Centre for Internet and Society

Secure IT 2012 — Securing Citizens through Technology

praskrishna — 2012-04-28T04:06:47Z

The event is co-organised by DST and NSDI, Govt. of India in partnership with Elets Technomedia Pvt. Ltd. on March 1, 2012 at Claridges in New Delhi.

Draft Agenda

9.00 am – 9.30 am	Registration & Tea
9.30 am – 11.00 am	Inaugural Session

Securing Citizens through Technology

The SecureIT 2012 Inaugural Session would present an overview of the security scenario in the country, and place the use of ICT towards ensuring national security centrestage. The inaugural would also highlight the use that ICT is being put for in effective disaster management, minimising material as well as human loss.

The session would aim at identifying a policy roadmap towards making effective use of ICT for the purposes of national security, well-being of citizens and businesses in times of disaster and an uncertain external environment and identify the major policy objectives for the sector as a whole.

Introductory Remarks: Dr Ravi Gupta, CEO Elets Technomedia and Editor-in-Chief, egov
Welcome Address: Dr M P Narayanan, President, Centre for Science, Development and Media Studies
Inaugural Address: Anil K Sinha, Vice Chairman, Bihar State Disaster Management Authority, Government of Bihar – Chief Guest, SecureIT 2012

Panel Discussion:

S Regunathan, Former Chief Secretary, Government of NCT of Delhi
R S Sharma, Director General, UIDAI
Shankar Aggarwal, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of India
Shambhu Singh, Joint Secretary (North East), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India
Ajay Sawhney, CEO, National e-Governance Division, Government of India
Major General (Dr) R Siva Kumar, Head, (NRDMS), Government of India

11. 00 am – 11.30 am	Networking Tea
11.30 am – 1.30 pm	Technical Session 1

Information Security – Securing Networks, Communications, Data and Applications

In the modern Information Age, knowledge is power like never before. A robust, secure communications network is not only desired, it is an absolute imperative in order to allow efficient functioning of the state. The communications networks have to be secured from state and non-state actors inimical to India. This session would highlight some major threats to the national communications infrastructure and the policies being adopted to counter these threats.

Chair: Ravi S Saxena, Additional Chief Secretary, DST, Government of Gujarat
Key Note Speaker: Dr Gulshan Rai, Director General, CERT-In

Distinguished Panellists:

S K Basu, Vice President, NIIT Technologies
Manas Sarkar, Head Pre-Sales (India & SAARC), Trend Micro
Ruchin Kumar, Principal Solution Architect, India and SAARC, Safenet India Pvt Ltd
Dr Kamlesh Bajaj, CEO, Data Security Council of India
Rajan Raj Pant, Controller, Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of Nepal
Prof. Anjali Kaushik, Management Development Institute, Gurgaon

1.30 pm – 2.30 pm	Lunch
2.30 pm – 5.00 pm	Technical Session 2

ICT in National Security and Policing

India faces a multiplicity of security challenges from within and without. Conventional responses to these challenges are no longer adequate and technology is being increasingly deployed to make the nation safer and more secure for residents, visitors and businesses. The legal framework has also been modified to incorporate modern technological advances.

The MHA has embarked upon a major project – Crime and Criminal Tracking System (CCTNS) that is expected to bring about a major overhaul of the policing system of the country. In this session, CCTNS and state adaptations of ICT in policing would be discussed along with an overview of technological advances in the field of security.

Chair: S Suresh Kumar, Joint Secretary (Centre-State), Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India

Distinguished Panellists:

NSN Murty, General Manager, Smarter Planet Solutions - India/ South Asia, IBM
Col Vishu Sikka, (Retd) General Manager – Defence, Aerospace & Public Security, SAP India & Subcontinent
Joachim Murat, Director of Sagem Morpho Security Pvt Ltd.
Hemant Sharma, Vice- Chair, BSA India Committee
Raj Prem Khilnani, DGP (Homeguard and Civil Defence), Maharashtra
Rajvir P Sharma, Additional Director General of Police, Bangalore Metropolitan Task Force
Loknath Behra, IGP, National Investigation Agency
Purushottam Sharma, IGP, State Crime Records Bureau, Madhya Pradesh
Ranjan Dwivedi, IGP, UP Police
Sanjay Sahay, IGP, Karnataka State Police

5.00 pm – 5. 30 pm	Networking Tea
5.30 pm – 7.00 pm	Technical Session 3

Managing Information for Safety and Security

In the modern age, ICT is deployed in a variety of ways for enhancing citizen safety and security. ICT is being widely used for disaster management, urban planning, census operations etc.

In this session, discussions would highlight some path-breaking uses of ICT for enhancing citizen safety in a number of diverse settings.

Chair: N Ravishanker, Additional Secretary, Universal Service Obligation Fund, DIT, Govt of India

Distinguished Panellists:

Sandeep Sehgal, IBM, VP, Public Sector, India and South Asia
Sanjeev Mital, CEO, National Institute of Smart Governance (NISG), Government of India
Dr R C Sethi, Additional Registrar General of India
Maj Gen R C Padhi, Assistant Surveyor General, Survey of India
Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, Center For Internet Society
V S Prakash, Director, Karnataka State Natural Disaster Monitoring Centre, Karnataka
Rajiv P Saxena, Deputy Director General, National Informatics Centre, Government of India
Jay Kay Gupta, Fire Chief, Delhi Development Authority

7.00 pm onwards

Valedictory Session: Way Ahead High Tea

VIDEO

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/secure-it-2012

Konkan Corridor Project — A Lecture by Vasant Gangavane

praskrishna — 2012-04-13T13:49:32Z

Well known social worker Vasant Gangavane will be giving a public lecture on the Konkan Corridor Project at Ashoka Innovators for the Public in Bangalore on April 16, 2012. The lecture will focus on the role of Information & Communication Technology for total rural transformation by inclusive integrated development with no change of land ownerships. The event is co-organized by Ashoka Innovators for the Public and the Centre for Internet and Society.

Citing examples from the 117 village clusters in the regions of Ratnagiri and Sindhudurga districts of Maharashtra the lecture hopes to throw light on questions like what is a village cluster, what does it mean to urbanize one village cluster and what do we need to do to urbanize one village cluster, how will we organize and coordinate the project. This apart the vision, status and action plans of the Konkan Corridor Project, the skills development in each cluster, intensive agriculture in each cluster, farm produce processing, water conservation in the project area, rivers in the project area, energy, transportation, industry, science communication, and self administration in each clusters will also be discussed.

Vasant Gangavane

In the 1970s Vasant Gangavane, a management graduate from Indian Institute of Management and Wharton, returned to his village in Konkan, Maharashtra, to give his people what he felt they needed most — the knowledge to manage their natural resources. In the process, he set up several models of rural development. Gangavane found that the rate at which people migrated out of the Konkan was very high, despite the fact that the area was rich in natural resources. He studied the area and realised that land improvement and watershed development were key issues. He conducted a series of experiments in agriculture, dairy and poultry farming before setting up the Gokul Prakalp Pratishthan (GPP) in 1978. With the Maharashtra government's comprehensive watershed management programme (COWDEP), Gangavane's Pratishthan afforested 400 hectares of land in Vilye village with mango and cashew trees. Gangavane then acquired 40 acres of wasteland in the village and built water conservation structures called Gokul bandharas. This resulted in the wells in the area being recharged and ensured enough drinking water for 25 families.This model was later adopted by the Indo-German Watershed Programme.

When Gangavane's project began, the village of Vilye was bereft of young people. Its young had migrated. Now there is reverse migration and 3,000 people have benefited from the programme. The village has been transformed — water runoff has been arrested and afforestation has changed the look of the village.

After the watershed programme, Gangavane formulated a theoretical plan for model villages called the Gokul project. The aim was communication and knowledgesharing. A participatory rural appraisal is also done to explore natural resource availability, potential and use. The awareness is meant to empower people and convince them that watershed programmes can address problems of poverty and inequity. Gangavane believes that with this knowledge, and with the resources available, a small family in the area can live sustainably.

Gangavane's Pratishthan has set up an Ashramshaala at Laanja, Ratnagiri district, which is a tribal residential school, where 300 children are provided free boarding and lodging up to the secondary level. GPP has also introduced computer education in schools. For his work Gangavane was awarded the Vanashree award, Vasantrao Naik Pratisthan award and the Indira Priyadarshini Vrikshamitra award.

Download the presentation here [PDF, 228 KB]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/talk-by-vasant-gangavane

Information & Communication Technology in Making a Healthy Information Society with special reference to use of ICTS in Educational Technology

praskrishna — 2014-07-18T09:06:20Z

The Department of Computer Science, Andhra Loyola College in collaboration with the Department of Computer Science, Krishna University will be organizing a UGC-sponsored National Seminar on August 11 and 12, 2014 at Andhra Loyola College in Vijayawada.

T. Vishnu Vardhan, Programme Director, Access to Knowledge from the Centre for Internet and Society will be giving a key note address at this event.

See the invitation below:

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/information-communication-technology-in-making-a-healthy-information-society-with-special-reference-to-use-of-icts-in-educational-technology

Future of Work: Report of the ‘Workshop on the IT/IT-eS Sector and the Future of Work in India’

ambika — 2020-03-05T19:03:07Z

This report provides an overview of the proceedings and outcomes of the Workshop on the IT/IT-eS Sector and the Future of Work in India (hereinafter referred to as the “Workshop”), organised at Omidyar Networks’ office in Bangalore, on June 29, 2018.

This report was authored by Torsha Sarkar, Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rath. It was edited by Elonnai Hickok. Akash Sriram, Divya Kushwaha and Torsha Sarkar provided transcription and research assistance. A PDF of the report can be accessed here.

Introduction

The Workshop was attended by a diverse group of stakeholders which included industry representatives, academicians and researchers, and civil society. The discussions went over various components of the transition in the sector to Industry 4.0, including the impact of Industry 4.0-related technological innovations on work broadly in India, and specifically in the IT/IT-eS sector (hereinafter referred to as the “Sector”). The discussion focused on the reciprocal impact on socio-political dimensions, the structure of employment, and forms of work within workspaces.

The Workshop was divided into three sessions. The first session was themed around the adoption and impact of Industry 4.0 technologies vis-a-vis the organisation of work. Within this the key questions were: the nature of the technologies being adopted, the causes that are driving the uptake of these technologies, and the ‘tasks’ constituting jobs in the Sector.

The second session focussed on the role of skilling and re-skilling measures as mitigators to projected displacement of jobs. The issues dealt with included shifts in company, educational, and social competency profiles as a result of Industry 4.0, transformations in the predominant pedagogy of education, vocational, and skill development programmes in India, and their success in creating employable workers and filling skill gaps in the industry.

The third session looked at social welfare considerations and public policy interventions that may be necessitated in the wake of potential technological unemployment owing to Industry 4.0. The session was designed with a specific focus on the axes of gender and class, addressing questions of precarity, wages, and job security in the future of work for marginalized groups in the workforce.

Preliminary Comments

The Workshop opened with a brief introduction on the research the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is undertaking on the Future of Work (hereinafter referred to as “FoW”) vis-a-vis Industry 4.0. The conception of Industry 4.0 that CIS is looking at is the technical integration of cyber-physical systems in production and logistics on one hand, and the use of internet of things (IoT) and the connection between everyday objects and services in the industrial processes on the other. The scope of the project, including the impact of automation on the organisation of employment and shifts in the nature and forms of work, including through the gig economy, and microwork, was detailed. The historical lens taken by the project, and the specific focus on questions of inequality across gender, class, language, and skill were highlighted.

It was pointed out that CIS’ research, in this regard, comes from the necessity of localising and re-examining the global narratives around Industry 4.0. While new technologies will be developed and implemented globally, the impact of these technologies in the Indian context would be mediated through local, political and socio-economic structures. For instance, the Third Industrial Revolution, largely associated with the massification of computing, telecommunications and electronics, is still unfolding in India, while attempts are already being made to adapt to Industry 4.0. These issues provided a starting point to the discussion on the impact of Industry 4.0 in India.

Qualifying Technological Change

Contexualising the narrative with historical perspectives

The panel for the first session commenced with a discussion around a historical perspective on job loss being brought about due to mechanisation. The distinction between Industry 3.0 and 4.0, it was suggested, was largely arbitrary, inasmuch as technological innovation has been a continuous process and has been impacting lives and the way work is perceived. It was argued that the only factor differentiating Industry 4.0 from previous industrial revolutions is ‘intelligent’ technology that is automating routine cognitive tasks. The computer, programmatic logic control (PLC) and data (called the ‘new oil’) were also a part of Industry 3.0, but intelligent technologies are able to provide greater analytical power under Industry 4.0.

The discussion also went over the distinction between the terms ‘job’, ‘task’ and ‘work’. It was argued that the term ‘job’ might be treated as a subset of the term ‘work’, with the latter moving beyond livelihood to encompass questions of dignity and a sense of fulfilment in the worker. With relation to this distinction, it was mentioned that the jobs at the risk of automation would be those that fulfill only the basic level in Maslow’s hierarchy - implying largely routine manual tasks. Additionally, it was explained that although these jobs will continue to use labour through Industry 4.0, it is only the nature of technological enablement that would change to automate more dangerous and hazardous tasks.

Technology as a long-term enabler of job creation

It was argued that technology has historically been associated with job creation. Historical instances cited included that of popular anxiety due to anticipated job loss through the uptake of the spinning machine and the steam engine, whereas the actual reduction in the cost of production led to greater job creation, increased mobility and improved quality of life in the long-term. Such instances were used to further argue that technology has historically not resulted in long-term job reductions.

The platform economy was posited as a model for creating jobs, through the efficient matching of supply and demand through digital platforms. It was indicated that rural to urban migration is aided by such platforms, as labourers voluntarily enrol in skilling initiatives given the certainty of employment through platformization. It was further argued that historically, Indian workers have been educated rather than skilled, and that platformization and automation, coupled with the elasticity of human needs, will provide greater incentives for technically skilled workers by creating desirable jobs.

