Centre for Internet and Society

I dare you, I double dare you: Social media celebrates Sec 66A verdict

praskrishna — 2015-03-26T16:33:55Z

Users across social media platforms on Tuesday welcomed the Supreme Court's scrapping of the controversial Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, hailing it as a measure that will strengthen freedom of expression online.

The article by Vishakha Saxena published in the Hindustan Times on March 25, 2015 quotes Pranesh Prakash.

"This is the first SC judgment since the 60s to plainly strike down a law for free expression violation! #66A," tweeted Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society in Bengaluru.

Prakash, who tweeted "I AM ECSTATIC!!" minutes after the judgement, was one of the most vocal critics of Section 66A - which made offensive comments online punishable with jail terms - and played a key role in creating awareness about freedom of expression.

Apar Gupta, a representative of the People's Union for Civil Liberties (one of the parties that petitioned the Supreme Court against section 66A), also took to Twitter to jubilantly declare victory.

"My TL is a little crazy right now…This decision means a lot to me. Thank you. I am smiling." he posted.

Supreme Court advocate Karuna Nundy, who too represents PUCL, expressed her happiness on Facebook.

The top court struck down the provision, described as draconian by many internet rights activists, describing it as "unconstitutional" and a "restriction on free speech".

Section 66A, incorporated through an amendment of the IT Act in 2009, prohibited the sending of information of a "grossly offensive" or "menacing" nature through communication devices. It was used by several states to arrest people over posts on social media that officials claimed were "seditious" or "communally sensitive".

Discussions on social media against the provision had gained pace hours ahead of the court's ruling. Twitter, in fact, was abuzz as thousands used the hashtag #No66A to voice their opinions.

Reddit, known for being unabashed with opinion and language, wasn’t far behind. The first post announcing the verdict was upvoted 96% and garnered 460 points within four hours.

"Supreme Court zindabad! Now can we abuse Azam Khan without any fear?" commented user Apunebolatumerilaila.

Another user, Indian_galileo, wrote, "FINALLY, SOME SENSE HAS PREVAILED PRAISE THE OVERLORDS AT SC THANK YOU SC THANK YOU VERY VERY MUCH."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-march-25-2015-vishakha-saxena-i-dare-you-i-double-dare-you

Ruling in India shields Web posts

praskrishna — 2015-03-27T00:38:34Z

The Supreme Court in India struck down a section of its country’s information technology act Tuesday that had made it illegal for anyone to spread ‘‘offensive messages’’ on electronic devices and resulted in arrests over posts on Facebook and other social media.

This is the modified version of the article originally published by Washington Post and mirrored in Boston Globe. Sunil Abraham is quoted. Picture by Manjunath Kiran, AFP.

Supreme Court Judge Rohinton Fali Nariman wrote in the ruling that the section of the law, known as 66A, was unconstitutional, saying the vaguely worded legislation had wrongly swept up innocent people and had a ‘‘chilling’’ effect on free speech in the world’s most populous democracy.

‘‘Section 66A is cast so widely that virtually any opinion on any subject would be covered by it,’’ the judge wrote. ‘‘If it is to withstand the test of constitutionality, the chilling effect on free speech would be total.’’

India had first passed its Information Technology Act in 2000, but stricter provisions were added in 2008 and ratified in 2009 that gave police sweeping authority to arrest citizens for their personal posts on social media, a crime punishable for up to three years in jail and a fine.

Sunil Abraham, the executive director of the Center for Internet and Society in Bangalore, said that the section was originally intended to protect citizens from electronic spam, but it did not turn out that way.

‘‘Politicians who didn’t like what people were saying about them used it to crack down on online criticism,’’ he said.

In the end, there were more than 20 high-profile arrests, including a professor who posted an unflattering cartoon of a state political leader and an artist who drew a set of cartoons lampooning the government and Parliament.

The most well-known was the case of two young women arrested in the western town of Palghar after one of them posted a comment on Facebook that argued that the city of Mumbai should not have been shut down for the funeral of a famous conservative leader. A friend, who merely ‘‘liked’’ the post, was also arrested. After much outcry, the two were released on bail and the charges eventually dropped.

The case of the ‘‘Palghar Girls’’ inspired a young law student, Shreya Singhal, to take on the government’s law. Singhal became the chief petitioner for the case, along with other free speech advocates and an Indian information technology firm.

‘‘It’s a big victory,’’ Singhal said after the ruling. ‘‘The Internet is so far-reaching and so many people use it now, it’s very important for us to protect this right.’’

Singhal and other petitioners had also argued that another section of India’s technology act that allowed the government to block websites containing questionable material were also unconstitutional, but the court disagreed, saying there was a sufficient review process in place to avoid misuse.

Free speech in India is enshrined in the country’s constitution but has its limits. Books and movies are often banned or censored out of consideration for religious and minority groups.

In 2014, a conservative Hindu group persuaded Penguin India to withdraw a book on Hinduism by Wendy Doniger, a professor of religion at the University of Chicago, from the Indian market. And more recently, the government of India blocked a planned television debut of a documentary film on a 2012 gang rape case, ‘‘India’s Daughter.’’

Along with India, other nations have sharply increased monitoring and crackdowns on perceived insulting Web posts in recent years.

Across the Gulf Arab states, dozens of activists have been arrested for social media posts considered insulting to the country’s rulers or tarnishing the national image.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/boston-globe-march-25-2015-annie-gowen-ruling-in-india-shields-web-posts

India's Online Freedom Advocates Hail Court Ruling on Free Speech

praskrishna — 2015-03-27T01:43:22Z

Online freedom advocates in India are hailing a court ruling that struck down a controversial law seen as infringing free speech on the Internet. But in a country expected to have the world’s largest number of web users by 2018, some concerns about net censorship remain.

The blog post by Anjana Pasricha was published by Voice of America on March 24, 2015. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

The 24-year old law student, Shreya Singhal, who spearheaded the legal battle for overturning the harsh law, said it was the arrest of two young women in 2012 for a seemingly innocuous Facebook post that prompted her to petition the Supreme Court. One woman had criticized a shutdown in Mumbai after the death of a Hindu nationalist leader Bal Thackeray, the other “liked” her post.

Like millions of others, Singhal was alarmed at their detention because she says she could have been the one to post the innocuous comment.

“It [the law] was punishing people for expressing their views on the Internet, whereas if they did it or they did it on TV or they did nit in newspapers, they would not get arrested for the same views,” she said.

Scrapping the law on Tuesday, India's Supreme Court said the Information Technology Act was vaguely worded, and did not explain what could be “inconvenient" or “grossly offensive.” The judgment said the law was liable to have a chilling effect on free speech as it strikes at the root of liberty and freedom of expression.

The law had raised alarm bells after several people were arrested in recent years for posting “objectionable content.” In the latest instance, a 16-year-old boy in Uttar Pradesh state was arrested and released on bail for posting an “insulting” remark about regional party leader, Azam Khan. Among others who were picked up under the law were a professor in Kolkata and a cartoonist in Mumbai.

The previous government, which passed the law, said it was necessary to combat abuse and defamation on the Internet, but critics said it was used by political parties to suppress dissent and criticism.

The Supreme Court ruling also made it tougher for the government to order Internet companies to remove online content.

Sunil Abraham of Bangalore-based Center for Internet and Society says local and foreign Internet companies have faced growing pressure for putting up content deemed offensive in India.

“According to Facebook's latest transparency report, takedown requests and information requests from the Indian government continue to grow, and that is worrying. But that part of the law has been read down. Now when the government sends the takedown notice, it has to be accompany the takedown notice with a court order,” said Abraham.

But free speech campaigners say concerns about online censorship have not completely gone away. The Supreme Court has upheld a law that allows the government to block websites, saying there are sufficient safeguards.

Campaigners like Sunil Abraham think otherwise. “Lack of transparency makes it impossible for anybody to tell whether the government is censoring the Internet in a proportionate manner, whether it is working to truly address the real harms that emerge from bad content online. When the court in India bans books or movies, the judgments of these courts are made available to the public."

"But if when it comes to website blocking, this transparency requirement is missing. In fact, the law has secrecy provisions, which prevents ISP’s that receive these block orders from making them available in the public domain,” said Abraham.

The young student, Singhal, who led the legal battle, said she was “overwhelmed” at the victory for online freedom.

“We are such a diverse society in India with so many diverse and different opinions. It is inherent in us, it is part of us, this democracy, this debate we have,” she said.

Her views were echoed on Twitter and Facebook by people in India, a country of 1.2 billion people where Internet access is growing rapidly.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/voice-of-america-march-24-2015-anjana-pascricha-indias-online-freedom-advocates-hail-court-ruling-on-free-speech

India's Supreme Court Axes Online Censorship Law, But Challenges Remain

subha — 2015-03-27T02:38:20Z

The Supreme Court of India took a remarkable step to protect free expression on March 24, 2015, striking down controversial section 66A of the IT Act that criminalized “grossly offensive” content online. In response to a public interest litigation filed by Indian law student Shreya Singhal, the court made this landmark judgement calling the section “vague”, “broad” and “unconstitutional”. Since Tuesday's announcement, the news has trended nationally on Twitter, with more than 50,000 tweets bearing the hashtags #Sec66A and #66A.

The blog entry by Subhashish Panigrahi was originally published by Global Voices Online on March 25, 2015. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

Section 66A allowed police to arrest any person who sent online communications deemed “grossly offensive” or known to be false. This has enabled the government take down many websites with allegedly objectionable content. Among various cases since the law was updated in 2008, two people were arrested for making comments on Facebook regarding India's prime minister Narendra Modi and one man was arrested for commenting on public service closures following the death of political leader Bal Thakrey.

The now-defunct Section 66A reads as follows:

66-A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.
—Any person who sends, by means of a computer
resource or a communication device,—
(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal
intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device; or
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or
recipient about the origin of such messages, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.

Internet rights advocate and lawyer Pranesh Prakash, who works with the Center for Internet and Society in Bangalore, has been one of the law's most outspoken critics in recent years. Immediately following the ruling, he tweeted:

Nikhil Pahwa, independent journalist and founder of the MeddiaNama blog, offered his take on the ruling:

This is a great decision for freedom of speech in India…66A is far too vague, and lends itself to arbitrary implementation by the police, especially phrases like “grossly offensive”, annoyance, inconvenience, ill will. Remember that even the right to offend is an integral part of free speech.

