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Good Intentions, Recalcitrant Text - I: Why India’s Proposal at the ITU is Troubling for Internet Freedoms
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-going-awry-i-why-india2019s-proposal-at-the-itu-is-troubling-for-internet-freedoms
<b>The UN's International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is hosting its Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-14) this year in South Korea. At PP-14, India introduced a new draft resolution on ITU's Role in Realising Secure Information Society. The Draft Resolution has grave implications for human rights and Internet governance. Geetha Hariharan explores.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At the 2014 Plenipotentiary Conference (‘PP-14’ or ‘Plenipot’) of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), India has tabled <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/india-draft-resolution-itus-role-in-securing-information-security/at_download/file">a draft proposal</a> on “ITU’s Role in Realising Secure Information Society” [Document 98, dated 20 October 2014] (“<strong>Draft Resolution</strong>”). India’s proposal has incited a great deal of concern and discussion among Plenipot attendees, governments and civil society alike. Before offering my concerns and comments on the Draft Resolution, let us understand the proposal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Our Draft Resolution identifies 3 security concerns with exchange of information and resource allocation on the Internet:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li><i>First</i>, it is troubling for India that present network architecture has “<i>security weaknesses</i>” such as “<i>camouflaging the identity of the originator of the communication</i>”;<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> random IP address distribution also makes “<i>tracing of communication difficult</i>”;<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a></li>
<li><i>Second</i>, India is concerned that under the present allocation system of naming, numbering and addressing resources on the Internet, it is impossible or at the very least, cumbersome to identify the countries to which IP address are allocated;<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> </li>
<li><i>Third</i>, India finds it insecure from the point of view of national security that traffic originating and terminating in the same country (domestic traffic) often routes through networks overseas;<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> similarly, local address resolution also routes through IP addresses outside the country or region, which India finds troubling.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In an effort to address these concerns, the Draft Resolution seeks to instruct the ITU Secretary General:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li><i>First</i>,<i> </i>to develop and recommend a ‘traffic routing plan’ that can “<i>effectively ensure the traceability of communication</i>”;<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a></li>
<li><i>Second</i>, to collaborate with relevant international and intergovernmental organisations to develop an<i> </i>“<i>IP address plan</i>”<i> </i>which facilitates identification of locations/countries to which IP addresses are allocated and coordinates allocation accordingly;<a href="#_ftn7">[7]</a></li>
<li><i>Third</i>, to develop and recommend “<i>a public telecom network architecture</i>” that localizes both routing<a href="#_ftn8">[8]</a> as well as address resolution<a href="#_ftn9">[9]</a> for local/domestic traffic to “<i>within the country</i>”.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Admittedly, our Draft Resolution is intended to pave a way for “<i>systematic, fair and equitable allocation</i>” of, <i>inter alia</i>, naming, numbering and addressing resources,<a href="#_ftn10">[10]</a> keeping in mind security and human rights concerns.<a href="#_ftn11">[11]</a> In an informal conversation, members of the Indian delegation echoed these sentiments. Our resolution does not, I was told, raise issues about the “<i>concentration of control over Internet resources</i>”, though “<i>certain governments</i>” have historically exercised more control. It also does not, he clarified, wish to make privacy or human rights a matter for discussion at the ITU. All that the Draft Resolution seeks to do is to equip the ITU with the mandate to prepare and recommend a “<i>roadmap for the systematization</i>” of allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources, and for local routing of domestic traffic and address resolution. The framework for such mandate is that of security, given the ITU’s role in ‘building confidence and security in the use of ICTs’ under Action Line C5 of the <a href="http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/poa.html">Geneva Plan of Action</a>, 2003.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Unfortunately, the text of our Draft Resolution, by dint of imprecision or lack of clarity, undermines India’s intentions. On three issues of utmost importance to the Internet, the Draft Resolution has unintended or unanticipated impacts. <strong><i>First</i></strong>, its text on tracing communication and identity of originators, and systematic allocation of identifiable IP address blocks to particular countries, has impacts on privacy and freedom of expression. Given Edward Snowden’s <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded">NSA files</a> and the absence of adequate protections against government incursions or excesses into privacy,<a href="#_ftn12">[12]</a> either in international human rights law or domestic law, such text is troublesome. <strong><i>Second</i></strong>, it has the potential to undermine multi-stakeholder approaches to Internet governance by proposing text that refers almost exclusively to sovereign monopolies over Internet resource allocation, and <strong><i>finally</i></strong>, displays a certain disregard for network architecture and efficiency, and to principles of a free, open and unified Internet, when it seeks to develop global architecture that facilitates (domestic) localization of traffic-routing, address resolution and allocation of naming, numbering and addressing.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In this post, I will address the first concern of human rights implications of our Draft Resolution.<span> </span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Unintended Implications for Privacy and Freedom of Expression:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s Draft Resolution has implications for individual privacy. At two different parts of the preamble, India expresses concerns with the impossibility of locating the user at the end of an IP address:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Pream. §(e): “<i>recognizing</i>… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, <i>inter alia</i>, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”;</li>
<li>Pream. §(h): “<i>recognizing</i>… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The concerns here surround difficulties in tracking IP addresses due to the widespread use of NATs, as also the existence of IP anonymisers like Tor. Anonymisers like Tor permit individuals to cover their online tracks; they conceal user location and Internet activity from persons or governments conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis. For this reason, Tor has caused much discomfort to governments. <a href="http://www.wired.com/2014/10/laura-poitras-crypto-tools-made-snowden-film-possible/">Snowden used Tor</a> while communicating with Laura Poitras. Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning of Wikileaks fame is<i> </i><a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/maurer-dp-2011-10-wikileaks-final.pdf">reported</a> to have used Tor (page 24). Crypto is increasingly the safest – perhaps the only safe – avenue for political dissidents across the world; even Internet companies were <a href="http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-was-going-to-fine-yahoo-250k-a-day-if-it-didnt-1633677548">coerced</a> into governmental compliance. No wonder, then, that governments are doing all they can to dismantle IP anonymisers: the <a href="http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/10/nsa-repeatedly-tries-to-unpeel-tor-anonymity-and-spy-on-users-memos-show/">NSA</a> and <a href="http://www.itproportal.com/2013/10/04/nsa-and-gchq-repeatedly-tried-infiltrate-tor-documents-reveal/">GCHQ</a> have tried to break Tor; the Russian government has <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/putin-sets-110-000-bounty-for-cracking-tor-as-anonymous-internet-usage-in-russia-surges.html">offered a reward</a> to anyone who can.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Far be it from me to defend Tor blindly. There are reports <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption">suggesting</a> that Tor is being <a href="http://news.softpedia.com/news/Tor-Attracts-More-and-More-Cybercriminals-Experts-Warn-430659.shtml">used by offenders</a>, and not merely those of the Snowden variety. But governments must recognize the very obvious trust deficit they face, especially after <a href="http://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/may/ep-LIBE-Inquiry-NSA-Surveillance.pdf">Snowden’s revelations</a>, and consider the implications of seeking traceability and identity/geolocation for every IP address, in a systematic manner. The implications are for privacy, a right guaranteed by Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Privacy has been <a href="http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/UNGA_upload_0.pdf">recognized</a> by the UN General Assembly as applicable in cases of surveillance, interception and data collection, in Pream. §4 of its resolution <i>The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age</i>. But many states do not have robust privacy protections for individuals and data. And while governments may state the necessity to create international policy to further effective criminal investigations, such an aim cannot be used to nullify or destroy the rights of privacy and free speech guaranteed to individuals. Article 5(1), ICCPR, codifies this principle, when it states that States, groups or persons may not “<i>engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein…</i>”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Erosion of privacy has a chilling effect on free speech [</span><i><a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/376/254">New York Times v. Sullivan</a></i><span>, 376 U.S. 254], so free speech suffers too. Particularly with regard to Tor and identification of IP address location and users, anonymity in Internet communications is at issue. At the moment, most states already have anonymity-restrictions, in the form of identification and registration for cybercafés, SIM cards and broadband connections. For instance, Rule 4 of India’s </span><a href="http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR315E_10511(1).pdf">Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011</a><span>, mandates that we cannot not use computers in a cybercafé without establishing our identities. But our ITU Draft Resolution seeks to </span><i>dismantle</i><span> the ability of Internet users to operate anonymously, be they political dissidents, criminals or those merely acting on their expectations of privacy. Such dismantling would be both violative of international human rights law, as well as dangerous for freedom of expression and privacy in principle. Anonymity is integral to democratic discourse, held the US Supreme Court in </span><i><a href="http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/93-986.ZO.html">McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission</a></i><span> [514 U.S. 334 (1995)].