Factors leading to differential adoption of automation

In relation to the adoption of the technologies Industry 4.0, it was argued that the mere existence of a technology does not necessitate its scalablity at an industrial level. Scalability would be possible only when the cost of labour is high relative to the costs entailed in technological adoption. This was supported by data from a McKinsey Report^{^[1]} which indicated that countries like the US and Germany would be impacted in the short term by automation, because their cost of labour is higher. Conversely, since the cost of labour in India is relatively cheap, the reality of technological displacement is still far away and the impact would not be immediate.

Similarly, a distinction was also made to account for the differential impact of automation in various sectors. For instance, it was indicated that since the IT/IT-eS sector in India is based on exporting services and outsourcing of businesses. Accordingly, if Germany automates its automobile industry, that would impact India less than if it automates the IT/IT-eS sector, as the latter is more reliant on exporting its services to developed economies. The IT/IT-eS sector was further broken down into sub-sectors with the intention of highlighting the differential impact of automation and FoW in each of these sub-sectors. It was agreed that the BPO sub-sector would be more adversely impacted than core IT services, given its constitution of routine nature of tasks at a higher risk of automation.

Disaggregating India’s Skilling Approach

The discussion around skilling measures was contextualised in the Indian context by alluding to data collected from the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) surveys. The data revealed that around 36% of India’s total population is under the age of seventeen and approximately 13% are between 18 - 24. Additional statistics suggested that only around a quarter of the workforce aged 18-24 years had achieved secondary and higher secondary education and close to 13% of the workforce was illiterate. While these numbers included both male and female workers, it was pointed out that it was an incomplete dataset as it excluded transgender workers. It was suggested it should be this segment of the Indian demographic that is targeted for significant skilling pushes, which could be catalysed through specific vocational training centres. It was also suggested that there was a need for to restructure the role of the National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) in the Indian skilling framework.

A comprehensive picture was painted by conceptualising the skilling framework in India as 5 distinct pillars. This conceptualisation was used to debunk the narrative around NSDC being the sole entity pushing for skill development in the country. The NSDC’s function in the skilling framework was posited as providing funding to skilling initiatives with programmes lasting for a period of 3 months. These 3- month programmes were critiqued for being insufficient for effective training, especially given the low skill levels of workers going into the programmes. The NSDC’s placement rate of 12% as per their own records was used to support this argument. Further suggestions on making the NSDC more effective were made in a later discussion^{^[2]}.

Related to this, the second pillar of vocational skilling was said to be the Industrial Training Institute (ITI). The third pillar was said to be the school system which was critiqued for does not offering vocational education at secondary and senior secondary levels. The fourth pillar comprised of the 16 ministries which governed the labour laws in India - none of whose courses were National Skills Qualifications Framework (NSQF) compliant.

The fifth pillar was construed as the industry itself and the enterprise-based training it conducted. However, it was stated that India’s share of registered companies who did enterprise-based training was dismal. In 2009, the share of enterprise-based training was 16% which rose in 2014 to 36%. Further, most of these 36% were registered large firms as opposed to small and medium sized enterprises. Unregistered companies, it was suggested, were simply doing informal apprenticeships.

Joint public and private skilling initiatives

In addition to government sponsored skilling initiatives, attention was directed to skill development partnerships that took the shape of public-private initiatives. As an example, it was said that that a big player in the ride-hailing economy had worked with NSDC and other skilling entities to ensure that soft skills were being imparted to their driver partners before they were on-boarded onto the platform.

It was also brought forth that innovative forms of skilling and training were gaining traction in the education sector as well in the private sector. This was instantiated through instances of uptake of platforms which apply artificial intelligence, and within that machine learning based techniques, to generate and disseminate easier- to- consume video-based learning.

Driving Job Growth: Solving for Structural Eccentricities of the Indian Labour Market

Catalysing manufacturing-led job growth

The discussion began by discussing specific dynamics of the Indian labour markets in the context of the Indian economy. It was pointed out the productivity level of the services sector is not as high as the productivity level of manufacturing, which is problematic for job creation in a developing economy such as India witnessing capital-intensive growth in the manufacturing sector. The underlying argument was that the jobs of the future in the Indian context will have to be created in the manufacturing sector.

Several macroeconomic policy interventions were suggested to reverse the trend of capital-intensive growth in order to make manufacturing the frontier for enhanced job creation. The need for a trade policy in consonance with the industrial policy was stated as imperative. This was substantiated by highlighting the lack of an inverted duty structure governing the automobile sector that has led India to be amongst the biggest manufacturers of automobiles. The inverted duty structure entails finished products having a lower import tariff and a lower customs duty when compared to import of raw materials or intermediates. However, it was highlighted that a dissonant industrial policy failed to acknowledge that at least 50% of india’s manufacturing comes from Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) and provided no assistance to MSMEs in obtaining credit, market access or technology upgradation. On the other hand, it was asserted that large corporates get 77% of the total bank credit.

Another challenge that was highlighted was with the Government of India’s severely underfunded manufacturing cluster development programs under the aegis of the Ministry of Textiles and the Ministry of MSMEs. For sectors that contribute majorly towards India’s manufacturing output, it was asserted that these programmes were astonishingly bereft of any governing policy and suffer from several foundational issues. Moreover, it was observed that these clusters are located around the country in Tier 2, 3 and 4 cities where the quality of infrastructure is largely lacking. The Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT) program devised for the development of these cities is also myopic as the the target cities are not the ones where these manufacturing clusters are located. The rationale behind such an approach was that building infrastructure at geographical sites of job creation would lead to an increase in productivity which would in turn attract greater investment. This would have to necessarily be accompanied by hastening the setting up of industrial corridors - the lackadaisical approach to which was stated as a key component of India being outpaced by other developing economies in the South East Asian region.

An additional policy intervention that was suggested was from the lens of setting up of skilling centres by NSDC in proximity to these manufacturing clusters where the job creation is being evidenced as opposed to larger metropolitan cities.

Carving out space for a vocational training paradigm

It was asserted that the focus of skilling needs to be on the manufacturing rather than services sector, given the centrality of manufacturing to a developing economy undergoing an atypical structural transformation^{^[3]} - as outlined above. Further compounding the problem of jobless growth, it was stated that 50% of the manufacturing workforce have 8 or less years of education and only 5% of the workforce including those that have technical education are vocationally trained, according to the NSS, 62nd Round on Employment and Unemployment.

A gulf in primary and secondary education vis-a-vis vocational training was pointed as one of the most predominant causes behind the much touted ‘skills gap’ that the Indian workforce is said to be battling with. Using data to further cull out the argument, it was said that in 2007, the net enrollment in India for primary education had already reached 97% and that between 2010 - 2015, the secondary education enrollment rate went from 58% to 85%.^{^[4]} It was hypothesised that the latter may have risen to 90% levels since. Furthermore, the higher education enrollment rate also commensurately went up from 11% in 2006 to 26-27% in 2017.^{^[5]} It was argued that this is impossible to achieve without gender parity in higher education. This gender parity in education was contrasted with the systematic decline in the women’s labour force participation that India has been witnessing in the last 30 years.

Consequently, the ‘massification’ of higher education in India over the past 10 years was critiqued as ineffectual in comparison to the Chinese model, as the latter focused on engaging students in vocational training, which the Indian education system had failed to do. The role of the gig economy in creating job opportunities despite this gap between educational and vocational training was regarded as important, especially given the lack of growth in the traditional job markets.

Accounting for the Margins

With relation to the profiles of workers within sectors, it was indicated that factors such as gender, class, skill, income, and race must be accounted for to determine the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of automation. Several points were discussed with relation to this disaggregation.

Technology as an equaliser? Gender and skill-biased technological change

First, the idea of technology and development as objective and neutral forces was questioned, with the assertion that human decision-makers, who more often than not tend to be male, allow inherent biases to creep into outputs, processes, and objectives of automation. Data from the Belong Survey in IT services^{^[6]} indicated that the proportion of women in core engineering was 26% of the workforce, while that in software testing was 33%. Coupled with the knowledge that automation and technology would automate software testing first, it was argued that jobs held by female workers were positioned at a higher immediate risk of automation than male workers.

The ‘Leaky Pipe Problem’ in STEM industries i.e. the observation that female workers tend to be concentrated in entry level jobs, while senior management is largely male dominated was also brought to the fore. This was used to bolster the argument that female workers in the Sector will lose out in the shorter term, when automation adversely impacts the lower level jobs.

A survey conducted by Aspiring Minds^{^[7]} which tracked the employability of the engineering graduates was utilised to further flesh out skill biased technological change. As per the survey, 40% of the graduating students are employable in the BPO sector, while only 3% of the students are employable in the sector for software production. With the BPO sector likelier to be impacted more adversely than core IT services, it was emphasised that policy considerations should be very specific in their ambit.

Social security and the platform economy

The discussion around the platform economy commenced with a focus on how it had created economic opportunities in the formal sector by matching demand and supply on one hand, and by reducing inefficiency in the system through technology on the other. It was pointed out that these newer forms of work were creating millions of entrepreneurship opportunities that did not exist previously. These opportunities, it was suggested, were in themselves flexible and contributing the greater push towards enhancing the numbers of those that come within the ambit of India’s formal economy.

This discussion was countered by suggesting that the shift of the workforce from the informal sector to the formal sector, which companies in the gig economy claimed they contributed to, have instead restricted the kind of lives gig workers have been living historically. As an instance, it was pointed out that a farmer who had been working with a completely different set of skills was now being asked to shift to a new set of skills which would be suited for a very specific role and not transposable across occupations. In other words, it would not be meaningful skilling. It was also pointed out that what distinguishes formal work from informal is whether the worker has social security net or not - mere access to banking services or filing of tax returns was not sufficient for characterising a workforce as being formal in nature.

Relatedly, the possibility of social security was discussed for the unorganised sector and microworkers. One of the possibilities discussed was to ensure state subsidised maternity, disability, and death security, and pensions for workers below the poverty line. The fiscal brunt borne by the government for such a scheme was anticipated to not be above 0.4% of the GDP. It was suggested that this would move forward the conversation on minimum wage and fair work, which would be of great importance in broader conversations around working conditions in the platform economy.

The interplay of gender and platformisation

It was highlighted that trends in automation are going to change the occupational structure in the digital economy - the effect of which will especially be felt in cognitive routine jobs given their increased propensity to platformisation. A World Economic Forum report^{^[8]} was cited which indicated the disproportional risk of unemployment faced by women given their concentration in cognitive routine jobs was also brought up.

The discussion logically undertook a deeper look at the platformisation of work with a specific focus on freelance microwork and its impact on the female labour force and culled out certain positive mandates arising from such newer forms of work. It was suggested that industries are more likely to employ female workers in microwork due to lower rates of attrition, and flexible labour. It was reiterated that freelancing in India extends beyond data entry and other routine jobs, to include complex work - thereby also catering to skilled workers desirous of flexibility. Platforms designing systems to meet the demand for flexible work were also discussed, such as platforms geared towards female workers undertaking reskilling measures and counselling for females returning from maternity leave or sabbaticals. Additionally, the difficulty of defining freelancing under existing frameworks of employment, compounded by the lack of legal structures for such work, was outlined.

Systemic challenges within the Indian labour law framework

Static design of legal processes

Labour law was, naturally, acknowledged as a key determinant in the conversation around both the uptake and impact of automative technologies encapsulated within Industry 4.0.

The archaic nature of India’s labour law framework was highlighted as a major impediment to ensuring both worker rights as well as the ease of conducting commerce. It was pointed out that organised labour continues to be under the ambit of the Industrial Disputes Act, which was made effective in 1947, has undergone minimal amendments since. This was critiqued on the basis that the framework for the law is embedded in its historical context, and while the industrial landscape in the country has transformed drastically since the implementation of the Industrial Disputes Act, the legal framework has not evolved. Similarly, the Karnataka Shops and Establishments Act, 1961 which regulates the Sector today was enacted much before the Sector even opened up in India in the 1990s.

Additionally, it was pointed out that the consolidation of the fragmented extant framework of labour laws in India was being consolidated into 4 labour codes without any wholesale modernisation push reforming the laws being consolidated. Consequently, it was argued that the government has to drive changes through policies alone as the legal framework remains static. Barriers to implementation of adequate policies were also discussed, such as the political impact of labour policies, lack of state initiative to deal with the impact of the future of work, apart from the historic inability of the law to keep up with the state of labour and economy.

Labour law arbitrage

One of the reasons behind the increasing contractualizing of labour in India was attributed to over-regulation. There was consensus that the labour law regime was not conducive to industry in India leading to greater opportunistic behaviours from industry participants. It was acknowledged that the political clout that a lot of contractors (of labourers) enjoy along with providing primary employers greater flexibility to hire and fire employees at will has led to a widespread utilisation of contract labour entities.

It was further stated that industry behaviour has adopted several other tools of arbitrage to not consider labour law as a key impediment in the ease of scaling business. Empirical evidence of labour law arbitrage was cited to drive home the point - according to national surveys, 80-85% of enterprises employ less than 99 workers as the law mandates stricter compliance requirements for enterprises employing 100 or more workers^{^[9]}. This was acknowledged a serious hurdle to scaling businesses.

Problems behind other apparently well-intentioned legislation from a public policy lens having counterproductive consequences was also highlighted. In the space of labour laws, the example of the recently enacted Maternity Benefit (Amendment) Act, 2017 was cited. By enhancing maternity benefits, without accounting for other provisioning such as a paternity benefit inclusion, it was anticipated that companies may entirely shy away from hiring women.

Policy Paralysis

The discussion progressed towards a high-level discussion around the efficacy of law vis-a-vis state policy as a means to create a system of checks and balances in the context of Industry 4.0. It was highlighted that law, by design, would be outpaced by technological change. The common law system of law operating in India is premised on a time-tested emphasis on post-facto regulation. In other words, it is reactionary. While policy making in India suffers from a similar plague of playing catch-up, it is in large part due to a bureaucratic structure premised on generalism - a pressing need for domain expertise in policy making was emphasised upon. Having said that, it was stated that it is the institutional design of policy making institutions that needs rectification. What was acknowledged was the success, albeit scant, that individual states have had in policy making catering to specific yet diverse domains. A greater push towards clear and progressive evidence-based policy pushes was stressed upon with the anticipation that it would lead to self-regulation by the industry itself - be it in terms of the future of employment or of the economic direction that the industry will embark on.

