Centre for Internet and Society

Women Arrested in Mumbai for Complaining on Facebook

praskrishna — 2012-11-21T11:32:04Z

For over 30 hours following the death of the Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray on Saturday, stores throughout Mumbai closed their shutters and taxis and autorickshaws stayed off the streets.

This article by Neha Thirani and Hari Kumar was published in New York Times on November 19, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

While analysts throughout Mumbai debated whether the citywide shutdown following the death of Mr. Thackeray was inspired by fear or respect, one 21-year-old woman and her friend were arrested for raising a similar question.

On Sunday, the police in Palghar, in Thane district, on the outskirts of Mumbai, arrested Shaheen Dhadha after she posted a status update on Facebook that questioned the shutdown, also known as a bandh. A local daily, the Mumbai Mirror, reported that Ms. Dhadha, 21, had written, "People like Thackeray are born and die daily and one should not observe a bandh for that." The police also arrested her friend who "liked" the post, whom NDTV identified by her first name, Renu.

The women were arrested under Section 505 of the Indian Penal Code for “statements creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill will between classes.” Srikant Pingle, station house in charge of the Palghar police, told India Ink that the local Shiv Sena chief, whom he identified as “Mr. Bhushan,” filed the complaint against Ms. Dhadha because her comment on Facebook hurt Shiv Sena’s sentiments. Mr. Pingle declined to comment further on the details of the arrests.

Sudhir Gupta, the defense counsel for the two women, told NDTV, “Their posts don’t incite violence. It can’t be said they have made any derogatory remarks. They don’t belong to any political ideology.”

In a phone conversation with India Ink, a police officer of the Palghar station, who identified himself only as Gavali, said that the arrest took place on Sunday night and that the pair had been taken to court on Monday.

The two women, who were sentenced to 14 days in jail by the court, received bail after a bond of 15,000 rupees ($270) was paid, reported NDTV.

The Times of India reported that a mob of 2,000 Shiv Sena workers vandalized her uncle’s orthopedic clinic in Palghar. Repeated calls made to the Dhada orthopedic hospital in Thane went unanswered, while Harshal Pradhan, a Shiv Sena spokesman, said that he was unaware of the incident.

A police officer at the Palghar Police Station, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that no one has been arrested in the attack on the clinic.

Pranesh Prakash, program manager with the Center for Internet and Society, said the arrests of the two women were a violation of free speech and the misapplication of the law. “There were thousands of people on Facebook, Twitter and in person who were saying the exact same kinds of things that this girl is alleged to have said,” said Mr. Prakash. “And the fact that only she and one other person who liked that comment have been arrested shows a clear arbitrariness in the application of the law.”

In an open letter addressed to the chief minister of Maharashtra, the former Supreme Court Judge Markandey Katju defended the two women, saying, “To my mind it is absurd to say that protesting against a bandh hurts religious sentiments.” He further said that the arrest appears to be a criminal act as it is a crime to wrongfully arrest or wrongfully confine someone who has committed no crime.

On social networking sites, people came out in support of Ms. Dhadha and her friend. The Facebook group “Ban Shiv Sena” had about 36,400 "likes" as of Monday afternoon, while the party’s official Facebook page had just under 2,700. On Twitter, several commenters expressed solidarity with the two women, including Milind Deora, the government minister of state, communications and information technology, who said, "To learn who rules over you, simply find out who you are not allowed to criticize ~ Voltaire."

In Maharashtra, Shiv Sena has a history of banning books, movies and other popular culture that are critical of the political party. In 2010, Rohinton Mistry’s book, "Such a Long Journey," was withdrawn from the syllabus of Mumbai University after Shiv Sena officials complained that the book insulted Bal Thackeray. Ironically, in a January 2007 interview with Shekhar Gupta, the editor in chief of The Indian Express, Mr. Thackeray said that what differentiated him from the mafia is that journalists and others were free to disagree with him and criticize him.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/india-blogs-nytimes-nov-19-2012-neha-thirani-hari-kumar-women-arrested-in-mumbai-for-complaining-on-facebook

Girls arrested for Facebook post on Thackeray get bail

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T05:18:30Z

Two girls who were arrested for making a Facebook comment protesting the closure of shops in the wake of Shiv Sena supremo Bal Thackeray‘s death, have been released on bail bonds of Rs 15,000 each.

This article was published in the FirstPost on November 19, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

The duo, one of whom had reportedly updated her Facebook status to read “People like Thackeray are born and die daily and one should not observe a bandh for that” and the other one who ‘liked’ it, were initially booked under section 295A (hurting the religious sentiment of others) and were reportedly remanded to judicial custody for 14 days, NDTV reported.

The two girls were arrested after a complaint made to the Palghar police station in neighbouring Thane district by a local Sena leader.

A group of Shiv Sainiks attacked and ransacked the girl’s uncle’s orthopaedic clinic at Palghar, even though she withdrew her comment and apologised.

In comments to Firstpost, Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society, said that the arrest was a gross misapplication of the Indian Penal Code, and said that this particular provision had been misused on multiple occasions by the state of Maharashtra.

“What makes this seem ironic, and almost a parodic news report, is the fact that Bal Thackeray probably violated this provision more times than most other politicians, but was only charged under it once or twice”, he said.

The arrest has predictably elicited outrage from across the spectrum. Many took to social media to express their disgust, while NDTV reported that Maharashtra police HQ in Mumbai was very upset with the action taken by the Palghar police.

Press Council of India Chairman Markandey Katju had also called for the immediate release of the girls and wrote to Maharashtra Chief Minister Prithviraj Chavan asking him to ensure it.

Pointing out that people were not living under a fascist dictatorship, he said that the act of arrest appeared to be a criminal act since it was a violation under sections of the Indian Penal Code to wrongfully arrest or confine anyone.

The PCI chief said that legal consequences would follow if the Chief Minister failed to take action.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/first-post-nov-19-2012-girls-arrested-for-facebook-post-on-thackeray-get-bail

India's Shame: World Reacts to FB Post Arrest

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T05:51:10Z

The arrest of 21 year old Shaheen Dhada for posting anti-Bal Thackeray comments has not only outraged Indians. The story has been picked up and reported across international media as well. Though they may not be aware of the complexities of Indian politics, the fact that young girls were arrested for an FB post has got them questioning the dwindling tolerance for the freedom of speech in India.

This was posted by Sonal Bhadoria in IndiaTimes on November 21, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

The Wall Street Journal warns ,'You better think twice before 'Liking' your friends' comments on Facebook. It may land you in jail.' The article quotes Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society saying “Bal Thackeray had violated the same provisions in his lifetime,” with reference to Mr. Thackeray’s inflammatory speeches against the South Indians and Muslims.

The BBC put a question mark on India's commitment to freedom of speech by citing recent examples of the arrest of a cartoonist like Ravi Srinivasan, a 46-year-old businessman in the southern Indian city of Pondicherry, who was arrested for a tweet criticising Karti Chidambaram, son of Indian Finance Minister P Chidambaram.

UK's Daily Mail, says 'So much for freedom of speech' and questions the IT act which led to the arrest.

In a New York Times article, Pranesh Prakash questioned the arbitrariness in the application of the law saying 'There were thousands of people on Facebook, Twitter and in person who were saying the exact same kinds of things that this girl is alleged to have said'. The article also stated that Shiv Sena has a history of banning books, movies and other popular culture that are critical of the political party.

Mashable noted that several dissenters had taken to Twitter to speak out about the arrest including Milind Deora, the government minister of state, communications and information technology, who showed support for Dhadha and Renu with this tweet:

Milind Deora
@milinddeora

To learn who rules over you, simply find out who you are not allowed to criticize ~ Voltaire
It also asked 'Do you think Facebook is a good place to voice political opinions?'

The Christian Science Monitor calls the incident 'the latest in a string of crackdowns on Internet speech in the world's largest democracy'. It says, 'The other cases have included arrest of a resident of Chandigarh who complained on the Facebook page of Chandigarh police that they were not doing enough to find her stolen car; a cartoonist who posted work online protesting corruption scandals by the central government; and a professor in Kolkata who merely forwarded an email with a cartoon that was critical of West Bengal chief minister Mamata Banerjee.' The article also mentions Shaheen Dhada’s uncle, Dr. Abdullah Ghaffar Dhada stating that he had incurred losses of two million Rupees due to the ransacking of his clinic by angry Shiv Sainiks.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/indiatimes-sonal-bhadoria-nov-21-2012-indias-shame-world-reacts-to-fb-post-arrest

Thousands go online against 66A

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T06:40:38Z

An online petition aimed at amending section 66A of the Information Technology (IT) Act and re-examining internet laws has garnered 3,000 signatures since it began on Tuesday — two days before Kapil Sibal, telecom and IT minister, chairs a meeting with the cyber regulation advisory committee.

