Centre for Internet and Society

You can still get into trouble for online posts: Digital law experts

praskrishna — 2015-04-02T01:44:32Z

The internet in India is freer now, but individuals could still to get into trouble for online posts, say digital media and law experts. Hailing the Supreme Court judgment on Tuesday as a landmark verdict for free speech in India, experts who have closely read the judgment say there is much to be careful about too.

The article by Kim Arora was published in the Times of India on March 30, 2015. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

The scrapping of the contentious section doesn't mean that one has a free run, cautions Sunil Abraham, executive director, Centre for Internet and Society. An online comment can still land you in jail, he says.

"The judgement in no way means that speech on online platforms will be unregulated now. You can still be charged for pornography or voyeurism under the IT Act. There are many provisions in the Constitution and Indian Penal Code that the government can use to target people it wants to go after. You can be still charged for hate speech or defamation - which is a criminal offence in India - for an online comment," says Abraham.

While lawyer Apar Gupta found the judgment to be forward-looking, he pointed to Para 98 of the 120 page judgment, which addresses Article 14 of the Constitution regarding "discrimination" and talks of the distinction between online and other media.

"We make it clear that there is an intelligible differentia between speech on the internet and other mediums of communication for which separate offences can certainly be created by legislation," says the judgment. "The court has indicated that special offences can be created for the internet. Constant vigilance is the price of liberty. We need to constantly engage with these issues to keep the internet free," says Gupta.

The judgment has been praised for making a distinction between online posts and messages that pertain to advocacy, discussion and incitement. "This is an excellent decision. The SC is saying that no matter what the medium, we stand for constitutional rights. The judges were ready to listen, and ready to share their experience of using the internet also," says Mishi Choudhary, legal director at Software Freedom Law Center, adding, "It was a lost opportunity for the Modi government. They should have gotten rid of section 66 A themselves."

Section 69A of the Act, which stands as is, allows non-transparent blocking of online content in the interest of "sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above." However, Choudhary says that since it is a narrowly-drawn provision, it ensures more safeguards.

"It will be noticed that Section 69A unlike Section 66A is a narrowly drawn provision with several safeguards. First and foremost, blocking can only be resorted to where the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do. Secondly, such necessity is relatable only to some of the subjects set out in Article 19(2). Thirdly, reasons have to be recorded in writing in such blocking order so that they may be assailed in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution," she says.

Going forward, the government plan of action should focus on balancing safety and freedom on the internet, says Rajya Sabha MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar, who himself was one of the petitioners. "The final endgame has to be one where we have a new law or even a new IT Act which meets the twin objectives of a safe and free internet. The two need not be mutually exclusive," he says.

(With inputs from Anand J in Bengaluru)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/times-of-india-march-30-2015-kim-arora-you-can-still-get-into-trouble-for-online-posts

India High Court: No Takedown Requests On Social Sites Without Court, Gov't Order

praskrishna — 2015-04-03T06:18:52Z

Indian police will no longer be able to threaten Internet users and online intermediaries with jail merely on the basis of a complaint that they have posted “offensive” posts online.

The blog post by Madhur Singh was published in Bloomberg BNA on March 25, 2015. Geetha Hariharan gave her inputs.

Following a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India March 24, law enforcement agencies will be able to take action in such cases only after an order has been obtained from a court or the government (Singhal v.Union of India, India Sup. Ct., 3/24/15).

The court struck down in its entirety Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which authorized criminal penalties for sending “offensive” messages through electronic communication services. Opponents of the measure said the section defined “offensive” very vaguely and broadly, and that cases of arrest under the section frequently made headlines.

Freedom of speech activists and Internet-based businesses welcomed the judgment as a boost for civil liberties, freedom of speech and a conducive business environment for an entire gamut of online businesses.

The judgment is good news for intermediaries such as Facebook Inc. and the India-based review site MouthShut.com, both of which have been repeatedly inundated with takedown notices based on complaints against “offensive” posts.

Offensive Posts Were Actionable Under Section 66A

Section 66A, added to the Information Technology Act of 2000 through an amendment in February 2009, prescribed imprisonment of up to three years and a fine for anyone who sends via a computer resource or communication device:

(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character;
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device; or
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages.

A supporting Section 79(3)(b) stated that “upon receiving actual knowledge, or on being notified by the appropriate government or its agency that any information, data or communication link residing in or connected to a computer resource controlled by the intermediary is being used to commit the unlawful act,” the intermediary would have to “expeditiously remove or disable access to that material or that resource.”

Together, these sections put ordinary Internet users at risk for arrest for simply posting online and obligated intermediaries such as Twitter Inc., Facebook, MouthShut.com and others to take down content simply pursuant to a complaint.

Earlier this month, Facebook revealed statistics indicating that India is second on its global list of governments demanding takedowns.

Court Removes Intermediaries' Discretion

Shwetasree Majumder, partner at Fidus Law Chambers, told Bloomberg BNA March 25 that after this decision, any blocking of content can now only take place via a reasoned order after complying with several procedural safeguards, including a hearing to the originator and intermediary either by the designated
officer or pursuant to an order passed by a competent court.

“So intermediaries like Google, Facebook etc. are no longer required to judge as to whether the take down notices received by them contain legitimate requests or not,” she wrote in an e-mail. “As an acknowledgement that a true intermediary should not concern itself with the merits of the content posted by third parties, the court takes away the intermediary's discretion as to what content must remain and what must go.”

Geetha Hariharan, program officer at the Centre for Internet and Society, told Bloomberg BNA that after “reading down” Section 79, the Supreme Court “has relieved the intermediary of its responsibility to judge the lawfulness of content. Now, the intermediary will lose immunity under Section 79(3)(b) (and be liable
to prosecution or penalty) only if it does not take content down after receiving ‘actual knowledge of a court order or government notification' requiring takedown of content.”

Prior to the judgment, an intermediary was required to judge whether a takedown notice concerned unlawful content on its website, which would constitute “actual knowledge” under the section. If the intermediary made an affirmative determination, it was required to take the content down or lose immunity under Section 79(3)(b).

Supreme Court Strikes Down 66A

Momentum against Section 66A built up over the last three years, particularly after law student Shreya Singhal filed a challenge in the Supreme Court after two Mumbai women were arrested and put in jail for 10 days in 2012 for Facebook posts against a shutdown of Mumbai city following a politician's death.

A Supreme Court bench comprising Justices Jasti Chelameswar and Rohinton F. Nariman heard ten such cases together, and ruled March 24 that Section 66A was unconstitutional as it directly affected the right of the public to know. Holding that Section 66A was “open ended, undefined, and vague” so that “virtually any opinion on any subject would be covered by it, as any serious opinion dissenting with the mores of the day would be caught within its net,” the court struck it down in its entirety.

The court said that Rule 3(4) of the Intermediaries (Guidelines) Rules, 2011, which pertains to an intermediary disabling access to material that is “known” to be violative of Rule 3(2), needed to be read down in the same manner as Section 79(3)(b).

The court, however, upheld Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, which gives the government the power to block web content if doing so is in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity or security of India.

Impact on Intermediary Liability

Overall, Majumder said that intermediary liability now stands significantly watered down. One particular case this might impact is the currently pending Super Cassettes India Ltd. v MySpace Inc. case before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, which is considering the validity of the high threshold of intermediary liability prescribed by a single judge in copyright infringement cases.

Hariharan wrote in an e-mail that while intermediaries such as Internet service providers (ISPs) or content hosts may “choose” to take down content when they receive a private takedown notice, they don't “need” to do so to remain immune under Section 79(3)(b) or Rule 3(4) of the Intermediaries Guidelines.

“This reduces uncertainty in intermediary liability in India. It will also hopefully keep intermediaries from taking down content in an overbroad manner to escape liability,” Hariharan said, adding that the government nevertheless continues to have the ability to criminalize online acts. For instance, Sections 66B
to 67B of the IT Act define and criminalize different online conduct. Additionally, sections of the Indian Penal Code that criminalize speech acts (e.g., Sections 295A and 153A for incitement; Section 292 for obscenity) have also been applied to online acts in the past.

The Internet & Mobile Association of India said in a statement on its website March 24 that the judgment will mark a new phase for the growth and evolution of the Internet in India. While Internet users will no longer fear illegal censorship or harassment, it said that “online businesses, ranging from established international companies to small Indian startups, will be able to take advantage of a more conducive business environment.”

The IAMAI added that the judgment will be especially helpful to smaller companies such as Mouthshut.com that will “now not be harassed by the frivolous and mal-intentioned notices of take down.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bloomberg-bna-march-25-2015-madhur-singh-india-high-court-no-takedown-requests-on-social-sites-without-court-govt-order

India tops list of content restrictions requests, says Facebook

praskrishna — 2015-04-03T17:01:53Z

India has again topped the list of content restriction requests in the second half of 2014 with over 5,800 requests recorded in Facebook's Government Requests Report released on Sunday.