Concluding Remarks

The discussions during the course of the Workshop situated the discourse around Industry 4.0 within the contours of the Indian labour realities and the IT sector within that.

As a useful starting point, various broader perspectives around the impact of technological change on the quantum of jobs were brought forth. While the industry perspective was that of technology as an enabler of job creation in the long-run, it was sufficiently tempered by concerns around those impacted adversely in the short to medium-term time frames. These concerns coalesced towards understanding the potential impact of Industry 4.0 on the nature of work, as well as mitigation tools to ease the impact of technological disruption on labour.

Important facets of technological adoption within the Sector were highlighted, such as potential for scalability as well as the distinct eccentricities of the various sub-sectors the IT sector subsumed. The differential impact within the various sub-sectors was pegged to the differential composition of automatable tasks (routine, rule-based) within each sub-sector. However, questions regarding the exact contours of task composition were left unanswered signalling a potential area for further research. On the other hand, the primary challenge to technological adoption faced from the labour-supply side was skilling, or the lack thereof. This was contextualised in the larger scheme of structural issues plaguing the skilling machinery operating in the country, which lead to inadequate dispensation of technical and vocational education and training (TVET). In terms of additional structural issues that would potentially have an impact on how Industry 4.0 plays out in the Indian context, attention was directed towards overdue reform of the labour law framework which has already struggled with incorporating newer forms of working engagements such as platform and gig work, that are being evidenced as a part of Industry 4.0.

An underlying theme that found mention across sessions was the need to devote attention to prevent further marginalisation as a consequence of technological disruption of the already marginalised. Evidence from government datasets as well as from literature around concepts such as skill biased technological change, the leaky pipe problem, and the U-shaped curve of female labour force participation were cited to explicate these issues. The merits of different policy measures to address these concerns, such as social security, living wages, and maternity benefits were also discussed.

While the Workshop touched upon several facets of the discourse around Industry 4.0 in the Sector, it also sprung up areas that require further inquiry. Questions around where in the value chain use-cases for Industry 4.0 technologies were emerging needed a more comprehensive understanding. Moreover, the impact of Sector Skill Councils (SSCs), a central aspect of the skilling ecosystem in India, wasn’t touched upon. An additional path of inquiry that emerged pertained to evolving constructive reforms to legal and economic policy frameworks as top-down interventions within the Sector that could be anticipated to play a significant role in the uptake and impact of Industry 4.0 technologies.

^{^[1]} McKinsey Global Institute, A future that works: Automation, employment, and productivity, https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/Digital%20Disruption/Harnessing%20automation%20for%20a%20future%20that%20works/MGI-A-future-that-works-Executive-summary.ashx, (accessed 10 August 2018).

^{^[2]} See discussion under ‘Catalysing manufacturing-led job growth‘.

^{^[3]} R. Verma, Structural Transformation and Jobless Growth in the Indian Economy, The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Economy, 2012.

^{^[4]} S. Mehrotra, ‘The Indian Labour Market: A Fallacy, Two Looming Crises and a Tragedy’, CSE Working Paper, April 2018.

^{^[5]} ibid.

^{^[6]} Mohita Nagpal, ‘Women in tech: There are 3 times more male engineers to females’, belong.co, http://blog.belong.co/gender-diversity-indian-tech-companies, (accessed 10 August 2018).

^{^[7]} Aspiring Minds, National Programming Skills Report - Engineers 2017, https://www.aspiringminds.com/sites/default/files/National%20Programming%20Skills%20Report%20-%20Engineers%202017%20-%20Report%20Brief.pdf, (accessed 11 August 2018).

^{^[8]} World Economic Forum, The Future of Jobs Employment, Skills and Workforce Strategy for the Fourth Industrial Revolution: Global Challenge Insight Report, January 2016.

^{^[9]} Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, All India Report of Sixth Economic Census, Government of India, 2014.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/future-of-work-report-of-the-workshop-on-the-it-it-es-sector-and-the-future-of-work-in-india

Fill The Gap: Global Discussion on Digital Natives

nishant — 2010-01-22T10:54:13Z

More often than not people don't understand the new practices inspired by Internet and digital technologies. As such a series of accusations have been leveled against the Digital Natives. Educators, policy makers, scholars, and parents have all raised their worries without hearing out from the people they are concerned about. Hivos has initiated an online global discussion about Digital Natives. So, to voice your opinion, start tweeting with us now #DigitalNatives.

If you cannot attend Fill The Gap, you can also join us in a global discussion on some of the issues being discussed at #DigitalNatives

1. Are you an apolitical consumer, or do you have ambitions?

http://www.tweetworks.com/groups/view/DigitalNatives

2. Are you a little prince or princess, who only wants to talk to like minded people or are you different?

http://www.tweetworks.com/groups/view/DigitalNativesPrincess

3. Is Wikipedia your bible or do you really know something?

http://www.tweetworks.com/groups/view/DigitalNativesWiki

4. Are you a digital dinosaur? They say you don’t know anything about ICT!

http://www.tweetworks.com/groups/view/DigitalDinosaur

5. Why use the Internet, why don’t you march the streets?

http://www.tweetworks.com/groups/view/DigitalNativesProtest

6. Plans to change the world? What do you need?

http://www.tweetworks.com/groups/view/DigitalNativesChanceTheWorld

If you are in Amsterdam, here is the information you will need to attend the event:

Fill the Gap! - 7

R U Online?

Date: 15 January 2010

Time: 12.30 until 17.00 hour

Location: Het Sieraad, Postjesweg 1, Amsterdam

The seventh edition of Fill the Gap! is all about the power of youth and IT in developing countries. How can their skills be strengthened and put to use for a better world? Hivos, apart from cohosting the event, will be involving digital natives to hear their stories about ICT and engagement.

An Open Space event on the potential of new (mobile) media and youth in developing countries. For everyone in politics, the profit and the non-profit sectors who is interested in ICT and international development cooperation.

The use of new (mobile) technology is the most natural thing in the world for the youth of today.

Shaped by the digital era and at ease with creativeity, these innovators use new media to change the world. Just think of the Twitter revolution in Iran. What can the international development sector learn from this? How could international development cooperation use the potential power of youth to tackle development problems?

The seventh edition of Fill the Gap! is all about the power of youth and IT in developing countries. How can their skills be strengthened and put to use for a better world? The kick-off will be hosted by Jennifer Corriero, co-founder of Taking IT Global: the international platform for youth and the use of new media for a better world. Then the floor is open to discuss your own ideas with people from new media, the business world and the international development sector during the Open Space sessions. Join in: come to Amsterdam on Friday January 15th and be inspired during Fill the Gap!

Registration is free. The programme is in English.

» Fill the Gap

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/research/grants/digital-natives-with-a-cause/dntweet

Policy Brief on the Report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on ICT

Elonnai Hickok and Vipul Kharbanda — 2016-08-23T15:37:05Z

In light of the complex challenges and threats posed to, and by, the field of information telecommunications in cyberspace, in 1998 the draft resolution in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly was introduced and adopted without a vote (A/RES/53/70) ]. Since then, the Secretary General to the General Assembly has invited annual reports on the issue.

The most recent report, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, was published in June 2015. The 2015 Report touches upon a number of issues, including international cooperation, norms and principles for responsible state behavior, confidence building measures cross border exchange of information, and capacity building measures.

Annual reports will continue to be accepted by the General Assembly, and the 2016/2017 Group of Governmental Experts will have it's first meeting in August 2016. India was a member of the Group of Governmental Experts in 2013.

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) has written an article analyzing India’s alignment with the recommendations of the report of the Group of Governmental Experts. This policy brief attempts to articulate the major policy actions that may be considered by India to further incorporate and implement the principles enunciated in the Report.

CIS believes that the report of the Group of Governmental Experts provides important minimum standards that countries could adhere to in light of challenges to international security posed by ICT developments. Given the global nature of these challenges and the need for nations to holistically address such challenges from a human rights and security perspective, CIS believes that the Group of Governmental Experts and similar international forums are useful and important forums for India to continue to actively engage with.

Below are our specific recommendations:

(a) Consistent with the purposes of the United Nations, including to maintain international peace and security, States should cooperate in developing and applying measures to increase stability and security in the use of ICTs and to prevent ICT practices that are acknowledged to be harmful or that may pose threats to international peace and security;

India has entered into treaties on ICT issues with countries such as Belarus, Canada, China, Egypt, and France. Additionally, India’s IT Act addresses a number of the cyber crimes listed in the Budapest Convention. However, India is not yet a signatory to the Convention. This leaves scope for India to consider further forums and means of international cooperation to better realise this principle.

India has been invited to accede to the Budapest Convention in the past but for various tactical and political reasons has not yet agreed to do so. Although whether to accede to an International Convention or not is usually a well discussed and thought out policy decision of the diplomatic core of a country, the mutual assistance framework, however flawed it may be, would offer a better opportunity for India for international cooperation for increasing the stability and security of ICTs and prevent harmful ICT practices as envisaged in the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts.

(b) In case of ICT incidents, States should consider all relevant information, including the larger context of the event, the challenges of attribution [of cybercrime] in the ICT environment and the nature and extent of the consequences;

While the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEITY) as well as the Computer Emergency Response Team, India (CERT-In) have a number of policies which talk about maintaining security and means of addressing threats in the ICT environment, most ICT incidents, crimes or illegal activities using ICT, unless they involve large or government institutions, are handled by the regular police establishment of the country. The lack of capacity, both in terms of infrastructure and skill, of the regular police to adequately address most cyber crimes is an area that needs to be strengthened. The need for cyber security capacity building in India was highlighted in 2015 by the Standing Committee on Information Technology. It would be useful for dedicated cyber crime departments to be established in all districts. This would be a step in the right direction to provide the requisite capacity and resources to deal with the various technical issues such as attribution, jurisdiction, etc. arising out of ICT incidents.

(d) States should consider how best to cooperate to exchange information, assist each other, prosecute terrorist and criminal use of ICTs and implement other cooperative measures to address such threats. States may need to consider whether new measures need to be developed in this respect;

Owing to the growing irrelevance of physical and political borders in the age of globally networked devices, one of the most important issues arising out of ICTs and cyber crimes is the need for greater and more efficient exchange of information between nations. It has been widely accepted that sharing of information on a regular and sustained basis between nation states would be a very important tool. Limitations in the traditional mechanisms (MLATs, Letters Rogatory, etc.) such as the delay in accessing the information as well as denial of access due to differences in legal standards, present hurdles to the efficacy of law enforcement agencies only emphasize the urgency of developing a new mechanism of international information sharing that would be able to deal with ICT incidents, while at the same time protecting the freedoms and privacy rights of the citizens of the world. Exploration and participation in dialogues and solutions that are evolving at the international level around cross border sharing of information is key.

(i) States should take reasonable steps to ensure the integrity of the supply chain [of ICT equipment] so that end users can have confidence in the security of ICT products. States should seek to prevent the proliferation of malicious ICT tools and techniques and the use of harmful hidden functions;

While the National Electronics Policy of 2012 states that the government should mandate technical and safety standards in order to curb the inflow of sub-standard and unsafe electronic products, the government is yet to mandate any broad standards in the Indian market for ICT equipment. Considering the enormous security implications of compromised ICT this is an area where the government should prioritize and must act immediately. Mandating standards may require the establishment of a monitoring or enforcement mechanism to ensure that the standards are being implemented. This should be done with the aim of ensuring security while not hindering innovation or the flow of business. To achieve such a balance, research and discussion is needed within the government to formulate a mechanism which would ensure the safety and quality of ICT tools while at the same time ensuring that industry is not hindered.

Conclusion

The suggestions given above are some of the major lessons from the analysis of the UN Report on ICT which CIS believe the government of India could adopt and pursue to strengthen its enlightenment with the recommendations of the Report. It is also imperative that the Government of India continues to realise the importance of the work being done by the Group of Governmental Experts and take measures to ensure that a representative from India is included in future Groups. Meanwhile, India can take positive steps by strengthening domestic privacy safeguards, improving transparency and efficiency of relevant policies and processes, and looking towards solutions that respect rights and strengthen security.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/policy-brief-on-the-report-of-the-un-group-of-governmental-experts-on-ict

International Conference on Innovation for Shared Prosperity

praskrishna — 2016-08-25T02:40:59Z

Rohini Lakshane attended a conference on IP Rights, Competition and Standard Setting in the IT industry on August 20 and 21, 2016. The conference was organized by O.P. Jindal Global University and Jindal Initiative on Research in IP & Competition.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/news/international-conference-on-innovation-for-shared-prosperity

Re-Wiring Women's Rights Debates in the Digital Age

praskrishna — 2015-02-12T17:07:32Z

IT for Change in partnership with Kutch Mahila Vikas Sangathan and ANANDI organized this event on September 13 and 14, 2014. Rohini Lakshane participated as a speaker.

Website:
http://www.itforchange.net/ITfC_Course_Re-wiring_womens_rights/index.php/Agenda

Speakers List:
http://www.itforchange.net/ITfC_Course_Re-wiring_womens_rights/index.php/Session_speakers

Video

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/re-wiring-women-rights-debates-in-digital-age

CIS Submission to UN High Level Panel on Digital Co-operation

Aayush Rathi, Ambika Tandon, Arindrajit Basu and Elonnai Hickok — 2019-02-19T01:41:35Z

The High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation was convened by the UN Secretary-General to advance proposals to strengthen cooperation in the digital space among Governments, the private sector, civil society, international organizations, academia, the technical community and other relevant stakeholders. The Panel issued a call for input that called for responses to various questions. CIS responded to the call for inputs.

