Centre for Internet and Society

Pervasive Mobile Technologies: Meet Our Mobile Devices!

jdine — 2012-12-21T07:48:40Z

As a part of the Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace research project, the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) is researching 12 mobile phone devices to generate a better understanding of the intellectual property (IP) implications of pervasive mobile technologies available in the Indian market. This post is an introduction to our 12 mobile phones.

As detailed in my introductory blog on Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace Research Initiative, CIS will be conducting research on mobile technologies as a small off-shoot of the overall project. Pervasive technologies that can be purchased for less than USD 100 play an integral role in bringing access to knowledge to those that routinely face barriers to the consumption of information. However, their legality, particularly in terms of their use of IP, is unclear. In order to better understand the legal environment in which these technologies exist, CIS purchased 12 mobile phones to study the patent implications of their hardware, software and content.

Through examination, research, interviews and consultancies, we hope to create an in-depth documentation of each device, an extensive database or account of the patents implicated, and a number of narrower research avenues on topics related to IP, patents, and mobile technologies.

This blog post will serve as a brief introduction to our mobile devices. The information that I have compiled was discovered through shallow interaction with the phones — turning a device on and exploring the interface and content — which is why the documentation is not particularly extensive at this point. I have had difficulty identifying certain features of some of the phones, like which media formats they support or whether or not they are EDGE[2] — enable, but I am confident that I will be able to ascertain these specifications in the near future; however, certain features, like what OS (operating system) they run on and what chip set they are using, will require collaboration with experts to identify. The exploration is on-going, and more information will be posted as it is discovered.

Aside from all of the usual functions of a mobile phone (making calls, receiving calls, saving numbers, etc.), each of our mobiles devices possess what I have termed the "basics": dual GSM SIM capabilities with dual standby, the ability to connect to 2G networks, GPRS, a WAP browser (except device 011), bluetooth capabilities, a microSD slot, a dual camera (a camera that takes still photos and records video), an FM radio receiver and the ability to play .mp3 audio files and .mp4 video files, record audio and view .jpg images. Each phone also has a handful of various "utilities" and "extras" applications (such as an alarm, a calculator, a calendar, etc.) as well as at least one game. The full specifications of each phone will be provided in the near future, along with further pictures of each device.

As much of the research in this project pertains to the IP implications of the devices, we have decided to withhold the make and model of each device to shield the producers from any negative repercussions that could be the result of our research inquiries. They have been assigned the numeric code names 001 to 012.

Without further ado, I'd like to introduce you to our mobile phones:

001 - The Classroom in a Box

Price: Rs. 6,300.00 / $113.00

KEY FEATURES

Pico-Projector
Analog TV Receiver
MS Office Document Viewer


This bar-design feature phone has all of the basics with a few added bonuses: an analog TV receiver, viewer, and a built-in pico-projector that projects the mobile's screen onto any surface. Though this phone does not technically fall into our definition of pervasive technologies because of its price, it was the first mobile phone with a built-in pico-projector as well as an analog TV receiver available on the Indian market for less than Rs. 10,000 when it was purchased more than a year ago. Since then, other sub-USD100 pico-projector mobile devices have made an appearance on the Indian market, but each of those devices appear to have been discontinued and 001 continues to be the cheapest pico-projector mobile phone available for purchase.

002 - The Supercharger

Price: Rs. 2,499.00 / $45.00

KEY FEATURES

Solar Panel
Hindi Keyboard

	002 is a sleek candybar feature phone with a particularly interesting innovation. While it uses a standard lithium-ion battery that can be recharged via connection to a wall socket or electrical device (such as a laptop), it also has a built-in solar panel that can generate some charge as well. The solar panel technology is not yet very efficient—the panel would have to be placed in direct sunlight for multiple hours to fully charge the battery—but it represents an important step towards untethering mobile phones and mobile phone users from costly electricity infrastructure, a development that would have significant implications for rural populations who have unreliable access to electricity.

003 - The Networker

Price: Rs. 1,250.00 / $22.00

KEY FEATURES

Wi-Fi
Optical Trackpad
Secondary Forward-facing Camera
Support for 8 Languages


With a boxy, QWERTY-keyboard design and relatively small screen, 003 does not appear, at first glance, to be anymore than an average feature phone — but appearances can be deceiving. With a highly responsive optical trackpad, an analog TV receiver, BlackBerry-esque interface and WiFi capabilities, this mobile device packs some sophisticated technologies and features. Further, it is the only phone in our collection that can connect to the internet using WLAN networks. Considering that some of the other devices are much more complex — and expensive — than 003, the wide-spread exclusion of WiFi capabilities in our collection is intriguing. Is the choice to include or exclude mobile technology a matter of economics? Are cellular WiFi components expensive, and producers are choosing to exclude WiFi as a method of cutting costs? Is it simply a response to patterns of consumer demand? The WiFi questions will be explored in more depth in up-coming blog posts.

004 - The Linguist

Price: Rs. 2,250.00 / $40.00

KEY FEATURES

Android-like OS
Support for 14 Languages
Secondary Forward-facing Camera
Large Number of Pre-loaded Apps


Though it may be hard to believe at first glance, this mobile device was purchased for less than Rs. 2500. With its large internal memory, support for 14 different languages (including Tamil, Bengali and Hindi), and its large array of pre-loaded games and social media applications already set it apart from the less sophisticated mobiles in our collection, 004 also runs on a mysterious Android-like operating system similar to the popular MIUI Android ROM developed by the Chinese-based company Xiaomi Tech. This give it a very sophisticated interface with the look and feel of a smartphone, though the device itself lacks many of the capabilities that are often considered as smartphone criteria (GPS, high-speed internet access, push/pull email, Wi-Fi, an app store, etc.). Because this device, and others like it in our collection, have more sophisticated hardware, software and content than a generic feature phone, but are not as capable as a smartphone, I have taken to calling these devices "semi-smart".

005 - TV on the Go

Price: Rs. 1,450.00 / $26.00

KEY FEATURES

Analog TV receiver
Arabic Keyboard
Secondary Forward-facing Camera


Though it doesn't have any particular innovation that sets it apart from the other devices, 005 is a hardy QWERTY-design feature phone with all of the basics as well as a good collection of social media applications and an analog TV receiver. Though its keyboard can be programmed to write in English, Tamil, Arabic and Hindi script, the buttons have the Arabic abjad on them, which brings up the question of which market this mobile was originally designed for.

006 - The Spy

Price: Rs. 1,680.00 / $30.00

KEY FEATURES:

Secondary “Spy” Camera
Ability to behave as a modem via USB connection

	006 is an interesting candy bar feature phone. On initial examination, this mobile appears to be a completely generic feature phones with all of the basics, but nothing auxiliary. However, a more careful inspection will reveal a secondary camera with an unusual placement — instead of being place at the top of the screen like all of the other secondary cameras found on our devices, this camera is situated on the right hand side of the phone.

The manufacturer of this device actually refers to this secondary camera as a "spy" camera, and it is truly an appropriate name; from a distance, it looks more like a headphone jack than a camera, and its placement allows for photo and video to be taken without any suspicious movement or positioning by the user. The secondary camera has 1.3 megapixels and can take relatively high resolution photos and videos.

007 - The Semi-Smartphone

Price: Rs. 2,150.00 / $39.00

KEY FEATURES

Android-like OS (maybe MIUI)
USB Tethering
Push Email


Device 007 is a semi-smart touchscreen phone, and by far the most sophisticated device in our collection. We believe that it uses MIUI OS, which gives it a very similar look to Android and a functionality that is reminiscent of iOSx. While it doesn't have an app store, 007 is jam-packed with pre-loaded applications and can support a wide variety of file formats. Further, while the phone cannot connect to WLAN networks on its own; it can connect to WiFi by tethering to a networked device via USB connection.

008 - The Trendy

Price: Rs. 2,350.00 / $42.00

KEY FEATURES

Android-like OS
Support for 9 languages


Another mainstream look-alike, 008 runs the same unidentified OS as device 004 and has similar capabilities. Its plastic casing is a bit flimsy, but its "back", "home" and "list" buttons are touch sensitive. Its sophisticated OS and pre-loaded applications make it a semi-smart device.

009 - The Boombox

Price: Rs. 1,420.00 / $26.00

KEY FEATURES

Huge built-in speaker
Android-like OS

	Though it is less recognizable than some of the other devices, this mobile may have one of the significant smartphone qualifiers that our other devices lack: an app store — or what appears to be an app store. The app store icon itself is actually the icon for the Android app store, but the interface is completely different, and the only thing available for download is a handful of games. Interestingly enough, many of these games also make appearances on some of the other mobile devices (like fishing joy and tear clothes). Further, I would not call this phone semi-smart, as its interface is not particularly any more sophisticated than some of the other feature phones in our collection.

009 also features a large built-in speaker, the Opera Mini mobile browser and an Android-like OS, though this OS is less sophisticated than that of 004 and 008.

010 - 3D

Price: Rs. 1,440.00 / $26.00

KEY FEATURES

Android-like OS
Pre-loaded Stereoscopic (3D) videos
Support for 13 languages


This semi-smart touchscreen phone also has an Android-like operating system. Though it lacks an app store and push-email, it comes pre-loaded with a veritable smorgasbord of games and social media applications and supports 13 different languages. It also comes with a pair of 3D glasses and two short, very basic pre-loaded stereoscopic videos.

011 - The Mighty Mini

Price: Rs. 750.00 / $14.00

KEY FEATURES

Dual GSM SIM support
Best bang-for-your-buck for a basic mobile phone


At Rs. 750, this little feature phone was the least expensive phone we could find that still had almost all of the basics. Even without any extra features, it is still almost Rs. 200 cheaper than the majority of the most basic GSM dual SIM mobiles available on the formal Indian market[3]— and, in most cases, 011 has more capabilities than most of those devices. With .mp3 and .mp4 file playback, a dual camera, colour display, a WAP browser, MMS messaging support, two charging ports and Urdu and Hindi language support, this mobile phone personifies affordable accessibility to knowledge and media.

012 - The Pianist

Price: Rs. 1,550.00 / $28.00

KEY FEATURES

Touch piano
Two charging ports
Support for a multitude of audio, video and image formats

	012 is a basic candy bar feature phone with a particularly novel innovation: a touch piano. It is quite sensitive to touch and has a one octave range.

013 - The Indian Experience

Price: Rs. 2,100.00 / $38.00

KEY FEATURES

India specific content
Proprietary App Store

	This little touchscreen mobile is chockfull of “Indian-specific” content, including an application that links directly to an online portal where consumers can download “Hungama” videos, music and movies onto the phone—for a price. Many of the games also charge a monthly user fee, though interestingly enough, Angry Birds and Talking Tom Cat are pre-loaded and free to play. This phone also has a proprietary app store with a limited amount of mBounce4] applications and games available for purchase. I am not yet sure if this app store can be remotely updated with new apps, but the device can receive data vis USB connection, so it is possible that new applications can be added through direct file transfer. It also has keyboard support for English, Hindi and Tamil, but the interface cannot be set it appear in anything other than English.

[2]. Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution, also known as Enchanced GPRS (EGPRS) is a mobile phone technology that also improved data transmission on GSM networks. It is considered a pre-3G radio technology. Read more about it here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_Data_Rates_for_GSM_Evolution
[3]. Information retrieved from www.flipkart.com. The prices shown here have been verified as being the same or very similar (though never more expensive) to the prices offered by each brand's official distributors. See Flipkart search links:

Mircomax: http://bit.ly/UW3q0U

Spice Mobility: http://bit.ly/V0DK9i

Karbonn: http://bit.ly/10DKKbz

Lava: http://bit.ly/TSxUzQ

[4] mBounce Ltd is a Hong Kong-based company that performs a variety of mobile phone application support services like proprietary in-house billing infrastructure for app stores, the pre-loading of applications and app stores, and application creation. They are MediaTek-nominated key partner in providing MRE (Maui Runtime Environment) App Store Solutions, but mBounce applications and software can also be placed on other mobile operating systems. You can read more about mBounce here: http://www.mbounce.com/?lang=eng&module=ltrbox&menu=m1&content=home and here: http://developer.mediatek.com/mre/en/partner/335

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-mobile-technologies-meet-our-grey-market-devices

Exploring the Internals of Mobile Devices — Report from a One-day Workshop at TERI

jdine — 2012-12-01T05:57:53Z

On October 27, 2012, the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) organised a one-day workshop on exploring the internals of mobile technologies at the TERI Southern Regional Centre in Bangalore. The workshop received more than 140 registrants, of which approximately 40 attended. In this post, Jadine Lannon explores the discussions and the developments that took place at the workshop.

The event brought together professional and non-professional individuals and communities interested in exploring mobile technologies. The aim of the workshop was the provide participants with the knowledge and tools to better understand the internals of mobile technologies as well as familiarize the attendees with CIS's "Pervasive Technologies" research project.

Anil Kumar Pugalia, Sudar Muthu and Pankaj Bharadiya were the expert speakers. The event was supported by the well-established online security, hardware and software domain communities NULL, SecurityXploaded, Computer Club India and Bangalore Android User Group.

Sudar Muthu: Capabilities of Arduino

Capabilities of Arduino (including Due) from Sudar Muthu	Sudar Muthu began the workshop with a talk on the capabilities of Arduino and the ways in which Arduino can be used to interface with different external devices. He discussed with us different types of Arduino, the technical specifications of Arduino, the ways that Arduino can be used to interface with external boards and the interfacing that he has been able to accomplish using Arduino and various devices. The slides from his Powerpoint presentation are viewable on the left.

Anil Kumar Pugalia: Mobile Hacking using Linux Drivers

Anil Kumar Pugalia followed Sudar's presentation with an exploration of methods of mobile hacking using Linux drivers. He discussed various Linux kernel hacking techniques as well as tools that can be used to perform reverse-engineering on a mobile device. The slides from Anil's presentation can be accessed on the right.	Mobile Hacking using Linux Drivers from Anil Kumar Pugalia

The following two talks were delivered by Pankaj Bharadiya from Texas Instruments. In his first presentation, he explored hardware hacking and board/chips capabilities. His second talk was on porting open software on hardware. In addition to his discussions, he also covered porting Android on open hardware. The slides from his presentations will be posted shortly.

After all the presentations, the participants were invited to handle and open up the 12 mobile devices that CIS purchased for our Pervasive Mobile Technologies research project. The participants worked in teams of two to five members to open up the mobile devices and observe their internals. We asked the participants to record any information about the internals of the mobiles that they were able to find, including the make, model, and serial numbers of the components. Pictures from this part of the workshop will be posted shortly.

All of the collected information was recorded and distributed among the participants so that the group could continue to work on identifying the mobile internals and the various data sheets associated with each component. This data will be added to the specifications of each mobile device as it is collected. CIS hopes to continue to collaborate with the individuals and communities who participated in this workshop as well as other interested individuals who may have been unable to attend the one-day workshop to proceed with this process of identification. We also hope to hold a second event, a one- to two-day hackathon, sometime in December to continue the exploration of our mobile devices.

CIS would like to thank Anil Kumar Pagalia, Sudar Muthu, Pankaj Bharadiya, Khasim Syed Mohammed, Akash Mahajan (NULL representative), Amit Malik (SecurityXploaded representative), the NULL, SecurityXploaded, Bangalore Android User Group and Computer Club India communities, and all of the participants for making the workshop a huge success and aiding us in our ongoing research project!

You can reach participating communities at following links:

For any further information on the past workshop or future events, please connect with us:

Jadine Lannon (jadine@cis-india.org), research intern for the A2K programme
Amarjit Singh (amarjitlife@gmail.com), the Workshop Manager.