</span><a href="#_ftn13">[13]</a><span> Restrictions on Internet anonymity facilitate communications surveillance and have a chilling effect on the free expression of opinions and ideas, </span><a href="http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session23/A.HRC.23.40_EN.pdf">wrote Mr. Frank La Rue</a><span>, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (¶¶ 48-49).</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So a law or international policy for blanket identification and traceability of IP addresses has grave consequences for and <i>prima facie </i>violates privacy, anonymity and freedom of speech. But these rights are not absolute, and can be validly restricted. And because these human rights are implicated, the ITU with its lack of expertise in the area may not be the adequate forum for discussion or study.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>To be valid and justified interference, any law, policy or order interfering with privacy and free speech must meet the standards of reasonableness and proportionality, even if national security were the government’s legitimate aim, laid down in Articles 19(3) and 17 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) [</span><i><a href="http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/vws488.htm">Toonen v. Australia</a></i><span>, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), ¶6.4]. And as the European Court of Human Rights found in </span><i><a href="http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-76586">Weber & Saravia v. Germany</a></i><span> [Application no. 54934/00, 29 June 2006 (ECHR), ¶95], law or executive procedure that </span><i>enables</i><span> surveillance without sufficient safeguards is </span><i>prima facie</i><span> unreasonable and disproportionate. Re: anonymity, in </span><i><a href="http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-126635">Delfi AS v. Estonia</a></i><span> [Application no. 64569/09, 17 February 2014, ¶83], while considering the liability of an Internet portal for offensive anonymous comments, the ECHR has emphasized the importance of balancing freedom of expression and privacy. It relied on certain principles such as “</span><i>contribution to a debate of general interest, subject of the report, the content, form and consequences of the publication</i><span>” to test the validity of government’s restrictions.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The implications of the suggested text of India’s Draft Resolution should then be carefully thought out. And this is a good thing. For one must wonder why governments need perfect traceability, geolocation and user identification for <i>all</i> IP addresses. Is such a demand really different from mass or blanket surveillance, in scale and government tracking ability? Would this not tilt the balance of power strongly in favour of governments against individuals (citizens or non-citizens)? This fear must especially arise in the absence of domestic legal protections, both in human rights, and criminal law and procedure. For instance, India’s Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in 2008) has Section 66A, which criminalizes offensive speech, as well as speech that causes annoyance or inconvenience. Arguably, arrests under Section 66A have been <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bangalore/Man-arrested-for-allegedly-sending-offensive-MMS-against-Modi-confirmed-innocent-by-police-released/articleshow/35624351.cms">arbitrary</a>, and traceability may give rise to a host of new worries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In any event, IP addresses and users can be discerned under existing domestic law frameworks. Regional Internet Registries (RIR) such as APNIC allocate blocks of IP addresses to either National Internet Registries (NIR – such as IRINN for India) or to ISPs directly. The ISPs then allocate IP addresses dynamically to users like you and me. Identifying information for these ISPs is maintained in the form of </span><a href="http://www.irinn.in/whoisSearchform.action">WHOIS records</a><span> and </span><a href="file://localhost/pub/stats/apnic">registries</a><span> with RIRs or NIRs, and this information is public. ISPs of most countries require identifying information from users before Internet connection is given, i.e., IP addresses allocated (mostly by dynamic allocation, for that is more efficient). ISPs of some states are also regulated; in India, for instance, ISPs require a </span><a href="http://www.dot.gov.in/licensing/data-services">licence</a><span> to operate and offer services.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If any government wished, on the basis of some reasonable cause, to identify a particular IP address or its user, then the government could first utilize WHOIS to obtain information about the ISP. Then ISPs may be ordered to release specific IP address locations and user information under executive or judicial order. There are also technical solutions, such as <a href="http://traceroute.monitis.com/">traceroute</a> or <a href="http://ip-lookup.net/">IP look-up</a> that assist in tracing or identifying IP addresses. Coders, governments and law enforcement must surely be aware of better technology than I.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If we take into account this possibility of geolocation of IP addresses, then the Draft Resolution’s motivation to ‘systematize’ IP address allocations on the basis of states is unclear. I will discuss the implication of this proposal, and that of traffic and address localization, in my next post.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Pream. §(e), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Pream. §(h), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Op. §1, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to collaborate with all stakeholders including International and intergovernmental organizations, involved in IP addresses management to develop an IP address plan from which IP addresses of different countries are easily discernible and coordinate to ensure distribution of IP addresses accordingly”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Pream. §(g), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that communication traffic originating and terminating in a country also many times flows outside the boundary of a country making such communication costly and to some extent insecure from national security point of view”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Pream. §(f), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that even for local address resolution at times, system has to use resources outside the country which makes such address resolution costly and to some extent insecure from national security perspective”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Op. §6, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend a routing plan of traffic for optimizing the network resources that could effectively ensure the traceability of communication”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Op. §1, Draft Resolution; <i>see</i> note 3.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Op. §5, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures that effectively the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country remains within the country”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> Op. §4, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures effectively that address resolution for the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country/region takes place within the country”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶3: “Planning and distribution of numbering and naming resources in a systematic, equitable, fair and just manner amongst the Member States…”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶2: “…there are certain areas that require critical attention to move in the direction of building the necessary “Trust Framework” for the safe “Information Society”, where privacy, safety are ensured”.</p>
<p style="text-align: left; "><a href="#_ftnref12">[12]</a> <i>See, for instance</i>, Report of the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), <i>Right to Privacy in the Digital Age</i>, A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014), ¶34-35, <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf">http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf</a>. <i>See esp. </i>note 30 of the Report, ¶35.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Many thorny political differences exist between the US and many states (including India and Kenya, who I am told has expressed preliminary support for the Draft Resolution) with regard to Internet governance. Irrespective of this, the US Constitution’s First Amendment and judicial protections to freedom of expression remain a yardstick for many states, including India. India, for instance, has positively referred to the US Supreme Court’s free speech protections in many of its decisions; <i>ex. see</i> Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 Cri. L.J. 329; R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-going-awry-i-why-india2019s-proposal-at-the-itu-is-troubling-for-internet-freedoms'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-going-awry-i-why-india2019s-proposal-at-the-itu-is-troubling-for-internet-freedoms</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaCryptographyPrivacyCybersecurityInternet GovernanceFreedom of Speech and ExpressionChilling EffectMulti-stakeholderAnonymityITU2014-11-02T15:13:45ZBlog EntryNet neutrality: Net activism packs a punch
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-sandhya-soman-april-19-2015-net-neutrality-net-activism-packs-a-punch
<b>For the first time in the history of internet campaigns in India, a protest movement has successfully changed the course of a debate without having to take to the streets. The net neutrality movement is being fought almost totally in the virtual world. Hashtag activism isn't new in India. In recent times, several big campaigns have been bolstered by the internet which helped mobilize mass support and kept people constantly updated on events. Pink Chaddi, Jan Lokpal and the Nirbhaya movements were some examples of successful on-the-ground campaigns that were galvanized by social media. But they still needed public action — dharnas, candlelight vigils and actual pink undies — to make a difference.