Download the submission here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-to-un-high-level-panel-on-digital-co-operation

Of the State and the Governments - The Abstract, the Concrete and the Responsive

zainab — 2011-08-03T09:56:52Z

This post examines the concepts of state and government to lay the ground for understanding responsiveness enforced through transparency discourses and the deployment of ICTs, the Internet and e-governance programmes. It also lays the context for understanding why and how ICTs. Internet and e-governance have been deployed in India for improving government-citizen interfaces, eliminating middlemen, delivering services electronically and for introducing a range of similar reforms to institute transparency and a responsive state.

In the introductory post, I had suggested that we needed to examine the notion of the ‘responsive state’, particularly in the context of discourses around transparency and the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the Internet to institute transparency and thereby create a responsive state. I argued that interrogating the notion of the ‘responsive state’ is necessary to understand how responsiveness and even statehood actually translate on the ground for different citizen groups when ICTs and the Internet are deployed to provide information to citizens, to deliver services electronically, to eliminate middlemen, to re-engineer processes in government departments and state institutions, and to make the state more visible and (therefore, supposedly) more accessible and responsive to its people.

In this post, I want to open up the concepts of the state and the government in a more fundamental way to begin our explorations regarding ‘responsiveness’ and the ‘responsive state’. Attending to the idea and the practice of the state and the government in everyday life will open up the meanings that ‘responsiveness’ and transparency, ICTs and the Internet are attributed within different contexts and in the range of relationships that exist between the state and its citizens, governments and citizens, and across state and government institutions. It is necessary to understand how relationships between citizens and governments and across the range of government and state institutions get shaped by the contexts within which governance is carried out, and the “fields”[i] within which we locate and study governments, governance, transparency and technology. This will enable us to nuance the notion and the translation of responsiveness in its online, offline, transparent, secretive, overt and/or surreptitious avatars.

I will begin this post by explaining the similarities and differences between the concepts (and ground realities) of state and the government as well as the relationships that exist between these entities. This conceptual clarification will set the context for understanding the genesis and application of responsiveness and transparency and the deployment of ICTs and the Internet to usher responsiveness and transparency in India in subsequent blog posts.

The State – Abstract-Concrete, Composite-Fragmented, Homogeneous-Heterogeneous: The state is an abstract idea which has its concrete basis in a physical territory. The state is also reified through an organizational structure that is referred to as the bureaucracy. We, as citizens, give legitimacy and authority to the idea of the state and statehood by conferring powers on certain representatives, institutions and systems to make decisions on our behalf and to exercise power for maintenance of law and order. The notion of the state (more concretely the institutions representing and exercising powers on behalf of the state) also derives legitimacy and authority from the Constitution and the laws of the land. The image of the state, as has been passed down to us by particular narratives of history and certain strands of political philosophy as well as through the print and electronic media is that the state is a composite, compact structure which has absolute - and in certain contexts unlimited powers. The “state idea” (Abrams, 1988) remains a powerful organizing concept in the lives of citizens as well as the employees and representatives of the state. This is because the concept of the state provides a sense of structure and coherence in our lives which in turn creates a sense of belongingness to a territory (physical space) and/or an institution (such as public services, public sector institutions, municipality, government departments, etc). This sense of structure, coherence and order is further reinforced by the following beliefs:

1. That the state, organized and reified through its bureaucratic machinery, functions in a rational, orderly manner. This is the classic idea of the state promoted by Max Weber;

2. That the state is the source as well as the guardian of laws. These laws will protect and preserve the integrity of the territory and in turn, the integrity (and compositeness) of the state (where the notion of the state and its notional boundaries are based on an actual, physical territory);

3. That laws are supreme and everyone is equal before the law;

4. That laws will enforce order and provide relief, redressal, entitlements and access to welfare to one and all.

The state is thus imagined as a benign authority, a benefactor, which must protect its people, provide them with welfare and at the same time, safeguard order and integrity of the territory (and therefore, order and integrity of the state structure/organization). The state also remains the last resort that people have for articulating their claims and getting them fulfilled. There is therefore, a tenuous relationship with the state where as much as certain ideological groups/belief systems/world views and various citizen groups desire the state’s role and intervention in the individual’s life to be minimized, they still continue to view the state i.e., the law courts and the common judicial system[ii], to be the ultimate source of law and the final arbiter of disputes. To cite an example, even though the private property rights framework gives precedence to the individual over the state, advocates of private property invariably assume or necessitate the existence of an overarching/central legal system to which individuals can take their disputes and grievances. This kind of advocacy automatically creates a paradox for individual freedom because a centralized legal system functions on the basis of uniform laws that may not consider the particularities and the uniqueness of each dispute over private property. Moreover, such a centralized legal system has the capacity to impinge on the individuals’ and groups’ freedoms especially when individuals’ and groups’ practices of ownership and usufruct (which can be social, historical, cultural and negotiated over time) do not comply with corresponding legalistic notions and practices.

The concept of the state is also associated with the notion of power where the state holds and wields power. The relationship between the state and its citizens is defined by this power equation. The notion of democracy is hinged on the idea that since people confer powers upon the state and they elect representative governments by voting at elections, citizens should also be able to contain the powers of the state and prevent the state from becoming an absolute, authoritarian entity. Deliberations, debate and discussion over the state’s policies and decisions (and a free press) are viewed as tools through which the state’s actions can be questioned, criticized and when necessary, contained. It is for the purposes of deliberations, debate and discussion that publishing of information about state policies as well as the processes through which decisions are made is deemed as quintessential in certain frameworks (and corresponding policies) of the ‘responsive state’.

The notion of the state remains a powerful idea in people’s imaginations and actions. The belief in the existence of a state system/organization enables people to make claims on what they see as state institutions or employees of the state. At the same time, as researchers and theorists excavating the “everyday state” argue, what also matters is how people ‘encounter’ the state when they make claims and/or seek resources, who they ‘mark’ as the state in these encounters, and what their ‘experience’ of the state is – a monolith, a bureaucratic mess, a sloth, a responsive entity and/or apathetic (Corbridge, Srivastava, et al, 2005; Fuller and Benei, 2000; Elyachar, 2005; Tarlo, 2003). The nature of the encounters with ‘the state’ and consequently the perceptions of power and authority vary depending on the institutions/personnel that different people approach. This implies that the institutions within the state system are different from each other and they function in diverse ways and contexts. These institutions are also not equally and cordially aligned with the idea of the state and the state system. Moreover, the resources that they variously control have different kinds of significance and meanings for both, the officials in charge of the respective institutions as well as the people vying for those resources. In short, not all institutions within the state system are equally statist in terms of the way in which they control resources, wield power, maintain territorial integrity and statist quo and interact with different citizen groups. To explain this in more concrete terms, let us take the instance of the forest authorities in India. Forest departments tend to be much more authoritarian and controlling of forest lands and forest resources and consequently the people within their jurisdictions and territory. This authority of the forest department stems from historical factors and it has been further reinforced through the laws passed in the post-independence period regarding protection of wildlife and various resources and produces of forests. Moreover, as mandated in the Constitution of India, forests symbolize an essential aspect of the territorial integrity of the state. Hence, the powers that have been conferred, both constitutionally and by central governments and cabinet ministries on forest departments and officials over time, is more than the powers that have been granted to other state institutions and departments in the context of control over the state’s natural resources. Therefore, the manner in which forest departments function in relation with citizens as well as in relation with other state institutions and government departments produces and reinforces certain perceptions of the state i.e., authoritarian, autocratic, corrupt, wielding excessive power, curbing group liberties, punitive, among others. In yet some other aspects of governance and everyday life, we find that police forces have unlimited powers and depending on socio-economic status and networks, different citizen groups have different perceptions of and relationships with the police and therefore, of the state which the police forces represent. Groups living in slums and squatter settlements tend to fear and dread police forces most because these groups tend to be marked as criminal owing to their (supposedly) ‘illegal’ occupancy of state/public/private land which in turn makes them the first targets of law and order and markers of criminality. Hence, community based organizations (CBOs) train slum dwellers and squatters, foremost, on how to interact with the police, how to conduct themselves in police stations, and provide them with information regarding the laws and procedures which immediately affect poor people’s lives and their relationship with the police and law and order[iii]. On the other hand, vehicle owning populations tend to the loathe the police (mainly traffic police and beat station cops) for demanding unnecessary bribes and engaging in what are seen to be as extortionist practices.

At this point, it will be instructive and insightful to ask the questions who/what is the state and where is it located (both physically and symbolically). There are myriad answers to this question, as one strand of sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists variously studying the “everyday state” in India and across the world have demonstrated and argued. In the past, scholars such as Philipp Abrams (1988) have questioned whether the state really exists in reality or is it simply an idea, a powerful construct that has been passed down to us by history and theory? Abrams has simultaneously asked questions about the methodologies for studying the state – do we go back to histories and theories to locate and understand the state or do we examine the practices of state more carefully. Each of these approaches carries with it its own problems of studying and explaining the state. Abrams fundamentally suggests that the state is associated with coherence, homogeneity and compositeness, all of which are imaginary attributes that do not exist on the ground. Then, is the concept of the state useful at all and if so, why?

For the purposes of this series on the ‘responsive state’ as well as the larger monograph which tries to trace the history of transparency, ICTs, Internet and politics in India, it is necessary for us to deal with the idea and the different practices of state in as much entirety and variety as may be possible. This is because discourses of transparency, e-governance policies and programmes and the use of ICTs to create/reform citizen-government interfaces are based on a particular idea of the state i.e., a notion of order as stemming from conformity/adherence to law, ‘the state’ as the final arbiter of disputes between peoples, ‘the state’ as the provider of welfare and therefore, ‘the state’ as a benefactor and a benevolent leviathan, and ‘the state’ as rational and orderly and internally coherent, cogent and composite. As I will explain in subsequent posts, ICTs, e-governance systems and the Internet are deployed precisely to reinforce these ideas of the Indian state to the people as well as to reorder, realign and re-engineer processes and personnel who are seen as stepping outside the lines of law and due process. Whether such technological interventions and the technology itself succeeds in enforcing this vision of order and absolute alignment is an issue that necessitates asking several nuanced questions:

How does the state – primarily decision-makers and policy-makers – imagine and understand technology and its application?
How are e-governance policies interpreted and implemented by government officials (and even private parties) on the ground?
How do officials internalize the visions ingrained in e-governance policies and deployments of ICTs and how does this impact the manner in which they implement directives from the state in this regard and subsequently interact with citizens?
Who gains and who loses when ICTs, e-governance and the Internet are deployed to deliver services to people electronically, to provide information and to create better government-citizen interfaces?
How are gains and losses assessed and why are they assessed as such? Who assesses the gains and losses and why?
Are gains and losses absolute and irreversible?
Do some deployments of ICTs, e-governance strategies and the Internet produce impacts that can only be seen and evaluated in the long run?
How does the state – in terms of power, authority, implementation of law and order and preservation of territorial integrity – manifest through the various deployments of ICTs and e-governance policies in different contexts?

These questions regarding the impact of ICTs, Internet and e-governance programmes on different citizen groups as well as the notions and practices of the state require us to turn our attention towards understanding the concepts of government, governance and administration and grounding our understandings of these concepts in the manner in which various government departments and institutions interact with citizens, on an everyday basis, in the process of governing and administering. Revisiting and opening up these concepts is further essential because governments and administrators are responsible for interpreting (and therefore, translating) and implementing the state’s policies and visions on the ground. This does not imply that the state is separate from government and administration. In fact, as we saw in the example of the forest departments and police forces, certain arms of the government and administration can be highly statist in the manner in which they exercise powers, control resources, make decisions and interact with citizens. We also saw above that not all government departments and state institutions are equally comfortable with and aligned with the state idea i.e., in terms of notions of law, order, authority and power. It therefore, becomes necessary to understand how different government departments and administrators understand, embody and even negotiate notions of law, order and power, what are the historical, political and social sources which shape the functioning and ideologies of different government departments, and how are notions of law, order, responsiveness and transparency configured when these different government departments implement various e-governance policies and transparency initiatives in an effort to become responsive.

Let us briefly examine the concept of government and in the process, tackle the important issue of state-society relationship.

Government – the State in Society and the Society in State: Governments are the concrete face of the state and the state idea. They are bodies/institutions/organizations which perform duties of the state and discharge the state’s obligations towards its people. Some of the primary obligations include:

delivering the state’s welfare resources to different citizen groups,
attending to and fulfilling and/or negotiating people’s varied claims and demands for entitlements,
resolving people’s complaints, disputes and grievances,
maintaining law and order and ensuring compliance with law,
providing infrastructure and services that are considered necessary for people’s well-being as well as for the physical territory’s (i.e., the state’s) development and progress.

Governments are expected to function in ways that aid in maintaining the integrity of the territory and therefore, the authority of the state. Governments must therefore, follow the policies formulated by the state and implement them in letter and spirit. However, implementation rarely happens in the exact letter and spirit because of a variety of factors including:

1. Inadequate release of funds which in turn is triggered by factors such as competition over power, territory and loyalty, competition between political parties, poor allocation to essential budgetary heads in the programme implementation, desire within government agencies to curb the autonomy of individual departments/personnel by providing fewer funds, etc.

2. Existing competition between administrative agencies, government employees and decision-makers which can be altered because of implementation. This, in turn, can prevent implementation altogether or, the implementing authorities may implement policies in a way that aids in preserving certain kinds of autonomy, powers and interests of the implementing agencies.

3. Multiple claims that arise in the course of implementation which in turn puts implementation on a sticky course and alters the letter(s) and spirit of the original policies as government agencies, administrators and the various implementing authorities negotiate (and even suppress) the claims made by different interest groups (which includes citizen groups, government agencies themselves, middlemen, competing political parties, among others).