Click below for a slideshow of the pictures from the workshop:

Photos

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/exploring-the-internals-of-mobile-devices

Preliminary Findings: Working Requirements for Complex Products under the Indian Patent System

praskrishna — 2017-08-22T13:48:08Z

Prof. Jorge L. Contreras gave a talk on a forthcoming paper "Preliminary Findings: Working Requirements for Complex Products under the Indian Patent System" at the "2nd International Conference on Standardisation, Patents and Competition Issues" held on June 10 and 11, 2017 in New Delhi. The conference was organized by O.P. Jindal Global University.

The paper contains findings a study by Rohini Lakshane of CIS and Prof Jorge Contreras, University of Utah on the Statements of Working (Form 27) of the patents they found for their previous paper "Patents and mobile devices in India: An empirical survey". View the slide deck. See the event website. To read the Research Methodology click here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/news/2nd-international-conference-on-standardisation-patents-and-competition-issues

Fueling the Affordable Smartphone Revolution in India

sinha — 2016-03-16T15:23:43Z

Smartphones have emerged as the exemplar of mankind's quest for shrinking technologies. They embody the realization of a simple premise – that computing devices would do more and cost less. This realization has been responsible for modern society's profound transformations in communication, governance, and knowledge distribution.

The essay was published as part of the The Good Life in Asia's Digital 21st Century essay collection.

The launch of the iPhone in 2007 is often credited with ushering in an era of smartphones. Ever since, the world's best tech R&D has focused on increasing the capabilities of these devices. And as a result, less than a decade later, we have sub-hundred dollar smartphones. The low-cost smartphone has found an enthusiastic and insatiable market in developing countries, especially Asia. India is no exception to the Asian narrative – Micromax, Spice, and Lava (low cost smartphone manufacturers) are household names in the Indian smartphone market, which accounted for 65% of internet traffic in 2014 (Meeker, 2015).

The Indian Prime Minister, carrying the twin aspirations of catalyzing the growth of indigenous manufacturing and bridging the digital divide, launched the “Digital India” and “Make in India” campaigns last year. During his US visit, Google, Apple, Microsoft, Facebook extended their support to the campaigns' vision (Guynn, 2011). The campaigns outline the government's elaborate initiatives to, inter alia, bridge the digital divide and build indigenous manufacturing capacity. While all these developments bode well for the indigenous smartphone, there remain some serious concerns affecting the growth of the industry – for instance, patent infringement litigations and the absence of clear legal and regulatory solutions.

From the state of the industry and its implications, it can be concluded that: first, growing access to smartphones has been influenced by their phenomenal affordability; second, smartphones are an excellent example of technology for development (UNDP, 2001) and a facilitator of access to knowledge; and third, domestic smartphone production has occurred in an imprecise legal and regulatory environment.

This essay attempts to build an appreciation for the role that smartphones are playing in development, specifically, by fostering Access to Knowledge. Conversations around development by public-interest groups and emerging industries often espouse Access to Knowledge to address concerns in international development, communications, technology, education, and intellectual property policy. Whereas the principle can be regarded as in-theworks, two theories inform us about the role of mobile phones in fostering Access to Knowledge. Lea Sheaver's theory classifies mobile as an Access-toKnowledge good. Lea enumerates the five key components of a robust Access to Knowledge framework, viz., education for information literacy, access to the global knowledge commons, access to knowledge goods, an enabling legal framework, and effective innovation systems (Sheaver, 2007). According to her, affordability of the good is the ultimate indicator of its efficacy as an access to knowledge good. Furthermore, inventions in microchip technology, electronics manufacturing, and software need to be supported by enabling legal and policy frameworks coupled with effective innovation systems.

Yochai Benkler's framework classifies mobile-devices as both informationembedded goods and information-embedded tools (Benkler, 2006). He says, “Information-embedded goods are those goods which are ‘better, more plentiful or cheaper because of some technological advance embedded in them or associated with their production,’ such as medicines, movies, and improved crop seed. Information-embedded tools, in turn, are those technologies necessary for research, innovation, and communication of knowledge” (Benkler, 2006). A smartphone qualifies as both because it can be used to obtain knowledge, and it depends on discoveries in microchip technology, electronics manufacturing, and software to function.

To date, there has been no formal, theoretical or evidentiary investigation on the emergence of smartphones as an Access-to-Knowledge good. In the following sections, I will attempt to explain the smartphone’s dependence on an enabling legal framework and effective innovation systems (Lea's components). It must be borne in mind that globally, discussions affecting access to knowledge have aimed at creating balanced and inclusive systems related to intellectual property (Kapczynski & Krikorian, 2010). Therefore, the essay will focus on: first, the relationship between constituent mobile technologies and intellectual property as a function of production/deployment of smartphones in India; and second, the relationship between innovation and access.

Creating an Enabling Legal Framework to Foster Access to Knowledge

The adage “the only lesson you can learn from history is that it repeats itself” is worth bearing in our narrative. The emergence of the smartphones industry in Asia has commonalities with the flourishing Asian piracy trade – which remains an essential access solution for low-income societies constantly barraged by expensive western media goods. The prohibitive cost of acquiring brand-name devices (e.g. Apple, HTC, Samsung, Sony) drove local production to imitate and innovate cheaper substitutes (WIPO, 2010). This occurred within the lenient and flexible intellectual property regimes prevalent in Asian countries, which continue to be constantly criticized for their failure to enact stricter intellectual property law. The hubs of smartphone production – China, Taiwan, and India – have flexible intellectual property protection law and lax enforcement measures (Centre for Internet and Society, 2012).

Concerns of intellectual property center around patent and copyright legislation, which have yet to be fully developed to address intellectual property in high-tech industries (since trademark issues remain unchanged, they will not be discussed in the essay.) As a result, constituent smartphone technologies have been shaped and governed by a blend of formal and informal rules and legal and illegal practices. This is why they are often referred to as “gray market” technologies. A smartphone in terms of constituent intellectual property can be broadly divided into hardware and software technologies. This piece will first deal with hardware, followed by software technologies.

Hardware Technologies and Their Relationship with IP Law

Presently, most Indian manufacturers import hardware from China and Taiwan, and assemble the phones in India. A few key Indian domestic players are Maxx Mobile, Intex, Spice, and Lava, whose dominance have not gone unnoticed by foreign manufacturers. A couple of these domestic manufacturers are now embroiled in patent litigation threats or infringement suits. And as litigation piles up in Indian courts, the judiciary is slowly waking up to mobile patent litigation, but is yet to rule comprehensively. To make matters worse, the jurisdiction of the Indian antitrust regulator remains unclear, and to a certain extent overlaps with the judiciary, adding to the ambiguity. For instance, when an appellate court ruled in favor of the Swedish tech-giant Ericsson, it ordered Micromax to pay a flat 1.25 – 2% of its devices' selling price to Ericsson (Lakshane, 2015). The ruling was devoid of a more rational and reasoned approach developed by courts of other jurisdictions in similar matters, which prescribed that the infringers pay damages based on the price of the patented components only, and not the retail price of the phones. This decision risks causing a significant increase in the price of phones and potentially threatens local innovation.

The Indian government's Make in India and Digital India campaigns aim to fulfill the vision of a digitally empowered India, and the 2015 Indian Union budget also targets boosting the electronics manufacturing industry. Despite these broad initiatives, there needs to be a more focused policy in place to ensure domestic companies do not get weighed down by patent related concerns. The root cause of litigation is the vesting of a majority of critical mobile patents (Standard Essential Patents, or SEPs) by a handful tech-giants. For instance, Qualcomm owns 5700 patents around CDMA technology (qualcomm.com). In another instance, the DVD format constitutes 311 SEPs for DVD players and 272 SEPs for DVD recorders (CIS, 2012). Such a dense concentration of patents around SEPs creates a patent thicket and thereby compels Smartphone manufacturers to acquire multiple licenses, and to pay high transaction costs and huge royalties to the owner. To reduce conflict and protect domestic players from being arm-twisted into paying high royalties, the government can potentially identify critical technologies and initiate the formation of a patent pool of such technologies. The concept of a patent pool mandates that the patent holders issue licenses on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory basis to interested parties. However, a nuanced and cautious approach to setting up such pools is necessary (Shapiro, 2001).

There are interesting lessons in China's steps to encourage local innovation of Smartphone hardware as well, specifically in the form of standardized technologies. The Chinese government has actively supported the development of indigenous standards to shield domestic manufacturers from royalty exposure. In fact, the China Blue High-definition Disc (CBHD) standard was built as an alternative to the Blu-ray disc and was duly adopted by the Chinese government, which reportedly caused the royalty rates for the Blu-ray format to dip. Much later, Warner Bros, Paramount, and other motion picture producers adopted the CBHD standard as well for distribution in China.

Software Technologies and Their Relationship with IP Law

Unlike hardware technology, where India is struggling to build manufacturing capacity, the success of the Indian software industry has already been realized. The software-as-a-service (SaAS) industry is led by Infosys, TCS, and Wipro in software exports. The prevailing trend in the industry since the 1980s was to assign ownership of their products to offshore clients. However, in the past decade, there has been a conscious shift by the Indian software development workforce to build products for Smartphone platforms. This is in response to the shift in local populations to accessing content and services online. Reports indicate that India has the second largest population of mobile applications developers (approx. 3 million) in the world, second only to the US (Livemint, 2015). The Indian government has recognized the potential of mobile application-based ventures and created funds to encourage app development in India (IAMAI, 2015).

Intellectual property protection around software is fairly ambiguous. A piece of code is potentially capable of gaining both patent and copyright protection. In the area of mobile application development, preliminary research findings indicate that coding occurs with an agnostic attitude towards intellectual property laws (Cassar, 2014). One of the reasons is ambiguity on a multitude of issues around the protection of software because Indian legislation on patent and copyright is frustratingly insufficient. There is a growing discontentment about long-term patent protection over software code, which could be detrimental to innovation – particularly, to the start-up segment of software industry. In more technologically advanced economies, software patenting has emerged as a scourge – last year, the US Supreme Court in Alice Corporation Pty Ltd v. CLS Bank International Et Al narrowed the eligibility of software inventions to gain patent protection. The activist discourse has shifted in favor of eliminating software patenting because of the incremental and obsolescent nature of a software invention, inter alia (Lapowsky, 2015). However, in a recent disappointing move, the Indian patent office widened the scope of patent-eligible subject matter for software-related inventions – a move that was decried by free software activists and industry alike. This widening of scope can only benefit tech-giants in building bigger patent portfolios, which is unnecessary and unhealthy for innovation by small and mid-tier entities (Sinha, 2015).

Effective Innovation Systems

Innovation ensures fresh creation of knowledge. A society cannot premise itself on the mere importation of knowledge; it must also strive to use the knowledge to meet its own local needs and environment. Innovation depends on a variety of factors – there is no singular path or factor to build an innovative and enterprising society. The patent system is often incorrectly credited with “promoting” innovation. The discourse around innovation was extremely patent-centric until studies disproved the assumptive correlation between high patenting activity and innovation. Continuing in the same vein, Lea states, “From the A2K perspective, however, relying on patents – which represent the right to exclude others from access to the innovation – is particularly problematic. Patents likely represent the segment of innovation of least value for expanding access to knowledge: improvements in the knowledge stock whose application is limited by exclusive property rights” (Shaver, 2007).

In this framework, it is also important to shed light on the growing movement of openness. Openness as a movement has been captured by various fields - Big data, software, education, media, etc. Free and Open Source Software has emerged as a key agent in information technology policy-making in India, with the Indian government adopting an open standards policy and an open software policy for its own purposes.

In the context of smartphone technologies, preliminary findings also support the shift towards openness (Huang, 2014). Industry participants have observed that openness will lead to greater benefits in private production of hardware technologies. Similarly, mobile applications developers have also voiced support of open source software (Cassar, 2014).

Conclusion

The discussion above identified a limited set of legal and regulatory concerns affecting the state of production/deployment of smartphones in India. These issues and findings are backed by preliminary research, and purport to sustain the emergence of the smartphone as an enabler of access to knowledge. The proposed solutions direct industry and the government alike to take immediate steps to fix problems impeding pervasive access to this knowledge good.

The experience of the smartphone industry with an imprecise legal and regulatory environment, akin to piracy, has thus far been a success story of affordability, quality substitution, and innovation. However, this narrative is now threatened by messy litigation, jurisdictional uncertainties between the anti-trust regulator and judicial system, SEP licensing issues, rise of software patents, inter alia. Despite these issues, the industry continues to grow. The future of access to knowledge is therefore bright, provided that stakeholders make efforts to meet the needs of this emerging industry and the public, including development and consumer interests.

References / Links / Resources

Benkler, Y. (2006). The Wealth Of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets And Freedom. Retrieved from http://www.benkler.org/wealth_of_networks/index.php?title=Chapter_9%2C_section_3.
Cassar, S. (2014). Interviews with App Developers: Open Source, Community, and Contradictions – Part III. Retrieved from: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-app-developers-open-sourcecommunity-and-contradictions-iii
Cassar, S. (2014) Ambiguity in the App Store: Understanding India’s emerging IT sector in light of IP. Retrieved from http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ambiguity-in-the-app-store
Centre for Internet and Society, Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace(2012, September). Retrieved from http://cis-india.org/a2k/pervasive-technologies-research-proposal.pdf/view
Guynn, J. (2015, September 28). Facebook, Silicon Valley like Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/09/27/narendra-modi-india-facebook-markzuckerberg-google-sundar-pichai-silicon-valley/72936544/
Huang, M. (2014). [Open] Innovation and Expertise > Patent Protection & Trolls in a Broken Patent Regime (Interviews with Semiconductor Industry - Part 3). Retrieved from: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ interviews-with-semi-conductor-industry-part-3
IAMAI (2015). An inquiry into India's app economy.
Kapczynski, A., Krikorian, G., (2010). Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property. Retrieved from: https://mitpress.mit.edu/sites/default/files/titles/free_download/9781890951962_Access_to_ Knowledge_in_the_Age_of_Intellectual_Property.pdf
Lakshane, R. (2015, September). FAQ: CIS Proposal for Compulsory Licensing of Critical Mobile Technologies. Retrieved from: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/faq-cis-proposal-for-compulsory-licensing-ofcritical-mobile-technologies
Lakshane, R. (2015, February). Open Letter to Prime Minister Modi. Retrieved from: http://cis-india.org/ a2k/blogs/open-letter-to-prime-minister-modi
Lapowsky, I. (2015, February). If You Want to Fix Software Patents, Eliminate Software Patents. Retrieved from https://www.eff.org/mention/follow-wired-twitter-facebook-rss-eff-if-you-want-fix-software-patentseliminate-software
Meeker, M. (2015). 2015 Internet Trends. Retrieved from http://www.kpcb.com/partner/mary-meeker
PTI (2015). Google aims to make India a hub for app development. Livemint. Retrieved from: http:// www.livemint.com/Industry/rwWUfp30YezONe0WnM1TIO/Google-aims-to-make-India-a-hub-for-appdevelopment.html
Qualcomm Enters Into CDMA Modem Card License Agreement with Seiko Instruments Incorporated. (n.d.). Retrieved November 13, 2015, from https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2000/06/20/ qualcomm-enters-cdma-modem-card-license-agreement-seiko-instruments
Shapiro, C. (2001). Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 1, 119-150. Retrieved from: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10778.pdf
Shaver, L. (2007). Defining and Measuring Access to Knowledge: Towards an A2K Index. Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 22. retrieved from: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/22
Sinha, A. (2015). Comments on the Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions (CRIs). Retrieved from http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-on-the-guidelines-for-examination-of-computerrelated-inventions-cris
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development (2001). Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2001/en/
World Intellectual Property Organisation. (2010, Dec 1-2). Media Piracy in Emerging Economies: Price, Market Structure and Consumer Behavior. Retrieved from the WIPO website: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ mdocs/enforcement/en/wipo_ace_6/wipo_ace_6_5.pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/digital-asia-hub-the-good-life-in-asias-21-st-century-anubha-sinha-fueling-the-affordable-smartphone-revolution-in-india

FAQ: CIS' Proposal for Compulsory Licensing of Critical Mobile Technologies

rohini — 2016-02-14T04:40:29Z

Earlier this year, the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) had proposed that the Government of India (GoI) initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and mandate a five percent compulsory license. The proposal was made in light of ongoing litigation in India over standard essential patents pertaining to mobile technology, and the government's own “Make in India” and “Digital India” programmes.

