Centre for Internet and Society

Comment by CIS at ACE on Presentation on French Charter on the Fight against Cyber-Counterfeiting

pranesh — 2011-12-01T11:59:45Z

The seventh session of the World Intellectual Property Organization's Advisory Committee on Enforcement is being held in Geneva on November 30 and December 1, 2011. Pranesh Prakash responded to a presentation by Prof. Pierre Sirinelli of the École de droit de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 on 'The French Charter on the Fight against Cyber-Counterfeiting of December 16, 2009' with this comment.

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society. First, I would like to congratulate you on your re-election.

And I would like to congratulate Prof. Sirenelli on his excellent presentation.

I would like to flag a few points, though:

One of the benefits of normal laws, as opposed to the soft/plastic laws, which he champions, is that normal laws are bound by procedures established by law, due process requirements, and principles of natural justice. Unfortunately, the soft/plastic laws, which in essence are private agreements, are not.
The report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Expression and Opinion made it clear in his report to the UN Human Rights Council that the Internet is now an intergral part of citizens exercising their right of freedom of speech under national constitutions and under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That report highlights that many initiatives on copyright infringement, including that of the French government with HADOPI and the UK, actually contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The right of privacy is also flagged by many as something that will have to be compromised if such private enforcement of copyright is encouraged.

I'd like to know Prof. Sirinelli's views on these three issues: due process, right of freedom of speech, and the right to privacy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ace-7-french-charter-cis-comment

Calling Out the BSA on Its BS

pranesh — 2011-09-14T18:16:51Z

The Business Software Alliance (BSA) is trying to pull wool over government officials' eyes by equating software piracy with tax losses. Pranesh Prakash points out how that argument lacks cogency, and that tax losses would be better averted if BSA's constituent companies just decided to pay full taxes in India.

In the past we have covered the Business Software Alliance's lack of rigour in their piracy statistics, and disconnect from their constituent members when it comes to opposing free and open source software. In reaction to the criticism they have received over the years, BSA has finally stopped equating lack of sales with losses. But now, they have started equating software piracy with tax losses.

How IDC thinks tax works

In a report prepared by International Data Corporation (IDC) for the Business Software Alliance (BSA), they note:

Substantial value in form of potential industry and tax revenues is lost to software piracy: The situation in India is not healthy with a software piracy rate of 65% in 2009 (more than six out of ten PC software programs installed in 2009 were not paid for). Only one-third of the overall PC software revenues are captured by the industry incumbents and the rest are lost to software piracy. Most of the unlicensed software use occurs in otherwise legal businesses installing the programs on more PCs than allowed by the licenses they have paid for. Consequently, in 2009, the state exchequer tax receipts loss was roughly US$866 million at the current piracy and employment levels, as the industry lost its otherwise legitimate share of revenues to piracy.

For this to be true, there must be two assumptions that are satisfied. First, those who are pirating software must not spend the money that they save by doing so on any other taxable activity. Second, the companies that would get the money if the software weren't pirated must pay the Indian government taxes. As we'll see, neither of these two assumptions are warranted.

The BSA-IDC report reasons as follows: Pirates don't pay taxes on the illegal software that they sell, so that is tax evasion and consequently a tax loss. It states:

Higher demand for legal software will result in higher flow of license volume through the supply chain, resulting in increase in volume of business transactions. Each transaction adds a certain percentage of the deal or value added to the state exchequer's coffers in the form of indirect tax revenue[...] Increase in demand will also result in increased employment. Consequently, revenues from direct taxes will be increased for the government, as employees join newly created high-paying jobs.

How tax actually works

That reasoning is flawed. The majority of software piracy in India happens through two methods: violation of software licence terms by using the software on more computers than it is licensed for; and pre-loading of illegal software by computer sellers. Those 'computer seller' pirates do not sell the software separately, but bundle it with the computer as an additional service. In other words, they don't charge for it in the first place. So, quite clearly, there is no tax evasion.

Despite there being no tax evasion, there is the possibility of tax loss for the state. That would happen when instead of doing taxable activity A with with their money, they do non-taxable activity B. Putting money in special government bonds instead of spending it on software, for instance, is one such instance. However, that is a strange, unwarranted assumption. People don't always put the money that they don't spend on software into government bonds. It is a much more reasonable assumption that people would spend that money on other consumables, like food or other such tangible commodities.

Lastly, there is the unwarranted assumption that increase in demand for legal software increases employment. In fact, it is a much more reasonable assumption that increase in piracy increases employment in case of developing countries. Printing ("DTP") shops use pirated versions of Photoshop, CorelDraw and InDesign, computer education centres use pirated versions of Microsoft Windows, offices use pirated versions of Microsoft Word and Excel. If these didn't teach their employees the use of pirated software, millions of people would lose their jobs. All of these employees pay direct taxes. There is no analysis in the BSA-IDC report that accounts for this, treating all these millions of people as non-existent for purposes of their analysis.

Increasing tax: Make MNC software companies pay full taxes

Thus, there is no real tax loss to the government if the money that would have been spent on commercial software was instead spent on some other commodity. Indeed, there might even be an increase in tax collection because software companies, including leading ones such as Microsoft, are much more likely to avoid taxes than companies that deal in tangible commodities. There are well-known routes of decreasing tax liability for intangible goods such as software. Software companies normally state that they license software instead of selling it (as this suits them on issues such as customs duties), but when it comes to income tax, they try to paint the transaction as a sale of a product. (Microsoft, for instance claims that its earnings in India are 'business income' and not 'royalties' and hence is exempt under the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between India and the USA.) A company that deals with tangible commodities has no such 'licensing vs. sale' loop-hole that they can try to exploit. Further, many software companies are located in special economic zones that are "software exporting zones", and hence get large tax deductions.

In India, for instance, Microsoft is resisting payment of income tax for by routing all licensing to distributors in India through a shell company in Singapore and holding that Microsoft India had no income tax liabilities. Microsoft has been fined Rs. 2 crore because it tried to separate the importing of software into India from the (more valuable) granting of licences to customers and pay only nominal customs duties on the former and under-declaring the value of the latter as zero. From nine Microsoft dealers a total of Rs 255 crore was collected as tax. Of the roughly Rs. 4000 crores loss that the BSA-IDC report claims, around 6% is realizable from just a single tax (customs duties) from 9 companies dealing in the products of one company. If we multiply this by all taxes (income tax included) amongst all the dealers of all the constituent companies of BSA, then the Indian government might recover more from taxes than is supposedly lost to piracy!

Elsewhere around the globe, the 'Double Irish' arrangement, the 'Dutch Sandwich' route and other such are used by MNC software companies to evade taxes. Just as there are tax havens, there are some IPR havens that cater to companies selling/licensing software and other such intangible commodities.

If only these software companies were to stop evading taxes in the countries in which they sell software, then the government's tax collections would automatically increase.

Final idiocies, and conclusion

In the BSA-IDC report, they write: "Assessing the relationship between software piracy rates and UN Human Development Index (a measure of average achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development) suggests that countries with greater rates of software piracy tend to have lower levels of economic development. This further strengthens the hypothesis that IP rights (IPR) enforcement increases economic activity.".

This is as sensible as saying "countries with greater rates of industrial espionage (such as France, Germany, and USA) tend to have higher levels of economic development" strengthens the hypothesis that industrial espionage increases economic development. While it is empirically true that most countries with greater rates of software piracy have lower levels of economic development, it is equally true that countries with lower levels of economic development (being countries with poorer populations) have more software piracy. It is equally true that software piracy decreases if the cost of software decreases, as shown by the more carefully-conducted analysis in the Media Piracy in Emerging Economies report.

To use greater software piracy and lower economic development as evidence of the causal link between IPR enforcement and economic activity is to betray absolute ignorance about both economics and logic.

The startlingly poor level of analysis of the BSA-IDC report leaves no question that the conclusions were arrived at independently of the analysis. Such misleading analysis is worse than trash: it is downright dangerous as an instrument of policy setting.

To increase tax receipts, the government may as well start by making BSA's constituent companies pay all the taxes they owe.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/calling-out-the-bsa-on-bs

Analysis of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2012

pranesh — 2013-11-12T14:13:04Z

There are some welcome provisions in the Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2012, and some worrisome provisions. Pranesh Prakash examines five positive changes, four negative ones, and notes the several missed opportunities. The larger concern, though, is that many important issues have not been addressed by these amendments, and how copyright policy is made without evidence and often out of touch with contemporary realities of the digital era.

The Copyright (Amendment) Bill 2012 has been passed by both Houses of Parliament, and will become law as soon as the President gives her assent and it is published in the Gazette of India. While we celebrate the passage of some progressive amendments to the Copyright Act, 1957 — including an excellent exception for persons with disabilities — we must keep in mind that there are some regressive amendments as well. In this blog post, I will try to highlight those provisions of the amendment that have not received much public attention (unlike the issue of lyricists’ and composers’ ‘right to royalty’).

Welcome Changes

Provisions for Persons with Disabilities

India now has amongst the most progressive exception for persons with disabilities, alongside countries like Chile. Under the amendments, sections 51(1)(zb) and 31B carve out exceptions and limitations for persons with disabilities. Earlier s.52(1)(zb) dealt only with formats that were “special designed only for the use of persons suffering from visual, aural, or other disabilities”. Thanks to a campaign mounted by disability rights groups and public interest groups such as CIS, it now covers “any accessible format”. Section 52(1)(zb) allows any person to facilitate access by persons with disabilities to copyrighted works without any payment of compensation to the copyright holder, and any organization working the benefit of persons with disabilities to do so as long as it is done on a non-profit basis and with reasonable steps being taken to prevent entry of reproductions of the copyrighted work into the mainstream. Even for-profit businesses are allowed to do so if they obtain a compulsory licence on a work-by-work basis, and pay the royalties fixed by the Copyright Board. The onerousness of this provision puts its utility into question, and this won’t disappear unless the expression “work” in s.31B is read to include a class of works.

