Centre for Internet and Society

India’s Supreme Court strikes down law that led to Facebook arrests

praskrishna — 2015-03-27T00:29:08Z

India’s Supreme Court on Tuesday struck down a provision of a law that made it illegal to spread “offensive messages” on electronic devices and resulted in arrests over posts on Facebook and other social media.

The article by Annie Gowen was published in Washington Post on March 24, 2015. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

In a decision hailed as a victory for free speech, Judge Rohinton Fali Nariman ruled that Section 66A of the Information Technology Act was unconstitutional, writing that the vaguely worded legislation had wrongly swept up innocent people and had a “chilling” effect on free speech in the world’s most populous democracy.

“Section 66A is cast so widely that virtually any opinion on any subject would be covered by it,” the judge wrote. “If it is to withstand the test of constitutionality, the chilling effect on free speech would be total.”

India passed the Information Technology Act in 2000, and an amendment that went into effect in 2009 gave authorities broad powers to arrest those who post content deemed “grossly offensive” or false. The offense was punishable by up to three years in jail and a fine.

Sunil Abraham, the executive director of the Centre for Internet and Society in Bangalore, said that the provision was originally intended to protect citizens from electronic spam but that it was used much more broadly.

“Politicians who didn’t like what people were saying about them used it to crack down on online criticism,” he said.

The section has resulted in more than 20 high-profile arrests, including that of a professor who posted an unflattering cartoon of a state political leader and an artist who drew cartoons lampooning the government and Parliament.

The most well-known was the case of two young women arrested in the western town of Palghar after one of them posted a comment on Facebook that said Mumbai should not have been shut down for the funeral of a famous conservative leader. A friend who merely “liked” the post also was arrested. After much outcry, the two were released on bail and the charges eventually dropped.

The case of the “Palghar Girls” inspired a young law student, Shreya Singhal, to take on the law. Singhal became the chief petitioner for the case, joined by other free speech advocates and an Indian information technology firm.

[When — and where — posting the wrong thing to Facebook can get you arrested]

“It’s a big victory,” Singhal said after the ruling. “The Internet is so far-reaching and so many people use it now, it’s very important for us to protect this right.”

In addition, Singhal and other petitioners had argued that a section of the Information Technology Act that allowed the government to block Web sites containing questionable material also was unconstitutional. The court disagreed, however, saying there was a sufficient review process in place to avoid misuse.

Free speech is enshrined in the Indian constitution but has its limits. Books and movies are often banned or censored out of consideration for the sentiments of religious and minority groups.

Last year, a conservative Hindu group persuaded Penguin India to withdraw a book on Hinduism by Wendy Doniger, a professor of religion at the University of Chicago, from the Indian market. And, more recently, the government halted the planned television debut of a documentary on a 2012 gang rape called “India’s Daughter.”

[India blocks film about 2012 New Delhi rape case]

The government, whose attorney had argued in court that the legislature was in the best position to understand the needs of the people, also welcomed the decision.

“The government is committed to free speech. India is a democratic country, and free flow of ideas should be respected. We do not seek to curtail any rights,” said Ravi Shankar Prasad, the minister of communications and information technology. He cautioned, however, that social media users and platforms should show self-restraint.

In recent years, other nations also have sharply increased monitoring of and crackdowns on Web posts perceived as insulting.

Across the Persian Gulf Arab states, dozens of activists have been arrested for social media posts considered insulting to the countries’ rulers or damaging to the national image. In January 2014, an American national was allowed to leave the United Arab Emirates after serving more than eight months in prison for posting a YouTube video spoofing the UAE’s youth culture.

Brian Murphy in Washington contributed to this report. Picture: (Indranil Mukherjee/AFP/Getty Images)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/washington-post-annie-gowen-march-24-2015-indias-sc-strikes-down-law-that-led-to-fb-arrests

Noose tightens on freedom of speech on the Internet

praskrishna — 2015-03-27T01:01:18Z

A worrying trend has emerged in the last few years, where intermediaries around the world are being used as chokepoints to restrict freedom of expression online, and to hold users accountable for content.

The blog post by Gabey Goh was originally published by Digital News Asia and mirrored in Malaymail Online on March 26, 2015. Jyoti Panday gave her inputs.

“These services are all routinely asked to take down content, and their policies for responding are often muddled, heavy-handed, or inconsistent.

“That results in censorship and the limiting of people’s rights,” he told Digital News Asia (DNA) on the sidelines of RightsCon, an Internet and human rights conference hosted in Manila from March 24-25.

This year, the government of France is moving to implement regulation that makes Internet operators “accomplices” of hate-speech offences if they host extremist messages.

In February, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) urged ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) to ensure that domain name registries and registrars “investigate copyright abuse complaints and respond appropriately.”

Closer to home, the Malaysian Government passed a controversial amendment to the Evidence Act 1950 – Section 114A – back in 2012.

Under Section 114A, an Internet user is deemed the publisher of any online content unless proven otherwise. The new legislation also makes individuals and those who administer, operate or provide spaces for online community forums, blogging and hosting services, liable for content published through their services.

Due to the potential negative impact on freedom of expression, a roadmap called the Manila Principles on Internet Liability was launched during RightsCon.

The EFF, Centre for Internet Society India, Article 19, and other global partners unveiled the principles, whose framework outlines clear, fair requirements for content removal requests and details how to minimise the damage a takedown can do.

For example, if content is restricted because it’s unlawful in one country or region, then the scope of the restriction should be geographically limited as well.

The principles also urge adoption of laws shielding intermediaries from liability for third-party content, which encourages the creation of platforms that allow for online discussion and debate about controversial issues.

“Our goal is to protect everyone’s freedom of expression with a framework of safeguards and best practices for responding to requests for content removal,” said Malcolm.

Jyoti Panday from the Centre for Internet and Society India noted that people ask for expression to be removed from the Internet for various reasons, good and bad, claiming the authority of myriad local and national laws.

“It’s easy for important, lawful content to get caught in the crossfire. We hope these principles empower everyone – from governments and intermediaries, to the public – to fight back when online expression is censored,” she said.

The Manila Principles can be summarised in six key points:

Intermediaries should be shielded by law from liability for third-party content
Content must not be required to be restricted without an order by a judicial authority
Requests for restrictions of content must be clear, be unambiguous, and follow due process
Laws and content restriction orders and practices must comply with the tests of necessity and proportionality
Laws and content restriction policies and practices must respect due process
Transparency and accountability must be built in to laws and content restriction policies and practices

“In addition, there is no logic in distinguishing between intellectual property (IP) and other forms of content as in the case in the United States for example, where under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, intermediaries are not liable for third party content but that doesn’t apply to IP,” he added.

The Manila Principles have two main targets: Governments and intermediaries themselves. The coalition, led by EFF, will be approaching governments to present the document and discuss the recommendations on how best to establish an intermediary liability regime.

This includes immunising intermediaries from liability and requiring a court order before any content can be taken down.

With intermediaries, the list includes companies such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, to discuss establishing transparency, responsibility and accountability in any actions taken.

The overall aim with the Manila Principles is to influence policy changes for the better.

Malcolm pointed out that by coincidence, some encouraging developments have taken place in India. On the same day the principles were released, the Indian Supreme Court struck down the notorious Section 66A of the country’s Information Technology Act.

Since 2009, the law had allowed both criminal charges against users and the removal of content by intermediaries based on vague allegations that the content was “grossly offensive or has menacing character,” or that false information was posted “for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will.”

Calling it a “landmark decision,” Malcolm noted that the case shows why the establishment and promotion of the Manila Principles are important.

“Not only is the potential overreach of this provision obvious on its face, but it was, in practice, misused to quell legitimate discussion online, including in the case of the plaintiffs in that case – two young women, one of whom made an innocuous Facebook post mildly critical of government officials, and the other who ‘liked’ it,” he said.

The court however, upheld section 69A of the Act, which allows the Government to block online content; and Section 79(3), which makes intermediaries such as YouTube or Facebook liable for not complying with government orders for censorship of content. — Digital News Asia

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/malaymail-online-gabey-goh-march-26-2015-noose-tightens-on-freedom-of-speech-on-the-internet

The noose tightens on freedom of speech on the Internet

praskrishna — 2015-03-27T01:06:52Z

A WORRYING trend has emerged in the last few years, where intermediaries around the world are being used as chokepoints to restrict freedom of expression online, and to hold users accountable for content.

The blog post by Gabey Goh was published by Digital News Asia on March 26, 2015. Jyoti Panday gave her inputs.

“All communication across the Internet is facilitated by intermediaries: Service providers, social networks, search engines, and more,” said Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) senior global policy analyst Jeremy Malcolm.

“These services are all routinely asked to take down content, and their policies for responding are often muddled, heavy-handed, or inconsistent.

“That results in censorship and the limiting of people’s rights,” he told Digital News Asia (DNA) on the sidelines of RightsCon, an Internet and human rights conference hosted in Manila from March 24-25.

This year, the government of France is moving to implement regulation that makes Internet operators ‘accomplices’ of hate-speech offences if they host extremist messages.

In February, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) urged ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) to ensure that domain name registries and registrars “investigate copyright abuse complaints and respond appropriately.”

Closer to home, the Malaysian Government passed a controversial amendment to the Evidence Act 1950 – Section 114A – back in 2012.

Under Section 114A, an Internet user is deemed the publisher of any online content unless proven otherwise. The new legislation also makes individuals and those who administer, operate or provide spaces for online community forums, blogging and hosting services, liable for content published through their services.

Due to the potential negative impact on freedom of expression, a roadmap called the Manila Principles on Internet Liability was launched during RightsCon.

The EFF, Centre for Internet Society India, Article 19, and other global partners unveiled the principles, whose framework outlines clear, fair requirements for content removal requests and details how to minimise the damage a takedown can do.

For example, if content is restricted because it’s unlawful in one country or region, then the scope of the restriction should be geographically limited as well.

The principles also urge adoption of laws shielding intermediaries from liability for third-party content, which encourages the creation of platforms that allow for online discussion and debate about controversial issues.

“Our goal is to protect everyone’s freedom of expression with a framework of safeguards and best practices for responding to requests for content removal,” said Malcolm.

