised the role of the media in creating situations of entrapment and using the ‘inducement test’. It remarked that such inducement tests infringe upon the individual's right to privacy. It directed news channels to take steps to prohibit “reporters from producing or airing any programme which are based on entrapment and which are fabricated, intrusive and sensitive.[24]

The court proposed a set of guidelines to be followed by news channels and electronic media in carrying out sting operations. The guidelines direct a channel proposing to telecast a sting operation to obtain a certificate from the person who recorded or produced the same certifying that the operation is genuine to his knowledge. The guidelines propose that the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting should set up a committee which would have the powers to grant permission for telecasting sting operations. The permission to telecast a sting operation should be granted by the committee only if it is satisfied about the overriding public interest to telecast the sting operation. The guidelines mandate that, in addition, to ensuring accuracy, the operation should not violate a person’s right to privacy, "unless there is an identifiable large public interest” for broadcasting or publishing the material. However, the court failed to define what constitutes 'larger public interest'.

The PCI norms also lay down similar guidelines which require a newspaper reporting a sting operation to obtain a certificate from the person involved in the sting to certify that the operation is genuine and record in writing the various stages of the sting. The decision to report the sting vests with the editor who merely needs to satisfy himself that the sting operation is of public interest.

In addition, to the Cable Television Networks Act and the PCI norms, the News Broadcasting Standard Authority (NBSA) was set up in 2008 as a self-regulatory body by News Broadcasters Association.[25] The primary objective of the NBSA is to receive complaints on broadcasts. The NBSA has drafted a Code of Ethics and Broadcasting Standards governing broadcasters and television journalists. The Code of Ethics provides guiding principles relating to privacy and sting operations that broadcasters should follow.

With respect to privacy, the Code directs channels not to intrude into the private lives of individuals unless there is a “clearly established larger and identifiable public interest for such a broadcast.” Any information on private lives of persons should be “warranted in public interest.” Similarly, for sting operations, the Code directs that they should be used as “a last resort” by news channels and should be guided by larger public interest. They should be used to gather conclusive evidence of criminality and should not edit/alter visuals to misrepresent truth.

In a recent judgement on a supposed sting operation conducted by M/s. Associated Broadcasting Company Pvt. Limited[26] on TV9 on ‘Gay culture rampant in Hyderabad’, the NBA took suo motu notice of the violation of privacy of individuals with alternate sexual orientation and misuse of the tool of sting operation. NBA in its judgement held that the Broadcaster had violated clauses on privacy, sting operations and sex and nudity of the Code of Ethics. It further, observed, that the Broadcaster and the story did not reveal any justifiable public interest in using the sting operation and violating the privacy of individuals. In this particular case, the Broadcaster had revealed the personal information and faces of supposedly gay men in Hyderabad to report on the ‘underbelly’ of gay culture and life. However, the news report, as NBSA observed, did not prove any criminality and was merely a sensational report of gay culture allegedly prevalent in Hyderabad.

The PCI norms provide that the press should not tape-record conversations without the person’s express consent or knowledge, except where it is necessary to protect a journalist in a legal action or for “other compelling reason.” What constitutes a compelling reason is left to the discretion of the journalist.

It was in the 1980s, that the first sting operation on how women were being trafficked was carried out by the Indian Express reporter Ashwin Sarin. As part of the sting, the Express purchased a tribal girl called Kamla. Subsequently, in 2001, the sting operation conducted by Tehelka exposed corruption in defence contracts using spy cams and journalists posing as arms dealers. The exposé on defence contracts led to the resignation of the then defence minister George Fernandes. Sting operations gained legitimacy in India, especially in the aftermath of the Tehelka operation, exposing corruption within the government. The original purpose of a sting operation or an undercover operation was to expose corruption. Stings were justifiable only when it served a public interest. Subsequent to the Tehelka exposé, stings have assumed the status of investigative journalism, much of which has been questioned in recent times, especially, with respect to ethics involved in conducting sting operations and the methods of entrapment used by the media. Further, stings by Tehelka, where the newspaper used sex workers to entrap politicians have brought to question the manner in which stings are operated. Although, the overriding concern surrounding sting operations has been its authenticity, as opposed to, the issue of personal privacy.

For instance, in March 2005 a television news channel carried out a sting operation involving Bollywood actor Shakti Kapoor to expose the casting couch phenomenon in the movie industry. The video showing Shakti Kapoor asking for sexual favours from an aspiring actress, who was an undercover reporter, was received with public outrage. Nonetheless, prominent members of the media questioned the manner in which the sting was conducted. The sting was set up as an entrapment. The court has taken a strong view against the use of entrapment in sting operations. In the case of the Shakti Kapoor sting, privacy of the actor was clearly violated. The manner in which the sting was conducted casts serious doubt on who was the victim.[27]

Additionally, the sting violated the PCI norms. It failed to provide a record of the various stages of how the sting operation was conducted. In United Kingdom, the media when violating privacy of a person has to demonstrate that it is in the interest of the public.

International Law on Media & Privacy Ethics

United Kingdom

The Press Complaints Commission (PCC), UK is a self-regulatory body similar to NBA. The PCC has put down code of ethics to be followed by journalists. The PCC guidelines provide that everyone has the right to privacy and editors must provide reason for intrusions to a person’s privacy. This includes photographing individuals in private places without their consent. Interestingly, private places include public or private property "where there is a reasonable expectation of privacy." In India however, as Kulkarni pointed out, photographs are taken without the consent of an individual if he/she is in a public space.

Like the PCI norms, the PCC Code lays down guidelines to follow when reporting on minors (below 16 years of age) who have been victims of sexual assault. As per the guidelines, the identity of the children should be protected. Further, relatives or friends of persons convicted or accused of a crime should not be identified without their consent, unless the information is relevant to the story. References to a person’s race, colour, sexual orientation and gender should be avoided. For instance, the media reportage of the TISS rape case, which revealed the nationality and colour of the victim, would be in violation of the PCC Code. In the TISS rape case, the information on the nationality and colour of the victim was not only irrelevant to the story, but as amply demonstrated by the media it reinforced prejudices against white women as ‘loose or amoral’.[28]

As far as sting operations are concerned, the PCC lays down that the press must not publish material acquired by hidden camera or clandestine devices by intercepting private messages, emails or telephone calls without consent. However, revealing private information in cases of public interest is an exception to the general rule to be followed with respect to individual privacy. The PCC defines public interest to include, but it is not restricted to:

"i) Detecting or exposing crime or serious impropriety
ii) Protecting public health and safety
iii) Preventing the public from being misled by an action or statement of an individual or organisation"

It requires editors to amply demonstrate that a publication is of public interest. In case the material is already in public domain the same rules of privacy do not apply. However, in cases involving children below 16 years of age, editors must demonstrate exceptional public interest that overrides the interest of the child. Tellingly, the PCC recognises freedom of expression as public interest.

The PCC, to ensure that persons are not hounded by the media have started issuing desist orders. The PCC issues a desist notice to editors to prevent the media from contacting the person. Preventive pre-publication is when the PCC pre-empts a story that may be pursued or published and attempts to either influence the reporting of the story in a way that it is not in violation of a person’s privacy or persuades the media house not to publish the story. The PCC, however, does not have the powers to prevent publication.

Further, United Kingdom is a member of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to privacy under Article 8 of the Convention: "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence."

However, there is no independent law which recognises the right to privacy. The judiciary however has protected the right to privacy in several occasions, like in the famous J.K. Rowling case where the English Court held, that a minor’s photograph without the consent of the parent or guardian, though not offensive, violates the child’s right to privacy.[29]

France

The French legal system protects the right to privacy under: Article 9 of the Civil Code.

Article 9 of the Civil Code states:

Everyone has the right to respect for his private life. Without prejudice to compensation for injury suffered, the court may prescribe any measures, such as sequestration, seizure and others, appropriate to prevent or put an end to an invasion of personal privacy; in case of an emergency those measures may be provided for by an interim order. The right to privacy allows anyone to oppose dissemination of his or her picture without their express consent.

Article 9 covers both the public and private spheres, and includes not merely the publication of information but also the method of gathering information. Also, in France violation of one’s privacy is a criminal offence. This includes recording or transmitting private conversations or picture of a person in a private place without the person’s consent. This implies that privacy is not protected in a public place. Any picture taken of a person dead or alive, without their prior permission, is prohibited. Buying of such photographs where consent of a person also constitutes as an offence. Journalists, however, are not disqualified from the profession if they have committed such an offence.[30]

France has the Freedom of the Press of 29 July 1881 which protects minors from being identified and violent and licentious publication which targets minors. It punishes slander, publication of any information that would reveal the identity of a victim of a sexual offence, information on witnesses and information on court proceedings which include a person’s private life.[31]

Sweden

Privacy is protected in Sweden under its Constitution. All the four fundamental laws of the country: the Instrument of Government, the Act of Succession, the Freedom of the Press Act, and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression protect privacy. The Instrument of Government Act of 1974 provides for the protection of individual privacy. It states that freedom of expression is limited under Article 13 of the Constitution:

"Freedom of expression and freedom of information may be restricted having regard to the security of the Realm, the national supply, public safety and order, the integrity of the individual, the sanctity of private life, or the prevention and prosecution of crime. Freedom of expression may also be restricted in economic activities. Freedom of expression and freedom of information may otherwise be restricted only where particularly important reasons so warrant."

Sweden has a Press Council which was established in 1916. The Council consists of the Swedish Newspaper Publishers' Association, the Magazine Publishers' Association, the Swedish Union of Journalists and the National Press Club. The Council consists of "a judge, one representative from each of the above-mentioned press organisations and three representatives of the general public who are not allowed to have any ties to the newspaper business or to the press organisations."

Additionally, there is an office of the Press Ombudsman which was established in 1969. Earlier the Swedish Press Council used to deal with complaints on violations of good journalistic practice. After the setting up of the Press Ombudsman, the complaints are first handled by the Press Ombudsman, who is empowered to take up matters suo motu. "Any interested members of the public can lodge a complaint with the PO against newspaper items that violate good journalistic practice. But, the person to whom the article relates to must provide a written consent, if the complaint is to result in a formal criticism of the newspaper."[33]

The Swedish Press Council reports that in the recent years, 350-400 complaints have been registered annually, of which most concern coverage of criminal matters and invasion of privacy.

