Centre for Internet and Society

A2K3 Panel XI - Ogg Vorbis

admin — 2008-09-21T14:43:16Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/content-access/a2k3-panel-xi.ogg

Open Access Day Flyer

sunil — 2008-10-31T09:24:39Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/content-access/open%20access%20day%20flyer.pdf

MS Format

admin — 2011-08-23T03:07:11Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/standards/uploads/response-to-indian-open-standards-policy-10-sept-2008.doc

Oo.org Format

admin — 2011-08-23T03:06:49Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/standards/uploads/response-to-indian-open-standards-policy-10-sept-2008.odt

PDF Format

admin — 2011-08-23T03:06:23Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/standards/uploads/response-to-indian-open-standards-policy-09-sept-2008.pdf

J. T. D'souza

sunil — 2008-09-23T10:50:54Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/software-patents/JTDs-position-on-DPM.pdf

Open letter to Hillary Clinton on Internet Freedom

sunil — 2012-09-04T08:28:02Z

Last month I wrote an open letter to Hillary Clinton. It was based on a presentation I that I made during a panel discussion at a Google sponsored conference titled Internet at Liberty 2012 in Washington DC on May 24, 2012.

Sunil Abraham's article was published in Thinking Aloud on July 17, 2012

The question that my panel tried to grapple with was "In a world where nearly nine out of ten Internet users are not American, what is the responsibility of United States institutions in promoting internet freedom?" My co-panelists were Cynthia Wong who is with the Centre for Democracy and Technology, Mohamed El Dahshan a writer and journalist, Dunja Mijatovic the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.

Internet freedom is a curious subject. It is a technology specific liberty - for a moment consider television freedom. The US has more Muslims than India has Christians. But Indian television in the average hotel comes in hundreds and there are at least 3 channels of Christian preaching. But US television in hotels is usually less than 50 channels with no channels of Islamic preaching. In fact even the reception of secular channels from the Islamic World like Al Jazeera is still difficult in America. Can we accuse the US of not having television freedom since their television features Christian evangelists but not Muslim evangelists? Should it be part of India's foreign policy to evangelize television freedom given that there is a large domestic industry with clear international potential?

In an ideal world - citizens will possess technology-neutral freedom to communication and expression. But nothing can be farther from the truth. Communication technologies are regulated using a plethora of policies and practices and very often these have a chilling effect on freedoms.

The following is my response to the technology-specific demands for deregulation from the US Government.

Text of the Open Letter[2]

Recognise Access to Knowledge (A2K) as pre-condition for freedom of expression: There is no difference between aggressive enforcement of imbalanced and obsolete intellectual property laws and censorship. The need of the moment is not more enforcement to protect obsolete business models against the everyday practices of ordinary netizens but rather the reform of intellectual property law (levies, broader exceptions and limitations, pools, statutory and compulsory licenses, prizes etc.) to keep pace with innovations in technology and the production of knowledge and culture.

Recognise privacy as pre-condition for security: The alleged tension between privacy and security is a false dichotomy. Blanket surveillance by design compromises security. Surveillance is like salt in cooking — essential in very small quantities but dangerous even if slightly in excess. Blanket surveillance technologies are only going make things easier for — and will only serve as targets for — current and future online villains.

Don't lose the moral high-ground: Remember, with great power comes great responsibility. Other countries are waiting to cherry pick from your worst practices. Also don't use trade agreements to selectively export components of US policy without the accompanying safeguards for civil liberties and rights. Citizens in oppressive and authoritarian states are depending on the US government, courts and civil society to protect their rights online. Don't undermine their capacity to shame their governments by holding up the US as the example of 'how to get things right'. They urgently need the US government to lead by example.

Recognise that freedom of expression has become a trade issue: This is unfortunate but this is true — thanks to the precedent set by the developed world when it came to asymmetric trade negotiations. Just as the US is interested in protecting the interests of its corporations in global markets — other governments are keen protect the interests of their own corporations. The optimal solution in this case is where all countries and corporations are equally unsatisfied. This will remain a continuing discussion.

Address developing country anxieties around critical internet infrastructure: Security by obscurity will no longer do — security by transparency through open standards, technologies and governance is the only way to fears and build a trust-worthy and secure Internet for all of us. For example, there is urgent need to develop standards for supply chain audits of information infrastructure. The US has dealt with the fear of back doors by banning the use of hardware and software from countries it does not trust. The developing world is not sure if there are back-doors in hardware and software manufactured by US corporations.

Time has comes to address this and other related anxieties.

Appreciate diversity in nomenclature: 'Freedom' and 'liberty' may be appropriate terms to use in the United States of America. But openness may be more in countries that are not yet full and robust liberal democracies. The Internet Governance Forum for example uses 'openness' instead of 'freedom'. Openness is also preferred because it includes 'freedom of expression', 'freedom of information' (also known as right to information, access to information or public and 'free knowledge' (free software, open standards, open content, open access, open data, open educational resources, etc.)