</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Sandhya Soman was <a class="external-link" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Net-neutrality-Net-activism-packs-a-punch/articleshow/46973783.cms">published in the Times of India</a> on April 19, 2015. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But the ongoing battle for internet freedom has proved that clicktivism isn't just about passive engagement with a cause. While it's all too easy to 'like' a cause, leading to what David Carr describes as "favoriting fatigue" in an article in the New York Times, some clicks can count in the real world.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It all started when the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) posted a vaguely worded and complicated discussion paper on net neutrality and called for public responses to it. "Clearly, many people understood that some of the proposals put forward by Trai in its paper threatened the internet as they knew it," says Anja Kovacs, who directs the Internet Democracy Project and has closely followed online activism in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Soon, an unlikely collective of techies, lawyers, journalists and even stand-up comics had banded together. Some of them — such as tech entrepreneur Kiran Jonnalagadda and journalist Nikhil Pahwa — had been writing and tweeting about the issue for a while but the Trai paper galvanized them. "I dropped everything and asked for help. Kiran, (lawyers) Apar Gupta amd Raman Chima, Sandeep Pillai, standup group All India Bakchod and several Reddit India users (some of whom remain anonymous), started getting involved," says Pahwa, who is the founder of Medianama. The only common factor was their love for internet and an acute worry what this policy consultation might do to destroy its open and equal nature.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Though scattered across India, once they came together online, this 'apolitical collective' was able to rope in engineers, developers, open source activists, entrepreneurs, policy experts, lawyers and journalists as volunteers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The best way to counter propaganda and opposition was to get people involved. An abridged version of the voluminous Trai paper was posted online, and a FAQ section created on a public Google Doc. "Many came forward to answer the questions and that exercise helped create an understanding of the situation," explains Pahwa. By the time, Jonnalagadda and a few other developers set up the savetheinternet.in website by April 1, there was enough information and data points. Lawyers Gupta and Chima had also decoded the legalese and prepared cogent answers to Trai's 20 questions. This was turned into a ready-to-use email template for users to hit 'send'.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">And send they did. The flood of emails to the Trai inbox number is already 803,723 and counting. The results of the social media backlash are evident — with e-commerce retailer Flipkart pulling out of Airtel Zero and several websites backing out of Facebook and Reliance's internet.org. "I was hoping to get around 15,000 responses to counter, say, 15 from the telecom lobby. Now, people make fun of me because I said that," laughs Pahwa. In this case, what also struck a chord was the idea of a bunch of young guys using tech to take on mismanagement by the older generation and corporate greed, says entrepreneur Mahesh Murthy. "We were telling them we like things on the internet as they are now."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But it is hard to sustain online outrage without an action plan, relentless groundwork and some comic warfare. So, when the contentious paper came out on March 27, the website was followed by AIB's punchy video that decoded the concept and took irreverent potshots at those who wanted to limit access while urging people to write to Trai. A lot of the lessons for the campaign came from the US where a John Oliver video turned the tide in the net neutrality debate. "We had seen that several people don't take internet petitions seriously. Also, we wanted to follow the proper legal course in this issue and not hold dharnas," says Jonnalagadda.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is also important for campaigns to result in doable action. As Kovacs points out, savetheinternet.in and netneutrality. in gave users practical tools to respond before the April 24 deadline. The team also kept clarifying doubts and complex concepts on social media and also had an AMA (ask me anything) chat on Scrollback on Saturday while the 'other side' stuck to big words and jargon.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Of course, like every movement, this one too has attracted criticism. The proneutrality band has been branded as socialist and utopian and there were intense arguments amongst supporters. "Disagreements and arguments are not unique to the activism online," says Pranesh Prakash, policy director at Centre for Internet and Society.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Earlier in the debate, Prakash had said he'd received strong pushback from friends and allies when he spoke about the possible benefits of non-competitive zero rating, an example would be allowing companies to offer free access to their sites and apps via an arrangement with a telecom company — if effective competition exists. Airtel Zero and Reliance's Internet.org claim to do the same though most supporters remain critical. Says Prakash: "There might've been differences. But the fact that a lot of people are thinking about effects of 'free', and comparing it to predatory pricing shows that #savetheinternet is one of the better examples of engaged activism."<br /> <br /> Online campaigns have previously also successfully mobilized people to get involved in issues they do not know much about, says author Nilanajana Roy, who is an influential voice on Twitter. The J&K flood relief efforts last year started on Twitter but got volunteers moving on the ground, she says. "People don't always realize what they care strongly about so, despite the risk of compassion fatigue or armchair volunteerism, it's worth having some online activism," says Roy.<br /> <br /> Meanwhile, those behind the savetheinternet campaign are struggling with their new-found identity as "activists". "I think of myself as a venture capitalist and marketing consultant, not a khadi kurta-jholawala from JNU," says Mahesh Murthy, among those who strongly support the movement.<br /> <br /> And at the end of the day, most of these activists would like to go back to their cubicles, free to browse or start a business. But not before they've tried to keep the internet open.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-sandhya-soman-april-19-2015-net-neutrality-net-activism-packs-a-punch'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-sandhya-soman-april-19-2015-net-neutrality-net-activism-packs-a-punch</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceChilling EffectCensorship2015-05-09T09:02:03ZNews ItemIndian government orders ISPs to block 857 porn websites
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/idg-news-service-august-2-2015-indian-govt-orders-isps-to-block-857-porn-websites
<b>The Indian government has ordered a large number of porn websites to be blocked, creating an uproar among users and civil rights groups in the country.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span>The blog post by John Ribeiro was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.pcworld.com/article/2955832/indian-government-orders-isps-to-block-857-porn-websites.html">originally published by IDG News Service and mirrored on PC World website</a> on August 2, 2015.</p>
<p><section class="page">
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Department of Telecommunications has issued orders for the blocking of 857 websites serving pornography, said two persons familiar with the matter, who declined to be named.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Section 69 (A) of India’s Information Technology Act allows the government to order blocking of public access to websites and other information through computer resources, though this section appears to be designed to be invoked when a threat is perceived to the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states or public order.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“The government cannot on its own block private access to pornography under current statutes,” said Pranesh Prakash, policy director of the Centre for Internet and Society in Bangalore. “Parliament has not authorized the government to ban porn on its own.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“However, courts have in the past ordered specific websites to be blocked for specific offences such as defamation, though as far as I know not for obscenity,” Prakash added.</p>
<p>Viewing pornography privately is not a crime in the country, though its sale and distribution is an offense.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Some porn websites were still accessible through certain Internet service providers on Monday, as some ISPs took some time to implement the order. “All the 857 websites will be blocked by all ISPs today,” said a source in the ISP industry, who requested anonymity. “As licensees we have to follow the orders.”</p>
<p>The government could not be immediately reached for comment.</p>
<aside class="desktop tablet smartphone nativo-promo"> </aside>
<p>Reports of the blocks created a furore among Internet users in the country, who criticized the move on <a href="http://www.reddit.com/r/india/comments/3fdwhm/are_porn_sites_getting_blocked/">Reddit,</a> Twitter and other social media.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s Supreme Court struck down in March as unconstitutional an Internet law that provided for the arrest of people sending online messages considered offensive or menacing. But it upheld Section 69 (A) in that same ruling, which it described as a “narrowly drawn provision” limited to a few subjects.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In a public interest lawsuit <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cant-stop-an-adult-from-watching-porn-in-his-room-says-sc/article7400690.ece">on the blocking of pornography</a>, the Supreme Court last month declined to issue an interim order that would block porn websites at the request of the private litigant, according to a report.</p>
</section></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/idg-news-service-august-2-2015-indian-govt-orders-isps-to-block-857-porn-websites'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/idg-news-service-august-2-2015-indian-govt-orders-isps-to-block-857-porn-websites</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceChilling Effect2015-09-13T08:18:33ZNews ItemProxies and VPNs: Why govt can't ban porn websites?
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-august-3-2015-siladitya-ray-proxies-and-vpns
<b>The government's move to block more than 800 pornographic websites has led experts to question whether this latest attempt to police the internet is even feasible.
