Centre for Internet and Society

Shreya Singhal and 66A

sunil — 2015-04-19T08:09:42Z

Most software code has dependencies. Simple and reproducible methods exist for mapping and understanding the impact of these dependencies. Legal code also has dependencies --across court orders and within a single court order. And since court orders are not produced using a structured mark-up language, experts are required to understand the precedential value of a court order.

The article was published in the Economic and Political Weekly Vol-L No.15. Vidushi Marda, programme officer at the Centre for Internet and Society, was responsible for all the research that went into this article. PDF version here.

As a non–lawyer and engineer, I cannot authoritatively comment on the Supreme Court’s order in Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015) on sections of the Information Technology Act of 2000, so I have tried to summarise a variety of views of experts in this article. The Shreya Singhal order is said to be unprecedented at least for the last four decades and also precedent setting as its lucidity, some believe, will cause a ripple effect in opposition to a restrictive understanding of freedom of speech and expression, and an expansiveness around reasonable restrictions. Let us examine each of the three sections that the bench dealt with.

The Section in Question

Section 66A of the IT Act was introduced in a hastily-passed amendment. Unfortunately, the language used in this section was a pastiche of outdated foreign laws such as the UK Communications Act of 2003, Malicious Communications Act of 1988 and the US Telecommunications Act, 1996.¹ Since the amendment, this section has been misused to make public examples out of innocent, yet uncomfortable speech, in order to socially engineer all Indian netizens into self-censorship.²

Summary: The Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act in its entirety holding that it was not saved by Article 19(2) of the Constitution on account of the expressions used in the section, such as "annoying," "grossly offensive," "menacing,", "causing annoyance." The Court justified this by going through the reasonable restrictions that it considered relevant to the arguments and testing them against S66A. Apart from not falling within any of the categories for which speech may be restricted, S66A was struck down on the grounds of vagueness, over-breadth and chilling effect. The Court considered whether some parts of the section could be saved, and then concluded that no part of S66A was severable and declared the entire section unconstitutional. When it comes to regulating speech in the interest of public order, the Court distinguished between discussion, advocacy and incitement. It considered the first two to fall under the freedom of speech and expression granted under Article 19(1)(a), and held that it was only incitement that attracted Article 19(2).

Between Speech and Harm

Gautam Bhatia, a constitutional law expert, has an optimistic reading of the judgment that will have value for precipitating the ripple effect. According to him, there were two incompatible strands of jurisprudence which have been harmonised by collapsing tendency into imminence.³ The first strand, exemplified by Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP⁴ and Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar,⁵ imported an older and weaker American standard, that is, the tendency test, between the speech and public order consequences. The second strand exemplified byRam Manohar Lohia vs State of UP,⁶ S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram,⁷ andArup Bhuyan vs Union of India,⁸ all require greater proximity between the speech and the disorder anticipated. In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court held that at the stage of incitement, the reasonable restrictions will step in to curb speech that has a tendency to cause disorder. Other experts are of the opinion that Justice Nariman was doing no such thing, and was only sequentially applying all the tests for free speech that have been developed within both these strands of precedent. In legal activist Lawrence Liang's analysis, "Ramjilal Modi was decided by a seven judge bench and Kedarnath by a constitutional bench. As is often the case in India, when subsequent benches of a lower strength want to distinguish themselves from older precedent but are unable to overrule them, they overcome this constraint through a doctrinal development by stealth. This is achieved by creative interpretations that chip away at archaic doctrinal standards without explicitly discarding them."⁹

Compatibility with US Jurisprudence

United States (US) jurisprudence has been imported by the Indian Supreme Court in an inconsistent manner. Some judgments hold that the American first amendment harbours no exception and hence is incompatible with Indian jurisprudence, while other judgments have used American precedent when convenient. Indian courts have on occasion imported an additional restriction beyond the eight available in 19(2)-the ground of public interest, best exemplified by the cases of K A Abbas¹⁰ and Ranjit Udeshi.¹¹ The bench in its judgment-which has been characterised by Pranesh Prakash as a masterclass in free speech jurisprudence¹²-clarifies that while the American first amendment jurisprudence is applicable in India, the only area where a difference is made is in the "sub serving of general public interest" made under the US law. This eloquent judgment will hopefully instruct judges in the future on how they should import precedent from American free speech jurisprudence.

Article 14 Challenge

The Article 14 challenge brought forward by the petitioners contended that Section 66A violated their fundamental right to equality because it differentiated between offline and online speech in terms of the length of maximum sentence, and was hence unconstitutional. The Court held that an intelligible differentia, indeed, did exist. It found so on two grounds. First, the internet offered people a medium through which they can express views at negligible or no cost. Second, the Court likened the rate of dissemination of information on the internet to the speed of lightning and could potentially reach millions of people all over the world. Before Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court had already accepted medium-specific regulation. For example in K A Abbas, the Court made a distinction between films and other media, stating that the impact of films on an average illiterate Indian viewer was more profound than other forms of communication. The pessimistic reading of Shreya Singhal is that Parliament can enact medium-specific law as long as there is an intelligible differentia which could even be a technical difference-speed of transmission. However, the optimistic interpretation is that medium-specific law can only be enacted if there are medium-specific harms, e g, phishing, which has no offline equivalent. If the executive adopts the pessimistic reading, then draconian sections like 66A will find their way back into the IT Act. Instead, if they choose the optimistic reading, they will introduce bills that fill the regulatory vacuum that has been created by the striking down of S66A, that is, spam and cyberbullying.

Section 79

Section 79 was partially read down. This section, again introduced during the 2008 amendment, was supposed to give legal immunity to intermediaries for third party content by giving a quick redressal for those affected by providing a mechanism for takedown notices in the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules notified in April 2011. But the section and rules had enabled unchecked invisible censorship¹³ in India and has had a demonstrated chilling effect on speech¹⁴ because of the following reasons:

One, there are additional unconstitutional restrictions on speech and expression. Rule 3(2) required a standard "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" that would have to be incorporated by all intermediaries. Under these rules, users are prohibited from hosting, displaying, uploading, modifying, publishing, transmitting, updating or sharing any information that falls into different content categories, a majority of which are restrictions on speech which are completely out of the scope of Article 19(2). For example, there is an overly broad category which contains information that harms minors in any way. Information that "belongs to another person and to which the user does not have any right to" could be personal information or could be intellectual property. A much better intermediary liability provision was introduced into the Copyright Act with the 2013 amendment. Under the Copyright Act, content could be reinstated if the takedown notice was not followed up with a court order within 21 days.¹⁵ A counter-proposal drafted by the Centre for Internet and Society for "Intermediary Due Diligence and Information Removal," has a further requirement for reinstatement that is not seen in the Copyright Act.¹⁶

Two, a state-mandated private censorship regime is created. You could ban speech online without approaching the court or the government. Risk-aversive private intermediaries who do not have the legal resources to subjectively determine the legitimacy of a legal claim err on the side of caution and takedown content.

Three, the principles of natural justice are not observed by the rules of the new censorship regime. The creator of information is not required to be notified nor given a chance to be heard by the intermediary. There is no requirement for the intermediary to give a reasoned decision.