The article by Neha Alawadhi was published in the Economic Times on March 17, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

"Overall, we continue to see an increase in government requests for data and content restrictions. The amount of content restricted for violating local law increased by 11% over the previous half, to 9,707 pieces of content restricted, up from 8,774," said Monika Bickert, Facebook's head of global policy management, and Chris Sonderby, deputy general counsel, in a statement on the social networking website.

Facebook saw a rise in content restriction requests from countries like Turkey and Russia, while requests from countries like Pakistan came down. The number of content restriction requests from Pakistan came down to 54 in the second half of 2014 from 1,773 in the first half. The number of content restriction requests from India rose to 5,832 from 4,960 in the first half.

India has been the top requestor for content restrictions in the past one and a half years, and the number of these requests and for user account data from the country have consistently been on the rise.

Facebook said that while the number of government requests for user account data remained relatively flat in the six-month period, there was an increase in data requests from "governments such as India, and decline in requests from countries such as the United States and Germany".

India made 5,473 requests for user account data in the six months ending December 2014, second only to the United States, which made 14,274 requests in the same period. About 45% of the requests made by India led to Facebook producing some data, according to the report, while 79% of the requests made by the US were complied with.

"Of course, the figures are alarming... But it would have been better if Facebook had also given us more information on the kind of data that was being asked for. Now we only have consolidated figures. So what kind of data was asked for, that would have been more useful," said counsel for the Software Freedom Law Centre.

India is the second largest market for Facebook, with 112 million users until last year, second only to the United States. According to Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, "the number of content restriction requests are not only high on an absolute number, but even on a per-user basis".

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-march-17-2015-neha-alawadhi-india-tops-list-of-content-restrictions-requests-says-facebook

Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt

sunil — 2015-04-17T01:44:39Z

Much confusion has resulted from the Section 66A verdict. Some people are convinced that online speech is now without any reasonable restrictions under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. This is completely false.

There are many other provisions within the IT Act that still regulate speech online, for example the section on obscenity (Sec. 67) and also the data protection provision (Sec. 43A). Additionally there are provisions within the Indian Penal Code and other Acts that regulate speech both online and offline. For example, defamation remains a criminal offence under the IPC (Sec. 499), and disclosing information about children in a manner that lowers their reputation or infringes their privacy is also prohibited under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (Sec. 23).

Others are afraid that the striking down of Section 66A results in a regulatory vacuum where it will be possible for bad actors to wreak havoc online because the following has been left unaddressed by the IT Act.

Criminal Intimidation: The phrase "criminal intimidation" was included in Sec. 66A(b), but the requirement was that intimidation should be carried out using "information which he knows to be false". Sec. 506 of the IPC which punishes criminal intimidation does not have this requirement and is therefore a better legal route for affected individuals, even though the maximum punishment is a year shorter than the three years possible under the IT Act.
Cyber-stalking: A new section for stalking - Sec. 345 D - was added into the IPC in 2013 which also recognised cyber stalking. The definition within Sec.345D is more precise compared to the nebulous phrasing in Sec. 66A, which read - "monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication, commits the offence of stalking".
Phishing: Sec. 66A (c) dealt with punishment to people who "deceive or mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages". Sec.66D, which will be the operative section after this verdict, deals with "cheating by impersonation" and forms a more effective safeguard against phishing.

Cyber-bulling of children is arguably left unaddressed. Most importantly, spam, the original intention behind 66A, now cannot be tackled using any existing provision of the law. However, the poorly drafted section made it impossible for law enforcement to crack down on spammers. A 2005 attempt by the ITU to produce model law for spam based on a comparative analysis of national laws resulted in several important best practices that were ignored during the 2008 Amendment of the Act. For example, the definition of spam must cover the following characteristics - mass, unsolicited and commercial. All of which was missing in 66A.

Good quality law must be drafted by an open, participatory process where all relevant stakeholders are consulted and responded to before bills are introduced in parliament.

A scanned copy of the article was published in the Deccan Chronicle on March 26, 2015.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deccan-chronicle-march-26-2015-sunil-abraham-fear-uncertainty-doubt

Shreya Singhal and 66A

sunil — 2015-04-19T08:09:42Z

Most software code has dependencies. Simple and reproducible methods exist for mapping and understanding the impact of these dependencies. Legal code also has dependencies --across court orders and within a single court order. And since court orders are not produced using a structured mark-up language, experts are required to understand the precedential value of a court order.

The article was published in the Economic and Political Weekly Vol-L No.15. Vidushi Marda, programme officer at the Centre for Internet and Society, was responsible for all the research that went into this article. PDF version here.

As a non–lawyer and engineer, I cannot authoritatively comment on the Supreme Court’s order in Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015) on sections of the Information Technology Act of 2000, so I have tried to summarise a variety of views of experts in this article. The Shreya Singhal order is said to be unprecedented at least for the last four decades and also precedent setting as its lucidity, some believe, will cause a ripple effect in opposition to a restrictive understanding of freedom of speech and expression, and an expansiveness around reasonable restrictions. Let us examine each of the three sections that the bench dealt with.

The Section in Question

Section 66A of the IT Act was introduced in a hastily-passed amendment. Unfortunately, the language used in this section was a pastiche of outdated foreign laws such as the UK Communications Act of 2003, Malicious Communications Act of 1988 and the US Telecommunications Act, 1996.¹ Since the amendment, this section has been misused to make public examples out of innocent, yet uncomfortable speech, in order to socially engineer all Indian netizens into self-censorship.²

Summary: The Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act in its entirety holding that it was not saved by Article 19(2) of the Constitution on account of the expressions used in the section, such as "annoying," "grossly offensive," "menacing,", "causing annoyance." The Court justified this by going through the reasonable restrictions that it considered relevant to the arguments and testing them against S66A. Apart from not falling within any of the categories for which speech may be restricted, S66A was struck down on the grounds of vagueness, over-breadth and chilling effect. The Court considered whether some parts of the section could be saved, and then concluded that no part of S66A was severable and declared the entire section unconstitutional. When it comes to regulating speech in the interest of public order, the Court distinguished between discussion, advocacy and incitement. It considered the first two to fall under the freedom of speech and expression granted under Article 19(1)(a), and held that it was only incitement that attracted Article 19(2).

Between Speech and Harm

Gautam Bhatia, a constitutional law expert, has an optimistic reading of the judgment that will have value for precipitating the ripple effect. According to him, there were two incompatible strands of jurisprudence which have been harmonised by collapsing tendency into imminence.³ The first strand, exemplified by Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP⁴ and Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar,⁵ imported an older and weaker American standard, that is, the tendency test, between the speech and public order consequences. The second strand exemplified byRam Manohar Lohia vs State of UP,⁶ S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram,⁷ andArup Bhuyan vs Union of India,⁸ all require greater proximity between the speech and the disorder anticipated. In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court held that at the stage of incitement, the reasonable restrictions will step in to curb speech that has a tendency to cause disorder. Other experts are of the opinion that Justice Nariman was doing no such thing, and was only sequentially applying all the tests for free speech that have been developed within both these strands of precedent. In legal activist Lawrence Liang's analysis, "Ramjilal Modi was decided by a seven judge bench and Kedarnath by a constitutional bench. As is often the case in India, when subsequent benches of a lower strength want to distinguish themselves from older precedent but are unable to overrule them, they overcome this constraint through a doctrinal development by stealth. This is achieved by creative interpretations that chip away at archaic doctrinal standards without explicitly discarding them."⁹

Compatibility with US Jurisprudence

United States (US) jurisprudence has been imported by the Indian Supreme Court in an inconsistent manner. Some judgments hold that the American first amendment harbours no exception and hence is incompatible with Indian jurisprudence, while other judgments have used American precedent when convenient. Indian courts have on occasion imported an additional restriction beyond the eight available in 19(2)-the ground of public interest, best exemplified by the cases of K A Abbas¹⁰ and Ranjit Udeshi.¹¹ The bench in its judgment-which has been characterised by Pranesh Prakash as a masterclass in free speech jurisprudence¹²-clarifies that while the American first amendment jurisprudence is applicable in India, the only area where a difference is made is in the "sub serving of general public interest" made under the US law. This eloquent judgment will hopefully instruct judges in the future on how they should import precedent from American free speech jurisprudence.

Article 14 Challenge

The Article 14 challenge brought forward by the petitioners contended that Section 66A violated their fundamental right to equality because it differentiated between offline and online speech in terms of the length of maximum sentence, and was hence unconstitutional. The Court held that an intelligible differentia, indeed, did exist. It found so on two grounds. First, the internet offered people a medium through which they can express views at negligible or no cost. Second, the Court likened the rate of dissemination of information on the internet to the speed of lightning and could potentially reach millions of people all over the world. Before Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court had already accepted medium-specific regulation. For example in K A Abbas, the Court made a distinction between films and other media, stating that the impact of films on an average illiterate Indian viewer was more profound than other forms of communication. The pessimistic reading of Shreya Singhal is that Parliament can enact medium-specific law as long as there is an intelligible differentia which could even be a technical difference-speed of transmission. However, the optimistic interpretation is that medium-specific law can only be enacted if there are medium-specific harms, e g, phishing, which has no offline equivalent. If the executive adopts the pessimistic reading, then draconian sections like 66A will find their way back into the IT Act. Instead, if they choose the optimistic reading, they will introduce bills that fill the regulatory vacuum that has been created by the striking down of S66A, that is, spam and cyberbullying.