</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Siladitya Ray was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/technology-topstories/is-the-government-s-attempt-to-block-online-porn-futile/article1-1375866.aspx">published in the Hindustan Times</a> on August 3, 2015. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Internet service providers (ISPs) have confirmed they received letters from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) on Saturday that directed them to block certain websites. But can the government stop users from visiting porn sites?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The answer seems to be no.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"It is extremely easy to circumvent these blocks, using virtual private networks (VPNs) and proxies that anonymise your traffic," said Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society in Bengaluru.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A cursory Google search on how to unblock porn websites throws up millions of how-tos and guides on using proxies and VPNs to get around restrictions set by authorities. All these services anonymise users’ web traffic by routing them through foreign servers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">According to data from Pornhub, one of the world's biggest porn sites, India ranks fifth for the most daily visitors to the website. Pornhub saw a total of 78.9 billion video views globally in 2014.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The government can try to keep up with proxies and block them too. But as proxies change on a daily basis and there are always dozens of functioning proxies to choose from across, blocking all of them will be a near impossible task.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Tor, an anonymity network, is also a popular way to surf blocked sites.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But is it legal to circumvent blocks put in place by authorities by using VPNs and proxies?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There is no law in India that prohibits viewing pornography, experts say. Section 67 of the Information Technology Act only deals with "publishing obscene information in electronic form".</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This provision has been interpreted as a measure to criminalise the posting of pornographic content online. However, accessing "obscene" content privately – such as within the four walls of a person’s home – is not illegal, say experts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In July, while hearing a petition seeking the blocking of pornographic websites, Supreme Court Chief Justice HL Dattu wondered whether the court could restrain an adult from watching pornography within his home and described such a ban as a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, which grants the right to personal liberty to its citizens.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But what about the legality of using VPNs and proxies? “There are no laws preventing the use of VPNs and proxies in India," said Prakash.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Are proxies and VPNs safe?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While the use of proxies and VPNs is very simple, they do come with their own set of problems. These services have access to all your browsing data and may push adware and other forms of malware.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Prakash advised that users should only choose services that are well known and have a good reputation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"Sites like TorrentFreak put out annual lists of the top VPNs available," he said. These can be used as a guide to determine what services are safe.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-august-3-2015-siladitya-ray-proxies-and-vpns'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-august-3-2015-siladitya-ray-proxies-and-vpns</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceChilling EffectCensorship2015-09-13T08:26:17ZNews ItemBan on pornography temporary, says government
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-august-4-2015-ban-on-pornography-temporary-says-government
<b>The government has taken a dramatic U-turn from its stated position on internet pornography.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article was <a class="external-link" href="http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/ban-on-pornography-temporary-says-government-115080301262_1.html">published in Business Standard</a> on August 4, 2015. Pranesh Prakash has been quoted.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span class="p-content">A year after conveying to the Supreme Court that a blanket ban on internet pornography was not possible, through the department of electronics and information technology, it has asked internet providers to disable 857 websites that carry adult content. A senior official from the department of telecommunications (DoT) said the ban was a temporary measure, till the final order is announced by the apex court on August 10.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span class="p-content"><span class="p-content"> The government is looking at setting up an ombudsman to oversee cyber content, which will have representatives from NGOs, child activists and the government. The DoT official said, “There has to be some kind of regulatory oversight away from the government intervention… An ombudsman might be set up for overseeing cyber related content issues.”</span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span class="p-content"><span class="p-content"><span class="p-content">The genesis of the current notification lies in the public interest litigation (PIL) filed by advocate Vijay Panjwani in April 2013. The PIL has sought curbs on these websites on the internet, especially the ones showing child pornography. The senior DoT official conveyed that the blocking of 857 websites was in compliance with the SC directive asking for measures to block porn sites, particularly those dealing with child pornography.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span class="p-content">The July 31 notification from DoT has advised internet service licensees to disable content on 857 websites, as the content "hosted on these websites relates to morality and decency as given in Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India". The government had stated last year that it was not technologically feasible to monitor such contents as it would require physical intervention, which would impact data speeds.<br /> <br /> In December 2014, the government had approached telecom providers and internet service providers to help identify such sites, but the service providers did not cooperate. Consequently, the government has gone ahead and identified 857 websites. However, the government has not given any detail as what was the criterion to identify such websites.<br /> <br /> Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, says DoT has used the provision of 79 (3) (b) of the IT Act, which is a convoluted Section that the intermediatory (ISPs) may lose protection from liability. This section is very convulated, the provisions for website blocking does not allow blocking porn. In section 69 (a), the entire procedure is that it allows an opportunity for the blocked website to be heard. “I can't comment on the reasons that the government for doing this. I know the order says the ban relates to morality, decency," adds Prakash.<br /> <br /> Last year, the government took a position that said blocking these websites was not feasible, given that these sites are hosted outside India. In case of any ban, these sites can be relocated within hours to bypass it. Pavan Duggal, an advocate who specialises in cyber laws, has called the disablement 'cosmetic,' as it will not have the requisite deterrent effect. Duggal says: "This is a lost battle from the word go, as it is impossible to disable access permanently."<br /> <br /> Watching such content in India is currently not an offence and, thus, the government is invoking “morality and decency” while seeking a curb on a fundamental right — Freedom of Speech & Expression. Under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution, the state can curb a fundamental right in order to maintain public order, decency or morality.<br /> </span></p>
<hr />
<p><span><span><b>TO BAN OR NOT TO BAN</b></span></span><br /> <br /> <b>2013</b></p>
<ul>
<li> Advocate Vijay Panjwani & Kamlesh Vaswani file PIL seeking curbs on internet pornography</li>
</ul>
<p><b>Aug 2014</b></p>
<ul>
<li> Supreme Court bench under Chief Justice R M Lodha agreed with the PIL and sought strict laws to curb online content</li>
</ul>
<p><b>8 Jul 2015</b></p>
<ul>
<li> Chief Justice of India H L Dattu upholds personal liberty and refuses to pass an interim order. Asks government to take a stand on the issue</li>
<li> CJI, heading a three-judge Bench, asks government to a detailed affidavit within four weeks</li>
</ul>
<p><b>Jul 31</b></p>
<ul>
<li> DoT sends notification seeking ban on 857 websites</li>
<li> Currently, there are no laws banning internet pornography in India, other than those related to children</li>
<li> Government’s stated position has been that it is difficult to curb online content</li>
</ul>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-august-4-2015-ban-on-pornography-temporary-says-government'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-august-4-2015-ban-on-pornography-temporary-says-government</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshInternet GovernanceChilling EffectCensorship2015-09-13T08:46:24ZNews ItemGNI and IAMAI Launch Interactive Slideshow Exploring Impact of India's Internet Laws
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/gni-and-iamai-launch-interactive-slideshow-exploring-impact-of-indias-internet-laws
<b>The Global Network Initiative and the Internet and Mobile Association of India have come together to explain how India’s Internet and technology laws impact economic innovation and freedom of expression. </b>
<p>The <a class="external-link" href="http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/">Global Network Initiative (GNI)</a>, and the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.iamai.in/">Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI)</a> have launched an interactive slide show exploring the impact of existing Internet laws on users and businesses in India. The slide show created by Newsbound, and to which Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) has contributed its comments—explain the existing legislative mechanisms prevalent in India, map the challenges of the regulatory environment and highlight areas where such mechanisms can be strengthened.</p>
<p>Foregrounding the difficulties of content regulation, the slides are aimed at informing users and the public of the constraints of current legal mechanisms in place, including safe harbour and take down and notice provisions. Highlighting Section 79(3) and the Intermediary Liability Rules issued in 2011, the slide show identifies some of the challenges faced by Internet platforms, such as the broad interpretation of the legislation by the executive branch.</p>
<p>Challenges governing Internet platforms highlighted in the slide show include uniform Terms of Service that do not consider the type of service being provided by the platform, uncertain requirements for taking down content and compliance obligations related to information disclosure. Further the issues of over compliance and misuse of the legal notice and take down system introduced under Section 79 of the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules 2011.</p>
<p>The Rules were created with the purpose of providing guidelines for the ‘post-publication redressal mechanism expression as envisioned in the Constitution of India'. However, since their introduction, the Rules have been criticised extensively, by both the national and the international media on account of not conforming to principles of natural justice and freedom of expression. Critics have pointed out that by not recognising the different functions performed by the different intermediaries and by not providing safeguards against misuse of such mechanism for suppressing legitimate expression, the Rules have a chilling effect on freedom of expression.</p>
<p>Under the current Rules, the third party provider/creator of information is not given a chance to be heard by the intermediary, nor is there a requirement to give a reasoned decision by the intermediary to the creator whose content has been taken down. The take down procedure also, does not have any provisions for restoring the removed information, such as providing a counter notice filing mechanism or appealing to a higher authority. Further, the content criteria for removal of content includes terms like 'disparaging' and 'objectionable', which are not defined and prima facie seem to be beyond the reasonable restrictions envisioned by the Constitution of India. With uncertainty in content criteria and no safeguards to prevent abuse complainant may send frivolous complaints and suppress legitimate expressions without any fear of repercussions.</p>
<p>Most importantly, the redressal mechanism under the Rules shifts the burden of censorship, previously, the exclusive domain of the judiciary or the executive, and makes it the responsibility of private intermediaries. Often, private intermediaries, do not have sufficient legal resources to subjectively determine the legitimacy of a legal claim, resulting in over compliance to limit liability. The slide show cites the <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/chilling-effects-on-free-expression-on-internet">2011 CIS research carried out by Rishabh Dara</a> to determine whether the Rules lead to a chilling effect on online free expression, towards highlighting the issue of over compliance and self censorship.</p>
<p>The initiative is timely, given the change of guard in India, and stresses, not only the economic impact of fixing the Internet legal framework, but also the larger impact on users rights and freedom of expression. The initiative calls for a legal environment for the Internet that enables innovation, protects the rights of users, and provides clear rules and regulations for businesses large and small.</p>
<p>See the slideshow here: <a href="http://globalnetworkinitiative.org/india">How India’s Internet Laws Can Help Propel the Country Forward</a></p>
<p><strong>Other GNI reports and resources: </strong></p>
<p><a href="http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Closing%20the%20Gap%20-%20Copenhagen%20Economics_March%202014_0.pdf">Closing the Gap: Indian Online Intermediaries and a Liability System Not Yet Fit for Purpose</a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Closing%20the%20Gap%20-%20Copenhagen%20Economics_March%202014_0.pdf">Strengthening Protections for Online Platforms Could Add Billions to India’s GDP</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/gni-and-iamai-launch-interactive-slideshow-exploring-impact-of-indias-internet-laws'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/gni-and-iamai-launch-interactive-slideshow-exploring-impact-of-indias-internet-laws</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceIntermediary LiabilityChilling EffectInformation Technology2014-07-17T12:01:01ZBlog EntryWhy should we care about takedown timeframes?