Read CIS' proposal to the Government of India regarding the formation of a patent pool here. To read about ongoing litigation in India over standard essential patents pertaining to mobile technology, click here.

1. How did CIS arrive upon the figure of 5 percent as the compulsory licensing fee for the patent pool?

As part of foreign technology agreements, the Department of Industrial Development (DID) introduced a ceiling of 5 percent on the royalty rates charged for domestic sale and 8 percent for export of goods pertaining to "high priority industries" in the year 1991. Royalties higher than 5 percent or 8 percent, as the case may be, required securing approval from the government[1]. While 1991 was too early for the mobile device manufacturing industry to be listed among high priority industries, the public announcement by the government covered computer software, consumer electronics, and electrical and electronic appliances for home use[2]. In 2009, another department under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Department for Industrial Policy and Promotion, revoked the cap on royalty rates[3]. Sanjana Govil throws some light on why government regulation on intellectual property was introduced in the early 90s and how it succeeded in reducing the flow of money out of India: Putting a Lid on Royalty Outflows — How the RBI can Help Reduce India 's IP Costs.

The situation in 1991 is somewhat analogous to the current one where most of the patent holders in the mobile device technology domain are multinational corporations, which results in large royalty amounts leaving India. At the same time, litigation over patent infringement in India has thwarted the manufacture and sale of mobile devices of homegrown brands. Additionally, these developments are detrimental to the Modi government’s aim of encouraging local manufacturing as well as strengthening India’s intellectual property regime.

2. How would royalties be distributed among patent holders in a patent pool where a single fee of 5 percent is being charged?

A patent pool formed for the purpose of compulsorily licensing the patents contained in it can be managed by combining government intervention with the governance structure of a voluntary patent pool. Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva enumerates the different approaches to setting royalty rates in a patent pool once a “royalty base” has been established[4]:

● Rule of Thumb

● Numerical Proportionality

● Industry Standards / Market or Comparable Technology Method

● Discounted Cash Flow

● Ranking

● Cost-based Rate Setting

● Surrogate Measures

● Disaggregation Methods

● Option Methods

● Competitive Advantage Valuation (R)

3. The letter implicitly suggests that litigation intended to protect the interests of patent holders could potentially have a chilling effect on government initiatives, local innovation and the interests of consumers. Is there evidence to support this?

Though there is a thin line between legitimate application of legal remedies and chilling effects, the ramifications of the acitivies of non-practising entities (NPEs), of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPP suits), and of frivolous lawsuits provide plenty of evidence to support making such a proposal.

Some indicative examples:

Patent trolling pays: Since 2010, trolls have made 3 times as much money in court as real companies

Kootol (India-based troll with US and European patent applications) sends notices to many companies regarding Twitter/Facebook-style feeds

Alleged troll that sued eBay over PTO reexamination dismisses lawsuit

Patent Troll Lodsys Settles for Nothing to Avoid Trial

Why I’m not paying the Troll Toll

[1] Press Note No. 12 (1991 Series), Procedures in respect of foreign technology agreement, http ://eaindustry .nic .in /handbk /chap 003.pdf, Last accessed September 16, 2015.

[2] Press Note No. 10 (1992 Series), Revised List of Annex-III items, http ://eaindustry .nic .in /handbk /chap 005.pdf, Last accessed September 16, 2015.

[3] Press Note No.8 of 2009, Liberalization of Foreign Technology Agreement policy, http ://dipp .gov .in /English /acts _rules /Press _Notes /pn 8_2009.pdf, Last accessed September 16, 2015.

[4] B. Setting Royalty Rates, Patent Valuation and License Fee Determination in Context of Patent Pools, Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva, http ://cis -india .org /a 2 k /blogs /patent -valuation -and -license -fee -determination -in -context -of -patent -pools, Last accessed September 16, 2015.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/faq-cis-proposal-for-compulsory-licensing-of-critical-mobile-technologies

Pervasive Technologies: Working Document Series – Updated Research Methodology – Applying the Actor Network Theory to Competition Law and Standard Essential Patent Litigation in India

nehaa — 2015-10-04T04:20:13Z

This document lays out the updated research methodology for the paper on competition law issues around standard essential patent litigation in India.

Read the earlier posts:

In New Delhi, as in Fascist Milan or Nazi Berlin, the individual is lost; the scale is not human but super human; not national, but super-national: it is, in a word, Imperial.[1]

Twenty plus years later, written after he was awe-struck by the grandeur of the Rashtrapati Bhawan in New Delhi, Dalrymple’s delightful choice of words on the similarities between Lutyen’s Delhi and Speer’s Nuremberg[2] rather aptly describe today’s globalized narrative of intellectual property (“IP”) rights determination and ownership. The process of determination of standards applied in mobile devices, claims of IP ownership in these standards and the subsequent enforcement (globally) of these IP claims are all instances of this narrative.

The increasingly global nature of both – innovation and intellectual property has been well documented by researchers over the years and needs no further exploration in this article. This article will seek to examine how this narrative influences (either overtly or covertly) the application of competition law to the regulation of standard essential patents (SEPs) in India. More specifically, this article seeks to study the role of various human and non-human actors involved were competition law to be considered as a potential solution to the matter of SEP litigation in India.

This article examines four research questions. First, how does the globalized narrative of intellectual property influence the determination of standards around mobile devices, their IP protection, licensing and enforcement? Second, what are the important competition law issues in SEP litigation in the United States of America (“USA”) and the European Union (“EU”), and how have regulators (the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the European Commission (“EC”) respectively) and courts in these jurisdictions addressed these issues? Third, what are the critical issues in SEP litigation and competition law in India and how do they compare with similar questions in other jurisdictions? Fourth, could solutions and methodology from the FTC and the EC be applied to SEP competition law matters in India?

In this effort, this article will employ Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network Theory[3] (“ANT”) as the primary research methodology, supplemented where needed by others including comparative research and case studies. A detailed approach into discussing the (above) research questions has been discussed below.

Question one - how does the globalized narrative of intellectual property influence the determination of standards around mobile devices, their IP protection, licensing and enforcement?

This question primarily seeks to explain the determination SEPs on standards through International Standard Setting Organizations (“SSOs”) and the subsequent obligation on members of the SSOs to licence these SEPs on a Fair, Reasonable and Non Discriminatory (“FRAND”) basis.

Applying the ANT, this question will identify both human and non-human actors and that play a role internationally, in the determination of SEPs and their licensing. Illustratively, these actors include the SSOs, multinational corporations that are members of the SSOs, the FRAND licences and the contracts/terms of reference between the SSOs and their member corporations. In order to address this question, the author will refer to academic writing and other literature explaining the role of various actors and the international nature of the standard setting process. Networks that these actors share with each other and the possible influences to the determination of international standards will be studied. This question will explore the international IP environment, and the power of various actors that have an influence on IP norm setting, and attempt to locate the power of these various actors in their network setting.

Question two - what are the important competition law issues in SEP litigation in the USA and the EU, and how have regulators (the FTC and the EC respectively) and courts in these jurisdictions addressed these issues?

This question will study the competition law issues arising from the international determination of standards and the cross-border assertion and enforcement of intellectual property rights discussed in the previous question. This question will also study how (first, whether) courts and regulators have attempted to address some of the competition law issues.

Also applying the ANT, this question will identify various actors involved in competition law litigation around SEPs before the FTC, EC and the courts in the USA and the EU. Illustratively, these include the parties to the litigation, the regulator (whether the FTC or the EC), the court and the legal principles employed. Further applying the ANT, this question will also study how the various actors relate to one another, as a result of their connections within this network, i.e., the litigation, and other connections in other networks (for instance, the position of the parties in certain markets).

Under this research question, select a case study method will be employed to select cases from each jurisdiction. The most important cases pertaining to competition law questions will be studied. These are yet to be identified.

Question three - what are the critical issues in SEP litigation and competition law in India and how do they compare with similar questions in other jurisdictions?

This research question will seek to map the global context around SEP litigation (discussed above) to specific cases in India. In doing so, the author will study the two SEP disputes in India with competition law implications – the Ericsson and Micromax dispute and the Ericsson and Intex dispute; based on information available in the public domain. While there are other pending disputes around SEPs in India, they do not involve the Competition Commission of India (India’s market regulator), and hence are outside the scope of this article. Through a study of these cases, questions of competition law will be identified. Such questions may be either those as a result of the direct application of the Competition Act, 2000 or certain actions taken by the courts with competition law implications (for instance, granting ex-parte interim injunctions).

Having identified competition law issues in SEP litigation in India, the author will then employ the comparative research methodology to trace similar issues in international SEP litigation, discussed under the previous research question. What the author is most interested in locating is the position of the actors in domestic as well as international SEP litigation. Specifically, it is submitted that characters in the domestic litigation also trace back to the context of global IP norm setting; some of them more directly than others. For instance, multinational corporations are directly involved in IP norm setting and are a party to domestic disputes. Further, domestic regulators may seek to draw inferences or apply commonly understood international legal principles, thus invoking more international actors. This phase will attempt to distill the uniqueness of India in the narrative of global IP ownership around SEP litigation.

Question four- what are the challenges for competition regulation of SEPs in India; do principles and methodology from the FTC/ EU and courts present solutions to these challenges?

In this question, the author deliberates the challenge of competition regulation for SEPs in India and whether the approach of international regulators and courts could serve as a roadmap to address these issues.

In answering this question, the author will trace India’s specific location in global competition. The tensions between differently situated actors and the networks that they form will be examined. Some comparisons will be made to illustrate how the relationship of international jurisdictions (mainly the USA and the EU) with international multinational corporations that are a party to litigation differs from that of India. Legal traditions and institutions in India will be used to understand what legal possibilities are available for using competition regulation to regulate SEPs. This includes specifically the levers in competition law such as abuse of dominance as well as the nature of the competition regulator and the role that it identifies for itself. One might also consider the relative ‘youth’ of the competition regulator as a factor in laying down legal principles, the constraints it imposes on itself as well as a tension between the market regulator and the courts. This phase will also attempt to make a case for IP regulation within India’s existing culture of engaging with the public interest in intellectual property regulation.

Having examined global IP norm setting in SEPs, international and domestic issues around SEP litigation and the network of actors involved in these proceedings, in concluding this article, the author seeks to illustrate how actors and networks in the SEP-competition set-up derive power from each other; and how the location of an actor within a network is likely to influence law and regulation. Tracing this location will then in turn be useful in determining what solutions would best address the matter of competition regulation for SEPs in India.

[1]William Dalrymple, The City of Djinns – A Year in Delhi (rep. 2014, Penguin, India) at 83.

[2]Id at 82.

[3]Bruno Latour, Networks, Societies, Spheres: Reflections of an Actor – Network Theorist, International Journal of Communication 5 (2011), 796- 810, http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/viewArticle/1094 (accessed 31 August, 2015).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/pervasive-technologies-working-document-series-2013-updated-research-methodology-2013-applying-the-actor-network-theory-to-competition-law-and-standard-essential-patent-litigation-in-india

Methodology: Statements of Working (Form 27) of Indian Mobile Device Patents

rohini — 2017-09-10T15:19:51Z

In India, if a patent is not locally worked within three years of its issuance, any person may request a compulsory license, and if the patent is not adequately worked within two years of the grant of such a compulsory license, it may be revoked. In order to provide the public with information about patent working, India requires every patentee to file an annual statement on “Form 27” describing the working of each of its issued Indian patents. We conducted the first comprehensive and systematic study of all Forms 27 filed with respect to mobile devices. We tried to empirically establish the extent to which patentees and licensees comply with the statutory requirement to declare information about the working of their patents. Research assistance was provided by interns Anna Liz Thomas and Nayana Dasgupta.

The research paper on patent landscape, Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey, [PDF] was published in the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2017).

The research paper on "Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products: An Empirical Assessment of India's Form 27 Practice and Compliance" has been published here (July 2017).

The dataset of all the Form 27 studied for this paper has been published here.

Research Questions

How many annual Form 27 submissions have been made to the Indian Patent Office for 4,419 granted patents identified in the landscape of mobile device patents in India?
How many patents have no corresponding Form 27 filed yet?
How many Form 27 submissions from those found are defective?
Is there an identifiable pattern in the defects and discrepancies?
Is there any discernible trend in filing of Form 27 over time and with respect to patent owners?

The objective of this paper is to quantitatively determine the extent to which patentees and licensees comply with the statutory requirement to declare information about the working of their patents according to Section 146(2) of the Patents Act, 1970 read with Rule 131 of the Patent Rules, 2003.

Section 146(2): Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), every patentee and every licensee (whether exclusive or otherwise) shall furnish in such manner and form and at such intervals (not being less than six months) as may be prescribed statements as to the extent to which the patented invention has been worked on a commercial scale in India.

Rule 131: Form and manner in which statements required under section 146(2) to be furnished

The statements shall be furnished by every patentee and every licensee under sub-section (2) of section 146 in Form 27 which shall be duly verified by the patentee or the licensee or his authorised agent.
The statements referred to in sub-rule (1) shall be furnished in respect of every calendar year within three months of the end of each year.
The Controller may publish the information received by him under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 146.

Object

The research object is Form 27 submissions made annually to the Indian Patent Office for the 4,419 granted patents.

4,052 of these patents were identified in the landscape (“the patent landscape”) developed by the Centre for Internet and Society as a part of ongoing research on patents pertaining to sub-USD-100 mobile devices sold in India. The dataset of the patent landscape can be accessed here. Another 367 patents pertaining to mobile technology identified during the landscaping exercise but excluded from it, were added to the initial set of 4,052 patents.

A blank copy of Form 27 is available here. The pro forma is defined as per Schedule II of Patent Rules, 2003.

Research Methods

[Corresponding research questions

How many annual Form 27 submissions have been made to the Indian Patent Office for 4,419 granted patents identified in the landscape of mobile device patents in India?
How many patents have no corresponding Form 27 filed yet?
How many Form 27 submissions from those found are defective?]

Outsourcing the searching of the submitted copies of Form 27 to a contractor

Owing to the repetitive nature of the process for collecting the forms, as well the large scale of the project, the task of searching was outsourced to a contractor. Price quotations were invited from five data entry operators and two firms of patent attorneys. On the basis of the quotation, deliverable time, scope and nature of the results delivered, and quality assurance, the contract was awarded to one firm. The firm offered the best price for a commensurate deliverable time and assured quality of results.

Form 27 retrieval online

Form 27 were searched from IPAIRS (Indian Patent Information Retrieval System) and InPASS (Indian Patent Advanced Search System) public databases of the Indian Patent Office.

InPASS has two features: Application Status and E-Register. We checked both features, in case forms not found through one could be located through the other. We indeed found that, sometimes, the forms not available on E-register could be found through the Application Status table, and vice versa.

Case 1: Accessing form 27 using Application Status tab on INPASS

A search portal is located at ipindiaservices.gov.in/publicsearch.

Enter the patent number in the “Patent Number” search field without the kind codes (IN) and click on “Search”. E.g., for patent number IN263932B, enter ‘263932’ in the “Patent Number” field.
Once the queried patent is displayed, select the “Application Status” tab to access the list of documents that were filed for the requested patent.