Don't be too instrumental in your interventions: Don't undermine the local credibility of like-minded civil society, think-tanks and research organisations by being too directive in your support. Managerialism will undermine reform of policies and practices in information societies and so does inappropriate/premature monitoring and evaluation (for example, looking for explicit attribution in terms of casual connections between your actions and outcomes). There is a need to support greater reflexivity in the global information society by developing institutional capacity in developing countries through unrestricted funding. True critical thinking is the foundation of both scientific progress and open societies. Go out of your way to find and support those who disagree with you. Protect the plural foundation of our networked society!

Video

Sunil Abraham was a speaker along with Cynthia Wong, Mohamed El Dahshan and Dunja Mijatovic in Plenary IV Debate 3 at the Internet at Liberty 2012 event organised by Google on May 24, 2012.

View the video on YouTube

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/open-letter-to-hillary-clinton

Route map for CCMG-JMI

admin — 2008-09-21T14:43:16Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/content-access/CCMG_Location.gif

Pylons

sunil — 2008-09-26T13:26:58Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/home-images/pylons-bigger.jpg

Tin Chen

sunil — 2009-09-08T04:56:25Z

Tin Chen holding camera.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/home-images/IMG_0726_small.JPG

Big win for freedom of speech. Really?

sunil — 2015-03-29T01:20:51Z

The 66A ruling was historic, but what about the provisions regulating speech online and offline that still exist within the ITA, the IPC and other laws.

The article was published in Bangalore Mirror on March 29, 2015.

The Shreya Singhal v. Union of India ruling on the Information Technology Act 2000 (ITA) was truly a historic moment in Indian free speech jurisprudence. Few anticipated the striking down of the draconian Sec. 66A in its entirety, for introducing additional unconstitutional limits to free speech through its vague and imprecise language. The Supreme Court also read down Sec. 79(3)(b) and the intermediary liability rules — requiring a court order or a government notification to take down content and relieving intermediaries of the responsibility for determining legality of content. However, the court left the provision for website blocking, 69A, as it stood.

66A criminalised those that use a computer resource or a communication device to send one of the three classes of information listed below — some of which was redundant as they were already offences under the IPC (sections indicated in brackets below) or other sections of the ITA:

Information that was grossly offensive or menacing in character;
False information for causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury [44], criminal intimidation [506], enmity, hatred [295A] or ill will.
Annoying or inconvenient message - to deal spam OR to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages - presumably for phishing, which incidentally is dealt with more properly in Sec. 66D of ITA.

The regulatory vacuum created by the striking down of 66A can be addressed by parliament by ITA to reintroduce a well-crafted anti-spam provision that does not infringe upon human rights.

The intermediary liability section 79 and the associated rules were introduced to encourage free speech by granting immunity to intermediaries for content created by their users, unless they failed to act on take down notices. However, this provision proved to have a chilling effect on free speech, with risk-aversive intermediaries over-complying with takedown notices as they were unable to distinguish between legal and illegal content. Shreya Singhal solves half the problem - whether intermediaries decide either to remove or retain content in response to take down notices sent by non-government entities and individuals they remain immune from liability. But government entities can continue to censor speech using takedown notices without any oversight, transparency or adherence to the principles of natural justice. The recently launched Manila Principles developed by the CIS and others gives a more complete set of best practices that could be used to fix Sec. 79 through an amendment. For example - "abusive or bad take down notices should be penalized."

Website-blocking under 69a is mostly an opaque procedure as per the letter of the law as it does not require the user to be informed [because the alternative of informing the intermediary is deemed sufficient], and given a chance to be heard, and a secrecy rule prevents all documentation related to the procedure from being disclosed to the public. There is both an optimistic and a pessimistic view on what the bench has said when it upheld this section. Constitutional law expert Gautam Bhatia is of the view that the judge has made informing the user mandatory and has also overridden the secrecy provision by requiring a written order that can be assailed through writ petitions. But a more pessimistic reading is that the bench found the section constitutional and was satisfied with the safeguards and was only reiterating the procedure in the judgment. The trouble is the opacity of the procedure is worse than the current text of the law - there is no evidence that users have ever been notified and RTI requests for documentation related to block orders have been rejected using the secrecy rule.

Does the striking down of 66A mean that speech on the internet is completely free and completely unregulated? No, several provisions that regulate speech online and offline still exist within the ITA, the IPC and other laws. Within the ITA - infringing the privacy of individuals [ 66E], transmission of obscene material [67], including sexually explicit material [Sec. 67A], and also child pornography [67B], the Cyber Cafe Rules which require intermediaries to install web filters.