Jyoti Panday from the Centre for Internet and Society India noted that people ask for expression to be removed from the Internet for various reasons, good and bad, claiming the authority of myriad local and national laws.

“It’s easy for important, lawful content to get caught in the crossfire. We hope these principles empower everyone – from governments and intermediaries, to the public – to fight back when online expression is censored,” she said.

The Manila Principles can be summarised in six key points:

Intermediaries should be shielded by law from liability for third-party content.

Content must not be required to be restricted without an order by a judicial authority.

Requests for restrictions of content must be clear, be unambiguous, and follow due process.

Laws and content restriction orders and practices must comply with the tests of necessity and proportionality.

Laws and content restriction policies and practices must respect due process.

Transparency and accountability must be built in to laws and content restriction policies and practices.

“Right now, different countries have differing levels of protection when it comes to intermediary liability, and we’re saying that there should be expansive protection across all content,” said Malcolm (pic).

“In addition, there is no logic in distinguishing between intellectual property (IP) and other forms of content as in the case in the United States for example, where under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, intermediaries are not liable for third party content but that doesn’t apply to IP,” he added.

The Manila Principles have two main targets: Governments and intermediaries themselves. The coalition, led by EFF, will be approaching governments to present the document and discuss the recommendations on how best to establish an intermediary liability regime.

This includes immunising intermediaries from liability and requiring a court order before any content can be taken down.

With intermediaries, the list includes companies such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, to discuss establishing transparency, responsibility and accountability in any actions taken.

“We recognise that a lot of the time, intermediaries are not waiting for a court order before taking down content, and we’re telling them to avoid removing content unless there is a sufficiently good reason and users have been notified and presented that reason,” said Malcolm.

The overall aim with the Manila Principles is to influence policy changes for the better.

Malcolm pointed out that by coincidence, some encouraging developments have taken place in India. On the same day the principles were released, the Indian Supreme Court struck down the notorious Section 66A of the country’s Information Technology Act.

Since 2009, the law had allowed both criminal charges against users and the removal of content by intermediaries based on vague allegations that the content was “grossly offensive or has menacing character,” or that false information was posted “for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will.”

Calling it a “landmark decision”, Malcolm noted that the case shows why the establishment and promotion of the Manila Principles are important.

“Not only is the potential overreach of this provision obvious on its face, but it was, in practice, misused to quell legitimate discussion online, including in the case of the plaintiffs in that case – two young women, one of whom made an innocuous Facebook post mildly critical of government officials, and the other who ‘liked’ it,” he said.

The court however, upheld section 69A of the Act, which allows the Government to block online content; and Section 79(3), which makes intermediaries such as YouTube or Facebook liable for not complying with government orders for censorship of content.

Gabey Goh reports from RightsCon in Manila at the kind invitation of the South-East Asian Press Alliance or Seapa.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/digital-news-asia-gabey-goh-march-26-2015-noose-tightens-on-freedom-of-speech-on-internet

India's landmark online speech ruling is step toward greater press freedom

praskrishna — 2015-03-29T00:55:35Z

In an historic decision, India's Supreme Court on Tuesday struck down part of a law used to silence criticism and free expression. While this marks a pivotal victory that has been welcomed in many quarters, many challenges remain for press freedom in the country.

The blog post by Sumit Galhotra was published by CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists) on March 28, 2015. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

Section 66A of the Information Technology Act--the vaguely worded provision struck down by the court--criminalized online speech deemed "grossly offensive" or "menacing," along with information for the purpose of causing "annoyance" or "inconvenience." Individuals convicted under the provision could face up to three years in prison. This law, along with others that remain on the books, has allowed India to become a paradise for the offended.

The law was challenged by a public interest litigation mounted by Shreya Singhal, in 2012. Singhal, who had just returned to Delhi from her studies in the U.K., was infuriated at how the law was being used to stifle debate and criticism in her home country, according to reports.

The September 2012 arrest of cartoonist Aseem Trivedi, on a range of charges including one under Section 66A, over his cartoons on politics and corruption, caught Singhal's attention. A few weeks later, she learned of the arrest of 21-year-old Shaheen Dhada, who questioned on Facebook the shutdown of Mumbai following the death of a politician, Singhal said. Dhada's friend, Renu Srinivasan, who had merely "liked" the comment, was arrested under the law. According to news reports, both were charged. These cases sparked a national debate on the space for free expression in the world's largest democracy, and led Singhal to challenge the law, she told reporters.

"It's a big victory," Singhal, who is currently studying law in Delhi, told the media following Tuesday's decision. "The Internet is so far-reaching and so many people use it now, it's very important for us to protect this right."

India is expected to overtake the U.S. as the second largest population of Internet users in the world, behind only China, according to the Internet and Mobile Association of India, a nonprofit group representing the Web and mobile industry. As Internet usage accelerates in India, thanks in large part to the widespread use of mobile devices, there has been an ongoing debate on how best to policeit in a country that has to contend with frequent episodes of violence, civil unrest, and terrorist attacks.


Karuna Nundy, an advocate at the Supreme Court of India who helped the legal challenge, says the country has several laws that are a threat to press freedom. (Geoffrey King)

Lawrence Liang, a lawyer and researcher at the Bangalore-based Alternative Law Forum, an Indian legal research organization, shared in Singhal's welcoming of the decision. "It is important to note that this is the first judgment in decades in which the Supreme Court has struck down a legal provision for violating freedom of speech, and in doing so, it simultaneously builds upon a rich body of free speech cases in India and paves the way for a jurisprudence of free speech in the 21st century, the era of the Internet and social media," he told CPJ.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, an organization that focuses on issues of digital pluralism, called the judgment "a moral victory." He said the decision "furthers free speech jurisprudence in India, but also in all those other countries where an Indian precedent would be important," including many countries in Asia, and places such as South Africa.

As part of the judgment, the court narrowed its reading of Section 79 of the IT Act, under which private parties could submit notice-and-takedown orders directly to Internet intermediaries. The court held that intermediary liability can be pursued only through a court order or other government order, reports said.

Liang told CPJ the judgment falls short in some areas. The Supreme Court's 123-page judgment kept in place Section 69A of the IT Act and Information Technology Rules 2009 that allows the government to block websites if the content in question has the potential to create communal discord, social disorder, or impact India's relations with other countries, according to news reports.

"I would say that if there is missed opportunity in the judgment, it is the clarification of the process of blocking websites. If Section 66A was found to be arbitrary in that its scope covered protected and unprotected speech, then the procedure for blocking websites as laid out in Section 69A is also beset with similar problems," Liang said.

According to Chinmayi Arun, research director at the Centre for Communications Governance at the National Law University in Delhi, the 2009 rules require blocking requests and implementation to be kept confidential. "This means that speakers will have no way of finding out that the government has ordered intermediaries to block their content. Speakers will therefore not be able to question unconstitutional blocking orders before the judiciary--this is a clear interference with their constitutional rights," she told CPJ via email, referring to online users who could fall foul of the law.

Academic in me: As a matter of legal & constitutional analysis, the SC judgment is at its best on #66A, but weaker on 69A & weakest on 79.
-- Pranesh Prakash (@pranesh_prakash) March 24, 2015

For some journalists, the decision highlights how virtually no national party in India, including the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is a champion of these rights. In a piece for independent news website Scroll, journalist Shivam Vij criticizes the current Narendra Modi-led government for missing an opportunity by not acting decisively to address the problematic law. "It has become routine for India's politicians to avoid taking tough political decisions if they can be left to the courts," he said. "When in power, the BJP is as happy as the Congress to have at its disposal laws that can muzzle voices of dissent."

Trivedi told CPJ he agreed that the previous and current government did little to address abuses of the law. Trivedi, who up until the court decision, faced charges under Section 66A, and had joined Singhal as a petitioner in the case, added: "This decision marks a strong first step." The cartoonist's lawyer, Vijay Hiremath, told CPJ that the Section 66A charge has now been removed, but Trivedi still faces charges under the National Emblem Act.

While the striking down of Section 66A is a step in the right direction, many challenges remain for press freedom in India. Karuna Nundy, an advocate at the Supreme Court of India, who was at the forefront of the legal challenge, told CPJ numerous colonial-era laws, particularly in India's penal code, continue to pose threats to free speech and press freedom in India. CPJ has long documented cases of Indian journalists being threatened with sedition, defamation, and laws that criminalize "outraging religious sentiment."

Actually, next step(s): a review of the constitutionality of sedition, challenge criminal defamation, constitutionalise civil defamation.
-- Gautam Bhatia (@gautambhatia88) March 24, 2015

But Nundy expressed optimism for the challenges ahead for press freedom in India and elsewhere. She said the judgment shows, "If you do the work, you take the trouble, you make the challenge, you can achieve the kinds of values that you stand for. That is the work that is the duty of all us as national citizens and citizens of the world."

[Geoffrey King, CPJ Internet Advocacy Coordinator, contributed to this report from Manila]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/cpj-march-28-2015-sumit-galhotra-indias-landmark-online-speech-ruling-is-step-toward-greater-press-freedom

Three reasons why 66A verdict is momentous

pranesh — 2015-03-29T16:22:51Z

Earlier this week, the fundamental right to freedom of expression posted a momentous victory. The nation's top court struck down the much-reviled Section 66A of the IT Act — which criminalized communications that are "grossly offensive", cause "annoyance", etc — as "unconstitutionally vague", "arbitrarily, excessively, and disproportionately" encumbering freedom of speech, and likely to have a "chilling effect" on legitimate speech.

The article was published in the Times of India on March 29, 2015.

It also struck down Sec 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act on similar grounds. This is a landmark judgment, as it's possibly the first time since 1973's Bennett Coleman case that statutory law was struck down by the Supreme Court for violating our right to free expression.

The SC also significantly 'read down' the draconian 'Intermediary Guidelines Rules' which specify when intermediaries — website hosts and search engines — may be held liable for what is said online by their users. The SC held that intermediaries should not be forced to decide whether the online speech of their users is lawful or not. While the judgment leaves unresolved many questions — phrases like "grossly offensive", which the SC ruled were vague in 66A, occur in the Rules as well — the court's insistence on requiring either a court or a government order to be able to compel an intermediary to remove speech reduces the 'invisible censorship' that results from privatized speech regulation.