In the Application Status tab, scroll down to the bottom to view “Application Status table”. Click on the “View Documents” button to access the list of the documents filed for the queried patent. A pop-up window opens with the results.

In the window, a list of hyperlinks to various documents is displayed. Sometimes Form 27/ working statement is explicitly named so. At other times, it may have a different title. Once you click on the form 27 link, a PDF file opens in a new tab. There may be more than one Form 27 in the list of documents as Form 27 is an annual submission.

Case 2: No record of Form 27 found (Application status tab)

If the form is not present on InPASS, that is, if it has not been uploaded to the website, or if it has not been submitted to the Indian Patent Office (IPO), then it will not be displayed in the list of documents described in Case 1, step 5. Such instances have been logged as “No record found”.

Case 3: Accessing form 27 using E-Register tab on INPASS

At http://ipindiaservices.gov.in/publicsearch, a patent search portal is displayed. Enter the patent number by following the same steps as described in Case 1 until the queried patent is displayed. Select the “E-register” tab to access the e-register data corresponding to the queried patent.

In the “E-register” tab, scroll to the bottom to view the “Information u/s 146” table. The “Information u/s 146” table includes a list of Form 27 filed for the queried patent. As visible in the screenshot below, on clicking the “261762_2015” hyperlink, Form 27 for the queried patent opens. There could be multiple form 27s corresponding to different years.

Case 4: No record of Form 27 found (E-register)

If the form is not present in the E-register, that is, if it has not been uploaded to the website or if it has not been submitted to the IPO, then the E-Register tab displays “Eregister Not Available”.

Case 5: Searching on IPAIRS

Both InPASS and IPAIRS fetch forms from the same URL. However, we observed that one search engine sometimes displays the forms when the other doesn’t. The IPAIRS search engine was used when Form 27 was not found on InPASS.

IPAIRS patent search homepage: http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/search/index.aspx On the home page, in the Application Status tab, enter the full patent application number and CAPTCHA.
A window containing information pertaining to the patent application opens. At the bottom of the window, there is a “View Documents” button.

On clicking on “View Documents”, a new window with list of hyperlinked documents opens as described in Case 1, Step 5.

The URL for the new window displayed via “View Documents” on IPAIRS is the same as the URL displayed via “View Documents” in the “Application Status” tab on InPASS. For example, for patent number 263932, the URL for this window is the same on IPAIRS and InPASS: http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/GrantedSearch/viewdoc.aspx?id=Bx6eZ7YQLgsl3yH1LqKHjg==&loc=wDBSZCsAt7zoiVrqcFJsRw==

Form 27 retrieval via Right To Information (RTI) requests

CIS filed two requests under the RTI Act, 2005 with the Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks in Mumbai.

CIS' RTI application to the Indian Patent Office in Mumbai, March 2016 [PDF]. The IPO's reply, April 2016 [PDF].

(View text: https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-request-to-indian-patents-office-for-form-27-statement-of-working-of-patents-march-2016)

CIS' RTI application to the IPO in Mumbai, June 2015 [PDF]. The IPO's reply, June 2015 [PDF].

(View text: https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/rti-request-to-indian-patents-office-for-form-27-statement-of-working-of-patents-2015)

InPASS and IPAIRS yielded Form 27 for 1,999 patents out of 4,419. For Form 27 pertaining to 61 of the remaining patents, CIS made a request in March 2016 under the Right to Information Act (2005) to the office of the Indian Patent Office located in Mumbai.

How the 61 patents were chosen
37 of the 50 companies in the patent landscape owned granted patents. We took one patent from each of the 37 companies. [See Annexure 4 (PDF)of Methodology: Patent landscaping in the Indian mobile device market] The remaining were patents litigated in India, as well as patents transferred from one of the companies in the landscape to another.

IPO’s reply to the March 2016 RTI application
The IPO replied in April 2016 that it could provide CIS with forms for eleven of the requested patents. As for the rest of the forms, the IPO stated, “As thousand [sic] of Form-27 are filed in this office, it is very difficult to segregate Form-27 for the patent numbers enlisted in your RTI application as it needs diversion of huge official/ staff manpower and it will affect day to day [sic] work of this office.”

Repeating the Form 27 search online

A few days after CIS received the reply from the IPO, Form 27 pertaining to patents in the landscape started appearing on InPASS and IPAIRS E-register portal. CIS’ contractor repeated the search for forms for all 4,419 patents as some forms filed in 2016 and 2015 were found. Forms for additional 1,003 patents were found, taking the number of patents with at least one corresponding form to 3,002.

Of the 1,417 patents for which forms were not found, 481 are either expired or there is no log corresponding to them in the E-Register.

Schema for the results

Information from the Form 27 was logged into a spreadsheet with the following heads:
Serial Number -- Assignee -- Patent Number -- Status -- Application Date -- Grant Date -- Title -- Application Number -- Form 27 presence -- Multiple Forms -- Number of years -- Year -- If Worked -- Working/ Non-working Status -- Working/ Non-working Information -- Licensing Status -- Licensing Information -- Comments.

Detailed legend and process of logging the results

Assignee: Name of the company that owns the patent. Annexure 4 [PDF] lists 50 companies studied for the patent landscape. 37 of those companies owned patents in India. Thus, the assignee could be one of 37 companies among the 50 in Annexure 4. Where two assignees are mentioned, the patent was transferred from the second assignee to the first on account of sale of the patent, company merger, etc. For example, "Huawei|NEC" indicates that a patent that belonged to NEC was transferred to Huawei.

Form 27 presence: Whether or not Form 27 was found. Entries in this column are either “Yes” or “No”. If case Form 27 was not found, the subsequent columns are unpopulated.

Multiple Forms: If more than one Form 27 was found, the number of years for which it was found. In some cases, more than one form was found for the same patent for the same year. We have considered these instances as a single form for the same year and noted the defect in the “Comments” column.

Year: The year for which the form was filed. This information was found in #2 of the pro forma of Form 27. In the case of patents with Form 27 filed for more than one year, the entries for different years have been logged into consecutive rows.

If Worked: This information was found in 3(i) of the pro forma. Depending on whether the text of Form 27 states that the patent was “worked” or “not worked”, results have been logged as either “Yes” or “No”. In instances where it is not explicitly stated whether the patent has been worked or not, or where 3(i) is blank, the results are logged as “Not disclosed” with a description of the defect in the “Comments” column.

Working/ Non-working status: Corresponds to 3(i)a in the case of patents stated as “worked” and to 3(i)b in the case of those stated as “not worked”. The results have been marked as:

Description is generic (future use)
Description is generic (present use)
Description is specific
No description

Description is generic (future use): No specific information been provided as required by 3(i)a or 3(i)b. The description indicates that in the future the patentee might “work” or license the patent or do both. E.g: “May be worked in the future depending on the market demand and when technology is mature.”

“We are still assessing the commercial and technological aspects of working of this patent in India and negotiating marketing and distribution of patented product with related parties.”

“Technical developments [sic] are still continuing” or “Negotiations and technical developments [sic] are still continuing”.

Description is generic (present use): No specific information been provided as required by 3(i)a or 3(i)b. The description indicates that the patentee may be “working” the patent. E.g:, “DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE INVENTION, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE ACCURATELY WHETHER THE PATENTED INVENTION HAS BEEN WORKED IN INDIA OR NOT. Improvements in the invention are continuing to be made. The Patentee is actively looking for licensees and customers to commercialise the invention in the Indian environment.”

“... This patent is among a large number of patents in the patentee’s complex portfolio which may cover the products services and embedded technologies provided by the patentee or its licensee(s) in India. This patent might worked [sic] in India in some of the patentee(s) existing or future products, services and embedded technologies. Given the extremely Iarge number of patents that may apply to any given product or service of the patentee, it is very difficult to Identify and accurately update which of those patents would apply to the numerous products, services and embedded technologies.”

Description is specific: Specific information has been provided as required in 3(i)a or 3(i)b.

E.g, “Quantum of the patented product-303520 and value of the patented product in INR-2790524299”.

No description: 3(i)a and 3(i)b are blank.

Working/non-working information: Contains the full text of the descriptions mentioned in “Working/non-working status” column. These have been reproduced verbatim from Form 27 filings.

Licensing status: States whether or not the patent has been licensed as per 3(ii) of the pro forma for Form 27. Results are logged as “Yes” (licensed), “No” (no-licensed), “Cross-licensed” and “Not disclosed”.

“Not disclosed” indicates that the response to 3(ii) is either blank or there is an explicit statement that licensing information would not be disclosed on Form 27. E.g: “As all the licenses are confidential in nature, the details pertaining to the same are not being disclosed herein and may be provided to the Patent Office as and when the same is specifically directed by the Patent Office under sealed cover so that such details are not laid open in public domain.”

Licensing information: Contains the full text of the response reproduced verbatim from 3(ii). (Blank fields when there is no text in 3(ii))

For patents marked as licensed, this column contains the names and addresses of licensees and/ or sub-licensees.

For patents marked as not-licensed, this column is either blank or contains statements such as, “Information Not readily available; efforts will be made to collect and submit further information, if asked for.”, “None”, “No licensees”.

For patents marked as “cross-licensed”, the patentee states that it has a cross-licensing agreement with its licensees. E.g: “There is a cross license agreement between <company name> and at least one licensee, giving mutual rights to produce despite monopoly afforded by patents that are hold by any of the companies. There is no information available on whether the technology of said patent is included products sold by such licensee. As all the licenses are confidential in nature, the details pertaining to the same shall be provided under specific directions from the Patent Office.”

Comments: Contains information about defects and notable observations from the Form 27 submissions.

Validation of results

Validation of the results was done via deduplication first and then random sampling of 10% of the results.

Analysis of results

[Corresponding research questions:
4. Is there an identifiable pattern in the defects and discrepancies?
5. Is there any discernible trend in filing of Form 27 over time and with respect to patent owners?]

The results logged into the spreadsheet were analysed to find a pattern in the defects in the submissions. Visualisations will be created, if necessary.

Prior Art

Extraordinary writ petition in the matter of a public interest litigation, filed in the High Court of Delhi, Shamnad Basheer vs Union of India and others, C.M. No. 5590 of 2015 http://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FORM-27-WP-1R-copy.pdf

The petitioner(s) “sought to investigate the commercial working of certain patented inventions in India, particularly in relation to three key areas”. One of these areas include telecommunications technology. Para 53 to 58 of the writ elucidate on the petitioners’ observations and findings on “High technology patents and trolls”, while para 59 and 60 refer to the linkage between patents and products. Annexure P-8 of this petition contains copies of Form 27 filed by Ericsson in India. Annexure P-11 contains a “summary of findings of Form 27 investigations conducted by the petitioner”. Annexure P-4 (II. Telecommunications Sector) contains a list of 58 patents pertaining to the telecommunications domain in India. 21 of these are coincide with the patent landscape mentioned in “Research Object”.
Basheer had published a report in 2011 based on the findings of his RTI investigation of Form 27 pertaining to pharmaceutical patents in India. The report titled “RTI Applications and “Working” of Foreign Drugs in India?” is available at: http://www.spicyip.com/docs/Workingpatents.doc The report sheds light on lack of filing, incomplete filing and violation of patent working norms by pharmaceutical companies. He states having encountered difficulties during the RTI process: The RTI process was a very arduous one, with the patent office refusing information or claiming missing files in some cases. We had to resort to the appellate procedure in almost all cases. And in one case concerning the drugs Tarceva and Sutent, both the CPIO (Delhi office) and the appellate authority refused to provide information. We had to then take the matter up directly with Controller General PH Kurian who immediately ordered that the information be provided. Upon his instructions, the information was provided within 24 hours. However, we received this information only on the 4^th of April 2011, more than 6 months since we began the RTI process! (Source: Drug Firms and Patent "Working": Extent of Compliance with Form 27 http://spicyip.com/2011/04/drug-firms-and-patent-working-extent-of.html

Limitations

If Form 27 is not found on InPASS or INPAIRS, it is not possible to determine if the form has not been submitted to the IPO or it has been submitted but the IPO has not uploaded it. There is no publicly available database or log where such information is available.
Technical issues with the IPAIRS website hampered the speed of searching for and downloading Form 27. At the time of trial run in May 2015, the website was not available for nearly a week. Technical issues also lead to conflicting search results on IPAIRS and INPASS at times. For example, the form may be available via one search engine but not via another, even though they are fetched the files from the same database. Runtime errors occur due to browser caching.

Edited, September 10, 2017: To add -- URLs of the research paper on Form 27 published in July 2017, and of the dataset containing raw data, which was published and licensed CC-BY-SA 4.0.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-statements-of-working-form-27-of-indian-mobile-device-patents

Intellectual Property in Mobile Application Development in India

sinha — 2015-08-31T14:33:06Z

A steady rise in smart phone penetration in India has led to a corresponding growth of the mobile application development industry. Mobile application development like all technological implementations is subject to intellectual property issues. However, very little is understood about the effect of existing patent and copyright law on this niche industry. I aim to develop an understanding of the mobile applications industry, and how it is governed by current Indian patent and copyright regime. I will also use this research to inform the optimal ways in which policymakers may ensure the continual emergence of the mobile applications industry. This blog post lays down a document delineating the research methodology and research questions within the Intellectual Property in Mobile Application Development in India chapter under the Pervasive Technologies Project. The document is a work in progress.

Introduction to the “Intellectual Property in Mobile Application Development” chapter

Software companies in India were traditionally operating on the software as a service (SAAS model). Service contracts signed within this industry ensured that all IPR developed during a project was owned by the client. With the advent of the smart-phone, many software developers left SAAS enterprises in pursuit of developing their own mobile application products (“mobile apps”). Several developers began to aggressively acquire or create patent portfolios around their products.¹ However, it has been observed that mobile apps continue to be increasingly produced in imitation of other products or services or by more discrete means of copying source code or content without the right to do so.

The overall objective of this chapter is to develop a holistic picture of the mobile apps development ecosystem in India in order to portray the decisions developers are making within their practice as a function of how India's intellectual property regime operates within this ecosystem. I will also examine whether existing regimes of intellectual property interact inhibit or accelerate the growth of the mobile applications development ecosystem in India, especially in conjunction with market and cultural forces arising as a result.

Research Questions and Methodology

1. What are the decisions developers are making within their practice in terms of location of their enterprise and clients, scale of audience, funding, business models and mobile apps marketplace (app stores) ?

1.1. Who is the primary actor in the mobile applications development cycle in India?

Method: Analysis of the quantitative research conducted by Samantha Cassar across 267 mobile applications developers.²

Create a new survey instrument and supplement with relevant external expert interviews obtained from Samantha Cassar's qualitative research.

The interviews shall be conducted with respondents based out of Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad
The exercise targets 10 developers in each city

The analysis of the interviews and results of Samantha's web survey shall be verified by an expert well-versed with the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data

1.2 Is the mobile apps marketplace organically developing into a Bazaar model, or a Cathedral model?

Method: Literature review

1.3. What are the contractual terms between the enterprise and the employee? What is the typical nature of agreements in the mobile apps development industry between enterprise-employee and enterprise- client?

Method: Analysis of the quantitative research conducted by Samantha Cassar and supplement with relevent external expert interviews obtained from her qualitative research.

What is the nature of innovation emerging from the mobile app industry? What is the awareness of the mobile applications developer and its enterprise of rules concerning code, content and design? How does re-use and sharing of code, content and design occur in the mobile application developer ecosystem ? What is the perceived impact of the Indian IPR regime on the aforementioned aspects? Finally, do the emerging trends in re-use and sharing of code run afoul of Indian IP law?

Method: Analysis of Indian Patent and Copyright regime to assess the legality of prevailing practices in the ecosystem.

Analysis of the quantitative research conducted by Samantha Cassar and supplement it with relevant external expert interviews obtained from Samantha's qualitative research.