Essentially then, government institutions and departments – the concrete faces of the state – are mired in multiple claims and interests not only with respect to implementation but also in the way in which they function in everyday life. These claims are advanced not only by citizen groups but also by the very employees of governments and by agencies and authorities related with various aspects of the governments’ functioning. Here, we need to address the issue of state-in-society and society-in-state which tends to be overlooked and even ignored in accounts and theories about the state. The state – wherever is experienced and however, it is sighted – is part of the gamut known as society. This means that the people working as government employees/state employees are simultaneously members of other networks and social groups. Consequently, they hold and embody various views and ideas that may be in consonance with as well as contradictory to notions of power, authority, law and order. These government employees also compete for the resources of the state – water, sanitation, housing sites, roads, electricity – as much as they are responsible for delivering the same resources to different citizen groups. In the process of delivery of welfare and service provision then, interests are shaped from time to time depending on the socio-economic and political positions of the administrators, bureaucrats and people’s representatives in charge as well as their association with various kinds of networks that enable them to maintain/enhance their personal/institutional positions and powers. Some of these interests and networks also shape the roles of government employees and administrators i.e., elected representatives, municipal field staff, engineers, etc., can also become middlemen in the process of delivering services and resources. How they function as middlemen depends on the resources in question as well as the political, social and administrative contexts in which the services are provided.

This aspect of state-in-society which is visible when we closely examine how governments and administrative departments and institutions function is an important factor that not only shapes interests and policy implementation but also influences that manner in which the state – power, authority, law and order – manifests in the interactions between citizens and governments. Therefore, when attempts are made to reconfigure or reform the interfaces between governments and citizens by introducing e-governance tools and ICTs, essentially the entire gamut of networks, social norms, conventions and negotiations that underlies government-citizen interfacing is tried to be put in line with a rational conception of law, due process and order. This implies that certain arms of the state attempt to reinforce and reorder particular government departments and functionaries in line with the idea of the rational, orderly and law enforcing state. (These arms of the state could be the central government in New Delhi, central government departments in New Delhi and state governments trying to align departments and functionaries working at different levels in the federal system hierarchy.) In turn, this means that the complexities in government-citizen interfacing – middlemen, opaque procedures, inadequate information, use of personal discretion, mobilization of political, economic and personal networks - are tried to be straightened through the application of technology which is viewed as neutral and capable of enforcing order and uniformity in procedures and service delivery. Therefore, it becomes essential to understand how different government departments function and how various services are delivered in order to assess where technology is/gets situated and how technology reorders/realigns government functionaries in line with the statist notions of law, order and fairness.

By way of a conclusion …: I will end this post here, leaving it for readers to ruminate and think over the ideas presented here. I will return back in the next post with a more concrete history of how and why ICTs, e-governance and Internet have been deployed in India to usher transparency and responsiveness in the functioning of the state via government agencies and departments. The concrete description will help put into perspective some of the conceptual issues and insights discussed in this post.

Till then, adios!

References:

Abrams, Philip. March 1988. “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State”. Journal of Historical Sociology. Vol. 1 (1): 58-89.

C. J. Fuller and V. Benei (eds). 2000. The Everyday State and Society in Modern India. New Delhi: D. K. Publishers.

Corbridge, Stuart, Glynn Williams, Manoj Srivastava and Rene Veron. (2005) Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Elyachar, Julia. 2005. Markets of Dispossession: NGOS, Economic Development and the State in Cairo. Duke University Press: Durham and London.

Moore, Sally Falk. 1973. “Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study.” Law and Society Review. Vol. 7 (4): 719-746.

Tarlo, Emma. 2003. Unsettling Memories: Narratives of India’s ‘Emergency’. Delhi: Permanent Black.

Also see …

Gupta, Akhil and James Fergusson. 2002. “Spatializing States: Towards An Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality”. American Ethnologist. Vol. 29 (4): 981-1002. See mainly part one on conceptual issues – spatializing states.

[i] The concept of “field” is borrowed from Sally Falk Moore’s (1973) model of the “semi-autonomous social field”. Moore suggests that a ‘field’ is a concrete, observable arena that generates rules and is simultaneously influenced by agencies and forces from outside (720). The notion of the ‘field’ aids in more a concrete and nuanced study of institutions especially the immediate and larger contexts in which institutions function and how this influences their functioning, why actors make particular decisions in certain circumstances, and how rules are formulated, adhered and resisted. Analyses will vary depending on how we map the field and which actors and factors we include/exclude and give primacy to in the given field.

[ii] Here, it is important to note that despite advocacy and practice of independence of judiciary, the judicial system of a nation functions on the principle of the ‘law of the land’ and maintaining the integrity and compositeness of the physical territory. In this respect, belief in the state’s judicial system continues to perpetuate the belief that there is a singular and ultimate source and arbiter of law, in this case the judicial system, even when the judiciary can strike down the decisions made by the executive organs of the state. Therefore, even if the judiciary is independent, the way in which it functions is to maintain and preserve the state system (i.e. the territory) and the statist quo (i.e. the state system and authority).

[iii] Interviews with social workers from community based organizations in Mumbai, conducted between May and November 2009.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/histories-of-the-internet/blogs/transparency-and-politics/of-the-state-and-the-governments-the-abstract-the-concrete-and-the-responsive

Consultation on Draft E-commerce Policy

Admin — 2019-03-20T15:47:02Z

Alternative Law Forum and IT for Change organized a public consultation on draft e-commerce policy on March 14, 2019 at Tony Hall, Ashirwad , Off St.Marks Road in Bangalore. Arindrajit Basu attended the event.

The newly created Department Promotion of Industry and Indian Trade has published a draft e-commerce policy ( [ https://dipp.gov.in/whats-new/draft-national-e-commerce-policy-stakeholder-comments | https://dipp.gov.in/whats-new/draft-national-e-commerce-policy-stakeholder-comments ] ) inviting public comments with a deadline of March end. All actors involved in commerce – from traders, to street vendors, to vendors selling on online platforms, apart from domestic and foreign e-commerce companies are greatly impacted by this new policy. At one level, this policy would determine the relative power among these actors vying for the Indian retail space. At another level, however, the draft policy is about who should own personal, social and commercial data that is behind e-commerce – whether people and communities about whom the data is or it can entirely be owned and appropriated by the e-commerce companies, mostly foreign ones, who collect the data. EU is also examining whether data about and around products put by sellers on online platforms is owned by the these sellers or by platforms. These are issues which need wide and deep discussions by all sections of society from traders , technology enthusiasts, lawyers, civil society and all others. However there is very little public discussions on the same. It is towards this end that we are organising this discussions. We would also like to explore possible inputs that different groups can make to the policy. The Joint Action Committee Against Foreign Retail and E-commerce is one group that has prepared some points on behalf of traders community, which are enclosed, and these too can be discussed at the meeting among others.

The discussion was a first of many more discussions. The participants of this consultation were researchers, lawyers, street vendors union representatives, traders associations representatives and others.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/consultation-on-draft-e-commerce-policy

Regulatory Perspectives on Net Neutrality

pranesh — 2015-07-18T02:46:30Z

In this paper Pranesh Prakash gives an overview on why India needs to put in place net neutrality regulations, and the form that those regulations must take to avoid being over-regulation.

With assistance by Vidushi Marda (Programme Officer, Centre for Internet and Society) and Tarun Krishnakumar (Research Volunteer, Centre for Internet and Society). I would like to specially thank Vishal Misra, Steve Song, Rudolf van der Berg, Helani Galpaya, A.B. Beliappa, Amba Kak, and Sunil Abraham for extended discussions, helpful suggestions and criticisms. However, this paper is not representative of their views, which are varied.

Today, we no longer live in a world of "roti, kapda, makaan", but in the world of "roti, kapda, makaan aur broadband". ^{^[1]} This is recognized by the National Telecom Policy IV.1.2, which states the need to "recognise telecom, including broadband connectivity as a basic necessity like education and health and work towards 'Right to Broadband'."^{^[2]} According to the IAMAI, as of October 2014, India had 278 million internet users. ^{^[3]} Of these, the majority access Internet through their mobile phones, and the WEF estimates only 3 in 100 have broadband on their mobiles.^{^[4]} Thus, the bulk of our population is without broadband. Telecom regulation and net neutrality has a very important role in enabling this vision of Internet as a basic human need that we should aim to fulfil.

1. Why should we regulate the telecom sector?

All ICT regulation should be aimed at achieving five goals: achieving universal, affordable access; ^{^[5]} ensuring and sustaining effective competition in an efficient market and avoiding market failures; protecting against consumer harms; ensuring maximum utility of the network by ensuring interconnection; and addressing state needs (taxation, security, etc.). Generally, all these goals go hand in hand, however some tensions may arise. For instance, universal access may not be provided by the market because the costs of doing so in certain rural or remote areas may outweigh the immediate monetary benefits private corporations could receive in terms of profits from those customers. In such cases, to further the goal of universal access, schemes such as universal service obligation funds are put in place, while ensuring that such schemes either do not impact competition or very minimally impact it.

It is clear that to maximise societal benefit, effective regulation of the ICT sector is a requirement, which otherwise, due to the ability of dominant players to abuse network effect to their advantage, is inherently prone towards monopolies. For instance, in the absence of regulation, a dominant player would charge far less for intra-network calls than inter-network calls, making customers shift to the dominant network. This kind of harm to competition should be regulated by the ICT regulator. However, it is equally true that over-regulation is as undesirable as under-regulation, since over-regulation harms innovation - whether in the form of innovative technologies or innovative business models. The huge spurt of growth globally of the telecom sector since the 1980s has resulted not merely from advancements in technology, but in large part from the de-monopolisation and deregulation of the telecom sector.^{^[6]} Similarly, the Internet has largely flourished under very limited technology-specific regulation. For instance, while interconnection between different telecom networks is heavily regulated in the domestic telecom sector, interconnection between the different autonomous systems (ASes) that make up the Internet is completely unregulated, thereby allowing for non-transparent pricing and opaque transactions. Given this context, we must ensure we do not over-regulate, lest we kill innovation.

2. Why should we regulate Net Neutrality? And whom should we regulate?

We wouldn't need to regulate Net Neutrality if ISPs were not "gatekeepers" for last-mile access. "Gatekeeping" occurs when a single company establishes itself as an exclusive route to reach a large number of people and businesses or, in network terms, nodes. It is not possible for Internet services to reach the customers of the telecom network without passing through the telecom network. The situation is very different in the middle-mile and for backhaul. Even though anti-competitive terms may exist in the middle-mile, especially given the opacity of terms in "transit agreements", a packet is usually able to travel through multiple routes if one route is too expensive (even if that is not the shortest network path, and is thus inefficient in a way). However, this multiplicity of routes is not possible in the last mile.

This leaves last mile telecom operators (ISPs) in a position to unfairly discriminate between different Internet services or destinations or applications, while harming consumer choice. This is why we believe that promoting the five goals mentioned above would require regulation of last-mile telecom operators to prevent unjust discrimination against end-users and content providers.

Thus, net neutrality is the principle that we should regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic.

3. How should we regulate Net Neutrality?

3.1. What concerns does Net Neutrality raise? What harms does it entail?

Discriminatory practices at the level of access to the Internet raises the following set of concerns:

1. Freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and privacy.

2. Harm to effective competition

a. This includes competition amongst ISPs as well as competition amongst content providers.

b. Under-regulation here may cause harm to innovation at the content provider level, including through erecting barriers to entry.

c. Over-regulation here may cause harm to innovation in terms of ISP business models.

3. Harm to consumers

a. Under-regulation here may harm consumer choice and the right to freedom of speech, expression, and communication.

b. Over-regulation on this ground may cause harm to innovation at the level of networking technologies and be detrimental to consumers in the long run.

4. Harm to "openness" and interconnectedness of the Internet, including diversity (of access, of content, etc.)

a. Exceptions for specialized services should be limited to preserve the open and interconnectedness of the Internet and of the World Wide Web.

It might help to think about Net Neutrality as primarily being about two overlapping sets of regulatory issues: preferential treatment of particular Internet-based services (in essence: content- or source-/destination-based discrimination, i.e., discrimination on basis of 'whose traffic it is'), or discriminatory treatment of applications or protocols (which would include examples like throttling of BitTorrent traffic, high overage fees upon breaching Internet data caps on mobile phones, etc., i.e., discrimination on the basis of 'what kind of traffic it is').

Situations where the negative or positive discrimination happens on the basis of particular content or address should be regulated through the use of competition principles, while negative or positive discrimination at the level of specific class of content, protocols, associated ports, and other such sender-/receiver-agnostic features, should be regulated through regulation of network management techniques . The former deals with instances where the question of "in whose favour is there discrimination" may be asked, while the latter deals with the question "in favour of what is there discrimination".

In order to do this, a regulator like TRAI can use both hard regulation - price ceilings, data cap floors, transparency mandates, preventing specific anti-competitive practices, etc. - as well as soft regulation - incentives and disincentives.

3.1.1 Net Neutrality and human rights

Any discussion on the need for net neutrality impugns the human rights of a number of different stakeholders. Users, subscribers, telecom operators and ISPs all possess distinct and overlapping rights that are to be weighed against each other before the scope, nature and form of regulatory intervention are finalised. The freedom of speech, right to privacy and right to carry on trade raise some of the most pertinent questions in this regard.

For example, to properly consider issues surrounding the practice of paid content-specific zero-rating from a human rights point of view, one must seek to balance the rights of content providers to widely disseminate their 'speech' to the largest audiences against the rights of consumers to have access to a diverse variety of different, conflicting and contrasting ideas.

This commitment to a veritable marketplace or free-market of ideas has formed the touchstone of freedom of speech law in jurisdictions across the world as well as finding mention in pronouncements of the Indian Supreme Court. Particular reference is to be made to the dissent of Mathew, J. inBennett Coleman v. Union of India^{^[7]} and of the majority Sakal Papers v. Union of India^{^[8]} which rejected the approach.