Four, different classes of intermediaries are all treated alike. Since the internet is not an uniform assemblage of homogeneous components, but rather a complex ecosystem of diverse entities, the different classes of intermediaries perform different functions and therefore contribute differently to the causal chain of harm to the affected person. If upstream intermediaries like registrars for domain names are treated exactly like a web-hosting service or social media service then there will be over-blocking of content.

Five, there are no safeguards to prevent abuse of takedown notices. Frivolous complaints could be used to suppress legitimate expressions without any fear of repercussions and given that it is not possible to expedite reinstatement of content, the harm to the creator of information may be irreversible if the information is perishable. Transparency requirements with sufficient amounts of detail are also necessary given that a human right was being circumscribed. There is no procedure to have the removed information reinstated by filing a counter notice or by appealing to a higher authority.

The judgment has solved half the problem by only making intermediaries lose immunity if they ignore government orders or court orders. Private takedown notices sent directly to the intermediary without accompanying government orders or courts order no longer have basis in law. The bench made note of the Additional Solicitor General's argument that user agreement requirements as in Rule 3(2) were common practice across the globe and then went ahead to read down Rule 3(4) from the perspective of private takedown notices. One way of reading this would be to say that the requirement for standardised "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" remains. The other more consistent way of reading this part of the order in conjunction with the striking down of 66A would be to say those parts of the user agreement that are in violation of Article 19(2) have also been read down.

This would have also been an excellent opportunity to raise the transparency requirements both for the State and for intermediaries: for (i) the person whose speech is being censored, (ii) the persons interested in consuming that speech, and (iii) the general public. It is completely unclear whether transparency in the case of India has reduced the state appetite for censorship. Transparency reports from Facebook, Google and Twitter claim that takedown notices from the Indian government are on the rise.¹⁷ However, on the other hand, the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEITY) claims that government statistics for takedowns do not match the numbers in these transparency reports.¹⁸ The best way to address this uncertainty would be to require each takedown notice and court order to be made available by the State, intermediary and also third-party monitors of free speech like the Chilling Effects Project.

Section 69A

The Court upheld S69A which deals with website blocking, and found that it was a narrowly-drawn provision with adequate safeguards, and, hence, not constitutionally infirm. In reality, unfortunately, website blocking usually by internet service providers (ISPs) is an opaque process in India. Blocking under S69A has been growing steadily over the years. In its latest response to an RTI (right to information)¹⁹ query from the Software Freedom Law Centre, DEITY said that 708 URLs were blocked in 2012, 1,349 URLs in 2013, and 2,341 URLs in 2014. On 30 December 2014 alone, the centre blocked 32 websites to curb Islamic State of Iraq and Syria propaganda, among which were "pastebin" websites, code repository (Github) and generic video hosting sites (Vimeo and Daily Motion).²⁰ Analysis of leaked block lists and lists received as responses to RTI requests have revealed that the block orders are full of errors (some items do not exist, some items are not technically valid web addresses), in some cases counter speech which hopes to reverse the harm of illegal speech has also been included, web pages from mainstream media houses have also been blocked and some URLs are base URLs which would result in thousands of pages getting blocked when only a few pages might contain allegedly illegal content.²¹

Pre-decisional Hearing

The central problem with the law as it stands today is that it allows for the originator of information to be isolated from the process of censorship. The Website Blocking Rules provide that all "reasonable efforts" must be made to identify the originator or the intermediary who hosted the content. However, Gautam Bhatia offers an optimistic reading of the judgment, he claims that the Court has read into this "or" and made it an "and"-thus requiring that the originator must also be notified of blocks when he or she can be identified.²²

Transparency

Usually, the reasons for blocking a website are unknown both to the originator of material as well as those trying to access the blocked URL. The general public also get no information about the nature and scale of censorship unlike offline censorship where the court orders banning books and movies are usually part of public discourse. In spite of the Court choosing to leave Section 69A intact, it stressed the importance of a written order for blocking, so that a writ may be filed before a high court under Article 226 of the Constitution. While citing this as an existing safeguard, the Court seems to have been under the impression that either the intermediary or the originator is normally informed, but according to Apar Gupta, a lawyer for the People's Union for Civil Liberties, "While the rules indicate that a hearing is given to the originator of the content, this safeguard is not evidenced in practice. Not even a single instance exists on record for such a hearing."²³ Even worse, block orders have been unevenly implemented by ISPs with variations across telecom circles, connectivity technologies, making it impossible for anyone to independently monitor and reach a conclusion whether an internet resource is inaccessible as a result of a S69A block order or due to a network anomaly.

Rule 16 under S69A requires confidentiality with respect to blocking requests and complaints, and actions taken in that regard. The Court notes that this was argued to be unconstitutional, but does not state their opinion on this question. Gautam Bhatia holds the opinion that this, by implication, requires that requests cannot be confidential. Chinmayi Arun, from the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi, one of the academics supporting the petitioners, holds the opinion that it is optimism carried too far to claim that the Court noted the challenge to Rule 16 but just forgot about it in a lack of attention to detail that is belied by the rest of the judgment.

Free speech researchers and advocates have thus far used the RTI Act to understand the censorship under S69A. The Centre for Internet and Society has filed a number of RTI queries about websites blocked under S69A and has never been denied information on grounds of Rule 16.²⁴ However, there has been an uneven treatment of RTI queries by DEITY in this respect, with the Software Freedom Law Centre²⁵ being denied blocking orders on the basis of Rule 16. The Court could have protected free speech and expression by reading down Rule 16 except for a really narrow set of exceptions wherein only aggregate information would be made available to affected parties and members of the public.

Conclusions

In Shreya Singhal, the Court gave us great news: S66A has been struck down; good news: S79(3) and its rules have been read down; and bad news: S69A has been upheld. When it comes to each section, the impact of this judgment can either be read optimistically or pessimistically, and therefore we must wait for constitutional experts to weigh in on the ripple effect that this order will produce in other areas of free speech jurisprudence in India. But even as free speech activists celebrate Shreya Singhal, some are bemoaning the judgment as throwing the baby away with the bathwater, and wish to reintroduce another variant of S66A. Thus, we must remain vigilant.

Notes

1 G S Mudur (2012): "66A 'Cut and Paste Job,'" The Telegraph, 3 December, visited on 3 April, 2015, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1121 203/jsp/frontpage/story_16268138.jsp

2 Sunil Abraham (2012): "The Five Monkeys and Ice Cold Water," Centre for Internet and Society, 26 September, visited on 3 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/www-deccan-chronicle-sep-16-201...

3 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Striking Down of 66A: How Free Speech Jurisprudence in India Found Its Soul Again," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 26 March, visited on 4 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/26/the-striking-down-of-sect...

4 Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP, 1957, SCR 860.

5 Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar, 1962, AIR 955.

6 Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of UP, AIR, 1968 All 100.

7 S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram, 1989, SCC(2), 574.

8 Arup Bhuyan vs Union of India, (2011), 3 SCC 377.

9 Lawrence Liang, Alternative Law Forum, personal communication to author, 6 April 2015.

10 K A Abbas vs Union of India, 1971 SCR (2), 446.

11 Ranjit Udeshi vs State of Maharashtra,1965 SCR (1) 65.

12 Pranesh Prakash (2015): "Three Reasons Why 66A Verdict Is Momentous"/ Times of India/(29 March). Visited on 6 April 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-times/all-that-matters/Th...