In the IPC, several sections regulate speech that define closely the intent and ingredients required in a precise way, something 66A did not do. Sedition is defined in Sec. 124A, with restrictions on speech in the case of causing hatred, contempt or disaffection towards the state. Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language etc is criminalised [153A], and imputations or assertions prejudicial to national integration are also prohibited [153B]. Certain restrictions on speech have also been made in terms of protecting the privacy and dignity of individuals for ex. disclosure of a victim's identity in sensitive cases [228], insulting the modesty of a woman [509]. Defamation [499] and conduct intended to cause public mischief by way of statements, rumours, reports [505] remain criminalized; and in 2013 cyber stalking [354D] has also been added.

[with inputs from Vidushi Marda] The author is the director of The Centre for Internet and Society

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/bangalore-mirror-march-29-2015-sunil-abraham-big-win-for-freedom-of-speech-really

Multiple Aspects Need to be Addressed as the Clamour Grows for Network Neutrality

sunil — 2015-04-16T13:33:03Z

In the global debate there are four violations of Network Neutrality that are considered particularly egregious.

The article was published in DNA on April 16, 2015.

One — blocking of destinations or services in order to force the consumer to pay extra charges for access, two — not charging or zero-rating of certain destinations and services with or without extraction of payment from the sender or destination, and three — throttling or prioritisation of traffic between competing destinations or services and four — specialised services wherein the very same Internet infrastructure is used to provide non-Internet but IP based services such as IP-TV.

The main harms of network neutrality violations are as follows: one, censorship by private parties without legal basis; two, innovation harms because the economic threshold for new entrants is raised significantly; three, competition harms as monopolies become more entrenched and then are able to abuse their dominant position; four, harms to diversity because of the nudge effect that free access to certain services and destinations has on consumers reducing the infinite plurality of the Internet to a set of menu options. The first and fourth harm could result in the Internet being reduced to a walled garden.

It is insufficient to try and address this with networking rules for engineers such as “all packets should be treated equally.” But a set of principles could be developed that can help us grow access without violating network neutrality. Wikimedia Foundation has already developed their principles which they call “Wikipedia Zero Operating Principles”. In India our principles could include the following. One, no blocking without legal basis. Two, transparency — all technical and commercial arrangements are to be disclosed to the public. Three, non-exclusivity — all arrangements should be available to all parties, no special deals for those you favour. Four, non-discrimination between equals — technologies and entities that are alike should be treated alike. Five, necessity — whilst some measure may be required occasionally when there is network congestion they should be rolled back in a time-bound fashion.

Once these principles are enforced through a network neutrality regulation, ISPs and telecom operators will be allowed to innovate with business and payment models. Steve Song, inventor of Village Telco says “My preferred take on zero-rating would be to zero-rate gprs/edge data in general so that there is a minimum basic access for all.” My colleague Pranesh Prakash says “One possibility, of many, is to create a single marketplace or exchange for zero-rating, through which one can zero-rate on all telecom networks for standard tiered rates that they publish, and terms that are known to the regulator. Banning is akin to a brahmastra in a regulator's arsenal: it should not be used lightly” Jochai Ben-Avie of Mozilla told me yesterday of experiments in Bangladesh where consumers watch an advertisement everyday in exchange for 5Mb of data. My own suggestion to address the harms caused by walled gardens would be to make them leak – mandate that unfettered access to the Internet be provided every other hour.

There is many other ways in which the Internet has been transformed in India and other countries but these are not commonly considered network neutrality violations. Here are some examples. One, blocking of port 25 — a port that is commonly used to relay email spam. Two, blocking of port 80 – so that domestic connections cannot be used to host web servers. Three, the use of private IP addresses, ISPs who are delaying migration to IPv6 infrastructure because of cost implications leverage their IPv4 address inventory by using Carrier Grade — Network Address Translators [CG-NATs]. Four, asymmetric connections where download speeds for consumers are faster than upload speeds. With the exception of the first example — all of them affect end users negatively but do not usually impact corporations and therefore have been unfortunately sidelined in the global debate.

The TRAI consultation paper reveals many of the concerns of the telecom operators that go beyond the scope of network neutrality. Many of these concerns are very legitimate. There is a scarcity of spectrum — this could partially be addressed by auctioning more spectrum, scientific management of spectrum, promotion of shared spectrum and unlicensed spectrum. Their profit margins are thinning – this could be addressed by dismantling the Universal Service Obligation Fund, it is after all as Rohan Samarajiva puts it “a tax on the poor.” Internet companies don't pay taxes – this could be addressed by the Indian government, by adopting the best practices from the OECD around preventing tax avoidance. But some of their concerns cannot be addressed because of the technological differences between telecom and Internet networks. While it is relatively easy to require telecom companies to provide personal information and allow for interception of communications, those Internet companies that use end-to-end encryption cannot divulge personal information or facilitate interception because it is technologically impossible. While the first two concerns could be addressed by TRAI, the last two should be addressed by other ministries and departments in the Indian government.