Further, the practice of deep-packet inspection, which is sometimes used in the process of network management, raises privacy concerns as it seeks to go beyond what is "public" information in the header of an IP packet, necessary for routing, to analysing non-public information. ^{^[9]}

3.2 What conditions and factors may change these concerns and the regulatory model we should adopt?

While the principles relating to Net Neutrality remain the same in all countries (i.e., trying to prevent gatekeepers from unjustly exploiting their position), the severity of the problem varies depending on competition in the market, on the technologies, and on many other factors. One way to measure fair or stable allocation of the surplus created by a network - or a network-of-networks like the Internet - is by treating it as a convex cooperation game and thereupon calculating that game's Shapley value:^{^[10]} in the case of the Internet, this would be a game involving content ISPs, transit ISPs, and eyeball (i.e., last-mile) ISPs. The Shapley value changes depending on the number of competitors there are in the market: thus, the fair/stable allocation when there's vibrant competition in the market is different from the fair/stable allocation in a market without such competition. That goes to show that a desirable approach when an ISP tries to unjustly enrich itself by charging other network-participants may well be to increase competition, rather than directly regulating the last-mile ISP. Further, it shows that in a market with vibrant last-mile competition, the capacity of the last-mile ISP to unjustly are far diminished.

In countries which are remote and have little international bandwidth, the need to conserve that bandwidth is high. ISPs can regulate that by either increasing prices of Internet connections for all, or by imposing usage restrictions (such as throttling) on either heavy users or bandwidth-hogging protocols. If the amount of international bandwidth is higher, the need and desire on part of ISPs to indulge in such usage restrictions decreases. Thus, the need to regulate is far higher in the latter case, than in the former case.

The above paragraphs show that both the need for regulation and also the form that the regulation should take depend on a variety of conditions that aren't immediately apparent.

Thus, the framework that the regulator sets out to tackle issues relating to Net Neutrality are most important, whereas the specific rules may need to change depending on changes in conditions. These conditions include:

● last-mile market

○ switching costs between equivalent service providers

○ availability of an open-access last-mile

○ availability of a "public option" neutral ISP

○ increase or decrease in the competition, both in wired and mobile ISPs.

● interconnection market

○ availability of well-functioning peering exchanges

○ availability of low-cost transit

● technology and available bandwidth

○ spectrum efficiency

○ total amount of international bandwidth and local network bandwidth

● conflicting interests of ISPs

○ do the ISPs have other business interests other than providing Internet connectivity? (telephony, entertainment, etc.)

3.3 How should we deal with anti-competitive practices?

Anti-competitive practices in the telecom sector can take many forms: Abuse of dominance, exclusion of access to specific services, customer lock-in, predatory pricing, tying of services, cross-subsidization, etc., are a few of them. In some cases the anti-competitive practice targets other telecom providers, while in others it targets content providers. In the both cases, it is important to ensure that ensure that telecom subscribers have a competitive choice between effectively substitutable telecom providers and an ability to seamlessly switch between providers.

3.3.1 Lowering Switching Costs

TRAI has tackled many of these issues head on, especially in the mobile telephony space, while competitive market pressures have helped too:

● Contractual or transactional lock-in. The easiest way to prevent shifting from one network to another is by contractually mandating a lock-in period, or by requiring special equipment (interoperability) to connect to one's network. In India, this is not practised in the telecom sector, with the exception of competing technologies like CDMA and GSM. Non-contractual lock-ins, for instance by offering discounts for purchasing longer-term packages, are not inherently anti-competitive unless that results in predatory pricing or constitutes an abuse of market dominance. In India, switching from one mobile provider to another, though initiated 15 years into the telecom revolution, is in most cases now almost as easy as buying a new SIM card.^{^[11]} TRAI may consider proactive regulation against contractual lock-in.

● Number of competitors. Even if switching from one network to another is easy, it is not useful unless there are other equivalent options to switch to. In the telecom market, coverage is a very important factor in judging equivalence. Given that last mile connectivity is extremely expensive to provide, the coverage of different networks are very different, and this is even more true when one considers wired connectivity, which is difficult to lay in densely-populated urban and semi-urban areas and unprofitable in sparsely-populated areas. The best way to increase the number of competitors is to make it easier for competitors to exist. Some ways of doing this would be through enabling spectrum-sharing, lowering right-of-way rents, allowing post-auction spectrum trading, and promoting open-access last-mile fibre carriers and to thereby encourage competition on the basis of price and service and not exclusive access to infrastructure.

● Interconnection and mandatory carriage. The biggest advantage a dominant telecom player has is exclusive access to its customer base. Since in the telecom market, no telco wants to not connect to customers of another telco, they do not outright ban other networks. However, dominant players can charge high prices from other networks, thereby discriminating against smaller networks. In the early 2000s, Airtel-to-Airtel calls were much cheaper than Airtel-to-Spice calls. However, things have significantly changed since then. TRAI has, since the 2000s, heavily regulated interconnection and imposed price controls on interconnection ("termination") charges.^{^[12]} Thus, now, generally, inter-network calls are priced similarly to intra-network calls. And if you want cheaper Airtel-to-Airtel calls, you can buy a special (unbundled) pack that enables an Airtel customer to take advantage of the fact that her friends are also on the same network, and benefits Airtel since they do not in such cases have to pay termination charges. Recently, TRAI has even made the interconnection rates zero in three cases: landline-to-landline, landline-to-cellular, and cellular-to-landline, in a bid to decrease landline call rates, and incentivise them, allowing a very low per call interconnection charges of 14 paise for cellular-to-cellular connections. ^{^[13]}

○ With regard to Net Neutrality, we must have a rule that no termination charges or carriage charges may be levied by any ISP upon any Internet service. No Internet service may be discriminated against with regard to carriage conditions or speeds or any other quality of service metric. In essence all negative discrimination should be prohibited. This means that Airtel cannot forcibly charge WhatsApp or any other OTT (which essentially form a different "layer") money for the "privilege" of being able to reach Airtel customers, nor may Airtel slow down WhatsApp traffic and thus try to force WhatsApp to pay. There is a duty on telecom providers to carry any legitimate traffic ("common carriage"), not a privilege. It is important to note that consumer-facing TSPs get paid by other interconnecting Internet networks in the form of transit charges (or the TSP's costs are defrayed through peering). There shouldn't be any separate charge on the basis of content (different layer from the carriage) rather than network (same layer as the carriage). This principle is especially important for startups, and which are often at the receiving end of such discriminatory practices.

● Number Portability. One other factor that prevents users from shifting between one network and another is the fact that they have to change an important aspect of their identity: their phone number (this doesn't apply to Internet over DSL, cable, etc.). At least in the mobile space, TRAI has for several years tried to mandate seamless mobile number portability. The same is being tried by the European Commission in the EU. ^{^[14]} While intra-circle mobile number portability exists in India - and TRAI is pushing for inter-circle mobile number portability as well^{^[15]} - this is nowhere as seamless as it should be.

● Multi-SIM phones. The Indian market is filled with phones that can accommodate multiple SIM cards, enabling customers to shift seamlessly between multiple networks. This is true not just in India, but most developing countries with extremely price-sensitive customers. Theoretically, switching costs would approach zero if in a market with full coverage by n telecom players every subscriber had a phone with n SIM slots with low-cost SIM cards being available.

The situation in the telecom sector with respect to the above provides a stark contrast to the situation in the USA, and to the situation in the DTH market. In the USA, phones get sold at discounts with multi-month or multi-year contracts, and contractual lock-ins are a large problem. Keeping each of the above factors in mind, the Indian mobile telecom space is far more competitive than the US mobile telecom space.

Further, in the Indian DTH market, given that there is transactional lock-in (set-top boxes aren't interoperable in practice, though are mandated to be so by law^{^[16]}), there are fewer choices in the market; further, the equivalent of multi-SIM phones don't exist with respect to set-top boxes. Further, while there are must-carry rules with respect to carriage, they can be of three types: 1) must mandatorily provide access to particular channels^{^[17]} (positive obligation, usually for government channels); 2) prevented from not providing particular channels (negative obligation, to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and political censorship); and 3) must mandatorily offer access to at least a set number of channels (positive obligation for ensuring market diversity). ^{^[18]} Currently, only (1) is in force, since despite attempts by TRAI to ensure (3) as well.^{^[19]}

If the shifting costs are low and transparency in terms of network practice is reported in a standard manner and well-publicised, then that significantly weakens the "gatekeeper effect", which as we saw earlier, is the reason why we wish to introduce Net Neutrality regulation. This consequently means, as explained above in section 3.2, that despite the same Net Neutrality principles applying in all markets and countries, the precise form that the Net Neutrality regulations take in a telecom market with low switching costs would be different from the form that such regulations would take in a market with high switching costs.

3.3.2 Anti-competitive Practices

Some potential anti-competitive practices, which are closely linked, are cross-subsidization, tying (anti-competitive bundling) of multiple services, and vertical price squeeze. All three of these are especial concerns now, with the increased diversification of traditional telecom companies, and with the entry into telecom (like with DTH) of companies that create content. Hence, if Airtel cross-subsidizes the Hike chat application that it recently acquired, ^{^[20]} or if Reliance Infocomm requires customers to buy a subscription to an offering from Reliance Big Entertainment, or if Reliance Infocomm meters traffic from another Reliance Big Entertainment differently from that from Saavn, all those would be violative of the principle of non-discrimination by gatekeepers. This same analysis can be applied to all unpaid deals and non-commercial deals, including schemes such as Internet.org and Wikipedia Zero, which will be covered later in the section on zero-rating.

While we have general rules such as sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, we do not currently have specific rules prohibiting these or other anti-competitive practices, and we need Net Neutrality regulation that clearly prohibit such anti-competitive practices so that the telecom regulator can take action for non-compliance . We cannot leave these specific policy prescriptions unstated, even if they are provided for in section 3 of the Competition Act. These concerns are especial concerns in the telecom sector, and the telecom regulator or arbitrator should have the power to directly deal with these, instead of each case going to the Competition Commission of India. This should not affect the jurisdiction of the CCI to investigate and adjudicate such matters, but should ensure that TRAI both has suo motu powers, and that the mechanism to complain is made simple (unlike the current scenario, where some individual complainants may fall in the cracks between TRAI and TDSAT).

3.3.3 Zero-rating

Since a large part of the net neutrality debate in India involves zero-rating practices, we deal with that in some length. Zero-rating is the practice of not counting (aka "zero-rating") certain traffic towards a subscriber's regular Internet usage. The zero-rated traffic could be zero-priced or fixed-price; capped or uncapped; subscriber-paid, Internet service-paid, paid for by both, or unpaid; content- or source/destination-based, or agnostic to content or source/destination; automatically provided by the ISP or chosen by the customer . The motivations for zero-rating may also be varied, as we shall see below. Further, depending on the circumstances, zero-rating could be competitive or anti-competitive. All forms of zero-rating result in some form of discrimination, but not all zero-rating is harmful, nor does all zero-rating need to be prohibited.

While, as explained in the section on interconnection and carriage above, negative discrimination at the network level should be prohibited, that leaves open the question of positive discrimination. It follows from section 3.1 that the right frame of analysis of this question is harm to competition, since the main harm zero-rating is, as we shall see below, about discriminating between different content providers, and not discrimination at the level of protocols, etc.

Whether one should allow for any form of positive discrimination at the network level or not depends on whether positive discrimination of (X) has an automatic and unfair negative impact on all (~X). That, in turn, depends on whether (~X) is being subject to unfair competition. As Wikipedia notes, "unfair competition means that the gains of some participants are conditional on the losses of others, when the gains are made in ways which are illegitimate or unjust." Thus, positive discrimination that has a negative impact on effective competition shall not be permitted, since in such cases it is equivalent to negative discrimination ("zero-sum game") . Positive discrimination that does not have a negative impact on effective competition may be permitted, especially since it results in increased access and increases consumer benefit, as long as the harm to openness and diversity is minimized .

While considering this, one should keep in mind the fact that startups were, 10-15 years ago, at a huge disadvantage with regard to wholesale data purchase. The marketplaces for data centres and for content delivery networks (which speed up delivery of content by being located closer, in network terms, to multiple last-mile ISPs) were nowhere near as mature as they are today, and the prices were high. There was a much higher barrier to startup entry than there is today, due to the prices and due to larger companies being able to rely on economies of scale to get cheaper rates. Was that unfair? No. There is no evidence of anti-competitive practices, nor of startups complaining about such practices. Therefore, that was fair competition, despite specific input costs that were arguably needed (though not essential) for startups to compete being priced far beyond their capacity to pay.

Today the marketplace is very different, with a variety of offerings. CDNs such as Cloudflare, which were once the preserve of rich companies, even have free offerings, thus substantially lowering barriers for startups that want faster access to customers across the globe.

Is a CDN an essential cost for a startup? No. But in an environment where speed matters and customers use or don't use a service depending on speed; and where the startup's larger competitors are all using CDNs, a startup more or less has to. Thankfully, given the cheap access to CDNs these days, that cost is not too high for a startup to bear. If the CDN market was not competitive enough, would a hypothetical global regulator have been justified in outright banning the use of CDNs to 'level' the playing field? No, because the hypothetical global regulator instead had the option to (and would have been justified in) regulating the market to ensure greater competition.

A regulator should not prohibit an act that does not negatively impact access, competition, consumer benefit, nor openness (including diversity), since that would be over-regulation and would harm innovation.

3.3.3.1 Motivations for Zero-Rating

3.3.3.1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility / Incentivizing Customers to Move Up Value Chain

There exist multiple instances where there is no commercial transaction between the OTT involved and the telecom carrier, in which zero-priced zero-rating of specific Internet content happens. We know that there is no commercial transaction either through written policy (Wikipedia Zero) or through public statements (Internet.org, a bouquet of sites). In such cases, the telecom provider would either be providing such services out of a sense of public interest, given the social value of those services, or would be providing such services out of self-interest, to showcase the value of particular Internet set the same time.

The apprehended risk is that of such a scheme creating a "walled garden", where users would be exposed only to those services which are free since the search and discovery costs of non-free Internet (i.e., any site outside the "walled garden") would be rather high. This risk, while real, is rather slim given the fact that the economic incentives for those customers who have the ability to pay for "Internet packs" but currently do not find a compelling reason to do so, or out of both a sense of public interest and self-interest of the telecom providers works against this.