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-should-we-care-about-takedown-timeframes
<b>The issue of content takedown timeframe - the time period an intermediary is allotted to respond to a legal takedown order - has received considerably less attention in conversations about intermediary liability. This article examines the importance of framing an appropriate timeframe towards ensuring that speech online is not over-censored, and frames recommendations towards the same.
</b>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p><em>This article first <a class="external-link" href="https://cyberbrics.info/why-should-we-care-about-takedown-timeframes/">appeared</a> in the CyberBRICS website. It has since been <a class="external-link" href="https://www.medianama.com/2020/04/223-content-takedown-timeframes-cyberbrics/">cross-posted</a> to the Medianama.</em></p>
<p><em>The findings and opinions expressed in this article are derived from the larger research report 'A deep dive into content takedown timeframes', which can be accessed <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/a-deep-dive-into-content-takedown-frames">here</a>.</em></p>
<p><strong>Introduction</strong></p>
<p>Since the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) proposed the draft amendments to the intermediary liability guidelines in December of 2018, speculations regarding their potential effects have been numerous. These have included, <a class="external-link" href="http://www.medianama.com/2020/01/223-traceability-accountability-necessary-intermediary-liability/">mapping</a> the requirement of traceability of originators vis-a-vis chilling effect on free speech online, or <a class="external-link" href="http://cyberbrics.info/rethinking-the-intermediary-liability-regime-in-india/">critiquing</a> the proactive filtering requirement as potentially leading to censorship.</p>
<p>One aspect, however, that has received a lesser amount of attention is encoded within Rule 3(8) of the draft amendments. By the virtue of that rule, the time-limit given to the intermediaries to respond to a legal content takedown request (“turnaround time”) has been reduced from 36 hours (as it was in the older version of the rules) to 24 hours. In essence, intermediaries, when faced with a takedown order from the government or the court, would now have to remove the concerned piece of content within 24 hours of receipt of the notice.</p>
<p>Why is this important? Consider this: the <a class="external-link" href="http://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1999/3/A2000-21.pdf">definition</a> of an ‘intermediary’ within the Indian law encompasses a vast amount of entities – cyber cafes, online-marketplaces, internet service providers and more. Governance of any intermediary liability norms would accordingly require varying levels of regulation, each of which recognizes the different composition of these entities. In light of that, the content takedown requirement, and specifically the turnaround time becomes problematic. Let alone that the vast amount of entities under the definition of intermediaries would probably find it impossible to implement this obligation due to their technical architecture, this obligation also seems to erase the nuances existing within entities which would actually fall within its scope. </p>
<p>Each category of online content, and more importantly, each category of intermediary are different, and any content takedown requirement must appreciate these differences. A smaller intermediary may find it more difficult to adhere to a stricter, shorter timeframe, than an incumbent. A piece of ‘terrorist’ content may be required to be treated with more urgency than something that is defamatory. These contextual cues are critical, and must be accordingly incorporated in any law on content takedown.</p>
<p>While making our submissions to the draft amendments, we found that there was a lack of research from the government’s side justifying the shortened turnaround time, nor were there any literature which focussed on turnaround time-frames as a critical point of regulation of intermediary liability. Accordingly, I share some findings from our research in the subsequent sections, which throw light on certain nuances that must be considered before proposing any content takedown time-frame. It is important to note that our research has not yet found what should be an appropriate turnaround time in a given situation. However, the following findings would hopefully start a preliminary conversation which may ultimately lead us to a right answer.</p>
<p><strong>What to consider when regulating takedown time-frames?</strong></p>
<p>I classify the findings from our research into a chronological sequence: a) broad legal reforms, b) correct identification of scope and extent of the law, c) institution of proper procedural safeguards, and d) post-facto review of the time-frame for evidence based policy-making.</p>
<p><em>1. Broad legal reforms: Harmonize the law on content takedown.</em></p>
<p>The Indian law for content takedown is administered through two different provisions under the Information Technology (IT) Act, each with their own legal procedures and scope. While the 24-hour turnaround time would be applicable for the procedure under one of them, there would continue to <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/information-technology-procedure-and-safeguards-for-blocking-for-access-of-information-by-public-rules-2009">exist</a> a completely different legal procedure under which the government could still effectuate content takedown. For the latter, intermediaries would be given a 48-hour timeframe to respond to a government request with clarifications (if any).</p>
<p>Such differing procedures contributes to the creation of a confusing legal ecosystem surrounding content takedown, leading to arbitrary ways in which Indian users experience internet censorship. Accordingly, it is important to harmonize the existing law in a manner that the procedures and safeguards are seamless, and the regulatory process of content takedown is streamlined.</p>
<p><em>2. Correct identification of scope and extent of the law: Design a liability framework on the basis of the differences in the intermediaries, and the content in question.</em></p>
<p>As I have highlighted before, regulation of illegal content online cannot be <a class="external-link" href="https://blog.mozilla.org/netpolicy/2018/07/11/sustainable-policy-solutions-for-illegal-content/">one-size-fits-all</a>. Accordingly, a good law on content takedown must account for the nuances existing in the way intermediaries operate and the diversity of speech online. More specifically, there are two levels of classification that are critical.</p>
<p><em>One</em>, the law must make a fundamental classification between the intermediaries within the scope of the law. An obligation to remove illegal content can be implemented only by those entities whose technical architecture allows them to. While a search engine would be able to delink websites that are declared ‘illegal’, it would be absurd to expect a cyber cafe to follow a similar route of responding to a legal takedown order within a specified timeframe.</p>
<p>Therefore, one basis of classification must incorporate this difference in the technical architecture of these intermediaries. Apart from this, the law must also design liability for intermediaries on the basis of their user-base, annual revenue generated, and the reach, scope and potential impact of the intermediary’s actions.</p>
<p><em>Two, </em>it is important that the law recognizes that certain types of content would require more urgent treatment than other types of content. Several regulations across jurisdiction, including the NetzDG and the EU Regulation on Preventing of Dissemination of Terrorist Content Online, while problematic in their own counts, attempt to either limit their scope of application or frame liability based on the nature of content targeted.</p>
<p>The Indian law on the other hand, encompasses within its scope, a vast, varying array of content that is ‘illegal’, which includes on one hand, critical items like threatening ‘the sovereignty and integrity of India’ and on the other hand, more subjective speech elements like ‘decency or morality’. While an expedited time-frame may be permissible for the former category of speech, it is difficult to justify the same for the latter. More contextual judgments may be needed to assess the legality of content that is alleged to be defamatory or obscene, thereby making it problematic to have a shorter time-frame for the same.</p>
<p><em>3. Institution of proper procedural safeguards: Make notices mandatory and make sanctions gradated</em>.</p>
<p>Apart from the correct identification of scope and extent, it is important that there are sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that the interests of the intermediaries and the users are not curtailed. While these may seem ancillary to the main point, how the law chooses to legislate on these issues (or does not), nevertheless has a direct bearing on the issue of content takedown and time-frames.</p>
<p>Firstly, while the Indian law mandates content takedown, it does not mandate a process through which a user is notified of such an action being taken. The mere fact that an incumbent intermediary is able to respond to removal notifications within a specified time-frame does not imply that its actions would not have ramifications on free speech. Ability to takedown content does not translate into accuracy of the action taken, and the Indian law fails to take this into account.</p>
<p>Therefore, additional obligations of informing users when their content has been taken down, institutes due process in the procedure. In the context of legal takedown, such notice mechanisms also <a class="external-link" href="http://www.eff.org/wp/who-has-your-back-2019">empower</a> users to draw attention to government censorship and targeting.</p>
<p>Secondly, a uniform time-frame of compliance, coupled with severe sanctions goes on to disrupt the competition against the smaller intermediaries. While the current law does not clearly elaborate upon the nature of sanctions that would be imposed, general principles of the doctrine of safe harbour dictate that upon failure to remove the content, the intermediary would be subject to the same level of liability as the person uploading the content. This threat of sanctions may have adverse effects on free speech online, resulting in potential <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/intermediary-liability-in-india.pdf">over-censorship</a> of legitimate speech.</p>
<p>Accordingly, sanctions should be restricted to instances of systematic violations. For critical content, the contours of what constitutes systematic violation may differ. The regulator must accordingly take into account the nature of content which the intermediary failed to remove, while assessing their liability.</p>
<p><em>4. Post-facto review of the time-frame for evidence based policy-making: Mandate transparency reporting.</em></p>