This article by Apoorva Dutt was published in DNA on November 29, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

The petition, anchored on Change.org, a platform for social initiatives, was started by Bangalore-based advocate Gautam John after two girls were arrested for their Facebook post on imposing a bandh in the city on the day Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray was cremated. Following their arrests, Shaheen Dhada has deleted her Facebook account while her friend Rini Srinivasan who merely liked the post has opened a new account on the social networking site. However, she has vowed to refrain from making political statements.

John is blunt about the legislative effect an online petition can have. l Turn to p8.

“Honestly, I don’t believe that a petition can change laws, but it gives concerned citizens a platform for documenting their concern in such troubling scenarios. To some extent, this sort of petition can represent a civil society’s point of view. No more can a government authority say ‘only NGOs care about an issue’. Now they know – thousands of ordinary people care,” John said.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre For Internet and Society in Bangalore, points out the flaws in section 66A that have been exploited in cases like the Palghar incident. “Section 66A is very broadly-worded and the punishment (three years imprisonment) is excessive,” he said. “The law was borrowed – that too badly – from a British law. There are many a things greatly flawed in this unconstitutional provision, from the disproportionality of the punishment to the non-existence of the crime. The 2008 amendment to the IT Act was one of eight laws passed in 15 minutes without any debate in the winter session of Parliament.”

The petition also aims to organise a meeting of the civil society stakeholders to look into these concerns. A similar meeting was scheduled to be held in August, but it did not take place.

Sudarshan Balachandran of Change.org is the lead campaigner and organiser of the petition. He hopes to hand over a copy of the petition to Sibal during the meeting on Thursday. “Sibal has gone on record to say that they will examine the law, and if they feel it doesn’t work, it will be junked. So I am hopeful,” said Balachandran.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/dnaindia-nov-29-2012-apoorva-dutt-thousands-go-online-against-66a

Free Speech and Surveillance

Gautam Bhatia — 2014-07-07T04:59:59Z

Gautam Bhatia examines the constitutionality of surveillance by the Indian state.

The Indian surveillance regime has been the subject of discussion for quite some time now. Its nature and scope is controversial. The Central Monitoring System, through which the government can obtain direct access to call records, appears to have the potential to be used for bulk surveillance, although official claims emphasise that it will only be implemented in a targeted manner. The Netra system, on the other hand, is certainly about dragnet collection, since it detects the communication, via electronic media, of certain “keywords” (such as “attack”, “bomb”, “blast” and “kill”), no matter what context they are used in, and no matter who is using them.

Surveillance is quintessentially thought to raise concerns about privacy. Over a series of decisions, the Indian Supreme Court has read in the right to privacy into Article 21’s guarantee of the right to life and personal liberty. Under the Supreme Court’s (somewhat cloudy) precedents, privacy may only be infringed if there is a compelling State interest, and if the restrictive law is narrowly tailored – that is, it does not infringe upon rights to an extent greater than it needs to, in order to fulfill its goal. It is questionable whether bulk surveillance meets these standards.

Surveillance, however, does not only involve privacy rights. It also implicated Article 19 – in particular, the Article 19(1)(a) guarantee of the freedom of expression, and the 19(1)(c) guarantee of the freedom of association.

Previously on this blog, we have discussed the “chilling effect” in relation to free speech. The chilling effect evolved in the context of defamation cases, where a combination of exacting standards of proof, and prohibitive damages, contributed to create a culture of self-censorship, where people would refrain from voicing even legitimate criticism for fear of ruinous defamation lawsuits. The chilling effect, however, is not restricted merely to defamation, but arises in free speech cases more generally, where vague and over-broad statutes often leave the border of the permitted and the prohibited unclear.

Indeed, a few years before it decided New York Times v. Sullivan, which brought in the chilling effect doctrine into defamation and free speech law, the American Supreme Court applies a very similar principle in a surveillance case. In NAACP v. Alabama, the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), which was heavily engaged in the civil rights movement in the American deep South, was ordered by the State of Alabama to disclose its membership list. NAACP challenged this, and the Court held in its favour. It specifically connected freedom of speech, freedom of association, and the impact of surveillance upon both:

“Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the “liberty” assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny… it is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute [an] effective a restraint on freedom of association… this Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one’s associations. Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”

In other words, if persons are not assured of privacy in their association with each other, they will tend to self-censor both who they associate with, and what they say to each other, especially when unpopular groups, who have been historically subject to governmental or social persecution, are involved. Indeed, this was precisely the argument that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) made in its constitutional challenge to PRISM, the American bulk surveillance program. In addition to advancing a Fourth Amendment argument from privacy, the ACLU also made a First Amendment freedom of speech and association claim, arguing that the knowledge of bulk surveillance had made – or at least, was likely to have made – politically unpopular groups wary of contacting it for professional purposes (the difficulty, of course, is that any chilling effect argument effectively requires proving a negative).

If this argument holds, then it is clear that Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c) are prima facie infringed in cases of bulk – or even other forms of – surveillance. Two conclusions follow: first, that any surveillance regime needs statutory backing. Under Article 19(2), reasonable restrictions upon fundamental rights can only be imposed by law, and not be executive fiat (the same argument applies to Article 21 as well).

Assuming that a statutory framework is brought into force, the crucial issue then becomes whether the restriction is a reasonable one, in service of one of the stated 19(2) interests. The relevant part of Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions upon the freedom of speech and expression “in the interests of… the security of the State [and] public order.” The Constitution does not, however, provide a test for determining when a restriction can be legitimately justified as being “in the interests of” the security of the State, and of public order. There is not much relevant precedent with respect to the first sub-clause, but there happens to be an extensive – although conflicted – jurisprudence dealing with the public order exception.

One line of cases – characterised by Ramji Lal Modi v. State of UP and Virendra v. State of Punjab – has held that the phrase “for the interests of” is of very wide ambit, and that the government has virtually limitless scope to make laws ostensibly for securing public order (this extends to prior restraint as well, something that Blackstone, writing in the 18^th century, found to be illegal!). The other line of cases, such as Superintendent v. Ram Manohar Lohia and S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, have required the government to satisfy a stringent burden of proof. In Lohia, for instance, Ram Manohar Lohia’s conviction for encouraging people to break a tax law was reversed, the Court holding that the relationship between restricting free speech and a public order justification must be “proximate”. In Rangarajan, the Court used the euphemistic image of a “spark in a powder keg”, to characterise the degree of proximity required. It is evident that under the broad test of Ramji Lal Modi, a bulk surveillance system is likely to be upheld, whereas under the narrow test of Lohia, it is almost certain not to be.

Thus, if the constitutionality of surveillance comes to Court, three issues will need to be decided: first, whether Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c) have been violated. Secondly – and if so – whether the “security of the State” exception is subject to the same standards as the “public order” exception (there is no reason why it should not be). And thirdly, which of the two lines of precedent represent the correct understanding of Article 19(2)?

Gautam Bhatia — @gautambhatia88 on Twitter — is a graduate of the National Law School of India University (2011), and has just received an LLM from the Yale Law School. He blogs about the Indian Constitution at http://indconlawphil.wordpress.com. Here at CIS, he blogs on issues of online freedom of speech and expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/free-speech-and-surveillance

Reply to RTI Application on Blocking of website and Rule 419A of Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951

praskrishna — 2013-03-21T07:58:12Z

The Department of Telecommunications sent its reply to an RTI application from the Centre for Internet and Society. The application was sent on December 27, 2012 with reference to blocking of websites and Rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.