13 Pranesh Prakash (2011): "Invisble Censorship: How the Government Censors Without Being Seen," The Centre for Internet and Society, 14 December, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/invisible-censorship

14 Rishabh Dara (2012): "Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet," The Centre for Internet and Society, 27 April, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/chilling-effects-on-free-expres... .

15 Rule 75, Copyright Rules, 2013.

16 The Draft Counter Proposal is available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/counter-proposal-by-cis-draft-i...

17 According to Facebook's transparency report, there were 4,599 requests in the first half of 2014, followed by 5,473 requests in the latter half. Available at https://govtrequests.facebook. com/country/India/2014-H2/ also see Google's transparency report available at http: //www.google. com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/?hl=en and Twitter's report, available at https:// transparency.twitter.com/country/in

18 Surabhi Agarwal (2015): "Transparency Reports of Internet Companies are Skewed: Gulashan Rai," Business Standard, 31 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/transparency-re... .

19 http://sflc.in/deity-says-2341-urls-were-blocked-in-2014-refuses-to-reve...

20 "32 Websites Go Blank," The Hindu, 1 January 2015, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/now-modi-govt-blocks-32-websites/a...

21 Pranesh Prakash (2012): "Analysing Latest List of Blocked Sites (Communalism and Rioting Edition)," 22 August, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysing-blocked-sites-ri... . Also, see Part II of the same series at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/analyzing-the-latest-list-of-bl... and analysis of blocking in February 2013, at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analyzing-latest-list-of-b...

22 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Supreme Court's IT Act Judgment, and Secret Blocking," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 25 March, viewed on 6 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/25/the-supreme-courts-it-act...

23 Apar Gupta (2015): "But What about Section 69A?," Indian Express, 27 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://indianexpress. com/article/opinion/ columns/but-what-about-section-69a/

24 Pranesh Prakash (2011): DIT's Response to RTI on Website Blocking, The Centre for Internet and Society, 7 April, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rti-response-dit-blocking ). Also see http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-dit-response-2nd-... and http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/reply-to-rti-applicat...

25 http://sflc.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/RTI-blocking-final-reply-from-...

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-and-political-weekly-sunil-abraham-april-11-2015-shreya-singhal-and-66a

Don’t SLAPP free speech

sunil — 2013-02-28T11:22:09Z

IIPM is proving adept at the tactical use of lawsuits to stifle criticism, despite safeguards. THE DEPARTMENT of Telecommunications, on 14 February, issued orders to block certain web pages critical of the Indian Institute of Planning and Management (IIPM).

Sunil Abraham's column with inputs from Snehashish Ghosh was published in Tehelka on February 3, 2013 (Issue 9 Volume 10)

Despite our best efforts, we have not managed to get a copy of the court order. Meanwhile, there has been a lot of speculation among Internet policy experts on Twitter. What is the title of the case? Which judge issued the order? Who is the affected party? Why have mainstream media houses like Outlook not been served notice by the court? Is the infamous Section 66A of the IT Act to be blamed? That is highly unlikely. News reports suggest that a lower court in Gwalior has issued an ad interim injunction in a defamation suit. Most experts agree that this is a SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) suit, where a company uses the cost of mounting a legal defence to silence critics.

Bullies with deep pockets use the law in very creative ways, such as forum shopping, forum shifting and the use of proxies. Forum shopping can be best understood through the example of mining giant Fomento suing Goan blogger Sebastian Rodrigues for $1 billion at the Kolkata High Court, even though Goa would have been a more logical location. Though IIPM lost an earlier case against Careers360 before the Uttaranchal High Court, the offending URLs from that case are included in the latest block order, exemplifying successful forum shifting. The doctrine of ‘res subjudice’ does not permit courts to proceed in a matter which is “directly and substantially” similar to a previous suit between the same parties. Proxies are usually employed to circumvent this procedural doctrine.

Article 19(2) of our Constitution empowers the State to create laws that place eight types (depending on how you count) of reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression. One of these reasonable restrictions is defamation. Tort law on defamation in India has been mostly borrowed from common law principles developed in the UK, which include a series of exceptions where the law cannot be used. In the present context, the exceptions important for the IIPM case include: fair and bona fide comment and matter of public interest. In addition, Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code provides for 10 exceptions to defamation. The exceptions relevant to this case are: “first: imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published”, “ninth: imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other’s interests” and “tenth: caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good”. The criminal law on defamation in India is based on robust legal principles, but for the sake of public interest it’d be best to do away with such a law as it has far-reaching, chilling effects on free speech.

On interim injunctions in defamation suits, the Delhi High Court set an important precedent protecting free speech in 2011. While applying the English principle — the Bonnard Rule — the court in Tata Sons Pvt Ltd versus Greenpeace International held that a higher standard should be adhered to while granting an interim injunction in a defamation suit, because such an injunction might impinge upon freedom of expression and thus potentially be in violation of the Indian Constitution. This century-old rule states that “until it is clear that an alleged libel is untrue… the importance of leaving free speech unfetter – ed is a strong reason in cases of libel for dealing most cautiously and warily with the granting of interim injunctions…”

In the same case, the Court rejected the argument that since it was published online and thus had wider reach and greater permanence, an injunction should be granted. It observed that “publication is a comprehensive term, embracing all forms and mediums — including the Internet”, thus ruling out special treatment for the Inter net in cases of defamation. That is good news for free speech online in India. Now let’s stick to it.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/tehelka-sunil-abraham-feb-3-2013-dont-slap-free-speech

CIS Response to ICANN's proposed renewal of .org Registry

akriti — 2019-04-28T02:16:40Z

We thank ICANN for the opportunity to comment on this issue of its proposed renewal of the .org Registry Agreement with the operator, Public Interest Registry (PIR). Supporting much of the community , we too find severe issues with the proposed agreement. These centre around the removal of price caps and imposing obligations being currently deliberated in an ongoing Policy Development Process (PDP).

Presumption of Renewal

CIS has, in the past, questioned the need for a presumption of renewal in registry contracts and it is important to emphasize this within the context of this comment as well. We had, also, asked ICANN for their rationale on having such a practice with reference to their contract with Verisign to which they responded saying:

“Absent countervailing reasons, there is little public benefit, and some significant potential for disruption, in regular changes of a registry operator. In addition, a significant chance of losing the right to operate the registry after a short period creates adverse incentives to favor short term gain over long term investment.”

This logic can presumably be applied to the .org registry, as well, yet a re-auction of ,even, legacy top-level domains can only serve to further a fair market, promote competition and ensure that existing registries do not become complacent.

These views were supported in the course of the PDP on Contractual Conditions - Existing Registries in 2006 wherein competition was seen useful for better pricing, operational performance and contributions to registry infrastructure. It was also noted that most service industries incorporate a presumption of competition as opposed to one of renewal.