Journalist and author Sagarika Ghose sarcastically wondered if the government of India would retroactively offer recompense for all of the actions taken against citizens for violating 66A.

Some were playful in their response to the decision. Siddharth Sing set out to “test” the efficacy of the ruling with a tweet mocking prominent public figures in Indian politics:

Section 69, which provides authorities with the power to censor websites that “create communal disturbance, social disorder, or affect India's relationship with other countries” was upheld however. The Court has yet to clarify this decision. CIS India's Pranesh Prakash tweeted:

Unfortunately 69A (website blocking) has been upheld despite many issues, incl lack of transparency. Need to read full judgment to see why.

— Pranesh Prakash (@pranesh_prakash) March 24, 2015

Tuesday's decision comes after the government of India was heavily criticized in January 2015 for blocking 32 websites in the country.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/global-voices-march-25-2014-subhashish-panigrahi-indias-supreme-court-axes-online-censorship-law-but-challenges-remain

What 66A Judgment Means For Free Speech Online

geetha — 2015-03-27T16:50:43Z

This week India's Supreme Court redefined the boundaries of freedom of speech on the internet. With the Court's decision in Shreya Singhal & Ors. v. Union of India, Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, has been struck down in entirety and is no longer good law.

Geetha Hariharan's article was originally published in the Huffington Post on March 26, 2015.

This week India's Supreme Court redefined the boundaries of freedom of speech on the internet. With the Court's decision in Shreya Singhal & Ors. v. Union of India, Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, has been struck down in entirety and is no longer good law. Through a structured, well-reasoned and heartening judgment, the court talks us through the nuances of free speech and valid restrictions. While previously, intermediaries were required to take down content upon suo moto determination of lawfulness, Section 79(3)(b) of the Act -- the intermediary liability provision -- has been read down to require actual knowledge of a court order or a government notification to take down content. Section 69A of the Act and its corresponding Rules, the provisions enabling the blocking of web content, have been left intact by the court, though infirmities persist.

The Supreme Court's decision comes at a critical moment for freedom of speech in India. In recent years, the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution has suffered unmitigated misery: Wendy Doniger's The Hindus: An Alternative History was banned for hurting religious sentiments, publisher Orient Blackswan fearing legal action stayed its release of an academic work on sexual violence in Ahmedabad, the author Perumal Murugan faced harsh criticism for his novel One Part Woman and chose to slay his authorial identity.

"The Supreme Court's decision comes at a critical moment for freedom of speech in India. In recent years, the freedom guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution has suffered unmitigated misery."

The tale of free speech on the Internet is similar. In response to takedown requests, intermediaries prefer to tread a safe path, taking down even legitimate content for fear of triggering penalties under Section 79 of the IT Act. The government has blocked websites in ways that transgress the bounds of 'reasonable restrictions' on speech. Section 66A alone has gathered astounding arrests and controversy. In 2012, Shaheen Dhada and her friend were arrested in Maharashtra for observing that Bal Thackeray's funeral shut down Mumbai, Devu Chodankar in Goa and Syed Waqar in Karnataka were arrested in 2014 for making posts about PM Narendra Modi, and a Puducherry man was arrested for criticizing P. Chidambaram's son. The misuse of Section 66A, and the inadequacy of other provisions of the IT Act, were well-documented.

Section 66A: No longer draconian

In a writ petition filed in 2012, the law student Shreya Singhal challenged the constitutionality of Section 66A on grounds, inter alia, of vagueness and its chilling effect. More petitions were filed challenging other provisions of the IT Act including Section 69A (website blocking) and Section 79 (intermediary liability), and these were heard jointly by justices Rohinton F. Nariman and G. Chelameshwar. Section 66A, implicating grave issues of freedom of speech on the internet, was at the centre of the challenge.

"It is difficult -impossible, in fact - to foresee or predict what speech is permitted or criminalised under Section 66A. As a result, there is a chilling effect on free speech online, resulting in self-censorship."

Section 66A makes it a criminal offence to send any online communication that is "grossly offensive" or "menacing", or false information sent for the purposes of causing "annoyance, inconvenience, insult, injury, obstruction, enmity, hatred, ill will", etc. These terms are not defined. Neither do they fall within one of the eight subjects for limitation under Article 19(2). It is difficult -impossible, in fact - to foresee or predict what speech is permitted or criminalised under Section 66A. As a result, there is a chilling effect on free speech online, resulting in self-censorship.

With yesterday's decision, the Supreme Court has struck down Section 66A on grounds of vagueness, excessive range and chilling effects on speech online. What is perhaps most uplifting is the court's affirmation of the value of free speech. In the midst of rising conservatism towards free speech, the Court reminds us that an "informed citizenry" and a "culture of open dialogue" are crucial to our democracy. Article 19(1)(a) shields us from "occasional tyrannies of governing majorities", and its restriction should be within Constitutional bounds enumerated in Article 19(2).

What speech is protected?

There are three types of speech, the court says: Discussion, advocacy and incitement. Discussion and advocacy are at the heart of Article 19(1)(a), and are unquestionably protected. But when speech amounts to incitement - that is, if it is expected to cause harm, danger or public disorder- it can be reasonably restricted for any of these reasons: public order, sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State and friendly relations with foreign states.

" The Union of India argued that Section 66A is saved by the clauses "public order", "defamation", "incitement to an offence" and "decency, morality". But as the court finds that these are spurious grounds."

Section 66A, however, does not meet the legal standards for any of the limitation-clauses under Article 19(2), and so is unconstitutional. The Union of India argued that Section 66A is saved by the clauses "public order", "defamation", "incitement to an offence" and "decency, morality". But as the court finds that these are spurious grounds. For instance, Section 66A covers "all information" sent via the Internet, but does not make any reference (express or implied) to public order. Section 66A is not saved by incitement, either. The ingredients of "incitement" are that there must be a "clear tendency to disrupt public order", or an express or implied call to violence or disorder, and Section 66A is remarkably silent on these. By its vague and wide scope, Section 66A may apply to one-on-one online communication or to public posts, and so its applicability is uncertain. For these grounds, Section 66A has been struck down.

For freedom of speech on the internet, this is fantastic news! The unpredictability and threat of Section 66A has been lifted. Political commentary, criticism and dialogue are clearly protected under Article 19(1)(a). Of course, the government is still keen to regulate online speech, but the bounds within which it may do so have been reasserted and fortified.

Section 69A and website blocking

Section 69A empowers the government and its agencies to block websites on any of six grounds: "in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above". The blocking procedure is set out in the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009. It requires that a Committee for Examination of Request (CER) examines each blocking request, and gives the content-generator or host 48 hours to make a representation. The Secretary of the Department of Electronics and Information Technology then issues the blocking direction to the intermediary.

"[The court has] failed to consider the impact of Section 69A and its Rules. Our free speech rights as listeners are equally affected when legitimate websites containing information are blocked. Transparency, blockpage notifications and judicial review are essential to determine whether each blocking direction is valid."

Now, the Supreme Court decision has left Section 69A and its Rules intact, stating that it is a "narrowly drawn provision with several safeguards". However, the Court has overlooked some crucial details. For instance, no judicial review is available to test the validity of each blocking direction. Moreover, Rule 14 of the Blocking Rules requires that all blocking requests and directions are kept confidential. This means that neither the content-generator, nor the reader/listener or general public, will have any idea of how many blocking directions have been issued or why. There is no standard blockpage display in India, either, and this further aggravates the transparency problem.

Lamentably, the Supreme Court has not considered this. Though the court has recognised and upheld the rights of viewers, readers and listeners in its decision on Section 66A, it failed to consider the impact of Section 69A and its Rules on readers and listeners. Our free speech rights as listeners are equally affected when legitimate websites containing information are blocked. Transparency, blockpage notifications and judicial review are essential to determine whether each blocking direction is valid.

Section 79 and the intermediary as a judge

Section 79 provides a safe harbour for intermediaries: if they abide by the requirements of Section 79(2), they retain immunity. But under Section 79(3)(b), intermediaries can lose their immunity from prosecution if, after receiving a takedown notice, they do not take down content in three circumstances: (1) if they have actual knowledge that third-party information within their control is being used to commit an unlawful act (i.e., by suo moto deciding the lawfulness of content); (2) if a court order requires takedown of content; (3) if a government notification requires takedown. Rule 3(4) of the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules, 2011 has a similar provision.

"The Supreme Court has wisely put an end to private adjudication of lawfulness. Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(4) have been read down to mean that the intermediary must have actual knowledge of a court order or government notification."

This leads to a situation where a private intermediary is responsible for deciding what constitutes lawful content. Previous studies have shown that, when placed in such a position, intermediaries prefer overbroad blocking to escape liability. As readers, we can then only access uncontroversial content. But the freedom of speech includes, as the European Court of Human Rights emphasised in Otto-Preminger Institut, the freedom to "offend, shock and disturb".

In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court has wisely put an end to private adjudication of lawfulness. Section 79(3)(b) and Rule 3(4) have been read down to mean that the intermediary must have actual knowledge of a court order or government notification. Even if an intermediary chooses not to act in response to a private takedown notice, it will retain its immunity under Section 79.

With Shreya Singhal, India has reaffirmed its protections for freedom of speech on the internet. One may now freely speak online without fear of illegitimate and unconstitutional prosecution. However, a re-examination of the blocking procedure, with its infirmities and direct impact on speech diversity, is essential. But today, we celebrate!

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/huffington-post-geetha-hariharan-march-26-2015-what-66-a-judgment-means-for-free-speech-online

SC has set a high threshold for tolerance: Lawrence Liang

praskrishna — 2015-03-28T16:18:18Z

Lawyer-activist Lawrence Liang on why SC upheld section 69A and the implications of striking down section 66A.

The article by Dhamini Ratnam was published in Livemint on March 28, 2015. Lawrence Liang gave his inputs.

Tuesday marked a landmark in the fight for free speech in our country, as the Supreme Court struck down the contentious section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000. The section, which was introduced through an amendment in 2009, penalized those who wrote messages online that could be deemed as being false or grossly offensive. However, the apex court turned down a plea to strike down sections 69A (procedure for blocking websites) and 79 (exemption from liability of intermediaries) of the same law. Lawrence Liang, a lawyer who co-founded the Alternative Law Forum in Bengaluru, a fellow at the Centre for Internet and Society, and author of The Public is Watching: Sex, Laws and Videotape and A Guide to Open Content Licenses, spoke in an interview on the wide-ranging implications of the judgement. Edited excerpts:

What was the impetus to fight section 66A?

