Centre for Internet and Society

Aadhaar seeding: benefits and concerns

Admin — 2017-11-23T02:02:45Z

Products and services such as bank accounts, life insurance policies and phone connections have to be linked with Aadhaar. But is this of any real help?

The article by Shaikh Zoaib Saleem was published by Livemint on November 14, 2017.

The government has made it mandatory for consumers to link many important services with Aadhaar. You too may be getting frequent reminders to link your banks account, mutual fund and mobile number with Aadhaar. Recently, the Reserve Bank of India also clarified that it is mandatory to link bank accounts with Aadhaar.

The latest addition to this list are insurance policies. In a circular, the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (Irdai) has stated that linking of Aadhaar number to insurance policies is mandatory under the Prevention of Money-laundering (Maintenance of Records) Second Amendment Rules, 2017.

The issue is being discussed intensively, with the Supreme Court taking a decision in favour of linking Aadhaar biometrics and the number with a host of services. Several petitions have been filed challenging not just the linking of these services with Aadhaar but also the validity of Aadhaar itself. We spoke to people who support and those who oppose this linking, to understand how either case impacts consumers.

The benefits

According to the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), government schemes are asking for Aadhaar as it helps to clean out duplications and fakes, and provides accurate data to enable implementation of direct benefit programmes. “Use of Aadhaar reduces the cost of identifying persons and provides increased transparency to the government in implementation of its schemes,” the Authority states under frequently asked questions on its website (read more at: https://uidai.gov.in/your-aadhaar/help/faqs.html) So, when you link your bank account with your Aadhaar, government benefits such as subsidy on LPG cylinders is credited directly to that account. The FAQs, however, do not elaborate how such linking helps an individual who does not get, or does not wish to get, such subsidies. In a tweet, UIDAI had said that verifying a bank account using Aadhaar adds an additional layer of security.

Nakul Saxena, a former banker who now works on policy advocacy at the software think tank iSpirt Foundation, said that linking of Aadhaar with these services will help eradicate fake accounts, fake insurance policies and unauthorised mobile connections. “It is possible that there are many accounts in the system that have been opened using such documents and copied signatures and even the banks may not be aware of it. Some people may not even be aware that an account exists in their name. These accounts need to be verified using Aadhaar now,” he said.

The government claims to have removed millions of fake beneficiaries for government benefits by Aadhaar linking. As reported by Mint in May 2017, over 23 million fake ration cards have been scrapped, potentially saving the government Rs14,000 crore in food subsidy every year. Another Mint report in August says, three states discovered that about 2,72,000 fake students were availing the mid-day meal (MDM) scheme.

However, those who are against linking Aadhaar disagree with these arguments. “Initially, Aadhaar was about delivery of services. But linking everybody’s phone number and bank account is not about that anymore. The real question is, what purpose this linking serves. If the intention is to update the databases, then there can be other means to update those,” said Rahul Narayan, a Supreme Court advocate who is among the lawyers representing petitioners who have challenged Aadhaar linking in court.

The concerns

The fundamental objection to this linking of services is that all information on an individual will be available at a single place, which could make surveillance easier and also increase the risks if this information is hacked. “As of now, your bank knows something about you, your insurance company knows something and your mobile phone company knows something about you. Each of these are different silos of information. When these converge, which is then accessible to a single person, that person knows almost everything about you,” said Narayan.

Moreover, a user’s Aadhaar number and fingerprint are permanent identifiers, and at least the Aadhaar number has been compromised for over 130 million citizens, as per a study by Centre for Internet & Society, said Nikhil Pahwa, co-founder of the SaveTheInternet.in (https://internetfreedom.in) campaign for net neutrality in India. “This leaves the users vulnerable to social hacks, some of which we have already been reading about in the news. To forcefully and mandatorily link Aadhaar to bank accounts means that their finances are at risk,” he said.

Saxena said the data leaks that have been highlighted have been typically about demographic details such as name, date of birth and address “which have been commonly available so far.” However, given the heightened sensitivities in this digital age, customers must ask their service providers to not publish such details, nor provide this information freely, he added.

Grievance redressal and data privacy

Another major concern is the absence of a clear redressal mechanisms for consumers in case of a data leak, misuse or hack. “When things go wrong, consumers need to have access to a proper complaints mechanism. In the case of Aadhaar, such access is to be provided through the establishment of ‘contact centres’ under the Regulation 32 of the UIDAI Enrolment and Update Regulations. To the best of our knowledge, not much beyond Regulation 32 has yet been specified by the UIDAI,” said Renuka Sane, associate professor at the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, who has worked on data privacy and security issues.

Apart from this, Section 47 of the Aadhaar Act stipulates that only UIDAI or its authorised officers can file a criminal complaint for violations of the Act, she added.

“The UIDAI has been given complete discretion in determining if and when to file a criminal complaint for violations of the Act, and an individual aggrieved by actions of a third person is left to rely upon the bonafide actions of the UIDAI,” Sane added. The government is also working towards a data privacy legislation, that is needed to give citizens protection against misuse of their data, and them having some control over who gets their data, how it is used, and where it can be shared. “However, a data privacy legislation and mechanism will not ensure that data remains secure and protected, and that processes are followed. The Act disallowing people from sharing Aadhaar numbers did not prevent government departments from publishing details online,” said Pahwa. He also said that systems can get hacked, which could include the Aadhaar database, the parallel Aadhaar databases with state governments, or eKYC databases held with banks and telecom operators.

Saxena said the UIDAI has clarified that biometric information is not stored with user agencies, and stored biometrics can't be used for Aadhaar authentication or eKYC. “Hence, customers can be assured when using Aadhaar and biometrics with authorized entities,” he said. “The data privacy law will address data privacy and protection in all digital systems, not just Aadhaar. It will equally apply to social media and mobile apps. It should also go into the aspect of ‘right to be forgotten’,” said Saxena.

Pahwa, however, insists that the least that should be done is to give citizens the right to not link their Aadhaar and use other IDs for authentication, plus the ability to change their ID number if the system gets compromised.

What you should do

For now, the deadlines for linking bank accounts with Aadhaar is 31 December 2017, and for mobile phones it is 7 February 2018. In its latest hearing on the matter, the Supreme Court has directed service providers to mention these deadlines in their reminders. “Right now, regardless of what they say, nobody is going to shut down your bank account or disconnect your mobile connection, at least till the deadline. There are several petitions being heard in the Supreme Court. The matter is supposed to be taken up by the Supreme Court in the last week of November. The final word from the court is yet to come and it is quite possible that at least the deadlines gets extended,” said Narayan.

If you have already linked these services with Aadhaar, you are in no trouble. But if you are having second thoughts, the linking cannot be undone. If you are concerned about safety or other aspects, you can wait to get more clarity from the Supreme Court.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/shaikh-zoaib-saleem-livemint-november-14-2017-aadhaar-seeding-benefits-and-concerns

Identity of the Aadhaar Act: Supreme Court and the Money Bill Question

Vanya Rakesh and Sumandro Chattapadhyay — 2016-05-09T11:52:44Z

A writ petition has been filed by former Union minister Jairam Ramesh on April 6 challenging the constitutionality and legality of the treatment of this Act as a money bill. The Supreme Court heard the matter on April 25 and invited the Union government to present its view. It is our view that the Supreme Court can not only review the Lok Sabha speaker’s decision, but should also ask the government to draft the Aadhaar Bill again, this time with greater parliamentary and public deliberation. Vanya Rakesh and Sumandro Chattapadhyay wrote this article on The Wire.

Published by and cross-posted from The Wire.

The Aadhaar Act 2016, passed in the Lok Sabha on March 16, 2016, faced opposition ever since it was tabled in parliament. In particular, the move to introduce it as a money bill has been vehemently challenged on grounds of this being an attempt to bypass the Rajya Sabha completely. A writ petition has been filed by former Union minister Jairam Ramesh on April 6 challenging the constitutionality and legality of the treatment of this Act as a money bill. The Supreme Court heard the matter on April 25 and invited the Union government to present its view.

It is our view that the Supreme Court can not only review the Lok Sabha speaker’s decision, but should also ask the government to draft the Aadhaar Bill again, this time with greater parliamentary and public deliberation.

The money bill question

M.R. Madhavan has argued that the Aadhaar Act contains matters other than “only” those incidental to expenditure from the consolidated fund, as it establishes a biometrics-based unique identification number for beneficiaries of government services and benefits, but also allows the number to be used for other purposes beyond service delivery. While Pratap Bhanu Mehta calls this a subversion of “the spirit of the constitution”, P.D.T. Achary, former secretary general of the Lok Sabha, expressed concern about the attempts to pass off financial bills like Aadhaar as money bills as a means to circumvent and erode the supervisory role of the Rajya Sabha. Arvind Datar has further emphasised that when the primary purpose of a bill is not governed by Article 110(1), then certifying it as a money bill is an unconstitutional act.

Article 110(1) of the Constitution identifies a bill as a money bill if it contains “only” provisions dealing with the following matters, or those incidental to them:

imposition and regulation of any tax,
financial obligations undertaken by Indian Government,
payment into or withdrawal from the Consolidated Fund of India (CFI) or Contingent Fund of India,
appropriation of money and expenditure charged on the CFI or receipt, and
custody, issue or audit of money into CFI or public account of India.

However, the link of the Act with the Consolidated Fund of India is rather tenuous, since it depends on the Union or state governments declaring a certain subsidy to be available upon verification of the Aadhaar number. The objectives and validity of the Act would not actually change if the Aadhaar number no longer was directly connected to the delivery of services. The use of the word “if” in section 7 explicitly leaves scope for a situation where the government does not declare an Aadhaar verification as necessary for accessing a subsidy. In such a scenario, the Act will still be valid but without any formal connection with any charges on the Consolidated Fund of India.

A case of procedural irregularity?

The constitution of India borrows the idea of providing the speaker with the authority to certify a bill as money bill from British law, but operationalises it differently. In the UK, though the speaker’s certificate on a money bill is conclusive for all purposes under section 3 of the Parliament Act 1911, the speaker is required to consult two senior members, usually one from either side of the house, appointed by the committee from amongst those senior MPs who chair general committees. In India, the speaker makes the decision on her own.

Although article 110 (3) of the Indian constitution states that the decision of the speaker of the Lok Sabha shall be final in case a question arises regarding whether a bill is a money bill or not, this does not restrict the Supreme Court from entertaining and hearing a petition contesting the speaker’s decision. As the Aadhaar Act was introduced in the Lok Sabha as a money bill even though it does not meet the necessary criteria for such a classification, this treatment of the bill may be considered as an instance of procedural irregularity.

There is ample jurisprudence on what happens when the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review comes up against Article 122 – which states that the validity of any proceeding in the parliament can (only) be called into question on the grounds of procedural irregularities. In the crucial judgment of Raja Ram Pal vs Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha and Others (2007), the court evaluated the scope of judicial review and observed that although parliament is supreme, unlike Britain, proceedings which are found to suffer from substantive illegality or unconstitutionality, cannot be held protected from judicial scrutiny by article 122, as opposed to mere irregularity. Deciding upon the scope for judicial intervention in respect of exercise of power by the speaker, in Kihoto Hollohan vs Zachillhu and Ors. (1992), the Supreme Court held that though the speaker of the house holds a pivotal position in a parliamentary democracy, the decision of the speaker (while adjudicating on disputed disqualification) is subject to judicial review that may look into the correctness of the decision.

Several past decisions of the Supreme Court discuss how the tests of legality and constitutionality help decide whether parliamentary proceedings are immune from judicial review or not. In Ramdas Athawale vs Union of India (2010), the case of Keshav Singh vs Speaker, Legislative Assembly (1964) was referred to, in which the judges had unequivocally upheld the judiciary’s power to scrutinise the actions of the speaker and the houses. It was observed that if the parliamentary procedure is illegal and unconstitutional, it would be open to scrutiny in a court of law and could be a ground for interference by courts under Article 32, though the immunity from judicial interference under this article is confined to matters of irregularity of procedure. These observations were reiterated in Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui vs State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) and Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal vs State of Bihar (2016).