Given that the Delhi High Court has — wrongly and per incuriam, since it did not refer to s.14(a)(ii) as it was amended in 1994 — held parallel importation to be barred by the Copyright Act, it was important for Parliament to clarify that the Copyright Act in fact follows international exhaustion. Without this, even if any person can facilitate access for persons with disabilities to copyrighted works, those works are restricted to those that are circulated in India. Given that not many books are converted into accessible formats in India (not to mention the costs of doing so), and given the much larger budgets for book conversion in the developed world, this is truly restrictive.

Extension of Fair Dealing to All Works

The law earlier dealt with fair dealing rights with regard to “literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works”. Now it covers all works (except software), in effect covering sound recordings and video as well. This will help make personal copies of songs and films, to make copies for research, to use film clips in classrooms, etc.

Creative Commons, Open Licensing Get a Boost

The little-known s.21 of the Copyright Act, which deals with the right of authors to relinquish copyright, has been amended. While earlier one could only relinquish parts of one’s copyright by submitting a form to the Registrar of Copyrights, now a simple public notice suffices. Additionally, s.30 of the Act, which required licences to be in writing and signed, now only requires it to be in writing. This puts Creative Commons, the GNU Public Licence, and other open licensing models, on a much surer footing in India.

Physical Libraries Should Celebrate, Perhaps Virtual Libraries Too

Everywhere that the word “hire” occurs (except s.51, curiously), the word “commercial rental” has been substituted. This has been done, seemingly, to bring India in conformance with the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). The welcome side-effect of this is that the legality of lending by non-profit public libraries has been clarified. The amendment states:

"2(1)(fa) “commercial rental” does not include the rental, lease or lending of a lawfully acquired copy of a computer programme, sound recording, visual recording or cinematograph film for non-profit purposes by a non-profit library or non-profit educational institution."

Even after this, the overwhelming majority of the ‘video lending libraries’ that you see in Indian cities and towns continue to remain illegal.

Another welcome provision is the amended s.52(1)(n), which now allows “non-commercial public libraries” to store an electronic copy of a work if it already has a physical copy of the work. However, given that this provision says that the storage shall be “for preservation”, it seems limited. However, libraries might be able to use this — in conjunction with the fact that under s.14 of the Copyright Act lending rights of authors is limited to “commercial rental” and s.51(b) only covers lending of “infringing copies” — to argue that they can legally scan and lend electronic copies of works in the same manner that they lend physical copies. Whether this argument would succeed is unclear. Thus, India has not boldly gone where the European Commission is treading with talks of a European Digital Library Project, or where scholars in the US are headed with the Digital Public Library of America. But we might have gone there quietly. Thus, this amendment might help foster an Indian Internet Archive, or help spread the idea of the Open Library in India.

On a final note, different phrases are used to refer to libraries in the amendment. In s.2(1)(fa), it talks about "non-profit library"; in s.52(1)(n) and (o), it refers to "non-commercial public library"; and in s.52(1)(zb), it talks of "library or archives", but s.52(1)(zb) also requires that the works be made available on a "non-profit basis". The differentiation, if any, that is sought to be drawn between these is unclear.

Limited Protection to Some Internet Intermediaries

There are two new provisions, s.52(1)(b) and 52(1)(c), which provide some degree of protection to 'transient or incidental' storage of a work or performance. Section 52(1)(b) allows for "the transient or incidental storage of a work or performance purely in the technical process of electronic transmission or communication to the public", hence applying primarily to Internet Service Providers (ISPs), VPN providers, etc. Section 52(1)(c) allows for "transient or incidental storage of a work or performance for the purpose of providing electronic links, access or integration, where such links, access or integration has not been expressly prohibited by the right holder, unless the person responsible is aware or has reasonable grounds for believing that such storage is of an infringing copy". This seems to make it applicable primarily to search engines, with other kinds of online services being covered or not covered depending on one’s interpretation of the word 'incidental'.

Compulsory Licensing Now Applies to Foreign Works Also

Sections 31 ("compulsory licence in works withheld from public") and 31A ("compulsory licence in unpublished Indian works") used to apply to Indian works. Now they apply to all works, whether Indian or not (and now s.31A is about "compulsory licence in unpublished or published works", mainly orphan works). This is a welcome amendment, making foreign works capable of being licensed compulsorily in case it is published elsewhere but withheld in India. Given how onerous our compulsory licensing sections are, especially sections 32 and 32A (which deal with translations, and with literary, scientific or artistic works), it is not a surprise that they have not been used even once. However, given the modifications to s.31 and s.31A, we might just see those starting to be used by publishers, and not just radio broadcasters.

Worrisome Changes

Term of Copyright for Photographs Nearly Doubled

The term of copyright for photographs has now gone from sixty years from publication to sixty years from the death of the photographer. This would mean that copyright in a photograph clicked today (2012) by a 20 year old who dies at the 80 will only expire on January 1, 2133. This applies not only to artistic photographs, to all photographs because copyright is an opt-out system, not an opt-in system. Quite obviously, most photoshopping is illegal under copyright law.

This has two problems. First, there was no case made out for why this term needed to be increased. No socio-economic report was commissioned on the effects of such a term increase. This clause was not even examined by the Parliamentary Standing Committee. While the WCT requires a ‘life + 50′ years term for photographs, we are not signatories to the WCT, and hence have no obligation to enforce this. We are signatories to the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, which require a copyright term of 25 years for photographs. Instead, we have gone even above the WCT requirement and provide a life + 60 years term.

The second problem is that it is easier to say when a photograph was published than to say who the photographer was and when that photographer died. Even when you are the subject of a photograph, the copyright in the photograph belongs to the photographer. Unless a photograph was made under commission or the photographer assigned copyright to you, you do not own the copyright in the photographs. (Thanks to Bipin Aspatwar, for pointing out a mistake in an earlier version, with "employment" and "commission" being treated differently.) This will most definitely harm projects like Wikipedia, and other projects that aim at archiving and making historical photographs available publicly, since it is difficult to say whether the copyright in a photograph still persists.

Cover Versions Made More Difficult: Kolaveri Di Singers Remain Criminals

The present amendments have brought about the following changes, which make it more difficult to produce cover versions:

Time period after which a cover version can be made has increased from 2 years to 5 years.
Requirement of same medium as the original. So if the original is on a cassette, the cover cannot be released on a CD.
Payment has to be made in advance, and for a minimum of 50000 copies. This can be lowered by Copyright Board having regard to unpopular dialects.
While earlier it was prohibited to mislead the public (i.e., pretend the cover was the original, or endorsed by the original artists), now cover versions are not allowed to "contain the name or depict in any way any performer of an earlier sound recording of the same work or any cinematograph film in which such sound recording was incorporated".
All cover versions must state that they are cover versions.
No alterations are allowed from the original song, and alteration is qualified as ‘alteration in the literary or musical work’. So no imaginative covers in which the lyrics are changed or in which the music is reworked are allowed without the copyright owners’ permission. Only note-for-note and word-for-word covers are allowed.
Alterations were allowed if they were "reasonably necessary for the adaptation of the work" now they are only allowed if it is "technically necessary for the purpose of making of the sound recording".

This ignores present-day realities. Kolaveri Di was covered numerous times without permission, and each one of those illegal acts helped spread its popularity. The singers and producers of those unlicensed versions could be jailed under the current India Copyright Act, which allows even non-commercial copyright infringers to be put behind bars. Film producers and music companies want both the audience reach that comes from less stringent copyright laws (and things like cover versions), as well as the ability to prosecute that same behaviour at will. It is indeed ironic that T-Series, the company that broke HMV’s stranglehold over the Indian recording market thanks to cover versions, is itself one of the main movers behind ever-more stringent copyright laws.

Digital Locks Now Provided Legal Protection Without Accountability

As I have covered the issue of Technological Protection Measures (TPM) and Rights Management Information (RMI), which are ‘digital locks’ also known as Digital Rights Management (DRM), in great detail earlier, I won’t repeat the arguments at length. Very briefly:

It is unclear that anyone has been demanding the grant of legal protection to DRMs in India, and We have no obligation under any international treaties to do so. It is not clear how DRM will help authors and artists, but it is clear how it will harm users.
While the TPM and RMI provisions are much more balanced than the equivalent provisions in laws like the US’s Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMC), that isn’t saying much. Importantly, while users are given certain rights to break the digital locks, they are helpless if they aren’t also provided the technological means of doing so. Simply put: music and movie companies have rights to place digital locks, and under some limited circumstances users have the right to break them. But if the locks are difficult to break, the users have no choice but to live with the lock, despite having a legal right.

Removal of Parallel Importation

In past blog posts I have covered why allowing parallel imports makes sense in India. And as explained above, the Delhi High Court acted per incuriam when holding that the Copyright Act does not allow parallel importation. The Copyright Act only prohibits import of infringing copies of a work, and a copy of a book that has been legally sold in a foreign country is not an “infringing copy”. The government was set to introduce a provision making it clear that parallel importation was allowed. The Parliamentary Standing Committee heard objections to this proposal from a foreign publishers’ association, but decided to recommend the retention of the clause. Still, due to pressure from a few publishing companies whose business relies on monopolies over importation of works into India, the government has decided to delete the provision. However, thankfully, the HRD Minister, Kapil Sibal, has assured both houses of Parliament that he will move a further amendment if an NCAER report he has commissioned (which will be out by August or September) recommends the introduction of parallel imports.