There are other concerns that are much more difficult to address without the deep understanding of latest advancements in radio communication, signal processing and congestion control techniques in packet switched networks. A telecom expert who did not wish to be identified told me that “even 2G TDM voice is 10 to 15 times more efficient when compared to VOIP. IP was developed to carry data, and is therefore not an efficient mode to carry voice as overhead requirement for packets destroys the efficiency on voice. Voice is best carried close to the physical layer where the overheads are lowest.” He claims that since “VOIP calls are spectrally inefficient they should be discouraged” through differential pricing. We need accessible scientific literature and monitoring infrastructure so that an evidence base around concerns like this can be created so as to address them effectively through regulatory interventions.

You know you have reached a policy solution when all concerned stakeholders are equally unhappy. Unfortunately, the TRAI consultation paper assumes that Internet companies operate in a regulatory vacuum and therefore places much unnecessary focus on the licensing of these companies. This is a disastrous proposal since the Internet today is the result of “permission-less innovation”. The real issue is network neutrality and one hopes that after rigorous debate informed by scientific evidence TRAI finds a way to spread unhappiness around equally.

The author works for the Centre for Internet and Society which receives funds from Wikimedia Foundation which has zero-rating alliances with telecom operators in many countries across the world.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/dna-april-16-2015-sunil-abraham-multiple-aspects-need-to-be-addressed-as-the-clamour-grows-for-network-neutrality

Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt

sunil — 2015-04-17T01:44:39Z

Much confusion has resulted from the Section 66A verdict. Some people are convinced that online speech is now without any reasonable restrictions under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. This is completely false.

There are many other provisions within the IT Act that still regulate speech online, for example the section on obscenity (Sec. 67) and also the data protection provision (Sec. 43A). Additionally there are provisions within the Indian Penal Code and other Acts that regulate speech both online and offline. For example, defamation remains a criminal offence under the IPC (Sec. 499), and disclosing information about children in a manner that lowers their reputation or infringes their privacy is also prohibited under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (Sec. 23).

Others are afraid that the striking down of Section 66A results in a regulatory vacuum where it will be possible for bad actors to wreak havoc online because the following has been left unaddressed by the IT Act.

Criminal Intimidation: The phrase "criminal intimidation" was included in Sec. 66A(b), but the requirement was that intimidation should be carried out using "information which he knows to be false". Sec. 506 of the IPC which punishes criminal intimidation does not have this requirement and is therefore a better legal route for affected individuals, even though the maximum punishment is a year shorter than the three years possible under the IT Act.
Cyber-stalking: A new section for stalking - Sec. 345 D - was added into the IPC in 2013 which also recognised cyber stalking. The definition within Sec.345D is more precise compared to the nebulous phrasing in Sec. 66A, which read - "monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication, commits the offence of stalking".
Phishing: Sec. 66A (c) dealt with punishment to people who "deceive or mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages". Sec.66D, which will be the operative section after this verdict, deals with "cheating by impersonation" and forms a more effective safeguard against phishing.

Cyber-bulling of children is arguably left unaddressed. Most importantly, spam, the original intention behind 66A, now cannot be tackled using any existing provision of the law. However, the poorly drafted section made it impossible for law enforcement to crack down on spammers. A 2005 attempt by the ITU to produce model law for spam based on a comparative analysis of national laws resulted in several important best practices that were ignored during the 2008 Amendment of the Act. For example, the definition of spam must cover the following characteristics - mass, unsolicited and commercial. All of which was missing in 66A.

Good quality law must be drafted by an open, participatory process where all relevant stakeholders are consulted and responded to before bills are introduced in parliament.

A scanned copy of the article was published in the Deccan Chronicle on March 26, 2015.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deccan-chronicle-march-26-2015-sunil-abraham-fear-uncertainty-doubt

Shreya Singhal and 66A

sunil — 2015-04-19T08:09:42Z

Most software code has dependencies. Simple and reproducible methods exist for mapping and understanding the impact of these dependencies. Legal code also has dependencies --across court orders and within a single court order. And since court orders are not produced using a structured mark-up language, experts are required to understand the precedential value of a court order.

The article was published in the Economic and Political Weekly Vol-L No.15. Vidushi Marda, programme officer at the Centre for Internet and Society, was responsible for all the research that went into this article. PDF version here.

As a non–lawyer and engineer, I cannot authoritatively comment on the Supreme Court’s order in Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015) on sections of the Information Technology Act of 2000, so I have tried to summarise a variety of views of experts in this article. The Shreya Singhal order is said to be unprecedented at least for the last four decades and also precedent setting as its lucidity, some believe, will cause a ripple effect in opposition to a restrictive understanding of freedom of speech and expression, and an expansiveness around reasonable restrictions. Let us examine each of the three sections that the bench dealt with.