Thus, the decision of the Lok Sabha speaker to pass and certify a bill as a money bill is definitely not immune from judicial review. Additionally, the Supreme Court has the power to issue directions, orders or writs for enforcement of rights under Article 32 of the constitution, therefore, allowing the judiciary to decide upon the manner of introducing the Aadhaar Act in parliament.

National implications demand public deliberation

As the provisions of the Aadhaar Act have far reaching implications for the fundamental and constitutional rights of Indian citizens, the Supreme Court should look into the matter of its identification and treatment as a money bill and whether such decisions lead to the thwarting of legislative and procedural justice.

The Supreme Court may also take this opportunity to reflect on the very decision making process for classification of bills in general. As Smarika Kumar argues, experience with the Aadhaar Act reveals a structural concern regarding this classification process, which may have substantial implications in terms of undermining public and parliamentary deliberative processes. This “trend,” as Arvind Datar notes, of limiting legislative discussions and decisions of national importance within the space of the Lok Sabha must be swiftly curtailed.

Apart from deciding upon the legality of the nature of the bill, it is vital that the apex court ask the government to categorically respond to the concerns red-flagged by the Standing Committee on Finance, which had taken great exception to the continued collection of data and issuance of Aadhaar numbers in its report, and to the recommendations passed in the Rajya Sabha recently. Further, the repeated violation of the Supreme Court’s interim orders – that the Aadhaar number cannot be made mandatory for availing benefits and services – in contexts ranging from marriages to the guaranteed work programme should also be addressed and responses sought from the Union government.

Evidently, the substantial implications of the Aadhaar Act for national security and fundamental rights of citizens, primarily privacy and data security, make it imperative to conduct a duly balanced public deliberation process, both within and outside the houses of parliament, before enacting such a legislation.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/identity-of-the-aadhaar-act-supreme-court-and-the-money-bill-question

Submitted Your Biometrics for Aadhaar? Here’s How You Can Lock/Unlock That Data

Admin — 2019-02-02T02:09:56Z

Did you know that UIDAI provides a facility that allows users to lock/unlock their Aadhaar biometric data online?

The blog post by Vidya Raja was published in the Better India on January 24, 2019. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

Imagine someone hacking into your Netflix account – all you have to do is change the password. However, if there is a security breach with respect to your biometric details, there is no reversing it. So think carefully about how and where you submit your details. While the Supreme Court has said that it is no longer mandatory to link Aadhaar with your bank accounts or your telecom service provider, it does not lessen the importance of Aadhaar.

Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director, The Centre for Internet & Society, in a report published in The Mint, says, “Biometric devices are not hack-proof. It depends on the ease with which this can be done. In Malaysia, thieves who stole a car with a fingerprint-based ignition system simply chopped off the owner’s finger. When a biometric attendance system was introduced at the Institute of Chemical Technology (ICT) in Mumbai, students continued giving proxies by using moulds made from Fevicol.” Over the last year, there has been so much chatter about the Aadhaar number and how one can protect one’s information.

Did you know that UIDAI provides a facility that allows users to lock/unlock their Aadhaar biometric data online?

In this article, we explain how you can do that.

Locking biometrics online:

Visit UIDAI’s online portal to lock or unlock your biometrics
Once there, you will need to click on ‘My Aadhaar’ and under the Aadhaar Services tab, click on Lock/Unlock Biometrics
You will then be redirected to a new page and prompted to enter the 12-digit Aadhaar number and the security code
Once the details have been entered, click on ‘Send OTP’
You will receive an OTP on your registered mobile number
Enter this and click on the Login button
This feature will allow you to lock your biometrics
Enter the 4-digit security code mentioned on the screen and click on the ‘Enable’ button
Your biometrics will be locked, and you will have to unlock it in case you want to access it again

Unlocking biometrics online:

To unlock your biometrics, click on the ‘Login’ button
Enter your Aadhaar number and the security code in the designated spaces
Now click on ‘Send OTP’
An OTP will be sent to your registered mobile number
Enter it in the space provided and click on ‘Login’
In case you want to temporarily unlock the biometrics, enter the security code and click on the unlock button
Your biometrics will be unlocked for 10 minutes
The locking date and time is mentioned on the screen after which biometrics will be automatically locked
When you do not want to lock your biometrics, you can disable the lock permanently.

Using mAadhaar to lock/unlock biometrics:

mAadhaar is the official mobile application developed by the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). Presently, it is available on the Android platform.

Once the mAadhaar app has been downloaded, the user must use their Aadhaar card registered mobile number to login.
You will then be sent an OTP that you are required to enter for authentication. Do remember to change your password once registered.
On the top right side, tap on ‘Biometric lock’, and enter your password to lock the biometrics. Once locked, it will show a small lock icon next to your profile.
To unlock, tap on the same icon followed by your password. The information will unlock for 10 minutes. After that, it will be locked again.
Once you lock this information, it ensures that even the Aadhaar holder will not be able to use their biometric data (iris scan and fingerprints) for authentication, until unlocked.
If you try to use this information without unlocking, it will show you an error code 330.

Remember to lock and unlock your biometrics through a trusted channel. The fact that there is no fee involved in either exercise will make this easier. Also, even with the biometric locked, you can continue to use the OTP-based authentication process for transactions, where you will receive the OTP on your registered mobile number and e-mail address.

(Edited by Shruti Singhal)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-better-india-vidya-raja-january-24-2019-aadhaar-biometric-privacy-safety-online-india

Aadhaar Bill fails to incorporate suggestions by the Standing Committee

amber — 2016-03-10T15:58:57Z

In 2011, a standing committee report led by Yashwant Sinha had been scathing in its indictments of the Aadhaar BIll introduced by the UPA government. Five years later, the NDA government has introduced a new bill which is a rehash of the same. I look at the concerns raised by the committee report, none of which have been addressed by the new bill.

The article was published by The Wire on March 10, 2016

In December, 2010, the UPA Government introduced the National Identification Authority of India Bill, 2010 in the Parliament. It was subsequently referred to a Standing Committee on Finance by the Speaker of Lok Sabha under Rule 331E of the the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha. This Committee, headed by BJP leader Yashwant Sinha took evidence from the Minister of Planning and the UIDAI from the government, as well as seeking the view of parties such as the National Human Rights Commission, Indian Banks Association and researchers like Dr Reetika Khera and Dr. Usha Ramanathan. In 2011, having heard from various parties and considering the concerns and apprehensions about the UID scheme, the Committee deemed the bill unacceptable and suggested a re-consideration of the the UID scheme as well as the draft legislation.

The Aadhaar programme has so far been implemented under the Unique Identification Authority of India, a Central Government agency created through an executive order. This programme has been shrouded in controversy over issues of privacy and security resulting in a Public Interest Litigation filed by Judge Puttaswamy in the Supreme Court. While the BJP had criticised the project as well as the draft legislation when it was in opposition, once it came to power and particularly, after it launched various welfare schemes like Digital India and Jan Dhan Yojna, it decided to continue with it and use Aadhaar as the identification technology for these projects. In the last year, there have been orders passed by the Supreme Court which prohibited making Aadhaar mandatory for availing services. One of the questions that the government has had to answer both inside and outside the court on the UID project is the lack of a legislative mandate for a project of this size. About five years later, the new BJP led government has come back with a rehash of the same old draft, and no comments made by the standing committee have been taken into account.

The Standing Committee on the old bill had taken great exception to the continued collection of data and issuance of Aadhaar numbers, while the Bill was pending in the Parliament. The report said that the implementation of the provisions of the Bill and continuing to incur expenditure from the exchequer was a circumvention of the prerogative powers of the Parliament. However, the project has continued without abeyance since its inception in 2009. I am listing below some of the issues that the Committee identified with the UID project and draft legislation, none of which have been addressed in current Bill.

One of the primary arguments made by proponents of Aadhaar has been that it would be useful in providing services to marginalized sections of the society who currently do not have identification cards and consequently, are not able to receive state sponsored services, benefits and subsidies. The report points that the project would not be able to achieve this as no statistical data on the marginalized sections of the society are being used to by UIDAI to provide coverage to them. The introducer systems which was supposed to provide Aadhaar numbers to those without any form of identification, has been used to enroll only 0.03% of the total number of people registered. Further, the Biometrics Standards Committee of UIDAI has itself acknowledged the issues caused due to a high number of manual laborers in India which would lead to sub-optimal fingerprint scans. A report by 4G Identity Solutions estimates that while in any population, approximately 5% of the people have unreadable fingerprints, in India it could lead to a failure to enroll up to 15% of the population. In this manner, the project could actually end up excluding more people.

The Report also pointed to a lack of cost-benefit analysis done before going ahead with scheme of this scale. It makes a reference to the report by the London School of Economics on the UK Identity Project which was shelved due to a) huge costs involved in the project, b) the complexity of the exercise and unavailability of reliable, safe and tested technology, c) risks to security and safety of registrants, d) security measures at a scale that will result in substantially higher implementation and operational costs and e) extreme dangers to rights of registrants and public interest. The Committee Report insisted that such global experiences remained relevant to the UID project and need to be considered. However, the new Bill has not been drafted with a view to address any of these issues.

The Committee comes down heavily on the irregularities in data collection by the UIDAI. They raise doubts about the ability of the Registrars to effectively verify the registrants and a lack of any security audit mechanisms that could identify issues in enrollment. Pointing to the news reports about irregularities in the process being followed by the Registrars appointed by the UIDAI, the Committee deems the MoUs signed between the UIDAI and the Registrars as toothless. The involvement of private parties has been under question already with many questions being raised over the lack of appropriate safeguards in the contracts with the private contractors.

Perhaps the most significant observation of the Committee was that any scheme that facilitates creation of such a massive database of personal information of the people of the country and its linkage with other databases should be preceded by a comprehensive data protection law. By stating this, the Committee has acknowledged that in the absence of a privacy law which governs the collection, use and storage of the personal data, the UID project will lead to abuse, surveillance and profiling of individuals. It makes a reference to the Privacy Bill which is still at only the draft stage. The current data protection framework in the Section 43A rules under the Information Technology Act, 2000 are woefully inadequate and far too limited in their scope. While there are some protection built into Chapter VI of the new bill, these are nowhere as comprehensive as the ones articulated in the Privacy Bill. Additionally, these protections are subject to broad exceptions which could significantly dilute their impact.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aadhaar-bill-fails-to-incorporate-suggestions-by-the-standing-committee

Aadhaar Bill 2016 & NIAI Bill 2010 - Comparing the Texts

sumandro — 2016-03-09T11:25:01Z

This is a quick comparison of the texts of the Aadhaar Bill 2016 and the National Identification Authority of India Bill 2010. The new sections in the former are highlighed, and the deleted sections (that were part of the latter) are struck out.

Source: http://cis-india.github.io/aadhaar-bill-2016/

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aadhaar-bill-2016-niai-bill-2010-text-comparison

The New Aadhaar Bill in Plain English

Amber Sinha, Vanya Rakesh and Vipul Kharbanda — 2016-03-11T04:41:38Z

We have put together a plain English version of the The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016.

The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016

Chapter I. PRELIMINARY

Section 1

This Act is called Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016.
It will be applicable in whole of India (except the state of Jammu and Kashmir).
It will become applicable on a date to be notified by the Central Government.