<p>Transparency reporting, apart from ensuring accountability of intermediary action, is also a useful tool for understanding the impact of the law, specifically with relation to time period of response. The NetzDG, for all its criticism, has received <a class="external-link" href="https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/170901-Legal-Analysis-German-NetzDG-Act.pdfhttp://">support</a> for requiring intermediaries to produce bi-annual transparency reports. These reports provide us important insight into the efficacy of any proposed turnaround time, which in turn helps us to propose more nuanced reforms into the law.</p>
<p>However, to cull out the optimal amount of information from these reports, it is important that these reporting practices are standardized. There exists some international body of work which proposes a methodology for standardizing transparency reports, including the Santa Clara Principles and the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s (EFF) ‘Who has your back?’ reports. We have also previously proposed a methodology that utilizes some of these pointers.</p>
<p>Additionally, due to the experimental nature of the provision, including a review provision in the law would ensure the efficacy of the exercise can also be periodically assessed. If the discussion in the preceding section is any indication, the issue of an appropriate turnaround time is currently in a regulatory flux, with no correct answer. In such a scenario, periodic assessments compel policymakers and stakeholders to discuss effectiveness of solutions, and the nature of the problems faced, leading to <a class="external-link" href="http://www.livemint.com/Opinion/svjUfdqWwbbeeVzRjFNkUK/Making-laws-with-sunset-clauses.html">evidence-based</a> policymaking.</p>
<p><strong>Why should we care?</strong></p>
<p>There is a lot at stake while regulating any aspect of intermediary liability, and the lack of smart policy-making may result in the dampening of the interests of any one of the stakeholder groups involved. As the submissions to the draft amendments by various civil societies and industry groups show, the updated turnaround time suffers from issues, which if not addressed, may lead to over-removal, and lack of due process in the content removal procedure.</p>
<p>Among others, these submissions pointed out that the shortened time-frame did not allow the intermediaries sufficient time to scrutinize a takedown request to ensure that all technical and legal requirements are adhered to. This in turn, may also prompt third-party action against user actions. Additionally, the significantly short time-frame also raised several implementational challenges. For smaller companies with fewer employees, such a timeframe can both be burdensome, from both a financial and capability point of view. This in turn, may result in over-censorship of speech online.</p>
<p>Failing to recognize and incorporate contextual nuances into any law on intermediary liability therefore, may critically alter the way we interact with online intermediaries, and in a larger scheme, with the internet.</p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<p> </p>
<div> </div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-should-we-care-about-takedown-timeframes'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-should-we-care-about-takedown-timeframes</a>
</p>
No publisherTorSharkContent takedownIntermediary LiabilityChilling Effect2020-04-10T04:58:56ZBlog EntryRole of Intermediaries in Countering Online Abuse
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/role-of-intermediaries-in-counting-online-abuse
<b>The Internet can be a hostile space and protecting users from abuse without curtailing freedom of expression requires a balancing act on the part of online intermediaries.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This got published as two blog entries in the NALSAR Law Tech Blog. Part 1 can be accessed <a class="external-link" href="https://techlawforum.wordpress.com/2015/06/30/role-of-intermediaries-in-countering-online-abuse-still-a-work-in-progress-part-i/">here</a> and Part 2 <a class="external-link" href="https://techlawforum.wordpress.com/2015/06/30/role-of-intermediaries-in-countering-online-abuse-still-a-work-in-progress-part-ii/">here</a>.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As platforms and services coalesce around user-generated content (UGC) and entrench themselves in the digital publishing universe, they are increasingly taking on the duties and responsibilities of protecting rights including taking reasonable measures to restrict unlawful speech. Arguments around the role of intermediaries tackling unlawful content usually center around the issue of regulation—when is it feasible to regulate speech and how best should this regulation be enforced?</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Recently, Twitter found itself at the periphery of such questions when an anonymous user of the platform, @LutyensInsider, began posting slanderous and sexually explicit comments about Swati Chaturvedi, a Delhi-based journalist. The online spat which began in February last year, culminated into<a href="http://www.dailyo.in/politics/twitter-trolls-swati-chaturvedi-lutyensinsider-presstitutes-bazaru-media-delhi-police/story/1/4300.html"> Swati filing an FIR</a> against the anonymous user, last week. Within hours of the FIR, the anonymous user deleted the tweets and went silent. Predictably, Twitter users <a href="https://twitter.com/bainjal/status/609343547796426752">hailed this</a> as a much needed deterrence to online harassment. Swati’s personal victory is worth celebrating, it is an encouragement for the many women bullied daily on the Internet, where harassment is rampant. However, while Swati might be well within her legal rights to counter slander, the rights and liabilities of private companies in such circumstances are often not as clear cut.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Should platforms like Twitter take on the mantle of deciding what speech is permissible or not? When and how should the limits on speech be drawn? Does this amount to private censorship?The answers are not easy and as the recent Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)<a href="http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-126635"> </a><a href="http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-126635">judgment in the case of</a> Delfi AS v. Estonia confirms, the role of UGC platforms in balancing the user rights, is an issue far from being settled. In its ruling, the ECtHR reasoned that because of their role in facilitating expression, online platforms have a requirement “<i>to take effective measures to limit the dissemination of hate speech and speech inciting violence was not ‘private censorship”.</i></p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">This is problematic because the decision moves the regime away from a framework that grants immunity from liability, as long as platforms meet certain criteria and procedures. In <a href="http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-5-3-2014/4091">other words</a> the ruling establishes strict liability for intermediaries in relation to manifestly illegal content, even if they may have no knowledge. The 'obligation' placed on the intermediary does not grant them safe harbour and is not proportionate to the monitoring and blocking capacity thus necessitated. Consequently, platforms might be incentivized to err on the side of caution and restrict comments or confine speech resulting in censorship. The ruling is especially worrying, as the standard of care placed on the intermediary does not recognize the different role played by intermediaries in detection and removal of unlawful content. Further, intermediary liability is its own legal regime and is at the same time, a subset of various legal issues that need an understanding of variation in scenarios, mediums and technology both globally and in India.</p>
<h3 class="Standard">Law and Short of IT</h3>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Earlier this year, in a<a href="http://www.theverge.com/2015/2/4/7982099/twitter-ceo-sent-memo-taking-personal-responsibility-for-the"> leaked memo</a>, the Twitter CEO Dick Costolo took personal responsibility for his platform's chronic problem and failure to deal with harassment and abuse. In Swati's case, Twitter did not intervene or take steps to address harrassment. If it had to, Twitter (India), as all online intermediaries would be bound by the provisions established under Section 79 and accompanying Rules of the Information Technology Act. These legislations outline the obligations and conditions that intermediaries must fulfill to claim immunity from liability for third party content. Under the regime, upon receiving actual knowledge of unlawful information on their platform, the intermediary must comply with the notice and takedown (NTD) procedure for blocking and removal of content.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Private complainants could invoke the NTD procedure forcing intermediaries to act as adjudicators of an unlawful act—a role they are clearly ill-equipped to perform, especially when the content relates to political speech or alleged defamation or obscenity. The SC judgment in Shreya Singhal addressing this issue, read down the provision (Section 79 by holding that a takedown notice can only be effected if the complainant secures a court order to support her allegation. Further, it was held that the scope of restrictions under the mechanism is restricted to the specific categories identified under Article 19(2). Effectively, this means Twitter need not take down content in the absence of a court order.</p>
<h3 class="Standard">Content Policy as Due Diligence</h3>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Another provision, Rule 3(2) prescribes a content policy which, prior to the Shreya Singhal judgment was a criteria for administering takedown. This content policy includes an exhaustive list of types of restricted expressions, though worryingly, the terms included in it are not clearly defined and go beyond the reasonable restrictions envisioned under Article 19(2). Terms such as “grossly harmful”, “objectionable”, “harassing”, “disparaging” and “hateful” are not defined anywhere in the Rules, are subjective and contestable as alternate interpretation and standard could be offered for the same term. Further, this content policy is not applicable to content created by the intermediary.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Prior to the SC verdict in Shreya Singhal, <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sc-judgment-in-shreya-singhal-what-it-means-for-intermediary-liability">actual knowledge could have been interpreted</a> to mean the intermediary is called upon its own judgement under sub-rule (4) to restrict impugned content in order to seek exemption from liability. While liability accrued from not complying with takedown requests under the content policy was clear, this is not the case anymore. By reading down of S. 79 (3) (b) the court has addressed the issue of intermediaries complying with places limits on the private censorship of intermediaries and the invisible censorship of opaque government takedown requests as they must and should adhere, to the boundaries set by Article 19(2). Following the SC judgment intermediaries do not have to administer takedowns without a court order thereby rendering this content policy redundant. As it stands, the content policy is an obligation that intermediaries must fulfill in order to be exempted from liability for UGC and this due diligence is limited to publishing rules and regulations, terms and conditions or user agreement informing users of the restrictions on content. The penalties for not publishing this content policy should be clarified.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Further, having been informed of what is permissible users are agreeing to comply with the policy outlined, by signing up to and using these platforms and services. The requirement of publishing content policy as due diligence is unnecessary given that mandating such ‘standard’ terms of use negates the difference between different types of intermediaries which accrue different kinds of liability. This also places an extraordinary power of censorship in the hands of the intermediary, which could easily stifle freedom of speech online. Such heavy handed regulation could make it impossible to publish critical views about anything without the risk of being summarily censored.</p>