Section 79

Section 79 was partially read down. This section, again introduced during the 2008 amendment, was supposed to give legal immunity to intermediaries for third party content by giving a quick redressal for those affected by providing a mechanism for takedown notices in the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules notified in April 2011. But the section and rules had enabled unchecked invisible censorship¹³ in India and has had a demonstrated chilling effect on speech¹⁴ because of the following reasons:

One, there are additional unconstitutional restrictions on speech and expression. Rule 3(2) required a standard "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" that would have to be incorporated by all intermediaries. Under these rules, users are prohibited from hosting, displaying, uploading, modifying, publishing, transmitting, updating or sharing any information that falls into different content categories, a majority of which are restrictions on speech which are completely out of the scope of Article 19(2). For example, there is an overly broad category which contains information that harms minors in any way. Information that "belongs to another person and to which the user does not have any right to" could be personal information or could be intellectual property. A much better intermediary liability provision was introduced into the Copyright Act with the 2013 amendment. Under the Copyright Act, content could be reinstated if the takedown notice was not followed up with a court order within 21 days.¹⁵ A counter-proposal drafted by the Centre for Internet and Society for "Intermediary Due Diligence and Information Removal," has a further requirement for reinstatement that is not seen in the Copyright Act.¹⁶

Two, a state-mandated private censorship regime is created. You could ban speech online without approaching the court or the government. Risk-aversive private intermediaries who do not have the legal resources to subjectively determine the legitimacy of a legal claim err on the side of caution and takedown content.

Three, the principles of natural justice are not observed by the rules of the new censorship regime. The creator of information is not required to be notified nor given a chance to be heard by the intermediary. There is no requirement for the intermediary to give a reasoned decision.

Four, different classes of intermediaries are all treated alike. Since the internet is not an uniform assemblage of homogeneous components, but rather a complex ecosystem of diverse entities, the different classes of intermediaries perform different functions and therefore contribute differently to the causal chain of harm to the affected person. If upstream intermediaries like registrars for domain names are treated exactly like a web-hosting service or social media service then there will be over-blocking of content.

Five, there are no safeguards to prevent abuse of takedown notices. Frivolous complaints could be used to suppress legitimate expressions without any fear of repercussions and given that it is not possible to expedite reinstatement of content, the harm to the creator of information may be irreversible if the information is perishable. Transparency requirements with sufficient amounts of detail are also necessary given that a human right was being circumscribed. There is no procedure to have the removed information reinstated by filing a counter notice or by appealing to a higher authority.

The judgment has solved half the problem by only making intermediaries lose immunity if they ignore government orders or court orders. Private takedown notices sent directly to the intermediary without accompanying government orders or courts order no longer have basis in law. The bench made note of the Additional Solicitor General's argument that user agreement requirements as in Rule 3(2) were common practice across the globe and then went ahead to read down Rule 3(4) from the perspective of private takedown notices. One way of reading this would be to say that the requirement for standardised "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" remains. The other more consistent way of reading this part of the order in conjunction with the striking down of 66A would be to say those parts of the user agreement that are in violation of Article 19(2) have also been read down.

This would have also been an excellent opportunity to raise the transparency requirements both for the State and for intermediaries: for (i) the person whose speech is being censored, (ii) the persons interested in consuming that speech, and (iii) the general public. It is completely unclear whether transparency in the case of India has reduced the state appetite for censorship. Transparency reports from Facebook, Google and Twitter claim that takedown notices from the Indian government are on the rise.¹⁷ However, on the other hand, the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEITY) claims that government statistics for takedowns do not match the numbers in these transparency reports.¹⁸ The best way to address this uncertainty would be to require each takedown notice and court order to be made available by the State, intermediary and also third-party monitors of free speech like the Chilling Effects Project.

Section 69A

The Court upheld S69A which deals with website blocking, and found that it was a narrowly-drawn provision with adequate safeguards, and, hence, not constitutionally infirm. In reality, unfortunately, website blocking usually by internet service providers (ISPs) is an opaque process in India. Blocking under S69A has been growing steadily over the years. In its latest response to an RTI (right to information)¹⁹ query from the Software Freedom Law Centre, DEITY said that 708 URLs were blocked in 2012, 1,349 URLs in 2013, and 2,341 URLs in 2014. On 30 December 2014 alone, the centre blocked 32 websites to curb Islamic State of Iraq and Syria propaganda, among which were "pastebin" websites, code repository (Github) and generic video hosting sites (Vimeo and Daily Motion).²⁰ Analysis of leaked block lists and lists received as responses to RTI requests have revealed that the block orders are full of errors (some items do not exist, some items are not technically valid web addresses), in some cases counter speech which hopes to reverse the harm of illegal speech has also been included, web pages from mainstream media houses have also been blocked and some URLs are base URLs which would result in thousands of pages getting blocked when only a few pages might contain allegedly illegal content.²¹

Pre-decisional Hearing

The central problem with the law as it stands today is that it allows for the originator of information to be isolated from the process of censorship. The Website Blocking Rules provide that all "reasonable efforts" must be made to identify the originator or the intermediary who hosted the content. However, Gautam Bhatia offers an optimistic reading of the judgment, he claims that the Court has read into this "or" and made it an "and"-thus requiring that the originator must also be notified of blocks when he or she can be identified.²²

Transparency

Usually, the reasons for blocking a website are unknown both to the originator of material as well as those trying to access the blocked URL. The general public also get no information about the nature and scale of censorship unlike offline censorship where the court orders banning books and movies are usually part of public discourse. In spite of the Court choosing to leave Section 69A intact, it stressed the importance of a written order for blocking, so that a writ may be filed before a high court under Article 226 of the Constitution. While citing this as an existing safeguard, the Court seems to have been under the impression that either the intermediary or the originator is normally informed, but according to Apar Gupta, a lawyer for the People's Union for Civil Liberties, "While the rules indicate that a hearing is given to the originator of the content, this safeguard is not evidenced in practice. Not even a single instance exists on record for such a hearing."²³ Even worse, block orders have been unevenly implemented by ISPs with variations across telecom circles, connectivity technologies, making it impossible for anyone to independently monitor and reach a conclusion whether an internet resource is inaccessible as a result of a S69A block order or due to a network anomaly.

Rule 16 under S69A requires confidentiality with respect to blocking requests and complaints, and actions taken in that regard. The Court notes that this was argued to be unconstitutional, but does not state their opinion on this question. Gautam Bhatia holds the opinion that this, by implication, requires that requests cannot be confidential. Chinmayi Arun, from the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi, one of the academics supporting the petitioners, holds the opinion that it is optimism carried too far to claim that the Court noted the challenge to Rule 16 but just forgot about it in a lack of attention to detail that is belied by the rest of the judgment.

Free speech researchers and advocates have thus far used the RTI Act to understand the censorship under S69A. The Centre for Internet and Society has filed a number of RTI queries about websites blocked under S69A and has never been denied information on grounds of Rule 16.²⁴ However, there has been an uneven treatment of RTI queries by DEITY in this respect, with the Software Freedom Law Centre²⁵ being denied blocking orders on the basis of Rule 16. The Court could have protected free speech and expression by reading down Rule 16 except for a really narrow set of exceptions wherein only aggregate information would be made available to affected parties and members of the public.

Conclusions

In Shreya Singhal, the Court gave us great news: S66A has been struck down; good news: S79(3) and its rules have been read down; and bad news: S69A has been upheld. When it comes to each section, the impact of this judgment can either be read optimistically or pessimistically, and therefore we must wait for constitutional experts to weigh in on the ripple effect that this order will produce in other areas of free speech jurisprudence in India. But even as free speech activists celebrate Shreya Singhal, some are bemoaning the judgment as throwing the baby away with the bathwater, and wish to reintroduce another variant of S66A. Thus, we must remain vigilant.

Notes

1 G S Mudur (2012): "66A 'Cut and Paste Job,'" The Telegraph, 3 December, visited on 3 April, 2015, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1121 203/jsp/frontpage/story_16268138.jsp

2 Sunil Abraham (2012): "The Five Monkeys and Ice Cold Water," Centre for Internet and Society, 26 September, visited on 3 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/www-deccan-chronicle-sep-16-201...

3 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Striking Down of 66A: How Free Speech Jurisprudence in India Found Its Soul Again," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 26 March, visited on 4 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/26/the-striking-down-of-sect...

4 Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP, 1957, SCR 860.

5 Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar, 1962, AIR 955.

6 Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of UP, AIR, 1968 All 100.