Expansion of Moral Rights Without Safeguards

Changes have been made to author’s moral rights (and performer’s moral rights have been introduced) but these have been made without adequate safeguards. The changes might allow the legal heir of an author, artist, etc., to object to ‘distortion, mutilation, modification, or other act’ of her ancestors work even when the ancestor might not have. By this amendment, this right continues in perpetuity, even after the original creator dies and even after the work enters into the public domain. It seems Indian policymakers had not heard of Stephen Joyce, the grandson of James Joyce, who has “brought numerous lawsuits or threats of legal action against scholars, biographers and artists attempting to quote from Joyce’s literary work or personal correspondence”. Quoting from his Wikipedia page:

In 2004, Stephen threatened legal action against the Irish government when the Rejoyce Dublin 2004 festival proposed public reading of excerpts of Ulysses on Bloomsday. In 1988 Stephen Joyce burnt a collection of letters written by Lucia Joyce, his aunt. In 1989 he forced Brenda Maddox to delete a postscript concerning Lucia from her biography Nora: The Real Life of Molly Bloom. After 1995 Stephen announced no permissions would be granted to quote from his grandfather’s work. Libraries holding letters by Joyce were unable to show them without permission. Versions of his work online were disallowed. Stephen claimed to be protecting his grandfather’s and families reputation, but would sometimes grant permission to use material in exchange for fees that were often "extortionate".

Because in countries like the UK and Canada the works of James Joyce are now in the public domain, Stephen Joyce can no longer restrict apply such conditions. However now, in India, despite James Joyce’s works being in the public domain, Stephen Joyce’s indefensible demands may well carry legal weight.

Backdoor Censorship

As noted above, the provision that safeguard Internet intermediaries (like search engines) is very limited. However, that provision has an extensive removal provision:

Provided that if the person responsible for the storage of the copy has received a written complaint from the owner of copyright in the work, complaining that such transient or incidental storage is an infringement, such person responsible for the storage shall refrain from facilitating such access for a period of twenty-one days or till he receives an order from the competent court refraining from facilitating access and in case no such order is received before the expiry of such period of twenty-one days, he may continue to provide the facility of such access;

There are two things to be noted here. First, that without proof (or negative consequences for false complaints) the service provider is mandated to prevent access to the copy for 21 day. Second, after the elapsing of 21 days, the service provider may 'put back' the content, but is not mandated to do so. This would allow people to file multiple frivolous complaints against any kind of material, even falsely (since there is no penalty for false compalaints), and keep some material permanently censored.

Missed Opportunities

Fair Dealing Guidelines, Criminal Provisions, Government Works, and Other Missed Opportunities

The following important changes should have been made by the government, but haven’t. While on some issues the Standing Committee has gone beyond the proposed amendments, it has not touched upon any of the following, which we believe are very important changes that are required to be made.

Criminal provisions: Our law still criminalises individual, non-commercial copyright infringement. This has now been extended to the proposal for circumvention of Technological Protection Measures and removal of Rights Management Information also.
Fair dealing guidelines: We would benefit greatly if, apart from the specific exceptions provided for in the Act, more general guidelines were also provided as to what do not constitute infringement. This would not take away from the existing exceptions, but would act as a more general framework for those cases which are not covered by the specific exceptions.
Government works: Taxpayers are still not free to use works that were paid for by them. This goes against the direction that India has elected to march towards with the Right to Information Act. A simple amendment of s.52(1)(q) would suffice. The amended subsection could simply allow for “the reproduction, communication to the public, or publication of any government work” as being non-infringing uses.
Copyright terms: The duration of all copyrights are above the minimum required by our international obligations, thus decreasing the public domain which is crucial for all scientific and cultural progress.
Educational exceptions: The exceptions for education still do not fully embrace distance and digital education.
Communication to the public: No clear definition is given of what constitute a ‘public’, and no distinction is drawn between commercial and non-commercial ‘public’ communication.
Internet intermediaries: More protections are required to be granted to Internet intermediaries to ensure that non-market based peer-production projects such as Wikipedia, and other forms of social media and grassroots innovation are not stifled. Importantly, after the terrible judgment passed by Justice Manmohan Singh of the Delhi High Court in the Super Cassettes v. Myspace case, any website hosting user-generated content is vulnerable to payment of hefty damages even if it removes content speedily on the basis of complaints.

Amendments Not Examined

For the sake of brevity, I have not examined the major changes that have been made with regard to copyright societies, lyricists and composers, and statutory licensing for broadcasters, all of which have received considerable attention by copyright experts elsewhere, nor have I examined many minor amendments.

A Note on the Parliamentary Process

Much of the discussions around the Copyright Act have been around the rights of composers and lyricists vis-à-vis producers. As this has been covered elsewhere, I won’t comment much on it, other than to say that it is quite unfortunate that the trees are lost for the forest. It is indeed a good thing that lyricists and composers are being provided additional protection against producers who are usually in a more advantageous bargaining position. This fact came out well in both houses of Parliament during the debate on the Copyright Bill.

However, the mechanism of providing this protection — by preventing assignment of “the right to receive royalties”, though the “right to receive royalties” is never mentioned as a separate right anywhere else in the Copyright Act — was not critically examined by any of the MPs who spoke. What about the unintended consequences of such an amendment? Might this not lead to new contracts where instead of lump-sums, lyricists and music composers might instead be asked to bear the risk of not earning anything at all unless the film is profitable? What about a situation where a producer asks a lyricist to first assign all rights (including royalty rights) to her heirs and then enters into a contract with those heirs? The law, unfortunately at times, revolves around words used by the legislature and not just the intent of the legislature. While one cannot predict which way the amendment will go, one would have expected better discussions around this in Parliament.

Much of the discussion (in both the Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha) was rhetoric about the wonders of famous Indian songwriters and music composers and the abject penury in which some not-so-famous ones live, and there was very little discussion about the actual merits of the content of the Bill in terms of how this problem will be overcome. A few MPs did deal with issues of substance. Some asked the HRD Minister tough questions about the Statement of Objects and Reasons noting that amendments have been brought about to comply with the WCT and WPPT which were “adopted … by consensus”, even though this is false as India is not a signatory to the WCT and WPPT. MP P. Rajeeve further raised the issue of parallel imports and that of there being no public demand for including TPM in the Act, but that being a reaction to the US’s flawed Special 301 reports. Many, however, spoke about issues such as the non-award of the Bharat Ratna to Bhupen Hazarika, about the need to tackle plagiarism, and how the real wealth of a country is not material wealth but intellectual wealth.

This preponderance of rhetoric over content is not new when it comes to copyright policy in India. In 1991, when an amendment was presented to increase term of copyright in all works by ten years (from expiring 50 years from the author’s death to 60 years post-mortem), the vast majority of the Parliamentarians who stood up to speak on the issue waxed eloquent about the greatness of Rabindranath Tagore (whose works were about to lapse into the public domain), and how we must protect his works. Little did they reflect that extending copyright — for all works, whether by Tagore or not — will not help ‘protect’ the great Bengali artist, but would only make his (and all) works costlier for 10 additional years. Good-quality and cheaper editions of Tagore’s works are more easily available post-2001 (when his copyright finally lapsed) than before, since companies like Rupa could produce cheap editions without seeking a licence from Visva Bharati. And last I checked Tagore’s works have not been sullied by them having passed into the public domain in 2001.

Further, one could find outright mistakes in the assertions of Parliamentarians. In both Houses, DMK MPs raised objections with regard to parallel importation being allowed in the Bill — only in the version of the Bill they were debating, parallel importation was not being allowed. One MP stated that “statutory licensing provisions like these are not found anywhere else in the world”. This is incorrect, given that there are extensive statutory licensing provision in countries like the United States, covering a variety of situations, from transmission of sound recordings over Internet radio to secondary transmission of the over-the-air programming.

Unfortunately, though that MP did not raise this issue, there is a larger problem that underlies copyright policymaking in India, and that is the fact that there is no impartial evidence gathered and no proper studies that are done before making of policies. We have no equivalent of the Hargreaves Report or the Gowers Report, or the studies by the Productivity Council in Australia or the New Zealand government study of parallel importation.

There was no economic analysis conducted of the effect of the increase in copyright term for photographs. We have evidence from elsewhere that copyright terms are already too long, and all increases in term are what economists refer to as deadweight losses. There is no justification whatsoever for increasing term of copyright for photographs, since India is not even a signatory to the WCT (which requires this term increase). In fact, we have lost precious negotiation space internationally since in bilateral trade agreements we have been asked to bring our laws in compliance with the WCT, and we have asked for other conditions in return. By unilaterally bringing ourselves in compliance with WCT, we have lost important bargaining power.

Users and Smaller Creators Left Out of Discussions

Thankfully, the Parliamentary Standing Committee went into these minutiae in greater detail. Though, as I have noted elsewhere, the Parliamentary Standing Committee did not invite any non-industry groups for deposition before it, other than the disability rights groups which had campaigned really hard. So while changes that would affect libraries were included, not a single librarian was called by the Standing Committee. Despite comments having been submitted to the Standing Committee on behalf of 22 civil society organizations, none of those organizations were asked to depose. Importantly, non-industry users of copyrighted materials — consumers, historians, teachers, students, documentary film-makers, RTI activists, independent publishers, and people like you and I — are not seen as legitimate interested parties in the copyright debate. This is amply clear from the the fact that only one MP each in the two houses of Parliament raised the issue of users’ rights at all.

Concluding Thoughts

What stands out most from this process of amendment of the copyright law, which has been going on since 2006, is how out-of-touch the law is with current cultural practices. Most instances of photoshopping are illegal. Goodbye Lolcats. Cover versions (for which payments have to be made) have to wait for five years. Goodbye Kolaveri Di. Do you own the jokes you e-mail to others, and have you taken licences for quoting older e-mails in your replies? Goodbye e-mail. The strict laws of copyright, with a limited set of exceptions, just do not fit the digital era where everything digital transaction results in a bytes being copied. We need to take a much more thoughtful approach to rationalizing copyright: introduction of general fair dealing guidelines, reduction of copyright term, decriminalization of non-commercial infringement, and other such measures. If we don’t take such measures soon, we will all have to be prepared to be treated as criminals for all our lives. Breaking copyright law shouldn’t be as easy as breathing, yet thanks to outdated laws, it is.