<p class="Standard">Twitter may have complied with its duties by publishing the content policy, though the obligation does not seem to be an effective deterrence. Strong safe harbour provisions for intermediaries are a crucial element in the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression online. By absolving platforms of responsibility for UGC as long as they publish a content policy that is vague and subjective is the very reason why India’s IT Rules are in fact, in urgent need of improvement.</p>
<h3 class="Standard">Size Matters</h3>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">The standards for blocking, reporting and responding to abuse vary across different categories of platforms. For example, it may be easier to counter trolls and abuse on blogs or forums where the owner or an administrator is monitoring comments and UGC. Usually platforms outline monitoring and reporting policies and procedures including recourse available to victims and action to be taken against violators. However, these measures are not always effective in curbing abuse as it is possible for users to create new accounts under different usernames. For example, in Swati’s case the anonymous user behind @LutyensInsider account changed<a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/newdelhi/twitter-troll-lutyensinsider-changes-handle-after-delhi-journo-files-fir/article1-1357281.aspx"> </a><a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/newdelhi/twitter-troll-lutyensinsider-changes-handle-after-delhi-journo-files-fir/article1-1357281.aspx">their handle</a> to @gregoryzackim and @gzackim before deleting all tweets. In this case, perhaps the fear of criminal charges ahead was enough to silence the anonymous user, which may not always be the case.</p>
<h3 class="Standard">Tackling the Trolls</h3>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Most large intermediaries have privacy settings which restrict the audience for user posts as well as prevent strangers from contacting them as a general measure against online harassment. Platforms also publish<a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/bitwise/2015/04/twitter_s_new_abuse_policy_if_it_can_t_stop_it_hide_it.html"> </a><a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/bitwise/2015/04/twitter_s_new_abuse_policy_if_it_can_t_stop_it_hide_it.html">monitoring policy</a> outlining the procedure and mechanisms for users to<a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/04/twitter_s_new_harassment_policy_not_transparent_not_engaged_with_users.html"> </a><a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/04/twitter_s_new_harassment_policy_not_transparent_not_engaged_with_users.html">register their complaint</a> or<a href="https://blog.twitter.com/2015/update-on-user-safety-features"> </a><a href="https://blog.twitter.com/2015/update-on-user-safety-features">report abuse</a>. Often reporting and blocking mechanisms<a href="https://blog.twitter.com/2015/update-on-user-safety-features"> </a><a href="https://blog.twitter.com/2015/update-on-user-safety-features">rely on community standards</a> and users reporting unlawful content. Last week Twitter<a href="https://twittercommunity.com/t/removing-the-140-character-limit-from-direct-messages/41348"> </a><a href="https://twittercommunity.com/t/removing-the-140-character-limit-from-direct-messages/41348">announced a new feature</a> allowing lists of blocked users to be shared between users. An improvement on existing mechanism for blocking, the feature is aimed at making the service safer for people facing similar issues and while an improvement on standard policies defining permissible limits on content, such efforts may have their limitations.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">The mechanisms follow a one-size-fits-all policy. First, such community driven efforts do not address concerns of differences in opinion and subjectivity. Swati in defending her actions stressed the “<i>coarse discourse”</i> prevalent on social media, though as<a href="http://www.opindia.com/2015/06/foul-mouthed-twitter-user-files-fir-against-loud-mouthed-slanderer/"> </a><a href="http://www.opindia.com/2015/06/foul-mouthed-twitter-user-files-fir-against-loud-mouthed-slanderer/">this article points out</a> she might be assumed guilty of using offensive and abusive language. Subjectivity and many interpretations of the same opinion can pave the way for many taking offense online. Earlier this month, Nikhil Wagle’s tweets criticising Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a “pervert” was interpreted as “abusive”, “offensive” and “spreading religious disharmony”. While platforms are within their rights to establish policies for dealing with issues faced by users, there is a real danger of them doing so for<a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/05/chuck_c_johnson_suspended_from_twitter_why.2.html"> </a><a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/05/chuck_c_johnson_suspended_from_twitter_why.2.html">“</a><a href="http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/users/2015/05/chuck_c_johnson_suspended_from_twitter_why.2.html">political reasons” and based on “popularity” measures</a> which may chill free speech. When many get behind a particular interpretation of an opinion, lawful speech may also be stifled as Sreemoyee Kundu <a href="http://www.dailyo.in/user/124/sreemoyeekundu">found out</a>. A victim of online abuse her account was blocked by Facebook owing to multiple reports from a “<i>faceless fanatical mob”. </i>Allowing the users to set standards of permissible speech is an improvement, though it runs the risk of mob justice and platforms need to be vigilant in applying such standards.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">While it may be in the interest of platforms to keep a hands off approach to community policies, certain kind of content may necessiate intervention by the intermediary. There has been an increase in private companies modifying their content policy to place reasonable restriction on certain hateful behaviour in order to protect vulnerable or marginalised voices. <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/12/twitter-bans-revenge-porn-in-user-policy-sharpening">Twitter</a> and <a href="http://www.redditblog.com/2015/05/promote-ideas-protect-people.html">Reddit's</a> policy change in addressing revenge porn are reflective of a growing understanding amongst stakeholders that in order to promote free expression of ideas, recognition and protection of certain rights on the Internet may be necessary. However, any approach to regulate user content must assess the effect of policy decisions on user rights. Google's <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/22/revenge-porn-women-free-speech-abuse">stand on tackling revenge porn</a> may be laudable, though the <a href="https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141109/06211929087/googles-efforts-to-push-down-piracy-sites-may-lead-more-people-to-malware.shtml">decision to push down</a> 'piracy' sites in its search results could be seen to adversely impact the choice that users have. Terms of service implemented with subjectivity and lack of transparency can and does lead to private censorship.</p>
<h3 class="Standard">The Way Forward</h3>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Harassment is damaging, because of the feeling of powerlessness that it invokes in the victims and online intermediaries represent new forms of power through which users' negotiate and manage their online identity. Content restriction policies and practices must address this power imbalance by adopting baseline safeguards and best practices. It is only fair that based on principles of equality and justice, intermediaries be held responsible for the damage caused to users due to wrongdoings of other users or when they fail to carry out their operations and services as prescribed by the law. However, in its present state, the intermediary liability regime in India is not sufficient to deal with online harassment and needs to evolve into a more nuanced form of governance.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Any liability framework must evolve bearing in mind the slippery slope of overbroad regulation and differing standards of community responsibility. Therefore, a balanced framework would need to include elements of both targeted regulation and soft forms of governance as liability regimes need to balance fundamental human rights and the interests of private companies. Often, achieving this balance is problematic given that these companies are expected to be adjudicators and may also be the target of the breach of rights, as is the case in Delfi v Estonia. Global frameworks such as the Manila Principles can be a way forward in developing effective mechanisms. The determination of content restriction practices should always adopt the least restrictive means of doing so, distinguishing between the classes of intermediary. They must evolve considering the proportionality of the harm, the nature of the content and the impact on affected users including the proximity of affected party to content uploader.</p>
<p class="Standard" style="text-align: justify; ">Further, intermediaries and governments should communicate a clear mechanism for review and appeal of restriction decisions. Content restriction policies should incorporate an effective right to be heard. In exceptional circumstances when this is not possible, a post facto review of the restricton order and its implementation must take place as soon as practicable. Further, unlawful content restricted for a limited duration or within a specific geography, must not extend beyond these limits and a periodic review should take place to ensure the validity of the restriction. Regular, systematic review of rules and guidelines guiding intermediary liability will go a long way in ensuring that such frameworks are not overly burdensome and remain effective.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/role-of-intermediaries-in-counting-online-abuse'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/role-of-intermediaries-in-counting-online-abuse</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiOnline HarassmentInternet GovernanceIntermediary LiabilityChilling EffectOnline Abuse2015-08-02T16:38:36ZBlog EntryIndia blocks access to 857 porn sites