The Section in Question

Section 66A of the IT Act was introduced in a hastily-passed amendment. Unfortunately, the language used in this section was a pastiche of outdated foreign laws such as the UK Communications Act of 2003, Malicious Communications Act of 1988 and the US Telecommunications Act, 1996.¹ Since the amendment, this section has been misused to make public examples out of innocent, yet uncomfortable speech, in order to socially engineer all Indian netizens into self-censorship.²

Summary: The Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act in its entirety holding that it was not saved by Article 19(2) of the Constitution on account of the expressions used in the section, such as "annoying," "grossly offensive," "menacing,", "causing annoyance." The Court justified this by going through the reasonable restrictions that it considered relevant to the arguments and testing them against S66A. Apart from not falling within any of the categories for which speech may be restricted, S66A was struck down on the grounds of vagueness, over-breadth and chilling effect. The Court considered whether some parts of the section could be saved, and then concluded that no part of S66A was severable and declared the entire section unconstitutional. When it comes to regulating speech in the interest of public order, the Court distinguished between discussion, advocacy and incitement. It considered the first two to fall under the freedom of speech and expression granted under Article 19(1)(a), and held that it was only incitement that attracted Article 19(2).

Between Speech and Harm

Gautam Bhatia, a constitutional law expert, has an optimistic reading of the judgment that will have value for precipitating the ripple effect. According to him, there were two incompatible strands of jurisprudence which have been harmonised by collapsing tendency into imminence.³ The first strand, exemplified by Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP⁴ and Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar,⁵ imported an older and weaker American standard, that is, the tendency test, between the speech and public order consequences. The second strand exemplified byRam Manohar Lohia vs State of UP,⁶ S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram,⁷ andArup Bhuyan vs Union of India,⁸ all require greater proximity between the speech and the disorder anticipated. In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court held that at the stage of incitement, the reasonable restrictions will step in to curb speech that has a tendency to cause disorder. Other experts are of the opinion that Justice Nariman was doing no such thing, and was only sequentially applying all the tests for free speech that have been developed within both these strands of precedent. In legal activist Lawrence Liang's analysis, "Ramjilal Modi was decided by a seven judge bench and Kedarnath by a constitutional bench. As is often the case in India, when subsequent benches of a lower strength want to distinguish themselves from older precedent but are unable to overrule them, they overcome this constraint through a doctrinal development by stealth. This is achieved by creative interpretations that chip away at archaic doctrinal standards without explicitly discarding them."⁹

Compatibility with US Jurisprudence

United States (US) jurisprudence has been imported by the Indian Supreme Court in an inconsistent manner. Some judgments hold that the American first amendment harbours no exception and hence is incompatible with Indian jurisprudence, while other judgments have used American precedent when convenient. Indian courts have on occasion imported an additional restriction beyond the eight available in 19(2)-the ground of public interest, best exemplified by the cases of K A Abbas¹⁰ and Ranjit Udeshi.¹¹ The bench in its judgment-which has been characterised by Pranesh Prakash as a masterclass in free speech jurisprudence¹²-clarifies that while the American first amendment jurisprudence is applicable in India, the only area where a difference is made is in the "sub serving of general public interest" made under the US law. This eloquent judgment will hopefully instruct judges in the future on how they should import precedent from American free speech jurisprudence.

Article 14 Challenge

The Article 14 challenge brought forward by the petitioners contended that Section 66A violated their fundamental right to equality because it differentiated between offline and online speech in terms of the length of maximum sentence, and was hence unconstitutional. The Court held that an intelligible differentia, indeed, did exist. It found so on two grounds. First, the internet offered people a medium through which they can express views at negligible or no cost. Second, the Court likened the rate of dissemination of information on the internet to the speed of lightning and could potentially reach millions of people all over the world. Before Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court had already accepted medium-specific regulation. For example in K A Abbas, the Court made a distinction between films and other media, stating that the impact of films on an average illiterate Indian viewer was more profound than other forms of communication. The pessimistic reading of Shreya Singhal is that Parliament can enact medium-specific law as long as there is an intelligible differentia which could even be a technical difference-speed of transmission. However, the optimistic interpretation is that medium-specific law can only be enacted if there are medium-specific harms, e g, phishing, which has no offline equivalent. If the executive adopts the pessimistic reading, then draconian sections like 66A will find their way back into the IT Act. Instead, if they choose the optimistic reading, they will introduce bills that fill the regulatory vacuum that has been created by the striking down of S66A, that is, spam and cyberbullying.

