Centre for Internet and Society

Section 66F of the Information Technology Act, 2000

snehashish — 2012-12-02T09:39:01Z

Section 66F: Punishment for cyber terrorism.

1[66-F. Punishment for cyber terrorism.—(1) Whoever,—

(A) with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people by—

(i) denying or cause the denial of access to any person authorised to access computer resource; or

(ii) attempting to penetrate or access a computer resource without authorisation or exceeding authorised access; or

(iii) introducing or causing to introduce any computer contaminant,

and by means of such conduct causes or is likely to cause death or injuries to persons or damage to or destruction of property or disrupts or knowing that it is likely to cause damage or disruption of supplies or services essential to the life of the community or adversely affect the critical information infrastructure specified under Section 70; or

(B) knowingly or intentionally penetrates or accesses a computer resource without authorisation or exceeding authorised access, and by means of such conduct obtains access to information, data or computer database that is restricted for reasons of the security of the State or foreign relations; or any restricted information, data or computer database, with reasons to believe that such information, data or computer database so obtained may be used to cause or likely to cause injury to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, group of individuals or otherwise,

commits the offence of cyber terrorism.

(2) Whoever commits or conspires to commit cyber terrorism shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to imprisonment for life.]

1. Inserted by Act 10 of 2009, Section 32 (w.e.f. 27-10-2009)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/section-66f-of-the-i-t-act-2000

The real Sibal’s law: Resisting Section 66A is futile

praskrishna — 2012-12-03T05:16:11Z

The Information Technology Act is “substantially the same” as laws instituted in other democracies like UK and the United States. What’s more, the language that is employed in various sections is exactly the same. Thus was the thrust of Kapil Sibal’s defense of Section 66A on NDTV last night.

The article by Lakshmi Chaudhry was published in FirstPost on November 30. Pranesh Prakash's blog post on section 66A which was also carried in Outlook is quoted.

The problem therefore lies not in the law but in its interpretation: “It’s very difficult to interpret the act on the ground. If you give this power to a sub-inspector of police, it is more than likely to be misused.” Sibal is hence “open” to putting in place guidelines that may prevent such abuse, whether it involves requiring a senior police officer to make the call or specifying the “circumstances” in which the law is applicable.

Now, there are many ways to tear apart Sibal’s logic. In Outlook, for example, Centre for Internet and Society’s Pranesh Prakash offers a detailed comparison with the UK law to show that: one, the UK courts have “read down” the “broad wording” of the law; two, they remain subject to EU human rights provisions; and three, UK law may well be unconstitutional under the Indian Constitution which offers stronger free speech protection.

Prakash’s legal arguments are worthy, meticulously argued and — in my view — somewhat moot.

Here’s why. Would discarding or amending Section 66A prevent the MNS goons from hauling Sunil Vishwakarma to the police station for a Facebook update? Would it prevent the Palghar policemen from filing a case against Shaheen and Rinu under pressure from the local Sainiks? Would that Jadhavpur professor then be immune from Trinamool harrassment for offending Mamata?

The answer is a big fat N-O.

Sibal is right. In India, the actual law is often irrelevant. Interpretation is all. And that interpretation in the real world of the police thana is determined not by legal standards but according to political power. So we have wonderfully progressive statutes on the book — as we do in the matter of women’s rights — that exist only in theory. More effective and employed are the draconian, colonial-era laws that are routinely used to punish the innocent. The IT act is just one of them.

In India, law is a weapon, a brahmastra of the powerful. The Sainiks were looking to make an example of someone, to exercise their political brawn. Shaheen and Rinu were convenient targets, and once selected, no law could have saved them from Shiv Sena wrath. The legal threshold for “offensive” content is irrelevant to NCP Kiran Pawaskar who put pressure on the police to arrest two Air India employees because they “shared lewd jokes about politicians, made derogatory comments against the Prime Minister and insulted the national flag in their posts.”

The goonda raj of politicians on the Internet merely reflects the reality offline. All that our online activity does is make the aam aadmi more visible, and therefore easier to target and victimise. They can’t put in spy cameras in every living room, but now they can monitor our conversations on Facebook and Twitter instead. In a sense, the Internet has allowed Big Brother into our homes

This is why comparisons to UK or US — which enjoy the rule of law — are irrelevant. And why upgrading the rank of the policeman — DCP or Inspector-general — making the call will not change the outcome in most cases. The political pressures on a DCP or IG are not different than on a lowly sub-inspector who takes action not because he doesn’t understand the law, but because he understands all too well the costs of non-compliance. As for putting a magistrate in charge, well, it was a magistrate who authorised the arrests of Shaheen and Rinu.