Sweden, additionally, has a Code of Ethics which applies to press, radio and television. The Code of Ethics was adopted by the Swedish Co-operation Council of the Press in September 1995. The Code of Ethics for Press, Radio and Television in Sweden has been drawn up by the Swedish Newspaper Publishers' Association, the Magazine Publishers' Association, the Swedish Union of Journalists and the National Press Club.

The Code of Ethics lay down norms to be followed in respect of privacy. It states that caution should be exercised when publishing information that:

Infringes on a persons’ privacy, unless it is obviously in public interest,
Information on suicides or attempted suicides
Information on victims of crime and accidents. This includes publication of pictures or photographs[34]

Race, sex, nationality, occupation, political affiliation or religious persuasion in certain cases, especially when such information is of no importance, should not be published.

One should exercise care in use of pictures, especially, retouching a picture by an electronic method or formulating a caption to deceive the reader. In case a picture has been retouched, it should be indicated below the photograph.

Further, the Code asks journalists to consider “the harmful consequences that might follow for persons if their names are published” and names should be published only if it is in the public interest. Similarly, if a person’s name is not be revealed, the media should refrain from publishing a picture or any particulars with respect to occupation, title, age, nationality, sex of the person, which would enable identification of the person.

In case of court reporting or crime reporting, the Code states that the final judgement of the Court should be reported and given emphasis, as opposed to conducting a media trial. In addition, Sweden has incorporated the ECHR in 1994.

Japan

The Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association or Nihon Shinbun Kyokai (NSK),[35] was established in 1946 as an independent and voluntary organisation to establish the standard of reporting, and protect and promote interests of the media. The organisation as part of its mandate has developed the Canon of Journalism, which provides for ethics and codes members of the body should follow. The Canon recognises that with the easy availability of information, the media constantly has to grapple with what information should be published and what should be held back. The Code provides that journalists have a sense of responsibility and should not hinder public interests. In addition, to ensuring accuracy and fairness, the Code states that respect of human rights, includes respect for human dignity, individual honour and right to privacy. Right to privacy is acknowledged as a human right.

Japan does not have an information ministry or organs like the PCC in the U.K. or the Press Ombudsman in Sweden. Apart from the Canon, the NSK has a code for marketing of newspapers, an advertising code and the Kisha club guidelines.[36]

Japan in 2003 formulated the Personal Information Protection Act, which regulates public and private sector. The Act, which came into effect in 2005, aims to ensure that all personal data collected by the public and private sector are handled with care. The Act requires that the purpose of collecting personal information and its use should be specified, information should be acquired by fair means, any information should not be supplied to third parties without prior consent of the individual concerned.

Netherlands

The right to privacy is protected under Article 10 of the Netherlands Constitution. Further, the Article also provides for the enactment of Rules for dissemination of personal data and the right of persons to be informed when personal data is being recorded.

Netherlands also has the Netherlands Press Council which keeps the media in check. The Code of the International Federation of Journalists and the Code of Conduct for Dutch Journalists was drafted by the Dutch Society of Editors-in-Chief to establish media reporting standards. These guidelines can be disregarded by the media only in cases involving social interest.

The Code recognises:

That a person’s privacy should not be violated when there is no overriding social interest;
In cases concerning public persons violation of privacy would take place, but they have the right to be protected, especially, if that information is not of public interest;
The media should refrain from publishing pictures and images of persons without prior permission of persons. Similarly, the media should not publish personal letters and notes without the prior permission of those involved;
The media should refrain from publishing pictures and information of suspects and accused; and
Details of criminal offence should be left out if they would add to the suffering of the victim or his/her immediate family and if they are not needed to demonstrate the nature and gravity of the offence or the consequences thereof.

Conclusion

The right to privacy in India has failed to acquire the status of an absolute right. The right in comparison to other competing rights, like, the right to freedom of speech & expression, the right of the State to impose restrictions on account of safety and security of the State, and the right to information, is easily relinquished. The exceptions to the right to privacy, such as, overriding public interest, safety and security of the State, apply in most countries. Nonetheless, as the paper demonstrates, unwarranted invasion of privacy by the media is widespread. For instance, in the UK, Sweden, France and Netherlands, the right to photograph a person or retouching of any picture is prohibited unlike, in India where press photographers do not expressly seek consent of the person being photographed, if he/she is in a public space. In France, not only is the publication of information is prohibited on account of the right to privacy, but the method in which the information is procured also falls within the purview of the right to privacy and could be violative. This includes information or photograph taken in both public and private spaces. Privacy within public spaces is recognised, especially, “where there is reasonable expectation of privacy.” The Indian norms or code of ethics in journalism fail to make such a distinction between public and private space. Nor do the guidelines impose any restrictions on photographing an individual without seeking express consent of the individual.

The Indian media violates privacy in day-to-day reporting, like overlooking the issue of privacy to satisfy morbid curiosity. The PCI norms prohibit such reporting, unless it is outweighed by ‘genuine overriding public interest’. Almost all the above countries prohibit publication of details that would hurt the feelings of the victim or his/her family. Unlike the UK, where the PCC can pass desist orders, in India the family and/or relatives of the victims are hounded by the media.

In India, the right to privacy is not a positive right. It comes into effect only in the event of a violation. The law on privacy in India has primarily evolved through judicial intervention. It has failed to keep pace with the technological advancement and the burgeoning of the 24/7 media news channels. The prevalent right to privacy is easily compromised for other competing rights of ‘public good’, ‘public interest’ and ‘State security’, much of what constitutes public interest or what is private is left to the discretion of the media.

Notes

[1]The Radia Tapes’ controversy concerns recording of conversations between the lobbyist Nira Radia and politicians, industrialists, bureaucrats and journalists with respect to the 2G spectrum scam. The tapes were recorded by the Income Tax Department. The role played by the media, especially some prominent journalists, in scam has been questioned. A handful of magazines and newspapers have questioned the media ethics employed by these journalists, whose recorded conversations are in the public domain or have been published by a few political magazines. The publication of the recorded conversations by a few media publications has received a sharp reaction from the said journalists. They have accused those media journals of unverified reporting and conducting a smear campaign against them.

[2]1975 AIR 865, 1975 SCR (3) 333.

[3](1994) 6 S.C.C. 632.

[4]AIR 1997 SC 568.

[5]AIR 1997 SC 568.

[6]AIR 1997 SC 568.

[7]International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Part III Art. 17. Available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm [Last accessed 20//04/2011].

[8]W.P. (C) 288/2009

[9]PTI, Media just turned me into a 'slut' in IPL row: Sunanda Pushkar, 23/04/2010 Available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-04-23/india/28149154_1_sunanda-pushkar-shashi-tharoor-ipl-kochi [Last accessed 20/04/2011].

[10]Vrinda Gopinath, "Got A Girl, Named Sue", 26/04/2010 Available at http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?265098 [Last accessed 20/04/2011]

[11]Interview with Senior Assistant Editor, Hindustan Times, on 18.04.11.

[12]Guideline 6 (i) Right to Privacy, Norm if Journalistic Conduct, PCI.

[13]Interview with a freelance photographer and a former Reuters photographer on 16.04.11.

[14]Kumar, Vinod, “Raped American student’s drink not spiked in our bar,” 16.04.09 Available at http://www.mid-day.com/news/2009/apr/160409-Mumbai-News-Raped-American-student-date-drug-CafeXO-Tata-Institute-of-Social-Sciences.htm, Anon, “Party pics boomerangon TISS rape victim” , 04 .05.09, Available at http://www.mumbaimirror.com/index.aspx?page=article§id=15&contentid=2009050420090504031227495d8b4e80f [Last Accessed April 20,2011].

[15]Interview with Abhinav Pandey, crime reporter with a leading newspaper, on 21.04.11.

[16]Interview with Swati Deshpande, Senior Assistant Editor (Law), Times of India, on 15.04.11.

[17]Crl.Misc.(Main) 3938/2003

[18]Ibid.

[19]Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma vs State (Nct Of Delhi), Available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1515299/.

[20]Ibid

[21]WP(Crl.) No.1175/2007

[22]Ibid

[23]Ibid

[24]Ibid

[25]NBA is a community formed by private television & current affairs broadcasters. As per the NBA website, it currently has 20 leading news channels and current affairs broadcaster as its members. Complaints can be filed against any of the broadcasters that are members of NBA on whom the Code of Ethics is binding.

[26]For additional details, please refer to the website: http://www.nbanewdelhi.com/authority-members.asp [Last Accessed April 20,2011]

[27]TNN, “'Full video will further embarrass Shakti', 15.03.2005 Available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2005-03-15/mumbai/27849089_1_sting-operation-shakti-kapoor-film-industry.

[28]For more details please refer to the PCC website: http://www.pcc.org.uk/ [Last Accessed April 20,2011].

[29]Singh, A., May 2008, “JK Rowling wins privacy case over son's photos”http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1936471/JK-Rowling-wins-privacy-case-over-sons-photos.html [Last Accessed April 20,2011].

[30]For more details, please refer to: http://www.kbkcl.co.uk/2008/03/privacy-law-the-french-experience/ and http://ambafrance-us.org/spip.php?article640 [Last Accessed April 20,2011].

[31]For more details, please refer to:http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Freedom-of-speech-in-the-French.html [Last Accessed April 20,2011].

[32]http://www.po.se/english/how-self-regulation-works [Last Accessed April 20,2011].

[33]Ibid.

[34]Please refer to this website for additional details: http://ethicnet.uta.fi/sweden/code_of_ethics_for_the_press_radio_and_television and http://www.po.se/english/code-of-ethics/85-code-of-ethics-for [Last Accessed April 20,2011].

[35]http://www.pressnet.or.jp/english/index.htm [Last Accessed April 20,2011].