3. The apps marketplace is extremely important since they are the gatekeepers enabling access to apps. What is the nature of the apps marketplace? What are the limitations associated with it ? How do the existing regulatory models intersect with this relatively new marketplace? What is the enforcement carried out by these app stores in terms of IP?

Method: Literature review and analysis of the new survey instrument.

   4. How does Indian Copyright law and patent law apply to the mobile applications development ecosystem, in respect of the various business models operating in the industry?

       Method: Literature review

4.1. The patent regime is grounded on a laboratory model of innovation. What does the niche mobile applications development industry (working on a micro-creativity model of innovation) require differently from the patent regime to foster growth?

Method: Literature review

4.2. Similarly, copyright law has a distinct design for digital objects. Examine the design and its suitability to regulate a mobile application.

Method: Literature review to trace the development of copyright law. Copyright was designed to regulate a physical book publishing industry. By extending its application to myriad objects, the design has gone through significant changes. Also, conduct expert interviews in the field to understand the practice and gather qualitative data.

1 See Lava aims for 100 mobile apps, available at http://spicyip.com/2013/01/guest-post-lava-aims-for-100-mobile-app.html

2 Out of 267 respondents, 93 responded in full and 164 responded partially

3See Question 1.2 of this document

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/intellectual-property-in-mobile-application-development-in-india-1

PERVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES PROJECT WORKING DOCUMENT SERIES: DOCUMENT 1 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY FOR A PAPER ON COMPETITION LAW + IPR + ACCESS TO < $100 MOBILE DEVICES

nehaa — 2015-10-04T02:51:06Z

This blog post is the research methodology for my research paper under the Pervasive Technologies Project. This is a work in progress and is likely to be modified from time to time.

See a subsequent version titled Pervasive Technologies: Working Document Series - Research Questions and a Literature Review on the Actor-Network Theory

Preliminary

The realization of the promise of the sub hundred dollar mobile device as a facilitator of access to knowledge is contingent inter alia on its availability in the market place. In turn, the market availability of the sub hundred dollar mobile device is influenced by the existence of an enabling environment for producers to produce, and consumers to consume. From a regulatory perspective, the enabling environment itself is a function of existing laws and policies, and the 'developmental effects' of certain laws and policies (Saraswati, 2012).

This research paper under the Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Market Place Project ("PT Project") examines one such legal and policy lever and the role of a regulator in the development of an enabling environment for access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. This paper is founded on four assumptions: first, that access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices is influenced by their price; second, that the question of access necessitates conversation between the intellectual property regime and several other actors, sites and tools; third, that one of the fundamental goals of regulatory reform is the creation of a 'stable, open and future- proof environment' (Guermazi and Satola, 2005) that encourages access to these devices; and fourth, that there exist public law implications of intellectual property that justify the involvement of State actors and regulators in matters that may arise out of private transactions.

Research Questions

This research paper will examine whether there is a role to be played by one regulator, that is, the Competition Commission of India (“CCI”), in this narrative of innovation, intellectual property and access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices. Specifically, the following research questions will be addressed:

First, what is the relationship between intellectual property and competition law? Second, what are the competition law/antitrust concerns that arise around the licensing of intellectual property (standard essential patents)? Third, can existing mechanisms in competition law address concerns around the licensing of standard essential patents on sub hundred dollar devices, and is competition law a viable solution to address this issue? If so, which ones? Fourth, given the frequency of these litigations, is there a role to be played by an ex-post regulator, such as the CCI, or is there a need for ex-ante regulation?

Research Objects

In an attempt to address these research questions, this paper will examine the role of the Competition Commission of India and the Indian Judiciary. This paper will also examine the role of similarly placed institutions in the United States of America as well as some member states of the European Union.

This research paper will also examine select tools and sites sought to be used to create an enabling environment to facilitate access to these sub hundred dollar mobile devices: first, principles, legal frameworks and provisions of competition law/antitrust law; second, all relevant judicial decisions.

Research Method

First , this research paper will begin with establishing the case for the intervention of the regulator and/or the judiciary in the sub hundred dollar mobile device market by undertaking a review of primary and secondary literature [1]("literature"). Second, also through a literature review, the research will be contextualized to India in terms of the market, the actors involved and the legal framework. Third, a cross jurisdictional comparative legal search will be undertaken to understand the potential areas of intervention for the judiciary and the Competition Commission of India based on existing legal disputes in other jurisdictions; and the possible challenges that might ensue. Fourth, in a scenario building exercise, an attempt will be made to outline the role that the judiciary and the regulator might play in India, in order to ensure access to sub hundred dollar mobile devices is not impeded by litigation around standard essential patents.

Generally, in the writing of this paper, inputs will be sought from experts including MHRD Chair Professors, legal practitioners in India, academics in India and abroad and members of relevant departments of the Indian Government.

Research Communication

This research will be communicated through a series of blog posts- one every month from December, 2014 to December, 2015. A preliminary draft of a research paper will be produced by December, 2015, tentatively to be presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, New Delhi. The final output will be a research paper.

References

Bouthenia Guermazi and David Satola, Creating the "Right" Enabling Environment for ICT, in Robert Schware (ed.), E-development: From Excitement to Effectiveness (2005, World Bank Publications).
Jyoti Saraswati, Dot. Compradors- Power and Policy in the Development of the Indian Software Industry (2012, Pluto Press)

[1] Unless otherwise specified, for the purposes of this document, primary and secondary literature includes academic articles and books, newspaper articles and opinion pieces, blog posts, case law and other legal provisions.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-sub-hundred-dollar-mobile-devices-and-competition-law

Methodology: Access to Music through the Mobile

maggie — 2014-12-08T16:22:41Z

Like its predecessors the vinyl, the cassette tape, the CD, and the MP3 player, the mobile phone as the most recent musical carrier have been well documented to be a disruptive technology, one which has made earlier carrier technologies virtually obsolete. The mobile phone has transformed the music industry and its supporting infrastructure — dramatically altering the roles of various intermediaries and stakeholders who enable the creation, distribution, and consumption of musical content.

Context

For the first time in 13 years, the music business is growing again, with consumption of musical content at an all time high due to innovations which have provided more affordable and convenient platforms for accessing music than ever before. These include web-based and mobile-based applications which have arisen to compete with piracy through "free", "feels-like-free" and "fermium" business models.[1]

Given the pervasiveness of the mobile phone, especially in India where it is the only mode of access for over 50% of the population [2], these innovations along with expanding broadband and data services seems to be a mark of success in bringing access to music and other media content to those formerly priced out, and geographically excluded from the legal market.

However, Indian web and mobile-based applications such as Gaana and Saavn, and its U.S. counterparts like Spotify and Pandora have continuously operated at a loss, often sustained by venture capitalist funding or a larger corporate backing.[3] Although many online platforms, such as the recently shut down Flyte (funded by Flipkart) cite piracy as the official reason for its closure, industry insiders have allegedly noted exorbitant licensing fees demanded by rights holders as the case.[4]

Research Problems

1. It is uncertain whether legal access to affordable music through the mobile will remain.

As an access issue, this is problematic due to the potential disappearances of these platforms, which have with varying success provided an alternative to unauthorized file sharing while increasing the ease of consumers' access to a larger volume and variety of legal content. Some of these applications provide a "direct-to-fan" platform for musicians to upload their own music online without having to 'break in' to a relatively closed entertainment industry, particularly in the Indian market where the mass majority of music is dominated by the film industry. Access to increased volume and variety is also not a guarantee, particularly in light of some musicians' indignation over the intermediaries' profits from their content, and the little revenue received in return.

2. Numerous stakeholders are entering the technologically advancing, digital music industry resulting in uncertainty of optimal business models and increased complexity of revenue and royalty distribution.
Thus, given evolving business models due to the transitioning physical to digital music industry, no consensus has yet been found on which platforms or revenue models offer an optimal solution for access to, and production of music. The potential for monetization in all levels of the value chain - from production, to content aggregation, to content distribution, and consumption -- has resulted in an increase in the number of intermediaries, further complicating the ecosystem.

All stakeholders fulfill different roles in the industry while expressing the common challenge of 'monetization'.

Web and mobile based content distributors are attempting to find the right price points at which Indian consumers are willing to pay, particularly in a market whose billing model is largely based on mobile credits and cash-on-delivery since only 1% of the population have access to credit. [5] Globally, criticisms for streaming distributors like Spotify are highly publicized, not paying enough royalty to artists despite claims that 70% of their revenue is spent on content licensing.[6]

Content aggregators are attempting to monetize services such as music fingerprinting, meta-data tagging, and other analytics tracking to identify and capitalize on consumer behavior and consumption trends. Meanwhile, telecom companies and mobile phone manufacturers are attempting to provide integrated services and music bundle packages to increase the interoperability of these platforms for a more frictionless experience for consumers.

Content owners - vast majority being music labels -- are attempting to maintain their relevance in the industry through its powerful artist and repertoire marketing role, amidst criticisms that stakeholders like multi-channel networks and self-publishing content distributors (i.e. SoundCloud, Youtube, etc.) will deem it irrelevant. Many distributors globally note the vast ownership of content leading to the potential abuse of bargaining power, as exemplified by the Competition Commission of India's recent ruling that Super Cassette Industries' (or T-Series, who own 70% of Hindi film music) practiced unfair and discriminatory charging practices for a radio broadcasters due to their demand for minimum guarantees.[7]

The content producers -- lyricists, composers, performers, and more are struggling to monetize and finance the production of their music. Down the valuation stream, the contractual agreements between content owners and distributors affect the livelihoods of these artists. India's music industry is particularly unique in that the vast majority of content are film music, which means the common financier of music production are the film industry, rather than music labels or publishing houses. Additionally, given a one-time, work-for-hire agreement was commonplace in the Indian film industry during music production, a contractual agreement stipulating royalty division was slow to materialize.

3. Continued violation of law due to lack of legitimacy of Copyright Board, Copyright societies, and 2012 Copyright Amendment.

The entire music ecosystem is governed by the framework of copyright, which necessitates legal mechanisms to ensure proper regulation and balance between the protection of rights holders and access to content for consumers.

The 2012 Copyright Amendment attempted to address the imbalance of bargaining power through preventing the first author's transfer of right to royalty, amongst others. This amendment was also passed in response to alleged corruption and collusion between the content owners (music labels), various judiciaries, and the former copyright societies (Indian Performing Rights Societies ("IPRS") and the Indian Phonographic Publishing Limited ("PPL")), resulting in an absence of royalty payments to lyricists and composers for many years.[8]

Despite this, the Copyright Amendment have not been as effective in correcting the issues on the ground, and are still allegedly being circumvented via advanced royalties, backdated agreements, and waiver of performance royalty rights.[9] Other inefficiencies cited have been poor transparency of royalty payments, lack of publicly available analytics on web and mobile-based platforms, and untimely responses by the Copyright Board to conduct investigations into the allegations.

Amidst these allegations, some industry analysts also claim the Copyright framework itself needs to catch up with the technological potential that the internet, and these new services provide. This may be an alternative perspective to be explored.

*(Tentative) Research Questions and Methodology

Thus, given uncertainty of the sustainability of affordable, legal access; the increasing complexity of business models and royalty distribution, and the continued violation of Copyright law due to lack of legitimacy, the policy question is:
How can legal and institutional mechanisms ensure an enabling environment for access to, and production of music for all mobile phone users in India?

"Legal mechanisms" - Copyright Act, Copyright Board, licensing mechanisms
"Institutional mechanisms" - Copyright societies, music industry norms, corporate policies
"Access" - equitable, fair, easy access to quality and quantity of music
- Potential barriers to access (to music, through mobile):
- Political: Legal constraints (Goonda Act?), intermediaries prevent copying, licensing bodies
- Economic: Lack of availability of older repertoire, access to mobile device
- Social: Use or access of materials involving loss of privacy, lack of quality production
- Technological: TPMs, compatibility, broadband/data access, payment gateways, geographic barriers, lack of net neutrality

Access necessitates "production" - ability to create content with little entry barriers; balance right of artists to earn, and consumer access

Barriers to production and distribution:
Uncertainty of business models in age of digital music
Ineffectiveness of Copyright regulation: Copyright societies, Copyright board
Controversy surrounding Copyright Act
Lack of finance/income -- intermediaries taking share of pie ?? Inefficiencies in music industry?

"Mobile phone users in India" - smartphone users able to access web and mobile based platforms

How do the stakeholders in the Indian music industry work together to facilitate access to music via the mobile phone?

Who are the stakeholders of the music industry in India?
What are their roles and their objectives?
How have their roles changed given the digital transition of the music industry?

Method: Conduct a stakeholder analysis mapping the physical to digital transition. Secure information via literature review (academic and grey) and expert interviews secured via snowball sampling.

Content Creation

Lyricists/composers (film, non-film)
Performers (film, nom-film)
Film Producer
Sound Producer
Publisher
Self-production (Remix artists, DJs, independents)

Content Aggregation and Distribution
- Content Aggregation:

Music labels (International/film/indie)
Mobile aggregators (VAS companies)
Tech aggregators (back-end for digital platforms: meta-data tagging, analytics, etc.)

Content distribution (digital)

Online stores (e.g. iTunes)

Mobile/Web-based

Webcast/Radio (e.g. MumbaiOne Radio)
Digital Stores (e.g. Amazon, iTunes, eMusic, Google Play, Flyte, OKListen, etc.)
Interactive streaming (e.g. 8tracks, Gaana, Hungama, Raaga, Rdio, Spotify, etc.)
Bundled telco-music stores (formerly Nokia MixMusic)

Copyright Board
Copyright societies (e.g. IPRS (Indian Performing Rights Society), PPL (Phonographics Performance Limited, ISRA (Indian Singers Rights Association))
Associations (e.g. MCAI (Music Composers Association of India), SIMCA (South Indian Music Companies Association), IMI (Indian Music Industry - ass. of producers), etc.)

Financiers:
- Venture capitalists
- Brands/advertisers
- Corporate backing
- Multi-channel networks
  - Technical intermediaries
    - Telecom operators
    - Internet service providers
    - Data providers
    - Payment gateway providers

Mobile phone manufacturers

Consumers

Types of music listeners (Ovum research taxonomy)
- Active fans (lean forward/niche)
- Core enthusiasts (lean forward/mainstream)
- Indie followers (lean back/niche)
- Lean-back listeners (lean back/mainstream)
Class distinction / price sensitivity?

What are the current business models for web and mobile-based content distributors? How does this impact each stakeholder in the music industry?

What are the new business models of the digital music industry in India?
- How are the new intermediaries/stakeholders in the web/mobile targeted music industry impacting business models?
- Literature review (media, industry reports) and expert interviews

What is the revenue distribution in the music production value chain for the web/mobile-based platforms in India?
- Method: International comparison of new digital music business models worldwide:
- Online MOOC Course & lectures (Coursera - West Virginia University ; YouTube - Future of Music Coalition[11] )
- Literature review (academic, white, grey, media, industry repots, etc.)
- Method: Replicate FMC's study for Indian context: Music and How Money Flows[12]

Who are the consumers that access music via mobile/web-based platforms in India?

Is there a socio-cultural-economic dimension distinguishing those willing and able to pay? Who actually pays and how much?
- Method: Literature review, expert interviews, surveys??
- Are there different levels of musical engagement which translate to consumer behavior (active fans, core enthusiasts, indie follower, lean back listeners) and subsequent willingness to pay? What percentage of listeners fall in each category in India?
  - Method: Questionnaire to current users of web/mobile-based music distributors supplemented by expert interviews
  - What kind of economic good is digital music in India? Inferior, luxury, normal? Complementary, substitute? Public, merit, private, free?
    - Method: Literature review, theoretical economic analysis supplemented by user survey and expert interviews

Considering the stakeholders in the digital music industry, consumer behavior in India, how should music copyrights be regulated to provide optimal access of music through the mobile to consumers and fair renumeration to first authors?