Over the past few years, there have been numerous cases in which section 66A has been used in bad faith against individuals online. One of the cases that became well-known by virtue of just how ridiculous it was involved the arrest of Shaheen Dhada and her friend Renu Srinivasan (which led petitioner Shreya Singhal to file a public interest litigation in the Supreme Court that eventually led to this judgement), but there have been more, so it was inevitable that a law as draconian as section 66A would be challenged for its constitutional validity.

The judgement begins by noting a distinction between three forms of speech—discussion, advocacy and incitement—and says discussion and advocacy of a particular cause, howsoever unpopular, is at the heart of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution (all citizens shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression). Only when they reach the level of incitement can they be legitimately prohibited. While the judgement does not provide a new definition of incitement, it affirms what was laid down in the Rangarajan test (1989), in which the courts had established that for censorship to be justified, the “expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interest”. There should be an immediate and direct relation between speech and effect.

The court said that section 66A is “cast so widely that virtually any opinion on any subject would be covered by it, as any serious opinion dissenting with the mores of the day would be caught within its net”. The courts have also historically held that Article 19(1)(a) is as much about the right to receive information as it is to disseminate, and when there is a chilling effect on speech, it also violates the right to receive information. However, I would say that the court missed an opportunity to consider the blocking of websites under section 69A.

Why did the court uphold section 69A, and which other parts of the IT Act did it examine?

If section 66A was found to be arbitrary, then the procedure for blocking websites, as laid out in section 69A, is also beset with similar problems. The court, however, upheld this section and the rules under the IT Act on the grounds that there are internal safeguards and reasonable procedures. This section allows the government to block any site or information that violates Article 19(2) of the Constitution (which enables the legislature to impose certain restrictions on free speech).

The problem is that often there is no hearing or notice given to the owner of information, there is no transparency since blocks can happen on a confidential basis and these can have serious implications for the right to receive information.

The court read down section 79, which used to provide an intermediary exemption from liability with the exception that if it received “actual knowledge” of any illegal content, it was obliged to act within 36 hours. A study by the Centre for Internet and Society showed that even on sending frivolous takedown notices, intermediaries tended to comply to be on the safe side. The court’s decision has read down section 79 now to mean that “actual knowledge” means either an order of a court or the government. It moves it away from a subjective determination by intermediaries.

The court could have, like it did with section 79, retained section 66A while clarifying a procedure that would maintain a balance between the need sometimes to block and public interest, and transparency.

What does the judgement open up for the free speech debate?

The judgement speaks of chilling effects, because if one is not careful, one runs the risk of endangering political discourse through self-censorship. This is terrible for a democratic culture, which is premised on the ability to debate and dissent. Much of the use of section 66A has been politically motivated to silence criticism, and the judgement goes a long way towards promoting a culture of critique.

As the first major Supreme Court case on free speech in the 21st century, it sets the tone on how we think of free speech in a context where every individual with a smartphone is potentially a writer, a publisher and a distributor. By setting a high threshold for what is tolerated in online speech, it ensures that the online space is not doomed to be infantilized.

What position must the law take to protect rights and minority identities?

I think it is important to distinguish between different effects of speech. The court has merely reaffirmed a position that has been held in India for a long time (such as through the Ram Manohar Lohia judgement of 1960, which interpreted what “restriction made in the interests of public order” in Article 19(2) means). In other words, if someone is inciting violence, especially if they have the power to effect such violence (such as a politician), then their speech can be regulated, but the court also held that the idea of threat to public order is often imaginary.

For instance, in what way would Shaheen Dhada’s post on Facebook have incited violence? (In November 2012, Dhada, then a student and based in Palghar, Maharashtra, had written a post on Facebook commenting on the state of shutdown that followed politician Bal Thackeray’s death. Her comment was liked by her friend Srinivasan, and both of them were charged under section 66A.) So, the court is distinguishing between speech that is critical and speech that is dangerous. There are laws that deal with the latter, such as 153A and 295A of the IPC (Indian Penal Code).

It must be noted, however, that provisions also suffer from the same vice of vagueness. What we need is a more nuanced understanding of hate speech that addresses speech that incites violence or hatred against a community, but one in which the test is not of subjective hurt sentiment. The problem with hate speech laws is that they collapse questions of law and order with questions of subjective hurt, and we run the risk of becoming a republic of hurt sentiments where anyone can claim that their sentiments are hurt, especially their religious sentiments.

What happens to existing cases that are being tried under section 66A, such as the one against the organizers and participants of the All India Bakchod Roast?

Court judgements do not necessarily have retrospective effect, so cases that have been filed will continue. We must also remember that the cases filed under section 66A were also accompanied by other provisions. Of course, a judgement as significant as this, which completely delegitimizes section 66A, will have a profound impact on the ongoing cases insofar as they relate to the offence under the section, but the other charges remain.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-dhamini-ratnam-march-28-2015-sc-has-set-a-high-threshold-for-tolerance

66A DEAD. LONG LIVE 66A!

praskrishna — 2015-04-01T02:11:27Z

Last Tuesday, Twitter CEO Dick Costolo walked into Prime Minister Narendra Modi's office. India's most compulsive and most-followed tweeter, Modi, as Gujarat chief minister, had protested when the Manmohan Singh government blocked the micro-blogging site of a few journalists. Modi had blacked out his own Twitter profile and tweeted: “May God give good sense to everyone.”

The article by Soni Mishra was published in the Week on March 28, 2015. T. Vishnu Vardhan gave his inputs.

Today, with 11 million followers on Twitter, and 27.6 million likes on Facebook, Modi rules the virtual world and India. He received Costolo warmly and told him how Twitter could help his Clean India, girl child and yoga campaigns. Impressed, Costolo told Modi how Indian youth were innovating on Twitter.

But, the greatest and the most fundamental boost for all social media in India was being effected a few minutes drive away from the PMO. Ironically, in the Supreme Court of India, Modi's lawyers were defending a law made by the United Progressive Alliance government—section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which curbed free speech on social media.

Anything posted on the internet can go viral worldwide and reach millions in no time, argued Additional Solicitor General Tushar Mehta. While the traditional media is ruled by licences and checks, social media has nothing, he said. Finally, Mehta made an impassioned plea that the government meant well. Section 66A will be administered reasonably and will not be misused, he assured the court.

It seemed he, and the government, had forgotten an old saying: if there is a bad law, someone will use it. Luckily for India, and its liberal democracy, the judges saw a bad law and struck it down. “If section 66A is otherwise invalid, it cannot be saved by an assurance from the learned additional solicitor general,” said the bench comprising Justice Rohinton Nariman and Justice J. Chelameswar.

The fact is that 66A was knee-jerk legislation. Almost as thoughtless and compulsive as a netizen's derisive tweet. On December 22, 2008, the penultimate day of the winter session, the UPA government had got seven bills passed in seven minutes in the Lok Sabha; the opposition BJP had played along.

One of the bills was to amend the IT Act. It went to the Rajya Sabha the next day, when members were hurrying to catch their trains and flights home for the year-end vacation. They just okayed the bill and hurried home.

The argument then was that there was no need to discuss the bill as it had been examined by a standing committee of Parliament. Indeed, it had been. But, the committee, headed by Nikhil Kumar of the Congress, had met only for 23 hours and five minutes. Nine of its 31 members had not attended a single meeting. Ravi Shankar Prasad, the current Union minister for IT, was one among the 31.

Apparently, everyone wanted the bill, so did not bother to apply their minds. Only a CPI(M) member, A. Vijayaraghavan, had a few dissenting suggestions to the committee report. No one else bothered to mull over a law that was “unconstitutional, vague” and which would have a “chilling effect” on free speech.

Once the law was made, it was constable raj across India. Shaheen Dhada from Palghar simply commented on Facebook about a Shiv Sena bandh on the death of Bal Thackeray. Her friend Rinu Srinivasan liked it. The two teenagers were bundled into a police station. Rinu still remembers with a chill how “a mob of about 200 people gathered outside the police station that day.” This was when the Congress was ruling Maharashtra.

Jadavpur University professor Ambikesh Mahapatra was picked up by the police in Trinamool Congress-ruled West Bengal in April 2012, for posting a cartoon ridiculing Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. “I was thrashed several times in police custody,” said the professor, who got relief from the West Bengal Human Rights Commission.

Vickey Khan, 22, was arrested in Rampur, UP, for a Facebook post on Samajwadi Party leader Azam Khan. Rampur is, of course, Khan's pocket borough. The Uttar Pradesh Police, controlled by the Samajwadi Party government, also arrested dalit writer Kanwal Bharti from Rampur for criticising the UP government's suspension of IAS officer Durga Shakti Nagpal in 2013.

At least 30 people in AIADMK-ruled Chennai have been booked under 66A; four of them this year. Ravi Srinivasan, general secretary of the Aam Aadmi Party in Puducherry, was picked up in October 2012 for his tweets on Karti Chidambaram, son of then Union home minister P. Chidambaram. “He was not even in India when I tweeted,” said Ravi. “He sent the complaint by fax from abroad and everything happened [fast] as Puducherry is a Union Territory and can be controlled by the home ministry.”

Whistleblower A. Shankar of Chennai was pulled up by the Madras High Court for the content on his blog, Savukku. The Orissa Police, controlled by the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) government, took Facebook to court in 2011 asking who created a Facebook page in the name of Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik. It is another thing that the page had no content.

Indeed, there had been stray political voices opposing the law. In Parliament, the CPI(M)'s P. Rajeeve, the BJD's Jay Panda and independent MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar pushed several times for scrapping 66A. Panda moved a private members bill, and Rajeeve moved a resolution. “I only wish we in Parliament had heeded the people's voice and repealed it, instead of yet again letting the judiciary do our work for us,” Panda said after the law was scrapped.

Finally, it was left to a young law student, Shreya Singhal, to move the Supreme Court on behalf of the Palghar girls. Singhal pointed out that several provisions in 66A violated fundamental rights guaranteed by article 19(1)(a)—the right to freedom of speech and expression. Several more cases followed and, finally, the court heard them together.