[36]Kisha Clubs, are clubs where only a few media houses/newspapers have access to public institution information. They have been criticised for its lack of openness and encouraging monopoly on reporting.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/privacy-media-law

Right to Privacy Bill 2010 — A Few Comments

elonnai — 2012-03-22T06:26:14Z

Earlier this year, in February 2011, Rajeev Chandrasekhar introduced the Right to Privacy Bill, 2010 in the Rajya Sabha. The Bill is meant to “provide protection to the privacy of persons including those who are in public life”. Though the Bill states that its objective is to protect individuals’ fundamental right to privacy, the focus of the Bill is on the protection against the use of electronic/digital recording devices in public spaces without consent and for the purpose of blackmail or commercial use.

Specific Recommendations

The use of electronic recording devices in public is an important and expansive aspect of privacy, which is yet to be directly covered by Indian law. Though the Bill addresses the basic usage of electronic devices with built-in cameras, it frames the violation as a personal violation. In doing so, the Bill has taken a punitive approach, making it criminal to take photographs in situations outside of the laid-out regulations, rather than protective in nature, i.e., working to protect individuals from harassment and blackmail, and offer forms of redress to those damaged.

The Bill fails to address scenarios such as Google street view, satellite photographs, news channels, and live feeds at events and conferences. In these situations live data is being transmitted and posted on the Web for public to view by the media. When looking at the dilemma of photographs being taken in public by the media, the privacy interests are different to those that are based on control of personal information alone. They are substantive, as opposed to informational, and engage directly with individual dignity, autonomy, and the freedom of expression. For example, the interest in freedom of expression encompasses both those of the photographers and journalists producing material for his/her journal. Can a journalist print a photograph taken in a public space — of a public figure, which the public figure did not consent to, and which that person considers defamatory?

Interestingly, Europe has strong laws regulating the taking of photographs in public spaces, but these rules are covered by the Protection from Harassment Act, 1997 (UK), which speaks specifically to the media’s behaviour towards public figures — or they fall under a tort of misuse. In the US taking photographs only becomes an issue in the use of the photograph. Essentially anyone can be photographed without consent except when they have secluded themselves in places where they have a reasonable expectation of privacy such as dressing rooms, restrooms, medical facilities, or inside a private residence. This legal standard applies regardless of the age, sex, or other attributes of the individual. Once a photograph is taken, and if that photograph is used for commercial gain without consent or publicizes an otherwise private person inappropriately, then that person can be held liable under the tort of misappropriation.

Specific Comments to the Bill

Misguiding Title

The title of the Bill is, the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2006," but the scope of the Bill is focused on regulating the use of electronic recording devices, and it does not include many aspects of privacy. So we recommend that the title of the Bill be modified to "The Electronic Recording Devices Bill, 2010".

Inappropriate Blanket Use of Privacy

The introduction to the Bill states that its purpose is "for the protection of the right to privacy of persons including those who are in public life so as to protect them from being blackmailed or harassed or their image and reputation being tarnished in order to spoil their public life and for the prevention of misuse of digital technology for such purposes and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto."

Comment: Notwithstanding the fact that violations of privacy extend beyond blackmail, harassment, and defamation, and that digital technologies are not the only vehicles for privacy violations, it is important to qualify that privacy is not a blanket right, and that for public persons, the privacy that they are afforded is determined by balancing their interest against the public interest.

Narrow Definition of Public Figures

Section 2 (b) of the Bill states: "persons in public life" includes the representatives of the people in Parliament, state legislatures, local self government bodies, and office bearers of recognized political parties

Comment: Persons in public life include persons beyond the political sphere, specifically those in higher positions that influence the behaviour, lifestyles, and culture of the general population. Thus, we recommend that this definition be extended to include actors, actresses, athletes, artists, and musicians, CEOs, and authors.

Insufficient Limits to the Right to Privacy

Section 3 (1) states: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force every person, including persons in public life, shall have the right to privacy which shall be exclusive, unhindered and there shall be no unwarranted infringement thereof by any other person, agency, media or anyone:

Provided that sub-section (1) of section 3 shall not apply in cases of corruption, and misuse of official positions by persons in public life.

Comment: We recommend that the right to privacy, as any right, need not be identified as exclusive or unhindered. The right to privacy must be determined on a case by case basis relative to the public interest, and, while cases of corruption and misuse of official position by persons in public life certainly qualify, they do not encompass the wider variety of situations in which an individual’s right to privacy should be limited. For instance, if a public figure speaks out on an issue in a way that contradicts an earlier position that was captured on video, shouldn’t that be allowed to be made public? If a public figure is photographed in a morally questionable position, shouldn’t that be allowed to be made public? Indeed, even for private individuals, privacy is a matter of context. In airports and other sensitive public places it is commonly accepted that an individual’s right to privacy can be limited. If an individual has a disease such as HIV, under what circumstances should some or all of the greater public should be informed and their right to privacy may be limited?

Limited Scope of Technology

Section 4 of the Bill states: "No person shall use a cellular phone with an inbuilt camera, if it does not produce a sound of at least 65 decibels and flash a light when used to take a picture of any object or person, as the case may be.

Comment: We recommend that this clause clarifies if only cellular phones, and not cameras, computers, or other devices with built-in cameras are required to produce the sound of at least 65 decibels.

Overly Complicated Clauses

Section 5 of the Bill states: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person shall make digital recording or take photographs or make videography in any manner whatsoever of:

Section 5(a): any part or whole of a human body which is unclothed or partially clothed without the consent of the person concerned.

Section 5 (b): any part or whole of a human body at any public place without the consent of the person concerned and

Section 5 (c): the personal and intimate relationship of any couple in a home, hotel, resort, or any place within the four walls by hidden digital or other cameras and such other instruments, or any place within the four walls by hidden digital cameras and such other instruments…with the intent of blackmail or of making commercial gains from it or otherwise.

Comment: Section 5 currently lists certain circumstances in which photographs are not allowed to be taken of individuals in public without consent if they are to be used for the purpose of commercial gain or blackmail. Blackmail or commercial gains are not the only ways in which digital recordings of people can be misused. Certainly, taking such pictures to post for purposes of hurting one’s reputation or causing humiliation is as reprehensible as taking pictures for commercial gain, so the provision is too narrow. It may also be overboard, because a person may be captured in an artistic or political photograph but have, for example, bare arms or legs. That would be a picture of a part of a human body at a public place. We recommend that the list of offences include misappropriation and false light, and that the manner of the picture-taking not be limited to clauses (a) to (c) above.

Section 5 is the first instance in which the use of digital recordings for commercial gain has been mentioned as a violation in the Bill. We recommend that commercial gain as a violation should be added to the introduction of the Bill.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/privacy-bill-2010

Open Letter to the Finance Committee: Operational Design

praskrishna — 2011-02-17T10:02:46Z

The objective of the UID project is to provide identity infrastructure that is not susceptible to fraud or error. This note highlights parts of the operational design of the project, which are flawed. We plead that each point be taken into consideration and that the design be suitably revised.

Flawed aspects of the operational design

During enrolment: false identities

Initial proof of one’s identity is best proved through multiple, standardized documents. The UID lists seventeen acceptable documents.1 Acceptance and verification of only one of these identities is necessary for enrolment. This is a lower standard than existing forms of identity such as the Passport or the PAN card.2

During transactions: technology will not solve corruption

In every transaction that requires the use of the Aadhaar number, there are four points where corruption is possible and delivery of services will not take place:

The technology fails, and does not perform authentication;
The authority fails and delivers a false positive or false negative;
The local administrator fails to deliver the service after authentication;
The biometric fails due to biological changes, and thus the individual is denied benefits; and
Fraudulent use of face biometrics at the transaction level.

During transactions: high cost of centralization with limited benefits

Verifying unique identity for every transaction will introduce an unnecessary authentication overhead. In the UID Bill, there is provision for standardized authentication fees.3

At some point service providers will pass on the authentication cost through a required authentication fee to the residents. This will take place with no entitlement of any service or guarantee against fraud.

During redressal: no guarantee of quick and adequate remedies

The delivery of services is guaranteed only when there is an optional way for transactions to be completed. If an Aadhaar number holder attempts to complete a transaction, and the UIDAI rejects it, the individual can make a request for re-verification with the registrar.4

If the UIDAI still rejects the request, the individual must file a complaint to the UIDAI contact centre and wait for appropriate remedial action,5 yet the UIDAI is not liable for the loss of service.

During upgrades of the system: patchwork approach to data protection

It is more secure to have pro-active data protection than re-active data protection. The data protection legislation that is meant to secure data processed in the UID project will be established only after the UID bill becomes law. One can only assume that the UID will respond to every new policy development in a patchwork fashion.

1http://uidai.gov.in/index.php?option=com_fsf&view=faq&Itemid=206&catid=24

2 http://passport.nic.in/, http://nrisharejunction.com/pan.aspx

3 Chapter 3, Section 23 (2) (o): The National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010

4 http://uidai.gov.in/UID_PDF/Front_Page_Articles/Documents/Strategy_Overveiw-001.pdf

5 http://uidai.gov.in/images/FrontPageUpdates/aadhaarhandbookver1.2.pdf pg.18

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/operational-design

Open Letter to the Finance Committee: UID Budget

praskrishna — 2011-02-17T11:18:16Z

This note presents the aspects of the UID project, which have not been considered or incorporated into the UID’s budget. The costs include re-enrollment, loss in human time, and the cost of the audit function.