This was reposted in infojustice.org on May 25, 2012

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/analysis-copyright-amendment-bill-2012

The Future of the Moving Image

nishant — 2008-11-11T09:06:57Z

All dissimilar technologies are the same in their own way, but all similar technologies are uniquely different. This was probably at the core of the zeitgeist at the international seminar on “The Future of Celluloid” hosted by the Media Lab at the Jadavpur University, Kolkata, at which Nishant Shah, Director - Research CIS, presented a research paper. Practitioners, film makers, artists, theoreticians and academics, blurring the boundaries of both their roles and their disciplines and areas of interest, came together to move beyond convergence theories – to explore the continuities, conflations, contestations and confusions that Internet Technologies have led to for earlier technologies, but specifically for the technology of the moving image.

How Digital Cinema changes the notion of authorship...

The concerns that emerged at the Jadavpur University Media Lab's international seminar on The Future of Celluloid, were manifold and not confined to cinema or the moving image. These are concerns that are voiced on all realms of cultural production, where the traditional forms feel stranded at digital intersections, threatened by the emergence of new cultural productions which are so much more quintessentially the form and ideal that the traditional forms aspired to.

The blog, as we saw at the “Writing the Future Conference” was seen as a threat and more fundamentally replacing the novel form. Ars electronica or digital music has long since played the swan song of traditional orchestration practices. Similarly, the digital film (often broadcast on video sharing spaces like YouTube and MySpace) or even mainstream feature films that embody digital technologies of hypervisualisation, show necessarily more than celluloid could ever capture. As Ashish Rajadhyaksha pointed out, “The capacity to pay almost infinite attention to the celluloid image was made possible only with the digitisation of the celluloid image”.

Through the different presentations, this strain of thought was apparent – will we lose celluloid altogether? Is the future of cinema going to be in infantile pre-lapsarian representations of smiling/dancing/gurgling babies and furry pets made by indulgent mothers and doting pet owners? When cinema transitions from deep celluloid to shallow pixels, will the loss in depth also result in the death of meaning and processes of reading the image? And finally, the question that seems to surface, sometimes in the guise of academic concern, sometimes in the shape of alarm and anxiety, and sometimes in the form of paranoia and raging uncertainty: “Is this the end of Celluloid? “ to which Matt Hanson, who presented his open source film A Swarm of Angels, nuancedly added: "Only the end of celluloid as we know it!”

In my presentation titled ´Of Pranksters, Jesters and Clowns – YouTube Videos and Conditions of Collaborative Authorship´ I made a call to identify these questions as symptomatic of another more deep seated anxiety which makes for a fundamental revisiting of the relationship between the author, the text and the reader. Looking particularly at YouTube videos and the kind of arguments that have surrounded them – on copyright, defamation, plagiarism, piracy, sampling, remix, authorship, ownership – I proposed that at the centre of all these anxieties is the question of authorship, what constitutes it and the need to expand the scope of authorship by looking at the series of engagements that happen online.

I presented two cases to make my argument. The first was the case of 13-month-old Holden Lenz, dancing to Prince’s Let’s Go Crazy. In February 2007, Stephanie Lenz’s family had a digital equivalent of a Kodak moment. Her 13-month-old son Holden, pushing a walker across her kitchen floor, started moving to the addictive rhythms of Prince’s Let’s Go Crazy song and Stephanie recorded him on her digicam. Wanting more of the family to share the joy, she uploaded the video on to YouTube and it was viewed scores of times. Laughs were shared, gaps were bridged, digital technologies brought families scattered across time-zones and lifestyles together.

However, the lawyers at Universal Music did not seem to share the enthusiasm or the joy. They fired off a notice to YouTube asking them to remove the video because it amounted to a copyright infringement. YouTube, fearing legal ramifications, removed the video. Stephanie Lenz approached the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), which challenged Universal’s claims that held Lenz liable for up to 150,000 USD in fines for sharing the 29 seconds of her son dancing. While it is very easy to draw the battle-lines and look upon the well educated, highly paid lawyers of Universal as ‘idiots’ who spent probably millions of dollars in starting the legal battle, I think there is more at play here than who is right and who is wrong. What is really being debated, is not whether Lenz indulged in wilful copyright infringement or not, but the questions of who is an author, what are the mechanisms of attribution, and how do we understand these in the complex digital worlds that we populate?

Historically, the author was constructed as a communitarian figure whose work depended on and was enhanced by the collaborations and the collective knowledge of the people s/he interacted with. Chaucer, to quote the most canonical example, for instance, was recognised as the author of The Canterbury Tales only after the print industry finds its footing, thus neglecting the fact that the text was heavily distorted, enhanced, mutated, corrected, revised, edited and transformed by the various users of the manuscripts, who were not merely audience or receptors but also collaborative authors of the text. It is only with the establishment of the cultural industries, that such a fluid understanding of authorship gets crystalised into specific forms of engagement, where the author, the reader, the distributor, the consumer, the audience and the end user are all clearly defined and contained within presumed roles.

It is the blurring of these boundaries in the digital world that leads to the kind of debates that we observe around the Stephanie Lenz case. The inability of the newly emerging digital cultural industry to recognise different forms of engagement – remixing, sampling, embedding, referencing, distributing, editing, etc. – as creative and productive forms of authorship is at the basis of the anxieties that run amok in these debates. My presentation made a call for not only a de-criminalisation of pirate positions in the realm of cultural production, but also to recognise and celebrate the various conditions of collaborative authorship – be it by Holden Lenz who probably made the song twice as popular than it was, or by Avril Lavigne fans who went on a spree to make her song Girlfriend, the first video to be viewed one million times on Youtube – not merely as derivative or acts of prank and jests, but as legitimate and distinctive forms of authorship which expand the scope of the cultural object and give it unprecedented layers of meaning and engagement.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/research/conferences/conference-blogs/future-of-the-moving-image

Entertainment industry and Internet piracy in focus

praskrishna — 2012-09-17T10:00:54Z

The first-of-its-kind initiative by the anti-piracy cell of the Kerala Police to register cases against 1,010 Internet users for uploading or downloading the Malayalam film Bachelor Party has sparked a debate between social media experts and legal puritans on what the law actually says.

Krishnadas Rajagopal's article was published in the Hindu on September 17, 2012. Pranesh Prakash and Prashant Iyengar are quoted.

Internet users and anti-monopoly advocates say the police action against movie downloaders is “questionable.” They argue how the Copyright Act, 1957, has given wide exception to those who disseminate copyright works for “personal and private use.”

Legal puritans, on the other hand, quote the same 1957 law and the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000, to argue that the State police have not done anything wrong.

They say the act of uploading and downloading a copyrighted cinematographic work amounts to publishing and transmitting it, respectively.

They cite Section 66 of the IT Act, 2000, that says a “hacker,” if found guilty, can get three years’ imprisonment, a fine up to Rs.2 lakh, or even both.

That’s not all. Section 43 of the same statute prescribes that a “hacker” may have to cough up Rs.1 crore in compensation in case of “damage to the computer system.”

Middle line

Some others draw the middle line about the police’s drive. They say that though downloading is as illegal as buying a pirated CD from the market and “ignorance of law is no excuse to escape prosecution under an existing law,” the sheer magnitude of registering mass cases against downloaders, probably on a global scale, is impractical.

“It is questionable whether downloading for personal use by itself constitutes an offence under the Copyright Act, 1957. The Act has created a wide exception for personal and private use,” says Pranesh Prakash, programme manager for Access to Knowledge, Openness, Internet Governance and Freedom of Speech at The Centre for Internet and Society in Bangalore.

The usage “personal and private use” in the Act can be better understood in the contrast — that is, downloading without any intention to “disseminate the cinematographic work to a community you are not provisionally associated to.”

Legislative intent

Prashant Iyengar, Assistant Professor and Assistant Director, Centre for Intellectual Property Rights Studies, Jindal Global Law School, says the legislative intent behind the wide exceptions given to dissemination of work in the 1957 law is actually strengthening the public domain.

“In India under the Copyright Act, we have a robust regime of fair dealing rights to ensure that information cannot be monopolised at the expense of the public’s access to information,” he says.

He refers to Section 52 of the Act that allows reproduction of literary, artistic, musical, and dramatic works for research and private uses without any “quantitative restriction” on the amount that may be copied. “However, cinematographic works do not fall under this exception,” he says.

Under Section 51, a single copy of a cinematographic work could be “imported” to India for personal and domestic use. This would not amount to copyright infringement.

“But it is currently unsettled in law whether Section 51 would protect users downloading movies for their personal use. On the other hand, if you receive a copy of a movie CD by post, this section would clearly apply,” Mr. Iyengar says.

Pavan Duggal, senior Supreme Court lawyer specialising in cyber laws, differs in his opinion. As far as he is concerned, the law is clear against copyright infringement.

He says unauthorised downloading of movies also attracts action under the IT Act, 2000. “The legal perspective is that when you upload a pirated copy, you are doing an act of publishing and when you click the ‘download’ button, you are transmitting data in an electronic format for the purpose of diminishing the value of electronic information,” he says.

“The Kerala Police have not done anything fundamentally wrong by registering cases against uploaders and downloaders. When I am creating a film, I have copyright to both cinematic and electronic versions. In case of infringement, I can act by suing for damages, injunction, in addition to exposing the person to criminal liability under the Copyright Act,” Mr. Duggal says.

However, Mr. Iyengar vehemently counters the point. He asks a “pertinent” question — how the Kerala Police conducted their probe and how the Internet Protocol addresses were obtained when Internet service providers have strict privacy obligations against disclosure of any such details, except to government authorities.

“In this case, one hears that a private investigation firm called ‘Jadoo Infotech’ was involved in conducting ‘cyber-patrolling,’ which is not authorised by any law. They would be guilty of the digital equivalent offence of ‘lurking house trespass’,” Mr. Iyengar says.

But Nandagopal Rajan, an associate editor with a technology magazine in Delhi, has a simple logic grounded in law.