7 S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram, 1989, SCC(2), 574.

8 Arup Bhuyan vs Union of India, (2011), 3 SCC 377.

9 Lawrence Liang, Alternative Law Forum, personal communication to author, 6 April 2015.

10 K A Abbas vs Union of India, 1971 SCR (2), 446.

11 Ranjit Udeshi vs State of Maharashtra,1965 SCR (1) 65.

12 Pranesh Prakash (2015): "Three Reasons Why 66A Verdict Is Momentous"/ Times of India/(29 March). Visited on 6 April 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-times/all-that-matters/Th...

13 Pranesh Prakash (2011): "Invisble Censorship: How the Government Censors Without Being Seen," The Centre for Internet and Society, 14 December, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/invisible-censorship

14 Rishabh Dara (2012): "Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet," The Centre for Internet and Society, 27 April, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/chilling-effects-on-free-expres... .

15 Rule 75, Copyright Rules, 2013.

16 The Draft Counter Proposal is available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/counter-proposal-by-cis-draft-i...

17 According to Facebook's transparency report, there were 4,599 requests in the first half of 2014, followed by 5,473 requests in the latter half. Available at https://govtrequests.facebook. com/country/India/2014-H2/ also see Google's transparency report available at http: //www.google. com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/?hl=en and Twitter's report, available at https:// transparency.twitter.com/country/in

18 Surabhi Agarwal (2015): "Transparency Reports of Internet Companies are Skewed: Gulashan Rai," Business Standard, 31 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/transparency-re... .

19 http://sflc.in/deity-says-2341-urls-were-blocked-in-2014-refuses-to-reve...

20 "32 Websites Go Blank," The Hindu, 1 January 2015, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/now-modi-govt-blocks-32-websites/a...

21 Pranesh Prakash (2012): "Analysing Latest List of Blocked Sites (Communalism and Rioting Edition)," 22 August, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysing-blocked-sites-ri... . Also, see Part II of the same series at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/analyzing-the-latest-list-of-bl... and analysis of blocking in February 2013, at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analyzing-latest-list-of-b...

22 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Supreme Court's IT Act Judgment, and Secret Blocking," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 25 March, viewed on 6 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/25/the-supreme-courts-it-act...

23 Apar Gupta (2015): "But What about Section 69A?," Indian Express, 27 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://indianexpress. com/article/opinion/ columns/but-what-about-section-69a/

24 Pranesh Prakash (2011): DIT's Response to RTI on Website Blocking, The Centre for Internet and Society, 7 April, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rti-response-dit-blocking ). Also see http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-dit-response-2nd-... and http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/reply-to-rti-applicat...

25 http://sflc.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/RTI-blocking-final-reply-from-...

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-and-political-weekly-sunil-abraham-april-11-2015-shreya-singhal-and-66a

Don’t SLAPP free speech

sunil — 2013-02-28T11:22:09Z

IIPM is proving adept at the tactical use of lawsuits to stifle criticism, despite safeguards. THE DEPARTMENT of Telecommunications, on 14 February, issued orders to block certain web pages critical of the Indian Institute of Planning and Management (IIPM).

Sunil Abraham's column with inputs from Snehashish Ghosh was published in Tehelka on February 3, 2013 (Issue 9 Volume 10)

Despite our best efforts, we have not managed to get a copy of the court order. Meanwhile, there has been a lot of speculation among Internet policy experts on Twitter. What is the title of the case? Which judge issued the order? Who is the affected party? Why have mainstream media houses like Outlook not been served notice by the court? Is the infamous Section 66A of the IT Act to be blamed? That is highly unlikely. News reports suggest that a lower court in Gwalior has issued an ad interim injunction in a defamation suit. Most experts agree that this is a SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) suit, where a company uses the cost of mounting a legal defence to silence critics.

Bullies with deep pockets use the law in very creative ways, such as forum shopping, forum shifting and the use of proxies. Forum shopping can be best understood through the example of mining giant Fomento suing Goan blogger Sebastian Rodrigues for $1 billion at the Kolkata High Court, even though Goa would have been a more logical location. Though IIPM lost an earlier case against Careers360 before the Uttaranchal High Court, the offending URLs from that case are included in the latest block order, exemplifying successful forum shifting. The doctrine of ‘res subjudice’ does not permit courts to proceed in a matter which is “directly and substantially” similar to a previous suit between the same parties. Proxies are usually employed to circumvent this procedural doctrine.

Article 19(2) of our Constitution empowers the State to create laws that place eight types (depending on how you count) of reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression. One of these reasonable restrictions is defamation. Tort law on defamation in India has been mostly borrowed from common law principles developed in the UK, which include a series of exceptions where the law cannot be used. In the present context, the exceptions important for the IIPM case include: fair and bona fide comment and matter of public interest. In addition, Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code provides for 10 exceptions to defamation. The exceptions relevant to this case are: “first: imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published”, “ninth: imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other’s interests” and “tenth: caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good”. The criminal law on defamation in India is based on robust legal principles, but for the sake of public interest it’d be best to do away with such a law as it has far-reaching, chilling effects on free speech.

On interim injunctions in defamation suits, the Delhi High Court set an important precedent protecting free speech in 2011. While applying the English principle — the Bonnard Rule — the court in Tata Sons Pvt Ltd versus Greenpeace International held that a higher standard should be adhered to while granting an interim injunction in a defamation suit, because such an injunction might impinge upon freedom of expression and thus potentially be in violation of the Indian Constitution. This century-old rule states that “until it is clear that an alleged libel is untrue… the importance of leaving free speech unfetter – ed is a strong reason in cases of libel for dealing most cautiously and warily with the granting of interim injunctions…”

In the same case, the Court rejected the argument that since it was published online and thus had wider reach and greater permanence, an injunction should be granted. It observed that “publication is a comprehensive term, embracing all forms and mediums — including the Internet”, thus ruling out special treatment for the Inter net in cases of defamation. That is good news for free speech online in India. Now let’s stick to it.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/tehelka-sunil-abraham-feb-3-2013-dont-slap-free-speech

सावधान आपके प्रोफ़ाइल पर है पुलिस की नज़र!

praskrishna — 2013-07-31T04:10:37Z

जन लोकपाल, दिल्ली रेप केस और बाबा रामदेव के आंदोलनों में उमड़ी भीड़ से घबराई सरकारी एजेंसियां अब सोशल मीडिया पर कड़ी नज़र रखने के लिए मैदान में उतरी हैं.

This blog post by Parul Aggarwal was published by BBC on July 18, 2013. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

अपनी तरह के एक पहले मामले में मुंबई पुलिस ने क्लिक करें फ़ेसबुक-ट्विटर और दूसरे सोशल मीडिया पर आम लोगों की राय और उनकी भावनाओं पर निगरानी रखने की शुरुआत की है.

साइबर अपराधियों और इंटरनेट पर क्लिक करें गड़बड़ियां फैलाने वालों के अलावा अब पुलिस की नज़र उन लोगों पर भी रहेगी जो राजनीतिक-सामाजिक मुद्दों पर सोशल मीडिया में जमकर बोलते हैं.

आम लोग बने मुसीबत?

पुलिस की मंशा है समय रहते ये जानना कि जनता किन मुद्दो पर लामबंद हो रही है और विरोध प्रदर्शनों के दौरान बड़े स्तर पर लोगों का रुझान किस तरफ़ है.

सोशल मीडिया मॉनिटरिंग का ये काम मार्च 2013 में शुरु किए गए मुंबई पुलिस के सोशल मीडिया लैब के ज़रिए किया जाएगा. मुंबई पुलिस के एक वरिष्ठ अधिकारी ने बीबीसी से हुई बातचीत में कहा, ''नौजवान आजकल फ़ेसबुक पर ख़ासे एक्टिव हैं, ये लोग नासमझ हैं और बात-बात पर उग्र हो जाते हैं. सोशल मीडिया लैब के ज़रिए हम ये देखते हैं कि कौन किस मुद्दे पर ज़्यादा से ज़्यादा लिख रहा है और किस तरह की प्रतिक्रिया दे रहा है.''

दिल्ली रेप केस हो या इस तरह के दूसरे पब्लिक मूवमेंट, पिछले दिनों ऐसे कई मामले हुए हैं जब पुलिस ये नहीं जान पाई कि लोग क्या सोच रहे हैं या कितनी हद तक और कितनी बड़ी संख्या में लामबंद हो रहे हैं. हमारा काम है सोशल मीडिया पर नज़र रखते हुए पुलिस को ये बताना कि लोग किन चीज़ों के बारे में बात कर रहे हैं किस तरह के मुद्दे ज़ोर पकड़ रहे हैं."
रजत गर्ग, सीईओ सोशलऐप्सएचक्यू

इस काम में पुलिस को तकनीकी मदद मिल रही है नैसकॉम और तकनीकी क्षेत्र की एक निजी कंपनी ‘सोशलऐप्सएचक्यू’ से.