What role do legal mechanisms currently play in the distribution of royalty revenue in the music industry (on the ground)?
- Method: Mapping of copyright processes and agreements (oral, contractual, or otherwise) between stakeholders in the music industry, noting specifically role of Copyright Board, and (former) Copyright societies; expert interviews
What role do codified laws (2012 Copyright Amendment, case law) stipulate should be the legal mechanisms to distribute royalty in the music industry?
- Method: Legal literature review, expert interviews
- How have the 2012 Copyright Amendment impacted the stakeholders in the music industry? Are the laws effectively enforced? Has the Copyright Amendment been designed/defined/articulated in an optimal way for all stakeholders? Why or why not?
- Method: Literature review
- How should copyright be organized? Who should distribute royalty revenues? What process?
  - Method: Consider stakeholder analysis, context of India music/film industry, consumer demand and price-sensitivity, and conduct cross-jurisdictional comparison
  - What industry norms should be set for a more transparent, efficient supply chain to ensure rights holders receive fair compensation?
    - Method: International comparison of industry norms for copyright organization and distribution

[1].Amba Kak, Fighting Free with Free - The Legal Music Market in India as a Response to the Digital Age (Centre for Internet and Society, to be published.)

[2].Avendus Capital, India’s Mobile Internet: The Revolution Has Begun: An Overview of How Mobile Internet Is Touching the Lives of Millions, Industry (Avendus Capital Private Limited, September 2013), http://www.avendus.com/Files/Fund%20Performance%20PDF/Avendus_Report-India’s_Mobile_Internet-2013.pdf.

[3].Amba Kak, Fighting Free with Free - The Legal Music Market in India as a Response to the Digital Age (Centre for Internet and Society, to be published.)

[4].Nikhil Pahwa, “Why Flipkart Shut Down Flyte Music,” News and Analysis of Digital Media in India, MediaNama, (May 29, 2013), http://www.medianama.com/2013/05/223-why-flipkart-shut-flyte-music/.

[5].Reserve Bank of India, as cited in IFPI, India: Nearing an all-time high http://www.ifpi.org/india.php

[6].James Duffett-Smith, Music Licensing Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment (United States Copyright Office 2014).

[7].Ashok Chawla, M.L. Tayal, and S.L. Bunker, HT Media Limited v. Super Cassettes Industries Limited (Competition Commission of India 2014).

[8].Prashant Reddy, “Did the Big Music Companies on IPRS & PPL Collude to Deny Lyricists and Composers Crores of Rupees in ‘ringtone Royalties’ – An Investigation,” http://spicyip.com/2011/02/did-big-music-companies-on-iprs-ppl.html, SpicyIP, (February 14, 2011)

[9].Anonymous, “Ghost Post: The myriad ways in which the Copyright Amendment Act, 2012 is being circumvented” http://spicyip.com/2014/01/ghost-post-the-myriad-ways-in-which-the-copyright-amendment-act-2012-is-being-circumvented.html, SpicyIP, (January 18, 2014)

[10].https://www.coursera.org/course/gpsmusic

[11]. https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL471E012D03E9BA03

[12]. https://futureofmusic.org/blog/2013/06/18/music-and-how-money-flows

Click to download the PDF

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/methodology-access-to-music-through-mobile

Fab to Fabless: Understanding the Process of Chip Manufacturing (Interviews with Semiconductor Industry - Part 2)

maggie — 2014-12-26T12:06:48Z

This is the second of a four-part blog series highlighting findings from a small sample of interviews with fabless semiconductor industry professionals in Taiwan. These industry insiders was approached for the intent of understanding expert knowledge on the process of integrated circuit design. This post explores the process of chip manufacturing and the foundry business model.

See the first blog post here.

Studies have shown that Taiwan's integrated circuit manufacturing sector have shown spatial and industrial knowledge spillover, resulting in "increased information diffusion, interaction and communication, innovation, and intellectual capital.". Market research company IC Insights found that Taiwanese and Chinese companies represented five of the eight fastest-growing fabless integrated circuit ("IC") suppliers in 2013.

The Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Marketplace project is looking at the accessibility of networked communication technologies in the mass market within the sub-100 dollar range. This has resulted in a narrowing of the research scope to the mobile phone due to the pervasiveness of the mobile for accessing Internet, as understood by exploring the trends in technology usage models as explored in Part I of this blog post series: Trends and Changes in Technology (Part I of IV).

The need to understand the full story of the mobile phone production led CIS to Taiwan to understand the beginnings of the manufacturing process - the development of an integrated chip. The interviewed professionals all represented fabless IC semiconductor design companies which operated via a foundry business model where the actual fabrication is outsourced.

According to one expert whose company earned 50% of its revenue from mobile chipsets alone, the process of the mobile phone manufacturing begins at the fabless design stage, where fabless IC design companies design a chip following consultation with the fabricators to specify the mechanical constraints of the process (the size of the die, the minimum size of the wiring line, etc.) to ensure design requirements are met, and to negotiate the costs of production. Another interviewee highlighted that during this design phase, there are three clear goals: 1) Upgrade performance, 2) Reduce cost by integrating features, and 3) Reduce power consumption.

These particular companies provided insight to some of the commonly licensed technology that went into a smartphone chipset. This included the central processing unit (CPU) from ARM Holdings, who in 2010 held 95% of the CPU marketshare in smartphone technology, and have only increased since then. One of the interviewed companies also uses the graphics processing unit (GPU) intellectual property from Imagination Technologies, which after Qualcomm had the 2nd largest market share of IP for personal devices in 2013. Qualcomm who owns the most patents to the 3G standard with over 250 licenses in its CDMA portfolio has made considerable revenue gains thus far, but some analysts predict due to a transition into 4G technology without the same dominant 3G portfolio, they will lose their dominant market position.

Having taken into account these IP into the design process, the design is then sent to fabricators such as the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Industry (TSMC) who in 2013 owned at least 50% of the world's global maker share in fabrication, and others like the United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC) and Global Foundries). According to the interviewee, the fabrication process requires about 2-3 months.

This foundry business model is a result of increased efficiency and division of labour. Fabrication plants require large amounts of investments into manufacturing facilities. According to interviewees, one would have to spend an average of 5-10 billion USD to built a fabrication plant now. Since plants like TSMC exists, semiconductor industries can now focus on their area of expertise, which is design and customer relationship, and optimize their synergistic relationship for gains for all.

One of the recent revolutionary developments which have contributed to low-cost smartphone manufacturing has been the turnkey solution chipset, which includes the hardware reference design, the printed circuit board, the software, and instructions for how to create a mobile phone. This turnkey solution, amongst other electronic parts, are sent for white box packaging, then shipped to a distributor like WPG Holdings who are the largest electronics distributor in Asia. WPG and others will then distribute these chips and other related products to their customers, the smartphone manufacturers. This entire production cue takes about 3-4 months.

The turnkey solution as mentioned before vastly contrasts the traditional manufacturing process of a mobile phone, where a chip could be designed, given to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) who would then design all the remaining parts. There used to be a very clear division of labour. Now, one interviewee explained, manufacturers will "buy a turnkey solution, open a factory, take a chassis (case), screw it all together, and sell it. This is what's driven the demand, and that's what created this low cost-market."

According to our interviewees, the low-cost production of this turnkey chip solution is the reason how so many of the phones in the sub-$100 dollar market exist today.

P.127 of Tsai, Diana H. A. “Knowledge Spillovers and High-Technology Clustering: Evidence from Taiwan’s Hsinchu Science-Based Industrial Park.” Contemporary Economic Policy 23.1 (2005): 116–128. Print.

IC Insights. “Taiwanese and Chinese Companies Represented Five of Eight Fastest Growing Top-25 Fabless IC Suppliers in 2013.” IC Insights. N.p., 7 May 2014. Web. 3 Sept. 2014.

Morgan, Timothy Prickett. “ARM Holdings Eager for PC and Server Expansion.” The Register, Feb. 2011. Web.

Trefis Team. “Why Qualcomm’s Royalty Rate Will Continue To Decline.” Forbes, 10 June 2014. Web.

Wang, Lisa. “TSMC Eyes 50% Global Market Share.” 26 Mar. 2014: 13. Print.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-semi-conductor-industry-professionals-in-taiwan-2

Changing Usage Models: Desktops to Ubiquitous Cloud-Based Mobile Computing (Interviews with Semiconductor Industry - Part 1)

maggie — 2014-12-26T12:08:34Z

This is the first of a four-part blog series highlighting findings from a small sample of interviews with fabless semiconductor industry professionals in Taiwan. These industry insiders was approached for the intent of understanding expert knowledge on the process of integrated circuit design. However, the conversations resulted in leanings far beyond that scope. This post explores the trends of personal computing technology, which provides the pretext for the narrowing of the Pervasive Technologies project scope to a focus on the mobile phone.

Since the mid-1990s, the dissemination of information communications technologies (ICTs) has been hailed as the solution to bridging the digital divide. This rationale led to a multitude of programs, including One Laptop per Child, the Aakash tablet, and most recently, Modi's 'Digital India' campaign, to ensure all Indians have a mobile phone by the year 2019.

The Pervasive Technologies project looking at Access to Knowledge has come to understand that mobile phone technology have become ubiquitous, with 79% of internet users accessing the internet through mobiles in 2014. Particularly for low-income consumers, those who do not have access to computing rely on their mobile phones for accessing tools ranging from the common email, text messaging, calling; and the more advanced and revolutionary - mobile banking (e.g. m-PESA), crowd-sourced environmental protection (e.g. SpillMap), and more.

The evolution to the ubiquity of mobile technology was a valuable learning gained from recent interviews in Taiwan with professionals from the fabless semiconductor chip design industry. A senior executive with over 20 years experience in the field provided some insight to trends/changes in personal computing technology upon inquiring about the recent trends and changes within the industry.

One significant change that has been occurring is the usage model of consumers. Desktops and even laptops are not fully mobile since they cannot be used in one's hands. As broadband have become more pervasive, smartphones and tablets have resulted in new usage models where computing can be done virtually anywhere. People now tend to vale this more than the desktop experience.

The 'cloud' has also changed computing because the performance requirements for PC processors and other technologies no longer have to be as advanced. In addition, there has been a big shift from desktop content creation to mobile computing. This has mostly been catered towards content consumption (e.g. accessing email, viewing photos, using social media, etc.).

As a result of changing usage models and cloud competing, there has been a general industry shift away from computers. The PC market has slowed down, and the smartphone and tablet markets have exploded. They are generally cheeper, don't have as many bugs, and are much more convenient. Previously, the big names were desktop providers HP, and Dell; but now "there's less sex appeal around it… we're not excited by it.. it's the smartphone that's very exciting". The tech revolution has brought to light exciting smartphone brands like HTC, Samsung, Google and Apple.

In addition to big name smartphone brands, smaller, low-cost manufacturers like Xiaomi are developing a new business model through service, or application shopping. Prices of smartphones are continuing to decrease, so manufacturers using this model are looking to sell their hardware with smaller margins, and profit mainly through software. According to Digi-Capital, an investment bank for mobile apps and games, by 2017, mobile apps could reach $70 billion in annual revenue. Thus, greater affordability for the physical devices are naturally occurring within the market due to changing business models.

Accessibility of mobile phones through decreased costs are also supplemented by the trend of technology becoming much more open in the past 10-20 years. "One of the biggest challenges in the last 10 years is that you've got open source, you've got open hardware…things like the maker movement….", including Arduino, Linux, and others. There is a general market trend of consumers wanting to know more about their products.

However, one interviewee believed it was still much too closed, likening today's lack of openness to selling a vacuum cleaner without the user guide explaining how it works. "It's basically the same as buying a Hoover for home, and you don't get the user manual. How am I supposed to change the bag inside? They're not going to tell you."

When asked if this demand for more openness will change the industry, he responded: "There is a demand, there is a lot of demand, but very little supply. There is demand from the outside, and those within the company. We have to convince our departments to be more open. We have to convince the engineers. It's a lot like convincing politicians, there is no immediate reward."

Given these trends, it was of one interviewees' belief that increased accessibility of technology through both decreased cost and increased availability may not necessarily lie in the legal environment or the policy sphere, but rather requires patience for the industry to adapt to a changing marketplace.

Understanding the modes and mediums which information, culture, and ultimately knowledge is accessed is fundamental to the Pervasive Technologies research as an Access to Knowledge issue. Thus, getting a grasp on technological trends, and being able to predict upcoming business models was a very valuable learning.

Guha, Romit, and Anandita Mankotia Mankotia. “PM Modi’s Digital India Project: Government to Ensure That Every Indian Has Smartphone by 2019.” The Economic Times 25 Aug. 2014. Web. 2 Sept. 2014.

See the research proposal for the Pervasive Technologies project here: http://cis-india.org/a2k/pervasive-technologies-research-proposal.pdf

“Smartphone Users Worldwide Will Total 1.75 Billion in 2014.” eMarketer. N.p., 16 Jan. 2014. Web. 3 Sept. 2014.

Takahashi, Dean. “Mobile Apps Could Hit $70B in Revenues by 2017.” VentureBeat. N.p., 29 Apr. 2014. Web. 7 Sept. 2014.

This will be further explored in the last blog post of this series.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-semi-conductor-industry-professionals-in-taiwan-1

Review Meeting for the Pervasive Technologies Project

praskrishna — 2017-03-22T14:25:50Z

The Centre for Internet & Society in partnership with Beijing Normal University Institute for Internet Policy & Law organized a review meeting of the Pervasive Technologies project in Macau on February 20 - 21, 2017.

Sunil Abraham, Anubha Sinha, Rohini Lakshane and Vidushi Marda were speakers. Sunil introduced the participants to the Pervasive Technologies project. Anubha Sinha spoke on Intellectual Property in Mobile App Development in India. Vidushi Marda gave a talk on Competition Law and Standard Essential Patents. Rohini Lakshane gave a talk on Patent Landscaping in the Indian Mobile Device Marketplace. The agenda can be accessed here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/news/review-meeting-for-the-pervasive-technologies-project

The two-faced FRAND: Licensing and injunctive relief in ICTs

rohini — 2016-03-16T02:37:02Z

Important takeaways from the Indo-Europe Conference on Building a Sustainable IPR-ICT Ecosystem for Promoting Innovation, held in Bangalore in November 2015. Ericsson and the Indian Cellular Association presented an interesting set of views on FRAND licensing as well as injunctive relief, from seemingly opposite ends of the spectrum.

For the schedule, and more information, visit: http://www.ict-ipr.in/sipeit/conference

Ericsson’s position on patenting

-- Companies file numerous patent applications every year but 95% of all granted patents are never commercialised.

-- Ericsson manages to commercialise less than 5 percent of its patents.

-- A patent application could be rejected because it is not inventive or novel enough. Sometimes, a competitor manages to file for or obtain a patent for the same or similar technology a few days before Ericsson. Hence, it becomes prior art and Ericsson is unable to apply for a patent.

-- Monetising patents is a challenge because the technology they pertain to may not be good enough to be implemented. Either that, or nobody in the market wants the technology. There is no business aspect to it. Thus, patenting is expensive but but filing patents is a trial-and-error activity, which makes patenting financially cumbersome.

-- Ericsson feels the need to file a lot of patents, so that some of those patents could be useful from a business perspective. The rest are not commercialised.

-- The number of patents filed are rising in certain countries, but the numbers are misleading. Some patents are of poor quality and/ or unusable for commercialisation.

-- Ericsson gets approximately 5,000 inventions per year but files patent applications for only around 1,500 to 1,600, as the rest of the inventions do not have a business aspect to it. That is, Ericsson does not believe that the invention has good business potential or that there is little way for the market to adapt to it.