“Anybody who is downloading illegally cannot seek protection. You are actually doing something illegal. On the flip side, how many people can you prosecute?” he asked.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/www-the-hindu-sep-17-2012-krishnadas-rajagopal-entertainment-industry-and-internet-piracy-in-focus

Twists and turns of the SOPA opera

praskrishna — 2012-01-16T09:48:02Z

Proposed DNS filtering threatens the core protocol on which the Internet's universality depends, writes Deepa Kurup in this article published in the Hindu on 15 January 2012. Sunil Abraham is quoted in this.

As the debate over piracy and copyright infringement on the web hots up in the United States, with the Government seeking to clamp down on intellectual property rights violations online, Internet majors Reddit, Wikipedia and others are planning a complete “Internet blackout” of their services for 12 hours on January 18.

This is in protest against the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), introduced in the House of Representatives last year, and a related legislation in the U.S. Senate, the Protect IP Act.

The way the debate is playing out pits the large media corporations — movie houses, record companies and other IP holders — against ‘Internet users', backed by powerful Internet intermediaries such as Google and Yahoo!, who also stand to lose in a clampdown on websites and services that host content that violates U.S. copyright laws.

Global Relevance

Significantly, the proposed law, backed by big business interests, equips the U.S. Government to act against any website hosting content that it believes infringes copyright, even if hosted overseas. This makes SOPA relevant, globally.

The proposed action could involve domain name system (DNS) filtering or blocking, directing advertisement providers and web payment services to stop doing business with the host and preventing search engines from linking to the site. Penalties for simply streaming copyrighted content, such as movies, personal recordings of television shows or even a clipping of your favourite pop song, could be up to five years.

On the technology side, experts have argued that the proposal to allow DNS filtering (or blocking) can potentially weaken and destabilise the Internet. DNS servers convert every request made in a human-friendly languageto an IP address that computers and networks understand. Now what SOPA proposes is that at this DNS server level, when a request is made for “rogue sites”, it is redirected.

Technically, experts believe that this will have huge implications of the stability of the internet. A whitepaper titled ‘Technical concerns raised by DNS filtering requirements', authored by technology experts, claims that while this will promote more techniques to circumvent the DNS, it threatens “the ability of DNS to provide universal naming, a primary source of the Internet's values as a single, unified, global communications network.”

The DNS is a protocol that allows for universality, which lies at the core of the internet, enabling it to grow and become the important, borderless medium it is today. Further, such blocking would make it tough to distinguish between a resolution failure and a request from a hacked server, creating security concerns. It would also be counterproductive to existing Internet security protocols.

A Firewall

While opponents of the Bill have attacked it as an attempt to create a “firewall” — akin to or even worse than the infamous one that China has for its citizens — they point out that it is at stark odds with the oft-repeated stance of the U.S. on “Internet openness”.

Companies in the business of providing web services are, understandably, against the law as it allows the Government to block access to any intermediaries that facilitate or host any material that infringe on copyrights. This affects every service that hosts user-generated content.

In an advertisement published in The New York Times, nine internet majors including eBay, Google, Yahoo! And LinkedIn, urged the Government to find “targeted ways” to combat “foreign rogue websites” while preserving “the innovation and dynamism” that make the internet a driver of “growth and job creation”. Ironically, the Government too seeks to address protection of jobs and economic interests through this legislation.

Politics of the Internet

In terms of infrastructure, the U.S. controls critical web resources. Contrasting this to the Chinese firewall that blocks content for users within its jurisdiction, the U.S. decision to redirect a link can act as a “global block”, explains Sunil Abraham, director of the Centre for Internet and Society. Physically, seven of 13 root servers (or clusters) that run the DNS system, are located in the U.S., he points out. So, for an Indian citizen who chooses to record the latest episode of Dexter and stream it online, it means that both his site and the intermediary could be blacked out, in a post-SOPA world. Currently, the IP holder would have to take the trouble of reporting or challenging this in an Indian court, Mr. Abraham explains.

In recent years, countries led by Brazil, India and China have been lobbying for a greater role for multilateral bodies in controlling the Internet. In 2010, the U.S. Government “liberated” the ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) from its direct control. But, bringing a law that allows it to come down heavily on “rogues” unilaterally, is being viewed as a step backwards.

For now, all eyes in the tech community are on the legislation, and the many debates surrounding it, which promise to be among the most controversial and interesting ones in technology in recent times.

Read the original published in the Hindu

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/twists-and-turns-of-the-sopa-opera

Can Judges Order ISPs to Block Websites for Copyright Infringement? (Part 1)

ananth — 2014-01-31T06:00:47Z

In a three-part study, Ananth Padmanabhan examines the "John Doe" orders that courts have passed against ISPs, which entertainment companies have used to block dozens, if not hundreds, of websites. In this part, he looks at the theory behind John Doe orders and finds that it would be wrong for Indian courts to grant "John Doe" orders against ISPs.

The Madras High Court, in its 2012 order in R.K.Productions v. B.S.N.L.,[1] has affirmed the possibility of a suit against internet service providers (ISPs) to block access to certain webpages upon notification by the copyright owner. Though this appears to be a reasonable order at first glance, keeping in mind the fact that access to identified copyrighted works alone is targeted and not websites in their entirety, the legal basis for the same is highly questionable. In this two-part study, Ananth Padmanabhan explores the legal sanctity of these orders, especially post the coming into force of the Copyright Amendment, 2012. The first part of this study explores the genesis of John Doe orders and proceeds to examine the conceptual problems arising from tagging along website blocking orders within the broad sweep of John Doe action. This part concludes that website blocking orders against ISPs stand separately from, and cannot be justified in the same manner as, John Doe orders.

[1]. (2012) 5 LW 626. Hereinafter referred to as R.K. Productions.

John Doe Orders and their Conceptual Understanding

The concept of John Doe Orders in ex parte proceedings for copyright infringement came in due to the peculiar character of copyright piracy. Orders of this nature were being passed in jurisdictions across the world till they were, probably for the first time, passed in India in 2003. Since then, such orders have become a somewhat regular feature. In short, such orders permit the plaintiff to enforce an injunction order against unidentified / unnamed defendants, ‘John Doe’ being a generic name for such defendants. To understand the nature and mechanism of such enforcement and the various guidelines governing such orders, exploring the genesis of these orders is imperative.

In Billy Joel v Various John Does,[2] one of the earliest instances of a John Doe order, the plaintiff who was a musician and a successful recording artist, found to his annoyance that his success had spawned an underground industry that capitalised on his popularity through the sale of merchandise, usually T-shirts bearing his picture and name. These sales were carried on by unauthorised persons who showed up at his concerts with the merchandise and sold them outside the concert halls where he was performing. The plaintiff had in fact granted his recording company the exclusive right to market such merchandise, and the company was doing so inside the concert halls. Obviously, the presence of the unauthorised vendors outside the concert halls hurt the company’s sales and the plaintiff’s revenue share. This compelled him to approach the district court in Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief against various "John Does" or unidentified defendants who were carrying on the unauthorised sale of merchandise. The order was specifically sought seeking an ex parte temporary restraining order prohibiting certain unnamed persons from selling merchandise bearing the plaintiff’s name or likeness outside the Milwaukee Arena where he was scheduled to perform on that day. Thus, the order sought was confined to one particular instance and the situation demanded expedient preventive action since the concert was on the very same day.

The district court, while finding the propriety of an order against unidentified defendants "troubling", still went ahead and passed the order sought for. The court felt that the problem of the defendants’ identities would be met if the copies of the summons, complaint, and restraining order itself were to be served on all persons from whom merchandise connected with the plaintiff was seized on the night of the concert. Additionally, the court clarified that all these parties would be entitled to have their names added as parties to the cause title and even otherwise, to contest the seizures. The plaintiff had also furnished a bond to cover damages that may arise due to the awarding of such relief. The court applied the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium – where there is a wrong done, there has to be a remedy in law – while granting this relief. This is clear from the last paragraph of the judgement where the Court says : "Were the injunction to be denied, plaintiffs would be without any legal means to prevent what is clearly a blatant infringement of their valid property rights. While the proposed remedy is novel, that in itself should not weigh against its adoption by this court. A court of equity is free to fashion whatever remedies will adequately protect the rights of the parties before it."

Subsequently, various courts in the United States have granted such relief. However, most such instances of judicial intervention in cases of piracy have confined themselves to specific instances of piracy as opposed to orders of wider applicability extending to more than one instance of apprehended or real piracy. For instance, in Brockum Intern., Inc. v Various John Does,[3] the plaintiff sought a nation-wide order prohibiting the same activity in other cities visited by the popular rock band, The Who, on its national tour. The court declined to do so.

The Metallica Order

In New Zealand, the High Court has specifically applied the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium while justifying the issuance of John Doe Orders. In Tony Blain Pty.Limited v Splain and other Persons Unknown,[4] the court likened this kind of relief sought against unidentified defendants, to an order in the nature of Anton Piller remedy. The court stated that both these orders involved a common feature, being an intrusion into the privacy of the defendants. However, such an intrusion would be justified applying the maxim of ubi jus ibi remedium. According to the court, "in circumstances where it is plain that persons are infringing proprietary interests which the law recognises, or deceiving the public by way of trade in a manner which may indirectly affect the commercial interests of others, the law should, if it reasonably can, provide a remedy". Emphasising on the conduct-centric nature of these reliefs, the court held that John and Jane Does will be known by their works.

However, in its attempt to bring in some safeguards before passing such an order, the court held that it would be better in the future to bring such applications a little in advance so that amicus curiae could be appointed to represent the view point of the John and Jane Does. Further, the court observed that it was important to build into the procedure appropriate protections, including means of informing persons served with orders for injunction in clear language and simple terms what their remedies were. These remedies, in turn, would include a right to apply to the court within twenty four hours for a review of the order and a right to claim damages in an appropriate case, not merely on the basis of the usual undertaking to be given by plaintiffs, but also on the basis of the tort of misfeasance of public office. It will also be necessary for the plaintiff to file before the court, a full report verified by affidavit, of the process of execution of the particular orders.