The only reason the policemen who arrested the girls may be punished is that the Congress party is in power in Maharashtra, as in not the Shiv Sena or the BJP. In Kolkata, for example, Mamata-di has no intention of taking action against those who arrested Ambikesh Mahapatra. ‘Raja chale bazaar to kutta bhonke hazaar‘ (the king walks to market, though a thousand dogs bark),” declared Didi when pressed on Justice Katju’s criticism of her anti-free speech stance.

It succinctly embodies the attitude of our leaders. Sibal may be saddened by the Palghar case but he was every bit as unruffled as Mamata when Ravi Srinivasan was arrested for an innocuous tweet accusing Karti Chidambaram of corruption. There are naturally no plans to drop the case against him. So it matters little if the IT act is amended or who is tasked with interpreting Section 66A. Who is punished, who receives justice, however delayed, is determined by politics not law.

In his NDTV interview, Sibal chided Barkha for bringing up “5-10 instances” of unlawful arrests when “there must be millions of [abusive] comments that have been put on the internet.” It’s a familiar Sibal strategy that he has employed in the past. Pressed on Ravi Srinivasan’s arrest, he told reporters, “There are 500 things by the name of Kapil Sibal and there are some things which I really don’t like. But I have not taken action.”

What he’s really saying is that each time we update, tweet or comment, we enter an online version of russian roulette, the kind you play with a gun. You never know which chamber is loaded, or when a politician is likely to pull the trigger. We survive not by the mercy of the law but at the whim of the powerful. In India, law isn’t an ass; it’s our dear netaji’s chaprasi.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/first-post-politics-lakshmi-chaudhry-november-30-2012-the-real-sibals-law-resisting-section-66a-is-futile

Is the new ‘interception’ order old wine in a new bottle?

Elonnai Hickok, Vipul Kharbanda, Shweta Mohandas and Pranav M. Bidare — 2018-12-29T16:02:00Z

The government could always authorise intelligence agencies to intercept and monitor communications, but the lack of clarity is problematic.

An opinion piece co-authored by Elonnai Hickok, Vipul Kharbanda, Shweta Mohandas and Pranav M. Bidare was published in Newslaundry.com on December 27, 2018.

On December 20, 2018, through an order issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), 10 security agencies—including the Intelligence Bureau, the Central Bureau of Investigation, the Enforcement Directorate and the National Investigation Agency—were listed as the intelligence agencies in India with the power to intercept, monitor and decrypt "any information" generated, transmitted, received, or stored in any computer under Rule 4 of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009, framed under section 69(1) of the IT Act.

On December 21, the Press Information Bureau published a press release providing clarifications to the previous day’s order. It said the notification served to merely reaffirm the existing powers delegated to the 10 agencies and that no new powers were conferred on them. Additionally, the release also stated that “adequate safeguards” in the IT Act and in the Telegraph Act to regulate these agencies’ powers.

Presumably, these safeguards refer to the Review Committee constituted to review orders of interception and the prior approval needed by the Competent Authority—in this case, the secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs in the case of the Central government and the secretary in charge of the Home Department in the case of the State government.

As noted in the press release, the government has always had the power to authorise intelligence agencies to submit requests to carry out the interception, decryption, and monitoring of communications, under Rule 4 of the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009, framed under section 69(1) of the IT Act.

When considering the implications of this notification, it is important to look at it in the larger framework of India’s surveillance regime, which is made up of a set of provisions found across multiple laws and operating licenses with differing standards and surveillance capabilities.

- Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 allows the government (or an empowered authority) to intercept or detain transmitted information on the grounds of a public emergency, or in the interest of public safety if satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence. This is supplemented by Rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951, which gives further directions for the interception of these messages.

- Condition 42 of the Unified Licence for Access Services, mandates that every telecom service provider must facilitate the application of the Indian Telegraph Act. Condition 42.2 specifically mandates that the license holders must comply with Section 5 of the same Act.

- Section 69(1) of the Information Technology Act and associated Rules allows for the interception, monitoring, and decryption of information stored or transmitted through any computer resource if it is found to be necessary or expedient to do in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of India, defense of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above or for investigation of any offence.