Section 2

“Aadhaar number” is the identification number issued to an individual under the Act;
“Aadhaar number holder” is the person who has been given an Aadhaar number;
“authentication” is the process of verifying the Aadhaar number, demographic information and biometric information of any person by the Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR);
“authentication record” is the record of the authentication which will contain the identity of the requesting entity and the response of the CIDR;
“Authority” or “UIDAI” refers to the Unique Identification Authority of India established under this Act;
“benefit” means any relief or payment which may be notified by the Central Government;
“biometric information” means photograph, fingerprint, Iris scan, or any other biological attributes specified by regulations;
“Central Identities Data Repository” or “CIDR” means a centralised database containing all Aadhaar numbers, demographic information and biometric information and other related information;
“Chairperson” means the Chairperson of the UIDAI;
“core biometric information” means fingerprint, Iris scan, or any biological attributes specified by regulations;
“demographic information” includes information relating to the name, date of birth, address and other relevant information as specified by regulations. This information will not include race, religion, caste, tribe, ethnicity, language, records of entitlement, income or medical history;
“enrolling agency” means an agency appointed by the UIDAI or a Registrar for collecting demographic and biometric information of individuals for issuing Aadhaar numbers;
“enrolment” means the process of collecting demographic and biometric information from individuals for the purpose of issuing Aadhaar numbers;
“identity information” in respect of an individual, includes his Aadhaar number, his biometric information and his demographic information;
“Member” includes the Chairperson and Member of the Authority appointed under section 12;
“notification” means a notification published in the Official Gazette and the expression “notified” with its cognate meanings and grammatical variations will be construed accordingly;
“prescribed” means prescribed by rules made by the Central Government under this Act;
“records of entitlement” means the records of benefits, subsidies or services provided to any individual under any government programme;
“Registrar” means any person authorized by the UIDAI to enroll individuals under the Act;
“regulations” means the regulations made by the UIDAI under this Act;
“requesting entity” means an agency that submits the Aadhaar number and other information of an individual to the CIDR for authentication;
“resident” means a person who has resided in India for atleast 182 days in the last twelve months before the date of application for enrolment;
“service” means any facility or assistance provided by the Central Government in any form;
“subsidy” means any form of aid, support, grant, etc. in cash or kind as notified by the Central Government.

Chapter II. ENROLMENT

Section 3

Every resident is entitled to get an Aadhaar number.
At the time of enrollment, the enrolling agency will inform the individual of the following details—

how their information will be used;
what type of entities the information will be shared with; and
that they have a right to see their information and also tell them how they can see their information.

After collecting and verifying the information given by the individuals, the UIDAI will issue an Aadhaar number to each individual.

Section 4

Once an Aadhaar number has been issued to a person, it will not be re-assigned to any other person.
An Aadhaar number will be a random number and will not contain any attributes or identity of the Aadhaar number holder.
if adopted by a service provider, an Aadhaar number may be accepted as proof of identity of the person.

Section 5

The UIDAI will take special measures to issue Aadhaar number to women, children, senior citizens, persons with disability, unskilled and unorganised workers, nomadic tribes or to such other persons who do not have any permanent residence and similar categories of individuals.

Section 6

The UIDAI may require Aadhaar number holders to update their Aadhaar information, so that it remains accurate.

Chapter III. AUTHENTICATION

Section 7

As a condition for receiving subsidy for which the expenditure is incurred from the Consolidated Fund of India, the Government may require that a person should be authenticated or give proof of the Aadhaar number to establish his/her identity. In the case a person does not have an Aadhaar number, he/she should make an application for enrolment. If an Aadhaar number is not assigned, the person will be offered viable and alternate means of identification for receiving the subsidy, benefit or service.

Section 8

The UIDAI will authenticate the Aadhaar information of people as per the conditions prescribed by the government and may also charge a fees for doing so.
Any requesting entity will— (a) take consent from the individual before collecting his/her Adhaar information; (b) use the information only for authentication with the CIDR;
The entity requesting authentication will also inform the individual of the following— (a) what type of information will be shared for authentication; (b) what will the information be used for; and (c) whether there is any alternative to submitting the Aadhaar information to the requesting entity.
The UIDAI will respond to the authentication request with yes, no, or other appropriate response and share identity information about the Aadhaar number holder but not share any biometric information.

Section 9

The Aadhaar number or its authentication will not be a proof of citizenship or domicile.

Section 10

The UIDAI may engage any number of entities to establish and maintain the CIDR and to perform any other functions specified by the regulations.

Chapter IV. UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION AUTHORITY OF INDIA

Section 11

The UIDAI will be established by the Central Government to be responsible for the processes of enrolment and authentication of Aadhaar numbers.
The UIDAI will be a body corporate with the power to buy and sell property, to enter into contracts and to sue or be sued.
The head office of the UIDAI will be in New Delhi.
The UIDAI may establish its offices at other places in India.

Section 12

The UIDAI will have a Chairperson, two part-time Members and a chief executive officer, who to be appointed by the Central Government.

Section 13

The Chairperson and Members will be competent people with at least 10 years experience and knowledge in technology, governance, law, development, economics, finance, management, public affairs or administration.

Section 14

The Chairperson and the Members will be appointed for 3 years and can be re-appointed after their term. But no Member or Chairperson will be more than 65 years of age.
The Chairperson and Members will take an oath of office and of secrecy.
The Chairperson or Member may— (a) resign from office, by giving an advance written notice of at least 30 days; or (b) be removed from his office because she/he gets disqualified on any of the grounds mentioned in section 15.
The salaries and allowances of the Members and Chairperson will be prescribed under the government.

Section 15

The Central Government may remove a Chairperson or Member, who—
(a) has gone bankrupt;
(b) is physically or mentally unable to do his/her job;
(c) has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude;
(d) has a financial conflict of interest in performing his/her functions; or
(e) has abused his/her position so that the government needs to remove him/her in public interest.
The Chairperson or a Member will be given a chance to present his/her side of the story before being removed, unless he/she is being removed on the grounds of bankruptcy or criminal conviction.

Section 16

An Ex-Chairperson or Ex-Member will have to take the approval of the Central Government,—

to accept any job in any entity (other than a government organization) which was associated with any work done for the UIDAI while that person was a Chairperson or Member, for a period of three years after ceasing to hold office;
to act or advise any entity on any particular transaction for which that person had provided advice to the UIDAI while he/she was the Chairperson or a Member;
to give advice to any person using information which was obtained as the Chairperson or a Member which is not available to the public in general; or
to accept any offer of employment or appointment as a director of any company with which he/she had direct and significant official dealings during his/her term of office, for a period of three years.

Section 17

The Chairperson will preside over the meetings of the UIDAI and have the powers and perform the functions of the UIDAI.

Section 18

The chief executive officer (CEO) of the UIDAI will not be below the rank of Additional Secretary to the Government of India.
The chief executive officer will be responsible for— (a) the day-to-day administration of the UIDAI; (b) implementing the programmes and decisions of the UIDAI; (c) making proposals for the UIDAI; (d) preparation of the accounts and budget of the UIDAI; and (e) performing any other functions prescribed in the regulations.
The CEO will annually submit the following things to the UIDAI for its approval — (a) a general report covering all the activities of the Authority in the previous year; (b) programmes of work; (c) the annual accounts for the previous year; and (d) the budget for the coming year.
The CEO will have administrative control over the officers and other employees of the Authority.

Section 19

The time and place of the meetings of the UIDAI and the rules and procedures of those meetings will be prescribed by regulations.
The meetings will be presided by the Chairperson, and if they are absent, then the senior most Member of the UIDAI.
All decisions at the meetings of the UIDAI will be taken by a majority vote. In case of a tie, the person presiding the meeting will have the casting vote.
All decisions of the UIDAI will be signed by the Chairperson or any other Member or the Member-Secretary authorised by the UIDAI in this behalf.
If any Member, who is a director of a company and because of this has any financial interest in matters coming up for consideration at a meeting, that member should disclose the financial interest and not take any further part in the discussions and decision on that matter.

Section 20

No actions or proceeding of the UIDAI will become invalid merely because of—

any vacancy in, or any defect in the constitution of, the UIDAI;
any defect in the appointment of a person as Chairperson or Member of the Authority; or
any irregularity in the procedure of the Authority not affecting the merits of the case.

Section 21

The UIDAI, with the approval of the Government, can decide on the number and types of officers and employees that it would require.
The salaries and allowances of the employees, officer and chief executive officer will be prescribed under the government.

Section 22.

Once the UIDAI is establishment—

all the assets and liabilities of the existing Unique Identification Authority of India, established by the Government of India through notification dated the 28th January, 2009, will stand transferred to the new UIDAI.
all data and information collected during enrolment, all details of authentication performed, by the existing Unique Identification Authority of India will be deemed to have been done by the UIDAI. All debts, liabilities incurred and all contracts entered into by the Unique Identification Authority of India will be deemed to have been entered into by the UIDAI;
all money due to the existing Unique Identification Authority of India will be deemed to be due to the UIDAI; and
all suits and other legal proceedings instituted by or against such Unique Identification Authority of India may be continued by or against the UIDAI.

Section 23

The UIDAI will develop the policy, procedure and systems for issuing Aadhaar numbers to individuals and perform their authentication. The powers and functions of the UIDAI include—

specifying the demographic information and biometric information required for enrolment and the processes for collection and verification of that information;
collecting demographic information and biometric information from people seeking Aadhaar numbers;
appointing of one or more entities to operate the CIDR;
generating and assigning Aadhaar numbers to individuals;
performing authentication of Aadhaar numbers;
maintaining and updating the information of individuals in the CIDR;
omitting and deactivating an Aadhaar number;
specifying the manner of use of Aadhaar numbers for the purposes of providing or availing of various subsidies and other purposes for which Aadhaar numbers may be used;
specifying the terms and conditions for appointment of Registrars, enrolling agencies and service providers and revocation of their appointments;
establishing, operating and maintaining of the CIDR;
sharing the information of Aadhaar number holders;
calling for information and records, conducting inspections, inquiries and audit of the operations of the CIDR, Registrars, enrolling agencies and other agencies appointed under this Act;
specifying processes relating to data management, security protocols and other technology safeguards under this Act;
specifying the conditions/procedures for issuance of new Aadhaar number to existing Aadhaar number holder;
levying and collecting the fees or authorising the Registrars, enrolling agencies or other service providers to collect fees for the services provided by them under this Act;
appointing committees necessary to assist the Authority in discharge of its functions;
promoting research and development for advancement in biometrics and related areas;
making and specifying policies and practices for Registrars, enrolling agencies and other service providers;
setting up facilitation centres and grievance redressal mechanisms;
other powers and functions as prescribed.

The Authority may,— (a) enter into agreements with various state governments and Union Territories for collecting, storing, securing or processing of information or delivery of Aadhaar numbers to individuals or performing authentication; (b) appoint Registrars, engage and authorize agencies to collect, store, secure, process information or do authentication or perform other functions under this Act. The Authority may engage consultants, advisors and other persons required for efficient discharge of its functions.

Chapter V. GRANTS, ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT AND ANNUAL REPORT

Section 24

The Central Government may grant money to the UIDAI as it may decide, upon due appropriation by Parliament.

Section 25

Fees/revenue collected by the UIDAI will be credited to the Consolidated Fund of India

Section 26

The UIDAI will prepare an annual statement of accounts in the format prescribed by Central Government
The Comptroller and Auditor-General will audit the account of the UIDAI annually at intervals decided by him, at the UIDAI’s expense.
The Comptroller and Auditor-General or his appointees will have the same powers of audit they usually have to audit Government accounts.
The UIDAI will forward the statement of accounts certified by the Comptroller and Auditor-General and the audit report, to the Central Government who will lay it before both houses of Parliament.

Section 27

The UIDAI will provide returns, statements and particulars as sought, to the Central Government, as and when required.
The UIDAI will prepare an annual report containing the description of work for previous years, annual accounts of previous year, and the programmes of work for coming year.
The copy of the annual report will be laid before both houses of Parliament by the Central Government.