Cost of re-enrollment
In the report 'Biometrics Design Standards for UID Applications' 1 a pilot study in India concluded that about two to five per cent of the people did not have viable biometric data. These data have not been taken into account when setting the program budget. Over time biometrics modify, thus re-enrollment will be required. The UIDAI states that given the changing nature of biometric data – biometrics would be collected every five years for children and every ten years for adults. The current project does not give us a clear picture as to what extent the re-enrollment will be required, and how the additional costs will be accounted for.
Cost of loss in human time
A time motion study is a tool used to enhance business efficiency and ensure cost effectiveness by reducing the number of motions in performing a task. In their budget, the UIDAI has accounted for the salaries of individuals associated directly with the UIDAI. The UIDAI has not accounted for the loss in human time that will take place by individuals whose daily routine will be impacted by the UID. If a time motion study were to be done only on the UID project, one would find that individuals not paid by the UIDAI, lose potential wages due to the unpaid time they must dedicate towards the scheme – or that businesses will be forced to compensate for the extra time required for each transaction by providing additional personnel. For example: On a train the number of train masters present is calculated according to how many individuals each ticket master can check and process. With the UID, in order to prevent fraud around subsidized train tickets , individuals on the train will have their biometrics checked and authenticated. The below diagram demonstrates how authenticating an individual by their UID and biometric incurs a loss in human time, and thus, the process of collecting train tickets will require more train masters to complete.
Current Process:
- Present ticket to train master
- Train master checks identity card and identity on ticket
- Train master ticks ticket, and ticks his list to indicate verification
Process with biometrics:
- Present Aadhaar number, fingerprint , and ticket to train master
- Train master takes a reading of your fingerprint and sends it to the central database
- Train master waits for approval from the CIDR
- The CIDR gives a yes or no response
- If the answer is no – the train master swipes your finger five times, and then finds alternate forms of identification
- Train master provides proof of verification
Cost of audit function
The bulk of the UID enabled transactions will have financial implications. Every financial transaction involves three or four parties: the person who collects the payment, the person who prepares the documentation, the person who approves the documentation, and finally the person who audits the documentation. In such a context the technology can play the role of the person who: collects, prepares, and approves each transaction. The role of auditing the transaction cannot be played by technology. The audit function is human, and the audit function needs to be worked into the project budget.

1 “Biometrics Design Standards for UID Applications" pg.22

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/uid-budget

Open Letter to the Finance Committe: Biometrics

praskrishna — 2011-02-17T13:12:22Z

This note points out the weaknesses inherent in biometrics and the pitfalls in using them. It recommends procedural safeguards that should be adopted by the UID in order to make the use of biometrics more secure and inclusive.

Biometrics are not centrally stored and are used only for identification

Biometrics, as our first letter notes 1 are better suited for identification, and are inappropriate for authentication. Therefore, the central server need not store biometric information, and need only store the public key of each citizen's digital signature.2 Biometrics on a smart card for authentication will allow service providers to determine if the card is being carried by the right person. This configuration of biometrics has many positives. It is :
- Cost effective
- More secure
- Places the control of biometric information in the hands of the data subject
Use encrypted data, rather than live data

The UID scheme has stated that biometrics will be encrypted, but has not provided further details. 3
It is recommended that biometrics are:
- Encrypted whenever it is used, stored and transferred;
- A biometric should be encrypted to such a degree that it is not possible to reconstruct the biometric data; and
- After an encrypted version of the biometric is made, the original biometric should be deleted.
In order to perform an identification check – the biometrics presented should be encrypted and then compared to the encrypted version stored on the card. If the card is stolen – the thief would not be able to harvest biometrics.
Security clearance for all associated entities and personnel

UID registrations and transactions will be handled by 'registrars' or in other words personnel who work at organizations not directly under the control of the UIDAI. A clear process associated with who can perform transactions and a proper audit system is needed to prevent 'insider' attacks.
Clearly defined alternate identification factors

There are many situations in which a biometric cannot be accepted in a transaction. For example, when the biometric changes, is misread, or is unreadable. The UID has recognized this possibility and has stated: “In case of authentication, the operator needs to find an alternate method of authentication if fingerprint verification fails. The operator/application would not know the cause of verification failure. A timeout will be implemented in service after five attempts.”4
The alternative identity factors that will be accepted need to be clearly defined and articulate.
Standards for acceptance of biometric as authentication factor

The UIDAI has proposed a whole range of authentication factors – pin, password, partial biometrics, full biometrics, mobile phone and combination's thereof. 5 Some of these authentication factors may also be presented by the data subject over the Internet. As our previous letters have stated – some authentication factors are more secure than others. Therefore, the UIDAI should publish standards for acceptance of different authentication factors based on the security requirements of different types of transactions. Even if biometrics are used as an authentication standard – in our opinion it should only be used for trivial transactions without major financial or citizenship implications.

Footnotes:

1http://www.cis-india.org/advocacy/igov/privacy-india/letter-to-finance-committee

2 Distinguish and separate the authentication process from the identification process: Identification is a comparison of one set of biometric data against all sets of collected biometrics in one central database to verify the identity of the owner of the biometric data. Authentication is a comparison of a biometric against a stored template to validate the existence of that specific biometric

3 http://uidai.gov.in/index.php?option=com_fsf&view=faq&Itemid=206&catid=7

4 Biometric Design Standards for UID Applications: pg 37

5 UIDAI Strategy Overview. Creating a Unique Identity Number for Every Resident in India. Pg. 28

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/biometrics

Open Letter to the Finance Committee: Finance and Security

praskrishna — 2011-02-17T11:57:42Z

This note explores the three connections between finance and security and demonstrates the cost implications of operating a centrally designed identity management system as proposed by the UID. In doing so, it shows how the monitoring, storing, and securing of transactional data in a centralized database fall short of meeting the project's objectives of authentication, and thus is an additional cost. Further, it is argued that the blanket monitoring of the transaction database is not an effective method of detecting fraud, and is an expensive component of the project.

Operating a centralized identity management system that requires the use of a remote database for every transaction is always more expensive than a decentralized identity management system that could optionally use a local database.

Centralized database costs

Both public and private keys must be centrally stored
All transactions require connectivity for the sending and receiving of authentication of data, and have an associated connectivity cost
Securing all data at a central database has augmented costs

Decentralized database costs

Only the public key must be centrally stored
Some transactions require connectivity for the sending and receiving of authentication data

The cost of building an identity management system that includes recording, monitoring, and securing each transaction is more than the cost of building only an identity authentication system. The goal of the project is to identify a person. Recording each transaction will add unnecessary cost.

Cost of identity authentication system
Cost of monitoring transactions	> Cost of identity authentication system
Cost of securing transaction data

Increasing security or fighting fraud can be done in two ways - having a targeted approach or through blanket monitoring. The UID scheme, through the monitoring of the transaction database featuring trillions of transaction by 1.2 billion people is a blanket approach, and will provide lower return on investment than a targeted approach.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/finance-and-security

Open Letter to the Finance Committee: UID and Transactions

praskrishna — 2011-02-24T13:35:11Z

Since official documentation from the UIDAI is very limited, we assume that data pertaining to transactions would comprise of the Aadhaar number, identifier of the authenticating device, date-time stamp, and approval/rejection/error code. Recording and maintaining of data pertaining to transactions is very important because it increases transparency and accountability through an audit trail. However, storage of such sensitive data creates many privacy risks, because more often than not metadata gives you as much intelligence as raw data.

For example – even if you didn’t have access to the Radia recordings – just knowing who she called, when, how frequently, in what order, and for how long, will give quite a comprehensive picture. Thus, we believe that such data should not be fully stored in a central database. By way of an open letter, we suggest three alternative ways of storing and securing data relating to transactions, so that transparency and accountability is preserved without enabling surveillance or profiling of individuals.

Partial storage of data relating to transactions

Once a transaction is processed, half of the UID number is stored in the central database, while the other half of the number is stored with the service provider. Thus, for an agency to reconstruct the audit trail they must seek consent from the service provider and the UIDAI for information regarding a specific transaction. The process would follow steps like these:

Send part of the Aadhaar number to the CIDR
Service provider stores part of the Aadhaar number locally.
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies seeking transaction data securing required approvals from the Home Ministry and then request data from the UIDAI and service provider
Data is provided by UIDAI and the service provider and combined to reconstruct the audit trail.

Storage of the public keys with a custodian

Similar to the model followed in the new wiretapping regulations1, the transaction details in the central database is secured using several custodians. Thus, no single entity has complete knowledge of access to the database. And if the transaction details are leaked to the public, the custodian can be held responsible for negligence. Thus, for an agency to reconstruct the audit trail they must seek approvals and request encrypted data. The process would follow steps like these:

Encrypt transaction data with the public key of the ‘custodian’
Store encrypted data in CIDR
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies seeking transaction details require approvals from the Home Ministry, and then request encrypted data from the UIDAI.
The custodian on receipt of the necessary approvals decrypts the data using his/her private key, and then the audit trail becomes available.

Complete storage of transaction details at the service provider level

After a transaction is processed, the information is encrypted and stored in a de-centralized manner with the service provider, thus agencies or individuals can only access information regarding a specific transaction at a specific organization. The process would follow steps like these:

Encrypt transaction data
Store encrypted data at service provider level
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies seeking transaction details require approvals from the Home Ministry, and then request encrypted data from each service provider. Audit trail is reconstructed by merging data sets from different service providers.
The CIDR will only hold Aadhaar number, date-time stamp, and approval/rejection/error code.

Note

1 http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Tapping-norms-Govt-will-erase-private-talk/articleshow/7407633.cms

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/uid-and-transactions

'Privacy Matters', Ahmedabad: Conference Report

praskrishna — 2011-04-04T04:45:49Z

On 26 March 2011, civil society, lawyers, judges, students and NGO’s, gathered together at the Ahmedabad Management Association to take part in 'Privacy Matters' – a public conference organised by Privacy India in partnership with IDRC and Research Foundation for Governance in India (RFGI) — to discuss the challenges of privacy in India, with an emphasis on national security and privacy. The conference was opened by Prashant Iyengar, head researcher at Privacy India and Kanan Drhu, director of RFGI. Mr. Iyengar explained Privacy India’s mandate to raise awareness of privacy, spark civil action, and promote democratic dialogue around privacy challenges and violations in India. RFGI is a think tank established in 2009 which aims to research, promote, and implement various reforms to improve the legal and political process in Gujarat and across India. ‘Privacy Matters – Ahmedabad’ is the third conference out of the eight that Privacy India will be hosting across India. The next conference will take place in Hyderabad on 9 April 2011. It will focus on human rights and privacy.

The keynote speech, delivered by Usha Ramanathan, focused on links not often made between privacy and social phenomenon.