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-news-august-3-2015-india-blocks-access-to-857-porn-sites
<b>India has blocked free access to 857 porn sites in what it says is a move to prevent children from accessing them. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The story was published by BBC on August 3, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">Adults will still be able to access the sites using virtual private networks (VPNs) or proxy servers. In July, the Supreme Court expressed its unhappiness over the government's inability to block sites, especially those featuring child pornography.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Telecom companies have said they will not be able to enforce the "ban" immediately.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"We have to block each site one by one and it will take a few days for all service providers to block all the sites," an unnamed telecom company executive told The Times of India newspaper.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A senior official, who preferred to remained unnamed, told the BBC Hindi that India's department of telecommunications had "advised" telecom operators and Internet service providers to "control free and open access" to <a class="story-body__link-external">857 porn sites</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"There is no total ban. This was done in the backdrop of Supreme Court's observation on children having free access to porn sites. The idea is also to protect India's cultural fabric. This will not prevent adults from visiting porn sites," the official said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In July, the top court had observed that it was not for the court to order a ban on porn sites.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"It is an issue for the government to deal with. Can we pass an interim order directing blocking of all adult websites? And let us keep in mind the possible contention of a person who could ask what crime have I committed by browsing adult websites in private within the four walls of my house. Could he not argue about his right to freedom to do something within the four walls of his house without violating any law?," the court said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">According to <a class="story-body__link-external" href="http://www.pornhub.com/insights/2014-year-in-review">statistics released</a> by adult site Pornhub, India was its fourth largest source of traffic in 2014, behind the US, UK and Canada. Pranesh Prakash of the Bangalore based Centre for Internet and Society said the directive to block the 857 sites was "the largest single order of its kind" in India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"The government's reasoning that it is not a ban because adults can still access the porn sites is ridiculous," he told the BBC. The move has caused a great deal of comment on Indian social media networks, with many prominent personalities coming forward to condemn it.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Popular author Chetan Bhagat, writer and commentator Nilanjana Roy, politician Milind Deora and director Ram Gopal Varma have all added their voices to the debate.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-news-august-3-2015-india-blocks-access-to-857-porn-sites'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-news-august-3-2015-india-blocks-access-to-857-porn-sites</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceDigital MediaChilling Effect2015-08-05T01:31:32ZNews ItemPorn ban: People will soon learn to circumvent ISPs and govt orders, expert says
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-2-2015-karthikeyan-hemalatha-porn-ban
<b></b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Karthikeyan Hemalatha was published in the <a class="external-link" href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Porn-ban-People-will-soon-learn-to-circumvent-ISPs-and-govt-orders-expert-says/articleshow/48320914.cms">Times of India</a> on August 2. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The government used other sections of the Act to circumvent this provision. Sources in the Department of Telecommunication, which comes under the ministry of communications and information technology, said a notification had been issued under Section 79 (b) of IT Act under which internet service providers could be penalized for not following government orders. "Though the section protects an internet service provider (ISP) from legal action for the content it may allow, it can be penalized for not following government orders to ban them," said Prakash.<br /> <br /> Last month, the Supreme Court declined to pass an interim order to block websites which have pornographic content. "Such interim orders cannot be passed by this court. Somebody may come to the court and say 'look I am above 18 and how can you stop me from watching it within the four walls of my room?' It is a violation of Article 21 [right to personal liberty]," said Chief Justice H L Dattu.<br /> <br /> The judge was reacting to a public interest litigation filed by advocate Kamlesh Vashwani who was seeking to block porn websites in the country. "The issue is definitely serious and some steps need to be taken. The Centre is expected to take a stand. Let us see what stand the Centre will take," the Chief Justice said and directed the Centre to reply within four weeks. Over the weekend, the stance became clear.<br /> <br /> Sources also say that Section 19 (2) of the Constitution was used for the ban. The section allows the government to impose "reasonable restrictions in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court."<br /> <br /> For netizens, the government could actually be providing crash courses on proxy sites. "This is the best way to teach people on how to circumvent ISPs and government orders," said Prakash, adding that real abusive porn sites might still be available.<br /> <br /> "There is no dynamic mechanism to block all sites with pornographic content. The government has to individually pick URLs (uniform resource locator) to ban websites. Right now, only popular websites have been banned and the little known abusive sites like those that propagate revenge porn or child porn," said Prakash. "No ban can be comprehensive," he added.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-2-2015-karthikeyan-hemalatha-porn-ban'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-2-2015-karthikeyan-hemalatha-porn-ban</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshIT ActCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceDigital MediaChilling Effect2015-08-05T01:47:52ZNews ItemPorn block in India sparks outrage
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-australian-news-august-5-2015-amanda-hodge-porn-block-in-india-sparks-outrage
<b>
India’s government has triggered a storm of protest after blocking 857 alleged pornography websites, with privacy and internet freedom campaigners, as well as consumers, condemning the move as arbitrary and unlawful.
</b>
<div>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The article by Amanda Hodge was published in the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/porn-block-in-india-sparks-outrage/story-e6frg6so-1227470074078">Australian</a> on August 5, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">The order, enforced since Sunday by the country’s main internet service providers, comes amid debate about the influence of pornography on sex crime in India, and as the Supreme Court considers a petition by lawyer Kamlesh Vaswani to ban pornographic websites that harm children.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The government has been forced to defend the move, saying it was taken in response to Supreme Court criticism at inaction against child pornography websites, although the Supreme Court itself has refused to impose any interim ban while it considers the petition. The websites — a fraction of the world’s millions of internet pornography sites — will remain blocked until the government figures out how to restrict access, a spokesman said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Critics have slammed the measure as unconstitutional and pointed out the list includes adult humour sites that contain no pornographic content. Others have suggested it is another intrusion into the private lives of ordinary Indians by an administration intent on pushing a puritanical Hindu agenda, citing the recent ban on beef in several states and an alleged “Hindu-isation” of school textbooks.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">That prompted outrage from Telecom Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad. “I reject with contempt the charge that it is a Talibani government. Our government supports free media, respects communication on social media and has respected freedom of communication always,” he said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While India has no law preventing citizens accessing internet pornography, regulations do restrict the publishing of “obscene information in electronic form”. Centre for Internet and Society policy director Pranesh Prakash told <i>The Australian </i>yesterday that some elements of that act were welcome — such as prohibition of child pornography and the uploading of a person’s private parts without consent — but “the provisions relating to ‘sexually explicit materials’ are far too broad, with no exceptions made for art, architecture, education or literature”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr Prakash said the pornography ban amounted to an “abdication of the government’s duty”, given the list of sites blocked was provided on request to the government by one of the Vaswani petitioners. “The additional solicitor-general essentially asked one of the petitioners to provide a list of websites, which she passed on to the Department of Information Technology, which in turn passed to Department of Telecommunications asking for them to be blocked or disabled.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“That is not acceptable in a democracy where it is not the government which has actually found any of these websites to be unlawful.” Mr Prakash also criticised the secrecy surrounding the order, which he said contravened Indian law requiring a public declaration of any intended ban so that it might be challenged. The bans were made under “Rule 12” of India’s IT Act, which empowers the government to force ISPs to block sites when it is “necessary or expedient”.</p>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-australian-news-august-5-2015-amanda-hodge-porn-block-in-india-sparks-outrage'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-australian-news-august-5-2015-amanda-hodge-porn-block-in-india-sparks-outrage</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshIT ActCensorshipFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceDigital MediaChilling Effect2015-08-05T02:10:46ZNews Item