- Section 69B of the Information Technology Act and associated Rules empowers the Centre to authorise any agency of the government to monitor and collect traffic data “to enhance cyber security, and for identification, analysis, and prevention of intrusion, or spread of computer contaminant in the country”.

- Section 92 of the CrPc allows for a Magistrate or Court to order access to call record details.

Notably, a key difference between the IT Act and the Telegraph Act in the context of interception is that the Telegraph Act permits interception for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence on the condition of public emergency or in the interest of public safety while the IT Act permits interception, monitoring, and decryption of any cognizable offence relating to above or for investigation of any offence. Technically, this difference in surveillance capabilities and grounds for interception could mean that different intelligence agencies would be authorized to carry out respective surveillance capabilities under each statute. Though the Telegraph Act and the associated Rule 419A do not contain an equivalent to Rule 4—nine Central Government agencies and one State Government agency have previously been authorized under the Act. The Central Government agencies authorised under the Telegraph Act are the same as the ones mentioned in the December 20 notification with the following differences:

- Under the Telegraph Act, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) has the authority to intercept. However, the 2018 notification more specifically empowers the Cabinet Secretariat of RAW to issue requests for interception under the IT Act.

- Under the Telegraph Act, the Director General of Police, of concerned state/Commissioner of Police, Delhi for Delhi Metro City Service Area, has the authority to intercept. However, the 2018 notification specifically authorises the Commissioner of Police, New Delhi with the power to issue requests for interception.

That said, the IT (Procedure and safeguard for Monitoring and Collecting Traffic Data or Information) Rules, 2009 under 69B of the IT Act contain a provision similar to Rule 4 of the IT (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009 - allowing the government to authorize agencies that can monitor and collect traffic data. In 2016, the Central Government authorised the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team to monitor and collect traffic data, or information generated, transmitted, received, or stored in any computer resource. This was an exercise of the power conferred upon the Central Government by Section 69B(1) of the IT Act. However, this notification does not reference Rule 4 of the IT Rules, thus it is unclear if a similar notification has been issued under Rule 4.

While it is accurate that the order does not confer new powers, areas of concern that existed with India’s surveillance regime continue to remain including the question of whether 69(1) and 69B and associated Rules are constitutionally valid, the lack of transparency by the government and the prohibition of transparency by service providers, heavy handed penalties on service providers for non-compliance, and a lack of legal backing and oversight mechanisms for intelligence agencies. Some of these could be addressed if the draft Data Protection Bill 2018 is enacted and the Puttaswamy Judgement fully implemented.

Conclusion

The MHA’s order and the press release thereafter have served to publicise and provide needed clarity with respect to the powers vested in which intelligence agencies in India under section 69(1) of the IT Act. This was previously unclear and could have posed a challenge to ensuring oversight and accountability of actions taken by intelligence agencies issuing requests under section 69(1) .

The publishing of the list has subsequently served to raise questions and create a debate about key issues concerning privacy, surveillance and state overreach. On December 24, the order was challenged by advocate ML Sharma on the grounds of it being illegal, unconstitutional and contrary to public interest. Sharma in his contention also stated the need for the order to be tested on the basis of the right to privacy established by the Supreme Court in Puttaswamy which laid out the test of necessity, legality, and proportionality. According to this test, any law that encroaches upon the privacy of the individual will have to be justified in the context of the right to life under Article 21.

But there are also other questions that exist. India has multiple laws enabling its surveillance regime and though this notification clarifies which intelligence agencies can intercept under the IT Act, it is still seemingly unclear which intelligence agencies can monitor and collect traffic data under the 69B Rules. It is also unclear what this order means for past interceptions that have taken place by agencies on this list or agencies outside of this list under section 69(1) and associated Rules of the IT Act. Will these past interceptions possess the same evidentiary value as interceptions made by the authorised agencies in the order?

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/newslaundry-elonnai-hickok-vipul-kharbanda-shweta-mohandas-and-pranav-bidare-december-27-2018-is-the-new-interception-order-old-wine-in-a-new-bottle

Invisible Censorship: How the Government Censors Without Being Seen

pranesh — 2012-01-04T08:59:14Z

The Indian government wants to censor the Internet without being seen to be censoring the Internet. This article by Pranesh Prakash shows how the government has been able to achieve this through the Information Technology Act and the Intermediary Guidelines Rules it passed in April 2011. It now wants methods of censorship that leave even fewer traces, which is why Mr. Kapil Sibal, Union Minister for Communications and Information Technology talks of Internet 'self-regulation', and has brought about an amendment of the Copyright Act that requires instant removal of content.