Indeed, Justices Nariman and Chelameswar have been extremely restrained in their comments. But, the fact that Parliament had not applied its mind comes through in the judgment.

The court “had raised serious concerns with the manner in which section 66A of the IT Act has been drafted and implemented across the country,” pointed out Supreme Court lawyer Shivshankar Panicker. Added Kiran Shanmugam, a cyber forensic expert and CEO of ECD Global Bengaluru: “The law lacked foresight in estimating the magnitude of the way the electronic media would grow.”

Apparently the government, too, knew it was defending the indefensible, and tried to win the case highlighting the benign nature of the democratic state. But, the court was not impressed. “Governments may come and governments may go, but section 66A goes on forever,” the judges noted. “An assurance from the present government, even if carried out faithfully, would not bind any successor government.”

Clearly, Mehta was defending the indefensible, a law that, the court found, would have a “chilling effect on free speech”. Moreover, as the judges found out, the new law did not provide even the safeguards that the older Criminal Procedure Code had provided. “Safeguards that are to be found in sections 95 and 96 of the CrPC are also absent when it comes to section 66A,” the judges said. For example, according to the CrPC, a book or document that contained objectionable matter could be seized by the police, but it also allowed the publisher to move court. The new law did not provide even such a cushion.

All the same, the court was careful and did not overturn the entire law. It scrapped section 66A, and section 118(D) of the Kerala Police Act, but upheld section 69A and section 79 of the IT Act, which too had been questioned by the litigants (see box on page 45).

The judgment has set the cyberworld rocking. “I am so happy now, I do not know how to express it,” said Rinu, now an audio-engineering student in Kerala. Shaheen is married and lives in Bengaluru. Vickey Khan is relieved. “Some people had told me that I could be jailed for three years,” he said. But, Azam Khan took it out on the media and said it “favours criminals”.

Karti, who claims to be a votary of free speech, however, wants “some protection” against defamation. “I filed a complaint in an existing provision of law,” he said. “If that provision is not available, then I will have to seek other provisions to safeguard my reputation.”

Mahapatra is still apprehensive. “The government will still try to harass me,” he said. “But I know that in the end I will win.” Shankar of Chennai called it “a huge relief for people like me, who are active on social media.” Ravi Srinivasan, who locked horns with Karti, said he felt “relieved and happy”.

The hard rap on the knuckles for their legislative laxity has sobered the political class. The Congress, the progenitor of 66A, admitted that the vagueness of the law was its undoing. “If in a particular area, the local constabulary took action to stifle dissent, it was never the purpose of the act,” said Congress spokesperson Abhishek Manu Singhvi. The Modi government officially welcomed the judgment, and its spokespersons are blaming the UPA for the law.

Apparently, the scrapped law was made after a series of grossly offensive posts appeared on the social media five years ago. “If such content is not blocked online, it would immediately lead to riots,” said a law ministry official, who said the posts had been shown to the court, too. He said the government would take some time to draft a new law.

But, is a new law required? Opinion is still divided. What if someone is defamed on the net? “There are defamation laws which can deal with these,” said T. Vishnuvardhan, programme director, Centre for Internet and Society, Bengaluru. “Also, the IT Act has various provisions. If somebody misuses your picture on social media, you can report it to the website immediately. The website is liable to take action on it within 36 hours.”

Smarika Kumar of Bengaluru-based Alternative Law Forum said the scrapping of 66A does not mean one can post anything online. “The Supreme Court has said that speech can be censored when it falls under the restrictions provided under article 19(2) of the Constitution,” she said. “But, if you prevent speech on any other ground, it is going to be unconstitutional.”

But, even critics of 66A think a replacement law is needed. Said Rajeev Chandrasekhar: “The government needs to act quickly and create a much more contemporaneous Act, via multi-stakeholder consultations, general consensus and collaboration, so that there is less ambiguity and freedom of expression is preserved.”

Senior Supreme Court advocate Pravin H. Parekh said, “As the cyberworld is growing day by day and there is increase in the number of social media users, we do require a proper mechanism which can regulate the expression of views on the internet.”

The government is putting forth the argument of national security. “If the security establishment says the present act is not sufficient, we will look into it. The government will consider it, but only with adequate safeguards,” said Ravi Shankar Prasad.

That will call for a legislative process undertaken in a cool and calm house, and not hurried through when the members are ready to hurry home.

Sound judgment

Thumbs down
The Supreme Court set aside section 66A of the IT act, which says any person who sends offensive, menacing or false information to cause annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, or uses email to trouble its recipient or deceive him/her about the origin of such messages, can be punished with a jail term up to three years and a fine.

The court also struck down section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act, which says any person who makes indecent comments by calls, mails, messages or any such means causing grave violation of public order or danger can be punished with imprisonment up to three years or a fine not exceeding Rs10,000, or both.

Thumbs up
The Supreme Court upheld section 69A of the IT act, which allows the government to block the public's access to information in national interest and penalise intermediaries [telecom or internet service providers and web hosting services] who fail to comply with the government's directives.

Section 79 of the IT Act, which deals with intermediaries' exemption from liability in certain cases, too, was upheld.

With R. Prasanan, Mini P. Thoma, Ajay Uprety, Lakshmi Subramanian, Rabi Banerjee and Sharmista Chaudhury

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-week-march-28-2015-soni-mishra-66a-dead-long-live-66a

The Supreme Court Judgment in Shreya Singhal and What It Does for Intermediary Liability in India?

jyoti — 2015-04-17T23:59:34Z

Even as free speech advocates and users celebrate the Supreme Court of India's landmark judgment striking down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000, news that the Central government has begun work on drafting a new provision to replace the said section of the Act has been trickling in.

The SC judgement in upholding the constitutionality of Section 69A (procedure for blocking websites) and in reading down Section 79 (exemption from liability of intermediaries) of the IT Act, raises crucial questions regarding transparency, accountability and under what circumstances may reasonable restrictions be placed on free speech on the Internet. While discussions and analysis of S. 66A continue, in this post I will focus on the aspect of the judgment related to intermediary liability that could benefit from further clarification from the apex court and in doing so, will briefly touch upon S. 69A and secret blocking.

Conditions qualifying intermediary for exemption and obligations not related to exemption

The intermediary liability regime in India is defined under S. 79 and assosciated rules that were introduced to protect intermediaries for liability from user generated content and ensure the Internet continues to evolve as a “marketplace of ideas”. But as intermediaries may not have sufficient legal competence or resources to deliberate on the legality of an expression, they may end up erring on the side of caution and takedown lawful expression. As a study by Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) in 2012 revealed, the criteria, procedure and safeguards for administration of the takedowns as prescribed by the rules lead to a chilling effect on online free expression.

S. 69A grants powers to the Central Government to “issue directions for blocking of public access to any information through any computer resource”. The 2009 rules allow the blocking of websites by a court order, and sets in place a review committee to review the decision to block websites as also establishes penalties for the intermediary that fails to extend cooperation in this respect.

There are two key aspects of both these provisions that must be noted:

a) S. 79 is an exemption provision that qualifies the intermediary for conditional immunity, as long as they fulfil the conditions of the section. The judgement notes this distinction, adding that “being an exemption provision, it is closely related to provisions which provide for offences including S. 69A.”

b) S. 69A does not contribute to immunity for the intermediary rather places additional obligations on the intermediary and as the judgement notes “intermediary who finally fails to comply with the directions issued who is punishable under sub-section (3) of 69A.” The provision though outside of the conditional immunity liability regime enacted through S. 79 contributes to the restriction of access to, or removing content online by placing liability on intermediaries to block unlawful third party content or information that is being generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted by them. Therefore restriction requests must fall within the contours outlined in Article 19(2) and include principles of natural justice and elements of due process.

Subjective Determination of Knowledge

The provisions for exemption laid down in S. 79 do not apply when they receive “actual knowledge” of illegal content under section 79(3)(b). Prior to the court's verdict actual knowledge could have been interpreted to mean the intermediary is called upon its own judgement under sub-rule (4) to restrict impugned content in order to seek exemption from liability. Removing the need for intermediaries to take on an adjudicatory role and deciding on which content to restrict or takedown, the SC has read down “actual knowledge” to mean that there has to be a court order directing the intermediary to expeditiously remove or disable access to content online. The court also read down “upon obtaining knowledge by itself” and “brought to actual knowledge” under Rule 3(4) in the same manner as 79(3)(b).

Under S.79(3)(b) the intermediary must comply with the orders from the executive in order to qualify for immunity. Further, S. 79 (3)(b) goes beyond the specific categories of restriction identified in Article 19(2) by including the term “unlawful acts” and places the executive in an adjudicatory role of determining the illegality of content. The government cannot emulate private regulation as it is bound by the Constitution and the court addresses this issue by applying the limitation of 19(2) on unlawful acts, “the court order and/or the notification by the appropriate government or its agency must strictly conform to the subject matters aid down in Article 19(2).”

By reading down of S. 79 (3) (b) the court has addressed the issue of intermediaries complying with takedown requests from non-government entities and has made government notifications and court orders to be consistent with reasonable restrictions in Article 19(2). This is an important clarification from the court, because this places limits on the private censorship of intermediaries and the invisible censorship of opaque government takedown requests as they must and should adhere, to the boundaries set by Article 19(2).

Procedural Safeguards

The SC does not touch upon other parts of the rules and in not doing so, has left significant procedural issues open for debate. It is relevant to bear in mind and as established above, S. 69A blocking and restriction requirements for the intermediary are part of their additional obligations and do not qualify them for immunity. The court ruled in favour of upholding S. 69A as constitutional on the basis that blocking orders are issued when the executive has sufficiently established that it is absolutely necessary to do so, and that the necessity is relatable to only some subjects set out in Article 19(2). Further the court notes that reasons for the blocking orders must be recorded in writing so that they may be challenged through writ petitions. The court also goes on to specify that under S. 69A the intermediary and the 'originator' if identified, have the right to be heard before the committee decides to issue the blocking order.

Under S. 79 the intermediary must also comply with government restriction orders and the procedure for notice and takedown is not sufficiently transparent and lacks procedural safeguards that have been included in the notice and takedown procedures under S. 69. For example, there is no requirement for committee to evaluate the necessity of issuing the restriction order, though the ruling does clarify that these restriction notices must be within the confines of Article 19(2). The judgement could have gone further to directing the government to state their entire cause of action and provide reasonable level of proof (prima facie). It should have also addressed issues such as the government using extra-judicial measures to restrict content including collateral pressures to force changes in terms of service, to promote or enforce so-called "voluntary" practices.