Chapter VI. PROTECTION OF INFORMATION

Section 28

The UIDAI will ensure the security and confidentiality of identity information and authentication records.
The UIDAI will take measures to ensure that all information with the UIDAI, including CIDR records is secured and protected against access, use or disclosure and against destruction, loss or damage.
The UIDAI will adopt and implement appropriate technical and organisational security measures, and ensure the same are imposed through agreements/arrangements with its agents, consultants, advisors or other persons.
Unless otherwise provided, the UIDAI or its agents will not reveal any information in the CIDR to anyone.
An Aadhaar number holders may request UIDAI to provide access his information (excluding the core biometric information) as per the regulations specified.

Section 29

The core biometric information collected will not be a) shared with anyone for any reason, and b) used for any purpose other generation of Aadhaar numbers and authentication.
Identity information, other than core biometric information, may be shared only as per this Act and regulations specified under it.
Identity information available with a requesting entity will not be used for any purpose other than what is specified to the individual, nor will it be shared further without the individual’s consent.
Aadhaar numbers or core biometric information will not be made public except as specified by regulations.

Section 30

All biometric information collected and stored in electronic form will be deemed to be “electronic record” and “sensitive personal data or information” under Information Technology Act, 2000 and its provisions and rules will apply to it in addition to this Act.

Section 31

If the demographic or biometric information about any Aadhaar number holder changes, is lost or is found to be incorrect, they may request the UIDAI to make changes to their record in the CIDR, as necessary.
The identity information in the CIDR will not be altered, except as provided in this Act.

Section 32

The UIDAI will maintain the authentication records in the manner and for as long as specified by regulations.
Every Aadhaar number holder may obtain his authentication record as specified by regulations.
The UIDAI will not collect, keep or maintain any information about the purpose of authentication.

Section 33

The UIDAI may reveal identity information, authentication records or any information in the CIDR following a court order by a District Judge or higher. Any such order may only be made after UIDAI is allowed to appear in a hearing.
The confidentiality provisions in Sections 28 and 29 will not apply with respect to disclosure made in the interest of national security following directions by a Joint Secretary to the Government of India, or an officer of a higher rank, authorised for this purpose.
An Oversight Committee comprising Cabinet Secretary, and Secretaries of two departments — Department of Legal Affairs and DeitY— will review every direction under 33 B above.
Any directions under 33 B above are valid for 3 months, after which they may be extended following a review by the Oversight Committee.

Chapter VII. OFFENCES AND PENALTIES

Section 34

Impersonating or attempting to impersonate another person by providing false demographic or biometric information will punishable by imprisonment of up to three years, and/or fine of up to ten thousand rupees.

Section 35

Changing or attempting to change any demographic or biometric information of an Aadhaar number holder by impersonating another person (or attempting to do so), with the intent of i) causing harm or mischief to an Aadhaar number holder, or ii) appropriating the identity of an Aadhaar number holder, is punishable with imprisonment up to three years and fine up to ten thousand rupees.

Section 36

Collection of identity information by one not authorised by this Act, by way of pretending otherwise, is punishable with imprisonment up to three years or a fine up to ten thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).

Section 37

Intentional disclosure or dissemination of identity information, to any person not authorised under this Act, or in violation of any agreement entered into under this Act, will be punishable with imprisonment up to three years or a fine up to ten thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).

Section 38

The following intentional acts, when not authorised by the UIDAI, will be punishable with imprisonment up to three years and a fine not less than ten lakh rupees:

accessing or securing access to the CIDR;
downloading, copying or extracting any data from the CIDR;
introducing or causing any virus or other contaminant into the CIDR;
damaging or causing damage to the data in the CIDR;
disrupting or causing disruption to access to CIDR;
causing denial of access to an authorised to the CIDR;
revealing information in breach of (D) in Section 28, or Section 29;
destruction, deletion or alteration of any files in the CIDR;
stealing, destruction, concealment or alteration of any source code used by the UIDAI.

Section 39

Tampering of data in the CIDR or removable storage medium, with the intention to modify or discover information relating to Aadhaar number holder will be punishable with imprisonment up to three years and a fine up to ten thousand rupees.

Section 40

Use of identity information in violation of Section 8 (3) by a requesting entity will be punishable with imprisonment up to three years and/or a fine up to ten thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).

Section 41

Violation of Section 8 (3) or Section 3 (2) by a requesting entity or enrolling agency will be punishable with imprisonment up to one year and/or a fine up to ten thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).

Section 42

Any offence against this Act or regulations made under it, for which no specific penalty is provided, will be punishable with be punishable with imprisonment up to one year and/or a fine up to twenty five thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company).

Section 43

In case of an offence under Act committed by a Company, all person in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company will also be held to be guilty and liable for punishment unless they can prove lack of knowledge of the offense or that they had exercised all due diligence to prevent it.
In case an offence is committed by a Company with the consent, connivance or neglect of a director, manager, secretary or other officer of a company, they will also be held guilty of the offence.

Section 44

This Act will also apply to offences committed outside of India by any person, irrespective of their nationality, if the offence involves any data in the CIDR.

Section 45

Offences under this Act will not be investigated by police officers below the rank of Inspector of Police.

Section 46

Penalties imposed under this Act will not prevent imposition of any other penalties or punishment under any other law in force.

Section 47

Courts will take cognizance of offences under this Act only upon complaint being made by the UIDAI or any officer authorised by it.
No court inferior to that of a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or a Chief Judicial Magistrate will try any offence under this Act.

Chapter VIII. MISCELLANEOUS

Section 48

Central Government has the power to supersede the UIDAI, through a notification, not for longer than six months, in the following circumstances: i) In case of circumstances beyond the control of the UIDAI, ii) The UIDAI has defaulted in complying with directions of the Central Government, affecting financial position of the UIDAI, iii) Public emergency
Upon publication of notification, Chairperson and Members of the UIDAI must vacate the office
Powers, functions and duties will be performed by person(s) authorised by the President.
Properties controlled and owned by UIDAI will vest in the Central Government.
Central Government will reconstitute the UIDAI upon expiration of supersession, with fresh appointment of Chairperson and Members.

Section 49

Chairperson, members, employees etc. are deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code.

Section 50

Central Government has the power to issue directions to the UIDAI on questions of policy (to be decided by the Government), except technical and administrative matters and the UIDAI will be bound by it.
The UIDAI will be given an opportunity to express views before direction is given.

Section 51

The UIDAI may delegate its powers and functions to a Member or officer of the UIDAI.

Section 52

No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings will lie against the Central Government, UIDAI, Chairperson, any Member, officer, or other employees of the UIDAI for an act done in good faith.

Section 53

The Central Government has the power to makes Rules for matters prescribed under this provision.

Section 54

UIDAI has the power to make regulations for matters prescribed under this provision.

Section 55

Rules and regulations under this Act will be laid before each House of Parliament for a total period of thirty days, both Houses must agree in making modification, and then the Rules will come into effect.

Section 56

Provisions of this Act are in addition to, and not in derogation of any other law currently in effect.

Section 57

This Act will not prevent use of Aadhaar number for other purposes under law by the State or other bodies.

Section 58

The Central Government may pass an order to remove a difficulty in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, not beyond three years from the commencement of this Act.

Section 59

Action take by Central Government under the Resolution of the Government of India for setting up the UIDAI or by the Department of Electronics and Information Technology under the notification including the UIDAI under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology will be deemed to have been validly done or taken.

STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

Correct identification of targeted beneficiaries for delivery of subsidies, services, frants, benefits, etc has become a challenge for the Government
This has proved to be a major hindrance for successful implementation of these programmes.
In the absence of a credible system to authenticate identity of beneficiaries, it is difficult to ensure that the subsidies, benefits and services reach to intended beneficiaries.
The UIDAI was established to lay down policies and implement the Unique Identification Scheme of the Government, by which residents of India were to be provided unique identity number.
Upon successful authentication, this number would serve as proof of identity for identification of beneficiaries for transfer of benefits, subsidies, services and other purposes.
With increased use of the Aadhaar number, steps to ensure security of such information need to be taken and offences pertaining to certain unlawful actions, created.
It has been felt that the processes of enrolment, authentication, security, confidentiality and use of Aadhaar related information must be made statutory.
The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Bill, 2016 seeks to provide for issuance of Aadhaar numbers to individuals on providing his demographic and biometric information to the UIDAI, requiring Aadhaar numbers for identifying an individual for delivery of benefits, subsidies, and services, authentication of the Aadhaar number, establishment of the UIDAI, maintenance and updating the information of individuals in the CIDR, state measures pertaining to security, privacy and confidentiality of information in possession or control of the UIDAI including information stored in the Central Identities Data Repository and identify offences and penalties for contravention of relevant statutory provisions.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-new-aadhaar-bill-in-plain-english

India's Aadhaar mandate for smartphone makers may rile global firms

praskrishna — 2016-09-15T02:25:31Z

They are unlikely to oblige to request to make changes in their operating system and devices to ensure Aadhaar authentication is done securely on smartphones.

The article by Alnoor Peermohammed was published in the Business Standard on September 14, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

India is asking global smartphone makers such asApple and Google to adopt locally designed standards on their devices or operating systems that would allow use of biometric scanners for Aadhaarauthentication, a move that could face resistance from global firms.

Apple, the world’s largest smartphone maker runs its own iOS closed ecosystem and mandates apps built by developers to be certified by the company. Its closest rival Google, which owns the Android operating software that runs on nine out of ten smartphones in India, has directives for device makers to comply with. Firms such as Samsung, Lenovo and Micromax build smartphones on the Android OS that are sold in India.

Most global companies are unlikely to oblige India’s request that would require to make changes in their operating system and devices to ensure Aadhaarauthentication is done securely on smartphones, say analysts.

“There is no clarity so far. As of now, it is impossible that they (global smartphone makers) would oblige for a hardware safe zone baked on the sensors,” says Sunil Abraham, executive director at Centre for Internet and Society, a Bengaluru-based researcher that works on emerging technologies. “Because the biometrics contain sensitive personal information, they (UIDAI) don’t want anybody — vmobile manufacturer, OS vendor, telco or ISP — to intercept it”.

India is hoping that global firms would accept the country’s plea considering that most of India’s population use a mobile phone as their only computing device and need them to authenticate on Aadhaar for using government and banking services.

“Right now we’re in consultation with all these device manufacturers as well as the operating system vendors,” said Ajay Bhushan Pandey, Director General of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) in a phone interview. “Basically we’re trying to evolve our system wherein a manufacturer or the devices where those operating systems are being used will have a facility where Aadhaar authentication can be made possible in a secure manner.”

India has over 105 crore people or 98% of adult population with Aadhaar. Most government and private organisations use Aadhaar authentication to issue services or products such as opening a bank account, getting a ration card or buying a mobile connection.

Reliance plans to reduce paperwork and issue connections in less than an hour usingAadhaar and try to get its 100 million target market sooner.

Over a fifth of India’s one billion users own smartphones and as the country sees better mobile internet access, more people are expected to upgrade to smartphones and use apps to access their banks to transfer funds, do online shopping and access government services.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-alnoor-peermohammed-september-14-2016-indias-aadhaar-mandate-for-smartphone-makers-may-rile-global-firms

Glaring Errors in UIDAI's Rebuttal

pranesh — 2016-09-18T03:22:32Z

This response note by Pranesh Prakash questions Unique Identification Authority of India’s reply to Hans Verghese Mathews' article titled “Flaws in the UIDAI Process” (EPW, March 12, 2016), which found “serious mathematical errors” in the article.

The article was published in Economic & Political Weekly Vol. 51, Issue No. 36, September 3, 2016.

While I am not a statistician, I have followed the technical debate between Hans Verghese Mathews and the UIDAI closely, and see a number of glaring errors in the latter’s so-called rebuttal in EPW (March 12, 2016).

The UIDAI alleges Mathews to have ignored the evidence that the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) "flattens" with more factors. However, Mathews cannot be accused of ignorance if the flattening of the ROC is not relevant to his argument. To explain this in simple terms, the ROC curve is used to choose the appropriate "threshold distance" which determines false positives and false negatives, and belongs to a stage which precedes the estimation of the false positive identification rates (FPIR).