Section 79

Section 79 was partially read down. This section, again introduced during the 2008 amendment, was supposed to give legal immunity to intermediaries for third party content by giving a quick redressal for those affected by providing a mechanism for takedown notices in the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules notified in April 2011. But the section and rules had enabled unchecked invisible censorship¹³ in India and has had a demonstrated chilling effect on speech¹⁴ because of the following reasons:

One, there are additional unconstitutional restrictions on speech and expression. Rule 3(2) required a standard "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" that would have to be incorporated by all intermediaries. Under these rules, users are prohibited from hosting, displaying, uploading, modifying, publishing, transmitting, updating or sharing any information that falls into different content categories, a majority of which are restrictions on speech which are completely out of the scope of Article 19(2). For example, there is an overly broad category which contains information that harms minors in any way. Information that "belongs to another person and to which the user does not have any right to" could be personal information or could be intellectual property. A much better intermediary liability provision was introduced into the Copyright Act with the 2013 amendment. Under the Copyright Act, content could be reinstated if the takedown notice was not followed up with a court order within 21 days.¹⁵ A counter-proposal drafted by the Centre for Internet and Society for "Intermediary Due Diligence and Information Removal," has a further requirement for reinstatement that is not seen in the Copyright Act.¹⁶

Two, a state-mandated private censorship regime is created. You could ban speech online without approaching the court or the government. Risk-aversive private intermediaries who do not have the legal resources to subjectively determine the legitimacy of a legal claim err on the side of caution and takedown content.

Three, the principles of natural justice are not observed by the rules of the new censorship regime. The creator of information is not required to be notified nor given a chance to be heard by the intermediary. There is no requirement for the intermediary to give a reasoned decision.

Four, different classes of intermediaries are all treated alike. Since the internet is not an uniform assemblage of homogeneous components, but rather a complex ecosystem of diverse entities, the different classes of intermediaries perform different functions and therefore contribute differently to the causal chain of harm to the affected person. If upstream intermediaries like registrars for domain names are treated exactly like a web-hosting service or social media service then there will be over-blocking of content.

Five, there are no safeguards to prevent abuse of takedown notices. Frivolous complaints could be used to suppress legitimate expressions without any fear of repercussions and given that it is not possible to expedite reinstatement of content, the harm to the creator of information may be irreversible if the information is perishable. Transparency requirements with sufficient amounts of detail are also necessary given that a human right was being circumscribed. There is no procedure to have the removed information reinstated by filing a counter notice or by appealing to a higher authority.

The judgment has solved half the problem by only making intermediaries lose immunity if they ignore government orders or court orders. Private takedown notices sent directly to the intermediary without accompanying government orders or courts order no longer have basis in law. The bench made note of the Additional Solicitor General's argument that user agreement requirements as in Rule 3(2) were common practice across the globe and then went ahead to read down Rule 3(4) from the perspective of private takedown notices. One way of reading this would be to say that the requirement for standardised "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" remains. The other more consistent way of reading this part of the order in conjunction with the striking down of 66A would be to say those parts of the user agreement that are in violation of Article 19(2) have also been read down.

This would have also been an excellent opportunity to raise the transparency requirements both for the State and for intermediaries: for (i) the person whose speech is being censored, (ii) the persons interested in consuming that speech, and (iii) the general public. It is completely unclear whether transparency in the case of India has reduced the state appetite for censorship. Transparency reports from Facebook, Google and Twitter claim that takedown notices from the Indian government are on the rise.¹⁷ However, on the other hand, the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEITY) claims that government statistics for takedowns do not match the numbers in these transparency reports.¹⁸ The best way to address this uncertainty would be to require each takedown notice and court order to be made available by the State, intermediary and also third-party monitors of free speech like the Chilling Effects Project.

Section 69A

The Court upheld S69A which deals with website blocking, and found that it was a narrowly-drawn provision with adequate safeguards, and, hence, not constitutionally infirm. In reality, unfortunately, website blocking usually by internet service providers (ISPs) is an opaque process in India. Blocking under S69A has been growing steadily over the years. In its latest response to an RTI (right to information)¹⁹ query from the Software Freedom Law Centre, DEITY said that 708 URLs were blocked in 2012, 1,349 URLs in 2013, and 2,341 URLs in 2014. On 30 December 2014 alone, the centre blocked 32 websites to curb Islamic State of Iraq and Syria propaganda, among which were "pastebin" websites, code repository (Github) and generic video hosting sites (Vimeo and Daily Motion).²⁰ Analysis of leaked block lists and lists received as responses to RTI requests have revealed that the block orders are full of errors (some items do not exist, some items are not technically valid web addresses), in some cases counter speech which hopes to reverse the harm of illegal speech has also been included, web pages from mainstream media houses have also been blocked and some URLs are base URLs which would result in thousands of pages getting blocked when only a few pages might contain allegedly illegal content.²¹