Download the file to access our full response.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/akriti-bopanna-april-28-2019-cis-response-to-icanns-proposed-renewal-of-org-registry

Discussion on Ranking Digital Rights in India (Delhi, January 07)

amber — 2016-12-29T07:07:34Z

Towards developing an understanding of how Indian ICT companies are recognising and upholding digital rights of their users, and to raise public awareness about the same, the Center for Internet and Society (CIS), with the support of Privacy International, has studied 8 Indian ICT companies, using the same methodology as the 2015 Corporate Accountability Index, to gain greater insight into company practices and initiate public dialogues. Please join us on Saturday, January 07, at the India Islamic Cultural Centre, New Delhi, for a presentation of our findings followed by an open structured discussion on the methodology and implications of the study.

Download: Invitation and agenda (PDF)

The Ranking Digital Rights Corporate Responsibility Index is a project hosted by the Open Technology Institute at New America Foundation that aims to rank Information and Communications Technology (ICTs) companies with respect to their Governance, Freedom of Expression, and Privacy practices. The inaugural Corporate Accountability Index, released in November 2015, evaluated 16 companies based on the project’s methodology that included 31 indicators in total.

Please join us on Saturday, January 07, at the India Islamic Cultural Centre, New Delhi, for a presentation of our findings followed by an open structured discussion on the methodology and implications of the Ranking Digital Rights study. We will begin at 10:30 am with a round of tea and coffee.

The event is open to all but the venue has limited space. The participants are requested to RSVP by sending an email to nisha@cis-india.org.

To further encourage programmers, researchers, journalists, students, and users in general to use and contribute to the findings of the Ranking Digital Rights study, and critique the underlying methodology, we are also organising a “rankathon” on Sunday, January 08, at the CIS office in Delhi. More details can be found here.

We look forward to your participation and contribution to the discussion. Please support us by sharing this invitation with your colleagues and networks.

Agenda

10:30-11:00	Coffee and Tea
11:00-11:15	Introduction
11:15-13:00	Presentation of the Findings and Discussion Divij Joshi and Aditya Singh Chawla
13:00-14:00	Lunch
14:00-15:00	Open Discussion #1: Parameters of Evaluation The RDR methodology was based upon evaluating commitments to uphold human rights through their services – in particular towards their commitment to users’ freedom of expression and privacy. Are there other parameters that may be considered in the Indian context?
15:00-16:00	Open Discussion #2: Towards Protecting Digital Rights What steps can be taken by the government, civil society, and industry in India to create an environment that recognizes and protects users digital rights? What are the relevant legal, political, and economic factors to take into consideration towards this? What are steps that other, multinational ICT companies have taken? Would these be realistic for Indian companies to implement?
16:00-16:30	Conclusion
16:30-17:00	Coffee and Tea

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/discussion-on-ranking-digital-rights-in-india-delhi-jan-07-2017

India's ‘Facebook ruling’ is another nail in the coffin of the MNO model

praskrishna — 2016-02-28T03:44:34Z

Ability to access 'net from mobe no longer considered a miracle.

The article was published in the Register on February 15, 2016. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.

Nobody could accuse India’s telecoms regulator, TRAI, of being in the operators’ pockets. This month it has, once again, set eye-watering reserve prices for the upcoming 700 MHz spectrum auction (see separate item), and now it has taken one of the toughest stances in the world on net neutrality, in effect banning zero rated or discounted content deals like Reliance Communications’ Facebook Basics, or Bharti Airtel’s Zero.

In a ruling last Monday, TRAI said telecoms providers are banned from offering discriminatory tariffs for data services based on content, and from entering deals to subsidize access to certain websites. They have six months to wind down any existing arrangements which contravene the new rules. Its stance is even stricter than in other countries with strong pro-neutrality laws, such as Brazil and The Netherlands.

“This is the most extensive and stringent regulation on differential pricing anywhere in the world,” Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, said. “Those who suggested regulation in place of complete ban have clearly lost.”

Such decisions, combined with high spectrum costs, will quickly make the traditional cellular business model unworkable in India, and the more that happens, the more wireless internet innovation will switch to open networks running on Wi-Fi and unlicensed spectrum. R.S. Sharma, chairman of TRAI, was careful to tell reporters that the zero rating ruling would not affect any plans to offer free Wi-Fi services, like those planned by Google in a venture with Indian Railways.

A disaster for MNOs, not Facebook

Facebook pronounced itself “disappointed” at TRAI’s ruling, having lobbied aggressively for a more flexible approach since RCOM was forced to suspend the Basics offering in December while the consultation process took place. But while the ruling bars the Basics offering – which provided free, low speed access, on RCOM’s network, to a selection of websites, curated by Facebook – it does not stop the social media giant pursuing other initiatives within its internet.org umbrella. These include projects to extend access using its own networks, powered by drones and unlicensed spectrum, to the unserved of India and other emerging economies.

So while the TRAI decision may be a setback for Facebook, it is not the body blow that it represents for the MNOs with their huge debt loads and infrastructure costs, and low ARPUs. Facebook, with 130m users in India, has a comparable reach to the Indian MNOs (only three, Bharti Airtel, Vodafone and Idea, have more subscribers than Facebook has users), and is better skilled at monetizing those consumers.

The challenge for companies like Facebook is that strict neutrality rules reduce their ability to harness others’ networks in order to reach out to new users. There are about 240m people in India who are online, but don’t use Facebook, and about 800m who are not connected, so the growth potential is far larger than in the other 37 countries where Basics is offered, such as Kenya or Zambia (Facebook is blocked in China). Using RCOM’s network and marketing activities was a far cheaper way to reach some of those people than launching drones, but Facebook has other options too, including its existing efforts to make its services more usable on very basic handsets and connections; the ability to leverage the WhatsApp brand; and partnerships with Wi-Fi providers.

The drones may have less immediate results than Basics, but they are a high profile example of an ongoing shift towards open networks, which has been going on for years, driven more by Wi-Fi proliferation than neutrality laws. The latter will be an accelerant, however.

All internet will be free, not zero rated

Currently, zero rating is an increasingly popular tactic to lure users with an apparently cheap deal and then, hopefully, see them upgrade to richer data plans, or spend money on m-commerce and premium content, in future. Zero rating involves allowing users access to selected websites and services without it affecting their data caps or allowances.

The US regulator has so far tolerated the practice, but the debate is raging, there and elsewhere, over whether it infringes neutrality laws, by offering different pricing for different internet services. If other authorities take the stance adopted by TRAI in India, operators will have to find new ways to attract customers and differentiate themselves.

Increasingly, access to a truly open internet will be the baseline, and priced extremely low. That low pricing will be made commercially viable by rising use of Wi-Fi to reduce cost of data delivery, whether for MNOs, wireline providers or web players like Google and Facebook, which are moving into access provision. Providers, whether traditional or new, will have to stop regarding access to the internet as a premium service or a privilege – it will be more akin to connecting someone to the electricity grid, just the base enabler of the real revenue model.

Just as it’s only when users plug something into that grid that they start to pay fees, so the operators will charge for higher value offerings which ride on top of the internet – premium content, enterprise services, cloud storage, freemium applications and so on.

The mobile operators have not embraced these ideas willingly. For years, the ability to access the internet from a mobile device was regarded as a value-add, almost a miracle. Now that the wireless network is often the primary access method, they need to change their ideas and be more like the smarter cablecos – which have tacked internet access onto a model driven by paid-for content and services – or the web giants, which have worked out ways to monetize ‘free’ access, from advertising to big data.