To
Shri Subodh Saxena
Central Public Information Officer (RTI)
Director (DS-II), Room No 1006, Sanchar Bhawan
Department of Télécommunications (DoT)
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
20, Ashoka Road, New Delhi — 110001

Dear Sir,
Subject: Information on Website Blocking Requested under the Right to Information Act, 2005

1. Full Name of the Applicant: Centre for Internet & Society

2. Address of the Applicant

Mailing Address: Centre for Internet and Society
194, 2־C Cross,
Domlur Stage II,
Bangalore 560071

3. Details of the information required

It has come to our attention that Airtel Broadband Services ("Airtel") and Mahanagar Téléphoné Nigam Limited ("MTNL") have recently blocked access to a number of domain sites for all their users across the country. Airtel has blocked Fabulous Domains (http://www.fabulous.com/), BuyDomains (http://www.buvdomains.com/) and Sedo (http://sedo.co.uk/uk/home/welcome/). MTNL has blocked Sedo (http://sedo.co.uk/uk/home/welcQme/). Subscribers trying to access this website receive a message noting "This website/URL has been blocked until further notice either pursuant to Court orders or on the Directions issued by the Department of Télécommunications". In this regard, we request information on the following queries under Section 6(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005:

Does the Department have powers to require an Internet Service Provider to block a website? If so, please provide a citation of the statute under which power is granted to the Department, as well as the safeguards prescribed to be in accordance with Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.
Did the Department order Airtel or MTNL to block any or all of the above mentioned websites? If so, please provide a copy of such order or orders. If not, what action, if at all, has been taken by the Department against Airtel and MTNL for blocking of websites?
Has the Department ever ordered the blocking of any website? If so, please provide a list of addresses of all the websites that have been ordered to be blocked.
Please provide use the present composition of the Committee constituted under rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.
Please provide us the dates and copies of the minutes of all meetings held by the Committee constituted under rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951, and copies of all their recommendations.

4. Years to which the above requests pertain: 2012

5. Designation and address of the PIO from whom the information is required

Shri Subodh Saxena
Central Public Information Officer (RTI)
Director (DS-II), Room No 1006, Sanchar Bhawan
Department of Télécommunications (DoT)
Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
20, Ashoka Road, New Delhi — 110001

To the best of my belief, the détails sought for fall within your authority. Further, as provided under section 6(3) of the Right to Information Act ("RTI Act"), in case this application does not fall within your authority, I request you to transfer the same in the designated time (5 days) to the concerned authority and inform me of the same immediately.

To the best of my knowledge the information sought does not fall within the restrictions contained in section 8 and 9 of the RTI Act, and any provision protecting such information in any other law for the time being in force is inapplicable due to section 22 of the RTI Act.

Please provide me this information in electronic form, via the e-mail address provided above. This to certify that I, Smitha Krishna Prasad, am a citizen of India.

A fee of Rs. 10/- (Rupees Ten Only) has been made out in the form of a demand draft drawn in favour of "Pay and Accounts Officer (HQ), Department of Telecom" payable at New Delhi.

Date. Monday November 26,2012
Place: Bengaluru, Karnataka

Below is the reply received from the Department of Telecommunications for the above RTI application

Government of India
Department of Télécommunications
Sanchar Bhawan, 20, Ashoka Road. New Delhi -110 001
(DS-CelI)

No. DIR(DS-II)/RTI/2009																		Dated:ll/01/2013

To,
Centre for Internet and Society,
No. 194, 2-C Cross,
Domlur Stage II,
Bangalore - 560 071

This has reference to RTI application dated 27/12/2012 with reference to Blocking of website and Rule 419A of Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951

In this regard it is submitted that Internet Service licensees are to follow the provisions of Information Technology Act 2000 as amended from time to time. Under Information Technology Act 2000, "Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules 2009" were notified on 27/10/2009.(Annexure) Aforesaid notified rules describes the "Designated Officer" for the purpose of issuing direction for blocking for access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource under subsection (2) of Section 69(A) of the ACT. Wide Gazette Notification dated 20/01/2010 Group Coordinator , Cyber Law division, Department of Information Technology has been authorized and designated as "Designated Officer".

As per the directions of Group Coordinator, Cyber Law division, under Information Technology Act 2000, instructions for blocking/ unblocking of websites/URLs are issued to Internet Service Licensees.

As per the available information no instruction to Internet Service Providers has been issued for Blocking of http://www.fabulous.com/, http://www.buydomains.com/, http://sedo.co.uk/uk/home/welcome/ and http://sedo.co.uk/uk/home/welcome/ as mentioned in your RTI application.

Copies of Blocking order for which blocking instructions issued by DoT are not being provided are not provided as per Clause 16 of "Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules 2009" which says "Strict confidentiality shall be maintained regarding all the requests and complaints received and actions taken thereof."
With reference to information (Para 4 & 5 of RTI Aplication ) on Rule 419A of Indian Telegraph Rule, 1951 , the RTI is being forwarded to Dir (AS-III) & CPIO, DoT for providing the information.
The appeal, it any, may be made before Shri Nitin Jain, DDG(DS) & Appellate Authority, Department of Télécommunications, Room No. 1201, Sanchar Bhawan, 20 Ashoka Road, Nevy Delhi-110 001 within 30 days from the date of receipt of this letter.

Encl: As above
																							(Subodh Saxena) DIR (DS-II) 011-2303 6860 011-2335 9454

Copy to:

(I) Shri Rajiv Kumar, CPIO & Director (AS-III), DoT, New Delhi

NOTIFICATION
New Delhi, the 27th October, 2009

G.S.R. 781 (E). — In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (z) of sub-section (2) of section 87, read with sub-section (2) of section 69A of the Information Technology Act 2000 (21 of 2000), the Central Government hereby makes the following rules, namely:

Short title and commencement — (1) These rules may be called the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access and Information by Public) Rules, 2009.
(2) They shall come into force on the date of their publication in the Official Gazette.
Definitions. — In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires. —
(a) "Act" means the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000);
(b) "computer resource" means computer resource as defined in clause (k) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Act;
(c) "Designated Officer" means an officer designated as Designated Officer under rule 3;
(d) "Form" means a form appended to these rules;
(e) "intermediary" means an intermediary as defined in clause (w) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Act;
(f) "nodal officer" means the nodal officer designated as such under rule 4;
(g) "organisation" means
(i) Ministries or Departments of the Government of India;
(ii) State Governments and Union Territories;
(iii) Any agency of the Central Government, as may be notified in the Official Gazette, by the Central Government
(h) "request" means the request for blocking of access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource;
(i) "Review Committee" means the Review Committee constituted under rule 419A of Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951.
Designated Officer — The Central Government shall designate by notification in Official Gazette, an officer of the Central Government not below the rank of a Joint Secretary, as the "Designated Officer", for the purpose of issuing direction for blocking for access by the public any information generated, transmitted. received,, stored or hosted in any computer resource under sub-section (2) of section 69A of the Act.
Nodal officer or organisation.— Every organisation for the purpose of these rules, shall designate one of its officer as the Nodal Officer and shall intimate the same to the Central Government in the Department of Information Technology under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technotogy, Government of India and also publish the name of the said Nodal Officer on their website.
Direction by Designated Officer. — The Designated Officer may, on receipt of any request from the Nodal Officer of an organisation or a competent court, by order direct any Agency of the Government or intermediary to block for access by the public any information or part thereof generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource for any of the reasons specified in sub-section (1) of section 69A of the Act.
Forwarding of requests by organisation. — (1) Any person may send their complaint to the Nodal Officer of the concerned organisation for blocking of access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource:
Provided that any request other than the one from the Nodal Officer of the organisation shall be sent with the approval of the Chief Secretary of the concerned State or Union territory to the Designated Officer.
Provided further that in case a Union territory has no Chief Secretary, then, such request may be approved by the Adviser to the Administrator of that Union territory.
(2) The organisation shall examine the complaint received under sub-rule (1) to satisfy themselves about the need for taking of action in relation to the reasons enumerated in sub-section (1) of section 69A of the Act and after being satisfied, it shall send the request through its Nodal Officer to the Designated Officer in the format specified in the Form appended to these rules.
(3) The Designated Officer shall not entertain any complaint or request for blocking of information directly from any person.
(4) The request shall be in writing on the letter head of the respective organisation, complete in all respects and may be sent either by mail or by fax or by e-mail signed with electronic signature of the Nodal Officer.
Provided that in case the request is sent by fax or by e-mail which is not signed with electronic signature, the Nodal Officer shall provide a signed copy of the request so as to reach the Designated Officer within a period of three days of receipt of the request by such fax or e-mail.
(5) On receipt, each request shall be assigned a number along with the date and time of its receipt by the Designated Officer and he shall acknowledge the receipt thereof to the Nodal Officer within a period of twenty four hours of its receipt.
Committee for examinatlon of request.— The request along with the printed sample content of the alleged offending information or part thereof shall be examined by a committee consisting of the Designated Officer as its chairperson and representatives, not below the rank of Joint Secretary in Ministries of Law and Justice, Home Affairs. Information and Broadcasting and the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team appointed under sub-section (1) of section 70B of the Act.
Examination of request.— (1) On receipt of request under rule 6, the Designated Officer shall make all reasonable efforts to identify the person or intermediary who has hosted the information or part thereof as well as the computer resource on which such information or part thereof is being hosted and where he is able to identify such person or intermediary and the computer resource hosting the informalion or part thereof which have been requested to be blocked for public access, he shall issue a notice by way of letters or fax or e-mail signed with electronic signatures to such person or intermediary in control of such computer resource to appear and submit their reply and clarifications, if any, before the committee referred to in rule 7, at a specified date and time, which shall not be less than forty-eight hours from the time of receipt of such notice by such person or intermediary.
(2) In case of non-appearance of such person or intermediary, who has been served with the notice under sub-rule (I), before the committee on such specified date and time, the committee shall give specific recommendation in writing with respect to the request received from the Nodal Officer, based on the information available with the committee.
(3) In case, such a person or intermediary, who has been served with the notice under sub-rule (1), is a foreign entity or body corporate as identified by the Designated Officer, notice shall be sent by way of letters or fax or e-mail signed with electronic signatures to such foreign entity or body corporate and any such foreign entity or body corporate shall respond to such a notice within the time specified therein, failing which the committee shall give specific recommendation in writing with respect to the request received from the Nodal Officer, based on the information available with the committee.
(4) The committee referred to in rule 7 shall examine the request and printed sample information and consider whether the request is covered within the scope of sub-section (1) of section 69A of the Act and that it is justifiable to block such information or part thereof and shall give specific recommendation in writing with respect to the request received from the Nodal Officer.
(5) The designated Officer shall submit the recommendation of the committee, in respect of the request for blocking of information along with the details sent by the Nodal Officer to the Secretary in the Department of Information Technology under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Government of India (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary, Department of Information Technology").
(6) The Designated Officer, on approval of the request by the Secretary, Department of Information Technology, shall direct any agency of the Government or the intermediary to block the offending information generaled, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in their computer resource for public access within time limit specified in the direction:
Provided that in case the request of the Nodal Officer is not approved by the Secretary, Department of Information Technology, the Designated Officer shall convey the same to such Nodal Officer.
Blocking of Information in cases of emergency.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 7 and 8, the Designated Officer, in any case of emergency nature, for which no delay is acceptable, shall examine the request and printed sample information and consider whether the request is within the scope of sub-section (1) of section 69A of the Act and it is necessary or expedient and justifiable to block such information or part thereof and submit the request with specific recommendations in writing to Secretary, Department of Information Technology.
(2) In a case of emergency nature, tne Secretary. Department of Information Technology may, if he is satisfied that it is necessary or expedent and justifiable for blocking for public access of any information or part thereof through any computer resource and after recording reasons in writing as an interim measure issue such directions as he may consider necessary to such identified or identifiable persons or intermediary in control of such computer resource hosting such information or part thereof without giving him an opportunity of hearing.
(3) The Designated Officer, at ihe earliest but not later than forty-eight hours of issue of direction under sub-rule 2, shall bring the request before the committee referred to in rule 7 for its consideration and recommendation.
(4) On receipt of recommendations of committee, Secretary, Department of Information Technology, shall pass the final order as regard to approval of such request and in case the request for blocking is not approved by the Secretary. Department of Information Technology in his final order, the interim direction issued under sub-rule (2) shall be revoked and the person or intermediary in control of such information shall be accordingly directed to unblock the information for public access.
Process of order of court for blocking of Information — In case of an order from a competent court in India for blocking of any information or part thereof generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in a computer resource, the Designated Officer shall, immediately on receipt of certified copy of the court order, submit it to the Secretary, Department of Information Technology and initiate action as directed by the court.
Expeditious disposal of request - The request received from the Nodal Officer shall be decided expeditiously which in no case shall be more than seven working days from the date of receipt of the request.
Action for non-compliance of direction by Intermediary — In case the intermediary fails to comply with the direction issued to him under rule 9, the Designated Officer shall, with the prior approval of the Secretary, Department of Information Technology, initiate appropriate action as may be required to comply with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 69A of the Act.
Intermediary to designate one person to receive and handle directions — (1) Every intermediary shall designate at least one person to receive and handle the directions for blocking of access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource under these rules.
(2) The designated person of the intermediary shall acknowledge receipt of the directions to the Designated Officer within two hours on receipt of the direction through acknowledgement letter or fax or e-mail signed with electronic signature.
Meeting of Review Commlttee — The Review Committee shall meet at least once in two months and record its findings whether the directions issued under these rules are in accordance with the provisions of sub-seclion (1) of section 69A of the Act and if is of the opinion that the directions are not in accordance with the provisions referred above, it may set aside the directions and issue order for unblocking of said information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in a computer resource for public access.
Maintenance of records by Designated Officer — The Designated Officer shall maintain complete record of the request received and action taken thereof, in electronic database and also in register of the cases of blocking for public access of the information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in a computer resource.
Requests and complaints to be confidential — Strict confidentiality shall be maintained regarding all the requests and complaints received and actions taken thereof.

FORM
(See rule 6(2))

A. Complaint

Name of the complainant: --_________________________________________________________________
(Person who has sent the complaint to the Ministry/Department/State Govt./Nodal Officer)
Address: ________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
City: ______________________________ Pin Code: __________________
Telephone: ________________________ (prefix STD code)
Fax (if any): _______________________
Mobile (if any): ______________________
Email (if any): __________________________________

B. Details of website/computer resource/intermediary/offending information hosted on the website
(Please give details wherever known)
URL / web address: ____________________________________
IP Address: _______________________________________
Hyperlink: ________________________________________
Server/Proxy Server address: ________________________________________
Name of the Intermediary: _________________________________________
URL of the Intermediary: __________________________________________
(Please attach screenshot/printout of the offending information)
Address or location of intermediary in case the intermediary is telecom service provider, network service provider, internet service provider, web-hosting service provider and cyber cafe or other form of intermediary for which information under points (7), (8), (9), (10), (11) and (12) are not available.
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
C. Details of Request for blocking
Recommendations/Comments of the Ministry/State Govt: ________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
The level at which the comments/recommendation have been approved
(Please specify designation) ________________________________________________
Have the complaint been examined in Ministry / State Government: Y/N
If yes, under which of the following reasons it falls (please tick):
(i) Interest of sovereignty or integrity of India
(ii) Defence of India
(iii) Security of the State
(iv) Friendly relations with foreign states
(v) Public order
(vi) For preventing incitement to the commission of any cognisable offence relating to above
D. Details of the Nodal Officer, forwarding the complaint along with recommendation of the Ministry/State Govt. and related enclosures
Name of the Nodal Officer: ___________________________________________
Designation: ______________________________________________________
Organisation: _____________________________________________________
Address: ________________________________________________ _________

__________________________________________________________

City: __________________________ Pin Code: _________________
Telephone: ___________________________ (prefix STD code)
Fax (if any) _____________________
Mobile (if any) ______________________
Email (if any): ___________________________
E: Any other information:
F: Enclosures:

1.

2.

3.

Date Place Signature

[No. 9(16)J2004-EC]
N. RAVI SHANKER, Jt. Secy

3855GI/09-5

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/reply-to-rti-application-on-blocking-of-website-and-rule-419a-of-indian-telegraph-rules-1951

Analysis of DIT's Response to Second RTI on Website Blocking

pranesh — 2011-12-02T09:26:11Z

In this blog post, Pranesh Prakash briefly analyses the DIT's response to an RTI request on website blocking alongside the most recent edition of Google's Transparency Report, and what it tells us about the online censorship regime in India.

What the DIT's Response Tells Us, and What It Doesn't

We at the Centre for Internet and Society had sent in a right to information request to the Department of Information Technology (DIT) asking for more information about website blocking in India. The response we got from the DIT was illuminating in many ways. The following are the noteworthy points, in brief:

Six government officials, and one politician have so far made requests for 'disabling access' to certain online content under s.69A of the Information Technology (IT) Act.
68 individual items have been requested to be blocked, those being 64 websites (domain-level blocking), 1 sub-domain, and 3 specific web pages. Seemingly, none of these requests have been accepted.
The data provided by the government seemingly conflicts with the data released by the likes of Google (via its Transparency Report).
India's law enforcement agencies are circumventing the IT Act, the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and ultimately the Constitution, by not following proper procedure for removal of online content.
Either the DIT is not providing us all the relevant information on blocking, or is not following the law.