Accountability

The judgement could also have delved deeper into issues of accountability such as the need to consider 'udi alteram partem' by providing the owner of the information or the intermediary a hearing prior to issuing the restriction or blocking order nor is an post-facto review or appeal mechanism made available except for the recourse of writ petition. Procedural uncertainty around wrongly restricted content remains, including what limitations should be placed on the length, duration and geographical scope of the restriction. The court also does not address the issue of providing a recourse for the third party provider of information to have the removed information restored or put-back remains unclear. Relatedly, the court also does not clarify the concerns related to frivolous requests by establishing penalties nor is there a codified recourse under the rules presently, for the intermediary to claim damages even if it can be established that the takedown process is being abused.

Transparency

The bench in para 113 in addressing S. 79 notes that the intermediary in addition to publishing rules and regulations, privacy policy and user agreement for access or usage of their service has to also inform users of the due diligence requirements including content restriction policy under rule 3(2). However, the court ought to have noted the differentiation between different categories of intermediaries which may require different terms of use. Rather than stressing a standard terms of use as a procedural safeguard, the court should have insisted on establishing terms of use and content restriction obligations that is proportional to the role of the intermediary and based on the liability accrued in providing the service, including the impact of the restriction by the intermediary both on access and free speech. By placing requirement of disclosure or transparency on the intermediary including what has been restricted under the intermediary's own terms of service, the judgment could have gone a step further than merely informing users of their rights in using the service as it stands presently, to ensuring that users can review and have knowledge of what information has been restricted and why. The judgment also does not touch upon broader issues of intermediary liability such as proactive filtering sought by government and private parties, an important consideration given the recent developments around the right to be forgotten in Europe and around issues of defamation and pornography in India.

The judgment, while a welcome one in the direction of ensuring the Internet remains a democratic space where free speech thrives, could benefit from the application of the recently launched Manila principles developed by CIS and others. The Manila Principles is a framework of baseline safeguards and best practices that should be considered by policymakers and intermediaries when developing, adopting, and reviewing legislation, policies and practices that govern the liability of intermediaries for third-party content.

The court's ruling is truly worth celebrating, in terms of the tone it sets on how we think of free speech and the contours of censorship that exist in the digital space. But the real impact of this judgment lies in the debates and discussions which it will throw open about content removal practices that involve intermediaries making determinations on requests received, or those which only respond to the interests of the party requesting removal. As the Manila Principles highlight a balance between public and private interests can be obtained through a mechanism where power is distributed between the parties involved, and where an impartial, independent, and accountable oversight mechanism exists.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sc-judgment-in-shreya-singhal-what-it-means-for-intermediary-liability

Accessing pirated content might lead to prison term & Rs 3-lakh fine

praskrishna — 2016-08-23T02:47:52Z

India puts onus of downloading and viewing pirated content on individuals.

The article by Alnoor Peermohammed was published in the Business Standard on August 22, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

The central government is putting the onus of downloading and viewing of copyrighted content from sites it has blocked (with the help of internet service providers) on users.

Visiting torrent (a particular type of files) websites while on Tata Communications’ network recently had users being shown a message that viewing or downloading content on those sites could land them in prison for up to three years and a fine of up to Rs 3 lakh.

“There is not enough room in our prisons to keep these infringers and enough time in our courts to try them. It might sound very exciting as a message to put out but, essentially, they’re trying to scare people into good behaviour,” said Sunil Abraham, executive director at research firm Centre for Internet and Society.

There has been no change to the Copyright Act of 1957 or the Information Technology Act of 2000 for the updated notice being shown to users upon visiting blocked sites. Under these provisions, visiting a site, which is blocked is not illegal, unless it is child pornography.

“Copyright infringement happens all the time and even in developed countries, the rates are very high. Crackdowns on individuals and consumers are never going to solve the problem,” added Abraham.

Experts say the most the government could do is prosecute a couple of people and make examples of them, to dissuade others. This practice is followed globally. There are no examples, though, in India of prosecution for copyright infringement of online content.

The recent alteration of the statement seen by users on Tata networks was done on the directives of the Bombay High Court, after the company appealed that showing individual messages for why each website was blocked was not feasible. The resulting message sparked media frenzy that visitors of blocked websites could now be imprisoned.

Other media reports revealed that the recent blocking of websites by internet service providers was prompted by court orders to prevent piracy of Dishoom, the Bollywood movie.

Globally, there’s been a move to clamp on torrent websites which host pirated content, aided by large information technology entities such as Apple or Facebook. Last month, the US authorities arrested Kickass Torrents’ founder, Arten Vaulin, and blocked all the domains of the website, only to have it resurface a day later.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-august-22-2016-accessing-pirated-content-might-lead-to-prison-term-and-rs-3-lakh-fine

TV versus Social Media: The Rights and Wrongs

sunil — 2013-01-21T03:09:56Z

For most ordinary Netizens, everyday speech on social media has as much impact as graffiti in a toilet, and therefore employing the 'principle of equivalence' will result in overregulation of new media.

Sunil Abraham's guest column was published in the Tribune on January 20, 2013.

Many in traditional media, especially television, look at social media with a mixture of envy and trepidation. They have been at the receiving end of various unsavoury characters online and consequently support regulation of social media. A common question asked by television anchors is "shouldn't they be subject to the same regulation as us?" This is because they employ the 'principle of equivalence', according to which speech that is illegal on broadcast media should also be illegal on social media and vice versa. According to this principle, criticising a bandh on national TV or in a newspaper op-ed or on social media should not result in jail time and, conversely, publishing obscene content, in either new or old media, should render you a guest of the state.

Given that Section 66-A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, places more draconian and arguably unconstitutional limits on free speech when compared to the regulation of traditional and broadcast media, those in favour of civil liberties may be tempted to agree with the 'principle of equivalence' since that will mean a great improvement from status quo. However, we must remember that this compromise goes too far since potential for harm through social media is usually very limited when compared to traditional media, especially when it comes to hate speech, defamation and infringement of privacy. A Facebook update or 'like' or a tweet from an ordinary citizen usually passes completely unnoticed. On rare occasion, an expression on social media originating from an ordinary citizen goes viral and then the potential for harm increases dramatically. But since this is the fringe case we cannot design policy based on it. On the other hand, public persons (those occupying public office and those in public life), including television journalists, usually have tens and hundreds of thousands friends and followers on these social networks and, therefore, can more consistently cause harm through their speech online. For most ordinary Netizens, everyday speech on social media has as much impact as graffiti in a public or residential toilet and therefore employing the 'principle of equivalence' will result in overregulation of new media.

Ideally speech regulation should address the asymmetries in the global attention economy by constantly examining the potential for harm. This applies to both 'speech about' public persons and also 'speech by' them. Since 'speech about' public persons is necessary for transparent and accountable governance and public discourse, such speech must be regulated less than 'speech about' ordinary citizens. Let us understand this using two examples: One, a bunch of school kids referring to a classmate as an idiot on a social network is bullying, but citizens using the very same term to criticise a minister or television anchor must be permitted. Two, an ordinary citizen should be allowed to photograph or video-record the acts of a film or sports star at a public location and upload it to a social network, but this exception to the right of privacy based on public interest will not imply that the same ordinary citizen can publish photographs or videos of other ordinary citizens. Public scrutiny and criticism is part of the price to be paid for occupying public office or public life. If speech regulation is configured to prevent damage to the fragile egos of public persons, then it would have a chilling effect on many types of speech that are critical in a democracy and an open society.

When it comes to 'speech by' those in public office or in public life - given the greater potential for harm - they should be held more liable for their actions online. For example, an ordinary citizen with less than 100 followers causes very limited harm to the reputation of a particular person through a defamatory tweet. However, if the very same tweet is retweeted by a television anchor with millions of followers, there can be more severe damage to that particular person's reputation.

Many in television also wish to put an end to anonymous and pseudonymous speech online. They would readily agree with Nandan Nilekani's vision of tagging all - visits to the cyber cafe, purchases of broadband connections and SIM cards and, therefore, all activities from social media accounts with the UID number. I have been following coverage of the Aadhaar project for the past three years. Often I see a 'senior official from the UIDAI' make a controversial point. If anonymous speech is critical to protect India's identity project then surely it is an important form of speech. But, unlike the print media, which more regularly uses anonymous sources for their stories, television doesn't see clearly the connection between anonymous speech and free media. This is because many of the trolls that harass them online often hide behind pseudonymous identities. Television forgets that anonymous speech is at the very foundation of our democracy, i.e., the electoral ballot.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sunday-tribune-january-20-2013-sunil-abraham-tv-vs-social-media

Statutory Motion Against Intermediary Guidelines Rules

pranesh — 2012-04-03T09:35:41Z

Rajya Sabha MP, Shri P. Rajeev has moved a motion that the much-criticised Intermediary Guidelines Rules be annulled.

Motion to Annul Intermediary Guidelines Rules

A motion to annul the Intermediary Guidelines Rules was moved on March 23, 2012, by Shri P. Rajeeve, CPI(M) MP in the Rajya Sabha from Thrissur, Kerala.

The motion reads:

"That this House resolves that the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 issued under clause (zg) of sub-section (2) of Section 87 read with sub-section (2) of Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 published in the Gazette of India dated the 13th April, 2011 vide Notification No. G.S.R 314(E) and laid on the Table of the House on the 12th August, 2011, be annuled; and

That this House recommends to Lok Sabha that Lok Sabha do concur on this Motion."

This isn't the first time that Mr. Rajeeve is raising his voice against the Intermediary Guidelines Rules. Indeed, even when the Rules were just in draft stage, he along with the MPs Kumar Deepak Das, Rajeev Chandrashekar, and Mahendra Mohan drew Parliamentarians' attention to the rules. Yet, the government did not heed the MPs' concern, nor the concern of all the civil society organizations that wrote in to them concerned about human rights implications of the new laws. On September 6, 2011, Lok Sabha MP Jayant Choudhary gave notice (under Rule 377 of the Lok Sabha Rules) that the Intermediary Guidelines Rules as well as the Reasonable Security Practices Rules need to be reviewed. Yet, the government has not even addressed those concerns, and indeed has cracked down even harder on online freedom of speech since then.