However, Mathews has used the FPIR estimates provided by the UIDAI (based on evidence from the enrolment of 84 million persons), and calculated how the FPIR changes when extrapolated for a population of 1.2 billion persons. In other words, he did not need to look at the ROC curve as that factor is not relevant to his argument, since he has used UIDAI data (which has presumably been estimated on the basis of all 12 factors : 10 fingerprints and 2 irises).

Further, UIDAI asks why Mathews has assumed a linear curve for his extrapolation. Mathews has done no such thing. In fact, in their paper "Role of Biometric Technology in Aadhaar Enrollment," the UIDAI states: "FPIR rate grows linearly with the database size" (nd, 19). Thus, this is an assumption formerly made by them (without providing rationale for it to be a linear curve as opposed to anything else). Mathews mathematically derives bounds for the FPIR in his paper, that is, the range within which the FPIR lies. One gets a linear curve only if they use the upper bound and not on the usage of anything else. So while Mathews does, as he explains, provide the results of the calculation based on the upper bound for the sake of simplicity, he nowhere asserts nor assumes a linear curve.

If, as the UIDAI claims, one cannot perform such an extrapolation and needs to depend on “empirical evidence” instead, the question arises as to how the UIDAI decided to scale up the programme to 1.3 billion people given the error rates. One could also ask if the machines being used to capture biometrics are good enough for the enlargement. Surely they would have performed some extrapolations to decide this.

In their paper they note that "although it [FPIR] is expected to grow as the database size increases, it is not expected to exceed manageable values even at full enrolment of 120 crores" (UIDAI nd, 13). They do not illustrate the extent to which the FPIR is expected to grow—neither in their initial paper, nor in their rebuttal to Mathews—whereas Mathews provides a method of estimating the increase of FPIR. Even if UIDAI is correct in its appraisal of FPIR and that it will not exceed "manageable values," they need to either exemplify their calculations or release the latest data. They have done neither, and that is quite unfortunate.

References

UIDAI (nd): “Role of Biometric Technology in Aadhaar Enrollment,” Unique Identification Authority of India, Government of India, New Delhi, viewed on 18 August 2016, https://uidai.gov.in/images/FrontPageUpdates/role_of_biometric_technology

Related Links

Flaws in the UIDAI Process http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/9/special-articles/flaws-uidai-process.html
Erring on Aadhaar http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/11/discussion/erring-aadhaar.html
Request for Specifics http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/36/documents/request-specifics-rebuttal-u...
Glaring Errors in UIDAI's Rebuttal http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/36/documents/glaring-errors-uidais-rebutt...
Overlooking the UIDAI Process http://www.epw.in/journal/2016/36/documents/response-hans-verghese-mathe...

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/glaring-errors-in-uidai-rebuttal-epw

Govt to keep Aadhaar record for 7 years, activists worried

praskrishna — 2016-10-17T01:53:24Z

The government will keep for seven years a record of all the services and benefits availed using the Aadhaar number, say new rules, prompting fears that the database could be used for surveillance.

The article by Aloke Tikku was published in the Hindustan Times on October 17, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), which issues the 12-digit biometric identity to all Indian residents, will be required to preserve its record of verification of an Aadhaar number for the duration.

“This is an unprecedented centralised data retention provision,” said Sunil Abraham, director of the Bengaluru-based think tank, Centre for Internet and Society.

UIDAI chief executive officer ABP Pandey said the concerns were exaggerated. The agency was keeping records in case a dispute arose over a transaction.

The information will be retained online for two years and another five years in the offline archives, say the rules notified in September.

Users will be able to check the records but only for two years.

This restriction won’t apply to security agencies. Pandey, however, said the records would not be available to them without a district judge’s permission.

But, HT found that the rules allow designated joint secretary-level officers at the Centre to order access to information on the grounds of national security.

“Once Aadhaar becomes mandatory for all services, it can be used by benign and malignant actors to conduct a 360-degree surveillance on any individual,” Abraham said.

This is how the system, which will need millions of fingerprint-reading machines, works.

Every time a person fingerprints and quotes the Aadhaar number, the agency concerned sends the data to UIDAI to crosscheck the particulars.

The UIDAI authenticates about five million Aadhaar numbers, which are quoted to avail LPG subsidy, cheap ration and even passport, a day against a capacity to verify 100 million requests daily.

“You can think of it as Natgrid Plus,” Abraham said, a reference to the National Intelligence Grid being built by the government.

A one-stop database for counter-terrorism agencies, Natgrid will collate information real time from databases of various agencies such as bank, rail and airline networks.

“…we do not record the purpose for which an authentication request was received but only the details of the agency that sent it,” UIDAI’s Pandey said.

But seven years is a long time. Only a select category of government files are kept for longer than five years.

Asked about two-year deadline for users, Pandey said it would have been a logistic nightmare to let people access the records once the information was offline.

The Supreme Court has a ruled that Aadhaar is not a must for availing welfare schemes and is to decide if collecting biometric data for the 12-digit number infringed an individual’s privacy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-aloke-tikku-october-17-2016-govt-to-keep-aadhaar-record-for-seven-years-activitsts-worried

Intelligence agencies will not have open access to Aadhaar data: UIDAI chief

praskrishna — 2016-10-21T01:32:56Z

Intelligence agencies will not have free access to Aadhaar data, a top government official said on Thursday, looking to assuage fears of abuse of personal information.

The article by Aloke Tikku was published in the Hindustan Times on October 20, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), which issued identity cards to 1.07 billion Indians, last month decided to retain data related to the verification of Aadhaar-enabled transactions for seven years, leading to security concerns over data safety.

As reported by HT on Monday, privacy experts expressed concerns that transaction data retained for so long could be accessed by the security establishment for surveillance on individuals without sufficient grounds.

“This fear is completely misplaced,” ABP Pandey, UIDAI’s chief executive officer told HT in an interview.

Security agencies can access the data only in case of national security after they get the nod of an oversight committee headed by the cabinet secretary. This committee has to clear every order made by the designated joint secretary-level officer before the information is shared, he said.

“You cannot have any legal protection stronger than this,” Pandey added.

Aadhaar transaction data is not only protected by the most powerful, contemporary law to restrict access but also by strong cryptography.

“Even if someone attempts, the 2048-bit encryption is so strong that it will take them millions of computers and billions of years to decrypt the data,” he said.

A vocal critic of Aadhaar’s design, Sunil Abraham of the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) suggested he wouldn’t rely too much on the legal framework. “You cannot put a legal band-aid on a broken technological solution. You need to get privacy and security right by design,” the director of the Bengaluru-based research body said.

Abraham said the problem could have been averted if the UIDAI did not store the data in a centralised form. Instead, it could have used its digital signature to sign proof of authentication that could be stored by the authenticating agency and the citizen on a smart card.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-aloke-tikku-october-20-2016-intelligence-agencies-will-not-have-open-access-to-aadhaar-data

Request for Specifics: Rebuttal to UIDAI

hans — 2016-10-30T15:06:31Z

Responding to the Unique Identification Authority of India’s article that found “serious mathematical errors” in “Flaws in the UIDAI Process” (EPW 12 March 2016), the main mathematical argument used to arrive at the number of duplicates in the biometric database is explained.

The article was published in the Economic & Political Weekly on September 3, 2016, Vol.51, Issue No.36.

The author of a technical paper will be alarmed when he is convicted of “serious mathematical errors” by someone who has not bothered himself with “going too deep into the mathematics” used. The man must possess miraculous powers of divination one feels: fears rather. The UIDAI seems to have even such formidable diviners in their employ: who have dismissed just so peremptorily, in their rebuttal, the calculations made in my paper titled Flaws in the UIDAI process. The paper appeared in the issue of this journal dated to February 27 of this year. The rebuttal was published in the issue dated to the 12th of March. The interested reader can confirm that I have only repeated what was said there. The rebuttal does not specify, in any way, the mathematical mistakes I am supposed to have made. So I shall rehearse the relevant calculations very broadly: and the experts of the UIDAI will then exhibit, I trust, the specific mistakes they impute to me.[*]

[*]My reply to the UIDAIs attempted rebuttal was sent in to the EPW a few days after that appeared in print: and published as a “web exclusive” article in Volume 51, Issue Number 36 of the EPW, on 03/09/2016.

Read the Full Article

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-and-political-weekly-journal-vol-51-issue-36-september-3-2016-hans-varghese-mathews-request-for-specifics

Big Data in India: Benefits, Harms, and Human Rights - Workshop Report

Vidushi Marda, Akash Deep Singh and Geethanjali Jujjavarapu — 2016-11-18T12:58:19Z

The Centre for Internet and Society held a one-day workshop on “Big Data in India: Benefits, Harms and Human Rights” at India Habitat Centre, New Delhi on the 1st of October, 2016. This report is a compilation of the the issues discussed, ideas exchanged and challenges recognized during the workshop. The objective of the workshop was to discuss aspects of big data technologies in terms of harms, opportunities and human rights. The discussion was designed around an extensive study of current and potential future uses of big data for governance in India, that CIS has undertaken over the last year with support from the MacArthur Foundation.

Contents

Big Data: Definitions and Global South Perspectives

Aadhaar as Big Data

Seeding

Aadhaar and Data Security

Aadhaar’s Relational Arrangement with Big Data Scheme

The Myths surrounding Aadhaar

IndiaStack and FinTech Apps

Problems with UID

Big Data: Definitions and Global South Perspectives

“Big Data” has been defined by multiple scholars till date. The first consideration at the workshop was to discuss various definitions of big data, and also to understand what could be considered Big Data in terms of governance, especially in the absence of academic consensus. One of the most basic ways to define it, as given by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, USA, is to take it to be the data that is beyond the computational capacity of current systems. This definition has been accepted by the UIDAI of India. Another participant pointed out that Big Data is not only indicative of size, but rather the nature of data which is unstructured, and continuously flowing. The Gartner definition of Big Data relies on the three Vs i.e. Volume (size), Velocity (infinite number of ways in which data is being continuously collected) and Variety (the number of ways in which data can be collected in rows and columns).

The presentation also looked at ways in which Big Data is different from traditional data. It was pointed out that it can accommodate diverse unstructured datasets, and it is ‘relational’ i.e. it needs the presence of common field(s) across datasets which allows these fields to be conjoined. For e.g., the UID in India is being linked to many different datasets, and they don’t constitute Big Data separately, but do so together. An increasingly popular definition is to define data as “Big Data” based on what can be achieved through it. It has been described by authors as the ability to harness new kinds of insight which can inform decision making. It was pointed out that CIS does not subscribe to any particular definition, and is still in the process of coming up with a comprehensive definition of Big Data.

Further, discussion touched upon the approach to Big Data in the Global South. It was pointed out that most discussions about Big Data in the Global South are about the kind of value that it can have, the ways in which it can change our society. The Global North, on the other hand, has moved on to discussing the ethics and privacy issues associated with Big Data.

After this, the presentation focussed on case studies surrounding key Central Government initiatives and projects like Aadhaar, Predictive Policing, and Financial Technology (FinTech).

Aadhaar as Big Data

In presenting CIS’ case study on Aadhaar, it was pointed out that initially, Aadhaar, with its enrollment dataset was by itself being seen as Big Data. However, upon careful consideration in light of definitions discussed above, it can be seen as something that enables Big Data. The different e-governance projects within Digital India, along with Aadhaar, constitute Big Data. The case study discussed the Big Data implications of Aadhaar, and in particular looked at a ‘cradle to grave’ identity mapping through various e-government projects and the datafication of various transaction generated data.