It is thus seen that the High Court, though keen to do justice by providing a remedy that is effective enough to protect the plaintiff’s rights, also tried to mitigate the harshness of the measures proposed by bringing in some safeguards. This decision gave birth to the Metallica Order in New Zealand, the New Zealander’s equivalent of a John Doe Order. It has to be added that the nature of the order passed by the High Court in this case is very detailed and can be used as precedent, even for the requisite format, by all courts that pass similar orders.[5]

John Doe Orders in India

The decision in Tej Television Ltd. v Rajan Mandal,[6] will have to find first mention since these kind of orders against unidentified defendants hit the shores of the Indian legal landscape through this decision. Here, the plaintiff owned the Ten Sports television channel and had procured the broadcasting rights to several important sporting events including the 2002 Football World Cup matches. Being a paid channel, the cable operators had to part with royalty to the plaintiff for airing the programs broadcasted on this channel. To the plaintiff’s consternation, many local cable operators were airing these sporting events without taking licenses from the plaintiff / its authorised marketing agency. This resulted in the channel approaching the Delhi High Court and seeking, for the first time, a John Doe order against unidentified defendants. The channel had some evidence of unauthorised broadcasting of the initial matches by certain cable operators and apprehended that this conduct by more operators would not only result in revenue loss but also cause the 1377 cable operators, who had taken licenses from the plaintiff, to re-think the very necessity of doing so when they could air the sporting events in an unauthorised manner without any fear of liability. Another concern was the ease with which those who carried on the practise of unauthorised transmission could destroy any evidence of such conduct. The prayer sought by the plaintiff was an ex parte order against six named cable operators and “John Doe” orders against a further fourteen unnamed persons who, the plaintiff claimed, were wrongfully transmitting the Ten Sports channel. The order against unidentified defendants was sought to be justified on two broad grounds: (i) Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which gives courts the inherent power to evolve a fair and reasonable procedure for meeting exigent situations, and (ii) international practise in the form of John Doe orders issued by courts in various countries including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.

The High Court refused to grant a John Doe order on the facts and circumstances of this case but also clarified that in an appropriate situation, courts could well award a John Doe order even in India. The court granted relief to the plaintiff by appointing a Court Commissioner who was authorised to visit the premises of various cable operators, and search, make an inventory, and take into custody all equipment / wires used for the broadcast of the plaintiff’s channel. The court empowered the Commissioner to take the assistance of technical experts and police officials in carrying out this order, and directed him to prepare a report after gathering evidence of cable piracy in the form of video recordings and photographs. The court also considered itself at liberty, on the basis of this report, to issue notices to all alleged violators, and after the hearing, to initiate civil and criminal action against them in accordance with law. The Court Commissioner was also empowered to issue warnings to such prospective violators though there was no mention of any contempt proceedings against the violators for ignoring the warning given by the Commissioner. Upon close examination, this order was nothing but a mild modification of the power vested in the court under Order XXVI, Rule 9 of the CPC.

Final and Interim John Doe Orders

The Delhi High Court has, in some subsequent decisions, considered the possibility of a John Doe order without expressly granting the same. In Ardath Tobacco Co. Ltd. v Munna Bhai & Ors.,[7] the plaintiff was the proprietor of a tobacco brand, “State Express 555”. Aggrieved by the conduct of the defendants who were distributing "Peacock" cigarettes in packaging and trade dress that bore deceptive similarity to that of the plaintiff’s brand, the plaintiff sought a John Doe order against all such distributors including unidentified ones. From the report, it appears that an ex parte order appointing Court Commissioners, similar to the order in Tej Television, was awarded by the High Court initially. In the final order, the court was constrained to confine the order of permanent injunction to the named defendants since the plaintiff had failed to identify any John Does and add them to the array of parties for the purpose of securing injunctive relief. The same was again found to be the case in 3M Company v A. Patel,[8] where the final order of injunction was granted only against the 2 identified defendants.

Thus, in these cases, a distinction seems to be made between the interim orders that may be passed against the unidentified defendants, and the final relief granted by the court. The principle that emerges from these decisions is that orders against unidentified defendants can only go to the extent of collecting evidence against them through search of their premises by the Court Commissioner, or with the assistance of the Station House Officer (S.H.O) as was directed in ESPN Software India Private Ltd. v Tudu Enterprises.[9] No final relief can be granted against any person who is unnamed in the array of parties as a defendant. The purpose of an Ashok Kumar order (as such orders are branded in India) is only to bring such persons on record.

John Doe Orders – Procedure and Guidelines

Recently, the Delhi High Court has enunciated, with sufficient clarity, the procedure to be followed while granting interim orders against unidentified defendants. In Luxottica S.R.L v Mr. Munny & Ors.,[10] the plaintiff which owned the popular trade mark "Ray Ban" in respect of sunglasses, sought John Doe orders from the Delhi High Court with the aim of tacking rampant piracy and counterfeiting of its products. Surprisingly, there was no exigent necessity cited by the plaintiff for justifying the grant of such an order, unlike in Billy Joel, Metallica, Brockum, or Tej Television. Piracy had been going on in the past, and it continues to occur – that was broadly the case of the plaintiff here. Despite this, the Delhi High Court went on to issue an order of ex parte injunction restraining third parties from carrying on such counterfeiting activities. Extending the powers of the Court Commissioner, the High Court held:

The Commissioners are also authorized to visit any other premises/warehouse/store where they may have reason to suspect and/or information be received that counterfeit optical sunglasses bearing the Plaintiffs trademark RAY BAN are being stored/sold/offered for sale and thereafter. In respect of such Ashok Kumar Defendants, upon the seizure of any infringing/counterfeit products, the Commissioners shall forthwith serve such Ashok Kumar Defendants with a complete set of papers and a copy of the notice and summons. The Commissioners will seize and make an inventory of all the infringing goods including packaging material, cartons, stationery, literature, dyes, blocks, moulds, etc. bearing the impugned RAY BAN trademark and sign all books of accounts including ledgers, cash books, purchase and sale records etc., and return the seized goods on suprdari to such Ashok Kumar defendants and obtain undertakings from each of them that they will produce the seized goods as and when directed by the court.

The object behind this order seems to be the prevention of any destruction of the evidence. In consonance with this object, the High Court has even made provision for return of the seized material to the unnamed defendants during the pendency of this order, and given them the option of approaching the court and vacating the ex parte order of injunction issued against them. This Luxottica decision can be considered as India’s equivalent of the Metallica Order, as it gives a clear roadmap for courts that pass such orders in the future. Considering that John Doe orders have attracted criticism on the ground that they make serious inroads into the rights of the defendant, these safeguards specifically articulated by the Court do go some way in addressing these concerns and mitigating the hardship caused to the defendants.

Website Blocking Orders

An extension of the John Doe orders discussed above is the recent spate of decisions from various High Courts blocking access to certain websites that upload, or permit the uploading of, copyrighted content such as sound recordings and cinematograph films, without authorisation from the copyright owner. The relief granted is either movie-specific but against unknown persons, or website-specific.

To give a sample of the movie-specific relief: For the foregoing reasons, defendants and other unnamed and undisclosed persons, are restrained from copying, recording or allowing camcording or communicating or making available or distributing, or duplicating, or displaying, or releasing, or showing, or uploading, or downloading, or exhibiting, or playing, and/or defraying the movie ‘DON2’ in any manner without a proper license from the plaintiff or in any other manner which would violate/infringe the plaintiff?s copyright in the said cinematograph film ‘DON2’ through different mediums like CD, DVD, Blue- ray disc, VCD, Cable TV, DTH, Internet services, MMS, Pen drives, Hard drives, Tapes, CAS or in any other like manner.[11]

Similarly, in R.K.Productions Pvt. Ltd. v B.S.N.L. & Ors.[12]an order of the above nature has been passed in respect of the Tamil film "3". There are a few more that have already been passed by the Delhi and Madras High Courts, indicating that these kind of protective orders under Or.XXXIX R.1 and 2, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are well going to be the order of the day, especially when it comes to online piracy of copyrighted content.

The Indian Music Industry and a sound recording label have also approached the Calcutta High Court and obtained an order of the second kind, ie. a direction to the known defendants who are Internet Service Providers (ISPs), to block access to various websites listed in the Schedule to the Plaint, which are used exclusively for providing unauthorised access to copyrighted sound and video recordings. The order[13] is extracted below:

This is an application by the plaintiffs in aid of a suit complaining of copyright infringement. The plaintiff no. 1 and the members of the plaintiff no. 2 are the copyright owners of Hindi film songs. It is argued that the website mentioned in the prayers are posting and playing the songs, without any copyright or licence. This application is made ex parte on the apprehension that if notice of this application was served on the website they would shift their service to a different website.

In those circumstances, I pass an order of injunction in terms of prayer (a) of the Notice of Motion till further orders. I direct the respondent ISPs to indicate to the plaintiff the address of the website owner/operator referred to in the prayers.

I also make it clear that the above order of blocking should be confined to the above website only and should not otherwise interfere with internet service.

The last part of the last sentence extracted above has been emphasised as this is precisely what is happening as a consequence of the dual kind of orders discussed in this section. Though the first kind of order is, on its own terms, confined to only the film that is the subject matter of the suit, ISPs have used it to block access to entire websites in contravention of all recognised principles of network neutrality. Even in the case of the second kind of orders, there is absolutely no transparency as to how ISPs have been interpreting the order, and what websites are being targeted by them under the garb of such an order.[14] It is a well-established maxim that courts and judicial orders cannot be used as a vehicle for oppression, harassment, or to perpetrate abuse of power. This is precisely what has been witnessed since the last year in relation to the website blocking, and film-access blocking, orders passed by different courts. It is felt that legislative intervention is absolutely necessary in this field without any further delay to lay down parameters for exercise of judicial power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which power can otherwise be construed in any manner by any Court with little checks and balances on the possibility of such exercise of power.[15]

Conceptual Differences between John Doe and Website Blocking Orders

The most crucial point of distinction between these two types of orders is that while John Doe orders speak to the primary infringer, website blocking orders impose onerous responsibility on the ISP. John Doe orders as used in India thus far have served the purpose of a blanket search and seize mandate to gather evidence of direct infringement. As seen above, the final relief in the suit is granted only against those John Does who are subsequently identified and arrayed as parties to the main suit.[16] Website blocking orders, on the other hand, amount to granting the final relief at the interim stage itself, as access is blocked to web links hosted by unknown persons by taking recourse to the ISP.