The SC upheld the constitutional validity of Sec 69A and the Website Blocking Rules, noting they had several safeguards: providing a hearing to the website owner, providing written reasons for the blocking, etc. However, these safeguards are not practised by courts. Na Vijayashankar, a legal academic in Bengaluru, found a blogpost of his — ironically, on the topic of website blocking — had been blocked by a Delhi court without even informing him. He only got to find out when I published the government response to my RTI on blocked websites. Last December, Github, Vimeo and some other websites were blocked without being given a chance to contest it. As long as lower courts don't follow "principles of natural justice" and due process, we'll continue to see such absurd website blocking, especially in cases of copyright complaints, without any way of opposing or correcting them.

There are three main outcomes of this judgment. First is the legal victory: SC's analysis while striking down 66A is a masterclass of legal clarity and a significant contribution to free speech jurisprudence. This benefits not only future cases in India, but all jurisdictions whose laws are similar to ours, such as Bangladesh, Malaysia and the UK.

Second is the moral victory for free speech. Sec 66A was not merely a badly written law, it became a totem of governmental excess and hubris. Even when political parties realized they had passed 66A without a debate, they did not apologize to the public and revise it; instead, they defended it. Only a few MPs, such as P Rajeev and Baijayant Panda, challenged it. Even the NDA, which condemned the law in the UPA era, supported it in court. By striking down this totem, the SC has restored the primacy of the Constitution. For instance, while this ruling doesn't directly affect the censor board's arbitrary rules, it does morally undermine them.

Third, this verdict shows that given proper judicial reading, the Indian constitutional system of allowing for a specific list of purposes for which reasonable restrictions are permissible, might in fact be as good or even better in some cases, than the American First Amendment. The US law baldly states that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press. However, the US Supreme Court has never held the opinion that freedom of speech is absolute. The limits of Congress's powers are entirely judicially constructed, and till the 1930s, the US court never struck down a law for violating freedom of speech, and has upheld laws banning obscenity, public indecency, offensive speech in public, etc. However, in India, the Constitution itself places hard limits on Parliament's powers, and also, since the first amendment to our Constitution, allows the judiciary to determine if the restrictions placed by Parliament are "reasonable". In the judgment Justice Nariman quotes Mark Antony from Julius Caesar. He could also have quoted Cassius: "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves." Judges like Justice Nariman show the constitutional limits to free speech can be read both narrowly and judiciously: we can no longer complain about the Constitution as the primary reason we have so many restrictions on freedom of expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/times-of-india-march-29-2015-pranesh-prakash-three-reasons-why-66a-is-momentous

SECTION 66A: DELETE

praskrishna — 2015-03-30T01:32:18Z

The Supreme Court has killed a law that allowed the Government to control social media. What’s the Net worth of freedom hereafter?

The article by Kumar Anshuman was published in the Open Magazine on March 27, 2015. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

It was in 2009 that Section 66A was added as an amendment to India’s IT Act by the then UPA Government, but it took three years before it came to the notice of Shreya Singhal, a student of Law at Delhi University. By then, the Section had already earned itself a fair amount of notoriety for how much leeway it provided for the police and politicians to abuse the law.

The first time was in September 2011 when Musafir Baitha, a famous poet and government employee in Bihar, was suspended from his job because he criticised the state government on Facebook. An uproar followed, as people realised that freedom of speech in social media could now be construed as a criminal activity. Ambikesh Mahapatra, a professor at Jadavpur Unversity, became a target of the Mamata Banerjee government in April 2012 when he made cartoons of her. In September 2012, cartoonist Aseem Trivedi was arrested in Mumbai for a caricature of corruption under the UPA. But the case that caught Shreya Singhal’s attention was perhaps the most shocking of all. In November 2012, after Shiv Sena founder Bal Thackeray’s death, Shaheen Dhada, a Thane resident, posted a comment on her Facebook page criticising the near-total shutdown of Mumbai for the funeral. She wrote that Mumbai was shut not in respect, but fear, and that a leader should earn respect instead of forcing it out of people. Her friend Renu Srinivasan ‘liked’ this post. Hours later, both were arrested and booked under Section 66A. "I was shocked when I heard of this news," Singhal says, "I went and checked the post and there was nothing which could have provoked such an outrage." Her mother, Manali Singhal, a lawyer at the Supreme Court, advised her to file a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) against the Section.

The case continued for two years in the Supreme Court, while arbitrary arrests continued to be made. The UPA Government first defended 66A in court, taking the position that the current NDA Government took as well. It argued that the law would be used only in extreme cases where a person overreaches his or her online freedom to curtail the rights of others. Unconvinced, on 24 March, the apex court struck 66A down, saying that it could not allow such a law to exist on mere government assurances. The Court found several terms in the Act, such as ‘grossly offensive’ and ‘insult’, that were not clearly defined and could be interpreted arbitrarily to suit one’s convenience. ‘It is clear that Section 66A is unconstitutionally vague and it takes away a guaranteed freedom,’ observed the bench of Justice J Chelameswar and Justice Rohinton Nariman.

"We can celebrate the scrapping of Section 66A, but with caution," says Sunil Abraham, executive director at The Centre for Internet & Society in Bangalore. "[As for] those who are booked under Section 66A, the police also imposes different sections of the Indian Penal Code to justify their arrest." There are examples to support his statement, a recent one being the arrest of a Bareilly-based student, Gulrez Khan, who had posted a picture on Facebook of UP minister Azam Khan along with some derogatory comments about Hindus that he allegedly made. Gulrez Khan denied the comments, saying that his image was being maligned. The boy was arrested and booked. "People are making it out as a moment of triumph against the UP government. The fact is this boy had been arrested under Section 153A and 504 of the IPC along with Section 66A of the IT Act. We have said this even in the Supreme Court," says Gaurav Bhatia, a spokesperson of the Samajwadi Party and also a senior advocate.

But the import of scrapping Section 66A is that there is now one less law that can be misused, one that specifically stifles online freedom. "It’s an excellent judgment," says Lawrence Liang of Alternative Law Forum, Bangalore. “It couldn’t have been better than this. The fact that the apex court termed it ‘vague and overreaching’ signifies how important it was to scrap this."

Once the 122-page judgment arrived, there was a rush to welcome it—even by those who were responsible for Section 66A to begin with. Former Congress minister Kapil Sibal was one of them. "The Supreme Court has scrapped Section 66A to allow freedom of speech in cyberspace and we should welcome it,” he said. His former cabinet colleague P Chidambaram went to the extent of saying that it was poorly drafted. But the Congress as a party also warned of the possible misuse of this freedom, saying that it had woven various safeguards into Section 66A, including the condition that an arrest could only be made after an officer of the level of Inspector General or Superintendent of Police had okayed it. "The Supreme Court, it appears, has not found the safeguards sufficient," says Congress spokesperson and senior lawyer Abhishek Manu Singhvi. “It is now up to the current Government [to decide] how to strike the right balance between freedom of speech on one hand and [prevention of] abuse and hounding of groups or individuals through obscene or incorrigibly false information [on the other] to deter unbridled defamation in cyberspace." The Left parties, which were supporting the UPA Government back when Section 66A was imposed, have expressed happiness over the verdict. “The draconian provision of 66A was used to arrest people who express dissenting views against the Government and the State and to suppress criticism of those in power,” says senior CPM leader Sitaram Yechury.

The NDA Government has also welcomed the verdict. "The Government absolutely respects the right to freedom of speech and expression on social media and has no intention of curbing it," says Ravi Shankar Prasad, Union Minister for Information Technology.

But the scrapping of the Section leaves the Government with very little power to act against real abuse of online freedoms. Like Congress leader Milind Deora says, "An unregulated internet can be more dangerous than a regulated one." This argument is easily countered: there are enough provisions in existing laws that prevent a person from misusing freedom of speech. Says Apar Gupta, a senior lawyer, “Section 66A was a bailable section and arrests were made only with further imposition of IPC acts." While Article 19 (1) of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, at the same time Article 19 (2) provides a list of reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech. This is enough, experts believe, to curtail misuse of the internet. The court judgment also grants the Centre the freedom to enact any other law specific to the internet, provided it does not violate the provisions of freedom of speech as laid down by the Constitution of India.

This does, however, put a question mark on the necessity of Section 66A to begin with, if existing laws were quite enough to address freedom-of- speech abuses. "Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000, was enacted to prevent online abuse and hounding of groups and individuals, check the propagation of obscene or incorrigibly false information with the intent to create social divides and unrest, and deter unbridled defamation in cyberspace. This Act came into effect in 2008 when social media was yet evolving," says Singhvi. But experts disagree with this argument. "It is a perfect case of confusion and mixing up of facts,” says Sunil Abraham. “The purpose of this law was to curb unsolicited messages, spamming and harassing someone through fake identities in the internet space." He says that the Government claimed to borrow law provisions from the US, Canada and other countries, but the legislation was so poorly drafted that it didn’t have any teeth for action against spammers. "Even words like ‘unsolicited commercial mails’ were not included in the Act and that is the reason not a single person has been arrested in India for spam mails even after this Act came into being."

A section of the Indian legal fraternity believes that the country’s apex court should also have made a statement about the problem of spamming and harassment on the internet.

But there is bad news too. The same judgment that struck down Section 66A has upheld Section 69A of the IT Act as constitutionally valid. This allows the Government to block any website which it deems a direct threat to public order and security that might spread propaganda.

"In this case, the Government [can decide] to block a website without notifying [it with any] reason for it. If I am an internet user who wants to visit this site, I am also not notified why that website has been taken down. It is just the whims and fancies of a few officials in the Government, what to block and what not," says Apar Gupta. Using the section, the Union Government had blocked 32 websites just this January, saying that anti- national groups were using these websites for ‘jihadi propaganda’.