In such non-commercial zero-priced zero-rating, a telecom provider would only make money if and only if subscribers start paying for sites outside of the walled garden. If subscribers are happy in the walled garden, the telecom provider starts losing money, and hence has a strong motivation to stop that scheme. If on the other hand, enough subscribers start becoming paying customers to offset the cost of providing the zero-priced zero-rated service(s) and make it profitable, that shows that despite the availability of zero-priced options a number of customers will opt for paid access to the open Internet and the open Web, and the overall harms of such zero-priced zero-rating would be minimal. Hence, the telecom providers have an incentive to keep the costs of Internet data packs low, thus encouraging customers who otherwise wouldn't pay for the Internet to become paying customers.

There is the potential of consumer harm when users seek to access a site outside of the walled garden, and find to their dismay that they have been charged for the Internet at a hefty rate, and their prepaid balance has greatly decreased. This is an issue that TRAI is currently appraised of, and a suitable solution would need to be found to protect consumers against such harm.

All in all, given that the commercial interests of the telecom providers align with the healthy practice of non-discrimination, this form of limited positive discrimination is not harmful in the long run, particularly because it is not indefinitely sustainable for a large number of sites. Hence, it may not be useful to ban this form of zero-priced zero-rating of services as long as they aren't exclusive, or otherwise anti-competitive (a vertical price-squeeze, for instance), and the harm to consumers is prohibited and the harm to openness/diversity is minimized.

3.3.3.1.2 Passing on ISP Savings / Incentivizing Customers to Lower ISP's Cost

Suppose, for instance, an OTT uses a CDN located, in network distance terms, near an eyeball ISP. In this case, the ISP has to probably pay less than it would have to had the same data been located in a data centre located further away, given that it would have fewer interconnection-related charges.

Hence the monetary costs of providing access to different Web destinations are not equal for the ISP. This cost can be varied either by the OTT (by it locating the data closer to the ISP - through a CDN, by co-locating where the ISP is also present, or by connecting to an Internet Exchange Point which the ISP is also connected to - or by it directly "peering" with the ISP) or by the ISP (by engaging in "transparent proxying" in which case the ISP creates caches at the ISP level of specific content (usually by caching non-encrypted data the ISP's customers request) and serves the cached content when a user requests a site, rather than serving the actual site). None of the practices so far mentioned are discriminatory from the customer's perspective with regard either to price or to prioritization, though all of them enable faster speeds to specific content. Hence none of the above-mentioned practices are considered even by the most ardent Net Neutrality advocates to be violations of that principle. ^{^[21]} However, if an ISP zero-rates the content to either pass on its savings to the customer^{^[22]} or to incentivize the customer to access services that cost the ISP less in terms of interconnection costs, that creates a form of price discrimination for the customer, despite it benefiting the consumer.

The essential economic problem is that the cost to the ISP is variable, but the cost to the customer is fixed. Importantly, this problem is exacerbated in India where web hosting prices are high, transit prices are high, peering levels are low, and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) are not functioning well. ^{^[23]} These conditions create network inefficiencies in terms of hosting of content further away from Indian networks in terms of network distance, and thus harms consumers as well as local ISPs. In order to set this right, zero-rating of this sort may be permitted as it acts as an incentive towards fixing the market fundamentals. However, once the market fundamentals are fixed, such zero-rating may be prohibited.

This example shows that the desirability or otherwise of discriminatory practices depends fully on the conditions present in the market, including in terms of interconnection costs.

3.3.3.1.3 Unbundling Internet into Services ("Special Packs")

Since at least early 2014, mobile operators have been marketing special zero-rating "packs". These packs, if purchased by the customer, allow capped or in some instances uncapped, zero-rating of a service such as WhatsApp or Facebook, meaning traffic to/from that service will not be counted against their regular Internet usage.

For a rational customer, purchasing such a pack only makes sense in one of two circumstances:

● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, but has not purchased an "Internet data pack" since she doesn't find the Internet valuable. Instead, she has heard about "WhatsApp", has friends who are on it, and wishes to use that to reduce her SMS costs (and thereby eat into the carriage provider's ability to charge separately for SMSes). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for around ₹25 a month instead of paying ₹95 for an all-inclusive Internet data pack.

● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, and has purchased an "Internet data pack". However, that data pack is capped and she has to decide between using WhatsApp and surfing web sites. She is on multiple WhatsApp groups and her WhatsApp traffic eats up 65% of her data cap. She thus has to choose between the two, since she doesn't want to buy two Internet data packs (each costing around ₹95 for a month). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for ₹25 a month, paying a cumulative total of ₹120 instead of ₹190 which she would have had to had she bought two Internet data packs. In this situation, "unbundling" is happening, and this benefits the consumer. Such unbundling harms the openness and integrity of the Internet.

If users did not find value in the "special" data packs, and there is no market demand for such products, they will cease to be offered. Thus, assuming a telco's decision to offer such packs is purely customer-demand driven - and not due to deals it has struck with service providers - if Orkut is popular, telcos would be interested in offering Orkut packs and if Facebook is popular, they would be interested in offering a Facebook pack. Thus, clearly, there is nothing anti-competitive about such customer-paid zero-rating packs, whereas they clearly enhance consumer benefit. Would this increase the popularity of Orkut or Facebook? Potentially yes. But to prohibit this would be like prohibiting a supermarket from selectively (and non-collusively) offering discounts on popular products. Would that make already popular products even more popular? Potentially, yes. But that would not be seen as a harm to competition but would be seen as fair competition. This contravenes the "openness" of the Internet (i.e., the integral interconnected diversity that an open network like the Internet embodies) as an independent regulatory goal. The Internet, being a single gateway to a mind-boggling variety of services, allows for a diverse "long tail", which would lose out if the Internet was seen solely as a gateway to popular apps, sites, and content. However, given that this is a choice exercised freely by the consumer, such packs should not be prohibited, as that would be a case of over-regulation.

The one exception to the above analysis of competition, needless to say, is if that these special packs aren't purely customer-demand driven and are the product of special deals between an OTT and the telco. In that case, we need to ensure it isn't anti-competitive by following the prescriptions of the next section.

3.3.3.1.4 Earning Additional Revenues from Content Providers

With offerings like Airtel Zero, we have a situation where OTT companies are offering to pay for wholesale data access used by their customers, and make accessing their specific site or app free for the customer. From the customer's perspective, this is similar to a toll-free number or a pre-paid envelope or free-to-air TV channel being offered on a particular network.

However, from the network perspective, these are very different. Even if a customer-company pays Airtel for the toll-free number, that number is accessible and toll-free across all networks since the call terminates on Airtel networks and Airtel pays the connecting network back the termination charge from the fee they are paid by the customer-company. This cannot happen in case of the Internet, since the "call" terminates outside of the reach of the ISP being paid for zero-rating by the OTT company; hence unless specific measures are taken, zero-rating has to be network-specific.

The comparison to free-to-air channels is also instructive, since in 2010 TRAI made recommendations that consumers should have the choice of accessing free-to-air channels à-la-carte, without being tied up to a bouquet.^{^[24]} This would, in essence, allow a subscriber to purchase a set-top box, and without paying a regular subscription fee watch free-to-air channels. ^{^[25]} However, similar to toll-free numbers, these free-to-air channels are free-to-air on all MSO's set-top boxes, unlike the proposed Airtel Zero scheme under which access to a site like Flipkart would be free for customers on Airtel's network alone.

Hence, these comparisons, while useful in helping think through the regulatory and competition issues, should not be used as instructive exact analogies, since they aren't fully comparable situations.

3.3.3.1.5 Market Options for OTT-Paid Zero-Rating

As noted above, a competitive marketplace already exists for wholesale data purchase at the level of "content ISPs" (including CDNs), which sell wholesale data to content providers (OTTs). This market is at present completely unregulated. The deals that exist are treated as commercial secrets. It is almost certain that large OTTs get better rates than small startups due to economies of scale.

However, at the eyeball ISP level, it is a single-sided market with ISPs competing to gain customers in the form of end-users. With a scheme like "Airtel Zero", this would get converted into a double-sided market, with a gatekeeper without whom neither side can reach the other being in the middle creating a two-sided toll. This situation is ripe for market abuse: this situation allows the gatekeeper to hinder access to those OTTs that don't pay the requisite toll or to provide preferential access to those who pay, apart from providing an ISP the opportunity to "double-dip".

One way to fix this is to prevent ISPs from establishing a double-sided market. The other way would be to create a highly-regulated market where the gatekeeping powers of the ISP are diminished, and the ISP's ability to leverage its exclusive access over its customers are curtailed. A comparison may be drawn here to the rules that are often set by standard-setting bodies where patents are involved: given that these patents are essential inputs, access to them must be allowed through fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licences. Access to the Internet and common carriers like telecom networks, being even more important (since alternatives exist to particular standards, but not to the Internet itself), must be placed at an even higher pedestal and thus even stricter regulation to ensure fair competition.

A marketplace of this sort would impose some regulatory burdens on TRAI and place burdens on innovations by the ISPs, but a regulated marketplace harms ISP innovation less than not allowing a market at all.

At a minimum, such a marketplace must ensure non-exclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency. Thus, at a minimum, a telecom provider cannot discriminate between any OTTs who want similar access to zero-rating. Further, a telecom provider cannot prevent any OTT from zero-rating with any other telecom provider. To ensure that telecom providers are actually following this stipulation, transparency is needed, as a minimum.

Transparency can take one of two forms: transparency to the regulator alone and transparency to the public. Transparency to the regulator alone would enable OTTs and ISPs to keep the terms of their commercial transactions secret from their competitors, but enable the regulator, upon request, to ensure that this doesn't lead to anti-competitive practices. This model would increase the burden on the regulator, but would be more palatable to OTTs and ISPs, and more comparable to the wholesale data market where the terms of such agreements are strictly-guarded commercial secrets. On the other hand, requiring transparency to the public would reduce the burden on the regulator, despite coming at a cost of secrecy of commercial terms, and is far more preferable.

Beyond transparency, a regulation could take the form of insisting on standard rates and terms for all OTT players, with differential usage tiers if need be, to ensure that access is truly non-discriminatory. This is how the market is structured on the retail side.

Since there are transaction costs in individually approaching each telecom provider for such zero-rating, the market would greatly benefit from a single marketplace where OTTs can come and enter into agreements with multiple telecom providers.

Even in this model, telecom networks will be charging based not only on the fact of the number of customers they have, but on the basis of them having exclusive routing to those customers. Further, even under the standard-rates based single-market model, a particular zero-rated site may be accessible for free from one network, but not across all networks: unlike the situation with a toll-free number in which no such distinction exists.

To resolve this, the regulator may propose that if an OTT wishes to engage in paid zero-rating, it will need to do so across all networks, since if it doesn't there is risk of providing an unfair advantage to one network over another and increasing the gatekeeper effect rather than decreasing it.

However, all forms of competitive Internet service-paid zero-priced zero-rating, even when they don't harm competition, innovation amongst content providers, or consumers, will necessarily harm openness and diversity of the Internet. For instance, while richer companies with a strong presence in India may pay to zero-rate traffic for their Indian customers, decentralized technologies such as XMPP and WebRTC, having no central company behind them, would not, leading to customers preferring proprietary networks and solutions to such open technologies, which in turn, thanks to the network effect, leads to a vicious cycle. These harms to openness and diversity have to be weighed against the benefit in terms of increase in access when deciding whether to allow for competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating, as such competition doesn't exist in a truly level playing field . Further, it must be kept in mind that there are forms of zero-priced zero-rating that decrease the harm to openness / diversity, or completely remove that harm altogether: that there are other options available must be acknowledged by the regulator when considering the benefit to access from competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating.

3.3.3.1.6 Other options for zero-rating

There are other models of zero-priced zero-rating that either minimize the harm is that of ensuring free Internet access for every person. This can take the form of:^{^[26]}

● A mandatorily "leaky" 'walled garden':

○ The first-degree of all hyperlinks from the zero-rated OTT service are also free.

○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers during specified hours.

○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers based on amount on usage of the OTT service.^{^[27]}

● Zero-rating of all Web traffic

○ In exchange for viewing of advertisements

○ In exchange for using a particular Web browser

○ At low speeds on 3G, or on 2G.

3.3.3.2. What kinds of zero-rating are good

The majority of the forms of zero-rating covered in this section are content or source/destination-based zero-rating. Only some of the options covered in the "other options for zero-rating" section cover content-agnostic zero-rating models. Content-agnostic zero-rating models are not harmful, while content-based zero-rating models always harm, though to varying degrees, the openness of the Internet / diversity of OTTs, and to varying degrees increase access to Internet-based services. Accordingly, here is an hierarchy of desirability of zero-priced zero-rating, from most desirable to most harmful:

1. Content- & source/destination-agnostic zero-priced zero-rating.^{^[28]}

2. Content- & source/destination-based non-zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, chosen freely & paid for by users. ^{^[29]}

3. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, with full transparency. ^{^[30]}

4. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of commercial deal with partial zero-priced access to all content, with non-discriminatory access to the same deal by all with full transparency.^{^[31]}

5. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of a non-commercial deal, without any benefits monetary or otherwise, flowing directly or indirectly from the provider of the zero-rated content to the ISP, with full transparency. ^{^[32]}

6. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, across all telecom networks, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

7. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

8. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

9. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and transparency to the regulator.

10. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any regulatory framework in place.

3.3.4 Cartels and Oligopoly

While cartels and oligopolies may have an impact on Net Neutrality, they are not problems that any set of anti-discrimination rules imposed on gatekeepers can fix. Further, cartels and oligopolies don't directly enhance the ability of gatekeepers to unjustly discriminate if there are firm rules against negative discrimination and price ceilings and floors on data caps are present for data plans. Given this, TRAI should recommend that this issue be investigated and the Competition Commission of India should take this issue up.

3.4 Reasonable Network Management Principles

Reasonable network management has to be allowed to enable the ISPs to manage performance and costs on their network. However, ISPs may not indulge in acts that are harmful to consumers in the name of reasonable network management. Below are a set of guidelines for when discrimination against classes of traffic in the name of network management are justified.