सोशल मीडिया पर लामबंदी

सोशलऐप्सएचक्यू के सीईओ रजत गर्ग ने बीबीसी से हुई बातचीत में कहा, ''दिल्ली रेप केस हो या इस तरह के दूसरे पब्लिक मूवमेंट, पिछले दिनों ऐसे कई मामले हुए हैं जब पुलिस ये नहीं जान पाई कि लोग क्या सोच रहे हैं या कितनी हद तक और कितनी बड़ी संख्या में लामबंद हो रहे हैं. हमारा काम है सोशल मीडिया पर नज़र रखते हुए पुलिस को ये बताना कि लोग किन चीज़ों के बारे में बात कर रहे हैं किस तरह के मुद्दे ज़ोर पकड़ रहे हैं. ''

फ़ेसबुक-ट्विटर पर क्लिक करें निगरानी कोई नई बात नहीं लेकिन अब तक ये काम ज्यादातर मार्केटिंग कंपनियां ही करती आई हैं. लेकिन सोशलऐप्सएचक्यू जैसी कंपनियां जो कर रही हैं वो 'ओपन सोर्स इंटेलिजेंस' यानी सार्वजनिक स्रोतों से मिली संवेदनशील जानिकारियों को इकट्ठा करना है.

विशेष सॉफ्टवेयर्स की मदद

रजत गर्ग के मुताबिक़, “इंटरनेट को खंगालने और जानकारियां जुटाने का काम सॉफ्टवेयर करते हैं और जानकारियों को समझने और इन पर निगरानी का काम तकनीकी विशेषज्ञों की टीम. इससे ये देखा जा सकता है कि कि कौन से मुद्दे ज़ोर पकड़ रहे हैं और कौन लोग इन्हें लेकर सबसे ज़्यादा एक्टिव हैं. इन लोगों के सोशल नेटवर्क के ज़रिए ये जाना जा सकता है कि किसकी पहुंच कितने लोगों तक है और कोई भी गतिविधिति क्या रुप ले सकती है.’’ सरकार की दलील है कि जो जानकारियां सोशल मीडिया पर क्लिक करें सार्वजनिक रुप से मौजूद हैं केवल उन्हीं की निगरानी की जाती है. हालांकि तकनीक के जानकार कहते हैं कि भारत में प्राइवेसी से जुड़े क़ानून बेहद लचर हैं और फ़ेसबुक-ट्विटर का इस्तेमाल करने वाले ज्यादातर लोग अपनी निजी जानकारियां छिपाने जैसी तकनीकों से अनजान हैं.	अपनी वेबसाइट पर आपत्तिजनक सामग्री डालने को लेकर कार्टूनिस्ट असीम त्रिवेदी को भी गिरफ्तार किया गया था.

रजत गर्ग के मुताबिक़, “इंटरनेट को खंगालने और जानकारियां जुटाने का काम सॉफ्टवेयर करते हैं और जानकारियों को समझने और इन पर निगरानी का काम तकनीकी विशेषज्ञों की टीम. इससे ये देखा जा सकता है कि कि कौन से मुद्दे ज़ोर पकड़ रहे हैं और कौन लोग इन्हें लेकर सबसे ज़्यादा एक्टिव हैं. इन लोगों के सोशल नेटवर्क के ज़रिए ये जाना जा सकता है कि किसकी पहुंच कितने लोगों तक है और कोई भी गतिविधिति क्या रुप ले सकती है.’’

सरकार की दलील है कि जो जानकारियां सोशल मीडिया पर क्लिक करें सार्वजनिक रुप से मौजूद हैं केवल उन्हीं की निगरानी की जाती है. हालांकि तकनीक के जानकार कहते हैं कि भारत में प्राइवेसी से जुड़े क़ानून बेहद लचर हैं और फ़ेसबुक-ट्विटर का इस्तेमाल करने वाले ज्यादातर लोग अपनी निजी जानकारियां छिपाने जैसी तकनीकों से अनजान हैं.

अपनी वेबसाइट पर आपत्तिजनक सामग्री डालने को लेकर कार्टूनिस्ट असीम त्रिवेदी को भी गिरफ्तार किया गया था.

पारदर्शिता की कमी

ऐसे में सार्वजनिक मंच पर कई ऐसी जानकारियां उपलब्ध हो सकती हैं जो उन्हें पुलिस की आंख की किरकिरी बना दें.

साल 2012 में पूर्व शिवसेना प्रमुख बाला साहब ठाकरे की निधन के मौक़े पर बुलाए गए मुंबई बंद के ख़िलाफ़ फ़ेसबुक पर टिप्पणी करने वाली एक लड़की और उसकी पोस्ट को लाइक करने वाली उसकी दोस्त को रातोंरात गिरफ्तार कर लिया गया. पुलिस ने ये कार्रवाई एक स्थानीय शिवसेना नेता की शिकायत पर की थी.

कथित तौर पर संविधान का मज़ाक उड़ाने और अपनी वेबसाइट पर आपत्तिजनक सामग्री डालने को लेकर कार्टूनिस्ट असीम त्रिवेदी को भी गिरफ्तार किया गया. मीडिया में हुए हंगामे के बाद सभी लोगों को छोड़ दिया गया लेकिन भारत में अब तक इस तरह के कई ऐसे मामले सामने आ चुके हैं.

सूचना प्रौद्योगिकी क़ानून की धारा 66 कहती है कि इस तरह की कार्रवाई बेहद संवेदनशील और राष्ट्रहित से जुड़े मामलों में ही की जानी चाहिए. हालांकि धारा 66 की आड़ में सरकार और नेताओं के ख़िलाफ़ बोलने वालों की गिरफ्तारी सरकार की मंशा पर कई सवाल खड़े करती है.

इंटरनेट से जुड़े मुद्दों पर काम करने वाली संस्थाएं मानती हैं कि भारत में इंटरनेट और आम लोगों पर निगरानी रखने के मामले में सरकार की ओर से पारदर्शिता की बेहद कमी है.

'दुरुपयोग की संभावना'

द सेंटर फ़ॉर इंटरनेट एंड सोसाएटी से जुड़े प्रनेश प्रकाश कहते हैं, ''भारत में सूचना प्रौद्योगिकी और इंटरनेट से जुड़े क़ानूनों को अगर पढ़ें तो समझ आता है कि वो कितने ख़राब तरीक़े से लिखे गए हैं. इन क़ानूनों में स्पष्टता और जवाबदेही की गुंजाइश न होने के कारण ही उनका इस्तेमाल तोड़-मरोड़ कर किया जाता है.''

सोशल मीडिया के ज़रिए इंटरनेट पर सार्वजनिक रुप से बहुत कुछ हो रहा है. कुच्छेक मामलों को छोड़कर चीन जैसे देशों के मुकाबले अभिव्यक्ति की स्वतंत्रता को लेकर भारत सरकार ने अबतक कोई दमनकारी नीति नहीं अपनाई है. लेकिन समस्या ये है कि तकनीक की मदद से अगर दिन-रात निगरानी होगी और जानकारियां सामने आएंगी तो उनके दुरुपयोग की संभावना बढ़ जाती है. "

प्रनेश कहते हैं, ''साल 2011 में सरकार ने केंद्रीय मंत्रालयों और विभागों के लिए सोशल मीडिया से जुड़े दिशा-निर्देश जारी किए. इसका मक़सद था सरकारी विभागों को ये बताना कि सोशल मीडिया पर आम लोगों से कैसे जुड़ें. यही वजह है कि जब सरकार और पुलिस से जुड़े विभागों ने सोशल मीडिया लैब बनाए तो ज्यादातर लोगों ने समझा कि इनका मक़सद जनता की निगरानी नहीं बल्कि आम लोगों से जुड़ना है.''

तो मुंबई पुलिस का ये क़दम क्या आम लोगों और मानवाधिकार संगठनों के लिए ख़तरे की घंटी है ?

प्रनेश कहते हैं, “सोशल मीडिया के ज़रिए इंटरनेट पर सार्वजनिक रुप से बहुत कुछ हो रहा है. कुछ एक मामलों को छोड़कर चीन जैसे देशों के मुक़ाबले अभिव्यक्ति की स्वतंत्रता को लेकर भारत सरकार ने अब तक कोई दमनकारी नीति नहीं अपनाई है. लेकिन समस्या ये है कि तकनीक की मदद से अगर दिन-रात निगरानी होगी और जानकारियां सामने आएंगी तो उनके दुरुपयोग की संभावना बढ़ जाती है.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/bbc-uk-july-18-2013-parul-aggarwal-social-media-monitoring

Super Cassettes v. MySpace (Redux)

sinha — 2017-01-18T14:31:25Z

The latest judgment in the matter of Super Cassettes v. MySpace is a landmark and progressive ruling, which strengthens the safe harbor immunity enjoyed by Internet intermediaries in India. It interprets the provisions of the IT Act, 2000 and the Copyright Act, 1957 to restore safe harbor immunity to intermediaries even in the case of copyright claims. It also relieves MySpace from pre-screening user-uploaded content, endeavouring to strike a balance between free speech and censorship. CIS was one of the intervenors in the case, and has been duly acknowledged in the judgment.

On 23rd December 2016, Justice Ravindra Bhat and Justice Deepa Sharma of the Delhi High Court delivered a decision overturning the 2012 order in the matter of Super Cassettes Industries Limited v. MySpace. The 2012 order was heavily criticized, for it was agnostic to the technological complexities of regulating speech on the Internet and cast unfathomable burdens on MySpace. In the following post I summarise the decision of the Division Bench. Click here to read the judgment.