This, of course, is one of the goals of internet.org and Google’s similar initiatives involving drones, white space spectrum and satellites. The more users are able to access the internet, preferably for free, and the more they see Google or Facebook as their primary conduits to the web, the more data these companies have to feed into their deep learning platforms, their context aware services and their advertising and big data engines.

So while critics of TRAI said the zero rating decision was a setback to the goal of getting internet access into the hands of the huge underserved population of India, that population is too large and potentially rich for Facebook and its rivals to give up at the first hurdle.

Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg wrote in a blog post: "While we're disappointed with today's decision, I want to personally communicate that we are committed to keep working to break down barriers to connectivity in India and around the world. Internet.org has many initiatives, and we will keep working until everyone has access to the internet."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/news/the-register-february-15-2016-india-facebook-ruling-is-another-nail-in-coffin-of-mno-model

Global Censorship Conference

praskrishna — 2012-03-30T11:34:07Z

The Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression at Yale Law School is holding a conference on global censorship from March 30 to April 1, 2012, at Yale Law School. The programme is sponsored by the Information Society Project at Yale Law School and Thomson Reuters.

"This conference is the first major event for the Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression, and it brings together an exciting group of thinkers from law, political science, computer science, business and the non-profit sector to discuss the lessons of the past few years,” explained Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin, director of the Abrams Institute and the Information Society Project. “We think the study of free expression in the digital age should be international and interdisciplinary."[1]

Rishabh Dara, Google Policy Fellow who worked at CIS office in Bangalore on freedom of expression and internet-related policy issues is participating in the event as a speaker in the panel on Case Studies of Censorship. The panel will explore recent instances of censorship in the United States, Egypt, Syria, Brazil, and India and the common themes and important differences that emerged.

This conference will consider how censorship has changed in a networked world, exploring how networks have altered the practices of both governments and their citizens. Panels will include discussions of how governments can and do censor and how speakers can command technical and legal tools to preserve their ability to speak. The conference will conclude with a discussion of new controversies in censorship, including laws designed to prevent online bullying and intellectual property infringement.

Agenda

Friday March 30, 2012

2:00	Begin Registration
3:15 – 4:45	The Means of Change, Familiar and New (co-sponsored by Sponsored by the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights) In the popular story of the political upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa, information technology stands out as the new factor that was critical to rapid mass mobilization for demanding change. The media have been credited with making popular demands for change contagious. Enthusiasts for the potential of technology to foster progressive change have labeled these apparently sudden developments a Facebook revolution. Governments responded by seeking to curtail the use of mobile phones and the Internet. What role has technology played in igniting, sustaining and shaping recent political changes in the Arab world? Anupam Chander, Professor of Law, University of California, Davis and Director, California International Law Center Rebecca MacKinnon, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation John Pollock, journalist
5:00– 6:30	Keynote Lecture (co-sponsored by Sponsored by the Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights) Irwin Cotler, Canadian Parliament, former Attorney General of Canada
6:30– 9:00	Reception for Panelists of the Global Censorship Conference

Saturday March 31, 2012

9:00 – 10:00	Registration and Breakfast
10:00– 11:30	Panel One: Old and New Forms of Censorship Years ago, activists met in person to plan protests and quietly shared subversive texts. Now, events can be planned over social networking sites, and arguments for change are posted online. How have governments responded to these changes? How have activist practices and governments’ reactions changed the way we conceptualize censorship? Jack Balkin, Yale Law School Yochai Benkler, Harvard Law School Navid Hassanpour, Yale Political Science Deptartment Rebecca MacKinnon, Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow, New America Foundation
11:45 – 1:15	Panel Two: Technical Architectures of Censorship There are a number of choke points across the Internet and a number of different censorship mechanisms that can be deployed at various points across the network. Censorship can be executed at the router level, the Internet Service Provider (ISP) level, the Internet Content Provider (ICP) level, or the device level. Additionally, countries can employ a number of different technologies at each level. This panel will explore the many technical options for censorship and the strategic value of different choices. Laura DeNardis, Associate Professor of Communication at American University, and Affiliated Fellow, Information Society Project at Yale Law School Nagla Rizk, American University in Cairo Hal Roberts, Fellow at Berkman Center for Internet & Technology Ashkan Soltani, Independent Researcher and Consultant on Privacy and Security
1:15 – 2:15	Lunch
2:15 – 3:45	Panel Three: Case Studies of Censorship In the wake of censorship both domestically and abroad, many questions emerged about how the censorship was executed, what effects it had, if and how activists were able to route around the it, and how, if it all, it was eventually stopped. This panel will explore recent instances of censorship in the United States, Egypt, Syria, Brazil, and India and the common themes and important differences that emerged. Sherwin Siy, Deputy Legal Director and the Kahle/Austin Promise Fellow at Public Knowledge Lina Attalah, Journalist, Managing Editor of Al-Masry Al-Youm Anas Qtiesh, Blogger, Editor of Global Voices Carlos Affonso Pereira de Souza, Vice-Coordinator of the Center for Technology & Society (CTS) at the Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) Law School Rishabh Dara, Researcher at Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad
4:00 – 5:30	Panel Four: Technical Methods of Circumventing Censorship New technology may provide governments with new tools to censor, but it also creates opportunities for speakers and “hactivists” everywhere. How can individuals evade identification online and access blocked content? Can activists circumvent attempts to shut down the internet during periods of political unrest? What new methods are being developed to preserve free speech online? Roger Dingledine, The Tor Project Peter Fein, Telecomix Alex Halderman, University of Michigan, Dept. of Computer Science Sascha Meinrath, Open Technology Initiative Director, New America Foundation Wendy Seltzer, Senior Fellow, Information Society Project at Yale Law School
6:00 – 9:00	Dinner for Speakers

Sunday, April 1, 2012

9:00 – 9:30	Breakfast
9:30 – 11:00	Panel Five: Legal Solutions to Censorship Given the way censorship technologies have slowly crept into acceptable use because of concerns like piracy, child pornography, or national security, there is much debate about the role and capacity of law in combatting these new, digital forms of government censorship, domestically and internationally. This panel will discuss if and how legal solutions to censorship can be deployed most effectively. Derek Bambauer, Brooklyn Law School Jim Dempsey, Vice President of Public Policy at the Center for Democracy and Technology Molly Land, New York Law School Linda Lye, ACLU Northern California Jillian York, Director for International Freedom of Expression at the Electronic Frontier Foundation
11:15 – 12:45	Panel Six: New Controversies in Censorship Does new technology change the appropriate scope of free expression rights? Can policing intellectual property infringement burden free speech interests? Does surveillance ever have a censoring effect? This panel will wrestle with whether a variety of government activities constitutes inappropriate censorship or necessary actions to protect the public interest. Rebecca Bolin, Fellow at Information Society Project, Yale Law School Mark MacCarthy, Vice President for Public Policy, Software and Information Industry Association; Adjunct Professor, Communication, Culture and Technology Program, Georgetown University Preston Padden, Senior Fellow at the Silicon Flatirons Center and an Adjunct Professor at the University Of Colorado's Law School and Interdisciplinary Telecommunications Program David Post, Temple University, Beasley School of Law Christopher Soghoian, Graduate Fellow, Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, Indiana University
12:45	Bagged Lunch Available

[1].Global Censorship Conference to be Held March 30-April 1 at Yale Law School | Yale Law School, last accessed on March 30, 2012, http://www.law.yale.edu/news/15140.htm

Read the original posted in Yale Law School website

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/global-censorship-conference

Save Your Voice — A movement against Web censorship

praskrishna — 2012-03-13T11:44:27Z

‘Save Your Voice (SYV)’ is a movement against Web censorship and its main demand is the repealing of the Information Technology Act, said SYV founders, Aseem Trividi, a cartoonist, and Alok Dixit, a journalist, on Monday.