-- When companies invest heavily on research and development, and when they try to get (what will later become a) standardised technology released into the market, they should get fair returns on investment.

-- Indian companies need to invest in IPR. They need to do trial-and-error with respect to patenting. Only then, perhaps, some returns will accrue to them from owning patents.

-- Monetisation is besides selling products. It's a side effect of investment in research and development.

Ericsson’s position on FRAND licensing

-- No company apart from non-practising entities (NPEs) make all or most of its money from licensing. Ericsson makes most of its money from its products and not patents.

-- A large number of companies such as Ericsson have inventors based in India but the patents get registered abroad, [that is, the patents are not filed by the Indian subsidiary of Ericsson].

-- The percentage fee charged for a FRAND license is a low, single-digit number.

-- It's a wrong conception that FRAND licensing is very expensive and will shut down Indian companies. If there were no FRAND agreements, no Indian company would be able to put out a phone in the market.

-- It’s a wrong notion that FRAND agreements are prohibiting any company from the market. Indian companies will not be thrown out of the market by FRAND companies or companies that possess a lot of patents. No Indian company would be able to make and sell a phone if FRAND terms didn’t exist.

-- Ericsson is called a patent troll because it doesn’t make mobile phones anymore, but Ericsson built the technology it patented [unlike other patent trolls who buy and gather patents].

-- Ericsson has entered into more than licensing 100 agreements worldwide. Many of its licensees are repeat licensees.

-- The average selling price (ASP) of China-made phones sold in India is USD 50. This money goes to China. The ASP of high-end phones elsewhere is USD 250. Thus, a royalty of USD 15, calculated on the sale price of the end product, is not high.

Ericsson’s position on SEP litigation in India and injunctions

-- Nobody starts litigation in order to render an injunction in the end. The idea is to get the other party to the table and negotiate reasonable terms.

-- Litigation without injunction is a toothless tiger. The 'licensee' has the financial upper hand of not paying the licensor. So the former can keep prolonging negotiations.

-- When hold-out happens during licensing negotiations, litigation is used as a last resort. Injunctions are one of the possible outcomes of litigation.

-- India should play the SEP game. 5G development starts in January 2016 and India should try to get a stake in the development. Indian companies should try to get high quality patents.

[This suggestion seems to be for homegrown Indian companies as Ericsson also stated during the conference that, “A large number of companies such as Ericsson have inventors based in India but the patents get registered abroad”, that is, the patents are not filed by the Indian subsidiary of Ericsson.]

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Indian Cellular Association on injunctive relief, SEPs and FRAND licensing rates

-- When the standard setting process is collaborative, it is not logical to apply injunctive relief. It is against the ethos of the community.

--Telecommunication was the first industry to create monopolies, that is, standardisation in order to serve the customer better.

-- [With reference to SEP infringement litigation happening in India], the so-called infringer is not in league/ not competing with anything the patent holder is making and/ or selling.

-- The Competition Act in India is a wide-ranging law. It is not a restrictive trade practices act or a monopolies act. Patents are out of the purview of competition.

-- If a rights holder has acquired dominance as a part of the standard setting process, it is undoubtedly dominant. But if the rights holder's market practices are fair, then it is not violating any provisions of the Competition Act.

-- India has a “demographic dividend”. Legacy patent holders should look at India differently, and consider our purchasing power. If technology has to proliferate, then consumers in India cannot be burdened with the same royalties as the developed world.

-- We are trying to strengthen the TSDSI, India's indigenous standards development body [so that India can have a stake in international standards development].

-- The size of the global smartphone market today [2015] is USD 500 billion; India's mobile phone market is worth USD 16 billion. The mobile phone market share of China is pegged at USD 110 billion.

-- The mobile phone market in India will be worth USD 100 billion as of the year 2022 or 2023. For SEP royalties that reward the innovation of all the SEP holders, what will be the amount of royalty outflow? If the outflow is USD 500 billion [in the year 2022 or 2023], then the FRAND percentage be 0.5, which is not a single-digit number, unlike what was stated by Ericsson's representative.

-- In the projected figure of USD 100 billion, USD 30 billion accounts for display, USD 5 billion accounts for Lithium-ion battery, USD 5 billion for communication protocol, and the complete chipset stack for around USD 10 billion. If the FRAND rate were to be determined as a percentage of the price of the smallest practising component of the [finished] device, then it would be, say, 2% of USD 10 billion. If the FRAND rate were to be determined as a percentage of the end product, it would be 0.5% of USD 100 billion. But, if the FRAND percentage were a single-digit number, which could also be 9, then all the manufacturers except the rights holders would be snuffed out. China's mobile market is at USD 110 billion now and is projected to be at USD 400 billion in 2022, will be paying around USD 1 billion in total royalty outflows.

-- We also need to evaluate macro costs of research and development globally. How many times, how much, and for how many years do we need to reward innovation? What is the right return amount for inventors? All this will come up for serious debate with the patent office, the Competition Commission of India, the companies, and with the ministries. To ensure equitable growth and a level playing field, all these entities need to get involved.

-- There is deep distrust of rights holders due to opaqueness in their operations. For example, injunctive relief was sought against a small importer in an Indian court. The royalty rate demanded happened to be half of that demanded from another Indian importer in the same court against an interim injunction. The rights holder then claimed that the email sent to the former importer was a mistake and it revised the rates so that it was equal for both importers.

[This seems to be a reference to Ericsson suing Saral Communications for patent infringement in the Delhi High Court around the same time that Micromax complained to the Competition Commission of India alleging abuse of its dominant positon by Ericsson. The interim royalty rates quoted to Saral were half of the rates that Micromax was ordered to pay, rendering Ericsson's conduct discriminatory and in violation of FRAND. Ericsson subsequently claimed that the rates conveyed to Saral via email were a mistake and asked for the same interim royalty rates as it from Micromax. For more details refer to, Court document reveals discriminatory royalty demands by Ericsson for its wireless patents.

This is also an indication that the market practices of certain rights holders are not consistent, which not only results in a trust deficit but prevents the implementation of a harmonised FRAND rate across the world.]

****

Injunctive relief and FRAND licensing in Europe

-- According to the German Patent Act, there is automatic injunction as a consequence of patent infringement. No injunctive relief is granted for SEPs anymore in Germany, if certain conditions are fulfilled by the willing licensee.

-- Long-standing provisions exist in Germany for calculating royalties when multiple patents and multiple patent holders exist. FRAND licensing for one patent is useless. There should be FRAND for the whole complex.

-- As per the Huawei decision of the European Court of Justice, dated 16 July 2015, a willing licensee can make an offer for the price it wishes to pay to use a patent under the condition that it deposits an amount in the bank as a security for the licensor. Then the licensor cannot enforce the injunction anymore.

****

Open data in patenting

If the data available with patent offices across the world is made publicly accessible by the respective governments in a way that it is possible to search, understand, and visualise it, then there could be an explosion in innovation.

The trade-off between access and innovation

Inexpensive phones of sub-standard quality break down or stop working sooner than good quality phones. This also destroys incentives for innovators who want to bring high quality phones into the market. So the inexpensive, low-quality phones is a trade-off between having access to mobile phones today and experiencing the fruits of innovation tomorrow. The Hatch Waxman Act in the US addresses this issue by allowing imitators to come into the economy through an authorised mechanism, which also restores some incentives for innovation.

The tradeoff is also addressed better by implementing an evidence-based approach instead of a one-size-fits-all solution. Some regions require an emphasis on access. In other places that do not lack access due to their geographical location and clusters of innovators, IPRs can be implemented more strictly. Such a segmented approach to regions and product-markets can be crafted into policy.

The challenge of harmonisation

Denmark does not have a dedicated intellectual property office. Work on IP is integrated in the government offices for trade, growth, economy, and so on. IPR is strongly interlaced with competition law in the country. Similarly, the Department of Telecom, Department of Health, the Indian Patent Office and the Competition Commission of India should work in tandem to avoid conflict in the way they address cases and issues.

Patenting for universities

Indian university do not carry out patenting as much as their counterparts in other countries. The DieTY has schemes for supporting patent filing by universities and academic institutions.

Number of patents granted annually to:

Xingua University, China: 1,000

MIT, United States: 4,000

IIT and IISC, India: Between 100 and 200

Technology areas and number of SEPs in Europe

Telecom via public network: 4,284

IT and Internet: 534

Audio/ video systems, coding, et cetera.: 221

Security, cryptography, biometrics: 182

(Source: Competition Policy Brief, June 2014, Issue 8, Standard Essential Patents, European Commission)

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All comments in square brackets and italics by the author.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/two-faced-frand-licensing-and-injunctive-relief-in-icts

Conference on Standards Settings Organizations (SSO) and FRAND, NLSIU

rohini — 2016-04-02T18:12:41Z

Rohini Lakshané attended the Conference on Standards Settings Organizations (SSO) and FRAND held at NLSIU, Bengaluru on March 21 and 22, 2015. It was organised by the MHRD Chair on Intellectual Property Rights, Centre for Intellectual Property Rights and Advocacy (CIPRA), National Law School of India University, Bengaluru in association with Intel Technology India. This post is a compilation of notes from the conference.

Programme Schedule

Significant Takeaways
It is anti-competitive to seek to exclude competitors from the market by seeking injunctions on the basis of SEPs, if the licensee is willing to take a license on FRAND terms. In these circumstances, the seeking of injunctions can distort licensing negotiations and lead to unfair licensing terms, with a negative impact on consumer choice and prices. -- EU Competition Policy Brief, Issue 8, June 2014. This is a very important issue for India as it thinks about how it can attract foreign investments. India has a unique opportunity to learn from these lessons from around the globe and craft India-specific solutions. India has the intellectual capability and the institutions capable of crafting these solutions, and in doing that we can support Make In India. India needs to be mindful about what is happening in the [South Asian] region. China has moved aggressively to try to curb FRAND abuse. The People's Court in China ruled in Huawei vs. InterDigital that for 2G, 3G, and 4G patents, the license fees of royalties should not exceed 0.019% of the actual sale price. Apple also stated that Ericsson was calculating royalties on the sale price of the iPhone or iPad, whereas the royalty should be calculated on the value of the baseband chip that runs this technology in the mobile device. If such litigation occurs in India, what would be India's position? If a building block contains the technology pertaining to a patent, then royalty should be calculated on the smallest possible patent practising unit and not the entire product. The government of India has adopted a royalty free (RF) approach to licensing open standards. Non-essential claims are excluded from disclosure. Pending patent applications are not. Only 16% patents declared as SEPs are actually SEPs, according to a study. The Delhi High Court has passed interim orders restraining the CCI from deciding these cases. Our appeal to the courts is that these patent infringement lawsuits should not be viewed in isolation. They should not be viewed as merely contractual issues between the licensor and the licensee. They should be seen in the context of their economic effects and their adverse effect on competition. The CCI should be enabled to deal with such cases. Matheson: The phrase "compulsory license" sends a shiver down every corporate's spine every time it is used. International experience is that the judicial system has been the only forum where we have been able to have due process to enable us to construct cases properly in order to explain to the judge or to the jurors how the system works. That has produced very sensible solutions to this problem. Handing it off to the government to institute a compulsory license wouldn't be fair to the SEP holders.

SSOs and FRAND: Licensing issues

John Matheson, Director of Legal Policy (Asia Pacific), Intel

The role of licensing policy

Ensuring market access
Standards often depend on patented technology, which is accessed through the Promise to License on FRAND terms.
It is equally critical to ensure that standards can be implemented without unfair legal games.
It is essential to prevent patent hold-up.
Reasonable compensation

Patent holders remain entitled to fair compensation and benefit from the proliferation of their technologies via standardisation.

Why FRAND?

A FRAND commitment embodies certain fundamental principles that have been recognised widely by the courts and regulators.

The fundamental purpose of a FRAND commitment is widespread adoption of the standard.

Because of the peculiar nature of SEPs, the process is open to abuse.

A FRAND commitment is aimed at preventing patent holders from exploiting a hold-up value and extracting unreasonable royalties and concessions that could otherwise follow from being in a very unique position. Often, the holders of the IP have a single solution to an interoperability or connectivity conundrum that technology is facing.

Why are SEP license negotiations different from Non-SEP ones?

In the context of non-SEPs, one may be negotiating to obtain a license to a patent for a particular feature. If the licensor is being difficult, one can discard the feature to include something else. In a competitive market, this negotiation is focused on the value of the invention to be licensed. Thus one can redesign to avoid a particular claim and, in turn, avoid injunction.

On the other hand, it is necessary to either obtain a license for or infringe an SEP to manufacture the mobile device. There is no workable alternative or workaround to obtaining a license for the desired technology. With the threat of an injunction looming over the negotiations, the prospective licensee is under pressure to obtain a license. So the market negotiations for SEPs and non-SEPs are very different. One-way negotiations raise the possibility of a patent hold-up, and abuse of the standard implementer.

IP policies inevitably involve compromise.

Common areas of misunderstanding include:

Valuations or meaning of "reasonable". Valuations of IP under consideration.
Injunctive relief or exclusion orders
Discrimination or refusal to license
Patent transfer (It requires a continuation of the FRAND commitment, and shouldn't get differential treatment in the IP policy.)

Competition authorities in the US and EU have asked SSOs to reconsider policies to reduce ambiguity in the context of these areas of misunderstanding.

The ex-ante or the incremental value of the SEPs before the standard is set needs to be understood. The SSOs look at several different ways to solve a connectivity problem. The patent owners bring their patents into the standards body and claim that theirs is the best way to solve that problem. The market and consumers want an uncomplicated solution which works and is as cheap as possible. In many cases, there is one single winner, simply because we need one solution. In exchange for being the winner, the FRAND discipline is quid pro quo.

European Commission's response to two different patent lawsuits:

In the Samsung and Motorola cases, the Commission clarifies that in the standardisation context where the SEP holders have committed to:

License their SEPs
Do so on FRAND terms

It is anti-competitive to seek to exclude competitors from the market by seeking injunctions on the basis of SEPs, if the licensee is willing to take a license on FRAND terms.

In other words, if there is a bona fide commitment on the part of the licensee to agree to that test, then it is anti-competitive to seek an injunction.

In these circumstances, the seeking of injunctions can distort licensing negotiations and lead to unfair licensing terms, with a negative impact on consumer choice and prices. -- EU Competition Policy Brief, Issue 8, June 2014.

Anyone who needs access to connectivity or needs interoperability requires to get a SEP license, and if that license is required to be obtained within a time limit, it almost -- by definition -- is not going to work. Patent licenses take years to negotiate, and they're incredibly complex. For example, a patent policy may offer up to 12 months to agree on a license, but that is not the way the market works. So we cannot expect policies that put forth time limits to work in the SEP arena. What we can expect is that the implementers make a bona fide commitment to seek a license.

Motorola vs. Microsoft, Germany:

Motorola sought injunctive relief against Microsoft in Germany. Microsoft moved its distribution centre from Germany to the Netherlands. This resulted in loss of jobs, relocation costs ($11.6 million), and annual increased operating costs of $5 million for Microsoft.

Samsung vs. Apple, Germany

Similarly, on the basis of one patent, a temporary injunction was granted on the sale of the Apple iPad and iPhone. Apple was forced to agree to terms it didn't want to agree to, so that the sale of its products would resume.

This is a very important issue for India as it thinks about how it can attract foreign investments. India has a unique opportunity to learn from these lessons from around the globe and craft India-specific solutions. India has the intellectual capability and the institutions capable of crafting these solutions, and in doing that we can support Make In India.

SEP holders that make FRAND commitments should not be allowed to obtain injunctions against alleged infringers, except in limited circumstances. This formula has been adopted by the IEEE, which has solved this problem. India has the opportunity to leapfrog a lot of patent litigation by adopting the IEEE test.