● Discrimination between classes of traffic for the sake of network management should only be permissible if:

○ there is an intelligible differentia between the classes which are to be treated differently, and

○ there is a rational nexus between the differential treatment and the aim of such differentiation, and

○ the aim sought to be furthered is legitimate, and is related to the security, stability, or efficient functioning of the network, or is a technical limitation outside the control of the ISP^{^[33]}, and

○ the network management practice is the least harmful manner in which to achieve the aim.

● Provision of specialized services (i.e., "fast lanes") is permitted if and only if it is shown that

○ The service is available to the user only upon request, and not without their active choice, and

○ The service cannot be reasonably provided with "best efforts" delivery guarantee that is available over the Internet, and hence requires discriminatory treatment, or

○ The discriminatory treatment does not unduly harm the provision of the rest of the Internet to other customers.

These principles are only applicable at the level of ISPs, and not on access gateways for institutions that may in some cases be run by ISPs (such as a university network, free municipal WiFi, at a work place, etc.), which are not to be regulated as common carriers.

These principles may be applied on a case-by-case basis by a regulator, either suo motu or upon complaint by customers.

^{^[1]} Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, (19 May 2011), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf.

^{^[2]} Available at http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/userfiles/file/NTP%202012.pdf.

^{^[3]} IAMAI, India to Cross 300 million internet users by Dec 14, (19 November, 2014), http://www.iamai.in/PRelease_detail.aspx?nid=3498&NMonth=11&NYear=2014.

^{^[4]} World Economic Forum, The Global Information Technology Report 2015, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_IT_Report_2015.pdf.

^{^[5]} http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/4.1#s4.1.1

^{^[6]} See R.U.S. Prasad, The Impact of Policy and Regulatory Decisions on Telecom Growth in India (July 2008), http://web.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/SCID361.pdf.

^{^[7]} 1973 AIR 106

^{^[8]} 1962 AIR 305

^{^[9]} "When ISPs go beyond their traditional use of IP headers to route packets, privacy risks begin to emerge." Alissa Cooper, How deep must DPI be to incur privacy risk? http://www.alissacooper.com/2010/01/25/how-deep-must-dpi-be-to-incur-privacy-risk/

^{^[10]} Richard T.B. Ma & Vishal Misra, The Public Option: A Non-Regulatory Alternative to Network Neutrality, http://dna-pubs.cs.columbia.edu/citation/paperfile/200/netneutrality.pdf

^{^[11]} Mobile number portability was launched in India on January 20, 2011 in the Haryana circle. See http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-launches-nationwide-mobile-number-portability/1/127176.html . Accessed on April 24, 2015.

^{^[12]} For a comprehensive list of all TRAI interconnection regulations & subsequent amendments, see http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[13]} See Telecommunication Interconnection Usage Charges (Eleventh Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (1 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[14]} Article 30 of the Universal Service Directive, Directive 2002/22/EC.

^{^[15]} See Telecommunication Mobile Number Portability (Sixth Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (3 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[16]} The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Seventh) (The Direct to Home Services) Tariff Order, 2015 (2 of 2015).

^{^[17]} Section 8, Cable Television Networks Act, 1995.

^{^[18]} TRAI writes new rules for Cable TV, Channels, Consumers, REAL TIME NEWS, (August 11, 2014), http://rtn.asia/rtn/233/1220_trai-writes-new-rules-cable-tv-channels-consumers.

^{^[19]} An initial requirement for all multi system operators to have a minimum capacity of 500 channels was revoked by the TDSAT in 2012. For more details, see http://www.televisionpost.com/cable/msos-not-required-to-have-500-channel-headends-tdsat/.

^{^[20]} Aparna Ghosh, Bharti SoftBank Invests $14 million in Hike, LIVE MINT, (April 2, 2014), http://www.livemint.com/Companies/nI38YwQL2eBgE6j93lRChM/Bharti-SoftBank-invests-14-million-in-mobile-messaging-app.html.

^{^[21]} Mike Masnick, Can We Kill This Ridiculous Shill-Spread Myth That CDNs Violate Net Neutrality? They Don't, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140812/04314528184/can-we-kill-this-ridiculous-shill-spread-myth-that-cdns-violate-net-neutrality-they-dont.shtml.

^{^[22]} Mathew Carley, What is Hayai's stance on "Net Neutrality"?, https://www.hayai.in/faq/hayais-stance-net-neutrality?c=mgc20150419

^{^[23]} Helani Galpaya & Shazna Zuhyle, South Asian Broadband Service Quality: Diagnosing the Bottlenecks, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1979928

^{^[24]} DTH players told to offer pay channels on la carte basis, HINDU BUSINESS LINE (July 22, 2010), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/dth-players-told-to-offer-pay-channels-on-la-carte-basis/article999298.ece.

^{^[25]} The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Fourth) (Addressable Systems) Tariff Order, 2010.

^{^[26]} These suggestions were provided by Helani Galpaya and Sunil Abraham, based in some cases on existing practices.

^{^[27]} This is what is being followed by the Jana Loyalty Program: http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/05/06/with-a-new-loyalty-program-mobile-app-marketplace-jana-pushes-deeper-into-the-developing-world/

^{^[28]} Example: free Internet access at low speeds, with data caps.

^{^[29]} Example: special "packs" for specific services like WhatsApp.

^{^[30]} Example: zero-rating of all locally-peered settlement-free traffic.

^{^[31]} Example: "leaky" walled gardens, such as the Jana Loyalty Program that provide limited access to all of the Web alongside access to the zero-rated content.

^{^[32]} Example: Wikipedia Zero.

^{^[33]} A CGNAT would be an instance of such a technology that poses network limitations.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/regulatory-perspectives-on-net-neutrality

UN Special Rapporteur Report on Freedom of Expression and the Private Sector: A Significant Step Forward

vidushi — 2016-06-08T17:27:22Z

On 6 June 2016, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, released a report on the Information and Communications Technology (“ICT”) sector and freedom of expression in the digital age. Vidushi Marda and Pranesh Prakash highlight the most important aspects of the report.

Background

Today, the private sector is more closely linked to the freedom of expression than it has ever been before. The ability to speak to a mass audience was at one time a privilege restricted to those who had access to mass media. However, with digital technologies, that privilege is available to far more people than was ever possible in the pre-digital era. As private content created on these digital networks is becoming increasingly subject to state regulation, it is crucial to examine the role of the private sector in respect of the freedom of speech and expression.

The first foray by the Special Rapporteur into this broad area has resulted in a sweeping report, that covers almost every aspect of freedom of expression within the ICT sector, except competition which we will elaborate on later in this post.

Introduction

The report aims to “provide guidance on how private actors should protect and promote freedom of expression in a digital age”. It identifies the relevant international legal framework as Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework and Guiding Principles, also known as the Ruggie Principles provide the framework for private sector responsibilities on business and human rights.

The report categorises different roles of the private sector in organising, accessing, regulating and populating the internet. This is important because the manner in which the ICT sector affects the freedom of expression is far more complicated than traditional communication industries. The report identifies the distinct impact of internet service providers, hardware and software companies, domain name registries and registrars, search engines, platforms, web hosting services, platforms, data brokers and e-commerce facilities on the freedom of expression.

Legal and Policy Issues

The Special Rapporteur discusses four distinct legal and policy issues that find relevance in respect of this problem statement: Content Regulation, Surveillance and Digital Security, Transparency and Remedies.

Content Regulation

The report identifies two main channels through which content regulation takes place: the state, and internal processes.

Noting that digital content made on private networks is increasingly subject to State regulation, the report highlights the competing interests of intermediaries who manage platforms and States which demand for regulation of this content on grounds of defamation, blasphemy, protection of national security etc. This tension is demonstrated through vague laws that compel individuals and private corporations to over-comply and err on the side of caution “in order to avoid onerous penalties, filtering content of uncertain legal status and engaging in other modes of censorship and self-censorship.” Excessive intermediary liability forces intermediaries to over-comply with requests in order to ensure that local access to their platforms are not blocked. States attempt at regulating content outside the law through extra legal restrictions, and push private actors to take down content on their own initiative. Filtering content is another method, wherein States block and filter content through the private sector. Government blacklists, illegal content and suspended accounts are methods employed, and these have sometimes raised concerns of necessity and proportionality. Network or service shutdowns are classified as a “particularly pernicious” method of content regulation. Non neutral networks also are a method of content regulation with the possibilities of internet service providers throttling traffic. Zero rating is a potential issue, although the report acknowledges that “it remains a subject of debate whether they may be permissible in areas genuinely lacking Internet access”.

The other node of content regulation has been identified as internal policies and practices of the private sector. Terms of service restrictions are often tailored to the jurisdiction’s laws and policies and don’t always address the needs and interests of vulnerable groups. Further, the report notes, design and engineering choices of how private players choose to curate content are algorithmically determined and increasingly control the information that we consume.

Transparency

The report notes that transparency enables those entities subject to internet regulation to take informed decisions about their responsibilities and liabilities in a digital sphere and points out, that there is a severe lack of transparency about government requests to restrict or remove content. Some states even prohibit the publication of such information, with India being one example. In respect of the private sector, content hosting platforms sometimes at least reveal the circumstances under which content is removed due to a government request, although this is rather erratic. The report recognises the need to balance transparency with competing concerns like security and trade secrecy, and this is a matter of continued debate.

Surveillance and Digital Security

Freedom of expression concerns arise as data transmitted on private networks is gradually being subjected to surveillance and interference from the State and private actors. The report finds that several internet companies have reported an increase in government requests for customer data and user information. According to the Special Rapporteur, effective resistance strategies include inclusion of human rights guarantees, restrictively interpreting government requests negotiations. Private players also make surveillance and censorship equipment that enable States to intercept communications. Covert surveillance has been previously reported, with States tapping into communications as and when necessary. When private entities become aware of interception and covert surveillance, their human rights responsibilities arise. As private entities work towards enhancing encryption, anonymity and user security, states respond by compelling companies to create loopholes for them to circumvent such privacy and security enhancing technology.

Remedies

Unlawful content removal, opaque suspensions, data security breaches are commonplace occurrences in the digital sphere. The ICCPR guarantees that all people whose rights have been violated must have an effective remedy, and similarly, the Ruggie principles require that remedial and grievance mechanisms must be provided by corporations. There is some ambiguity on how these complaint or appeal mechanisms should be designed and implemented, and the nature and structure of these mechanisms is also unclear. The report states that it is necessary to investigate the role of the state in supplementing/regulating corporate mechanisms, its role in ensuring that there is a mechanism for remedies, and its responsibility to make sure that more easily and financially accessible alternatives exist for remedial measures.

Special Rapporteur’s priorities for future work and thematic developments

Investigating laws, policies and extralegal measures that equip governments to impose restrictions on the provision of telecommunications and internet services. Examining the responsibility of companies to respond in a way that respects human rights, mitigates harm, and provides avenues for redress.
Evaluating content restrictions under terms of service and community standards. Private actors face substantial pressure from governments and individuals to restrict expression, and a priority is to evaluate the interplay of private and state actions on freedom of expression in light of human rights obligations and responsibilities.
Focusing on the legitimacy of rationales for intermediary liability for content hosting, restrictions, conditions for removing third party content.
Exploring censorship and surveillance within the human rights framework, and encouraging greater scrutiny before using these technologies for purposes that undermine the freedom of expression.
Identifying ways to balance an increasing scope of freedom of expression with the need to address governmental interests in national security and public order.
Internet access - Future work will explore issues around access and private sector engagement and investment in ensuring affordability and accessibility, particularly considering marginalized groups.
Internet governance - Internet governance frameworks and reform efforts are sensitive to the needs of women, sexual minorities and other vulnerable communities. Throughout this future work, the Special Rapporteur will pay particular attention to legal developments (legislative, regulatory, and judicial) at national and regional levels.

Conclusions and Recommendations

States: The report recommends that states should not pressurise the private sector to interfere with the freedom of speech and expression in a manner that does not meet the condition of necessary and proportionate principles. Any request to take down content or access customer information must be based on validly enacted law, subject to oversight, and demonstrate necessary and proportionate means of achieving the aims laid down in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.
Private Actors: The Special Rapporteur recommends that private actors develop and implement transparent human rights assessment procedures, and develop policies keeping in mind their human rights impact. Apart from this, private entities should integrate commitments to the freedom of expression into internal processes and ensure the “greatest possible transparency”.
International Organisations: The report recommends that organisations make resources and educational material on internet governance publicly accessible. The Special Rapporteur also recommends encouraging meaningful civil society participation in multi-stakeholder policy making and standard setting processes, with an increased focus on sensitivity to human rights.

CIS Comments

CIS strongly agrees with the expansion of the Special Rapporteur’s scope that this report represents. He is no longer looking solely at states but at the private sector too.
CIS also notes that competition is an important aspect of the freedom of expression, but has not been discussed in this report. Viable alternatives to platforms, networks, internet service providers etc., will ensure a healthy, competitive marketplace, and will have a positive impact in resolving the issues identified above.
Our work has called for maintaining a balanced approach to liability of intermediaries for their users’ actions, since excessive liability or strict liability would lead to over-caution and removal of legitimate speech, while having no liability at all would make it difficult to act effectively against harmful speech, e.g., revenge porn.
CIS’ work on network neutrality has highlighted the importance of neutrality for freedom of speech, and has advocated for an evidence-based approach that ensures there is neither under-regulation, nor over-regulation. The Special Rapporteur suggests that ‘Zero-Rating’ practices always violate Net Neutrality, but the majority of the definitions of Net Neutrality proposed by academics and followed by regulators across the world often do not include Zero-Rating. Similarly, he suggests that the main exception for Zero-Rating is for areas genuinely lacking access to the Internet, whereas the potential for some forms of Zero-Rating to further freedom of expression, especially of minorities, even in areas with access to the Internet, provides sufficient reason for the issue to merit greater debate.

(Pranesh Prakash was invited by the Special Rapporteur to provide his views and took part in a meeting that contributed to this report)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/un-special-rapporteur-report-on-freedom-of-expression-and-the-private-sector-a-significant-step-forward