Fundamental Problems with Intermediary Guidelines Rules

The fundamental problems with the Rules, which deal with objectionable material online:

Shifting blame.

It makes the 'intermediary', including ISPs like BSNL and Airtel responsible for objectionable content that their users have put up.

No chance to defend.

There is no need to inform users before this content is removed. So, even material put up by a political party can be removed based on anyone's complaint, without telling that party. This was done against a site called *CartoonsAgainstCorruption.com". This goes against Article 19(1)(a).

Lack of transparency

No information is required to be provided that content has been removed. It's a black-box system, with no one, not even the government, knowing that content has been removed following a request. So even the government does not know how many sites have been removed after these Rules have come into effect.

No differentiation between intermediaries.

A one-size-fits-all system is followed where an e-mail provider is equated with an online newspaper, which is equated with a video upload site, which is equated with a search engine. This is like equating the post-office and a book publisher as being equivalent for, say, defamatory speech. This is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, which requires that unequals be treated unequally by the law.

No proportionality.

A DNS provider (i.e., the person who gives you your web address) is an intermediary who can be asked to 'disable access' to a website on the basis of a single page, even though the rest of the site has nothing objectionable.

Vague and unconstitutional requirements.

Disparaging speech, as long as it isn't defamatory, is not criminalised in India, and can't be because the Constitution does not allow for it. Content about gambling in print is not unlawful, but now all Internet intermediaries are required to remove any content that promotes gambling.

Allows private censorship.

The Rules do not draw a distinction between arbitrary actions of an intermediary and take-downs subsequent to a request.

Presumption of illegality.

The Rules are based on the presumption that all complaints (and resultant mandatory taking down of the content) are correct, and that the incorrectness of the take-downs can be disputed in court (if they ever discover that it has been removed). This is contrary to the presumption of validity of speech used by Indian courts, and is akin to prior restraint on speech. Courts have held that for content such as defamation, prior restraints cannot be put on speech, and that civil and criminal action can only be taken post-speech.

Government censorship, not 'self-regulation'.

The government says these are industry best-practices in existing terms of service agreements. But the Rules require all intermediaries to include the government-prescribed terms in an agreement, no matter what services they provide. It is one thing for a company to choose the terms of its terms of service agreement, and completely another for the government to dictate those terms of service.

Problems Noted Early

We have noted in the past the problems with the Rules, including when the Rules were still in draft form:

Other organizations like the Software Freedom Law Centre also sent in scathing comments on the law, noting that they are unconstitutional.

We are very glad that Shri Rajeeve has moved this motion, and we hope that it gets adopted in the Lok Sabha as well, and that the Rules get defeated.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/statutory-motion-against-intermediary-guidelines-rules

India's Broken Internet Laws Need a Shot of Multi-stakeholderism

pranesh — 2012-04-26T13:45:25Z

Cyber-laws in India are severely flawed, with neither lawyers nor technologists being able to understand them, and the Cyber-Law Group in DEIT being incapable of framing fair, just, and informed laws and policies. Pranesh Prakash suggests they learn from the DEIT's Internet Governance Division, and Brazil, and adopt multi-stakeholderism as a core principle of Internet policy-making.

(An edited version of this article was published in the Indian Express as "Practise what you preach" on Thursday, April 26, 2012.)

The laws in India relating to the Internet are greatly flawed, and the only way to fix them would be to fix the way they are made. The Cyber-Laws & E-Security Group in the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEIT, who refer to themselves as 'DeitY' on their website!) has proven itself incapable of making fair, balanced, just, and informed laws and policies. The Information Technology (IT) Act is filled with provisions that neither lawyers nor technologists understand (not to mention judges). (The definition of "computer source code" in s.65 of the IT Act is a great example of that.)

The Rules drafted under s.43A of the IT Act (on 'reasonable security practices' to be followed by corporations) were so badly formulated that the government was forced to issue a clarification through a press release, even though the clarification was in reality an amendment and amendments cannot be carried out through press releases. Despite the clarification, it is unclear to IT lawyers whether the Rules are mandatory or not, since s.43A (i.e., the parent provision) seems to suggest that it is sufficient if the parties enter into an agreement specifying reasonable security practices and procedures. Similarly, the "Intermediary Guidelines" Rules (better referred to as the Internet Censorship Rules) drafted under s.79 of the Act have been called "arbitrary and unconstitutional" by many, including MP P. Rajeev, who has introduced a motion in the Rajya Sabha to repeal the Rules ("Caught in a net", Indian Express, April 24, 2012). These Rules give the power of censorship to every citizen and allow them to remove any kind of material off the Internet within 36 hours without anybody finding out. Last year, we at the Centre for Internet and Society used this law to get thousands of innocuous links removed from four major search engines without any public notice. In none of the cases (including one where an online news website removed more material than the perfectly legal material we had complained about) were the content-owners notified about our complaint, much less given a chance to defend themselves.

Laws framed by the Cyber-Law Group are so poorly drafted that they are misused more often than used. There are too many criminal provisions in the IT Act, and their penalties are greatly more than that of comparable crimes in the IPC. Section 66A of the IT Act, which criminalizes "causing annoyance or inconvenience" electronically, has a penalty of 3 years (greater than that for causing death by negligence), and does not require a warrant for arrest. This section has been used in the Mamata Banerjee cartoon case, for arresting M. Karthik, a Hyderabad-based student who made atheistic statements on Facebook, and against former Karnataka Lokayukta Santosh Hegde. Section 66A, I believe, imperils freedom of speech more than is allowable under Art. 19(2) of the Constitution, and is hence unconstitutional.

While s.5 of the Telegraph Act only allows interception of telephone conversations on the occurrence of a public emergency, or in the interest of the public safety, the IT Act does not have any such threshold conditions, and greatly broadens the State's interception abilities. Section 69 allows the government to force a person to decrypt information, and might clash with Art.20(3) of the Constitution, which provides a right against self-incrimination. One can't find any publicly-available governmental which suggests that the constitutionality of provisions such as s.66A or s.69 was examined.

Omissions by the Cyber-Law Group are also numerous. The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) has been granted very broad functions under the IT Act, but without any clarity on the extent of its powers. Some have been concerned, for instance, that the broad power granted to CERT-In to "give directions" relating to "emergency measures for handling cyber security incidents" includes the powers of an "Internet kill switch" of the kind that Egypt exercised in January 2011. Yet, they have failed to frame Rules for the functioning of CERT-In. The licences that the Department of Telecom enters into with Internet Service Providers requires them to restrict usage of encryption by individuals, groups or organisations to a key length of only 40 bits in symmetric key algorithms (i.e., weak encryption). The RBI mandates a minimum of 128-bit SSL encryption for all bank transactions. Rules framed by the DEIT under s.84A of the IT Act were to resolve this conflict, but those Rules haven't yet been framed.

All of this paints a very sorry picture. Section 88 of the IT Act requires the government, "soon after the commencement of the Act", to form a "Cyber Regulations Advisory Committee" consisting of "the interests principally affected or having special knowledge of the subject-matter" to advise the government on the framing of Rules, or for any other purpose connected with the IT Act. This body still has not been formed, despite the lag of more than two and a half years since the IT Act came into force. Justice Markandey Katju’s recent letter to Ambika Soni about social media and defamation should ideally have been addressed to this body.

The only way out of this quagmire is to practise at home that which we preach abroad on matters of Internet governance: multi-stakeholderism. Multi-stakeholderism refers to the need to recognize that when it comes to Internet governance there are multiple stakeholders: government, industry, academia, and civil society, and not just the governments of the world. This idea has gained prominence since it was placed at the core of the "Declaration of Principles" from the first World Summit on Information Society in Geneva in 2003, and has also been at the heart of India's pronouncements at forums like the Internet Governance Forum. Brazil has an "Internet Steering Committee" which is an excellent model that practices multi-stakeholderism as a means of framing and working national Internet-related policies. DEIT's Internet Governance Division, which formulates India's international stance on Internet governance, has long recognized that governance of the Internet must be done in an open and collaborative manner. It is time the DEIT's Cyber-Law and E-Security Group, which formulates our national stance on Internet governance, realizes the same.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-broken-internet-law-multistakeholderism

FOEX Live: May 26-27, 2014

geetha — 2014-05-27T12:42:51Z

A selection of news from across India implicating online freedom of expression and use of digital technology

Media reports across India are focusing on the new government and its Cabinet portfolios. In the midst of the celebration of and grief over the regime change, we found many reports indicating that civil society is wary of the new government’s stance towards Internet freedoms.

Andhra Pradesh:

Andhra MLA and All India Majlis-e-Ittihad ul-Muslimin member Akbaruddin Owaisi has been summoned to appear before a Kurla magistrate’s court on grounds of alleged hate speech and intention to harm harmony of Hinduism and Islam. Complainant Gulam Hussain Khan saw an online video of a December 2012 speech by Owaisi and filed a private complaint with the court. “I am prima facie satisfied that it disclosed an offence punishable under Section(s) 153A and 295A of the Indian Penal Code,” the Metropolitan Magistrate said.

Goa:

A Goa Sessions Judge has dismissed shipbuilding diploma engineer Devu Chodankar’s application for anticipatory bail. On the basis of an April 26 complaint by CII state president Atul Pai Kane, Goa cybercrime cell registered a case against Chodankar for allegedly posting matter on a Facebook group with the intention of promoting enmity between religious groups in view of the 2014 general elections. The Judge noted, inter alia, that Sections 153A and 295A of the Indian Penal Code were attracted, and that it is necessary to find out whether, on the Internet, “there is any other material which could be considered as offensive or could create hatred among different classes of citizens of India”.

Karnataka:

Syed Waqas, an MBA student from Bhatkal pursuing an internship in Bangalore, was picked up for questioning along with four of his friends after Belgaum social activist Jayant Tinaikar filed a complaint. The cause of the complaint was a MMS, allegedly derogatory to Prime Minister Narendra Modi. After interrogation, the Khanapur (Belgaum) police let Waqas off on the ground that Waqas was not the originator of the MMS, and that Mr. Tinaikar had provided an incorrect mobile phone number.

In another part of the country, Digvijaya Singh is vocal about Indian police’s zealous policing of anti-Modi comments, while they were all but visible when former Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh was the target of abusive remarks.