Brief Facts

In 2007, Super Cassettes Industries Limited (SCIL) filed a suit against MySpace, a social networking platform, alleging copyright infringement against MySpace. The platform allowed users to upload and share media files, inter alia, and it was discovered that users were sharing SCIL’s copyrighted works sans authorisation. SCIL promptly proceeded to file a civil suit against MySpace for primary infringement under section 51(a)(i) of the Copyright Act as well as secondary infringement under section 51(a)(ii).

The 2012 order was extremely worrisome as it had turned the clock several decades back on concepts of internet intermediary liability. The court had held MySpace liable for copyright infringement despite it having shown no knowledge about specific instances of infringement; that it removed infringing content upon complaints; and that Super Cassettes had failed to submit songs to MySpace's song ID database. The most impractical burden of duty that the court pronounced was that MySpace was required to pre-screen content, rather than relying on post-infringement measures to remove infringing content. This was a result of interpreting due diligence to include pre-screening.

The court injuncted MySpace from permitting any uploads of SCIL's copyrighted content, and directed to expeditiously execute content removal requests. To read CIS' analysis of the Single Judge's interim order, click here.

In the instant judgment, the bench limited their examination to MySpace’s liability for secondary infringement, and left the direct infringement determination to the Single Judge at the subsequent trial stage. In doing so, the court answered the following three questions:

1) Whether MySpace could be said to have knowledge of infringement so as to attract liability for secondary infringement under Section 51(a)(ii)?

No. According to the Court, in the case of internet intermediaries, section 51(a)(ii) contemplates actual knowledge and not general awareness.

Elaborating re the circumstances of the case, the Court held that to attract liability for secondary infringement, MySpace should have had actual knowledge and not mere awareness of the infringement. Appreciating the difference between virtual and physical worlds, the judgment stated “the nature of internet media is such that the interpretation of knowledge cannot be the same as that is used for a physical premise.”

As per the court, the following facts only amounted to a general awareness, which was not sufficient to establish secondary liability:

Existence of user agreement terms which prohibited users from unauthorised uploading of content;
Operation of post-infringement mechanisms instituted by MySpace to identify and remove content;
SCIL sharing a voluminous catalogue of 100,000 copyrighted songs with MySpace, expecting the latter to monitor and quell any infringement;
Modifying videos to insert ads in them: SCIL contended that MySpace invited users to share and upload content which it would use to insert ads and make revenues – and this amounted to knowledge. The Court found that video modification for ad insertion only changed the format of the video and not the content; further, it was a pure automated process and there was no human intervention.

Additionally, no constructive knowledge could be attributed to MySpace to demonstrate reasonable ground for believing that infringement had occurred. A reasonable belief could emerge only after MySpace had perused all the content uploaded and shared on its platform – a task that was impossible to perform due to the voluminous catalogue handed to it and existing technological limitations.

The Court imposed a duty on SCIL to specify the works in which it owned copyright and being shared without authorisation on MySpace. It held that merely giving names of all content it owned without expressly pointing out the infringing works was contrary to the established principles of copyright law. Further, MySpace contended and the judge agreed, that in many instances the works were legally shared by distributors and performers – and often users created remixed works which only bore semblance to the title of the copyright work.

In such cases it becomes even more important for a plaintiff such as MySpace to provide specific titles, because while an intermediary may remove the content fearing liability and damages, an authorized individual’s license and right to fair use will suffer or stand negated. (Para 38 in decision)

Thus, where as MySpace undoubtedly permitted a place of profit for communication of infringing works uploaded by users, it did not have specific knowledge, nor reasonable belief of the infringement.

2) Does proviso to Section 81 override the "safe harbor" granted to intermediaries under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000?

and

3) Whether it was possible to harmoniously read and interpret Sections 79 and 81 of the IT Act, and Section 51 of the Copyright Act?

No, the proviso does not override the safe harbor, i.e. the safe harbor defence cannot be denied to the intermediary in the case of copyright actions.The three sections have to be read harmoniously, indeed.

The judgment referred to the Parliamentary Standing Committee report as a relevant tool in interpreting the two provisions, declaring that the rights conferred under the IT Act, 2000 are supplementary and not in derogation of the Patents Act or the Copyright Act. The proviso was inserted only to permit copyright owners to demand action against intermediaries who may themselves post infringing content – the safe harbor only existed for circumstances when content was third party/user generated.

Given the supplementary nature of the provisions- one where infringement is defined and traditional copyrights are guaranteed and the other where digital economy and newer technologies have been kept in mind, the only logical and harmonious manner to interpret the law would be to read them together. Not doing so would lead to an undesirable situation where intermediaries would be held liable irrespective of their due diligence. (Para 49 in decision)

Regarding section 79, the court reiterated that the section only granted a limited immunity to intermediaries by granting a measured privilege to an intermediary, which was in the nature of an affirmative defence and not a blanket immunity to avoid liability. The very purpose of section 79 was to regulate and limit this liability; where as the Copyright Act granted and controlled rights of a copyright owner.

The Court found Judge Whyte’s decision in Religious Technology Centre v. Netcom Online Communication Services (1995), to be particularly relevant to the instant case, and agreed with its observations. To recall, Netcom was the landmark US ruling which established that when a subscriber was responsible for direct infringement, and the service providers did nothing more than setting up and operating tech systems which were necessary for the functioning of the Internet, it was illogical to impute liability on the service provider.

On MySpace Complying with Safe Harbor Requirements under Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000 (and Intermediary Rules, 2011)

The court held that MySpace's operations were in compliance with section 79(2)(b). The content transmission was initiated at the behest of the users, the recipients were not chosen by MySpace, neither was there modification of content. On the issue of modification, the court reasoned that since modification was an automated process (MySpace was inserting ads) which changed the format only, without MySpace's tacit or expressed control or knowledge, it was in compliance of the legislative requirement.

Despite several safeguard tools and notice and take down regimes, infringed videos find their way. The remedy here is not to target intermediaries but to ensure that infringing material is removed in an orderly and reasonable manner. A further balancing act is required which is that of freedom of speech and privatized censorship. If an intermediary is tasked with the responsibility of identifying infringing content from non-infringing one, it could have a chilling effect on free speech; an unspecified or incomplete list may do that. (Para 62 in decision)

On the second aspect of due-diligence, the court held that Mypace complied with the due diligence procedure specified in the Rules - it published rules, regulations, privacy policy and user agreement for access of usage. Reading Rule 3(4) with section 79(2)(c), the court held that it due diligence required MySpace to remove content within 36 hours of gaining actual knowledge or receiving knowledge by another person of the infringing content. If MySpace failed to take infringing content down accordingly, then only will safe harbour be denied to MySpace.

This liberal interpretation of due diligence is a big win for internet intermediaries in India.

Additional Issues Considered by the Court

MySpace also tried to defend its activities by claiming the shield of the fair dealing section of the Indian Copyright Act. However, the Court refused, stating that the fair dealing defence was inapplicable to the case as the provisions protected transient and incidental storage. Whereas, in the instant circumstances, the content in question was stored/hosted permanently.

MySpace also contended that the Single Judge's injunction order was vague and general and had foisted unimplementable duties on MySpace, disregarding the way the Internet functioned. If MySpace had to strictly comply with the order, it would have to shut its business in India. The Court said that the Single Judge's order, if enforced, would create a system of unwarranted private censorship, running contrary to the principles of a free speech regime, devoid of considerations of peculiarities of the internet intermediary industry. Private censorship would also invite upon the ISP the legal risk of wrongfully terminating a user account.

Finally, the Court urged MySpace to explore and innovate techniques to protect the interests of traditional copyright holders in a more efficient manner.

Relief Granted

Setting aside the Single Judge's order aside, the Court directed SCIL to provide a specific catalogue of infringing works which also pointed to the URL of the files. Upon receiving such specific knowledge, MySpace has been directed to remove the content within 36 hours of the issued notice. MySpace will also keep an account of the removals, and the revenues earned from ads placed for calculating damages at the trial stage.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/super-cassettes-v-myspace

Save Your Voice — A movement against Web censorship

praskrishna — 2012-03-13T11:44:27Z

‘Save Your Voice (SYV)’ is a movement against Web censorship and its main demand is the repealing of the Information Technology Act, said SYV founders, Aseem Trividi, a cartoonist, and Alok Dixit, a journalist, on Monday.

DNA Correspondent covered a press conference held on March 12, 2012 in Bangalore. Sunil Abraham was quoted in the story.

Trivedi’s website — www.cartoonistagainstcorruption.com — was banned during Anna Hazare’s movement. Trivedi said: “Mumbai police banned the website without any prior notice and cases of ‘treason’ were also filed. The website was banned without a judicial order and I haven’t received an explanation about the crime committed.”

Sunil Abraham, executive director, Centre for Internet and Society, said the private sector does not protect the freedom of expression.