Conflicting Data on Censorship Requests

The latest Google Transparency Report, released on October 25, 2011, shows that there were 68 written requests (imaginably taking the form of forceful requests/orders) from Indian law enforcement agencies for removal of 358 items from Google's various. If you take the figures since January 2010, it adds up to over 765.

However, the official government statistics show only eight separate requests having been made to the DIT (which, under the IT Act, is the only authority that can order the blocking of online content), adding up to a total of 64 websites (domain-level), 1 sub-domain, and 3 specific web pages. Of these only 3 are for Google's services (2 for Blogger, and 1 for YouTube).

If classified according to presumable reason for seeking of the block, that would be 61 domains hosting adult content; 1 domain (tamil.net.in), 1 sub-domain (ulaginazhagiyamuthalpenn.blogspot.com), and 2 specific pages (video of a speech by Bal Thackeray on YouTube and Wikipedia page for Sukhbir Singh Badal) for political content; 1 for religious content (a blog post titled "Insults against Islam" in Malay); and 1 domain hosting online gambling (betfair.com). It is unclear for why one of the requests was made (topix.net).¹

Content Removal vs. Content Blocking

Section 69A of the IT Act provides the Central Government the power to "direct any agency of the Government or intermediary to block for access by the public or cause to be blocked for access by the public any information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in any computer resource". The only person through whom this power can be exercised is the 'Designated Officer' (currently Dr. Gulshan Rai of the DIT), who in turn has to follow the procedure laid down in the rules drafted under s.69A ("Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguard for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009", the 'Blocking Rules').

Because of this, we see everyone from the Secretary of the Public Law and Order Department of Tamil Nadu to the Joint Commissioner of Police of Mumbai and the State President of the Bharatiya Janata Minority Morcha approaching the Designated Officer for blocking of websites.

However, as the data from Google shows, there are many times more requests being sent to remove content. The only explanation for this is that an order to 'block for access... or cause to be blocked for access by the public' is taken to be different from an order for removal of content. Nothing in the IT Act, nor in the Blocking Rules actually address this issue.²

Thus, there is a possibility that the forcible removal of content is treated separately from blocking of content. That would mean that while blocking is regulated by the IT Act, forcible removal of content is not. Thus, it would seem that forcible removal of online content is happening without clear regulation or limits.³

Role of the Indian Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure

There are existing provisions in the Indian Penal Code that provide the government the power to censor book, pamphlets, and other material on varied grounds, including obscenity, causing of enmity between communities, etc. The police is provided powers to enforce such governmental orders. Section 95 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the State Government to declare (through an official notification) certain publications which seem to violate the Indian Penal Code as 'forfeited to the Government' and to issue search warrants for the same. After this the police can enforce that notification.

It is clear that this is not the case for any of the content removal requests that were sent to Google.

Police Are Defeating the Constitution and the IT Act

Therefore, it would seem that law enforcement agencies are operating outside the bounds set up under the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, as also the Information Technology Act, when they send requests for removal of content to companies like Google. While a company might comply with it because it appears to them to violate their own terms of service (which generally include a wide clause about content being in accordance with all local laws), community guidelines, etc., it would appear that it is not required under the law to do so if the order itself is not legal.

However, anecdotal evidence has it that most companies comply with such 'requests' even when they are not under any legal obligation to do so.

This way the intention of Parliament in enacting s.69A of the IT Act—to regulate government censorship of the Internet and bring it within the bounds laid down in the Constitution—is defeated.

DIT Either Evasive or Not Following Rules

The DIT did not provide answers on:

Whether any block ordered by the DIT has ever been revoked
On what basis DIT decides which intermediary (web host, ISP, etc.) to send the order of blocking to

It also provided the minutes for only one meeting⁴ of the committee that decides whether to carry out a block, when we had requested for minutes of all the meetings it has ever held. That committee (the Committee for Examination of Requests, constituted under Rule 8(4) of the Blocking Rules) has to consider every single item in every single request forwarded to the Designated Officer, and 68 items were sent to the Designated Officer in 6 requests. Quite clearly something doesn't add up. Either the Committee is not following the Blocking Rules or the DIT is not providing a full reply under the RTI Act.

A request was made to block http://www.topix.net, by the 'Commmissioner, Maharashtra State, Colaba, Mumbai—400001', presumably the Commissioner of State Intelligence Department of Maharashtra, whose office is located in Colaba. ↩
However, the Blocking Rules require the person or the hosting intermediary being contacted for a response. This provides the person/intermediary the opportunity to remove the content voluntarily or to oppose the request for blocking.

"Rule 8. Examination of request: (1) On receipt of request under rule 6, the Designated Officer shall make all reasonable efforts to identify the person or intermediary who has hosted the information or part thereof as well as the computer resource on which such information or part thereof is being hosted and where he is able to identify such person or intermediary and the computer resource hosting the information or part thereof which have been requested to be blocked for public access, he shall issue a notice by way of letters or fax or e-mail signed with electronic signatures to such person or intermediary in control of such computer resource to appear and submit their reply and clarifications if any, before the committee referred to in rule 7, at a specified date and time, which shall not be less than forty-eight hours from the time of receipt of such notice by such person or intermediary." ↩
While it is possible to imagine that the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure lay down limits, it is clear from the Google Transparency Report that the requests from removal are not coming based only on court orders, but from the executive and the police. The police have no powers under the IPC or the CrPC to request removal of content without either a public notification issued by the State Government or a court order. ↩
The minutes of the meeting held on August 24, 2010, on the request for blocking of www.betfair.com were sent as 'Annexure III' of the DIT response. This request was not granted. ↩

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-dit-response-2nd-rti-blocking

Haphazard censorship? Leaked list of blocked websites in India

praskrishna — 2012-08-23T06:18:45Z

An analysis of a leaked list of the websites blocked by Indian Internet Service Providers (ISPs) on directions from the Department of Telecom bring to light the inconsistencies in India's online censorship efforts.

Published in IBNLive on August 23, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

Pranesh Prakash, programme manager at the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), analysed the 309 specific items that were asked to be censored from August 18, till August 21, 2012 by the Indian government following the recent incidents of communal violence and the mass exodus of North East Indians from Bangalore.

"It is clear that the list was not compiled with sufficient care," Prakash writes in a post on the CIS website that reveals several egregious errors in the censorship process.

While the government put on its censor gear to apparently stop rumours from spreading, Prakash discovered that "people and posts debunking rumours have been blocked." Also there are some items on the list that do not even exist online.

The 309 items that were ordered to be blocked include URLs, Twitter accounts, img tags, blog posts, blogs, and a few websites.

Prakash, a graduate of the National Law School of India University, Bangalore, also raises the questions on the legal standing of the government's actions. "The blocking of many of the items on that list are legally questionable and morally indefensible, even while a some of the items ought, in my estimation, to be removed," he says.

Indian ISPs are also known to go overboard in their efforts to comply with any government order. There have been numerous incidents in the past when ISPs were asked to block a specific URL and they ended up blocking entire domains. The latest round of censorship is also no different. There have been reports of Airtel blocking the entire YouTube short URL youtu.be in some cities.

CIS hasn't published the complete list of the blocked items given "the sensitivity of the issue" but has posted a list of domains from which specific items have been asked to be blocked. The list follows:

ABC.net.au
AlJazeera.com
AllVoices.com
WN.com
AtjehCyber.net
BDCBurma.org
Bhaskar.com
Blogspot.com
Blogspot.in
Catholic.org
CentreRight.in
ColumnPK.com
Defence.pk
EthioMuslimsMedia.com
Facebook.com
Farazahmed.com
Firstpost.com
HaindavaKerelam.com
HiddenHarmonies.org
HinduJagruti.org
Hotklix.com
HumanRights-Iran.ir
Intichat.com
Irrawady.org
IslamabadTimesOnline.com
Issuu.com
JafriaNews.com
JihadWatch.org
KavkazCenter
MwmJawan.com
My.Opera.com
Njuice.com
OnIslam.net
PakAlertPress.com
Plus.Google.com
Reddit.com
Rina.in
SandeepWeb.com
SEAYouthSaySo.com
Sheikyermami.com
StormFront.org
Telegraph.co.uk
TheDailyNewsEgypt.com
TheFaultLines.com
ThePetitionSite.com
TheUnity.org
TimesofIndia.Indiatimes.com
TimesOfUmmah.com
Tribune.com.pk
Twitter.com
TwoCircles.net
Typepad.com
Vidiov.info
Wikipedia.org
Wordpress.com
YouTube.com
YouTu.be

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/www-ibnlive-in-com-haphazard-censorship-leaked-list-of-blocked-sites

India’s post-truth society

swaraj — 2018-09-12T12:16:31Z

The proliferation of lies and manipulative content supplies an ever-willing state a pretext to step up surveillance.