Seeding

Any digital identity like Aadhaar typically has three features: 1. Identification i.e. a number or card used to identify yourself; 2. Authentication, which is based on your number or card and any other digital attributes that you might have; 3. Authorisation: As bearers of the digital identity, we can authorise the service providers to take some steps on our behalf. The case study discussed ‘seeding’ which enables the Big Data aspects of Digital India. In the process of seeding, different government databases can be seeded with the UID number using a platform called Ginger. Due to this, other databases can be connected to UIDAI, and through it, data from other databases can be queried by using your Aadhaar identity itself. This is an example of relationality, where fractured data is being brought together. At the moment, it is not clear whether this access by UIDAI means that an actual physical copy of such data from various sources will be transferred to UIDAI’s servers or if they will just access it through internet, but the data remains on the host government agency’s server. An example of even private parties becoming a part of this infrastructure was raised by a participant when it was pointed out that Reliance Jio is now asking for fingerprints. This can then be connected to the relational infrastructure being created by UIDAI. The discussion then focused on how such a structure will function, where it was mentioned that as of now, it cannot be said with certainty that UIDAI will be the agency managing this relational infrastructure in the long run, even though it is the one building it.

Aadhaar and Data Security

This case study also dealt with the sheer lack of data protection legislation in India except for S.43A of the IT Act. The section does not provide adequate protection as the constitutionality of the rules and regulations under S.43A is ambivalent. More importantly, it only refers to private bodies. Hence, any seeding which is being done by the government is outside the scope of data protection legislation. Thus, at the moment, no legal framework covers the processes and the structures being used for datasets. Due to the inapplicability of S.43A to public bodies, questions were raised as to the existence of a comprehensive data protection policy for government institutions. Participants answered the question in the negative. They pointed out that if any government department starts collecting data, they develop their own privacy policy. There are no set guidelines for such policies and they do not address concerns related to consent, data minimisation and purpose limitation at all. Questions were also raised about the access and control over Big Data with government institutions. A tentative answer from a participant was that such data will remain under the control of the domain specific government ministry or department, for e.g. MNREGA data with the Ministry of Rural Development, because the focus is not on data centralisation but rather on data linking. As long as such fractured data is linked and there is an agency that is responsible to link them, this data can be brought together. Such data is primarily for government agencies. But the government is opening up certain aspects of the data present with it for public consumption for research and entrepreneurial purposes.The UIDAI provides you access to your own data after paying a minimal fee. The procedure for such access is still developing.

Aadhaar’s Relational Arrangement with Big Data Scheme

The various Digital India schemes brought in by the government were elucidated during the workshop. It was pointed out that these schemes extend to myriad aspects of a citizen’s daily life and cover all the essential public services like health, education etc. This makes Aadhaar imperative even though the Supreme Court has observed that it is not mandatory for every citizen to have a unique identity number. The benefits of such identity mapping and the ecosystem being generated by it was also enumerated during the discourse. But the complete absence of any data ethics or data confidentiality principles make us unaware of the costs at which these benefits are being conferred on us. Apart from surveillance concerns, the knowledge gap being created between the citizens and the government was also flagged. Three main benefits touted to be provided by Aadhaar were then analysed. The first is the efficient delivery of services. This appears to be an overblown claim as the Aadhaar specific digitisation and automation does not affect the way in which employment will be provided to citizens through MNREGA or how wage payment delays will be overcome. These are administrative problems that Aadhaar and associated technologies cannot solve. The second is convenience to the citizens. The fallacies in this assertion were also brought out and identified. Before the Aadhaar scheme was rolled in, ration cards were issued based on certain exclusion and inclusion criteria.. The exclusion and inclusion criteria remain the same while another hurdle in the form of Aadhaar has been created. As India is still lacking in supporting infrastructure such as electricity, server connectivity among other things, Aadhaar is acting as a barrier rather than making it convenient for citizens to enroll in such schemes.The third benefit is fraud management. Here, a participant pointed out that this benefit was due to digitisation in the form of GPS chips in food delivery trucks and electronic payment and not the relational nature of Aadhaar. Aadhaar is only concerned with the linking up or relational part. About deduplication, it was pointed out how various government agencies have tackled it quite successfully by using technology different from biometrics which is unreliable at the best of times.

The Myths surrounding Aadhaar

The discussion also reflected on the fact that Aadhaar is often considered to be a panacea that subsumes all kinds of technologies to tackle leakages. However, this does not take into account the fact that leakages happen in many ways. A system should have been built to tackle those specific kinds of leakages, but the focus is solely on Aadhaar as the cure for all. Notably, participants who have been a part of the government pointed out how this myth is misleading and should instead be seen as the first step towards a more digitally enhanced country which is combining different technologies through one medium.

IndiaStack and FinTech Apps

What is India Stack?

The focus then shifted to another extremely important Big Data project, India Stack, being conceptualised and developed by a team of private developers called iStack, for the NPCI. It builds on the UID project, Jan Dhan Yojana and mobile services trinity to propagate and develop a cashless, presence-less, paperless and granular consent layer based on UID infrastructure to digitise India.

A participant pointed out that the idea of India Stack is to use UID as a platform and keep stacking things on it, such that more and more applications are developed. This in turn will help us to move from being a ‘data poor’ country to a ‘data rich’ one. The economic benefits of this data though as evidenced from the TAGUP report - a report about the creation of National Information Utilities to manage the data that is present with the government - is for the corporations and not the common man. The TAGUP report openly talks about privatisation of data.

Problems with India Stack

The granular consent layer of India Stack hasn’t been developed yet but they have proposed to base it on MIT Media Lab’s OpenPDS system. The idea being that, on the basis of the choices made by the concerned person, access to a person’s personal information may be granted to an agency like a bank. What is more revolutionary is that India Stack might even revoke this access if the concerned person expresses a wish to do so or the surrounding circumstances signal to India Stack that it will be prudent to do so. It should be pointed out that the the technology required for OpenPDS is extremely complex and is not available in India. Moreover, it’s not clear how this system would work. Apart from this, even the paperless layer has its faults and has been criticised by many since its inception, because an actual government signed and stamped paper has been the basis of a claim.. In the paperless system, you are provided a Digilocker in which all your papers are stored electronically, on the basis of your UID number. However, it was brought to light that this doesn’t take into account those who either do not want a Digilocker or UID number or cases where they do not have access to their digital records. How in such cases will people make claims?

A Digital Post-Dated Cheque: It’s Ramifications

A key change that FinTech apps and the surrounding ecosystem want to make is to create a digital post-dated cheque so as to allow individuals to get loans from their mobiles especially in remote areas. This will potentially cut out the need to construct new banks, thus reducing the capital expenditure , while at the same time allowing the credit services to grow. The direct transfer of money between UID numbers without the involvement of banks is a step to further help this ecosystem grow. Once an individual consents to such a system, however, automatic transfer of money from one’s bank accounts will be affected, regardless of the reason for payment. This is different from auto debt deductions done by banks presently, as in the present system banks have other forms of collateral as well. The automatic deduction now is only affected if these other forms are defaulted upon. There is no knowledge as to whether this consent will be reversible or irreversible. As Jan Dhan Yojana accounts are zero balance accounts, the account holder will be bled dry. The implication of schemes such as “Loan in under 8 minutes” were also discussed. The advantage of such schemes is that transaction costs are reduced.The financial institution can thus grant loans for the minimum amount without any additional enquiries. It was pointed out that this new system is based on living on future income much like the US housing bubble crash. Interestingly, in Public Distribution Systems, biometrics are insisted upon even though it disrupts the system. This can be seen as a part of the larger infrastructure to ensure that digital post-dated cheques become a success.

The Role of FinTech Apps

FinTech ‘apps’ are being presented with the aim of propagating financial inclusion. The Technology Advisory Group for Unique Projects report stated that as managing such information sources is a big task, just like electricity utilities, a National Information Utilities (NIU) should be set up for data sources. These NIUs as per the report will follow a fee based model where they will be charging for their services for government schemes. The report identified two key NIUs namely the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) and the Goods and Services Tax Network (GSTN). The key usage that FinTech applications will serve is credit scoring. The traditional credit scoring data sources only comprised a thin file of records for an individual, but the data that FinTech apps collect - a person’s UID number, mobile number. and bank account number all linked up, allow for a far more comprehensive credit rating. Government departments are willing to share this data with FinTech apps as they are getting analysis in return. Thus, by using UID and the varied data sources that have been linked together by UID, a ‘thick file’ is now being created by FinTech apps. Banking apps have not yet gone down the route of FinTech apps to utilise Big Data for credit scoring purposes.

The two main problems with such apps is that there is no uniform way of credit scoring. This distorts the rate at which a person has to pay interest. The consent layer adds another layer of complication as refusal to share mobile data with a FinTech app may lead to the app declaring one to be a risky investment thus, subjecting that individual to a higher rate of interest .

Regulation of FinTech Apps and the UID Infrastructure

India Stack and the applications that are being built on it, generate a lot of transaction metadata that is very intimate in nature. The privacy aspects of the UID legislation doesn't cover such data. The granular consent layer which has been touted to cover this still has to come into existence. Also, Big Data is based on sharing and linking of data. Here, privacy concerns and Big Data objectives clash. Big Data by its very nature challenges privacy principles like data minimisation and purpose limitation.The need for regulation to cover the various new apps and infrastructure which are being developed was pointed out.

Problems with UID

It has been observed that any problem present with Aadhaar is usually labelled as a teething problem, it’s claimed that it will be solved in the next 10 years. But, this begs the question - why is the system online right now?

Aadhaar is essentially a new data condition and a new exclusion or inclusion criteria. Data exclusion modalities as observed in Rajasthan after the introduction of biometric Point of Service (POS) machines at ration shops was found to be 45% of the population availing PDS services. This number also includes those who were excluded from the database by being included in the wrong dataset. There is no information present to tell us how many actual duplicates and how many genuine ration card holders were weeded out/excluded by POS.

It was also mentioned that any attempt to question Aadhaar is considered to be an attempt to go back to the manual system and this binary thinking needs to change. Big Data has the potential to benefit people, as has been evidenced by the scholarship and pension portals. However, Big Data’s problems arise in systems like PDS, where there is centralised exclusion at the level of the cloud. Moreover, the quantity problem present in the PDS and MNREGA systems persists. There is still the possibility of getting lesser grains and salary even with analysis of biometrics, hence proving that there are better technologies to tackle these problems. Presently, the accountability mechanisms are being weakened as the poor don’t know where to go to for redressal. Moreover, the mechanisms to check whether the people excluded are duplicates or not is not there. At the time of UID enrollment, out of 90 crores, 9 crore were rejected. There was no feedback or follow-up mechanism to figure out why are people being rejected. It was just assumed that they might have been duplicates.

Another problem is the rolling out of software without checking for inefficiencies or problems at a beta testing phase. The control of developers over this software, is so massive that it can be changed so easily without any accountability.. The decision making components of the software are all proprietary like in the the de-duplication algorithm being used by the UIDAI. Thus, this leads to a loss of accountability because the system itself is in flux, none of it is present in public domain and there are no means to analyse it in a transparent fashion..

These schemes are also being pushed through due to database politics. On a field study of NPR of citizens, another Big Data scheme, it was found that you are assumed to be an alien if you did not have the documents to prove that you are a citizen. Hence, unless you fulfill certain conditions of a database, you are excluded and are not eligible for the benefits that being on the database afford you.

Why is the private sector pushing for UIDAI and the surrounding ecosystem?

Financial institutions stand to gain from encouraging the UID as it encourages the credit culture and reduces transaction costs.. Another advantage for the private sector is perhaps the more obvious one, that is allows for efficient marketing of products and services..

The above mentioned fears and challenges were actually observed on the ground and the same was shown through the medium of a case study in West Bengal on the smart meters being installed there by the state electricity utility. While the data coming in from these smart meters is being used to ensure that a more efficient system is developed,it is also being used as a surrogate for income mapping on the basis of electricity bills being paid. This helps companies profile neighbourhoods. The technical officer who first receives that data has complete control over it and he can easily misuse the data. This case study again shows that instruments like Aadhaar and India Stack are limited in their application and aren’t the panacea that they are portrayed to be.