DNA Correspondent covered a press conference held on March 12, 2012 in Bangalore. Sunil Abraham was quoted in the story.

Trivedi’s website — www.cartoonistagainstcorruption.com — was banned during Anna Hazare’s movement. Trivedi said: “Mumbai police banned the website without any prior notice and cases of ‘treason’ were also filed. The website was banned without a judicial order and I haven’t received an explanation about the crime committed.”

Sunil Abraham, executive director, Centre for Internet and Society, said the private sector does not protect the freedom of expression.

Read the original published by Daily News & Analysis on March 13, 2012

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/save-your-voice-2014-a-movement-against-web-censorship

Arrest of girl over Thackeray FB update a clear misuse of Sec 295A

praskrishna — 2012-11-20T12:00:53Z

The arrest of 21-year-old Shaheen Dhada over her Facebook status update questioning the shutdown of Mumbai over Shiv Sena supremo Bal Thackeray‘s death, is a clear misapplication of section 295 A of the Indian Penal Code (“outrage religious feelings of any class”), according to Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society.

The article was published in FirstPost on November 19, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

In comments to Firstpost, Prakash said that this law had been misused numerous times in the state of Maharashtra.

“Even the banning of James Laine’s book Shivaji happened under section 295 A, and the ban was subsequently held to have been unlawful. What makes this seem ironic, and almost a parodic news report, is the fact that Bal Thackeray probably violated this provision more times than most other politicians, but was only charged under it once or twice”, he said.

Dhada’s status update reportedly read, “People like Thackeray are born and die daily and one should not observe a bandh for that.” A friend of hers who ‘liked’ the comment was also arrested.

Prakash said that the arrest called for a discussion on the regulation of speech and expression. “It being a Facebook status update should not grant it any special immunity; the fact of that update not being punishable under s.295 A should! It isn’t regulation of social media that needs to be discussed, but regulation of speech and expression”, he said.

News of the arrest has understandably drawn a lot of attention on social media, and forums like Facebook and Twitter reflected outrage at the news.

The Times of India also reported that a mob of Shiv Sena workers attacked and ransacked the girl’s uncle’s orthopaedic clinic at Palghar, even though she withdrew her comment and apologised.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/first-post-india-nov-19-2012-arrest-of-girl-over-thackeray-fb-update-clear-misuse-of-sec-295a

Women arrested for Facebook post: Did cops act under Sena pressure?

praskrishna — 2012-11-21T11:17:37Z

After Bal Thackeray's death, during the Mumbai Bandh, a 21-year-old criticised the shutdown on her Facebook page — her friend approved of it — next thing they know, they are facing a case, and this morning they were arrested.

YP Singh, Alyque Padamsee, Rohan Joshi, Karuna Nundy and Pranesh Prakash took part in a discussion about the arrest of two girls over a Facebook comment. The discussion was aired in NDTV on November 19, 2012.

The anchor asked Pranesh Prakash:

Who are these people scrolling through people's Facebook posts and Twitter accounts, finding these comments and taking action?

Pranesh Prakash said that it could be anyone. The reality is doesn't really matter because the laws are written in such a way that if it is public and stuff that is on Facebook for different purposes can either be public or private, if it is public these laws can very often apply and that is a problem. We haven't quite figured out to what extent these laws apply. The IT Act section 66A for instance, is unconstitutional, section 295 A which has been applied, and section 505 which also seems to have been applied in this case make it a clear case of misappropriation of those provisions. These kind of arrests will happen. It doesn't quite matter if we have right laws at one level and it clearly doesn't help if we have bad laws. What we need to do at least in part to remedy the situation is to amend the IT Act to make it consonant and consistent with civil and political rights and to do so in multi-stakeholder fashion involving civil society, industry and government. Right now it doesn't protect privacy and freedom of speech as much as it should.

Watch the full video aired on NDTV

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/ndtv-video-ndtv-special-ndtv-24x7

Interview with Pranesh Prakash

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T06:58:39Z

Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society talks to Mint’s Surabhi Agarwal about the controversial Section 66A of the IT Act and the government’s decision to tweak it.

This video was published in LiveMint on November 30, 2012:

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/livemint-november-30-2012-video-interview-with-pranesh-prakash

Yes, You Can Get Arrested for a Facebook Status Update Now

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T08:16:20Z

A 21-year-old Indian woman thought Mumbai shouldn't have been shutdown for the funeral of an Islamophobic leader. Broadcasting such opinions on Facebook was apparently grounds for arrest.

The article by David Wagner was published in the Atlantic Wire on November 29, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

A Muslim graduate student, Shaheen Dhada posted a note (of her iPhone message) on her timeline November 18th, writing, "Every day thousands of people die, but still the world moves on ... Today, Mumbai shuts down out of fear, not out of respect." Her status was written in reference to the death of Bal Thackeray, the late leader of Hindu extremist group Shiv Sena, responsible for repeated waves violence against Muslims in the Maharashtra state, according to the BBC. Another 21-year-old woman, Rinu Shrinivasan, was also arrested by Indian police for stoking "religious enmity." She'd simply clicked "like" on Dhada's post.

A mob of angry Thackeray supporters thronged around the police station Dhada's house. Others vandalized her uncle's clinic two days after her arrest. Mumbai newspaper The Hindu reports today that charges have been dropped against the two arrested women, but those observing the case are worried about the precedent this sets for free speech in India. "I have 3,500 followers on Twitter, and I'm pretty sure I annoy 100 of them on a daily basis," says Centre for Internet and Society director Pranesh Prakash. But should that mean he and others in India should picture themselves in handcuffs every time they type a potentially controversial status update? Retired Supreme Court Justice Markandey Katju tells NPR's Julie McCarthy that, at least in this case, the arrest was totally inappropriate:

You can mourn a death in whichever way you want, but you can't bring a whole city to a stoppage. So what this girl wrote was in consonance with the verdict of the Supreme Court—nothing illegal.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/the-atlantic-wire-november-29-2012-david-wagner-you-can-get-arrested-for-facebook-status-update-now

Govt tweaks enforcement of IT Act after spate of arrests

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T08:27:01Z

The government on Thursday tweaked the law to make it tougher for citizens to be arrested for online comments that are deemed offensive after recent arrests came in for heavy criticism by Internet activists, the media and other groups.

Surabhi Agarwal's article was published in LiveMint on November 29, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

This took place just before the Supreme Court was to hear a public interest litigation seeking an amendment to the Information Technology (IT) Act.

Complaints under the controversial Section 66A of the IT Act, which criminalizes “causing annoyance or inconvenience” online or electronically, can be registered only with the permission of an officer of or above the rank of deputy commissioner of police, and inspector general in metro cities, said a senior government official.