Ms. Usha Ramanathan opened the conference by examining the links not often made between privacy and personal security, between databases and national security, and the centrality of dislodging privacy in projects of social control. In her presentation she spoke about the inverse relationship between national and personal security, making the point that an important part of privacy is the ability of an individual to secure their own person. Today, because national security follows a policy of ubiquitous surveillance, it is almost impossible for an individual to secure their person from the state. Ms. Ramanathan also traced the beginnings of ubiquitous surveillance to the increasing global fear of terrorism, and the national break down of the criminal justice system in India. Instead of looking to the roots of terrorism and the roots of failure in the criminal justice system, the Indian State has responded to both these factors by superimposing a system of surveillance on top of the existing rule. Consequently, the state has become pan-optical — closely following the movement of its entire population. The state has been able to achieve this level of surveillance through technology, which it has used to create identifiers for its population. The use of technology by the state mediates a link between corporate interest and state interest. Thus, by facilitating the easy and ubiquitous creation of identifiers and surveillance, technology is changing the idea and the nature of privacy. For example, it is now important that a privacy law allows for individuals to protect and secure their identity, something that every individual has and every individual controls, while regulating the creation and external use of identifiers — something that is used by another (not you) to distinguish a person from the rest of the population.

Questions to Consider

How can privacy legislation work to positively regulate the use of technology by the government, so that invasion of privacy does not consequently become state policy?

How can privacy legislation distinguish between and work to protect an identity while regulating the creation and use of personal information as identifiers?

Session I of the Conference featured a Judicial Perspective of Privacy and a Presentation on the Connections between Privacy and the Federal Income Tax Regime in India.

Privacy and the Constitution

J N Bhatt, the former Chief Justice of Gujarat and Bihar, and currently the head of the Gujarat State Law Commission, spoke about privacy as a fundamental right that has been written into articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Important points from his presentation include:

As privacy is already a recognized fundamental right, the question at hand is not if there is a right to privacy, but instead how can the right to privacy be best proliferated.

Within the question of how a privacy can best be proliferated, is a question about rights and duties. Wherever there is a right to privacy there is also a corresponding duty to privacy — as rights and duties are interdependent.

Though privacy has been recognized as a fundamental right in India, when looking at the actual assertion of the right, it is important to be aware of the cultural realities of India. India is a country with 39 per cent of her population living below the poverty line, with an even lower literacy rate, and there is a direct connection between the assertion of civil liberties, an individual’s civic sense, and education.

When looking at how to best proliferate the right to privacy, governance and common law, a methodology to reach the poorest of the poor should be laid out first.

Questions to Consider

What is the best way to proliferate the right to privacy ?

What legal structures need to be in place to ensure that the poor can assert their right to privacy?
What social structures need to be in place to ensure that the poor can assert their right to privacy?

Privacy and the Indian Tax Regime

Professor Amal Dhru, visiting professor from the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad and a practicing Chartered Accountant spoke on the connections between privacy and the federal income tax regime in India. In his presentation he explained how the information collected by the federal income tax regime in India can be both useful in holding a citizen accountable, and invasive of one’s personal privacy if mis-used. Important points from his presentation include:

The Indian tax regime highlights the tension between public interest as tax evasion is considered an exception to the right to privacy as it is a matter of public interest.

There is a lack of confidence in the existing banking and tax system in India. For example in the business sector, Indian investors have deposited over 700 billion dollars abroad as they are given complete privacy and security over their money.

Though there is a lack of confidence in the current banking and tax system, a tighter law is not necessarily the solution. For example, studies have found that tighter tax regimes lead to greater evasion, while looser tax regimes have higher compliance rates.

On April 1, 2011 the new tax codes for India will be implemented. The reform will give enormous power to tax offices, and as the tax authorities will become equipped to do taxes smarter – this will come at a cost to citizen’s privacy.

Questions to Consider

Just as a tighter tax law leads to a higher percentage of tax evasion, will a tight privacy law simply lead to greater numbers of privacy violations?

What creates public confidence in a law?

Should a privacy legislation be responsible for defining the public good?

Should privacy protection of tax-related information be incorporated into a privacy legislation or contained only in tax law?

To what extent should tax authorities be allowed to investigate potential tax evasion i.e., one’s computer, house or e-mail?

How does one balance the private vs. the public good?

Session II of the Conference focused on National Security and Privacy, and Cultural Conceptions of Privacy

National Security and Privacy

In the second session on Privacy and National Security, Colonel Mathew Thomas spoke on privacy and national security. Colonel Thomas is a management consultant and activity leader for development centers and has held top positions in the Indian Army, and the Defence Research and Development Organisation, where he headed the missile manufacturing facility. Sharing his personal experiences in the army he explained the connection between privacy and national security. Important points from his presentation include:

National Security is often not an internal threat, but instead an external threat.

There is a connection between the increase in surveillance and liberalization of Government.

More surveillance does not bring more security.

Foreign software poses as a threat to national security.

Greater security is gained through intelligent use and analysis of data.

A strong national security plan should not rely solely on surveillance of its citizens. Instead national security should be brought about through strong economic policies, non-reliance on foreign software, neutrality in foreign policy, fair trade policies, rural development and prevention of migration to cities, and having a politically honest and accountable governance.

Questions to Consider

Is it effective for privacy to be compromised in the name of anti- terror laws?
Can the development and distribution of indigenous software protect national privacy?
How can strong economic policies indirectly protect an individual's privacy?
How can a strong foreign policy protect an Indian citizen's privacy when it is stored or sent abroad?

Privacy as a Cultural Construct

Gagan Sethi from the Centre for Social Justice, Ahmedabad shared his opinion on privacy. Important points from his presentation include:

Privacy is a cultural construct that changes with context, perspective, and time.
When considering a privacy policy it is important to create a policy that does not strictly define what privacy is and what it is not, but instead create a policy that defines and promotes a common respect for human dignity.

Questions to Consider

If a privacy policy is developed to promote a common respect for human dignity – will it be effective?

Can you develop a policy that has a loose definition and mandate, but has strong legal teeth?

Session III of the Conference focused on Minority Identities and Privacy, Prisoner Rights, and Cyber Security.

Privacy and Minority Identities

Bobby Kuhnu, a lawyer and activist, presented in the third session on Privacy, Minority Identities, and Security. In his talk Mr. Kuhnu through the use of three examples examined the ideological underpinnings of the discourse on privacy and its bearings on socially marginalized identities in the context of the Indian State and the constitutional right to privacy. Important points from his presentation include:

In India, names can be sensitive and personal information like one’s religion, family, caste, and background can all be known through a name.
Because of the sensitivity of a person’s name, many people do not feel safe or comfortable in their own identity.
Reservation lists and public postings of information, can and have been used to discriminate and violate another’s privacy.

Questions to Consider

Should a privacy legislation requirement throughout institutions and government bodies that names should not be publicly displayed to the point of identification?
What is the most effective way of legally protecting an individual from discrimination based on their name?

Perspectives of Privacy

In the last portion of the day, Yash Sampat and Aditya Yagnik spoke on the origins of privacy and privacy in the cyber world. Vimmi Surti spoke on prisoner's rights and privacy and Ramswaroop Chaudhary presented on minority identities in South Asia and privacy. Important points from their presentation include:

Internet has led to an increase in privacy violations.
The result of privacy infringements is often the deprivation of individuals from safe access to services availed to them.
When looking at privacy as the protection of human dignity, prisoner’s rights are violated through overcrowding in prisons, poor health, and poor sanitation.

Questions to Consider

Are there legal mechanisms that can be put in place to ensure the least amount of deprivation to services when an individual’s privacy is invaded?

To what extent should prisoners be availed the right to privacy?

The concluding session was a time for discussion and opinion sharing

From the closing session, and the above sessions many themes and questions pertaining to privacy came out that will need to be addressed when considering the way forward for a privacy legislation including:

Regulation of ubiquitous surveillance in the name of national security
Regulation over public display of names and personal information
The need to distinguish between identity and identifier.
The need to protect an individual's identity while regulating the production and use of identifiers.
Privacy rights and prisoners: what does the right to privacy mean to a prisoner, i.e., clean facilities and health care.
Can the right to privacy be a platform for individuals to claim sanitary/safe working and living conditions.
Recognize the changing nature of privacy rights in a technological society.
Privacy implications of biometric usage.
Creation of a definition of when privacy rights will supersede identification needs.
How can government institutions, like the tax department, incorporate and protect the right to privacy with the collection of large amounts of data for more efficient services.
Privacy and the family

Download the report and agenda here [pdf - 452kb]

Also see Matthew's presentation [powerpoint file 116kb]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy/privacy-matters-report-from-ahmedabad

Privacy and the Information Technology Act — Do we have the Safeguards for Electronic Privacy?

Prashant Iyengar — 2012-12-14T10:29:12Z

How do the provisions of the Information Technology Act measure up to the challenges of privacy infringement? Does it provide an adequate and useful safeguard for our electronic privacy? Prashant Iyengar gives a comprehensive analysis on whether and how the Act fulfils the challenges and needs through a series of FAQs while drawing upon real life examples.

What kinds of computer related activities impinge on privacy?

Although Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) have greatly enhanced our capacities to collect, store, process and communicate information, it is ironically these very capacities of technology which make us vulnerable to intrusions of our privacy on a previously impossible scale. Firstly, data on our own personal computers can compromise us in unpleasant ways — with consequences ranging from personal embarrassment to financial loss. Secondly, transmission of data over the Internet and mobile networks is equally fraught with the risk of interception — both lawful and unlawful — which could compromise our privacy. Thirdly, in this age of cloud computing when much of "our" data — our emails, chat logs, personal profiles, bank statements, etc., reside on distant servers of the companies whose services we use, our privacy becomes only as strong as these companies’ internal electronic security systems. Fourthly, the privacy of children, women and minorities tend to be especially fragile in this digital age and they have become frequent targets of exploitation. Fifthly, Internet has spawned new kinds of annoyances from electronic voyeurism to spam or offensive email to ‘phishing’ — impersonating someone else’s identity for financial gain — each of which have the effect of impinging on one’s privacy.

Although there are a number of technological measures through which these risks can be reduced, it is equally important to have a robust legal regime in place which lays emphasis on the maintenance of privacy. This note looks at whether and how the Information Technology Act that we currently have in India measures up to these challenges of electronic privacy [1].

What provisions in the IT Act protect against violations of privacy?