Moreover, there is a vital difference between holding primary infringers liable and making mere conduits, such as ISPs. parties to a civil suit. The maxim ubi jus ibi remedium is clearly applicable in the former case, because the remedy is fashioned to bring on board the primary infringer and then afford him an opportunity of hearing before confirming the ex parte order against him. In the case of website blocking orders, the court straightaway directs the ISP to block access to the content, and the third party infringer is really a non-entity in the whole process as the attempt is not to bring him on board or to gather evidence. Hence, it is impermissible for an Indian court to grant an ex parte order directing the denial of access to a website or webpage by taking umbrage under its power to grant a John Doe order. However, Indian courts have done so, and the recent decision of the Madras High Court in R.K.Productions v. B.S.N.L.[17] has also affirmed the legality of such action. The court has judicially created a responsibility on ISPs that is akin to the take-down requirements thrust upon file-sharing websites, and which kicks in upon notice of infringing content given to the ISP by the copyright owner. This decision deserves serious critical evaluation, and an understanding of the different types of liability for copyright infringement is material for the same.

[2]. 499 F.Supp. 791 (1980). Hereinafter referred to as Billy Joel.

[3]. 551 F.Supp. 1054 (D.C.Wis.,1982). Hereinafter referred to as Brockum.

[4]. [1994] F.S.R. 497. Hereinafter referred to as Metallica. The plaintiff here was the exclusive authorised merchandiser for Metallica and Sir Paul McCartney, and the piracy alleged was similar to the one in Billy Joel’s case. Here too, the order was sought in respect of a specific concert to be held in Auckland within the next few days. The plaintiff innovatively sought an order by virtue of which certain solicitors named in the plaintiff’s application would, due to their status as officers of the court, be authorised to accost bootleggers at the concert venues and require them to provide their current addresses and evidence of identity, and these bootleggers would have to surrender up to these named solicitors all merchandise including T-shirts, head-bands, badges, or programmes in their possession or control.

[5]. See Bloomsbury Publishing Group Limited v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2003] 3 All E.R. 736.

[6]. [2003] F.S.R. 22. Hereinafter referred to as Tej Television.

[7]. 2009 (39) PTC 208 (Del).

[8]. Order dated 15.01.2009 in C.S. (O.S.) 1771 / 2006, reported as MANU/DE/1991/2009.

[9]. MANU/DE/1061/2011.

[10]. Order dated 25.09.2009 in C.S. (O.S.) 1846 / 2009, available at http://courtnic.nic.in/dhcorder/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=173895&yr=2009 (last accessed on 24.03.2013)

[11]. Order of the Delhi High Court dated 19.12.2011 in I.A. No.20510/2011 in C.S.(O.S.) No. 3207/2011 (Reliance Big Entertainment Pvt Ltd v Multivision Network & Ors.), available at http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=269404&yr=2011 (last accessed on 24.03.2013)

[12]. Order of the Madras High Court dated 29.03.2012 in O.A.No. 230 of 2012 in C.S.No. 208 of 2012, the link to which is provided at http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/search?q=madras+high+court+first+john+doe (last accessed on 24.03.2013)

[13]. Order of the Calcutta High Court dated 27.01.2012 in GA No. 187 of 2012 in CS No. 23 of 2012 (Sagarika Music Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v Dishnet Wireless Ltd. & Ors.), available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/147345981/ (last accessed on 24.03.2013)

[14]. The prayers sought in some of these civil suits are in complete contravention of the salutary principle in Or.VII, R.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, that “every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims”.

[15]. The website blocking order dated 29.01.2013 passed by a District Court in Dabra near Gwalior in respect of websites that posted content related to the Indian Institute of Planning and Management, a Business School, and the subsequent unblocking order by the same Court dated 28.02.2013 have again brought back the spotlight on the legality of such orders passed by the judiciary. See http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/unblock-urls-about-iipm-court/articleshow/18743461.cms (last accessed on 24.03.2013).

[16]. Ardath Tobacco Co. Ltd. v Munna Bhai & Ors., 2009 (39) PTC 208 (Del); 3M Company v A. Patel, MANU/DE/1991/2009.

[17]. (2012) 5 LW 626. Hereinafter referred to as R.K.Productions.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/john-doe-orders-isp-blocking-websites-copyright-1

Can Judges Order ISPs to Block Websites for Copyright Infringement? (Part 2)

ananth — 2014-03-06T16:48:18Z

In a three-part study, Ananth Padmanabhan examines the "John Doe" orders that courts have passed against ISPs, which entertainment companies have used to block dozens, if not hundreds, of websites. In this, the second part, he looks at the law laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court on secondary and contributory copyright infringement, and finds that those wouldn't allow Indian courts to grant "John Doe" orders against ISPs.

In the second part of his study, Ananth Padmanabhan proceeds to examine applying a general theory of secondary or contributory copyright infringement against ISPs. He traces the basis for holding a third party liable as a contributory by closely examining the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios[1] and MGM Studios, Inc. v Grokster, Ltd.[2] and concludes that this basis does not hold good in the case of a mere conduit intermediary such as an ISP.

[1]. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Hereinafter referred to as Betamax.

[2]. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Hereinafter referred to as Grokster.

Primary and Secondary Infringement

Liability for copyright infringement can either be primary or secondary in character. In the case of ISPs, liability as primary infringers does not arise at all, and it is in their capacity as conduit pipes facilitating the transmission of information that they could be held secondarily liable. Even in such cases, the contention of copyright owners is that once the ISP is notified of infringing content, it has the primary responsibility of preventing access to such content. This contention is essentially rooted in a theory of secondary infringement based on knowledge and awareness, and the means to prevent further infringement.

The controversy around a suitable model of secondary infringement is reflected in two judicial pronouncements – separated by a gap of more than two decades – delivered by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios,[3] the US Supreme Court held that the manufacturers of home video recording devices known in the market as Betamax would not be liable to copyright owners for secondary infringement since the technology was capable of substantially non-infringing and legitimate purposes. The U.S. Supreme Court even observed that these time-shifting devices would actually enhance television viewership and hence find favour with majority of the copyright holders too. The majority did concede that in an appropriate situation, liability for secondary infringement of copyright could well arise. In the words of the Court, “vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another”. However, if vicarious liability had to be imposed on the manufactures of the time-shifting devices, it had to rest on the fact that they sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. In the view of the Court, there was no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability merely on the showing of such fact.

Notes of dissent were struck by Justice Blackmun, who wrote an opinion on behalf of himself and three other judges. The learned Judge noted that there was no private use exemption in favour of making of copies of a copyrighted work and hence, unauthorised time-shifting would amount to copyright infringement. He also concluded that there was no fair use in such activity that would exempt it from the purview of infringement. The dissent held the manufacturer liable as a contributory infringer and reasoned that the test for contributory infringement would only be whether the contributory infringer had reason to know or believe that infringement would take place and not whether he actually knew of the same. Off-the-air recording was not only a foreseeable use for the Betamax, but also its intended use, for which Sony would be liable for copyright infringement.

This dissent has considerably influenced the seemingly contrarian position taken by the majority in the subsequent decision, MGM Studios, Inc. v Grokster, Ltd.[4] This case called into question the liability of websites that facilitated peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing. Re-formulating the test for copyright infringement, the US Supreme Court held that ‘one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties’. In re-drawing the boundaries of contributory infringement, the Court observed that contributory infringement is committed by any person who intentionally induces or encourages direct infringement, and vicarious infringement is committed by those who profit from direct infringement while declining to exercise their right to limit or stop it. When an article of commerce was good for nothing else but infringement, there was no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability and there would be no injustice in presuming or imputing intent to infringe in such cases. This doctrine would at the same time absolve the equivocal conduct of selling an item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses and would limit the liability to instances of more acute fault than the mere understanding that some of the products shall be misused, thus ensuring that innovation and commerce are not unreasonably hindered.

The Court distinguished the case at hand from Betamax, and noted that there was evidence here of active steps taken by the respondents to encourage direct copyright infringement, such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use. This evidence revealed an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and an active encouragement of infringement. Without reversing the decision in Betamax, but holding that it was misinterpreted by the lower court, the Court observed that Betamax was not an authority for the proposition that whenever a product was capable of substantial lawful use, the producer could never be held liable as a contributory for the use of such product for infringing activity by third parties. In the view of the Court, Betamax did not displace other theories of secondary liability. This other theory of secondary liability applicable to the case at hand was held to be the inducement rule, as per which any person who distributed a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as evidenced by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, would be liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. However, the Court clarified that mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough under this rule to subject a distributor to liability. Similarly, ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support or product updates, support liability etc. would not by themselves attract the operation of this rule. The inducement rule, instead, premised liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus did nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise.