A participant pointed out that in the light of the above discussions, the aim appears to be to get all kinds of data, through any source, and once you have gotten the UID, you link all of this data to the UID number, and then use it in all the corporate schemes that are being started. Most of the problems associated with Big Data are being described as teething problems. The India Stack and FinTech scheme is coming in when we already know about the problems being faced by UID. The same problems will be faced by India Stack as well.

Can you opt out of the Aadhaar system and the surrounding ecosystem?

The discussion then turned towards whether there can be voluntary opting out from Aadhaar. It was pointed out that the government has stated that you cannot opt out of Aadhaar. Further, the privacy principles in the UIDAI bill are ambiguously worded where individuals only have recourse for basic things like correction of your personal information. The enforcement mechanism present in the UIDAI Act is also severely deficient. There is no notification procedure if a data breach occurs. . The appellate body ‘Cyber Appellate Tribunal’ has not been set up in three years.

CCTNS: Big Data and its Predictive Uses

What is Predictive Policing?

The next big Big Data case study was on the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems (CCTNS). Originally it was supposed to be a digitisation and interconnection scheme where police records would be digitised and police stations across the length and breadth of the country would be interconnected. But, in the last few years some police departments of states like Chandigarh, Delhi and Jharkhand have mooted the idea of moving on to predictive policing techniques. It envisages the use of existing statistical and actuarial techniques along with many other tropes of data to do so. It works in four ways: 1. By predicting the place and time where crimes might occur; 2. To predict potential future offenders; 3. To create profiles of past crimes in order to predict future crimes; 4. Predicting groups of individuals who are likely to be victims of future crimes.

How is Predictive Policing done?

To achieve this, the following process is followed: 1. Data collection from various sources which includes structured data like FIRs and unstructured data like call detail records, neighbourhood data, crime seasonal patterns etc. 2. Analysis by using theories like the near repeat theory, regression models on the basis of risk factors etc. 3. Intervention

Flaws in Predictive Policing and questions of bias

An obvious weak point in the system is that if the initial data going into the system is wrong or biased, the analysis will also be wrong. Efforts are being made to detect such biases. An important way to do so will be by building data collection practices into the system that protect its accuracy. The historical data being entered into the system is carrying on the prejudices inherited from the British Raj and biases based on religion, caste, socio-economic background etc.

One participant brought about the issue of data digitization in police stations, and the impact of this haphazard, unreliable data on a Big Data system. This coupled with paucity of data is bound to lead to arbitrary results. An effective example was that of black neighbourhoods in the USA. These are considered problematic and thus they are policed more, leading to a higher crime rate as they are arrested for doing things that white people in an affluent neighbourhood get away with. This in turn further perpetuates the crime rate and it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. In India, such a phenomenon might easily develop in the case of migrants, de-notified tribes, Muslims etc. A counter-view on bias and discrimination was offered here. One participant pointed out that problems with haphazard or poor quality of data is not a colossal issue as private companies are willing to fill this void and are actually doing so in exchange for access to this raw data. It was also pointed out how bias by itself is being used as an all encompassing term. There are multiplicities of biases and while analysing the data, care should be taken to keep it in mind that one person’s bias and analysis might and usually does differ from another. Even after a computer has analysed the data, the data still falls into human hands for implementation.

The issue of such databases being used to target particular communities on the basis of religion, race, caste, ethnicity among other parameters was raised. Questions about control and analysis of data were also discussed, i.e. whether it will be top-down with data analysis being done in state capitals or will this analysis be done at village and thana levels as well too. It was discussed as topointed out how this could play a major role in the success and possible persecutory treatment of citizens, as the policemen at both these levels will have different perceptions of what the data is saying. . It was further pointed out, that at the moment, there’s no clarity on the mode of implementation of Big Data policing systems. Police in the USA have been seen to rely on Big Data so much that they have been seen to become ‘data myopic’. For those who are on the bad side of Big Data, in the Indian context, laws like preventive detention can be heavily misused.There’s a very high chance that predictive policing due to the inherent biases in the system and the prejudices and inefficiency of the legal system will further suppress the already targeted sections of the society. A counterpoint was raised and it was suggested that contrary to our fears, CCTNS might lead to changes in our understanding and help us to overcome longstanding biases.

Open Knowledge Architecture as a solution to Big Data biases?

The conference then mulled over the use of ‘Open Knowledge’ architecture to see whether it can provide the solution to rid Big Data of its biases and inaccuracies if enough eyes are there. It was pointed out that Open Knowledge itself can’t provide foolproof protection against these biases as the people who make up the eyes themselves are predominantly male belonging to the affluent sections of the society and they themselves suffer from these biases.

Who exactly is Big Data supposed to serve?

The discussion also looked at questions such as who is this data for? Janata Information System (JIS), is a concept developed by MKSS where the data collected and generated by the government is taken to be for the common citizens. For e.g. MNREGA data should be used to serve the purposes of the labourers. The raw data as is available at the moment, usually cannot be used by the common man as it is so vast and full of information that is not useful for them at all. It was pointed out that while using Big Data for policy planning purposes, the actual string of information that turned out to be needed was very little but the task of unravelling this data for civil society purposes is humongous. By presenting the data in the right manner, the individual can be empowered. The importance of data presentation was also flagged. It was agreed upon that the content of the data should be for the labourer and not a MNC, as the MNC has the capability to utilise the raw data on it’s own regardless.

Concerns about Big Data usage

Participants pointed out that privacy concerns are usually brushed under the table due to a belief that the law is sufficient or that the privacy battle has already been lost.
In the absence of knowledge of domain and context, Big Data analysis is quite limited. Big Data’s accuracy and potential to solve problems needs to be factually backed.
The narrative of Big Data often rests on the assumption that descriptive statistics take over inferential statistics, thus eliminating the need for domain specific knowledge. It is claimed that the data is so big that it will describe everything that we need to know.
Big Data is creating a shift from a deductive model of scientific rigour to an inductive one. In response to this, a participant offered the idea that troves of good data allow us to make informed questions on the basis of which the deductive model will be formed. A hybrid approach combining both deductive and inductive might serve us best.
The need to collect the right data in the correct format, in the right place was also expressed.

Potential Research Questions & Participants’ Areas of Research

Following this discussion, participants brainstormed to come up with potential areas of research and research questions. They have been captured below:

Big Data, Aadhaar and India Stack:

Has Aadhaar been able to tackle illegal ways of claiming services or are local negotiations and other methods still prevalent?
Is the consent layer of India Stack being developed in a way that provides an opportunity to the UID user to give informed consent? The OpenPDS and its counterpart in the EU i.e. the My Data Structure were designed for countries with strong privacy laws. Importantly, they were meant for information shared on social media and not for an individual’s health or credit history. India is using it in a completely different sphere without strong data protection laws. What were the granular consent layer structures present in the West designed for and what were they supposed to protect?
The question of ownership of data needs to be studied especially in context of a globalised world where MNCs are collecting copious amounts of data of Indian citizens. What is the interaction of private parties in this regard?

Big Data and Predictive Policing:

How are inequalities being created through the Big Data systems? Lessons should be taken from the Western experience with the advent of predictive policing and other big data techniques - they tend to lead to perpetuation of the current biases which are already ingrained in the system.
It was also pointed out how while studying these topics and anything related to technology generally, we become aware of a divide that is present between the computational sciences and social sciences. This divide needs to be erased if Big Data or any kind of data is to be used efficiently. There should be a cross-pollination between different groups of academics. An example of this can be seen to be the ‘computational social sciences departments’ that have been coming up in the last 3-4 years.
Why are so many interim promises made by Big Data failing? A study of this phenomenon needs to be done from a social science perspective. This will allow one to look at it from a different angle.

Studying Big Data:

What is the historical context of the terms of reference being used for Big Data? The current Big Data debate in India is based on parameters set by the West. For better understanding of Big Data, it was suggested that P.C. Mahalanobis’ experience while conducting the Indian census, (which was the Big Data of that time) can be looked at to get a historical perspective on Big Data. This comparison might allow us to discover questions that are important in the Indian context. It was also suggested that rather than using ‘Big Data’ as a catchphrase to describe these new technological innovations, we need to be more discerning.
What are the ideological aspects that must be considered while studying Big Data? What does the dialectical promise of technology mean? It was contended that every time there is a shift in technology, the zeitgeist of that period is extremely excited and there are claims that it will solve everything. There’s a need to study this dialectical promise and the social promise surrounding it.
Apart from the legitimate fears that Big Data might lead to exclusion, what are the possibilities in which it improve inclusion too?
The diminishing barrier between the public and private self, which is a tangent to the larger public-private debate was mentioned.
How does one distinguish between technology failure and process failure while studying Big Data?

Big Data: A Friend?

In the concluding session, the fact that the Big Data moment cannot be wished away was acknowledged. The use of analytics and predictive modelling by the private sector is now commonplace and India has made a move towards a database state through UID and Digital India. The need for a nuanced debate, that does away with the false equivalence of being either a Big Data enthusiast or a luddite is crucial.

A participant offered two approaches to solving a Big Data problem. The first was the Big Data due process framework which states that if a decision has been taken that impacts the rights of a citizen, it needs to be cross examined. The efficacy and practicality of such an approach is still not clear. The second, slightly paternalistic in nature, was the approach where Big Data problems would be solved at the data science level itself. This is much like the affirmative algorithmic approach which says that if in a particular dataset, the data for the minority community is not available then it should be artificially introduced in the dataset. It was also suggested that carefully calibrated free market competition can be used to regulate Big Data. For e.g. a private personal wallet company that charges higher, but does not share your data at all can be an example of such competition.

Another important observation was the need to understand Big Data in a Global South context and account for unique challenges that arise. While the convenience of Big Data is promising, its actual manifestation depends on externalities like connectivity, accurate and adequate data etc that must be studied in the Global South.

While the promises of Big Data are encouraging, it is also important to examine its impacts and its interaction with people's rights. Regulatory solutions to mitigate the harms of big data while also reaping its benefits need to evolve.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/big-data-in-india-benefits-harms-and-human-rights-a-report

Aadhar: Privacy is not a unidimensional concept

amber — 2017-08-23T01:50:19Z

Right to privacy is important not only for our negotiations with the information age but also to counter the transgressions of a welfare state. A robust right to privacy is essential for all Indian citizens to defend their individual autonomy in the face of invasive state actions purportedly for the public good.

The article was published in the Economic Times on July 23, 2017.

The ruling of this nine-judge bench will have far-reaching impact on the extent and scope of rights available to us all. In a disappointing case of judicial evasion by the apex court, it has taken over 600 days since a reference order was passed in August 11, 2015, for this bench to be constituted. Over two days of arguments, the counsels for the petitioners have presented before the court why the right to privacy, despite not finding a mention in the Constitution of India, is a fundamental right essential to a person’s dignity and liberty, and must be read into not one but multiple articles of the Constitution. The government will make its arguments in the coming week.

One must wonder why we are debating the contours of the right to privacy, which 40 years of jurisprudence had lulled us into believing we already had. The answer to that can be found in a series of hearings in the Aadhaar case that began in 2012. Justice KS Puttaswamy, a former Karnataka High Court judge, filed a petition before the Supreme Court, questioning the validity of the Aadhaar project due its lack of legislative basis (since then the Aadhaar Act was passed in 2016) and its transgressions on our fundamental rights. Over time, a number of other petitions also made their way to the apex court, challenging different aspects of the Aadhaar project. Since then, five different interim orders by the Supreme Court have stated that no person should suffer because they do not have an Aadhaar number. Aadhaar, according to the court, could not be made mandatory to avail benefits and services from government schemes. Further, the court has limited the use of Aadhaar to specific schemes: LPG, PDS, MGNREGA, National Social Assistance Programme, the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojna and EPFO.