Power of the Internet and Freedom of Expression

The Internet, as anyone who has ever experienced the wonder of going online would know, is a very different communications platform from any that has existed before. It is the one medium where anybody can directly share their thoughts with billions of other people in an instant. People who would never have any chance of being published in a newspaper now have the opportunity to have a blog and provide their thoughts to the world. This also means that thoughts that many newspapers would decide not to publish can be published online since the Web does not, and more importantly cannot, have any editors to filter content. For many dictatorships, the right of people to freely express their thoughts is something that must be heavily regulated. Unfortunately, we are now faced with the situation where some democratic countries are also trying to do so by censoring the Internet.

Intermediary Guidelines Rules

In India, the new 'Intermediary Guidelines' Rules and the Cyber Cafe Rules that have been in effect since April 2011 give not only the government, but all citizens of India, great powers to censor the Internet. These rules, which were made by the Department of Information Technology and not by the Parliament, require that all intermediaries remove content that is 'disparaging', 'relating to... gambling', 'harm minors in any way', to which the user 'does not have rights'. When was the last time you checked wither you had 'rights' to a joke before forwarding it? Did you share a Twitter message containing the term "#IdiotKapilSibal", as thousands of people did a few days ago? Well, that is 'disparaging', and Twitter is required by the new law to block all such content. The government of Sikkim can run advertisements for its PlayWin lottery in newspapers, but under the new law it cannot do so online. As you can see, through these ridiculous examples, the Intermediary Guidelines are very badly thought-out and their drafting is even worse. Worst of all, they are unconstitutional, as they put limits on freedom of speech that contravene Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) of the Constitution, and do so in a manner that lacks any semblance of due process and fairness.

Excessive Censoring by Internet Companies

We, at the Centre for Internet and Society in Bangalore, decided to test the censorship powers of the new rules by sending frivolous complaints to a number of intermediaries. Six out of seven intermediaries removed content, including search results listings, on the basis of the most ridiculous complaints. The people whose content was removed were not told, nor was the general public informed that the content was removed. If we hadn't kept track, it would be as though that content never existed. Such censorship existed during Stalin's rule in the Soviet Union. Not even during the Emergency has such censorship ever existed in India. Yet, not only was what the Internet companies did legal under the Intermediary Guideline Rules, but if they had not, they could have been punished for content put up by someone else. That is like punishing the post office for the harmful letters that people may send over post.

Government Has Powers to Censor and Already Censors

Currently, the government can either block content by using section 69A of the Information Technology Act (which can be revealed using RTI), or it has to send requests to the Internet companies to get content removed. Google has released statistics of government request for content removal as part of its Transparency Report. While Mr. Sibal uses the examples of communally sensitive material as a reason to force censorship of the Internet, out of the 358 items requested to be removed from January 2011 to June 2011 from Google service by the Indian government (including state governments), only 8 were for hate speech and only 1 was for national security. Instead, 255 items (71 per cent of all requests) were asked to be removed for 'government criticism'. Google, despite the government in India not having the powers to ban government criticism due to the Constitution, complied in 51 per cent of all requests. That means they removed many instances of government criticism as well.

'Self-Regulation': Undetectable Censorship

Mr. Sibal's more recent efforts at forcing major Internet companies such as Indiatimes, Facebook, Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft, to 'self-regulate' reveals a desire to gain ever greater powers to bypass the IT Act when censoring Internet content that is 'objectionable' (to the government). Mr. Sibal also wants to avoid embarrassing statistics such as that revealed by Google's Transparency Report. He wants Internet companies to 'self-regulate' user-uploaded content, so that the government would never have to send these requests for removal in the first place, nor block sites officially using the IT Act. If the government was indeed sincere about its motives, it would not be talking about 'transparency' and 'dialogue' only after it was exposed in the press that the Department of Information Technology was holding secret talks with Internet companies. Given the clandestine manner in which it sought to bring about these new censorship measures, the motives of the government are suspect. Yet, both Mr. Sibal and Mr. Sachin Pilot have been insisting that the government has no plans of Internet censorship, and Mr. Pilot has made that statement officially in the Lok Sabha. This, thus seems to be an instance of censoring without censorship.