The op-ed was published in Hindu Businessline on September 7, 2018.

After a set of rumours spread over WhatsApp triggered a series of lynchings across the country, the government recently took the interesting step of placing the responsibility for this violence on WhatsApp. This is especially noteworthy because the party in power, as well as many other political parties, have taken to campaigning over social media, including using WhatsApp groups in a major way to spread their agenda and propaganda.

After all, a simple tweet or message could be shared thousands of times and make its way across the country several times, before the next day’s newspaper is out. Nonetheless, while the use of social media has led to a lot of misinformation and deliberately polarising ‘news’, it has also helped contribute to remarkable acts of altruism and community, as seen during the recent Kerala floods.

While the government has taken a seemingly techno-determinist view by placing responsibility on WhatsApp, the duality of very visible uses of social media has led to others viewing WhatsApp and other internet platforms more as a tool, at the mercy of the user. However, as historian Melvin Kranzberg noted, “technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral”. And while the role of political and private parties in spreading polarising views should be rigorously investigated, it is also true that these internet platforms are creating new and sometimes damaging structural changes to how our society functions. A few prominent issues are listed below:

Fragmentation of public sphere

Jurgen Habermas, noted sociologist, conceptualised the Public Sphere as being “a network for communicating information and points of view, where the streams of communication are, in the process, filtered and synthesised in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions”.

To a large extent, the traditional gatekeepers of information flow, such as radio, TV and mainstream newspapers, performed functions enabling a public sphere. For example, if a truth-claim about an issue of national relevance was to be made, it would need to get an editor’s approval.

In case there was a counter claim, that too would have to pass an editorial check. Today however, nearly anybody can become a publisher of information online, and if it catches the right ‘influencer’s attention, it could spread far wider and far quicker than it would’ve in traditional media. While this does have the huge positive of giving space to more diverse viewpoints, it also comes with two significant downsides.

First, that it gives a sense of ‘personal space’ to public speech. An ordinary person would think a few times, do some research, and perhaps practice a speech before giving it before 10,000 people. An ordinary person would also think for perhaps five seconds before putting out a tweet on the very same topic, despite now having a potentially global audience.

Second, by having messages sent directly to your hand-held device, rather than open for anyone to fact-check and counter, there is less transparency and accountability for those who send polarising material and misinformation. How can a mistaken and polarising view be countered, if one doesn’t even know it is being made? And if it can’t be countered, how can its spread by contained?

The attention market

Not only is that earlier conception of public sphere being fragmented, these new networked public spheres are also owned by giant corporations. This means that these public spheres where critical discourse is being shaped and spread, are actually governed by advertisement-financed global conglomerates. In a world of information overflow, and privately owned, ad-financed public spheres, the new unit of currency is attention.

It is in the direct interest of the Facebooks and Googles of the world, to capture user attention as long as possible, regardless of what type of activity that encourages. It goes without saying that neither the ‘mundane and ordinary’, nor the ‘nuanced and detailed’ capture people’s attention nearly as well as the sensational and exciting.

Nearly as addicting, studies show, are the headlines and viewpoints which confirm people’s biases. Fed by algorithms that understand the human desire to ‘fit in’, people are lowered into echo chambers where like-minded people find each other and continually validate each other. When people with extremist views are guided to each other by these algorithms, they not only gather validation, but also now use these platforms to confidently air their views — thus normalising what was earlier considered extreme. Needless to say, internet platforms are becoming richer in the process.

Censorship by obfuscation

Censorship in the attention economy, no longer requires blocking of views or interrupting the transmission of information. Rather, it is sufficient to drown out relevant information in an ocean of other information. Fact checking news sites face this problem. Regardless of how often they fact-check speeches by politicians, only a minuscule percentage of the original audience comes to know about, much less care about the corrections.

Additionally, repeated attacks (when baseless) on credibility of news sources causes confusion about which sources are trustworthy. In her extremely insightful book “Twitter and Tear Gas”, Prof Zeynep Tufekci rightly points out that rather than traditional censorship, powerful entities today, (often States) focus on overwhelming people with information, producing distractions, and deliberately causing confusion, fear and doubt. Facts, often don’t matter since the goal is not to be right, but to cause enough confusion and doubt to displace narratives that are problematic to these powers.

Viewpoints from members of groups that have been historically oppressed, are especially harangued. And those who are oppressed tend to have less time, energy and emotional resources to continuously deal with online harassment, especially when their identities are known and this harassment can very easily spill over to the physical world.

Conclusion

Habermas saw the ideal public sphere as one that is free of lies, distortions, manipulations and misinformation. Needless to say, this is a far cry from our reality today, with all of the above available in unhealthy doses. It will take tremendous effort to fix these issues, and it is certainly no longer sufficient for internet platforms to claim they are neutral messengers. Further, whether the systemic changes are understood or not, if they are not addressed, they will continue to create and expand fissures in society, giving the state valid cause for intervening through backdoors, surveillance, and censorship, all actions that states have historically been happy to do!

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindu-businessline-swaraj-paul-barooah-september-7-2018-indias-post-truth-society

A trust deficit between advertisers and publishers is leading to fake news

sunil — 2018-10-02T06:44:55Z

Transparency regulations is need of the hour. And urgently for election and political advertising. What do the ads look like? Who paid for them? Who was the target? How many people saw these advertisements? How many times? Transparency around viral content is also required.

The article was published in Hindustan Times on September 24, 2018.

Traditionally, we have depended on the private censorship that intermediaries conduct on their platforms. They enforce, with some degree of success, their own community guidelines and terms of services (TOS). Traditionally, these guidelines and TOS have been drafted keeping in mind US laws since historically most intermediaries, including non-profits like Wikimedia Foundation were founded in the US.

Across the world, this private censorship regime was accepted by governments when they enacted intermediary liability laws (in India we have Section 79A of the IT Act). These laws gave intermediaries immunity from liability emerging from third party content about which they have no “actual knowledge” unless they were informed using takedown notices. Intermediaries set up offices in countries like India, complied with some lawful interception requests, and also conducted geo-blocking to comply with local speech regulation.

For years, the Indian government has been frustrated since policy reforms that it has pursued with the US have yielded little fruit. American policy makers keep citing shortcomings in the Indian justice systems to avoid expediting the MLAT (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties) process and the signing of an executive agreement under the US Clout Act. This agreement would compel intermediaries to comply with lawful interception and data requests from Indian law enforcement agencies no matter where the data was located.

The data localisation requirement in the draft national data protection law is a result of that frustration. As with the US, a quickly enacted data localisation policy is absolutely non-negotiable when it comes to Indian military, intelligence, law enforcement and e-governance data. For India, it also makes sense in the cases of health and financial data with exceptions under certain circumstances. However, it does not make sense for social media platforms since they, by definition, host international networks of people. Recently an inter ministerial committee recommended that “criminal proceedings against Indian heads of social media giants” also be considered. However, raiding Google’s local servers when a lawful interception request is turned down or arresting Facebook executives will result in retaliatory trade actions from the US.

While the consequences of online recruitment, disinformation in elections and fake news to undermine public order are indeed serious, are there alternatives to such extreme measures for Indian policy makers? Updating intermediary liability law is one place to begin. These social media companies increasingly exercise editorial control, albeit indirectly, via algorithms to claim that they have no “actual knowledge”.

But they are no longer mere conduits or dumb pipes as they are now publishers who collect payments to promote content. Germany passed a law called NetzDG in 2017 which requires expedited compliance with government takedown orders. Unfortunately, this law does not have sufficient safeguards to prevent overzealous private censorship. India should not repeat this mistake, especially given what the Supreme Court said in the Shreya Singhal judgment.