Pre-decisional Hearing

The central problem with the law as it stands today is that it allows for the originator of information to be isolated from the process of censorship. The Website Blocking Rules provide that all "reasonable efforts" must be made to identify the originator or the intermediary who hosted the content. However, Gautam Bhatia offers an optimistic reading of the judgment, he claims that the Court has read into this "or" and made it an "and"-thus requiring that the originator must also be notified of blocks when he or she can be identified.²²

Transparency

Usually, the reasons for blocking a website are unknown both to the originator of material as well as those trying to access the blocked URL. The general public also get no information about the nature and scale of censorship unlike offline censorship where the court orders banning books and movies are usually part of public discourse. In spite of the Court choosing to leave Section 69A intact, it stressed the importance of a written order for blocking, so that a writ may be filed before a high court under Article 226 of the Constitution. While citing this as an existing safeguard, the Court seems to have been under the impression that either the intermediary or the originator is normally informed, but according to Apar Gupta, a lawyer for the People's Union for Civil Liberties, "While the rules indicate that a hearing is given to the originator of the content, this safeguard is not evidenced in practice. Not even a single instance exists on record for such a hearing."²³ Even worse, block orders have been unevenly implemented by ISPs with variations across telecom circles, connectivity technologies, making it impossible for anyone to independently monitor and reach a conclusion whether an internet resource is inaccessible as a result of a S69A block order or due to a network anomaly.

Rule 16 under S69A requires confidentiality with respect to blocking requests and complaints, and actions taken in that regard. The Court notes that this was argued to be unconstitutional, but does not state their opinion on this question. Gautam Bhatia holds the opinion that this, by implication, requires that requests cannot be confidential. Chinmayi Arun, from the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi, one of the academics supporting the petitioners, holds the opinion that it is optimism carried too far to claim that the Court noted the challenge to Rule 16 but just forgot about it in a lack of attention to detail that is belied by the rest of the judgment.

Free speech researchers and advocates have thus far used the RTI Act to understand the censorship under S69A. The Centre for Internet and Society has filed a number of RTI queries about websites blocked under S69A and has never been denied information on grounds of Rule 16.²⁴ However, there has been an uneven treatment of RTI queries by DEITY in this respect, with the Software Freedom Law Centre²⁵ being denied blocking orders on the basis of Rule 16. The Court could have protected free speech and expression by reading down Rule 16 except for a really narrow set of exceptions wherein only aggregate information would be made available to affected parties and members of the public.

Conclusions

In Shreya Singhal, the Court gave us great news: S66A has been struck down; good news: S79(3) and its rules have been read down; and bad news: S69A has been upheld. When it comes to each section, the impact of this judgment can either be read optimistically or pessimistically, and therefore we must wait for constitutional experts to weigh in on the ripple effect that this order will produce in other areas of free speech jurisprudence in India. But even as free speech activists celebrate Shreya Singhal, some are bemoaning the judgment as throwing the baby away with the bathwater, and wish to reintroduce another variant of S66A. Thus, we must remain vigilant.

Notes

1 G S Mudur (2012): "66A 'Cut and Paste Job,'" The Telegraph, 3 December, visited on 3 April, 2015, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1121 203/jsp/frontpage/story_16268138.jsp

2 Sunil Abraham (2012): "The Five Monkeys and Ice Cold Water," Centre for Internet and Society, 26 September, visited on 3 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/www-deccan-chronicle-sep-16-201...

3 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Striking Down of 66A: How Free Speech Jurisprudence in India Found Its Soul Again," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 26 March, visited on 4 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/26/the-striking-down-of-sect...

4 Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP, 1957, SCR 860.

5 Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar, 1962, AIR 955.

6 Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of UP, AIR, 1968 All 100.

7 S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram, 1989, SCC(2), 574.

8 Arup Bhuyan vs Union of India, (2011), 3 SCC 377.

9 Lawrence Liang, Alternative Law Forum, personal communication to author, 6 April 2015.

10 K A Abbas vs Union of India, 1971 SCR (2), 446.

11 Ranjit Udeshi vs State of Maharashtra,1965 SCR (1) 65.

12 Pranesh Prakash (2015): "Three Reasons Why 66A Verdict Is Momentous"/ Times of India/(29 March). Visited on 6 April 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-times/all-that-matters/Th...

13 Pranesh Prakash (2011): "Invisble Censorship: How the Government Censors Without Being Seen," The Centre for Internet and Society, 14 December, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/invisible-censorship

14 Rishabh Dara (2012): "Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet," The Centre for Internet and Society, 27 April, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/chilling-effects-on-free-expres... .

15 Rule 75, Copyright Rules, 2013.

16 The Draft Counter Proposal is available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/counter-proposal-by-cis-draft-i...

17 According to Facebook's transparency report, there were 4,599 requests in the first half of 2014, followed by 5,473 requests in the latter half. Available at https://govtrequests.facebook. com/country/India/2014-H2/ also see Google's transparency report available at http: //www.google. com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/?hl=en and Twitter's report, available at https:// transparency.twitter.com/country/in

18 Surabhi Agarwal (2015): "Transparency Reports of Internet Companies are Skewed: Gulashan Rai," Business Standard, 31 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/transparency-re... .