Learn from what happened with Microsoft in Germany. What kind of message do you want to send to the foreign community about investing in India? Do you want to use the scare tactics of injunctions or do you want to adopt a policy that will avoid litigation?

India needs to be mindful about what is happening in the [South Asian] region. China has moved aggressively to try to curb FRAND abuse. The People's Court in China ruled in Huawei vs. InterDigital that for 2G, 3G, and 4G patents, the license fees of royalties should not exceed 0.019% of the actual sale price.

Reasonable Compensation Considerations

Royalty based on the smallest unit that practices the standard.
Technical value of patented technologies vs. alternatives.
Overall royalty that could reasonably charged for all SEPs.

Non-discrimination

A commitment to license every implementer of the relevant standard.

Transfer

FRAND commitments follow the transfer of a patent to subsequent proprietors.

Dr. Krishna Sirohi, Impact Innovator, GISFI, President, I2TB

As per the Make in India programme, we have to achieve zero imports by 2020. Product development in India by Indian companies will happen with collaborative research and development and IPR sharing through licenses. We are looking at national capacity building through product development and patent uses.

Global Information and Communication Technology Forum for India (GISFI) is a standards setting body involved with standardisation and research. It is a telecommunications standards development body (TSDO) set up with the approval of the DoT. It has peer relationships with ITU, OMA, TTC and a bunch of other SDOs. Internet of Things (IoT), mobility and security are its three major research programmes.

GISFI is working towards defining 5G in India. The 5G standardisation theme in India is called WISDOM (Wireless Innovative System for Dynamic Operating Mega Communications). GISFI is considering the perspective of the Indian user, the network capability, the network architecture, network development and the Indian revenue model, strategic and special purpose networks, inclusive growth, and network security.

However, some India-specific aspects such as illiteracy and lack of basic civic infrastructure need to be considered in the standardisation process.

GISFI plans and stages for 5G definition and adoption

Stage 1 (2014-2018): National agenda for strategic research, innovation and experimentation

Focus on Digital India and Make in India programmes.

Stage 2 (2016-2019): Standardisation

Stage 3 (2017-2021): Product Development

Stage 4 (2019-2023): Early Development

Technical understanding required for IPR issues

Enhancement applicable to general scenarios
- Traffic capacity
- Cell coverage
- Edge cell performance
- Intercell interference
- Network congestion
- Mobility
- Energy consumption
Enhancements targeting new use cases
- machine-type communication
- national security
- public safety services
Carrier aggregation
- Higher throughput owing to intra and inter-band transmission bandwidth of more than 20 MHz.
- Reduced network congestion owing to load-balancing across multiple carriers.
- Improvement in mobility and reduction in inter-cell interference.
Enhanced MIMO
- Improved spatial diversity and multiplexing
- Improved beam-forming
- Multiple access with multi-antenna transmission
Coordinated Multi-Point Operation (CoMP)
- Reduction in intercell interference owing to coordinated scheduling or beamforming (CS/CB)
- Transmission from multiple distribution points (base stations, RRH) in a coordinated way (Dynamic point selection, and Joint transmission)

What do SSOs handle IPR in different parts of the world and what are the issues they face?

GISFI has adopted ITU's IPR policy.

In SSOs, the FRAND principle works well only when participating entities have equal or almost equal IPR clout, and can reciprocate with their own patents every time other entities share their patents. It is difficult to create a balance between entities that only own IPR and those that only consume IPR.

Most of the members of SSOs are IPR owners. The entities that develop [technological] solutions without owning the IPRs are usually not a part of SSOs. However, additional strategies need to be implemented for realising the "Make in India" goal. The goal of zero imports by 2020 can only be achieved if a large number of small companies use these standards to develop products locally. So small manufacturers should be represented even at the highest levels of the standards development body. An IPR policy should be defined/ modified to factor in these needs.

Evaluation of LTE essential patents declared by ETSI

Cyber Creative Institute, June 2013: http://www.cybersoken.com/research/pdf/lte03EN.pdf

A large number of LTE patents are held by a handful of companies. There is no Indian owner of any LTE SEP.

Ericsson sued Apple in the US over infringement of its LTE patents. As of January 2015, Apple countersued Ericsson in a federal court in California and claimed that it did not owe any royalties to the latter.

Apple also stated that Ericsson was calculating royalties on the sale price of the iPhone or iPad, whereas the royalty should be calculated on the value of the baseband chip that runs this technology in the mobile device. If such litigation occurs in India, what would be India's position? If a building block contains the technology pertaining to a patent, then royalty should be calculated on the smallest possible patent practising unit and not the entire product.

Dr. Kumar N. Shivarajan, CTO, Tejas Networks

TSDSI's (Telecommunications Standards Development Society of India) IPR policy states that a member's technology will become a part of a standard as long as the member licenses it on FRAND terms to other members.

By 2017, 70% of the global equipment spend will be on LTE.
TD-LTE subscriber base in India has been projected to reach 67 million by 2017.
Most of the data connections in India are still on 2.5G.
Smartphones have become affordable but 3G continues to languish in India; 4G yet to take off.
The number of 3G connections in India grew from 30 million to 33 million from 2013 to 2014.

Is 5G the answer to India's access problems?

The mobile industry is aiming to go beyond traditional 4G LTE in 2015 and there is increasing focus on adding new bells and whistles to 4G and realise 4G+.

LTE Licensed-assisted access (formerly LTE-Unlicensed)
LTE Direct/ Peer-to-peer
LTE-M for machine to machine communication
CoMP

Countries forming 5G groups to take an early lead:

China: IMT-2020 (5G) Promotion Group
Korea: 5G Forum
EU: 5G Public Private Partnership (5G-PPP)

5G in its current form is souped-up 4G.

Key India-specific requirements for 5G standard development

5G must factor in the Indian requirement for DSL-like connectivity: Always ON, low latency, affordable cost
To minimise costs, 5G must minimise the use of BTS sites and focus on spectral efficiency.
5G should allow virtual network operations enabling multiple operators to use the same physical network infrastructure.
5G must work well in Indian propagation environments: concrete buildings blocking signals, dense barriers.
5G infrastructure should be green as electricity shortfall is a problem. India has 400,000 cell towers. 10% of them are not connected to the electricity grid. More than 70% experience power outages longer than 8 hours per day, and work on diesel-powered generators. As a result, 25% of the operational costs of telcos are their energy bills. India imports 3 billion litres of diesel annually to run these cell sites.

India can try to get a headstart in owning the IPR that would eventually go into the 5G standard.

Prof. Ramakrishna, MHRD Chair, NLSIU, Bengaluru

The attitude of an SSO towards patented technology determines the objective of its IPR policy. For example, an SSO may want to:

Promote widespread implementation of a standard without unnecessary IPR implications.
Ensure transparency and certainty about the declaration of patents and patents' claims as SEPs.
Ensure that every patented technology is available at a reasonable fee, comparable to the value of the technology.

What happens when IP ownership is transferred to another owner? It continues to be a part of the SSO but things get complicated.

New owners, third parties, subsidiaries, and affiliates fall under the purview of the IPR policy, by extension.

IP and Disclosure policies of Indian SDOs

BIS (Bureau of Indian Standards) and TEC (Telecommunication Engineering Centre) do not have IP policies of their own. TEC refers to the ISO/IEC IP policies wherever the technology is equivalent or the same.
GISFI disclosure requirement: Each member is required to inform GISFI in a timely manner of essential IPRs. But members are not under any obligation to conduct IP searches. GISFI's IPR policy is based on that of ETSI.
DOSTI (Development Organization of Standards for Telecommunications in India) is not functional.

IPR policy for open standards in e-governance

The government of India has adopted a royalty free (RF) approach to licensing open standards.

Mandatory Characteristics of Open Standards:

The patent claims necessary to implement the standard should be made available royalty free for the lifetime of the standard.
The standard shall be adapted and maintained by a not-for-profit organisation.
The standard shall have a technology-neutral specification.

The RF approach and the maintenance by a non-profit may be a disincentive for IP owners.

IEEE patent policy:

IEEE invites participants to disclose patent claims essential to a standard under development. Upon disclosure, the patent holder needs to submit a letter of assurance that states:

License(s) will be made available without compensation or at a RAND rate.
A commitment to enforce the essential patent claims against any entity complying with the standard.
Or state its unwillingness or inability to license its essential patent claims.

Common patent policy for ITU-T/ ITU-R/ ISO/ IEC

Recommendations/ deliverables are non-binding -- ensure compatibility of technologies and systems on a worldwide basis.

The "code of practice":

It is desirable that the fullest available information should be disclosed although ITU, ISO or IEC are unable to verify the validity of any such information.

Major types of IPR policies:

Participation-based IPR policies

These are common in small, informal bodies such as consortia.
Members are bound by the terms of membership to commit to licensing SEPs on RAND or RF terms.
SEP holders notify the standards body in case RAND or RF licenses are not available after the draft standard has been published.

Commitment-based IPR policies
- These are commonly followed large, standards setting bodies.
- These bodies identify SEPs to a draft standard through disclosure and submission of licensing commitment.
- Parties may seek alternative solutions or work on a withdrawn standard is the the alternative solutions don't work out.

Basic building blocks of commitment-based IPR policies

Disclosure policies:

Disclosure is important for
- sending requests to SEP holders to make licensing commitments
- ensuring that experts' groups make informed decisions on inclusion of patented technologies
- providing information to prospective standards implementers about the SEP owners

Two forms of disclosure:

A call for patents is made at the start of meetings. This is more informational than binding.
Later, the member states its intentions regarding licensing the patent on RAND terms.

How disclosure obligations arise (and commitments are binding):

IEEE has by-laws that are binding on members.
ITU, IEC, and ISO: It is via a resolution or recommendation.

(Indicative list)

General disclosure procedure:

The nature of disclosure rules concerning self-owned patents depends on the status or the role of the entity.

A "submitter" is a participant in the working group making a conscious decision to submit its technology to the SSO for a license or free of royalty.
A participant in a working group may submit its technology to the SSO free of royalty, on RAND terms, on RAND terms with the right to charge a fee, or with a refusal to license it. (A working group participant who discloses technology is usually a technology expert. When someone who does not have adequate knowledge of patents discloses technology, it has complicated implications.)
A non-working group participant (third-party) may also submit its technology.

ANSI has left it to the accredited SSO to decide the terms of disclosure for participants of working groups. It has not laid out a policy in this regard. Other organisations have laid out obligations on the submitter to disclose SEPs.

Nature of disclosure terms for patents owned by third-parties:

ETSI: It is obligatory.

ITU/ ISO: Obligatory only for participants of the working groups.

IEEE: Entirely voluntary

Non-essential claims are excluded from disclosure. Pending patent applications are not.

Working groups prefer early disclosure so that they may adopt or discard the claim as early as possible in the standard setting process.

ITU: Disclosure from the outset

IEEE: During meetings of the working group

ETSI: "Timely manner"

AFSI: At a sufficiently mature level

There is no mandate for updating the disclosure in case a standard evolves.

Most SSOs make disclosed patents public. Failure to disclose patents may result in accusations of abuse of monopoly or anti-trust/ anti-competitive activities.

It is difficult to identify all potentially essential patents due to the complexity of specifications.

Some SSOs don't require IP disclosure at all. The obligations to license on FRAND terms would be sufficient.

Only 16% patents declared as SEPs are actually SEPs, according to a study.

It makes sense for rightsholders to go for blanket disclosures instead of disclosure of specific patents.

Vinod Dhall, ex-chairperson of the Competition Commission of India (CCI):

Our competition law is new, so there aren't any cases pertaining to patent litigation and involving the competition law, which we can treat as precedents. In one of the mobile phone patent litigation cases in India, the implementer has approached the CCI claiming that the licensor has been abusing its dominant position in the market by charging unreasonable royalties.

The Delhi High Court has passed interim orders restraining the CCI from deciding these cases. Our appeal to the courts is that these patent infringement lawsuits should not be viewed in isolation. They should not be viewed as merely contractual issues between the licensor and the licensee. They should be seen in the context of their economic effects and their adverse effect on competition. The CCI should be enabled to deal with such cases.

Questions-answers round:

What are the criteria for declaring a patent an SEP?

T. Ramakrishnan: SSOs have no role in declaring that a patent is an SEP. The SEP holder declares that their patent is essential to a technical standard. Most of the time, the SEP may turn out to be a non-SEP at a later stage. Statistically, 16 out 100 claimed SEPs are actually SEPs. There is no way for SSOs to tell if a patent is an SEP. IP policies of most SSOs state that they don't search [if a patent is an SEP]. The members of SSOs are under no obligation to search.

The commitment to license an SEP on FRAND terms is more important to an SSO [than determining if the patent is indeed an SEP].

Can compulsory licensing be implemented with government intervention in India so that the Central Government can fix a royalty and put an end to patent litigation?

Matheson: The phrase "compulsory license" sends a shiver down every corporate's spine every time it is used. International experience is that the judicial system has been the only forum where we have been able to have due process to enable us to construct cases properly in order to explain to the judge or to the jurors how the system works. That has produced very sensible solutions to this problem. Handing it off to the government to institute a compulsory license wouldn't be fair to the SEP holders.

With respect to the "safe harbour" approach towards SEP-based injunctions, what does the licensee need to do to prove to the courts that it is a willing licensee, in the event that licensing negotiations fail or take a long time?

Matheson: It gets down to the licensee showing its willingness to negotiate. The licensee cannot make a half-hearted attempt and decline to negotiate or decline the licensor's offer and then disappear. They should physically engage in the negotiation. If and when it gets to a judicial environment, the judges know when people are telling stories and when parties are bona fide. They can tell a ruse when they see one, and I think it is one of the things you observe in practice.

Ramakrishnan: The licensee should be able to demonstrate that it is willing to pay the royalty and should deposit an amount towards royalty. One recommendation from AIPP states that instead of using the terms "willing licensee" and "willing licensor", use "good faith response". For "good faith" we have very well established criteria. The entire licensing process should end within 12 months of starting. If the negotiations fail or if the process takes longer, then they should agree upon an arbitrator to fix FRAND terms. These are indicators that demonstrate the licensee being a "willing licensee" or a "good faith" licensee.

Often technology changes before the legal action can be taken or the lawsuit completed, and the patent over which litigation has happened may no longer be relevant to the technology. How do patent holders deal with this situation?

S.K. Murthy, Research Scholar, NLSIU: Even if the technology becomes obsolete, damages can be claimed retrospectively.

Matheson: You have a commitment to a FRAND solution, so that when you enter the protracted negotiation, you know that at the end of it you will get a fair solution. That's not always the case when you are dealing outside the FRAND world. You're dealing with a FRAND incumbent, not with unlicensed patents.

Why is putting a time limit to negotiations not a good idea? Also, IEEE seems to have done well by taking the threat of negotiations out of its way. Is it practical in India, because injunction is still the most potent weapon to protect intellectual property rights in India currently?

Matheson: Licensing is incredibly complex. There can be claims to the validity of the patent, there are claim charts to be drawn, there is expert evidence to be put together. Litigation over patents can take 2 to 3 years. To say that there must be a solution [arrived at] within a smaller framework gives the licensor the opportunity to wait around till the end of that period and assert its patents through an injunction. If you're leaving injunction at the table, you will not have a fair solution. The licensee will always be at a major disadvantage. The IEEE solution is a good one because it has taken the time limit away, but at the same time the policies that would adopt that solution need to include the discipline to ensure that the negotiations are bona fide.

What percentage of the sale price should be provisioned by a product developer for royalties? Can a mechanism be drawn up for this purpose?

Justice Ratnakala: Definitely. Such a mechanism should be drawn up in the near future.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/conference-on-standards-settings-organizations-sso-and-frand-nlsiu