Backdoor Censorship through Copyright Act

Further, since the government cannot bring about censorship laws in a straightforward manner, they are trying to do so surreptitiously, through the back door. Mr. Sibal's latest proposed amendment to the Copyright Act, which is before the Rajya Sabha right now, has a provision called section 52(1)(c) by which anyone can send a notice complaining about infringement of his copyright. The Internet company will have to remove the content immediately without question, even if the notice is false or malicious. The sender of false or malicious notices is not penalized. But the Internet company will be penalized if it doesn't remove the content that has been complained about. The complaint need not even be shown to be true before the content is removed. Indeed, anyone can complain about any content, without even having to show that they own the rights to that content. The government seems to be keen to have the power to remove content from the Internet without following any 'due process' or fair procedure. Indeed, it not only wants to give itself this power, but it is keen on giving all individuals this power.

It's ultimate effect will be the death of the Internet as we know it. Bid adieu to it while there is still time.

The article was translated to Marathi and featured in Lokmat

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/invisible-censorship

Parliament panel blasts govt over ambiguous internet laws

praskrishna — 2013-03-28T08:37:30Z

The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Subordinate Legislation has come out with a report in which it has lambasted the government and asked it to make changes to IT rules that govern internet-related cases in India.

This article by Ishan Srivastava was published in the Times of India on March 28, 2013. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

It said in the report that multiple clauses in the laws had inherent ambiguity and that discrepancies exist in the government's stand on whether some rules are mandatory or only of advisory nature.

The committee said that inherent ambiguity of words like 'blasphemy' and `disparaging', among others, could lead to harassment of people as has happened with Section 66A of the IT Act repeatedly in recent times. Incidents include the arrest of two girls over 'liking' a Facebook post and a defamation case against an individual for an 'offensive' tweet. It has also been used by multiple politicians to suppress voices of dissent by branding them as 'defamatory'.

These ambiguous terms are used in the Intermediary Guidelines rules, passed in April 2011, which the committtee said could lead to legitimate speech being removed. Also, the Standing Committee noted that many categories of speech prohibited by the Intermediary Guidelines rules were not prohibited by any statute, and hence could not be prohibited by the government through these rules. The Standing Committee has asked the government to ensure that "no new category of crimes or offences is created" by these rules.

The committee also said that discrepancies exist in the nature of implementation of these laws. While the government's stand is that Intermediary Guidelines are only "of advisory nature and self-regulation" and that "it is not mandatory for the Intermediary to disable the information", the wording of the laws suggest otherwise. In many of the laws, terms like "shall act" within 36 hours are used. The committee said that there was a "need for clarity on the aforesaid contradiction" and "safeguards to protect against any abuse" since it could lead to censorship.

"The government has told the Committee that the rules are for "self-regulation", but they in fact aren't. The rules dictate what content cannot be hosted. And our research found that intermediaries react to fake takedown requests too, just to avoid being liable for their users' content. This is not self-regulation, but government-mandated private censorship," said Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS). CIS is a Bangalore-based non-profit body looking at issues of public accountability, privacy, free expression, and openness, and has consistently argued that many parts of the IT Act are unconstitutional.

The committee also suggested that all evidence relating to foreign websites refusing to honour Indian laws should be made public and a public debate should be encouraged as the internet is a global phenomena. Recently there have been instances of issues between the Indian government and tech giants like Facebook and Google related to censorship and taking down of 'offensive' and 'defamatory' content.

While the government's stand is that Intermediary Guidelines are only "of advisory nature and self-regulation" and that "it is not mandatory for the Intermediary to disable the information," the wording of the laws suggest otherwise.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/times-of-india-ishan-srivastava-march-28-2013-parliament-panel-blasts-govt-over-ambiguous-internet-laws

Department of Telecommunications Order u/s. 69A IT Act Blocking 32 URLS

pranesh — 2014-12-31T14:36:01Z

On December 17, 2014, the Dept. of Telecommunications blocked 32 URLs (as it was ordered to do so by the by Dept. of Electronics & IT — specifically the Designated Officer under section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and under the Information Technology (Procedures and Safeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009), those being: 01) https://justpaste.it/ 02) http://hastebin.com 03) http://codepad.org 04) http://pastie.org 05) https://pasteeorg 06) http://paste2.org 07) http://slexy.org 08) http://paste4btc.com/ 09) http://0bin.net 10) http://www.heypasteit.com 11) http://sourceforge.net/projects/phorkie 12) http://atnsoft.com/textpaster 13) https://archive.org 14) http://www.hpage.com 15) http://www.ipage.com/ 16) http://www.webs.com/ 17) http://www.weebly.com/ 18) http://www.000webhost.com/ 19) https://www.freehosting.com 20) https://vimeo.com/ 21) http://www.dailymotion.com/ 22) http://pastebin.com 23) https://gist.github.com 24) http://www.ipaste.eu 25) https://thesnippetapp.com 26) https://snipt.net 27) http://tny.ct (Tinypaste) 28) https://github.com (gist-it) 29) http://snipplr.com/ 30) http://termbin.com 31) http://www.snippetsource.net 32) https://cryptbin.com