19 http://sflc.in/deity-says-2341-urls-were-blocked-in-2014-refuses-to-reve...

20 "32 Websites Go Blank," The Hindu, 1 January 2015, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/now-modi-govt-blocks-32-websites/a...

21 Pranesh Prakash (2012): "Analysing Latest List of Blocked Sites (Communalism and Rioting Edition)," 22 August, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysing-blocked-sites-ri... . Also, see Part II of the same series at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/analyzing-the-latest-list-of-bl... and analysis of blocking in February 2013, at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analyzing-latest-list-of-b...

22 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Supreme Court's IT Act Judgment, and Secret Blocking," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 25 March, viewed on 6 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/25/the-supreme-courts-it-act...

23 Apar Gupta (2015): "But What about Section 69A?," Indian Express, 27 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://indianexpress. com/article/opinion/ columns/but-what-about-section-69a/

24 Pranesh Prakash (2011): DIT's Response to RTI on Website Blocking, The Centre for Internet and Society, 7 April, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rti-response-dit-blocking ). Also see http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-dit-response-2nd-... and http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/reply-to-rti-applicat...

25 http://sflc.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/RTI-blocking-final-reply-from-...

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-and-political-weekly-sunil-abraham-april-11-2015-shreya-singhal-and-66a

Don’t SLAPP free speech

sunil — 2013-02-28T11:22:09Z

IIPM is proving adept at the tactical use of lawsuits to stifle criticism, despite safeguards. THE DEPARTMENT of Telecommunications, on 14 February, issued orders to block certain web pages critical of the Indian Institute of Planning and Management (IIPM).

Sunil Abraham's column with inputs from Snehashish Ghosh was published in Tehelka on February 3, 2013 (Issue 9 Volume 10)

Despite our best efforts, we have not managed to get a copy of the court order. Meanwhile, there has been a lot of speculation among Internet policy experts on Twitter. What is the title of the case? Which judge issued the order? Who is the affected party? Why have mainstream media houses like Outlook not been served notice by the court? Is the infamous Section 66A of the IT Act to be blamed? That is highly unlikely. News reports suggest that a lower court in Gwalior has issued an ad interim injunction in a defamation suit. Most experts agree that this is a SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) suit, where a company uses the cost of mounting a legal defence to silence critics.

Bullies with deep pockets use the law in very creative ways, such as forum shopping, forum shifting and the use of proxies. Forum shopping can be best understood through the example of mining giant Fomento suing Goan blogger Sebastian Rodrigues for $1 billion at the Kolkata High Court, even though Goa would have been a more logical location. Though IIPM lost an earlier case against Careers360 before the Uttaranchal High Court, the offending URLs from that case are included in the latest block order, exemplifying successful forum shifting. The doctrine of ‘res subjudice’ does not permit courts to proceed in a matter which is “directly and substantially” similar to a previous suit between the same parties. Proxies are usually employed to circumvent this procedural doctrine.

Article 19(2) of our Constitution empowers the State to create laws that place eight types (depending on how you count) of reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression. One of these reasonable restrictions is defamation. Tort law on defamation in India has been mostly borrowed from common law principles developed in the UK, which include a series of exceptions where the law cannot be used. In the present context, the exceptions important for the IIPM case include: fair and bona fide comment and matter of public interest. In addition, Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code provides for 10 exceptions to defamation. The exceptions relevant to this case are: “first: imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published”, “ninth: imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other’s interests” and “tenth: caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good”. The criminal law on defamation in India is based on robust legal principles, but for the sake of public interest it’d be best to do away with such a law as it has far-reaching, chilling effects on free speech.

On interim injunctions in defamation suits, the Delhi High Court set an important precedent protecting free speech in 2011. While applying the English principle — the Bonnard Rule — the court in Tata Sons Pvt Ltd versus Greenpeace International held that a higher standard should be adhered to while granting an interim injunction in a defamation suit, because such an injunction might impinge upon freedom of expression and thus potentially be in violation of the Indian Constitution. This century-old rule states that “until it is clear that an alleged libel is untrue… the importance of leaving free speech unfetter – ed is a strong reason in cases of libel for dealing most cautiously and warily with the granting of interim injunctions…”

In the same case, the Court rejected the argument that since it was published online and thus had wider reach and greater permanence, an injunction should be granted. It observed that “publication is a comprehensive term, embracing all forms and mediums — including the Internet”, thus ruling out special treatment for the Inter net in cases of defamation. That is good news for free speech online in India. Now let’s stick to it.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/tehelka-sunil-abraham-feb-3-2013-dont-slap-free-speech