The real spanner in the works in the progress of this case was the stand taken by Mukul Rohatgi, then attorney general of India who, in a hearing before the court in July 2015, stated that there is no constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. His reliance was on two Supreme Court judgments in MP Sharma v Satish Chandra (1954) and Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh (1962): both cases, decided by eight- and six-judge benches respectively, denied the existence of a constitutional right to privacy. As the subsequent judgments which upheld the right to privacy were by smaller benches, Rohatgi claimed that MP Sharma and Kharak Singh still prevailed over them, until they were overruled by a larger bench.

The reference to a larger bench has since delayed the entire matter, even as a number of government schemes have made Aadhaar mandatory. This reading of privacy as a unidimensional concept by the courts is, with due respect, erroneous. Privacy, as a concept, includes within its scope, spatial, familial, informational and decisional aspects. We all have a legitimate expectation of privacy in our private spaces, such as our homes, and in our personal relationships. Similarly, we must be able to exercise some control over how personal data, like our financial information, are disseminated. Most importantly, privacy gives us the space to make autonomous choices and decisions without external interference. All these dimensions of privacy must stand as distinct rights. In MP Sharma, the court rejected a certain aspect of the right of privacy by refusing to acknowledge a right against search and seizure. This, in no way prevented the court, even in the form of a smaller bench, from ruling on any other aspects of privacy, including those that are relevant to the Aadhaar case.

The limited referral to this bench means that the court will have to rule on the status of privacy and its possible limitations in isolation, without even going into the details of the Aadhaar case (based on the nature of protection that this bench accords to privacy, the petitioners and defendants in the Aadhaar case will have to argue afresh on whether the project does impede on this most fundamental right). There are no facts of the case to ground the legal principles in, and defining the contours of a right can be a difficult exercise. The court must be wary of how any limits they put on the right may be used in future. Equally, it is important to articulate that any limitations on the right to privacy due to competing interests such as national security and public interest must be imposed only when necessary and always be proportionate.

It will not be enough for the court to merely state that we have a constitutional right to privacy. They would be well advised to cut through the muddle of existing privacy jurisprudence, and unequivocally establish the various facets of the right. Without that, we may not be able to withstand the modern dangers of surveillance, denial of bodily integrity and self-determination through forcible collection of information. The nine judges, in their collective wisdom, must not only ensure that we have a right to privacy, but also clearly articulate a robust reading of this right capable of withstanding the growing interferences with our autonomy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-times-july-23-2017-amber-sinha-aadhar-privacy-is-not-a-unidimensional-concept

Privacy vs. Transparency: An Attempt at Resolving the Dichotomy

sunil — 2015-03-08T06:26:21Z

The right to privacy has been articulated in international law and in some national laws. In a few countries where the constitution does not explicitly guarantee such a right, courts have read the right to privacy into other rights (e.g., the right to life, the right to equal treatment under law and also the right to freedom of speech and expression).

With feedback and inputs from Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Elonnai Hickok, Bhairav Acharya and Geetha Hariharan. I would like to apologize for not providing proper citation to Julian Assange when the first version of this blog entry was published. I would also like to thank Micah Sifry for drawing this failure to his attention. The blog post originally published by Omidyar Network can be read here. Also see http://newint.org/features/2015/01/01/privacy-transparency/

In other countries where privacy is not yet an explicit or implicit right, harm to the individual is mitigated using older confidentiality or secrecy law. After the Snowden affair, the rise of social media and the sharing economy, some corporations and governments would like us to believe that “privacy is dead”. Privacy should not and cannot be dead, because that would mean that security is also dead. This is indeed the most dangerous consequence of total surveillance as it is technically impossible to architect a secure information system without privacy as a precondition. And conversely, it is impossible to guarantee privacy without security as a precondition.

The right to transparency [also known as the right to information or access to information] – while unavailable in international law – is increasingly available in national law. Over the last twenty years this right has become encoded in national laws – and across the world it is being used to hold government accountable and to balance the power asymmetry between states and citizens. Independent and autonomous offices of transparency regulators have been established. Apart from increasing government transparency, corporations are also increasingly required to be transparent as part of generic or industry specific regulation in the public interest. For instance, India’s Companies Act, 2013, requires greater transparency from the private sector. Other areas of human endeavor such as science and development are also becoming increasingly transparent though here it is still left up to self-regulation and there isn’t as much established law. Within science and research more generally, the rise of open data accompanied the growth of the Open Access and citizen science movement.

So the question before us is: Are these two rights – the right to transparency and the right to privacy – compatible? Is it a zero-sum game? Do we have to sacrifice one right to enforce the other? Unfortunately, many privacy and transparency activists think this is the case and this has resulted in some conflict. I suggest that these rights are completely compatible when it comes to addressing the question of power. These rights do not have to be balanced against one another. There is no need to settle for a sub-optimal solution. Rather this is an optimization problem and the solution is as follows: privacy protections must be inversely proportionate to power and as Julian Assange says transparency requirements should be directly proportionate to power.[*]

In most privacy laws, the public interest is an exception to privacy. If public interest is being undermined, then an individual privacy can be infringed upon by the state, by researchers, by the media, etc. And in transparency law, privacy is the exception. If the privacy of an individual can be infringed, transparency is not required unless it is in the public interest. In other words, the “public interest” test allows us to use privacy law and transparency law to address power asymmetries rather than exacerbate them. What constitutes “public interest” is of course left to courts, privacy regulators, and transparency regulators to decide. Like privacy, there are many other exceptions in any given transparency regime including confidentiality and secrecy. Given uneven quality of case law there will be a temptation by the corrupt to conflate exceptions. Here the old common-law principle of “there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity” – which prevents confidentiality law from being used to cover malfeasance or illegality – can be adopted in appropriate jurisdictions.

Around 10 years ago, the transparency movement gave birth to yet another movement – the open government data movement. The tension between privacy and transparency is most clearly seen in the open government data movement. The open government data movement in some parts of the world is dominated by ahistorical and apolitical technologists, and some of them seem intent on reinventing the wheel. In India, ever since the enactment of the Right to Information Act, 2003, 30 transparency activists are either killed, beaten or criminally intimidated every year. This is the statistic from media coverage alone. Many more silently suffer. RTI or transparency is without a doubt one of the most dangerous sectors within civil society that you could choose to work in. In contrast, not a single open data activist has ever been killed, beaten or criminally intimidated. I suspect this is because open data activists do not sufficiently challenge power hierarchies. Let us look a little bit closely at their work cycle. When a traditional transparency activist asks a question, that is usually enough to get them into trouble. When an open data activist publishes an answer [a dataset nicely scrubbed and machine readable, or a visualization, or a tool] they are often frustrated because nobody seems interested in using it. Often even the activist is unclear what the question is. This is because open data activist works where data is available. Open data activists are obsessed with big datasets, which are easier to find at the bottom of the pyramid. They contribute to growing surveillance practices [the nexus between Internet giants, states, and the security establishment] rather that focusing on sousveillance [citizen surveillance of the state, also referred to as citizen undersight or inverse surveillance]. They seem to be obsessed only with tools and technologies, rather than power asymmetries and injustices.

Finally, a case study to make my argument easier to understand – Aadhaar or UID, India’s ambitious centralized biometric identity and authentication management system. There are many serious issues with its centralized topology, proprietary technology, and dependence on biometrics as authentication factors – all of which I have written about in the past. In this article, I will explain how my optimization solution can be applied to the project to make it more effective in addressing its primary problem statement that corruption is a necessary outcome of power asymmetries in India.

In its current avatar – the Aadhaar project hopes to assign biometric-based identities to all citizens. The hope is that, by doing authentication in the last mile, corruption within India’s massive subsidy programmes will be reduced. This, in my view, might marginally reduce retail corruption at the bottom of the pyramid. It will do nothing to address wholesale corruption that occurs as subsidies travel from the top to the bottom of the pyramid. I have advocated over the last two years that we should abandon trying to issue biometric identities to all citizens, thereby making them more transparent to the state. Let us instead issue Aadhaar numbers to all politicians and bureaucrats and instead make the state more transparent to citizens. There is no public interest in reducing privacy for ordinary citizens – the powerless – but there are definitely huge public interest benefits to be secured by increasing transparency of politicians and bureaucrats, who are the powerful.

The Indian government has recently introduced a biometric-based attendance system for all bureaucrats and has created a portal that allows Indian citizens to track if their bureaucrats are arriving late or leaving early. This unfortunately is just bean counting [for being corrupt and being punctual are not mutually exclusive] and public access to the national portal was turned off because of legitimate protests from some of the bureaucrats. What bureaucrats do in office, who they meet, and which documents they process is more important than when they arrive at or depart from work. The increased transparency or reduced privacy was not contributing to the public interest.

Instead of first going after small-ticket corruption at the bottom of the pyramid, maximization of public interest requires us to focus on the top, for there is much greater ROI for the anti-corruption rupee. For example: constructing a digital signature based on audit trails that track all funds and subsidies as they move up and down the pyramid. These audit trails must be made public so that ordinary villagers can be supported by open data activists, journalists, social entrepreneurs, and traditional civil society in verification and course correction.

I hope open data activists, data scientists, and big data experts will draw inspiration from the giants of the transparency movement in India. I hope they will turn their attention to power, examine power asymmetries and then ask how the Aadhaar project can be leveraged to make India more rather than less equal.

Videos

Open Up? 2014: Risky Business: Transparency, Technology, Security, and Human Rights

Open Up? 2014: Data Collection and Sharing: Transparency and the Private Sector

The videos can also be watched on Vimeo:

[*].http://prospect.org/article/real-significance-wikileaks “Transparency should be proportional to the power that one has.”

Read the presentation on Risky Business: Transparency, Technology, Security and Privacy made at the Pecha Kucha session here. (ODP File, 35 kb)

Disclaimer: The views, opinions, and positions expressed by the author(s) of this blog are theirs alone, and do not necessarily reflect the views, opinions, or positions of Omidyar Network. We make no representations as to accuracy, completeness, timeliness, suitability or validity of any information presented by individual authors of the blogs and will not be liable for any errors, omissions, or delays in this information or any losses, injuries or damages arising from its display or use.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/blog-old/privacy-v-transparency

Deadline For Linking Bank Accounts With Aadhaar To Be Extended To 31 March

Admin — 2017-12-16T13:24:59Z

The government does away with the existing deadline of 31 December for linking of bank accounts with Aadhaar and PAN

The article by Komal Gupta and Ramya Nair was published in Livemint on December 14, 2017

The government on Wednesday extended the deadline for linking of bank accounts with Aadhaar to 31 March, in line with its submission to the Supreme Court.

The earlier deadline was 31 December.

Bank account holders will have to furnish their 12-digit unique biometric identity number and Permanent account number or PAN by 31 March or within six months of opening the account, whichever is earlier, said a statement from the finance ministry.

This will provide temporary relief to crores of bank account holders who had not linked their bank accounts with the 12-digit unique identity number.

Last week, the income tax department had extended the deadline for linking of Aadhaar with the permanent account number to 31 March from 31 December.

The move comes a day before a Constitution bench of the Supreme Court starts hearing the issue of stay against mandatory linking of Aadhaar with bank accounts and mobile phone numbers.

The statement added that the bank account will cease to be operational in case of failure to furnish Aadhaar and PAN as on 31 March or at the end of six months. The account will become operational again only after the furnishing of documents.

“This is just a gesture from the government, seeking to avoid the court granting an interim stay against the mandatory linkage of Aadhaar with bank accounts. This apparent extension won’t truly help ordinary people, who will continue being harassed through constant messages urging them to provide their Aadhaar number to continue receiving entitlements, services, and for access to one’s own money,” said Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, a Bengaluru-based think tank.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/deadline-for-linking-bank-accounts-with-aadhaar-to-be-extended-to-31-march