All major democracies have some form of legal net regulation. "Laws in foreign jurisdictions vary widely as per the guarantees of civil rights afforded to citizens in any legal system," adds Gupta. "The legislations of the United States, which borrowed certain phrases in Section 66A, have already been declared unconstitutional. In the United Kingdom, similar phrases have come under fierce critique and have been limited by guidelines issued by the office of prosecutions. In these jurisdictions, as in India, existing criminal law applies equally to online speech as much as to offline."

Also, while social media enthusiasts rejoice over their first big victory against restrictions on online freedom of speech, the internet is still a matter of great concern for any government, thanks to its reach and influence. The Union Government walks a thin line while dealing with instances of abuse on social media, and many believe India needs an IT Act drafted in proper consultation with all stakeholders.

For now, a young law student has found a place in the legal history of India. "It will always be remembered as Shreya Singhal vs Union of India," says Singhal.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT

‘66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc. Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device:

Any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
Any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device;
Any electronic mail or message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages...

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine’

SUPREME COURT ORDER

‘In conclusion, we may summarise what has been held by us: Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is struck down in its entirety being violative of Article 19(1)(a) and not saved under Article 19(2)’

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/open-magazine-march-27-2015-kumar-anshuman-section-66a-delete

You can still get into trouble for online posts: Digital law experts

praskrishna — 2015-04-02T01:44:32Z

The internet in India is freer now, but individuals could still to get into trouble for online posts, say digital media and law experts. Hailing the Supreme Court judgment on Tuesday as a landmark verdict for free speech in India, experts who have closely read the judgment say there is much to be careful about too.

The article by Kim Arora was published in the Times of India on March 30, 2015. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

The scrapping of the contentious section doesn't mean that one has a free run, cautions Sunil Abraham, executive director, Centre for Internet and Society. An online comment can still land you in jail, he says.

"The judgement in no way means that speech on online platforms will be unregulated now. You can still be charged for pornography or voyeurism under the IT Act. There are many provisions in the Constitution and Indian Penal Code that the government can use to target people it wants to go after. You can be still charged for hate speech or defamation - which is a criminal offence in India - for an online comment," says Abraham.

While lawyer Apar Gupta found the judgment to be forward-looking, he pointed to Para 98 of the 120 page judgment, which addresses Article 14 of the Constitution regarding "discrimination" and talks of the distinction between online and other media.

"We make it clear that there is an intelligible differentia between speech on the internet and other mediums of communication for which separate offences can certainly be created by legislation," says the judgment. "The court has indicated that special offences can be created for the internet. Constant vigilance is the price of liberty. We need to constantly engage with these issues to keep the internet free," says Gupta.

The judgment has been praised for making a distinction between online posts and messages that pertain to advocacy, discussion and incitement. "This is an excellent decision. The SC is saying that no matter what the medium, we stand for constitutional rights. The judges were ready to listen, and ready to share their experience of using the internet also," says Mishi Choudhary, legal director at Software Freedom Law Center, adding, "It was a lost opportunity for the Modi government. They should have gotten rid of section 66 A themselves."

Section 69A of the Act, which stands as is, allows non-transparent blocking of online content in the interest of "sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above." However, Choudhary says that since it is a narrowly-drawn provision, it ensures more safeguards.

"It will be noticed that Section 69A unlike Section 66A is a narrowly drawn provision with several safeguards. First and foremost, blocking can only be resorted to where the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do. Secondly, such necessity is relatable only to some of the subjects set out in Article 19(2). Thirdly, reasons have to be recorded in writing in such blocking order so that they may be assailed in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution," she says.

Going forward, the government plan of action should focus on balancing safety and freedom on the internet, says Rajya Sabha MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar, who himself was one of the petitioners. "The final endgame has to be one where we have a new law or even a new IT Act which meets the twin objectives of a safe and free internet. The two need not be mutually exclusive," he says.

(With inputs from Anand J in Bengaluru)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/times-of-india-march-30-2015-kim-arora-you-can-still-get-into-trouble-for-online-posts

India High Court: No Takedown Requests On Social Sites Without Court, Gov't Order

praskrishna — 2015-04-03T06:18:52Z

Indian police will no longer be able to threaten Internet users and online intermediaries with jail merely on the basis of a complaint that they have posted “offensive” posts online.

The blog post by Madhur Singh was published in Bloomberg BNA on March 25, 2015. Geetha Hariharan gave her inputs.

Following a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India March 24, law enforcement agencies will be able to take action in such cases only after an order has been obtained from a court or the government (Singhal v.Union of India, India Sup. Ct., 3/24/15).

The court struck down in its entirety Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which authorized criminal penalties for sending “offensive” messages through electronic communication services. Opponents of the measure said the section defined “offensive” very vaguely and broadly, and that cases of arrest under the section frequently made headlines.

Freedom of speech activists and Internet-based businesses welcomed the judgment as a boost for civil liberties, freedom of speech and a conducive business environment for an entire gamut of online businesses.

The judgment is good news for intermediaries such as Facebook Inc. and the India-based review site MouthShut.com, both of which have been repeatedly inundated with takedown notices based on complaints against “offensive” posts.

Offensive Posts Were Actionable Under Section 66A

Section 66A, added to the Information Technology Act of 2000 through an amendment in February 2009, prescribed imprisonment of up to three years and a fine for anyone who sends via a computer resource or communication device:

(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character;
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device; or
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages.

A supporting Section 79(3)(b) stated that “upon receiving actual knowledge, or on being notified by the appropriate government or its agency that any information, data or communication link residing in or connected to a computer resource controlled by the intermediary is being used to commit the unlawful act,” the intermediary would have to “expeditiously remove or disable access to that material or that resource.”

Together, these sections put ordinary Internet users at risk for arrest for simply posting online and obligated intermediaries such as Twitter Inc., Facebook, MouthShut.com and others to take down content simply pursuant to a complaint.

Earlier this month, Facebook revealed statistics indicating that India is second on its global list of governments demanding takedowns.

Court Removes Intermediaries' Discretion

Shwetasree Majumder, partner at Fidus Law Chambers, told Bloomberg BNA March 25 that after this decision, any blocking of content can now only take place via a reasoned order after complying with several procedural safeguards, including a hearing to the originator and intermediary either by the designated
officer or pursuant to an order passed by a competent court.

“So intermediaries like Google, Facebook etc. are no longer required to judge as to whether the take down notices received by them contain legitimate requests or not,” she wrote in an e-mail. “As an acknowledgement that a true intermediary should not concern itself with the merits of the content posted by third parties, the court takes away the intermediary's discretion as to what content must remain and what must go.”

Geetha Hariharan, program officer at the Centre for Internet and Society, told Bloomberg BNA that after “reading down” Section 79, the Supreme Court “has relieved the intermediary of its responsibility to judge the lawfulness of content. Now, the intermediary will lose immunity under Section 79(3)(b) (and be liable
to prosecution or penalty) only if it does not take content down after receiving ‘actual knowledge of a court order or government notification' requiring takedown of content.”

Prior to the judgment, an intermediary was required to judge whether a takedown notice concerned unlawful content on its website, which would constitute “actual knowledge” under the section. If the intermediary made an affirmative determination, it was required to take the content down or lose immunity under Section 79(3)(b).

Supreme Court Strikes Down 66A

Momentum against Section 66A built up over the last three years, particularly after law student Shreya Singhal filed a challenge in the Supreme Court after two Mumbai women were arrested and put in jail for 10 days in 2012 for Facebook posts against a shutdown of Mumbai city following a politician's death.

A Supreme Court bench comprising Justices Jasti Chelameswar and Rohinton F. Nariman heard ten such cases together, and ruled March 24 that Section 66A was unconstitutional as it directly affected the right of the public to know. Holding that Section 66A was “open ended, undefined, and vague” so that “virtually any opinion on any subject would be covered by it, as any serious opinion dissenting with the mores of the day would be caught within its net,” the court struck it down in its entirety.

The court said that Rule 3(4) of the Intermediaries (Guidelines) Rules, 2011, which pertains to an intermediary disabling access to material that is “known” to be violative of Rule 3(2), needed to be read down in the same manner as Section 79(3)(b).

The court, however, upheld Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, which gives the government the power to block web content if doing so is in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity or security of India.

Impact on Intermediary Liability

Overall, Majumder said that intermediary liability now stands significantly watered down. One particular case this might impact is the currently pending Super Cassettes India Ltd. v MySpace Inc. case before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, which is considering the validity of the high threshold of intermediary liability prescribed by a single judge in copyright infringement cases.

Hariharan wrote in an e-mail that while intermediaries such as Internet service providers (ISPs) or content hosts may “choose” to take down content when they receive a private takedown notice, they don't “need” to do so to remain immune under Section 79(3)(b) or Rule 3(4) of the Intermediaries Guidelines.

“This reduces uncertainty in intermediary liability in India. It will also hopefully keep intermediaries from taking down content in an overbroad manner to escape liability,” Hariharan said, adding that the government nevertheless continues to have the ability to criminalize online acts. For instance, Sections 66B
to 67B of the IT Act define and criminalize different online conduct. Additionally, sections of the Indian Penal Code that criminalize speech acts (e.g., Sections 295A and 153A for incitement; Section 292 for obscenity) have also been applied to online acts in the past.

The Internet & Mobile Association of India said in a statement on its website March 24 that the judgment will mark a new phase for the growth and evolution of the Internet in India. While Internet users will no longer fear illegal censorship or harassment, it said that “online businesses, ranging from established international companies to small Indian startups, will be able to take advantage of a more conducive business environment.”

The IAMAI added that the judgment will be especially helpful to smaller companies such as Mouthshut.com that will “now not be harassed by the frivolous and mal-intentioned notices of take down.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bloomberg-bna-march-25-2015-madhur-singh-india-high-court-no-takedown-requests-on-social-sites-without-court-govt-order

Freedom of Expression in a Digital Age: Effective Research, Policy Formation & the Development of Regulatory Frameworks in South Asia

jyoti — 2015-04-12T03:53:04Z

The Centre for Internet & Society cordially invites you to a panel discussion on Freedom of Expression in a Digital Age. The event organized by Center for Global Communication Studies at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania, Observer Research Foundation and the Centre for Internet and Society will be held at Observer Research Foundation on April 21, 2015 from 11.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m.