Read the original published by Daily News & Analysis on March 13, 2012

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/save-your-voice-2014-a-movement-against-web-censorship

The War for India's Internet

praskrishna — 2012-06-14T09:12:34Z

Why is the world's biggest democracy cracking down on Facebook and Google? Rebecca Mackinnon's article was published in Foreign Policy on June 6, 2012.

"65 years since your independence," a new battle for freedom is under way in India -- according to a YouTube video uploaded by an Indian member of Anonymous, the global "hacktivist" movement. With popular websites like Vimeo.com blocked across India by court order, the video calls for action: "Fight for your rights. Fight for India." Over the past several weeks, the group has launched distributed denial-of-service attacks against websites belonging to Internet service providers, government departments, India's Supreme Court, and two political parties.

Street protests are being planned for this coming Saturday, June 9, in as many as 18 cities to protest laws and other government actions that a growing number of Indian Internet users believe have violated their right to free expression and privacy online. A lively national Internet freedom movement has grown rapidly across India since the beginning of this year. The most colorful highlight so far was a seven-day Gandhian hunger strike, otherwise known as a "freedom fast," held in early May on a New Delhi sidewalk by political cartoonist Aseem Trivedi and activist-journalist Alok Dixit. Trivedi's website was shut down this year in response to a police complaint by a Mumbai-based advocate who alleged that some of Trivedi's works "ridicule the Indian Parliament, the national emblem, and the national flag."

Escalating political and legal battles over Internet regulation in India are the latest front in a global struggle for online freedom -- not only in countries like China and Iran where the Internet is heavily censored and monitored by autocratic regimes, but also in democracies where the political motivations for control are much more complicated. Democratically elected governments all over the world are failing to find the right balance between demands from constituents to fight crime, control hate speech, keep children safe, and protect intellectual property, and their duty to ensure and respect all citizens' rights to free expression and privacy. Popular online movements -- many of them globally interconnected -- are arising in response to these failures.

Only about 10 percent of India's population uses the web, making it unlikely that Internet freedom will be a decisive ballot-box issue anytime soon. Yet activists are determined to punish New Delhi's "humorless babus," as one columnist recently called India's censorious politicians and bureaucrats, in the country's media. Grassroots organizers are bringing a new generation of white-collar protesters to the streets to defend the right to use a technology that remains alien to the majority of India's people.

The trouble started with the 2008 passage of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, whose Section 69 empowers the government to direct any Internet service to block, intercept, monitor, or decrypt any information through any computer resource. Company officials who fail to comply with government requests can face fines and up to seven years in jail. Then, in April 2011, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology issued new rules under which Internet companies are expected to remove within 36 hours any content that regulators designate as "grossly harmful," "harassing," or "ethnically objectionable" -- designations that are open to a wide variety of interpretations and that free speech advocates argue have opened the door to abuse. It is thanks to these rules that the website of the hunger-striking cartoonist, Trivedi, was taken offline. Also thanks to the 2011 rules, Facebook and Google are facing trial for having failed to remove objectionable content. If found guilty, the companies could face fines, and executives could be sentenced to jail time.

Saturday's protesters are calling for annulment of the 2011 rules and the repeal of part of the 2008 act. They are also calling for Internet service companies to reverse the wholesale blocking of hundreds of websites, including the file-sharing services isoHunt and The Pirate Bay, as well as the video-sharing site Vimeo and Pastebin, which is primarily used for the sharing of text and links. Internet service providers were responding to a court order from the Madras High Court demanding the blockage, which is aimed at preventing the online distribution of pirated versions of one particular film. The Internet companies, fearing that they would not be able to catch every individual instance on every possible site they host, instead chose to block entire services along with all of their content -- which had nothing to do with the film in question.

Such "John Doe" orders, named because they are directed against unknown potential offenders in the present and future, are characterized "by their overly broad and sweeping nature," argue lawyer Lawrence Liang and researcher Achal Prabhala, which extends "to a range of non-infringing activities as well, thus catching a whole range of legal acts in their net." More broadly, as Delhi-based journalist Shivam Vij wrote in a recent essay: "The current mechanisms of internet censorship in India -- blocking, direct removal requests to websites, intermediary rules -- are draconian and unconstitutional. They need to be replaced with a new set of rules that are fair, transparent and accessible for public scrutiny. They should not be amenable to misuse by the powers-that-be for their own private interests."

Not only are the rules abused, but researchers find that they are causing extralegal censorship by companies that overcompensate in order to err on the side of caution. Last year, the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society performed an experiment in which it sent "legally flawed" takedown demands to seven companies that provide a range of online services, including search, online shopping, and news with user-generated comments. The legal flaws in the notices were such that the companies could have rejected them without being in breach of the law. Yet "of the 7 intermediaries to which takedown notices were sent, 6 intermediaries over-complied with the notices, despite the apparent flaws in them," reads the Centre for Internet and Society report.

Despite the growing public opposition, a motion to annul the 2011 rules was defeated by voice vote in the upper house of Parliament last month. Yet the criticism was sufficiently sharp that Communications Minister Kapil Sibal announced that he will hold consultations with all members of Parliament, representatives of industry, and other "stakeholders" to discuss the law's problems and how it might be revised. Many of the law's critics, however, are skeptical that this will eliminate the law's deep flaws and loopholes for abuse, especially given the government's failure to listen so far. Comments on the 2011 rules submitted last year by the Centre for Internet and Society were not even acknowledged as having been received by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. "Sibal uses the excuse of national security and hate speech," says the center's director, Sunil Abraham, "but that is not what is happening."

Abraham worries that what is really happening is a government effort at Internet "behavior modification" through a process akin to an experiment involving caged monkeys, bananas, and ice water. Put four monkeys in a cage and hang a bunch of bananas on the ceiling. Every time one of them climbs up to reach the bananas, you drench all of them with ice water. Soon enough, the monkeys will start policing themselves -- attacking anybody who tries to reach the bananas, making it unnecessary for their masters to deploy the ice water. "This is why the government is being so aggressive so early on, with only 10 percent of India's population online," says Abraham. "If you start the drenching early on, by the time you get to 50 percent [Internet penetration], every one will be well-behaved monkeys." Companies will act as private Internet police for fear of legal punishment before the government is called upon to step in and enforce the law. If it works, Indian politicians could have fewer reasons to worry about online critiques or mockery, because companies fearing prosecution will proactively delete speech that could potentially be designated "harassing" or "grossly harmful."

India is not China or Iran, however. Its politicians may be corrupt, and most of its voters may not understand why Internet freedom matters because they've never used the Internet. But it still has an independent press and boisterous civil society that are not going to give up their critiques and protests anytime soon. India also has a strong, independent judiciary, with a record of ruling against censorship and surveillance measures when a strong case can be made that they conflict with constitutional protections of individual rights. "On free speech I have high faith in the Indian judiciary," says Abraham. "There is a good chance to launch a constitutional challenge."

If Google and Facebook lose at their impending trial -- now scheduled for July -- they will most certainly appeal, which activists hope could provide just such an opportunity to prevent the sort of "behavior modification" process that Abraham warns against. Now India's burgeoning Internet freedom movement needs its own reverse "behavior modification" strategy -- imposing consistent and regular doses of political and legal ice water upon India's bureaucrats, politicians, and companies whenever they do things that threaten to corrode the rights of India's Internet users. Saturday's protest is just the beginning.

Sunil Abraham is quoted in this article. Read the original here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/war-of-india-internet

Women arrested for Facebook post: Did cops act under Sena pressure?

praskrishna — 2012-11-21T11:17:37Z

After Bal Thackeray's death, during the Mumbai Bandh, a 21-year-old criticised the shutdown on her Facebook page — her friend approved of it — next thing they know, they are facing a case, and this morning they were arrested.

YP Singh, Alyque Padamsee, Rohan Joshi, Karuna Nundy and Pranesh Prakash took part in a discussion about the arrest of two girls over a Facebook comment. The discussion was aired in NDTV on November 19, 2012.

The anchor asked Pranesh Prakash:

Who are these people scrolling through people's Facebook posts and Twitter accounts, finding these comments and taking action?

Pranesh Prakash said that it could be anyone. The reality is doesn't really matter because the laws are written in such a way that if it is public and stuff that is on Facebook for different purposes can either be public or private, if it is public these laws can very often apply and that is a problem. We haven't quite figured out to what extent these laws apply. The IT Act section 66A for instance, is unconstitutional, section 295 A which has been applied, and section 505 which also seems to have been applied in this case make it a clear case of misappropriation of those provisions. These kind of arrests will happen. It doesn't quite matter if we have right laws at one level and it clearly doesn't help if we have bad laws. What we need to do at least in part to remedy the situation is to amend the IT Act to make it consonant and consistent with civil and political rights and to do so in multi-stakeholder fashion involving civil society, industry and government. Right now it doesn't protect privacy and freedom of speech as much as it should.

Watch the full video aired on NDTV

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/ndtv-video-ndtv-special-ndtv-24x7

Indians Rank Second For Online Snooping

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T06:10:24Z

Indians rank second globally when it comes to seeking details of private individuals online, as per Google transparency report.