At the outset, it would be pertinent to note that the IT Act defines a ‘computer resource’; expansively as including a “computer, computer system, computer network, data, computer database or software” [2]. As is evident, this definition is wide enough to cover most intrusions which involve any electronic communication devices or networks — including mobile networks. Briefly, then IT Act provides for both civil liability and criminal penalty for a number of specifically proscribed activities involving use of a computer — many of which impinge on privacy directly or indirectly. These will be examined in detail in the following sub-sections.

Intrusions into computers and mobile devices

accessing

downloading/copying/extraction of data or extracts any data

introduction of computer contaminant[3];or computer virus[4]

causing damage either to the computer resource or data residing on it

disruption

denial of access

facilitating access by an unauthorized person

charging the services availed of by a person to the account of another person,

destruction or diminishing of value of information

stealing, concealing, destroying or altering source code with an intention

The Act provides for the civil remedy of “damages by way of compensation” for damages caused by any of these actions. In addition anyone who “dishonestly” and “fraudulently” does any of these specified acts is liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term of upto three years or with a fine which may extend to five lakh rupees, or with both[5].

Bangalore techie convicted for hacking govt site (2009, Deccan Herald)[6]

In November 2009, The Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Chennai, sentenced N G Arun Kumar, a techie from Bangalore to undergo a rigorous imprisonment for one year with a fine of Rs 5,000 under section 420 IPC (cheating) and Section 66 of IT Act (hacking).

Investigations had revealed that Kumar was logging on to the BSNL broadband Internet connection as if he was the authorised genuine user and ‘made alteration in the computer database pertaining to broadband Internet user accounts’ of the subscribers.

The CBI had registered a cyber crime case against Kumar and carried out investigations on the basis of a complaint by the Press Information Bureau, Chennai, which detected the unauthorised use of broadband Internet.

The complaint also stated that the subscribers had incurred a loss of Rs 38,248 due to Kumar’s wrongful act. He used to ‘hack’ sites from Bangalore as also from Chennai and other cities, they said.

Children's privacy online

As computers and the Internet become ubiquitous children have increasingly become exposed to crimes such as pornography and stalking that make use of their private information. The newly inserted section 67B of the IT Act (2008) attempts to safeguard the privacy of children below 18 years by creating a new enhanced penalty for criminals who target children.

The section firstly penalizes anyone engaged in child pornography. Thus, any person who “publishes or transmits” any material which depicts children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, or anyone who creates, seeks, collects, stores, downloads, advertises or exchanges this material may be punished with imprisonment upto five years (seven years for repeat offenders) and with a fine of upto Rs. 10 lakh.

Secondly, this section punishes the online enticement of children into sexually explicitly acts, and the facilitation of child abuse, which are also punishable as above.

Viewed together, these provisions seek to carve out a limited domain of privacy for children from would-be sexual predators.

The section exempts from its ambit, material which is justified on the grounds of public good, including the interests of "science, literature, art, learning or other objects of general concern". Material which is kept or used for bona fide "heritage or religious purpose" is also exempt.

In addition, the newly released Draft Intermediary Due-Diligence Guidelines, 2011 [7]require ‘intermediaries’[8]to notify users not to store, update, transmit and store any information that is inter alia, “pedophilic” or “harms minors in any way”. An intermediary who obtains knowledge of such information is required to “act expeditiously to work with user or owner of such information to remove access to such information that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity”. Further, the intermediary is required to inform the police about such information and preserve the records for 90 days.

Electronic Voyeurism

Although once regarded as only the stuff of spy cinema, the explosion in consumer electronics has lowered the costs and the size of cameras to such an extent that the threat of hidden cameras recording people’s intimate moments has become quite real. Responding to the growing trend of such electronic voyeurism, a new section 66E has been inserted into the IT Act which penalizes the capturing, publishing and transmission of images of the "private area" [9]of any person without their consent, "under circumstances violating the privacy" [10] of that person.

This offence is punishable with imprisonment of upto three years or with a fine of upto Rs. two lakh or both.

Phishing – or Identity Theft

The word 'phishing' is commonly used to describe the offence of electronically impersonating someone else for financial gain. This is frequently done either by using someone else’s login credentials to gain access to protected systems, or by the unauthorized application of someone else’s digital signature in the course of electronic contracts. Increasingly a new type of crime has emerged wherein sim cards of mobile phones have been ‘cloned’ enabling miscreants to make calls on others' accounts. This is also a form of identity theft.

Two sections of the amended IT Act penalize these crimes:

Section 66C makes it an offence to “fraudulently or dishonestly” make use of the electronic signature, password or other unique identification feature of any person. Similarly, section 66D makes it an offence to “cheat by personation” [11] by means of any ‘communication device’[12] or 'computer resource'.

Both offences are punishable with imprisonment of upto three years or with a fine of upto Rs. one lakh.

Mumbai Police Solves Phishing scam [13]

In 2005, a financial institute complained that they were receiving misleading emails ostensibly emanating from ICICI Bank’s email ID.

An investigation was carried out with the emails received by the customers of that financial institute and the accused were arrested. The place of offence, Vijaywada was searched for the evidence. One laptop and mobile phone used for committing the crime was seized.

The arrested accused had used open source code email application software for sending spam e-mails. He had downloaded the same software from the Internet and then used it as it is.

He used only VSNL to spam the e-mail to customers of the financial institute because VSNL email service provider does not have spam box to block the unsolicited emails.

After spamming e-mails to the institute customers he got the response from around 120 customers of which 80 are genuine and others are not correct because they do not have debit card details as required for e-banking."

The customers who received his e-mail felt that it originated from the bank. When they filled the confidential information and submitted it the said information was directed to the accused. This was possible because the dynamic link was given in the first page (home page) of the fake website. The dynamic link means when people click on the link provided in spam that time only the link will be activated. The dynamic link was coded by handling the Internet Explorer onclick () event and the information of the form will be submitted to the web server (where the fake website is hosted). Then server will send the data to the configured e-mail address and in this case the e-mail configured was to the e-mail of the accused. All the information after phishing (user name, password, transaction password, debit card number and PIN, mother’s maiden name) which he had received through the Wi-Fi Internet connectivity of Reliance.com was now available on his Acer laptop.

This crime was registered under section 66 of the IT Act, sections 419, 420, 465, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code and sections 51, 63 and 65 of the Indian Copyright Act, 1957 which attract the punishment of three years imprisonment and fine upto Rs 2 lac which the accused never thought of.

Spam and Offensive Messages

Although the advent of e-mail has greatly enhanced our communications capacities, most e-mail networks today remain susceptible to attacks from spammers who bulk-email unsolicited promotional or even offensive messages to the nuisance of users. Among the more notorious of these scams is/was the so-called "section 409 scam" in which victims receive e-mails from alleged millionaires who induce them to disclose their credit information in return for a share in millions.

Section 66A of the IT Act attempts to address this situation by penalizing the sending of:

any message which is grossly offensive or has a menacing character
false information for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, insult, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill-will
any electronic e-mail for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience, or to deceive the addressee about the origin of such messages;

This offence is punishable with imprisonment upto three years and with a fine[14]

Hoax E-mails [15]

In 2009, a 15-year-old Bangalore teenager was arrested by the cyber crime investigation cell (CCIC) of the city crime branch for allegedly sending a hoax e-mail to a private news channel. In the e-mail, he claimed to have planted five bombs in Mumbai, challenging the police to find them before it was too late.

According to police officials, at around 1p.m. on May 25, the news channel received an e-mail that read: “I have planted five bombs in Mumbai; you have two hours to find it.” The police, who were alerted immediately, traced the Internet Protocol (IP) address to Vijay Nagar in Bangalore. The Internet service provider for the account was BSNL, said officials.

Minor Hoax Spells Major Trouble

Sixteen-year-old Rakesh Patel (name changed), a student from Ahmedabad, sent an e-mail to a private news channel on March 18, 2008, warning officials of a bomb on an Andheri-bound train. In the e-mail, he claimed to be a member of the Dawood Ibrahim gang. Three days later, the crime investigation cell (CCIC) of the city police arrested the boy under section 506 (ii) for criminal intimidation. He was charge-sheeted on November 28, 2008.
Status: Patel was given a warning by a juvenile court
A 14-year-old Colaba boy sent a hoax e-mail to a TV channel in Madhya Pradesh, three days after the July 26, 2008, Ahmedabad bomb blasts. He claimed that 29 bombs would go off in Jabalpur. He was picked up by officers of the anti-terrorism squad (ATS) who, with the help of the MP police, were able to trace the e-mail to a cyber café in Colaba.
Status: No FIR was registered. The Cuffe Parade police registered a non-cognizable (NC) complaint against him, and the boy was allowed to go home after the police gave him a “strict warning”.
Shariq Khan, 18, was arrested in Bhopal on July 26, 2006, for sending out three e-mails claiming to be a member of the terrorist organisation, which the police believed was behind the 7/11 train bombings. He was arrested by the Bhopal police. Later, the ATS brought the boy to Mumbai and also booked him for a five-year-old unsolved case where an unknown accused had sent e-mail warnings to the department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in 2001.
Status: The police filed a charge-sheet against Shariq who claimed that he had sent the e-mails for fun. Trial is pending in a juvenile court. Shariq is presently out on bail in Bhopal.
On February 26, 2006, a 17-yearold student from Jamnabai Narsee School called an Alitalia flight bound to Milan at 2 a.m. telling them there was a bomb on board. He wanted to stop his girlfriend from going abroad. She was one of the 12 students on their way to attend a mock United Nations session in Geneva.
Status: After being grilled by the police, he was arrested, but let out on bail.

Lawful Interception and monitoring of electronic communications under the IT Act

In addition to violations of privacy by criminal and the mischievous minded, electronic communications and storage are also a goldmine for governmental supervision and surveillance. This section provides a brief overview of the provisions in the IT Act which circumscribe the powers of the state to intercept electronic communications.

The newly amended IT Act completely rewrote its provisions in relation to lawful interception. The new section 69 dealing with “power to issue directions for interception or monitoring or decryption of any information through any computer resource” is much more elaborate than the one it replaced, In October 2009, the Central Government notified rules under section 69 which lay down procedures and safeguards for interception, monitoring and decryption of information (the “Interception Rules 2009”). This further thickens the legal regime in this context.