The discussion will highlight the challenges in promoting and strengthening online freedom of expression and evaluating the application of existing regulatory frameworks in South Asia. Click to view the invite.

International Frameworks and Freedom of Expression

Freedom of expression-an important fundamental right in itself, is also critical for defending and upholding other freedoms and rights. We exercise this right in our day-to-day lives, through the exchange of ideas, opinions and information. Understanding the means and structures of communication, and the regulation of environments that facilitate such exchange therefore become crucial for those seeking to realize freedom of expression.

Freedom of expression is enshrined in Article 19 of both theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The UDHR holds that " everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" . The ICCPR holds that, " everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice".

Freedom of expression has also been enshrined in regional conventions and charters, for example the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Convention on Human Rights4, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter") .

The former UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, highlighted in his 2013 report report that these frameworks are applicable to actions that take place online.6 While there may be no disagreements on freedom of expression as a legal right, it is important to bear in mind that it is not a non-derogable right, and may therefore be limited subject to safeguards indicated, for example, in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.

While there may be limitations are placed on the exercise of freedom of expression, there is limited clarity on when and how freedom of expression can be legitimately circumscribed. There have been attempts by civil society groups to articulate more clearly the specific conditions when freedom of expression may be derogated, most notably the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Siracusa Principles" ), and the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information ("Johannesburg Principles").

Freedom of Expression and Communications

Over the years, the norms and standards required for freedom of expression in the traditional media world have received much attention. When regulating communication, some restrictions upon freedom of expression have been regarded necessary and are enforceable by national or international courts. Such restrictions have been defined in international human rights laws and cover issues such as defamation, incitement to violence and hate speech. While these restrictions are not affected by the introduction of new means of communication, the proliferation of digital communications does warrant the recognition that there are new forms of censorship, unsettled questions of jurisdiction, and the need to develop new norms and standards that can keep pace with the myriad forms of expression and information sharing.

Communication in the digital age has led to the evolution of the Internet as a medium that has revolutionised largely local capacity for communication into a worldwide phenomenon that encompasses everything from personal one-to-one emails, social networks and reaching out to large audiences globally. The proliferation of digital technologies has not only fostered unprecedented access to information; the very environment stands transformed by the introduction of new kinds of information from voice, sound, image, text and code, that are accessible on a range of devices and across several types of technologies.

These networks and services democratized communication by lowering barriers to access and creating new space for publishing and peer-to-peer collaboration. Bypassing traditional gatekeepers of other forms of media, users can take on the role of writers, broadcasters or publishers on the Internet thus creating limitless possibilities for producing, sharing and exchanging all kinds of content. From this view, the Internet has sprung up as a globally accessible means of communication that is free from traditional restraints on free speech and expression. However, there are other unintended consequences that the Internet has had on both forms of power and control in the regulation of content, as online content has become increasingly contested, enclosed in a nationalized sphere challenging the free flow of information and freedom of expression.

Freedom of Expression in South Asia

As a network of networks, the internet has no overarching jurisdiction and with no single entity governing the totality of the internet, there exists a jurisdictional vacuum over content on the web. Further, there are no means of regulating content internationally or even a broad consensus on the norms that should be applied for restricting freedom of expression either on traditional or modern media. This has led to adverse consequences such as states adopting arbitrary actions and standards or companies exercising private censorship with content online.

South Asia has an important role in global development, with its share of the world's largest working-age population, a quarter of the world's middle-class consumers, the largest number of poor and undernourished in the world, and several fragile states of global geopolitical importance. With inclusive growth, South Asia has the potential to change the global order and communications and technology continue to play a critical role in realising the region's potential. Unfortunately, the history of colonial rule, authoritarian governments and a turbulent geo-political landscape have resulted in a tendency to over-regulate speech. Governments have construed the advent of the Internet as a challenge to their authority and their anxiousness to restrict use of the medium by citizens has resulted in often regressive and sometimes draconian laws such as Myanmar's Electronic Transactions Law, India's IT Act and Pakistan's Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act.

As the Internet expands and provides greater access, it also places censorship and surveillance capacities in the hands of states and corporations. It is therefore crucial that there exist strong protections of the right to freedom of expression that balance state powers and citizen rights. While the Internet has thrown up its own set of challenges such as hate speech, the verbal online abuse of women and the use of the Internet to spread rumours of violence, the regulation of content is a question that is far from being settled and needs our urgent attention. What role can and should the law play? When is it justified for the government to intervene? What can be expected from intermediaries, such as social networks and ISPs? And what can users do to protect the right to free speech - their own and that of others?

Balancing freedom of expression with other rights is further complicated by the challenges of fast paced and changing regulatory environment. By highlighting these challenges and questioning the application of existing frameworks we aim to contribute to further promoting and strengthening the right to freedom of expression, in India and beyond.

Introduction to panel and conference:

This is the context in which the Centre for Internet and Society, the Observer Research Foundation, the University of Pennsylvania's Internet Policy Observatory, and the Programme for Comparative Media Law and Policy at Oxford University are coming together to organise an event under the title 'Freedom of Expression in a Digital Age'. The event is a discussion and deliberation on 'Effective Research, Policy Formation, & the Development of Regulatory Frameworks in South Asia', aimed at bringing together policymakers, researchers, experts and civil society in discussing some of the most crucial issues in this space. The event would seek to look at past experiences, look at current realities and look ahead to how things could be made better in the South Asian context. The program agenda includes

Freedom of Expression in a Digital Age' Effective Research, Policy Formation, & the Development of Regulatory Frameworks in South Asia
Program Agenda and Article Submission Tracks
Learnings from the past		Current Realities		Looking ahead
11:00 - 1:00	1:00 - 2:00	2:00 - 4:00	4:00- 4:15	4:15-6:00
Welcome and Introductions		Welcome and Introductions		Welcome and Introductions
Overview of existing policies and regulatory models and their impact on FoEx online including the implementation of these models across South Asia	Lunch	How FoEx is being enabled online in different jurisdications and sectors of society across South Asia	Coffee break	Challenges associated with formulating a standard, harmonized, and adaptable regulation that is applicable to multiple digital platforms, both at the national and international level and possible solutions
FoEx as defined in jurisdictions across South Asia and as compared to international standards		Ways in which FoEx is, or may be, curtailed online		Ways forward to bridge existing gaps between policy formation and policy implementation with respect to FOEX online
Emerging technologies, markets, services and platforms and how they have shaped FoEx across South Asia		Online FoEx and the present need to balance it against other digital rights in jurisdictions across South Asia		Exploration of emerging regulatory questions such as whether online speech should be regulated in the same manner as offline speech or, if there are there are particular forms of online speech that are difficult to regulate such as defamation, hate speech, if there are effective models of remedy for violation of FOEX online
Impact of challenges on FoEx online such as barriers of entry, access, accessibility, cost, liability, policies and enforcement mechanisms differing across platforms across South Asia		The impact of jurisdiction, multi-national platforms, and domestic regulation on FOEX online		Ways in which civil society can impact and influence the development and implementation of Internet regulation
Research techniques that have been applied to the issue and have been effective in different political contexts across South Asia		Role and responsibility of intermediaries in regulating online speech as per governmental standards via content policies, terms of service, and other practices across South Asia		Exploration of the future role and interplay of technology and policy in enabling FOEX online
Q&A		Q&A		Q&A

About the Organisers

The Center for Global Communication Studies at the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania-has created the Internet Policy Observatory (IPO) to research the dynamic technological and political contexts in which these Internet governance debates take place. The IPO serves as a platform for informing relevant communities of activists, academics, and policy makers, and for displaying collected data and analysis. The Observatory encourages and sponsors research and studies ongoing events, key decisions and proposals, on Internet policy. The IPO seeks to deepen understanding of the evolution of mechanisms and processes that affect domestic Internet policies in key jurisdictions and the legal, political, economic, international and social factors that influence the implementation, or non-implementation, of such policies.The IPO also seeks to understand the relationship between national efforts and international policy formations and the role of civil society in domestic Internet policy processes and control.

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS)-is a non-profit research organization working to explore, understand and affect the shape and form of the Internet and its relationship with the political, cultural, and social milieu of our times. CIS' multidisciplinary research, intervention and collaboration engages with policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, openness (including open government data, free/open source software, open standards, open access to scholarly literature, open educational resources, and open video). CIS also engages in academic research on digital natives and digital humanities.

The Observer Research Foundation (ORF)- is India's premier independent public policy think tank and is engaged in developing and discussing policy alternatives on a wide range of issues of national and international significance. The fundamental objective of ORF is to influence the formulation of policies for building a strong and prosperous India in a globalised world. It hosts India's largest annual cyber conference - CyFy: the India Conference on Cyber Security and Internet Governance.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/freedom-of-expression-in-digital-age

Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt

sunil — 2015-04-17T01:44:39Z

Much confusion has resulted from the Section 66A verdict. Some people are convinced that online speech is now without any reasonable restrictions under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. This is completely false.

There are many other provisions within the IT Act that still regulate speech online, for example the section on obscenity (Sec. 67) and also the data protection provision (Sec. 43A). Additionally there are provisions within the Indian Penal Code and other Acts that regulate speech both online and offline. For example, defamation remains a criminal offence under the IPC (Sec. 499), and disclosing information about children in a manner that lowers their reputation or infringes their privacy is also prohibited under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (Sec. 23).

Others are afraid that the striking down of Section 66A results in a regulatory vacuum where it will be possible for bad actors to wreak havoc online because the following has been left unaddressed by the IT Act.

Criminal Intimidation: The phrase "criminal intimidation" was included in Sec. 66A(b), but the requirement was that intimidation should be carried out using "information which he knows to be false". Sec. 506 of the IPC which punishes criminal intimidation does not have this requirement and is therefore a better legal route for affected individuals, even though the maximum punishment is a year shorter than the three years possible under the IT Act.
Cyber-stalking: A new section for stalking - Sec. 345 D - was added into the IPC in 2013 which also recognised cyber stalking. The definition within Sec.345D is more precise compared to the nebulous phrasing in Sec. 66A, which read - "monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication, commits the offence of stalking".
Phishing: Sec. 66A (c) dealt with punishment to people who "deceive or mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages". Sec.66D, which will be the operative section after this verdict, deals with "cheating by impersonation" and forms a more effective safeguard against phishing.