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order.pdf

Department of Telecommunications Order u/s. 69A IT Act Blocking 32 URLS (2014-12-17, compressed version)

pranesh — 2014-12-31T14:48:24Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order_compressed.pdf

Department of Telecommunications Order u/s. 69A IT Act Blocking 32 URLS (2014-12-17, plaintext version)

pranesh — 2014-12-31T15:21:21Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/2014-12-17_DoT-32-URL-Block-Order.txt

Internet censorship will continue in opaque fashion

sunil — 2015-03-26T02:07:28Z

A division bench of the Supreme Court has ruled on three sections of the Information Technology Act 2000 - Section 66A, Section 79 and Section 69A. The draconian Section 66A was originally meant to tackle spam and cyber-stalking but was used by the powerful elite to crack down on online dissent and criticism.

The article by Sunil Abraham was published in the Times of India on March 25, 2015.

Section 79 was meant to give immunity to internet intermediaries for liability emerging from third-party speech, but it had a chilling effect on free speech because intermediaries erred on the side of caution when it came to deciding whether the content was legal or illegal.

And Section 69A was the web blocking or internet censorship provision, but the procedure prescribed did not adhere to the principles of natural justice and transparency. For instance, when books are banned by courts, the public is informed of such bans but when websites are banned in India, there's no clear message from the Internet Service Provider.

The Supreme Court upheld 69A, so web blocking and internet censorship in India will continue to happen in an opaque fashion which is worrying. But on 66A and 79, the landmark judgment protects the right to free speech and expression. It struck down 66A in entirety, saying the vague and imprecise language made the provision unconstitutional and it interfered with "the right of the people to know - the market place of ideas - which the internet provides to persons of all kinds". However, it only read down Section 79 saying "unlawful acts beyond what is laid down" as reasonable restrictions to the right to free speech in the Constitution "obviously cannot form any part" of the section. In short, the court has eliminated any additional restrictions for speech online even though it admitted that the internet is "intelligibly different" from traditional media and might require additional laws to be passed by the Indian Parliament."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-times-of-india-march-25-2015-sunil-abraham-internet-censorship-will-continue-in-opaque-fashion

Live Chat: Win for Free Speech

praskrishna — 2015-03-26T16:07:06Z

Join us for a live chat at 5.30 pm on SC striking down the Section 66A of the IT Act which had permitted the arrest of people for posting "offensive content" on the internet.

The live chat transcript was published in the Hindu on March 24, 2015. Geetha Hariharan participated in the live chat.

In a victory for proponents of free speech, the Supreme Court today struck down Section 66 A of the IT Act, which had permitted the arrest of people for posting “offensive content” on the internet. However, the Court upheld Section 69A, which allows the government to block websites based on a set of rules.

What are your views on this ruling? Join us for a live chat today at 5.30 pm with:

Gautam Bhatia, a practicing lawyer and author of "Offend, shock or disturb: Free Speech under the constitution" forthcoming in OUP.

Geetha Hariharan, a Programme Officer at Centre for Internet and Society, focusing on Internet governance and freedom of expression.

Lawrence Liang, Lawyer and researcher at Alternative Law Forum working on free speech.

and G Ananth Krishnan, Coordinating Editor with The Hindu

The Hindu: Hi all, welcome to the live chat on the Supreme Court's much-celebrated decision to strike down Section 66 A of the IT Act. There are caveats of course: For instance, the Court has upheld Section 69A, which allows the government to block websites based on a set of rules.

5:30

The Hindu: Welcome to Gautam Bhatia, a practicing lawyer and author of "Offend, shock or disturb: Free Speech under the constitution" forthcoming in OUP.

5:31

The Hindu: Geetha Hariharan, a Programme Officer at Centre for Internet and Society, focusing on Internet governance and freedom of expression.