Unlawful Intercept

In August 2007, Lakshmana Kailash K., a techie from Bangalore was arrested on the suspicion of having posted insulting images of Chhatrapati Shivaji, a major historical figure in the state of Maharashtra, on the social-networking site Orkut. The police identified him based on IP address details obtained from Google and Airtel – Lakshmana’s ISP. He was brought to Pune and detained for 50 days before it was discovered that the IP address provided by Airtel was erroneous. The mistake was evidently due to the fact that while requesting information from Airtel, the police had not properly specified whether the suspect had posted the content at 1:15 p.m. or a.m.

Taking cognizance of his plight from newspaper accounts, the State Human Rights Commission subsequently ordered the company to pay Rs 2 lakh to Lakshmana as damages [16].

The incident highlights how minor privacy violations by ISPs and intermediaries could have impacts that gravely undermine other basic human rights [17].

In addition to section 69, the Government has been empowered under the newly inserted section 69B to "monitor and collect traffic data or information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource".

"Traffic data" has been defined in the section to mean “any data identifying or purporting to identify any person, computer system or computer network or any location to or from which communication is or may be transmitted.” Rules have been issued by the Central Government under this section (the “Monitoring and Collecting Traffic Data Rules, 2009”) which are similar, although with important distinctions, to the rules issued under section 69.

Thus, there are two parallel interception and monitoring regimes in place under the Information Technology Act. In the paragraphs that follow, we provide an overview of the regime of surveillance under section 69 — since they are more targeted towards the individual, and consequently the threats to privacy are more severe — while highlighting important differences in the rules drafted under section 69.

Who may lawfully intercept?

Section 69 empowers the “Central Government or a state government or any of its officers specially authorised by the Central Government or the state government, as the case may be” to exercise powers of interception under this section.

Under the Interception Rules 2009, the secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs has been designated as the "competent authority", with respect to the Central Government, to issue directions pertaining to interception, monitoring and decryption. Similarly, the respective state secretaries in charge of Home Departments of the various states and union territories are designated as "competent authorities" to issue directions with respect to the state government [18].

	Central Government	State/Union Territory
Ordinary Circumstances	Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs	Secretary in charge of Home Departments of State
Emergency	Head or second senior most officer of security and law enforcement	Authorized officer not below the rank of Inspectors General of Police

However, an exception is made in cases of emergency, either

in remote areas where obtaining prior directions from the competent authority is not feasible or

for ‘operational reasons’ where obtaining prior directions is not feasible.

In such cases it would be permissible to carry out interception after obtaining the orders of the Head or second senior most officer of security and law enforcement at the central level, and an authorized officer not below the rank of Inspector General of Police at the state or union territory level. The order must be communicated to the competent authority within three days of its issue, and approval must be obtained from the authority within seven working days, failing which the order would lapse.

Where a state/union territory wishes to intercept/monitor or decrypt information beyond its territory, the competent authority for that state must make a request to the competent authority of the Central Government to issue appropriate directions.

Under what circumstances a direction to intercept may be issued?

Purposes for which interception may be directed

Under section 69, the powers of interception may be exercised by the authorized officers “when they are satisfied that it is necessary or expedient” to do so in the interest of:

sovereignty or integrity of India,

defense of India,

security of the state,

friendly relations with foreign states or

public order or

preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above or

for investigation of any offence.

Under section 69B, the competent authority may issue directions for monitoring for a range of “cyber security”[20] purposes including, inter alia, “identifying or tracking of any person who has breached, or is suspected of having breached or being likely to breach cyber security”.

Contents of direction

The reasons for ordering interception must be recorded in writing [21].

In the case of a direction under section 69, in arriving at its decision, the competent authority must consider alternate means of acquiring the information other than issuing a direction for interception [22]. The direction must relate to information sent or likely to be sent from one or more particular computer resources to another (or many) computer resources [23]. The direction must specify the name and designation of the officer to whom information obtained is to be disclosed, and also specify the uses for which the information is to be employed [24].

Duration of interception and periodic review

Once issued, an interception direction issued under section 69 remains in force for a period of 60 days (unless withdrawn earlier), and may be renewed for a total period not exceeding 180 days [25]. A direction issued under section 69B does not expire automatically through the lapse of time and theoretically would continue until withdrawn.

Within seven days of its issue, a copy of a direction issued under either section 69 or section 69B must be forwarded to the review committee constituted to oversee wiretapping under the Indian Telegraph Act [26]. Every two months, the review committee is required to meet and record its findings as to whether the direction was validly issued in light of section 69(3) [27]. If the review committee is of the opinion that it was not, it can set aside the direction and order destruction of all information collected [28].

What powers of interception do they have?

The competent authority may, in his written direction “direct any agency of the appropriate government to intercept monitor or decrypt or cause to be intercepted or monitored or decrypted any information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource”[29].

Accordingly, the subscriber or intermediary or any person in charge of the computer resource is must, if required by the designated government agency, extend all facilities, equipment and technical assistance to:

provide access to or secure access to the computer resource generating, transmitting, receiving or storing such information; or

intercept, monitor, or decrypt[30] the information, as the case may be; or

provide information stored in computer resource.

The intermediary must maintain records mentioning the intercepted information, the particulars of the person, e-mail account, computer resource, etc., that was intercepted, the particulars of the authority to whom the information was disclosed, number of copies of the information that were made, the date of their destruction, etc. [31]. This list of requisitions received must be forwarded to the government agency once every 15 days to ensure their authenticity [32].

In addition, a responsibility is cast on the intermediary to put in place adequate internal checks to ensure that unauthorized interception does not take place, and extreme secrecy of intercepted information is maintained [33].

How long can information collected during interception be retained?

Interception rules require all records, including electronic records pertaining to interception to be destroyed by the government agency “in every six months except in cases where such information is required or likely to be required for functional purposes”. In the case of the Monitoring and Collecting of Traffic Data Rules 2009, this period is nine months from the date of creation of record.

In addition, all records pertaining to directions for interception and monitoring are to be destroyed by the intermediary within a period of two months following discontinuance of interception or monitoring, unless they are required for any ongoing investigation or legal proceedings. In the case of Monitoring Rules, this period is six months from the date of discontinuance.

What penalties accrue to intermediaries and subscribers for resisting interception?

Section 69 stipulates a penalty of imprisonment upto a term of seven years and fine for any “subscriber or intermediary or any person who fails to assist the agency” empowered to intercept.

Data Protection under the IT Act

Data Retention Requirements of 'Intermediaries'

Section 67C of the amended IT Act mandates ‘intermediaries’[34] to maintain and preserve certain information under their control for durations which are to be specified by law.

Any intermediary who fails to retain such electronic records may be punished with imprisonment up to three years and a fine.

Liability for body-corporates under section 43A

The newly inserted section 43A makes a start at introducing a mandatory data protection regime in Indian law. The section obliges corporate bodies who ‘possess, deal or handle’ any ‘sensitive personal data’ to implement and maintain ‘reasonable’ security practices, failing which they would be liable to compensate those affected by any negligence attributable to this failure.

It is only the narrowly-defined ‘body corporates’ [35] engaged in ‘commercial or professional activities’ who are the targets of this section. Thus government agencies and non-profit organisations are entirely excluded from the ambit of this section [36].

“Sensitive personal data or information” is any information that the Central Government may designate as such, when it sees fit to.

The “reasonable security practices” which the section obliges body corporates to observe are restricted to such measures as may be specified either “in an agreement between the parties” or in any law in force or as prescribed by the Central Government.

By defining both “sensitive personal data” and “reasonable security practice” in terms that require executive elaboration, the section in effect pre-empts the courts from evolving an iterative, contextual definition of these terms.

Mphasis BPO Fraud: 2005 [37]

In December 2004, four call centre employees, working at an outsourcing facility operated by MphasiS in India, obtained PIN codes from four customers of MphasiS’ client, Citi Group. These employees were not authorized to obtain the PINs.

In association with others, the call centre employees opened new accounts at Indian banks using false identities. Within two months, they used the PINs and account information gleaned during their employment at MphasiS to transfer money from the bank accounts of CitiGroup customers to the new accounts at Indian banks.

By April 2005, the Indian police had tipped off to the scam by a U.S. bank, and quickly identified the individuals involved in the scam. Arrests were made when those individuals attempted to withdraw cash from the falsified accounts, $426,000 was stolen; the amount recovered was $230,000.

Draft Reasonable Security Practices Rules 2011 [38]

In February 2011, the Ministry of Information and Technology, published draft rules under section 43A in order to define “sensitive personal information” and to prescribe “reasonable security practices” that body corporates must observe in relation to the information they hold.

Sensitive Personal Information
Rule 3 of these Draft Rules designates the following types of information as ‘sensitive personal information’:

password;

user details as provided at the time of registration or thereafter;

information related to financial information such as Bank account / credit card / debit card / other payment instrument details of the users;

physiological and mental health condition;

medical records and history;(vi) Biometric information;

information received by body corporate for processing, stored or processed under lawful contract or otherwise;

call data records;

This however, does not apply to “any information that is freely available or accessible in public domain or accessible under the Right to Information Act, 2005”.

They and “any person” holding sensitive personal information are forbidden from “keeping that information for longer than is required for the purposes for which the information may lawfully be used”[40]

Mandatory Privacy Policies for body corporates

Rule 4 of the draft rules enjoins a body corporate or its representative who “collects, receives, possess, stores, deals or handles” data to provide a privacy policy “for handling of or dealing in user information including sensitive personal information”. This policy is to be made available for view by such “providers of information” [41]. The policy must provide details of:

Type of personal or sensitive information collected under sub-rule (ii) of rule 3;
Purpose, means and modes of usage of such information;
Disclosure of information as provided in rule 6 [42].

Prior Consent and Use Limitation during Data Collection

In addition to the restrictions on collecting sensitive personal information, body corporate must obtain prior consent from the “provider of information” regarding “purpose, means and modes of use of the information”. The body corporate is required to “take such steps as are, in the circumstances, reasonable”[43] to ensure that the individual from whom data is collected is aware of :

the fact that the information is being collected; and
the purpose for which the information is being collected; and
the intended recipients of the information; and
the name and address of :
the agency that is collecting the information; and
the agency that will hold the information.