The government, however, has not amended the terms in the section that are said to be vague and subject to interpretation.

The public interest litigation against Section 66A filed by student Shreya Singhal came up in chief justice Altamas Kabir’s court on Thursday. The matter will be heard on Friday.

Two girls near Mumbai were arrested last week for criticizing on Facebook the shutdown in the city for Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray’s funeral. Earlier in November, a businessman in Puducherry was arrested for comments made on Twitter against finance minister P. Chidambaram’s son Karti Chidambaram.

According to people present at the meeting of the cyber regulatory advisory committee on Thursday, the Union government will issue guidelines to states with respect to the compliance of the new enforcement rules soon. The people didn’t want to be named. An official said the move was not related to the case.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society think tank, said that while the change in the law is a step in the right direction and will eliminate a lot of frivolous complaints, more needs to be done to make the legislation specific.

Chief justice Kabir said the apex court was considering taking suo motu cognisance of recent incidents.

Singhal contended in her plea that “the phraseology of section 66A of the IT Act, 2000, is so wide and vague and incapable of being judged on objective standards, that it is susceptible to wanton abuse and, hence, falls foul of Article 14, 19 (1)(a) and Article 21 of the Constitution.”

She submitted that “unless there is judicial sanction as a prerequisite to the setting into motion the criminal law with respect to freedom of speech and expression, the law as it stands is highly susceptible to abuse and for muzzling free speech in the country.”

The PIL was argued by Mukul Rohatgi, who said in his opening remarks that Section 66A was vague. Terms such as “offensive” and “annoyance” should be clearly defined as the section is part of criminal law, he said.

Senior advocate Harish Salve, who was also present during the hearing, said India guaranteed the right to “annoy” and there was no need to have a separate law.

Salve, who is in the process of filing an intervention on behalf of some technology companies, added that the section needed to be narrowed to specifically cater to private messages sent electronically and not social media communications.

He said the existing law of defamation should suffice and could be extended to include electronic communications. According to a lawyer who is part of the team representing Singhal, the petition also demanded that the law be made non-cognisable so that the police can’t make an arrest without an order from a magistrate.

“There has been a lot of misuse and abuse of the law recently and we want it to be struck down absolutely and also the court to issue guidelines,” he said.

Apart from the incident at Palghar in Thane district involving the two girls, Singhal’s PIL referred to an April incident in which a professor of chemistry from Jadavpur University in West Bengal, Ambikesh Mahapatra, was arrested for posting a cartoon concerning chief minister Mamata Banerjee on a social networking site.

She also referred to the Puducherry case as well as the May arrests of two Air India Ltd employees, V. Jaganatharao and Mayank Sharma, by the Mumbai Police under the IT Act for posting content on Facebook and Orkut against a trade union leader and some politicians.

Singhal has sought guidelines from the apex court to “reconcile Section 41 and 156 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) with Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution” and that offences under the Indian Penal Code and any other legislation, if they involve the freedom of speech and expression, be treated as a non-cognizable offences for the purposes of Sections 41 and 156 (1).

Section 41 of CPC empowers the police to arrest any person without an order from a magistrate and without a warrant in the event that the offence involved is a cognizable offence. Section 156 (1) empowers the investigation by the police into a cognizable offence without an order from a magistrate.

The government official present at the cyber regulatory advisory committee said the expressions used in Section 66A had been taken from different statutes around the world, including the UK and the US.

“There has been a broad consensus that the parameters of the law concerned might be in order but from a procedural standpoint there might be difficulty,” the official said.

Prakash said that while some of the terms in the section may be taken from legislation overseas, the penalty imposed under the Indian law is far more stringent at three years of imprisonment than, for instance, six months under the UK law. “Criminal offences can’t be put at the same level as something which causes insult.”

The cyber regulatory advisory committee meeting was attended by minister for communications and information technolgy Kapil Sibal, and secretaries of the department of telecommunications and information technology, besides representatives of technology companies such as Google and Facebook, industry associations and civil society.

The official also said that the situation will be reviewed every three to four months based on “ground realities”.

A government official said on condition of anonymity that the decision to revive the cyber regulatory advisory committee had been taken at a meeting in August. Section 66A was put on the agenda since it was the subject of much debate, he said. The meeting, however, was not a pre-emptive measure ahead of the PIL that was taken up in the Supreme Court. The official also said that the government will spell out its position in court in favour of the legislation.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/livemint-politics-november-29-2012-surabhi-agarwal-govt-tweaks-enforcement-of-it-act-after-spate-of-arrests

The flaw in cyber law

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T09:06:25Z

Legal experts and netizens want the controversial clause in the IT Act to be scrapped after two Mumbai girls were arrested for a post on Facebook.

This article by S Ronendra Singh was published in the Hindu BusinessLine on November 29, 2012. Sunil Abraham and Snehashish Ghosh are quoted.

Shaheen Dhada, 21, and her friend Rini Srinivas would never have imagined that they could land in jail because of a Facebook post. The two girls were arrested in Palghar following a complaint from local Shiv Sena workers against Shaheen's post on Facebook, where she questioned the need for a 'bandh' being observed in Mumbai on the death of the Sena supremo Bal Thackery.

While the two girls’ experience was traumatic, the action by the police has given fodder to activists and cyber experts to raise the clamour for scrapping section 66A of the IT Act, which they term as being draconian.

The Palghar incident is not an isolated event. Recently, Ravi Srinivasan, a 45-year-old supplier of plastic parts to telecom companies and a volunteer with India Against Corruption got into trouble with police after he tweeted about alleged corruption charges against Karti Chidambram, son of Finance Minister P Chidambaram.

There was a common factor in all these cases - arbitrary use of the Section 66 (A) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The only mistake that most of these so-called offenders had committed was publishing their views online.

So, should we consider the law draconian now?

Assess Ambiguity

According to Snehashish Ghosh, Policy Associate at Centre for Internet and Society (Bangalore-based organisation looking at multidisciplinary research and advocacy in the field of Internet and society), the main reason for such inconsistent application of the law can be found in the history of the provision.

He said the language used in Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000 has been borrowed from Section 127 of the UK Communication Act, 2003 and the Malicious Communications Act, 1988.

“These two particular provisions are applicable in cases where the communication is directed to a particular person. Section 1 of the Malicious Prosecution Act begins with the, “any person who sends to another person” and hence it is clear that the provision does not include any post or electronic communication which is broadcasted to the world and deals with only one-to-one communication,” said Ghosh.

Section 127 only deals with “improper use of public electronic communications network”. It was meant to prevent misuse of public communication services. Therefore, social media Web sites do not fall under its ambit. However, the Section 66(A) in its current form fails to define any specific category, which has led to inconsistent and arbitrary use of the provision, said Ghosh.

One of the principles of interpretation of statute is that of absurdity. It states that when there are two interpretation of the law - where one renders it absurd and arbitrary, while the other puts it within the constitutional limits - then the latter interpretation is adopted.

“In the case of 66(A), interpreting it to include any form of communication transmitted using computer resource or communication device renders it to be absurd and arbitrary. Therefore, it should be interpreted and made applicable only to communication between two parties,” he opined.