Cyber-bulling of children is arguably left unaddressed. Most importantly, spam, the original intention behind 66A, now cannot be tackled using any existing provision of the law. However, the poorly drafted section made it impossible for law enforcement to crack down on spammers. A 2005 attempt by the ITU to produce model law for spam based on a comparative analysis of national laws resulted in several important best practices that were ignored during the 2008 Amendment of the Act. For example, the definition of spam must cover the following characteristics - mass, unsolicited and commercial. All of which was missing in 66A.

Good quality law must be drafted by an open, participatory process where all relevant stakeholders are consulted and responded to before bills are introduced in parliament.

A scanned copy of the article was published in the Deccan Chronicle on March 26, 2015.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deccan-chronicle-march-26-2015-sunil-abraham-fear-uncertainty-doubt

Shreya Singhal and 66A

sunil — 2015-04-19T08:09:42Z

Most software code has dependencies. Simple and reproducible methods exist for mapping and understanding the impact of these dependencies. Legal code also has dependencies --across court orders and within a single court order. And since court orders are not produced using a structured mark-up language, experts are required to understand the precedential value of a court order.

The article was published in the Economic and Political Weekly Vol-L No.15. Vidushi Marda, programme officer at the Centre for Internet and Society, was responsible for all the research that went into this article. PDF version here.

As a non–lawyer and engineer, I cannot authoritatively comment on the Supreme Court’s order in Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015) on sections of the Information Technology Act of 2000, so I have tried to summarise a variety of views of experts in this article. The Shreya Singhal order is said to be unprecedented at least for the last four decades and also precedent setting as its lucidity, some believe, will cause a ripple effect in opposition to a restrictive understanding of freedom of speech and expression, and an expansiveness around reasonable restrictions. Let us examine each of the three sections that the bench dealt with.

The Section in Question

Section 66A of the IT Act was introduced in a hastily-passed amendment. Unfortunately, the language used in this section was a pastiche of outdated foreign laws such as the UK Communications Act of 2003, Malicious Communications Act of 1988 and the US Telecommunications Act, 1996.¹ Since the amendment, this section has been misused to make public examples out of innocent, yet uncomfortable speech, in order to socially engineer all Indian netizens into self-censorship.²

Summary: The Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act in its entirety holding that it was not saved by Article 19(2) of the Constitution on account of the expressions used in the section, such as "annoying," "grossly offensive," "menacing,", "causing annoyance." The Court justified this by going through the reasonable restrictions that it considered relevant to the arguments and testing them against S66A. Apart from not falling within any of the categories for which speech may be restricted, S66A was struck down on the grounds of vagueness, over-breadth and chilling effect. The Court considered whether some parts of the section could be saved, and then concluded that no part of S66A was severable and declared the entire section unconstitutional. When it comes to regulating speech in the interest of public order, the Court distinguished between discussion, advocacy and incitement. It considered the first two to fall under the freedom of speech and expression granted under Article 19(1)(a), and held that it was only incitement that attracted Article 19(2).

Between Speech and Harm

Gautam Bhatia, a constitutional law expert, has an optimistic reading of the judgment that will have value for precipitating the ripple effect. According to him, there were two incompatible strands of jurisprudence which have been harmonised by collapsing tendency into imminence.³ The first strand, exemplified by Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP⁴ and Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar,⁵ imported an older and weaker American standard, that is, the tendency test, between the speech and public order consequences. The second strand exemplified byRam Manohar Lohia vs State of UP,⁶ S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram,⁷ andArup Bhuyan vs Union of India,⁸ all require greater proximity between the speech and the disorder anticipated. In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court held that at the stage of incitement, the reasonable restrictions will step in to curb speech that has a tendency to cause disorder. Other experts are of the opinion that Justice Nariman was doing no such thing, and was only sequentially applying all the tests for free speech that have been developed within both these strands of precedent. In legal activist Lawrence Liang's analysis, "Ramjilal Modi was decided by a seven judge bench and Kedarnath by a constitutional bench. As is often the case in India, when subsequent benches of a lower strength want to distinguish themselves from older precedent but are unable to overrule them, they overcome this constraint through a doctrinal development by stealth. This is achieved by creative interpretations that chip away at archaic doctrinal standards without explicitly discarding them."⁹

Compatibility with US Jurisprudence

United States (US) jurisprudence has been imported by the Indian Supreme Court in an inconsistent manner. Some judgments hold that the American first amendment harbours no exception and hence is incompatible with Indian jurisprudence, while other judgments have used American precedent when convenient. Indian courts have on occasion imported an additional restriction beyond the eight available in 19(2)-the ground of public interest, best exemplified by the cases of K A Abbas¹⁰ and Ranjit Udeshi.¹¹ The bench in its judgment-which has been characterised by Pranesh Prakash as a masterclass in free speech jurisprudence¹²-clarifies that while the American first amendment jurisprudence is applicable in India, the only area where a difference is made is in the "sub serving of general public interest" made under the US law. This eloquent judgment will hopefully instruct judges in the future on how they should import precedent from American free speech jurisprudence.

Article 14 Challenge

The Article 14 challenge brought forward by the petitioners contended that Section 66A violated their fundamental right to equality because it differentiated between offline and online speech in terms of the length of maximum sentence, and was hence unconstitutional. The Court held that an intelligible differentia, indeed, did exist. It found so on two grounds. First, the internet offered people a medium through which they can express views at negligible or no cost. Second, the Court likened the rate of dissemination of information on the internet to the speed of lightning and could potentially reach millions of people all over the world. Before Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court had already accepted medium-specific regulation. For example in K A Abbas, the Court made a distinction between films and other media, stating that the impact of films on an average illiterate Indian viewer was more profound than other forms of communication. The pessimistic reading of Shreya Singhal is that Parliament can enact medium-specific law as long as there is an intelligible differentia which could even be a technical difference-speed of transmission. However, the optimistic interpretation is that medium-specific law can only be enacted if there are medium-specific harms, e g, phishing, which has no offline equivalent. If the executive adopts the pessimistic reading, then draconian sections like 66A will find their way back into the IT Act. Instead, if they choose the optimistic reading, they will introduce bills that fill the regulatory vacuum that has been created by the striking down of S66A, that is, spam and cyberbullying.

Section 79

Section 79 was partially read down. This section, again introduced during the 2008 amendment, was supposed to give legal immunity to intermediaries for third party content by giving a quick redressal for those affected by providing a mechanism for takedown notices in the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules notified in April 2011. But the section and rules had enabled unchecked invisible censorship¹³ in India and has had a demonstrated chilling effect on speech¹⁴ because of the following reasons:

One, there are additional unconstitutional restrictions on speech and expression. Rule 3(2) required a standard "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" that would have to be incorporated by all intermediaries. Under these rules, users are prohibited from hosting, displaying, uploading, modifying, publishing, transmitting, updating or sharing any information that falls into different content categories, a majority of which are restrictions on speech which are completely out of the scope of Article 19(2). For example, there is an overly broad category which contains information that harms minors in any way. Information that "belongs to another person and to which the user does not have any right to" could be personal information or could be intellectual property. A much better intermediary liability provision was introduced into the Copyright Act with the 2013 amendment. Under the Copyright Act, content could be reinstated if the takedown notice was not followed up with a court order within 21 days.¹⁵ A counter-proposal drafted by the Centre for Internet and Society for "Intermediary Due Diligence and Information Removal," has a further requirement for reinstatement that is not seen in the Copyright Act.¹⁶

Two, a state-mandated private censorship regime is created. You could ban speech online without approaching the court or the government. Risk-aversive private intermediaries who do not have the legal resources to subjectively determine the legitimacy of a legal claim err on the side of caution and takedown content.

Three, the principles of natural justice are not observed by the rules of the new censorship regime. The creator of information is not required to be notified nor given a chance to be heard by the intermediary. There is no requirement for the intermediary to give a reasoned decision.

Four, different classes of intermediaries are all treated alike. Since the internet is not an uniform assemblage of homogeneous components, but rather a complex ecosystem of diverse entities, the different classes of intermediaries perform different functions and therefore contribute differently to the causal chain of harm to the affected person. If upstream intermediaries like registrars for domain names are treated exactly like a web-hosting service or social media service then there will be over-blocking of content.

Five, there are no safeguards to prevent abuse of takedown notices. Frivolous complaints could be used to suppress legitimate expressions without any fear of repercussions and given that it is not possible to expedite reinstatement of content, the harm to the creator of information may be irreversible if the information is perishable. Transparency requirements with sufficient amounts of detail are also necessary given that a human right was being circumscribed. There is no procedure to have the removed information reinstated by filing a counter notice or by appealing to a higher authority.

The judgment has solved half the problem by only making intermediaries lose immunity if they ignore government orders or court orders. Private takedown notices sent directly to the intermediary without accompanying government orders or courts order no longer have basis in law. The bench made note of the Additional Solicitor General's argument that user agreement requirements as in Rule 3(2) were common practice across the globe and then went ahead to read down Rule 3(4) from the perspective of private takedown notices. One way of reading this would be to say that the requirement for standardised "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" remains. The other more consistent way of reading this part of the order in conjunction with the striking down of 66A would be to say those parts of the user agreement that are in violation of Article 19(2) have also been read down.

This would have also been an excellent opportunity to raise the transparency requirements both for the State and for intermediaries: for (i) the person whose speech is being censored, (ii) the persons interested in consuming that speech, and (iii) the general public. It is completely unclear whether transparency in the case of India has reduced the state appetite for censorship. Transparency reports from Facebook, Google and Twitter claim that takedown notices from the Indian government are on the rise.¹⁷ However, on the other hand, the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEITY) claims that government statistics for takedowns do not match the numbers in these transparency reports.¹⁸ The best way to address this uncertainty would be to require each takedown notice and court order to be made available by the State, intermediary and also third-party monitors of free speech like the Chilling Effects Project.