During data collection, body corporates are required to give individuals the option to opt-in or opt-out from data collection [44]. They must also permit individuals to review and modify the information they provide "wherever necessary" [45]. Information collected is to be kept securely [46], used only for the stated purpose [47] and any grievances must be addressed by the body corporate “in a time bound manner” [48].

Unlike "sensitive personal information" there is no obligation to retain information only for as long as is it is required for the purpose collected.

Limitations on Disclosure of Information

The draft rules require a body corporate to obtain prior permission from the provider of such information obtained either “under lawful contract or otherwise” before information is disclosed [49]. The body corporate or any person on its behalf shall not publish the sensitive personal information [50]. Any third party receiving this information is prohibited from disclosing it further [51]. However, a proviso to this sub-rule mandates information to be provided to ‘government agencies’ for the purposes of “verification of identity, or for prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution, and punishment of offences”. In such cases, the government agency is required to send a written request to the body corporate possessing the sensitive information, stating clearly the purpose of seeking such information. The government agency is also required to “state that the information thus obtained will not be published or shared with any other person” [52].

Sub-rule (2) of rule 6 requires “any information” to be “disclosed to any third party by an order under the law for the time being in force.” This is to be done “without prejudice” to the obligations of the body corporate to obtain prior permission from the providers of information [53].

Reasonable Security Practices

Rule 7 of the draft rules stipulates that a body corporate shall be deemed to have complied with reasonable security practices if it has implemented security practices and standards which require:

a comprehensive documented information security program; and

information security policies that contain managerial, technical, operational and physical security control measures that are commensurate with the information assets being protected.

In case of an information security breach, such body corporate will be “required to demonstrate, as and when called upon to do so by the agency mandated under the law, that they have implemented security control measures as per their documented information security program and information security policies”.

The rule stipulates that by adopting the International Standard IS/ISO/IEC 27001 on “Information Technology – Security Techniques – Information Security Management System – Requirements”, a body corporate will be deemed to have complied with reasonable security practices and procedures.

The rule also permits “industry associations or industry clusters” who are following standards other than IS/ISO/IEC 27001 but which nevertheless correspond to the requirements of sub-rule 7(1), to obtain approval for these codes from the government. Once this approval has been sought and obtained, the observance of these standards by a body corporate would deem them to have complied with the reasonable security practice requirements of section 43A.

Penalties and Remedies for breach of Data Protection

Civil Liability for Corporates

As mentioned above, any body corporates who fail to observe data protection norms may be liable to pay compensation if:

it is negligent in implementing and maintaining reasonable security practices, and thereby

causes wrongful loss or wrongful gain to any person;[54]

Claims for compensation are to be made to the adjudicating officer appointed under section 46 of the IT Act. Further, details of the powers and functions of this officer are given in succeeding sections of this note.

Criminal liability for disclosure of information obtained in the course of exercising powers under the IT Act

Section 72 of the Information Technology Act imposes a penalty on “any person” who, having secured access to any electronic record, correspondence, information, document or other material using powers conferred by the Act or rules, discloses such information without the consent of the person concerned. Such unauthorized disclosure is punishable “with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees, or with both.”

Criminal Liability for unauthorized disclosure of information by any person of information obtained under contract

Section 72A of the IT Act imposes a penalty on any person [55] (including an intermediary) who

has obtained personal information while providing services under a lawful contract and

discloses the personal information without consent of the person,

with the intent to cause, or knowing it is likely to cause wrongful gain or wrongful loss [56]

Such unauthorised disclosure to a third person is punishable with imprisonment upto three years or with fine upto Rs five lakh, or both.

Whom to call? Adjudicatory Mechanism and Remedies under the IT Act

This section provides a brief outline of the mechanism installed by the IT Act to activate the various remedies and penalties prescribed in various sections of the Act. As a victim of online intrusion, how does one use the IT Act to seek redressal?

As mentioned above, the IT Act provides for both the civil remedy of damages in compensation (Chapter IX) as well as criminal penalties for offences such as imprisonment and fine (Chapter XI). In general, claiming a civil remedy does not bar one from seeking criminal prosecution and ideally both should be pursued together. For clarity, in the sections that follow, we will be discussing the two procedures separately.

Civil Damages and Compensation

Whom to approach?

Section 46 of the IT Act empowers the Central Government to appoint “adjudication officers” to adjudicate whether any person has committed any of the contraventions described in Chapter IX of the Act (See section 2.1 and 4.2 above) and to determine the quantum of compensation payable. Accordingly, the Central Government has designated the secretaries of the Department of Information Technology of each of the states or union territories as the “adjudicating officer” with respect to each of their territories [57].

However, a pecuniary limit has been placed on the powers of adjudicating officers, and they may only adjudicate cases where the quantum of compensation claimed does not exceed Rs. five crores. In cases where the compensation claimed exceeds this amount, jurisdiction would vest in the “competent court”, under the Code of Civil Procedure [58].

Section 61 of the Act bars ordinary civil courts from jurisdiction over matters which the adjudicating officers have been empowered to decide under this Act.

When must a complaint be filed?

The Limitation Act provides that a suit must be filed within three years from when the right to sue accrues [59].

What is the procedure?

Section 46 and the rules framed under that section provide elaborate guidelines on the procedure that is to be followed by the adjudicating officer. Thus, the adjudicating officer is required to give the accused person “a reasonable opportunity for making representation in the matter”. Thereafter, if , on an inquiry, “he is satisfied that the person has committed the contravention, he may impose such penalty or award such compensation as he thinks fit in accordance with the provisions of that section.”

In order to carry out their duties adjudicating officer have been invested with the powers of a civil court which are conferred on the cyber appellate tribunal [60]. Additionally, they have the power to punish for their contempt undert the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Rules framed under the section provide further details on the procedure that must be followed and provide for the issuance of a “show cause notice”, manner of holding enquiry, compounding of offences, etc. [61].

Section 47 provides that in adjudging the quantum of compensation, the adjudicating officer shall have due regard to the following factors, namely:—

the amount of gain of unfair advantage, wherever quantifiable, made as a result of the default;

the amount of loss caused to any person as a result of the default;

the repetitive nature of the default.

Where must a complaint be filed and in what format?

The complaint must be made to the adjudicating officer of the state or union territory on the basis of location of computer system, computer network. The complaint must be made on a plain paper in the format provided in the Performa attached to the rules [62].

In case the offender or computer resource is located abroad, it would be deemed, for the purpose of prosecution to be located in India [63].

How long does the process take?

The Rules direct that the whole matter should be heard and decided “as far as possible” within a period of six months [64].

How much does it cost?

The Rules stipulates a variable fee payable by a bank draft calculated on the basis of damages claimed by way of compensation

a) Upto Rs. 10,000	10% ad valorem rounded off to nearest next hundred
b) From 10001 to Rs.50000	Rs. 1000 plus 5% of the amount exceeding Rs.10,000 rounded off to nearest next hundred
c) From Rs.50001 to Rs.100000	Rs. 3000/- plus 4% of the amount exceeding Rs. 50,000 rounded off to nearest next hundred
d) More than Rs. 100000	Rs.5000/- plus 2% of the amount exceeding Rs. 100,000 rounded off to nearest next hundred

Appeals to the Cyber Appellate Tribunal and the High Court

The Act provides for the constitution of a cyber appellate tribunal to hear appeals from cases decided by the adjudicating officer.

Within 25 days of the copy of the decision being made available by the adjudicating officer, the aggrieved party may file an appeal before the cyber appellate tribunal.

Section 57 provides that the appeal filed before the cyber appellate tribunal shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavor shall be made by it to dispose of the appeal finally within six months from the date of receipt of the appeal. Section 62 gives the right of appeal to a high court to any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the cyber appellate tribunal on any question of fact or law arising out of such order. Such an appeal must be filed within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the cyber appellate tribunal.

Can contraventions be compounded (compromised) with the offender?

Except in the case of repeat offenders, contraventions may be compromised by the adjudicating officer or between the parties either before or after institution of the suit. Where any contravention has been compounded the IT Act provides that “no proceeding or further proceeding, as the case may be, shall be taken against the person guilty of such contravention in respect of the contravention so compounded”[65].

Criminal Penalties

The process described above applies to “contraventions” under Chapter IX of the Act. In addition to being liable to pay compensation, in the cases falling under section 43, such offenders may also be liable for criminal penalties such as imprisonment and fines [66]. This sub-section of this paper deals with the procedure to be followed with respect to the criminal offences set out under Chapter XI of the Act (for example, see sections 2.2 to 2.5 above).

Whom to approach? Who can take cognizance of offences and investigate them?

Section 78 of the IT Act empowers police officers of the rank of Inspectors and above to investigate offences under the IT Act.

Many states have set up dedicated cyber crime police stations to investigate offences under this Act [67]. Thus, for example, the State of Karnataka has set up a special cyber crime police station responsible for investigating all offences under the IT Act with respect to the entire territory of Karnataka [68].

When must a complaint be lodged?

Although there is no time limit prescribed by the IT Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure with respect to when an FIR must be filed, in general, courts tend to take an adverse view when a significant delay has occurred between the time of occurrence of an offence and it’s reporting to the nearest police station.

The Code of Criminal Procedure forbids courts from taking cognizance of cases after three years “if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years”. Where either the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved, or where it is not known by whom the offence committed, this period is computed from the date on which respectively the offence or the identity of the offender comes to the knowledge of the person aggrieved [69].

What is the procedure?

No special procedure is prescribed for the trial of cyber offences and hence the general provisions of criminal procedure would apply with respect to investigation, charge sheet, trial, decision, sentencing and appeal.

Can offences be compounded?

Offences punishable with imprisonment of upto three years are compoundable by a competent court. However, repeat offenders cannot have their subsequent offences compounded. Additionally, offences which “affect the socio-economic conditions of the country” or those committed against a child under 18 years of age or against women cannot be compounded [70].