According to Pavan Duggal, cyber law expert and advocate at Supreme Court of India, primarily section 66(A) is for protecting reputation and preventing misuse of its own.

“It is so vast – what is annoyance and inconvenience – gives a tremendous handle in the hands of the complainant and the police to target anyone. Further, if you send any information through email or SMS, which aims to mislead the addressee about such mail or message is a crime. All this suddenly opens a Pandora box of offences,” he said.

“So, when you look at case of Mamta Banerjee or latest case of those two girls getting arrested in Mumbai, it shows that Section 66(A) becomes an effective tool in the hands of ingenious complainants to gag free speech. And, that is why there is so much noise,” Duggal said.

To Use, Not Abuse

Sighting the recent case of the two girls from Mumbai, he said the law was abused and all they need to do is just exploit – whether clicking a ‘Like’ button on Facebook could involve Section 66(A) – and this case is setting a precedence that ‘liking’ a comment can be an offensive of Section 66(A).

“When you click a ‘Like’ button, you do not send any information that is defined under Section 66(A). You only send information of ‘liking’ that information or message,” he said.

However, it has become a code of misuse in its own sense. Parameters given there in the Act are extremely wide and can be interpreted.

“It has only one good thing – it makes the offence bailable, which means bail as a matter of right. But, once you get stuck under Section 66(A), along with that invites a long period of mental agony and trauma because the trial will take five-six years and you will have to undergo the trial,” he added.

So does it mean the Government should scrap or completely abolish this Section from the IT Act, 2000 or should the people of India file a petition against this Section?

Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, Centre for Internet and Society says there are laws specifically dealing with cyber stalking and communications and therefore, there we do not need an additional law.

“Either scrap or retain narrow parameters, which could be made defamatory. Otherwise, more such cases would be seen in future under this section. It has not done anything significant and has an impact on basic free online speech to public,” says Duggal.

A better approach would be to strike down the provision and include separate well defined anti-stalking and anti-spamming provision, said Ghosh of Centre for Internet and Society.

However, Mahesh Uppal, Director, ComFirst India (consultancy firm on regulatory issues) said it would be premature, in these circumstances, for any litigation against this Section.

“The issue is serious. However, this is as much to do with policing in general as it is to do with Section 66(A) which needs an amendment and clarification to remove any scope for abuse,” he said.

But, is the Government ready for any change?

Minister of Communications and IT, Kapil Sibal recently said, “Just because some people do not follow it properly, we cannot entirely scrap the law. Can we do away with penal code? We cannot.”

So, does that mean we, as citizens, have to consult legal notes before posting a message online or sending an SMS? And, even if we do, are all laws, sections and under-sections comprehendible by the common man? If not, how big a risk are we, and the person who ‘Likes’ what we say is taking?

The answers to these questions determine the future of freedom of speech.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/the-hindu-businessline-november-29-2012-the-flaw-in-cyber-law

Draft nonsense

pranesh — 2012-12-03T09:08:10Z

Seriously flawed and dodgily drafted provisions in the IT Act provide the state a stick to beat its citizens with.

Pranesh Prakash's op-ed was published in the Times of India on November 24, 2012.

Section 66A of the Information Technology Act once again finds itself in the middle of a brewing storm. It has been used in cases ranging from the Mamata Banerjee cartoon case, the Aseem Trivedi case, the Karti Chidambaram case, the Chinmayi case, to the current Bal Thackeray-Facebook comments case. In all except the Karti Chidambaram case (which is actually a case of defamation where 's. 66A' is inapplicable), it was used in conjunction with another penal provision, showing that existing laws are more than adequate for regulation of online speech. That everything from online threats wishing sexual assault (the Chinmayi case) to harmless cartoons are sought to be covered under this should give one cause for concern. Importantly, this provision is cognisable (though bailable), meaning an arrest warrant isn't required. This makes it a favourite for those wishing to harass others into not speaking.

Section 66A prohibits the sending "by means of a computer resource or a communication device" certain kinds of messages. These messages are divided into three sub-parts : (a) anything that is "grossly offensive or has menacing character";(b) information known to be false for the purposes of "causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will" and is sent persistently;or (c) "for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages". This carries with it a punishment of up to three years in jail and a fine without an upper limit. As even non-lawyers can see, these are very broadly worded, with use of 'or' everywhere instead of 'and', and the punishment is excessive. The lawyers amongst the readers will note that while some of the words used are familiar from other laws (such as the Indian Penal Code), they are never used this loosely. And all should hopefully be able to conclude that large parts of section 66A are plainly unconstitutional.

If that is so obvious, how did we end up getting this law? We copied (and badly at that) from the UK. The sad part is that the modifications that were introduced while copying are the bits that cause the most trouble. The most noteworthy of these changes are the increase in term of punishment to 3 years (in the UK it's 6 months); the late introduction (on December 16, 2008 by A Raja) of sub-section (c), meant as an anti-spam provision, but covering everything in the world except spam;and the mangling up of sub-section (b) to become a witches brew of all the evil intentions in this world.

Further, we must recognise that our Constitution is much stronger when it comes to issues like free speech than the UK's unwritten constitution, and our high courts and Supreme Court have the power to strike down laws for being unconstitutional, unlike in the UK where Parliament reigns supreme. The most the courts can do there is accommodate the European Convention on Human Rights by 'reading down' laws rather than striking them down.

Lastly, even if we do decide to engage in policy-laundering, we need to do so intelligently. The way the government messed up section 66A should serve as a fine lesson on how not to do so. While one should fault the ministry of communications and IT for messing up the IT Act so badly, it is apparent that the law ministry deserves equal blame as well for being the sleeping partner in this deplorable joint venture. For instance, wrongfully accessing a computer to remove material which one believes can be used for defamation can be considered 'cyber-terrorism'. Where have all our fine legal drafters gone? In a meeting, former SEBI chairman M Damodaran noted how bad drafters make our policies seem far dumber than they are. We wouldn't be in this soup if we had good drafters who clearly understand the fundamental rights guaranteed by our constitution.

There are a great many things flawed in this unconstitutional provision, from the disproportionality of the punishment to the non-existence of the crime. The 2008 amendment to the IT Act was one of eight laws passed in 15 minutes without any debate in the 2008 winter session of Parliament. For far too long the Indian government has spoken about "multi-stakeholder" governance of the internet at international fora (meaning that civil society and industry must be seen as equal to governments when it comes to policymaking for the governance of the internet). It is about time we implemented multi-stakeholder internet governance domestically. The way to go forward in changing this would be to set up a multi-stakeholder body (including civil society and industry) which can remedy this and other ridiculously unconstitutional provisions of our IT Act.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/times-crest-pranesh-prakash-november-24-2012-draft-nonsense

From Virtual to Reliable: Exploring Freedom and Facts in the World of WWW (World Wide Web)

praskrishna — 2017-03-29T04:01:25Z

An interactive seminar on internet freedom was organized by the Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands and Adaan Foundation on March 21, 2017 at the India International Centre in New Delhi. Saikat Dutta and Amber Sinha were panelists.

The seminar was coincident with the inauguration of the World Press Photo Exhibition 2016. In total there were four panelists. Read the agenda here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/from-virtual-to-reliable-exploring-freedom-and-facts-in-the-world-of-www-world-wide-web