Transparency regulations are imperative. And they are needed urgently for election and political advertising. What do the ads look like? Who paid for them? Who was the target? How many people saw these advertisements? How many times? Transparency around viral content is also required. Anyone should be able to see all public content that has been shared with more than a certain percentage of the population over a historical timeline for any geographic area. This will prevent algorithmic filter bubbles and echo chambers, and also help public and civil society monitor unconstitutional and hate speech that violates terms of service of these platforms. So far the intermediaries have benefitted from surveillance — watching from above. It is time to subject them to sousveillance — watched by the citizens from below.

Data portability mandates and interoperability mandates will allow competition to enter these monopoly markets. Artificial intelligence regulations for algorithms that significantly impact the global networked public sphere could require – one, a right to an explanation and two, a right to influence automated decision making that influences the consumers experience on the platform.

The real solution lies elsewhere. Google and Facebook are primarily advertising networks. They have successfully managed to destroy the business model for real news and replace it with a business model for fake news by taking away most of the advertising revenues from traditional and new news media companies. They were able to do this because there was a trust deficit between advertisers and publishers. Perhaps this trust deficit could be solved by a commons-based solutions based on free software, open standards and collective action by all Indian new media companies.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindustan-times-sunil-abraham-september-24-2018-a-trust-deficit-between-advertisers-and-publishers-is-leading-to-fake-news

Reliance-Jio Users Complain Of Porn Websites Being Blocked; Company Yet To Issue Official Statement

Admin — 2018-10-29T02:35:43Z

Going by a lot of Jio network users, it seems that Mukesh Ambani’s Jio has banned hundreds of porn sites, in compliance with the order of the Department of Telecommunications.

The blog post was published by Logical Indian on October 27, 2018. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

The order came after the Uttarakhand High Court on September 28, 2018, had directed the Centre to block over 850 pornographic websites. Many Jio users have taken to social media to show their protests. On Twitter, several users have threatened even to change their network if Jio doesn’t lift the ban.

However, the telecom operator has not issued an official statement confirming the ban or on the development so far. The complaints have come to notice after many users pointed out on social media platforms like Reddit and Twitter that several porn websites are no longer available on Jio network, as reported by the Financial Times.

The High Court’s Order

According to The Indian Express, the Uttarakhand High court’s order came after the alleged gang rape of a 16-year old girl by four students at her boarding school in Dehradun. It is alleged that the accused were “instigated by watching pornography” on their mobile phones before committing the crime.

In the order, the division bench of acting chief, justice Rajiv Sharma and justice Manoj Kumar Tiwari said, “There shall be a direction to all the Internet Service License Holders to punctually obey the notification dated 31st July 2015 and to block the publication or transmission of obscene material in any electronic form.” It further added that material containing sexually explicit act or conduct and also publishing or transmitting of material depicting children in sexually explicit acts should also be blocked.

Same crackdown in 2015

In 2015, the Department of Telecommunications had issued an order to block 857 porn websites. They had asked all the internet service providers to take compliance with the order and block the websites. A lot of people protested against this crackdown by the government. However, after receiving a huge criticism from the people, the government partially lifted the ban. But, following the rule, nothing had happened, and the porn sites were functioning as before, reported The Guardian.

An Indian think tank, Centre for Internet and Society member Pranesh Prakash said “It is illegitimate because it is not as though the government has found these websites unlawful … This is a blanket ban, and the government has not thought through the consequences,” reported by The Guardian.

The Logical Indian Take

Watching or not watching porn is a person’s liberty. India is a democratic nation, and according to our constitution, we are conferred with the freedom of expression and the right to personal liberty. So, this non-confirmed porn ban by Reliance Jio would be getting into the freedom of an individual.

After China, India has the second-largest number of internet users in the world. And, Reliance-Jio is just the third user base in India. The ban would not affect the population much but is definitely a threat to the user rights.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-logical-indian-october-27-2018-reliance-jio-users-complain-of-porn-websites-being-blocked

MHA snoop order & bid to amend IT rules: China-like clampdown or tracking unlawful content?

Admin — 2018-12-30T10:08:31Z

An MHA order last week authorised 10 government agencies to scan data on computers. This was followed by the Modi government’s proposal to amend the Information Technology rules for social media platforms like WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter to “proactively identify, remove or disable access to unlawful information or content” in order to curb fake news online.

The article by Fatima Khan was published in the Print on December 28, 2018. Amber Sinha was quoted.

No concrete steps taken by either NDA or UPA to enact laws for surveillance reform

The MHA order which gives 10 government agencies the power to intercept, monitor and decrypt ‘any information’ generated, transmitted, received, or stored in any computer, reaffirms the sorry state of communication surveillance law in India. This is reflected in the lack of judicial review, minimal legislative oversight and no regard for the principles of necessity, proportionality, user notification and transparency.

Despite detailed recommendations by the Committee of Experts led by Justice AP Shah back in 2013, there have been no concrete steps taken by either the current NDA government or the previous UPA government to enact laws for surveillance reform. The draft bill by the committee led by Justice Srikrishna does refer to the principles of necessity and proportionality, but stops short of recommending an overhaul of the surveillance regime. This notification is but merely the logical next step in the existing framework for communications surveillance.

On the other hand, the draft amendments to the IT Act regulations seek to address the problem of ‘unlawful content’ and seem to stem largely from concerns about the use of platforms like Facebook and WhatsApp to spread disinformation and impact electoral processes in India. To that extent, these steps are misguided and betray a failure to engage with the actual problem. Already, the powers of content moderation exercised by online platforms suffer from problems of transparency and accountability. The draft regulations will only serve to compound this problem while unreasonably expecting the platforms to exercise powers which should require judicial determination.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-print-december-28-2018-mha-snoop-order-bid-to-amend-it-rules-china-like-clampdown-or-tracking-unlawful-content

Regulating Sexist Online Harassment as a Form of Censorship

amber — 2021-05-31T09:56:31Z

This paper is part of a series under IT for Change’s project, Recognize, Resist, Remedy: Combating Sexist Hate Speech Online. The series, titled Rethinking Legal-Institutional Approaches to Sexist Hate Speech in India, aims to create a space for civil society actors to proactively engage in the remaking of online governance, bringing together inputs from legal scholars, practitioners, and activists. The papers reflect upon the issue of online sexism and misogyny, proposing recommendations for appropriate legal-institutional responses. The series is funded by EdelGive Foundation, India and International Development Research Centre, Canada.

Introduction

The proliferation of internet use was expected to facilitate greater online participation of women and other marginalised groups. However, over the past few years, as more and more people have come online, it is evident that social power in online spaces mirrors offline hierarchies. While identity and security thefts may be universal experiences, women and the LGBTQ+ community continue to face barriers to safety that men often do not, aside from structural barriers to access. Sexist harassment pervades the online experience of women, be it on dating sites, online forums, or social media.

In her book, Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest, Zeynep Tufekci argues that the nature and impact of censorship on social media are very different. Earlier, censorship was enacted by restricting speech. But now, it also works in the form of organised harassment campaigns, which use the qualities of viral outrage to impose a disproportionate cost on the very act of speaking out. Therefore, censorship plays out not merely in the form of the removal of speech but through disinformation and hate speech campaigns.

In most cases, this censorship of content does not necessarily meet the threshold of hate speech, and free speech advocates have traditionally argued for counter speech as the most effective response to such speech acts. However, the structural and organised nature of harassment and extreme speech often renders counter speech ineffective. This paper will explore the nature of online sexist hate and extreme speech as a mode of censorship. Online sexualised harassment takes various forms including doxxing, cyberbullying, stalking, identity theft, incitement to violence, etc. While there are some regulatory mechanisms – either in law, or in the form of community guidelines that address them, this paper argues for the need to evolve a composite framework that looks at the impact of such censorious acts on online speech and regulatory strategies to address them.

Click on to read the full text [PDF; 495 Kb]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/it-for-change-amber-sinha-regulating-sexist-online-harassment

World Narrow Web

pranesh — 2012-03-27T16:00:24Z

Censorship and how govt reacts to it may push us to country-specific networks, writes Pranesh Prakash in an article published in the Indian Express on 4 February 2012.

Twitter, a popular micro-blogging service, recently announced that “[today] we give ourselves the ability to reactively withhold content from users in a specific country — while keeping it available in the rest of the world”. In a move a few weeks ago, Blogger, Google’s blogging service, in effect announced something similar, by saying that default they would redirect Blogger users trying to get to Blogspot.com addresses (like http://example.blogspot.com) to their respective country sites (like http://example.blogspot.in). Twitter’s announcement was greeted with much disapproval by many Twitter users, as a move towards censorship, with some talking (on Twitter) about a boycott. Blogger’s move was hidden away, deep within a help page, and is being noticed now, and is causing quite a stir as caving in to censorship. Are these concerns justified? Before answering that question, let’s look at what the platforms’ announcements really say.