The blog post was published in Indolink on November 23, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

India recorded for 2,319 requests for the entire period of 2012, where various government agencies have been looking for individual user details contained in online records, as reported by Dailybhaskar.com. U.S. topped the list with 7,969 requests, while Brazil was on the third spot with 1,566 requests.

It was seen that in the first six months this year, India made 2,319 requests involving 3,467 users, while the U.S. made 7,969 requests in the same period. Globally, it was seen that there were 20,938 requests for user data in the period of January-June. The data includes an individual’s complete Gmail account, chat logs, Orkut profile and search terms among others. Google prepares this report every six months, and was started in July-December 2009.

The report also stated that the percentage of data requests fully or partially complied with by India stood at 64 percent.

The Director for policy at Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), Pranesh Prakash said "Though India is a large country with a significant number of internet users, this data is nonetheless an indicator of growing surveillance," as reported by Daily Bhaskar.com.Apart from snooping on user details, Indian authorities are also known to send requests for taking down certain web content, which is considered to be sensitive for national security or defamatory in general. A new trend also revealed that untrue court orders are being used as a key instrument for the same.

On one hand the nation is seeking to go net savvy, while on the other hand authorities are looking to stamp authority on freedom of a larger population.

If was also noted that there were 20 court orders and 64 requests from executive/police that resulted in 596 items being taken down from the web between January and June this year. Comparatively, there were only eight court orders and 22 executive/police requests in January-June 2010, resulting in 125 items being taken down.

Google said “In response to a court order, we removed 360 search results. The search results were linked to 360 web pages that had adult videos, which allegedly violated an individual’s personal privacy,” as reported by Business Standard.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/indolink-november-2012-indians-rank-second-for-online-shopping

Interview with Pranesh Prakash

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T06:58:39Z

Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society talks to Mint’s Surabhi Agarwal about the controversial Section 66A of the IT Act and the government’s decision to tweak it.

This video was published in LiveMint on November 30, 2012:

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/livemint-november-30-2012-video-interview-with-pranesh-prakash

Yes, You Can Get Arrested for a Facebook Status Update Now

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T08:16:20Z

A 21-year-old Indian woman thought Mumbai shouldn't have been shutdown for the funeral of an Islamophobic leader. Broadcasting such opinions on Facebook was apparently grounds for arrest.

The article by David Wagner was published in the Atlantic Wire on November 29, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

A Muslim graduate student, Shaheen Dhada posted a note (of her iPhone message) on her timeline November 18th, writing, "Every day thousands of people die, but still the world moves on ... Today, Mumbai shuts down out of fear, not out of respect." Her status was written in reference to the death of Bal Thackeray, the late leader of Hindu extremist group Shiv Sena, responsible for repeated waves violence against Muslims in the Maharashtra state, according to the BBC. Another 21-year-old woman, Rinu Shrinivasan, was also arrested by Indian police for stoking "religious enmity." She'd simply clicked "like" on Dhada's post.

A mob of angry Thackeray supporters thronged around the police station Dhada's house. Others vandalized her uncle's clinic two days after her arrest. Mumbai newspaper The Hindu reports today that charges have been dropped against the two arrested women, but those observing the case are worried about the precedent this sets for free speech in India. "I have 3,500 followers on Twitter, and I'm pretty sure I annoy 100 of them on a daily basis," says Centre for Internet and Society director Pranesh Prakash. But should that mean he and others in India should picture themselves in handcuffs every time they type a potentially controversial status update? Retired Supreme Court Justice Markandey Katju tells NPR's Julie McCarthy that, at least in this case, the arrest was totally inappropriate:

You can mourn a death in whichever way you want, but you can't bring a whole city to a stoppage. So what this girl wrote was in consonance with the verdict of the Supreme Court—nothing illegal.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/the-atlantic-wire-november-29-2012-david-wagner-you-can-get-arrested-for-facebook-status-update-now

Govt tweaks enforcement of IT Act after spate of arrests

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T08:27:01Z

The government on Thursday tweaked the law to make it tougher for citizens to be arrested for online comments that are deemed offensive after recent arrests came in for heavy criticism by Internet activists, the media and other groups.

Surabhi Agarwal's article was published in LiveMint on November 29, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

This took place just before the Supreme Court was to hear a public interest litigation seeking an amendment to the Information Technology (IT) Act.

Complaints under the controversial Section 66A of the IT Act, which criminalizes “causing annoyance or inconvenience” online or electronically, can be registered only with the permission of an officer of or above the rank of deputy commissioner of police, and inspector general in metro cities, said a senior government official.

The government, however, has not amended the terms in the section that are said to be vague and subject to interpretation.

The public interest litigation against Section 66A filed by student Shreya Singhal came up in chief justice Altamas Kabir’s court on Thursday. The matter will be heard on Friday.

Two girls near Mumbai were arrested last week for criticizing on Facebook the shutdown in the city for Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray’s funeral. Earlier in November, a businessman in Puducherry was arrested for comments made on Twitter against finance minister P. Chidambaram’s son Karti Chidambaram.

According to people present at the meeting of the cyber regulatory advisory committee on Thursday, the Union government will issue guidelines to states with respect to the compliance of the new enforcement rules soon. The people didn’t want to be named. An official said the move was not related to the case.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society think tank, said that while the change in the law is a step in the right direction and will eliminate a lot of frivolous complaints, more needs to be done to make the legislation specific.

Chief justice Kabir said the apex court was considering taking suo motu cognisance of recent incidents.

Singhal contended in her plea that “the phraseology of section 66A of the IT Act, 2000, is so wide and vague and incapable of being judged on objective standards, that it is susceptible to wanton abuse and, hence, falls foul of Article 14, 19 (1)(a) and Article 21 of the Constitution.”

She submitted that “unless there is judicial sanction as a prerequisite to the setting into motion the criminal law with respect to freedom of speech and expression, the law as it stands is highly susceptible to abuse and for muzzling free speech in the country.”

The PIL was argued by Mukul Rohatgi, who said in his opening remarks that Section 66A was vague. Terms such as “offensive” and “annoyance” should be clearly defined as the section is part of criminal law, he said.

Senior advocate Harish Salve, who was also present during the hearing, said India guaranteed the right to “annoy” and there was no need to have a separate law.

Salve, who is in the process of filing an intervention on behalf of some technology companies, added that the section needed to be narrowed to specifically cater to private messages sent electronically and not social media communications.

He said the existing law of defamation should suffice and could be extended to include electronic communications. According to a lawyer who is part of the team representing Singhal, the petition also demanded that the law be made non-cognisable so that the police can’t make an arrest without an order from a magistrate.

“There has been a lot of misuse and abuse of the law recently and we want it to be struck down absolutely and also the court to issue guidelines,” he said.

Apart from the incident at Palghar in Thane district involving the two girls, Singhal’s PIL referred to an April incident in which a professor of chemistry from Jadavpur University in West Bengal, Ambikesh Mahapatra, was arrested for posting a cartoon concerning chief minister Mamata Banerjee on a social networking site.

She also referred to the Puducherry case as well as the May arrests of two Air India Ltd employees, V. Jaganatharao and Mayank Sharma, by the Mumbai Police under the IT Act for posting content on Facebook and Orkut against a trade union leader and some politicians.

Singhal has sought guidelines from the apex court to “reconcile Section 41 and 156 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) with Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution” and that offences under the Indian Penal Code and any other legislation, if they involve the freedom of speech and expression, be treated as a non-cognizable offences for the purposes of Sections 41 and 156 (1).

Section 41 of CPC empowers the police to arrest any person without an order from a magistrate and without a warrant in the event that the offence involved is a cognizable offence. Section 156 (1) empowers the investigation by the police into a cognizable offence without an order from a magistrate.

The government official present at the cyber regulatory advisory committee said the expressions used in Section 66A had been taken from different statutes around the world, including the UK and the US.

“There has been a broad consensus that the parameters of the law concerned might be in order but from a procedural standpoint there might be difficulty,” the official said.

Prakash said that while some of the terms in the section may be taken from legislation overseas, the penalty imposed under the Indian law is far more stringent at three years of imprisonment than, for instance, six months under the UK law. “Criminal offences can’t be put at the same level as something which causes insult.”

The cyber regulatory advisory committee meeting was attended by minister for communications and information technolgy Kapil Sibal, and secretaries of the department of telecommunications and information technology, besides representatives of technology companies such as Google and Facebook, industry associations and civil society.

The official also said that the situation will be reviewed every three to four months based on “ground realities”.

A government official said on condition of anonymity that the decision to revive the cyber regulatory advisory committee had been taken at a meeting in August. Section 66A was put on the agenda since it was the subject of much debate, he said. The meeting, however, was not a pre-emptive measure ahead of the PIL that was taken up in the Supreme Court. The official also said that the government will spell out its position in court in favour of the legislation.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/livemint-politics-november-29-2012-surabhi-agarwal-govt-tweaks-enforcement-of-it-act-after-spate-of-arrests