Section 69A

The Court upheld S69A which deals with website blocking, and found that it was a narrowly-drawn provision with adequate safeguards, and, hence, not constitutionally infirm. In reality, unfortunately, website blocking usually by internet service providers (ISPs) is an opaque process in India. Blocking under S69A has been growing steadily over the years. In its latest response to an RTI (right to information)¹⁹ query from the Software Freedom Law Centre, DEITY said that 708 URLs were blocked in 2012, 1,349 URLs in 2013, and 2,341 URLs in 2014. On 30 December 2014 alone, the centre blocked 32 websites to curb Islamic State of Iraq and Syria propaganda, among which were "pastebin" websites, code repository (Github) and generic video hosting sites (Vimeo and Daily Motion).²⁰ Analysis of leaked block lists and lists received as responses to RTI requests have revealed that the block orders are full of errors (some items do not exist, some items are not technically valid web addresses), in some cases counter speech which hopes to reverse the harm of illegal speech has also been included, web pages from mainstream media houses have also been blocked and some URLs are base URLs which would result in thousands of pages getting blocked when only a few pages might contain allegedly illegal content.²¹

Pre-decisional Hearing

The central problem with the law as it stands today is that it allows for the originator of information to be isolated from the process of censorship. The Website Blocking Rules provide that all "reasonable efforts" must be made to identify the originator or the intermediary who hosted the content. However, Gautam Bhatia offers an optimistic reading of the judgment, he claims that the Court has read into this "or" and made it an "and"-thus requiring that the originator must also be notified of blocks when he or she can be identified.²²

Transparency

Usually, the reasons for blocking a website are unknown both to the originator of material as well as those trying to access the blocked URL. The general public also get no information about the nature and scale of censorship unlike offline censorship where the court orders banning books and movies are usually part of public discourse. In spite of the Court choosing to leave Section 69A intact, it stressed the importance of a written order for blocking, so that a writ may be filed before a high court under Article 226 of the Constitution. While citing this as an existing safeguard, the Court seems to have been under the impression that either the intermediary or the originator is normally informed, but according to Apar Gupta, a lawyer for the People's Union for Civil Liberties, "While the rules indicate that a hearing is given to the originator of the content, this safeguard is not evidenced in practice. Not even a single instance exists on record for such a hearing."²³ Even worse, block orders have been unevenly implemented by ISPs with variations across telecom circles, connectivity technologies, making it impossible for anyone to independently monitor and reach a conclusion whether an internet resource is inaccessible as a result of a S69A block order or due to a network anomaly.

Rule 16 under S69A requires confidentiality with respect to blocking requests and complaints, and actions taken in that regard. The Court notes that this was argued to be unconstitutional, but does not state their opinion on this question. Gautam Bhatia holds the opinion that this, by implication, requires that requests cannot be confidential. Chinmayi Arun, from the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi, one of the academics supporting the petitioners, holds the opinion that it is optimism carried too far to claim that the Court noted the challenge to Rule 16 but just forgot about it in a lack of attention to detail that is belied by the rest of the judgment.

Free speech researchers and advocates have thus far used the RTI Act to understand the censorship under S69A. The Centre for Internet and Society has filed a number of RTI queries about websites blocked under S69A and has never been denied information on grounds of Rule 16.²⁴ However, there has been an uneven treatment of RTI queries by DEITY in this respect, with the Software Freedom Law Centre²⁵ being denied blocking orders on the basis of Rule 16. The Court could have protected free speech and expression by reading down Rule 16 except for a really narrow set of exceptions wherein only aggregate information would be made available to affected parties and members of the public.

Conclusions

In Shreya Singhal, the Court gave us great news: S66A has been struck down; good news: S79(3) and its rules have been read down; and bad news: S69A has been upheld. When it comes to each section, the impact of this judgment can either be read optimistically or pessimistically, and therefore we must wait for constitutional experts to weigh in on the ripple effect that this order will produce in other areas of free speech jurisprudence in India. But even as free speech activists celebrate Shreya Singhal, some are bemoaning the judgment as throwing the baby away with the bathwater, and wish to reintroduce another variant of S66A. Thus, we must remain vigilant.

Notes

1 G S Mudur (2012): "66A 'Cut and Paste Job,'" The Telegraph, 3 December, visited on 3 April, 2015, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1121 203/jsp/frontpage/story_16268138.jsp

2 Sunil Abraham (2012): "The Five Monkeys and Ice Cold Water," Centre for Internet and Society, 26 September, visited on 3 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/www-deccan-chronicle-sep-16-201...

3 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Striking Down of 66A: How Free Speech Jurisprudence in India Found Its Soul Again," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 26 March, visited on 4 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/26/the-striking-down-of-sect...

4 Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP, 1957, SCR 860.

5 Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar, 1962, AIR 955.

6 Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of UP, AIR, 1968 All 100.

7 S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram, 1989, SCC(2), 574.

8 Arup Bhuyan vs Union of India, (2011), 3 SCC 377.

9 Lawrence Liang, Alternative Law Forum, personal communication to author, 6 April 2015.

10 K A Abbas vs Union of India, 1971 SCR (2), 446.

11 Ranjit Udeshi vs State of Maharashtra,1965 SCR (1) 65.

12 Pranesh Prakash (2015): "Three Reasons Why 66A Verdict Is Momentous"/ Times of India/(29 March). Visited on 6 April 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-times/all-that-matters/Th...

13 Pranesh Prakash (2011): "Invisble Censorship: How the Government Censors Without Being Seen," The Centre for Internet and Society, 14 December, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/invisible-censorship

14 Rishabh Dara (2012): "Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet," The Centre for Internet and Society, 27 April, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/chilling-effects-on-free-expres... .

15 Rule 75, Copyright Rules, 2013.

16 The Draft Counter Proposal is available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/counter-proposal-by-cis-draft-i...

17 According to Facebook's transparency report, there were 4,599 requests in the first half of 2014, followed by 5,473 requests in the latter half. Available at https://govtrequests.facebook. com/country/India/2014-H2/ also see Google's transparency report available at http: //www.google. com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/?hl=en and Twitter's report, available at https:// transparency.twitter.com/country/in

18 Surabhi Agarwal (2015): "Transparency Reports of Internet Companies are Skewed: Gulashan Rai," Business Standard, 31 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/transparency-re... .

19 http://sflc.in/deity-says-2341-urls-were-blocked-in-2014-refuses-to-reve...

20 "32 Websites Go Blank," The Hindu, 1 January 2015, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/now-modi-govt-blocks-32-websites/a...

21 Pranesh Prakash (2012): "Analysing Latest List of Blocked Sites (Communalism and Rioting Edition)," 22 August, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysing-blocked-sites-ri... . Also, see Part II of the same series at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/analyzing-the-latest-list-of-bl... and analysis of blocking in February 2013, at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analyzing-latest-list-of-b...

22 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Supreme Court's IT Act Judgment, and Secret Blocking," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 25 March, viewed on 6 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/25/the-supreme-courts-it-act...

23 Apar Gupta (2015): "But What about Section 69A?," Indian Express, 27 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://indianexpress. com/article/opinion/ columns/but-what-about-section-69a/

24 Pranesh Prakash (2011): DIT's Response to RTI on Website Blocking, The Centre for Internet and Society, 7 April, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rti-response-dit-blocking ). Also see http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-dit-response-2nd-... and http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/reply-to-rti-applicat...

25 http://sflc.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/RTI-blocking-final-reply-from-...

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-and-political-weekly-sunil-abraham-april-11-2015-shreya-singhal-and-66a

Don’t SLAPP free speech

sunil — 2013-02-28T11:22:09Z

IIPM is proving adept at the tactical use of lawsuits to stifle criticism, despite safeguards. THE DEPARTMENT of Telecommunications, on 14 February, issued orders to block certain web pages critical of the Indian Institute of Planning and Management (IIPM).

Sunil Abraham's column with inputs from Snehashish Ghosh was published in Tehelka on February 3, 2013 (Issue 9 Volume 10)

Despite our best efforts, we have not managed to get a copy of the court order. Meanwhile, there has been a lot of speculation among Internet policy experts on Twitter. What is the title of the case? Which judge issued the order? Who is the affected party? Why have mainstream media houses like Outlook not been served notice by the court? Is the infamous Section 66A of the IT Act to be blamed? That is highly unlikely. News reports suggest that a lower court in Gwalior has issued an ad interim injunction in a defamation suit. Most experts agree that this is a SLAPP (Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation) suit, where a company uses the cost of mounting a legal defence to silence critics.

Bullies with deep pockets use the law in very creative ways, such as forum shopping, forum shifting and the use of proxies. Forum shopping can be best understood through the example of mining giant Fomento suing Goan blogger Sebastian Rodrigues for $1 billion at the Kolkata High Court, even though Goa would have been a more logical location. Though IIPM lost an earlier case against Careers360 before the Uttaranchal High Court, the offending URLs from that case are included in the latest block order, exemplifying successful forum shifting. The doctrine of ‘res subjudice’ does not permit courts to proceed in a matter which is “directly and substantially” similar to a previous suit between the same parties. Proxies are usually employed to circumvent this procedural doctrine.

Article 19(2) of our Constitution empowers the State to create laws that place eight types (depending on how you count) of reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression. One of these reasonable restrictions is defamation. Tort law on defamation in India has been mostly borrowed from common law principles developed in the UK, which include a series of exceptions where the law cannot be used. In the present context, the exceptions important for the IIPM case include: fair and bona fide comment and matter of public interest. In addition, Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code provides for 10 exceptions to defamation. The exceptions relevant to this case are: “first: imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or published”, “ninth: imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other’s interests” and “tenth: caution intended for good of person to whom conveyed or for public good”. The criminal law on defamation in India is based on robust legal principles, but for the sake of public interest it’d be best to do away with such a law as it has far-reaching, chilling effects on free speech.