Twitter has given itself the ability to withhold specific tweets and users in particular countries where that content is legally required to be removed (generally with a court order). Their earlier option, they inform us, was to block the offending tweets and users in all countries. Apart from this, they will publish a notice for each tweet/ user that is blocked in a country. They will also be proactively publishing every removal request they receive at ChillingEffects.org, which allows us to hold them to account and question their decision to remove tweets.

Google, by redirecting you to the country-specific Blogger, is allowing for country-level removal of both blogs and individual blog posts. However, they also note that you can circumvent this by using a special “no redirect” address. Google currently forwards all search-related removals, but does not do so for Blogger-related requests, and all copyright-related complaints to ChillingEffects.org. Google does publish aggregate data relating to censorship of Blogger, on which free-speech advocates have been asking them to provide more granular information.

There are three problems. First, while Twitter was just as open to repressive governments’ requests last week, by making this change, they are advertising this fact to such governments. Thailand has noted it, and has congratulated Twitter.

Second, as Rob Beschizza, managing editor of the website Boing Boing, pointed out, there have been no instances of political content having been removed by Twitter. Even British courts’ super-injunctions (injunctions on speech, that prevent you from mentioning the fact that there is an injunction) were defeated by Twitter users, which only showed that attempts to censor material results in even more attention being drawn to it (which is popularly known as the “Streisand Effect”). So, does this now mean that Twitter will start applying local laws to judge “valid and applicable legal requests”, instead of American laws? What if the law is as bad as that which exists in India, where they are required to remove content within 36 hours based on any affected person’s complaint — without a court order? Will they still act on it? If they don’t, will the government or courts order Twitter.com to be blocked in India, finding it liable for illegal omissions?

Third, this trend points increasingly to the fact that we are witnessing a Balkanisation of the Web as more countries start asserting their sovereignty online. As Chinese dissident journalist Michael Anti pointed out recently, it seems we now need visas (read “circumvention techniques”) to visit the international Web. But even then, there is no longer a singular “international” Web, but an Indian Web and a Guatemalan Web, and an Angolan Web. And the government’s recent proposal of requiring companies to locate their servers in India is a move towards this (apart from being a move towards killing cloud computing).

That having been said, the reality is that the CEOs of Google, Google India, and Microsoft have been summoned to appear in Indian courts for allowing their users to publish material which they don’t know about, which is in a sealed envelope (and most of the accused companies haven’t been shown yet), and which they weren’t even asked once to remove.

The Intermediary Guidelines Rules passed by the Department of Information Technology in April 2011 do not require the user, whose content it is, to be told that there is a complaint, nor to be given a chance to defend themselves. It does not even require public notice that the content has been removed.

The truth is, the transparency around censorship that Google and Twitter are providing is far better than what most other companies are providing. For instance, Big Rock, an Indian DNS provider, suspended the CartoonsAgainstCorruption.com web address on the basis of a seemingly not legal request by the Cyber Cell of the Mumbai Crime Branch, and did so without any public notice and without even informing the cartoonist whose web address it was. At least Google and Twitter are pushing back against non-legal requests, and refusing to remove content that doesn’t violate local laws. Single-mindedly criticising them will only put off other companies from following in their footsteps.

Instead of criticising those who are actually working towards transparency in censorship, we should encourage them and others, push intermediaries not to cave in to unreasonable censorship requests, prevent them from over-censoring on their own, and push hard for the government to incorporate their best practices as part of the Intermediary Guidelines Rules.

The original article was published in the Indian Express

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/world-narrow-web

Internet Censorship: Anonymous Can’t be Just Harmful Hackers

nishant — 2012-08-06T06:56:50Z

If there was ever an interesting time for people concerned with freedom of speech and expression to live in, it is now, and it is definitely in India. It has been a series of battles the last couple of years, where a slightly out-dated government machinery has been trying to control and contain the burgeoning online spaces, only to be put in their place by the new-age tech-ninjas that have risen as the new heroes in our digital times.

Nishant Shah's column was published in the First Post on July 13, 2012

We might not have had our Wikileaks moment in India yet, but the recent consolidation of resources by civic hacker groups and a public outrage against top-down blocking of everyday webspaces have steadily and surely put the questions of censorship and freedom on our minds.

The protests have taken many forms – from civic action routes of campaigns and petitions by civil society and non-governmental organisations to guerrilla warfare in the shape of distributed denial of service attacks and hacking of government websites.

Anonymous must be more than just a hacker group: AP	A lot of these efforts have found popular interest and media attention, but they haven’t always found a solid ground for negotiation and dialogue with the policy makers and legislators designing this information regime. However, after the first off-line mobilisation of protests by Anonymous in India, the government has had to face the fact that the clicktivist users are not going to remain passive, merely venting their discontent on their blogs and social networking spaces. With the sustained and systemic attacks on government, public and corporate websites, revealing sensitive information and taking down web resources the new hackers have shown that they mean business. In a recent attack, Anonymous hacked the Tamil Nadu police’s websites and revealed information about the complaints people have made and the actions taken on them.

Anonymous must be more than just a hacker group: AP

A lot of these efforts have found popular interest and media attention, but they haven’t always found a solid ground for negotiation and dialogue with the policy makers and legislators designing this information regime. However, after the first off-line mobilisation of protests by Anonymous in India, the government has had to face the fact that the clicktivist users are not going to remain passive, merely venting their discontent on their blogs and social networking spaces.

With the sustained and systemic attacks on government, public and corporate websites, revealing sensitive information and taking down web resources the new hackers have shown that they mean business. In a recent attack, Anonymous hacked the Tamil Nadu police’s websites and revealed information about the complaints people have made and the actions taken on them.

They leaked the document under their Twitter handle ‘opindia_revenge’ to show the police inaction. The documents have redacted some information but it has also revealed personally identified data about the people involved, without taking into consideration that it might affect the people involved in the cases adversely. Acts like these have the cybercrime bureau now tracking down the attackers and taking the help of Internet Service Providers and other intermediaries to punish those responsible.

What the outcomes of this battle are going to be, will eventually change the ways in which our digital publics shape up. Given the lack of resistance that ISPs have shown in the past, when pressed for private information on suspicious users, the chances are that we might soon have a public spectacles of hacker-criminals. Looking at the past bungles in this arena, one also hopes that it will not be yet another instance of mixed up administration leading to wrong and misplaced prosecution.

But more than anything else, one hopes that the attackers, who have seen their protests as a part of their civic action and right to protest and demonstrate, have been wise enough to protect themselves because they are going to be tracked and tried as criminals if they are caught.

Much can be said about the nature of civic hacking, and much has already been said, heralding them as code warriors and berating them as a public nuisance. But in all that cacophony, we might need to separate the ideology (constitutional rights, free speech and expression) from the tactics (DDoS, hacking, parking on websites) and see what interests they eventually serve.

Because even as my heart sings with these sounds of protests, there is a growing alarm that these seemingly radical guerrilla warfare might actually be more counter-productive than helpful to the cause of building an open and inclusive internet.

Over the last years, many civil society and citizen collectives have realised that policies and regulation are more a dialogue than open warfare. Polarising ourselves on an axis of ‘good versus bad’, at the end of the day, only leads to more regulation and draconian measures because it makes the state feel under threat. Considerable energy has gone into building a culture of public policy consultations and dialogue that allows for different stakeholders to work towards a collective future of the internet.

And so we come back to the question of whose interest gets served in the spate of these attacks? This is the same question that haunts us when we hear about our favourite political parties taking to destroying public property and blocking public infrastructure. It is the question that resurfaces when you realise that you might agree with the politics but the tactics are actually harming what you think is important.

In the case of the Anonymous attacks, it unfortunately seems more bravado and aspiration to radical heroism than a sustained and strategic set of interventions. With this particular act they seemed to have not only hurt the people on whose behalf they are fighting, but also given the government more reasons and plausible excuses to exercise more regulation and control over the digital technologies.

The attacks are a bold move to put the questions of censorship into public discourse, and force the state to acknowledge the problems with its governance. But it would be great to see if we can build on these energies and momentum and lead to a more sustained engagement with the political questions at stake, so at to construct a larger movement to protect our rights to free speech and expression that is beyond the world of ad-hoc hacking and random acts of protest.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/internet-censorship