Kerala:

The Anti-Piracy Cell of Kerala Police plans to target those uploading pornographic content on to the Internet and its sale through memory cards. A circular to this effect has been issued to all police stations in the state, and civil society cooperation is requested.

In other news, Ernakulam MLA Hibi Eden inaugurated “Hibi on Call”, a public outreach programme that allows constituents to reach the MLA directly. A call on 1860 425 1199 registers complaints.

Maharashtra:

Mumbai police are investigating pizza delivery by an unmanned drone, which they consider a security threat.

Tamil Nadu:

Small and home-run businesses in Chennai are flourishing with the help of Whatsapp and Facebook: Mohammed Gani helps his customers match bangles with Whatsapp images, Ayeesha Riaz and Bhargavii Mani send cakes and portraits to Facebook-initiated customers. Even doctors spread information and awareness using Facebook. In Madurai, you can buy groceries online, too.

Opinion:

Chethan Kumar fears that Indian cyberspace is strangling freedom of expression through the continued use of the ‘infamous’ Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (as amended in 2008). Sunil Garodia expresses similar concerns, noting a number of arrests made under Section 66A.

However, Ankan Bose has a different take; he believes there is a thin but clear line between freedom of expression and a ‘freedom to threaten’, and believes Devu Chodankar and Syed Waqar may have crossed that line. For more on Section 66A, please redirect here.

While Nikhil Pahwa is cautious of the new government’s stance towards Internet freedoms, given the (as yet) mixed signals of its ministers, Shaili Chopra ruminates on the new government’s potential dive into a “digital mutiny and communications revolution” and wonders about Modi’s social media management strategy. For Kashmir Times reader Hardev Singh, even Kejriwal’s arrest for allegedly defaming Nitin Gadkari will lead to a chilling effect on freedom of expression.

Elsewhere, the Hindustan Times is intent on letting Prime Minister Narendra Modi know that his citizens demand their freedom of speech and expression. Civil society and media all over India express their concerns for their freedom of expression in light of the new government.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/foex-live-may-26-27-2014

FOEX Live: May 28-29, 2014

geetha — 2014-05-29T08:58:47Z

A selection of news from across India with a bearing on online freedom of expression and use of digital technology

Media focus on the new government and its ministries and portfolios has been extensive, and to my knowledge, few newspapers or online sources have reported violations of freedom of speech. However, on his first day in office, the new I&B Minister, Prakash Javadekar, acknowledged the importance of press freedom, avowing that it was the “essence of democracy”. He has assured that the new government will not interfere with press freedom.

Assam:

A FICCI discussion in Guwahati, attended among others by Microsoft and Pricewaterhouse Coopers, focused on the role of information technology in governance.

Goa:

Following the furore over allegedly inflammatory, ‘hate-mongering’ Facebook posts by shipping engineer Devu Chodankar, a group of Goan netizens formed a ‘watchdog forum’ to police “inappropriate and communally inflammatory content” on social media. Diana Pinto feels, however, that some ‘compassion and humanism’ ought to have prompted only a stern warning in Devu Chodankar’s case, and not a FIR.

Karnataka:

Syed Waqar was released by Belgaum police after questioning revealed he was a recipient of the anti-Modi MMS. The police are still tracing the original sender.

Madhya Pradesh:

The cases of Shaheen Dhada and Rinu Srinivasan, and recently of Syed Waqar and Devu Chodankar have left Indore netizens overly cautious about “posting anything recklessly on social media”. Some feel it is a blow to democracy.

Maharashtra:

In Navi Mumbai, the Karjat police seized several computers, hard disks and blank CDs from the premises of the Chandraprabha Charitable Trust in connection with an investigation into sexual abuse of children at the Trust’s school-shelter. The police seek to verify whether the accused recorded any obscene videos of child sexual abuse.

In Mumbai, even as filmmakers, filmgoers, artistes and LGBT people celebrated the Kashish Mumbai International Queer Film Festival, all remained apprehensive of the new government’s social conservatism, and were aware that the films portrayed acts now illegal in India.

Manipur:

At the inauguration of the 42nd All Manipur Shumang Leela Festival, V.K. Duggal, State Governor and Chairman of the Manipur State Kala Akademi, warned that the art form was under threat in the digital age, as Manipuri films are replacing it in popularity.

Rajasthan:

Following the lead of the Lok Sabha, the Rajasthan state assembly has adopted a digital conference and voting system to make the proceedings in the House more efficient and transparent.

Seemandhra:

Seemandhra Chief Minister designate N. Chandrababu Naidu promised a repeat of his hi-tech city miracle ‘Cyberabad’ in Seemandhra.

West Bengal:

West Bengal government has hired PSU Urban Mass Transit Company Limited to study, install and operationalize Intelligent Transport System in public transport in Kolkata. GPS will guide passengers about real-time bus routes and availability. While private telecom operators have offered free services to the transport department, there are no reports of an end-date or estimated expenditure on the project.

News and Opinion:

Over a week ago, Avantika Banerjee wrote a speculative post on the new government’s stance towards Internet policy. At Fair Observer, Gurpreet Mahajan laments that community politics in India has made a lark of banning books.

India’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) has detected high-level virus activity in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 8, and recommends upgrading to Explorer 11.

Of the projected 400 million users that Twitter will have by 2018, India and Indonesia are expected to outdo the United Kingdom in user base. India saw nearly 60% growth in user base this year, and Twitter played a major role in Elections 2014. India will have over 18.1 million users by 2018.

Elsewhere in the world:

Placing a bet on the ‘Internet of Everything’, Cisco CEO John Chambers predicted a “brutal consolidation” of the IT industry in the next five years. A new MarketsandMarkets report suggests that the value of the ‘Internet of Things’ may reach US $1423.09 billion by 2020 at an estimated CAGR of 4.08% from 2014 to 2020.

China’s Xinhua News Agency announced its month-long campaign to fight “infiltration from hostile forces at home and abroad” through instant messaging. Message providers WeChat, Momo, Mi Talk and Yixin have expressed their willingness to cooperate in targeting those engaging in fraud, or in spreading ‘rumours’, violence, terrorism or pornography. In March this year, WeChat deleted at least 40 accounts with political, economic and legal content.

Thailand’s military junta interrupted national television broadcast to deny any role in an alleged Facebook-block. The site went down briefly and caused alarm among netizens.

Snowden continues to assure that he is not a Russian spy, and has no relationship with the Russian government.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/foex-live-may-28-29-2014

A Review of the Functioning of the Cyber Appellate Tribunal and Adjudicatory Officers under the IT Act

divij — 2014-07-03T05:43:23Z

Tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies are a regular feature of the Indian judicial system, as they provide for easier and less onerous methods for dispute resolution, especially disputes which relate to technical areas and often require technical knowledge and familiarity with specialised factual scenarios.

Further, quasi-judicial bodies do not have the same procedural restrictions as proper courts, which makes the adjudication of disputes easier. The Information Technology Act of India, which regulates several important aspects of electronic information, including the regulation of private electronic transactions as well as detailing civil and criminal offences relating to computers and electronic information, contemplates a specialised dispute resolution mechanism for disputes relating to the offences detailed under the Act. The Act provides for the establishment of quasi-judicial bodies, namely adjudicating officers under S.46, to hear disputes arising out of Chapter IX of the Act, namely, offences of a civil nature under S.43, 43A, 44 and 45 of the Act, as well as criminal offences described under Chapter XI of the Act. The adjudicating officer has the power to both award compensation as damages in a civil remedy, as well as impose penalties for the contravention of the Act,[1] and therefore has powers of both civil and criminal courts. The first appellate body provided in the Act, i.e. the authority that any party not satisfied by the decision of the adjudicating officer can appeal to, is the Cyber Appellate Tribunal, consisting of a Chairperson and any other members so prescribed by the Central Government.[2] The second appeal, if a party is aggrieved by the decision of the Cyber Appellate Tribunal, may be filed before the High Court having jurisdiction, within 60 days from the date of communication of the order.[3]

Functioning of the Offices of the State Adjudicating Officers and the Cyber Appellate Tribunal

The office of the adjudicating officer is established under S.46 of the IT Act, which provides that the person appointed to such a post must be a government officer of a rank not below that of a Director or an equivalent rank, and must have experience both in the field of Information Technology as well as legal or judicial experience.[4] In most cases, the appointed adjudicating officer is the Principle Secretary to the Department of Information Technology in the state.[5] The decisions of these adjudicating officers determine the scope and meaning of several provisions of the IT Act, and are instrumental in the development of the law in this field and filling a lacuna regarding the interpretation of these important provisions, particularly in areas such as data protection and privacy.[6] However, despite the large number of cyber-crime cases being registered across the country,[7] there is a lack of available judgements on the adjudication of disputes under Sections 43, 43A, 44 and 45 of the Act. Of all the states, only the websites of the Departments of Information Technology in Maharashtra,[8], Tamil Nadu[9], New Delhi[10], and Haryana[11] have reported judgements or orders of the Adjudicating Officers. The adjudicating officer in Maharasthra, Rajesh Aggarwal, has done a particularly commendable job, having disposed of 51 cases under the IT Act, with 20 cases still pending.

The first Cyber Appellate Tribunal set up by the Central Government is located at New Delhi. Although a second branch of the Tribunal was to be set up in Bangalore, no efforts seem to have been made in this regard.[12] Further, the position of the Chairperson of the Appellate Tribunal, has been left vacant since 2011, after the appointed Chairperson attained the age of superannuation and retired. Although judicial and technical members have been appointed at various points, the tribunal cannot hold hearings without a chairperson. A total of 17 judgements have been passed by the Cyber Appellate Tribunal prior to the retirement of the chairperson, while the backlog of cases is continuously growing.[13] Despite a writ petition being filed before the Karnataka High Court and the secretary of the Department of IT coming on record to state that the Chairperson would be appointed within 6 months (of September 2013), no action seems to have been taken in this regard, and the lacunae in the judicial mechanism under the IT Act continues. The proper functioning of adjudicating officers and the Cyber Appellate Tribunal is particularly necessary for the functioning of a just judicial system in light of the provisions of the Act (namely, Section 61) which bar the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts in claims below the amount of Rs. 5 Crores, where the adjudicating officer or the CAT is empowered.[14]

Analysis of Cases Filed under Section 43A

Section 43A of the Information Technology Act was inserted by the 2008 Amendment, and is the principle provision governing protection of information held by intermediaries under the Act. Section 43A provides that “body corporates” handling “sensitive personal data” must implement reasonable security practices for the protection of this information. If it is negligent in providing or maintaining such reasonable security practices, the body corporate is to be held liable and must pay compensation for the loss occurred.[15] Rule 3 of the Draft Reasonable Security Practices Rules, defines sensitive personal data as including – passwords, user details as provided at the time of registration or thereafter, information related to financial information such as Bank account/ credit card /debit card /other payment instrument details of the users, physiological and mental health conditions, medical records and history, biometric information, information received by body corporate for processing, stored or processed under lawful contract or otherwise and call data records.[16]

All the decisions of appointed adjudicators are available for an analysis of Section 43A are from the adjudicating officer in Maharashtra, Mr. Rajesh Tandon, who despite having no judicial experience, has very cogent analysis and knowledge of legal issues involved in the cases, which is commendable for a quasi-judicial officer.