These seemingly divergent views on secondary infringement expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court are of significant relevance for India, due to the peculiar language used in the Indian Copyright Act, 1957.[4]

Section 51 of the Act, which defines infringement, bifurcates the two types of infringement – ie. primary and secondary infringement – without indicating so in as many words. While Section 51(a)(i) speaks to primary infringers, 51(a)(ii) and 51(b) renders certain conduct to be secondary infringement. Even here, there is an important distinction between 51(a)(ii) and 51(b). The former exempts the alleged infringer from liability if he could establish that he was not aware and had no reasonable ground for believing that the communication to the public, facilitated through the use of his “place”, would amount to copyright infringement. The latter on the other hand permits no such exception. Thus, any person, who makes for sale or hire, or by way of trade displays or offers for sale or hire, or distributes for the purpose of trade, or publicly exhibits by way of trade, or imports into India, any infringing copies of a work, shall be liable for infringement, without any specific mens rea required to attract such liability. It is in the context of the former provision, ie. 51(a)(ii) that the liability of certain file-sharing websites for copyright infringement has arisen.[5]

Mere Conduit ISPs – Secondary Infringement Absent

In MySpace, the Delhi High Court examined the liability for secondary infringement on the part of a website that provides a platform for file-sharing. While holding the website liable, the Single Judge considered material certain facts such as the revenue model of the defendant, which depended largely on advertisements displayed on the webpages, and automatically generated advertisements that would come up for a few seconds before the infringing video clips started playing. Shockingly, the Court even considered relevant the fact that the defendant did provide for safeguards such as hash block filters, take down stay down functionality, and rights management tools operational through fingerprinting technology, to prevent or curb infringing activities being carried on in their website. This, in the view of the Court, made it evident that the defendant had a reasonable apprehension or belief that the acts which were being carried on in the website could infringe someone else’s copyright including that of the plaintiff. The logic employed by the Court to attribute liability for secondary infringement on file-sharing websites is befuddling and reveals complete disregard for the degree of regulatory authority available on the internet even where the space, i.e., the website, is supposedly “under the control” of a person. However, a critical examination of this decision is not relevant in understanding the liability of mere conduit ISPs. This is for the reason that none of the factual considerations relied on by the Single Judge to justify imposition of liability on a file-sharing website under Section 51(a)(ii) arise when the defendant is an ISP that only provides the path for content-neutral transmission of data.

This was completely ignored by the Madras High Court in R.K.Productions v. B.S.N.L.,[6] where the producers of the Tamil film “3”, which enjoyed considerable pre-release buzz due to its song “Kolaveri Di”, sought an omnibus order of injunction against all websites that host torrents or links facilitating access to, or download of, this film. Though this was worded as a John Doe plaint by branding the infringers as unknown administrators of different torrent sites and so on, the real idea was to look to the resources and wherewithal of the known defendants, ie. the ISPs, to block access to the content hosted by the unknown defendants.

This prompted the ISPs to file applications under Or. VII, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit against them was barred by law. The Single Judge of the Madras High Court dismissed these applications for rejection of the plaint, after accepting the contention that the ISPs are necessary parties to the suit as the act of piracy occurs through the channel or network provided by them. The High Court heavily, and incorrectly, relied on MySpace without appreciating the distinction between a mere conduit ISP and a file-sharing website such as MySpace or YouTube, as regards their respective roles and responsibilities, the differing degrees of regulatory control over content enjoyed by them, and most importantly, the recognition and formalisation of these distinctions in the Copyright Act, 1957, vide the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[3]. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Hereinafter referred to as Betamax.

[4]. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Hereinafter referred to as Grokster.

[5]. Hereinafter the Act.

[6]. Super Cassette Industries Ltd. v MySpace Inc., MIPR 2011 (2) 303 (hereinafter referred to as MySpace). This decision of the Delhi High Court has been rightly criticised. See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/super-cassettes-v-my-space (last accessed on 24.03.2013).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/john-doe-orders-isp-blocking-websites-copyright-2

Recommendations for the Covid Vaccine Intelligence Network (Co-Win) platform

Pallavi Bedi — 2021-03-25T13:14:46Z

The first confirmed case of Covid-19 was recorded in India on January 30, 2020, and India’s vaccination drive started 12 months later on January 16, 2021; with the anxiety and hope that this signals the end of the pandemic. The first phase of the vaccination drive identified healthcare professionals and other frontline workers as beneficiaries. The second phase, which has been rolled out from March 1, covers specified sections of the general population; those above 60 years and those between 45 years and 60 with specific comorbid conditions. The first phase also saw the deployment of the Covid Vaccine Intelligence Network (Co-Win) platform to roll out and streamline the Covid 19 vaccination process. For the purpose of this blog post, the term CoWIn platform has been used to refer to the CoWin App and the CoWin webportal.

During the first phase, it was mandatory for the identified beneficiaries to be registered on the Co-Win App prior to receiving the vaccine. The Central Government had earlier indicated that it would be mandatory for all the future beneficiaries to register on the Co-Win app; however, the Health Ministry hours before the roll out of the second phase tweeted that beneficiaries should use the Co-Win web portal (not the Co-Win app) to register themselves for the vaccine. The App which is currently available on the play store is only for administrators; it will not be available for the general public. Beneficiaries can now access the vaccination by; (i) registering on the CoWin website; or (ii) Certain vaccination (sites) have a walk-in-facility: On-site registration, appointment, verification, and vaccination will all be on-site the same day; or (iii) register and get an appointment for the vaccination through the Aarogya Setu app.

The scale and extent of the global pandemic and the Covid-19 vaccination programme differs significantly from the vaccination/immunisation programmes conducted by India previously, and therefore, the means adopted for conducting the vaccination programme will have to be modified accordingly. However, as several newspaper reports have indicated the roll out of the CoWin platform has not been smooth. There are several glitches; from the user data being incorrectly registered, to beneficiaries not receiving the one time password required to schedule the appointment.

An entirely offline or online method (internet penetration is at 40% ) to register for the vaccine is not feasible and a hybrid model (offline registration and online registration) should be considered. However, the specified platform should take into account the concerns which are currently emanating from the use of Co-Win and make the required modifications.

Privacy Concerns

When the beneficiary uses the Co-Win website to register, she is required to provide certain demographic details such as name, gender, date of birth, photo identity and mobile number. Though Aadhar has been identified as one of the documents that can be uploaded as a photo identity, the Health Ministry in a response to a RTI filed by the Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF) clarified that Aadhaar is nor mandatory for registration either through the Co-Win website or through Aarogya Setu. While, the Government has clarified that the App cannot be used by the general public to register for the vaccination, it still leaves open the question of the status of the personal data of the beneficiaries identified in the first phase of the process, who were registered on the App, and whose personal details were pre-populated on the App. In fact in certain instances, Aadhar details were uploaded on the app as the identity proof, without the knowledge of the beneficiary.

These concerns are exacerbated in the absence of a robust data protection law and with the knowledge that the Co-Win platform (App and the website) does not have a dedicated independent privacy policy. While the Co-Win web portal does not provide any privacy policy, the privacy policy hyperlinked on the App directs the user to the Health Data Policy of the National Health Data Management Policy, 2020. The Central Government approved the Health Data Management Policy on December 14, 2020. It is an umbrella document for all entities operating under the digital health ecosystem.

An analysis of the Health Policy against the key internationally recognised privacy principles which are represented in most data protection frameworks in the world, including the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, highlights that the Health Policy does not provide any information on data retention, data sharing and the grievance redressal mechanism. It is important to note that the Health policy has also been framed in the absence of a robust data protection law; the Personal Data Protection Bill is still pending before Parliament.

The Co-WIn website does not provide any separate information on how long the data will be retained, whether the data will be shared and how many ministries/departments have access to the data.

A National Health Policy cannot and should not be used as a substitute for specific independent privacy policies of different apps that may be designed by the Government to collect and process the health data of users. Health Data is recognised as sensitive personal data under the proposed personal data protection bill and should be accorded the highest level of protection. This was also reiterated by the Karnataka High Court in its recent interim order on Aarogya Setu. It held that medical information or data is a category of data to which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, and “the sharing of health data of a citizen without his/her consent will necessarily infringe his/her fundamental right of privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.”

Link with Aarogya Setu

A beneficiary registered on the Co-Win platform can use the Aarogya Setu App to download their vaccination certificate. Beneficiaries have now also been provided an option to register for vaccination through Aarogya Setu. However, the rationale for linking the two separate platforms is not clear, especially as Aaroya Setu has primarily been deployed as a contact tracing application.

There is no information on whether the data (and to what extent) that is stored in the Co-Win platform will be shared with Aarogya Setu. It is also not clear whether the consent of the beneficiary registered on the Co-Win platform will be obtained again prior to sharing the data or whether registration on the Co-Win platform will be regarded as general consent for sharing the data with Aarogya Setu. This is contrary to the principle of informed consent (i.e the consent has to be unambiguous, specific, informed and voluntary), which a data fiduciary has to comply with prior to obtaining personal data from the data principal. The privacy policy of Aarogya Setu has also not been amended to reflect this change in the purpose of the App.

Co-Win registration as an entry to develop health IDs?

One of the objectives of the Health Data Management Policy is to develop a digital unique health ID for all the citizens. The National Health Data Management Policy states that participation in the National Health Data Ecosystem is voluntary; and the participants will, at any time, have the right to exit from the ecosystem. Currently, the policy has been rolled out on a pilot basis in 6 union territories, namely; Chandigarh, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Daman & Diu, Puducherry, Ladakh and Lakshadweep. As Health is a state subject under the Indian Constitution, Chhattisgarh has raised concerns about the viability and necessity of the policy, especially in the absence of a robust data protection legislation.

Mr. R.S. Sharma, the Chairperson of the ‘Empowered Group on Technology and Data Management to combat Covid-19’ had in an interview to India Today stated “ “Not just for vaccinations, but the platform will be instrumental in becoming a digital health database for India”. This indicates that this is an initial step towards generating health ID for all the beneficiaries. It would also violate the principle of purpose limitation, that data collected for one purpose (for the vaccine) cannot be reused for another (for the creation of the Digital Health ID system) without an individual’s explicit consent and the option to opt-out.

Conclusion

Given India’s experience and reasonable success with childhood immunisation, there is reasonable confidence that the country has the ability to scale up vaccination. However, the vaccination drive should not be used as a means to set aside the legitimate concerns of the citizens with regard to the mechanism deployed to get pet people to register for the vaccination drive. As a first step it is essential that Co-Win has a separate dedicated privacy policy which conforms to the internationally accepted privacy principles and enumerated in the Personal Data Protection Bill. It is also essential that Co-Win or any other app/digital platform should not be used as a backdoor entry for the government to create unique digital health IDs for the citizens, especially without their consent and in the absence of a robust data protection law.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/an-analysis-of-the-covid-vaccine-intelligence-network-co-win-platform