On interim injunctions in defamation suits, the Delhi High Court set an important precedent protecting free speech in 2011. While applying the English principle — the Bonnard Rule — the court in Tata Sons Pvt Ltd versus Greenpeace International held that a higher standard should be adhered to while granting an interim injunction in a defamation suit, because such an injunction might impinge upon freedom of expression and thus potentially be in violation of the Indian Constitution. This century-old rule states that “until it is clear that an alleged libel is untrue… the importance of leaving free speech unfetter – ed is a strong reason in cases of libel for dealing most cautiously and warily with the granting of interim injunctions…”

In the same case, the Court rejected the argument that since it was published online and thus had wider reach and greater permanence, an injunction should be granted. It observed that “publication is a comprehensive term, embracing all forms and mediums — including the Internet”, thus ruling out special treatment for the Inter net in cases of defamation. That is good news for free speech online in India. Now let’s stick to it.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/tehelka-sunil-abraham-feb-3-2013-dont-slap-free-speech

CIS Response to ICANN's proposed renewal of .org Registry

akriti — 2019-04-28T02:16:40Z

We thank ICANN for the opportunity to comment on this issue of its proposed renewal of the .org Registry Agreement with the operator, Public Interest Registry (PIR). Supporting much of the community , we too find severe issues with the proposed agreement. These centre around the removal of price caps and imposing obligations being currently deliberated in an ongoing Policy Development Process (PDP).

Presumption of Renewal

CIS has, in the past, questioned the need for a presumption of renewal in registry contracts and it is important to emphasize this within the context of this comment as well. We had, also, asked ICANN for their rationale on having such a practice with reference to their contract with Verisign to which they responded saying:

“Absent countervailing reasons, there is little public benefit, and some significant potential for disruption, in regular changes of a registry operator. In addition, a significant chance of losing the right to operate the registry after a short period creates adverse incentives to favor short term gain over long term investment.”

This logic can presumably be applied to the .org registry, as well, yet a re-auction of ,even, legacy top-level domains can only serve to further a fair market, promote competition and ensure that existing registries do not become complacent.

These views were supported in the course of the PDP on Contractual Conditions - Existing Registries in 2006 wherein competition was seen useful for better pricing, operational performance and contributions to registry infrastructure. It was also noted that most service industries incorporate a presumption of competition as opposed to one of renewal.

Download the file to access our full response.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/akriti-bopanna-april-28-2019-cis-response-to-icanns-proposed-renewal-of-org-registry

Discussion on Ranking Digital Rights in India (Delhi, January 07)

amber — 2016-12-29T07:07:34Z

Towards developing an understanding of how Indian ICT companies are recognising and upholding digital rights of their users, and to raise public awareness about the same, the Center for Internet and Society (CIS), with the support of Privacy International, has studied 8 Indian ICT companies, using the same methodology as the 2015 Corporate Accountability Index, to gain greater insight into company practices and initiate public dialogues. Please join us on Saturday, January 07, at the India Islamic Cultural Centre, New Delhi, for a presentation of our findings followed by an open structured discussion on the methodology and implications of the study.

Download: Invitation and agenda (PDF)

The Ranking Digital Rights Corporate Responsibility Index is a project hosted by the Open Technology Institute at New America Foundation that aims to rank Information and Communications Technology (ICTs) companies with respect to their Governance, Freedom of Expression, and Privacy practices. The inaugural Corporate Accountability Index, released in November 2015, evaluated 16 companies based on the project’s methodology that included 31 indicators in total.

Please join us on Saturday, January 07, at the India Islamic Cultural Centre, New Delhi, for a presentation of our findings followed by an open structured discussion on the methodology and implications of the Ranking Digital Rights study. We will begin at 10:30 am with a round of tea and coffee.

The event is open to all but the venue has limited space. The participants are requested to RSVP by sending an email to nisha@cis-india.org.

To further encourage programmers, researchers, journalists, students, and users in general to use and contribute to the findings of the Ranking Digital Rights study, and critique the underlying methodology, we are also organising a “rankathon” on Sunday, January 08, at the CIS office in Delhi. More details can be found here.

We look forward to your participation and contribution to the discussion. Please support us by sharing this invitation with your colleagues and networks.

Agenda

10:30-11:00	Coffee and Tea
11:00-11:15	Introduction
11:15-13:00	Presentation of the Findings and Discussion Divij Joshi and Aditya Singh Chawla
13:00-14:00	Lunch
14:00-15:00	Open Discussion #1: Parameters of Evaluation The RDR methodology was based upon evaluating commitments to uphold human rights through their services – in particular towards their commitment to users’ freedom of expression and privacy. Are there other parameters that may be considered in the Indian context?
15:00-16:00	Open Discussion #2: Towards Protecting Digital Rights What steps can be taken by the government, civil society, and industry in India to create an environment that recognizes and protects users digital rights? What are the relevant legal, political, and economic factors to take into consideration towards this? What are steps that other, multinational ICT companies have taken? Would these be realistic for Indian companies to implement?
16:00-16:30	Conclusion
16:30-17:00	Coffee and Tea

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/discussion-on-ranking-digital-rights-in-india-delhi-jan-07-2017

India's ‘Facebook ruling’ is another nail in the coffin of the MNO model

praskrishna — 2016-02-28T03:44:34Z

Ability to access 'net from mobe no longer considered a miracle.

The article was published in the Register on February 15, 2016. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.

Nobody could accuse India’s telecoms regulator, TRAI, of being in the operators’ pockets. This month it has, once again, set eye-watering reserve prices for the upcoming 700 MHz spectrum auction (see separate item), and now it has taken one of the toughest stances in the world on net neutrality, in effect banning zero rated or discounted content deals like Reliance Communications’ Facebook Basics, or Bharti Airtel’s Zero.

In a ruling last Monday, TRAI said telecoms providers are banned from offering discriminatory tariffs for data services based on content, and from entering deals to subsidize access to certain websites. They have six months to wind down any existing arrangements which contravene the new rules. Its stance is even stricter than in other countries with strong pro-neutrality laws, such as Brazil and The Netherlands.

“This is the most extensive and stringent regulation on differential pricing anywhere in the world,” Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, said. “Those who suggested regulation in place of complete ban have clearly lost.”

Such decisions, combined with high spectrum costs, will quickly make the traditional cellular business model unworkable in India, and the more that happens, the more wireless internet innovation will switch to open networks running on Wi-Fi and unlicensed spectrum. R.S. Sharma, chairman of TRAI, was careful to tell reporters that the zero rating ruling would not affect any plans to offer free Wi-Fi services, like those planned by Google in a venture with Indian Railways.

A disaster for MNOs, not Facebook

Facebook pronounced itself “disappointed” at TRAI’s ruling, having lobbied aggressively for a more flexible approach since RCOM was forced to suspend the Basics offering in December while the consultation process took place. But while the ruling bars the Basics offering – which provided free, low speed access, on RCOM’s network, to a selection of websites, curated by Facebook – it does not stop the social media giant pursuing other initiatives within its internet.org umbrella. These include projects to extend access using its own networks, powered by drones and unlicensed spectrum, to the unserved of India and other emerging economies.

So while the TRAI decision may be a setback for Facebook, it is not the body blow that it represents for the MNOs with their huge debt loads and infrastructure costs, and low ARPUs. Facebook, with 130m users in India, has a comparable reach to the Indian MNOs (only three, Bharti Airtel, Vodafone and Idea, have more subscribers than Facebook has users), and is better skilled at monetizing those consumers.

The challenge for companies like Facebook is that strict neutrality rules reduce their ability to harness others’ networks in order to reach out to new users. There are about 240m people in India who are online, but don’t use Facebook, and about 800m who are not connected, so the growth potential is far larger than in the other 37 countries where Basics is offered, such as Kenya or Zambia (Facebook is blocked in China). Using RCOM’s network and marketing activities was a far cheaper way to reach some of those people than launching drones, but Facebook has other options too, including its existing efforts to make its services more usable on very basic handsets and connections; the ability to leverage the WhatsApp brand; and partnerships with Wi-Fi providers.

The drones may have less immediate results than Basics, but they are a high profile example of an ongoing shift towards open networks, which has been going on for years, driven more by Wi-Fi proliferation than neutrality laws. The latter will be an accelerant, however.

All internet will be free, not zero rated

Currently, zero rating is an increasingly popular tactic to lure users with an apparently cheap deal and then, hopefully, see them upgrade to richer data plans, or spend money on m-commerce and premium content, in future. Zero rating involves allowing users access to selected websites and services without it affecting their data caps or allowances.

The US regulator has so far tolerated the practice, but the debate is raging, there and elsewhere, over whether it infringes neutrality laws, by offering different pricing for different internet services. If other authorities take the stance adopted by TRAI in India, operators will have to find new ways to attract customers and differentiate themselves.

Increasingly, access to a truly open internet will be the baseline, and priced extremely low. That low pricing will be made commercially viable by rising use of Wi-Fi to reduce cost of data delivery, whether for MNOs, wireline providers or web players like Google and Facebook, which are moving into access provision. Providers, whether traditional or new, will have to stop regarding access to the internet as a premium service or a privilege – it will be more akin to connecting someone to the electricity grid, just the base enabler of the real revenue model.

Just as it’s only when users plug something into that grid that they start to pay fees, so the operators will charge for higher value offerings which ride on top of the internet – premium content, enterprise services, cloud storage, freemium applications and so on.

The mobile operators have not embraced these ideas willingly. For years, the ability to access the internet from a mobile device was regarded as a value-add, almost a miracle. Now that the wireless network is often the primary access method, they need to change their ideas and be more like the smarter cablecos – which have tacked internet access onto a model driven by paid-for content and services – or the web giants, which have worked out ways to monetize ‘free’ access, from advertising to big data.

This, of course, is one of the goals of internet.org and Google’s similar initiatives involving drones, white space spectrum and satellites. The more users are able to access the internet, preferably for free, and the more they see Google or Facebook as their primary conduits to the web, the more data these companies have to feed into their deep learning platforms, their context aware services and their advertising and big data engines.

So while critics of TRAI said the zero rating decision was a setback to the goal of getting internet access into the hands of the huge underserved population of India, that population is too large and potentially rich for Facebook and its rivals to give up at the first hurdle.

Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg wrote in a blog post: "While we're disappointed with today's decision, I want to personally communicate that we are committed to keep working to break down barriers to connectivity in India and around the world. Internet.org has many initiatives, and we will keep working until everyone has access to the internet."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/news/the-register-february-15-2016-india-facebook-ruling-is-another-nail-in-coffin-of-mno-model