One class of cases, constituting a major chunk of the claims, is where the complainant is claiming against a bank for the fraudulent transfer of funds from the claimants account to another account. In most of these cases, the adjudicating officer examined the compliance of the bank with “Know Your Customer” norms and guidelines framed by the Reserve Bank of India for prevention of banking fraud and, where such compliance was found to be lacking and information which allowed the bank accounts of the complainant was allowed to be accessed by fraudsters, the presumption is that the bank was negligent in the handling of “sensitive personal information”,[17] by failing to provide for reasonable security practices and consequently was liable for compensation under S.43A, notwithstanding that the complainant also contributed to compromising certain personal information by responding to phishing mails,[18] or divulging information to other third parties.[19] These instances clearly fall within the scope of Section 43A, which protects “information related to financial information such as Bank account/ credit card /debit card /other payment instrument details of the users” as sensitive personal data from negligent handling by body corporates. The decisions of the adjudicating officer must be applauded for placing a higher duty of care on banks to protect informational privacy of its customers, given that they are in a position where they ought to be well equipped to deal with intimate financial information and holding them accountable for lack of proper mechanisms to counter bank fraud using stolen information, which reflects in the compensation which the banks have been liable to pay, not only as indemnification for losses, but also punitive damages.[20]

In Nirmalkumar Bhagerwal v IDBI Bank and Meenal Bhagerwal, the sensitive financial information of the complainant, namely, the bank statement, had been accessed by the complainants wife. In holding the bank to be liable for divulging the same, and that access to personal information by a spouse is also covered under S.43A, the officer seems to have imputed the loss of privacy on account of such negligence as ‘wrongful loss’ which deserves compensation. One anomalous decision of the officer was where the operator of an ATM was held liable for fraudulent credit card transactions in that Machine, due to “reasonable security practices” such as security personnel or CCTV footage, and therefore causing the loss of “sensitive personal data”. However, it is difficult to see how ATM operators can be held liable for failing to protect sensitive information from being divulged, when the case is simply of a person fraudulently using a credit card.

Another class of cases, generally linked with the above cases, is complaints against cell phone providers for divulging information through falsely procured Sim Cards. In such instances, the officer has held that by negligently allowing the issuance of duplicate sim cards, the phone company has led to the access of sensitive personal data and thus caused wrongful loss to the complainant. This interpretation of Section 43A is somewhat confusing. The officer seems to have interpreted the provisions of Section 43A to include carriers of the information which was originally sent through the computer resource of the banking companies. In this way, they are imputed the status of “handlers” of sensitive personal information, and their communications infrastructure through which the information is sent is the “computer resource” which it operates for the purpose of the Act. Therefore, through their negligence, they are abetting the offence under 43A.[21]

For example, in the case of Sanjay Govind Dhandhe v ICICI and Vodafone, the officer remarked that –“A SIM card is a veritable key to person’s sensitive financial and personal information. Realizing this, there are clear guidelines issued by the DOT regarding the issuance of SIM cards. The IT Act also intends to ensure that electronic personal and sensitive data is kept secured and reasonable measures are used to maintain its confidentiality and integrity. It is extremely crucial that Telecom companies actively follow strict security procedures while issuing SIM cards, especially in wake of the fact that mobiles are being increasingly used to undertake financial transactions. In many a case brought before me, financial frauds have been committed by fraudsters using the registered mobile numbers of the banks’ account holders.” Therefore, intermediaries such as telecom companies, which peripherally handle the data, are also liable under the same standards for ensuring its privacy. The adjudicating officer has also held telephone companies liable for itemized phone bills as Call Data Records negligently divulged by them, which again clearly falls under the scope of the Reasonable Security Practices Rules.[22]

Note:

"Credentek v Insolutions (http://it.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/ACT/DIT_Adjudication_Credentek_Vs_Insolutions-28012014.pdf) . This case holds that banks and the National Payments Corporation of India were liable under S. 43A for divulging information relating to transactions by their customers to a software company which provides services to these banks using the data, without first making them sign non-disclosure agreements. The NCPI was fined a nominal amount of Rs. 10,000."

[1]. Section 46, Information Technology Act, 2000.

[2]. Section 48 and 49 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (Amended as of 2008).

[3]. Section 62, IT Act. However, The High Court may extend this period if there was sufficient cause for the delay.

[4]. S. 46(3), Information Technology Act, “No person shall be appointed as an adjudicating officer unless he possesses such experience in the field of Information Technology and Legal or Judicial experience as may be prescribed by the Central Government.”

[5]. From whatever data is available, the adjudicating officers in the states of Maharashtra, New Delhi, Haryana, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka are all secretaries to the respective state departments relating to IT.

[6]. See http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-of-cases-filed-under-sec-48-it-act-for-adjudication-maharashtra; Also see the decision of the Karnataka adjudicating officer which held that body corporates are not persons under S.43 of the IT Act, and thus cannot be liable for compensation or even criminal action for offences under that Section, available at http://www.naavi.org/cl_editorial_13/adjudication_gpl_mnv.pdf.

[7]. Maharashtra Leads in War Against Cyber Crime, The Times of India, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Maharashtra-leads-in-war-against-cyber-crime/articleshow/30579310.cms. (18^th February, 2014).

[8]. https://it.maharashtra.gov.in/1089/IT-Act-Judgements

[9]. http://www.tn.gov.in/documents/atoz/J

[10]. http://www.delhi.gov.in/wps/wcm/connect/DoIT_IT/doit_it/it+home/orders+of+adjudicating+officer

[11]. http://haryanait.gov.in/cyber.htm

[12]. Bangalore Likely to host southern chapter of Cyber Appellate Tribunal, The Hinduk http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/karnataka/bangalore-is-likely-to-host-southern-chapter-of-cyber-appellate-tribunal/article3381091.ece (2^nd May, 2013).

[13]. http://catindia.gov.in/Judgement.aspx

[14]. Section 61 of the IT Act – ‘No court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which an adjudicating officer appointed under this Act or the Cyber Appellate Tribunal constituted under this Act is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act. Provided that the court may exercise jurisdiction in cases where the claim for injury or damage suffered by any person exceeds the maximum amount which can be awarded under this Chapter.’

[15]. Section 43A, Information Technology Act, 2000 – ‘Compensation for failure to protect data (Inserted vide ITAA 2006) Where a body corporate, possessing, dealing or handling any sensitive personal data or information in a computer resource which it owns, controls or operates, is negligent in implementing and maintaining reasonable security practices and procedures and thereby causes wrongful loss or wrongful gain to any person, such body corporate shall be liable to pay damages by way of compensation, to the person so affected. (Change vide ITAA 2008)

Explanation: For the purposes of this section (i) "body corporate" means any company and includes a firm, sole proprietorship or other association of individuals engaged in commercial or professional activities (ii) "reasonable security practices and procedures" means security practices and procedures designed to protect such information from unauthorized access, damage, use, modification, disclosure or impairment, as may be specified in an agreement between the parties or as may be specified in any law for the time being in force and in the absence of such agreement or any law, such reasonable security practices and procedures, as may be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with such professional bodies or associations as it may deem fit. (iii) "sensitive personal data or information" means such personal information as may be prescribed by the Central Government in consultation with such professional bodies or associations as it may deem fit.

[16]. Draft Reasonable Security Practices Rules under Section 43A of the IT Act, available at http://www.huntonfiles.com/files/webupload/PrivacyLaw_Reasonable_Security_Practices_Sensitive_Personal_Information.pdf.

[17]. Ravindra Gunale v Bank of Maharashtra, http://it.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/ACT/DIT_Adjudication_RavindraGunale_Vs_BoM&Vodafone_20022013.PDF. Ram Techno Pack v State Bank of India, http://it.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/ACT/DIT_Adjudication_RamTechno_Vs_SBI-22022013.pdf.

Srinivas Signs v IDBI, http://it.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/ACT/DIT_Adjudication_SreenivasSigns_Vs_IDBI-18022014.PDF.

Raju Dada Raut v ICICI Bank, http://it.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/ACT/DIT_Adjudication_RajuDadaRaut_Vs_ICICIBank-13022013.pdf

Pravin Parkhi v SBI Cards, http://it.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/ACT/DIT_Adjudication_PravinParkhi_Vs_SBICardsPayment-30122013.PDF.

[18]. Sourabh Jain v ICICI, http://it.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/ACT/DIT_Adjudication_SourabhJain_Vs_ICICI&Idea-22022013.PDF.

[19]. Poona Automobiles v Punjab National Bank, https://it.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/ACT/DIT_Adjudication_PoonaAuto_Vs_PNB-22022013.PDF

[20]. Amit Patwardhan v Bank of Baroda, http://it.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/ACT/DIT_Adjudicaton_AmitPatwardhan_Vs_BankOfBaroda-30122013.PDF.

[21]. Ravindra Gunale v Bank of Maharashtra, http://it.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/ACT/DIT_Adjudication_RavindraGunale_Vs_BoM&Vodafone_20022013; Raju Dada Raut v ICICI Bank, http://it.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/ACT/DIT_Adjudication_RajuDadaRaut_Vs_ICICIBank-13022013.pdf.

[22]. Rohit Maheshwari v Vodafone, http://it.maharashtra.gov.in/Site/Upload/ACT/DIT_Adjudication_RohitMaheshwari_Vs_Vodafone&ors-04022014.PDF.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/review-of-functioning-of-cyber-appellate-tribunal-and-adjudicatory-officers-under-it-act