The Centre for Internet and Society
https://cis-india.org
These are the search results for the query, showing results 1 to 15.
Internet Democratisation: IANA Transition Leaves Much to be Desired
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindustan-times-october-6-2016-vidushi-marda-internet-democratisation
<b>At best, the IANA transition is symbolic of Washington’s oversight over ICANN coming to an end. It is also symbolic of the empowerment of the global multistakeholder community. In reality, it fails to do either meaningfully.</b>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The article was published in the <a class="external-link" href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/internet-democratisation-iana-transition-leaves-much-to-be-desired/story-t94hojZjDXqS4LjNSepZlN.html">Hindustan Times</a> on October 6, 2016.</p>
<hr />
<img src="https://fortunedotcom.files.wordpress.com/2016/09/605664440.jpg" alt="PardonSnowden.org" />
<h6> Many suspect Washington’s 2014 announcement of handing over control of the IANA contract to be fuelled by the outcry following Edward Snowden’s revelations of the extent of US government surveillance. Source: AFP</h6>
<p style="text-align: justify;">September 30, 2016, marked the expiration of a contract between the US government and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to carry out the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In simpler, acronym-free terms, Washington’s formal oversight over the Internet’s address book has come to an end with the expiration of this contract, with control now being passed on to the “global multistakeholder community”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">ICANN was incorporated in California in 1998 to manage the backbone of the Internet, which included the domain name system (DNS), allocation of IP addresses and root servers. After an agreement with the US National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), ICANN was tasked with operating the IANA functions, which includes maintenance of the root zone file of the DNS. Over the years Washington has rejected calls to hand over the control of IANA functions, but in March 2014 it announced its intentions to do so and laid down conditions for the handover. Many suspect the driving force behind this announcement to be the outcry following Edward Snowden’s revelations of the extent of US government surveillance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The conditions laid down by the NTIA were met, and the US government accepted the transition proposal, amidst much political pressure and opposition, most notably from Senator Ted Cruz.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This transition is a step in the right direction, but in reality, it changes very little as it fails to address two critical issues: Of jurisdiction and accountability.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Jurisdiction is important while considering the resolution of contractual disputes, application of labour and competition laws, disputes regarding ICANN’s decisions, consumer protection, financial transparency, etc. Many of these questions, although not all, will depend on where ICANN is located. ICANN’s new bylaws mention that it will continue to be incorporated in California, and subject to California law just as it was pre-transition. Having the DNS subject to the laws of a single country can only lend to its fragility. ICANN’s US jurisdiction also means that it is not free from the political pressures from the US Senate and in turn, the toxic effect of American party politics that were made visible in the events leading up to September 30.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Another critical issue that the transition does not address is that of ICANN accountability. Post-transition, ICANN’s board will continue to be the ultimate decision-making authority, thus controlling the organisation’s functioning, and ICANN staff will be accountable to the board alone.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To put things in perspective, look at the board’s track record in the recent past. In August, an Independent Review Panel (IRP) found that ICANN’s board had violated ICANN’s own bylaws and had failed to discharge its transparency obligations when it failed to look into staff misbehaviour. Following this, in September, ICANN decided to respond to such allegations of mismanagement, opacity and lack of accountability by launching a review. The review however, would not look into the issues, failures and false claims of the board, but instead focus on the process by which ICANN staff was able to engage in such misbehaviour. This ironically, will be in the form of an internal review that will pass through ICANN staff — the subjects of the investigation — before being taken up to the board.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">At best, the transition is symbolic of Washington’s oversight over ICANN coming to an end. It is also symbolic of the empowerment of the global multistakeholder community. In reality, it fails to do either meaningfully.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindustan-times-october-6-2016-vidushi-marda-internet-democratisation'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/hindustan-times-october-6-2016-vidushi-marda-internet-democratisation</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiICANNIANAInternet Governance2016-11-03T07:52:37ZBlog EntryIf the DIDP Did Its Job
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/if-the-didp-did-its-job
<b></b>
<p dir="ltr"> </p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Over the course of two years, the Centre for Internet and Society sent 28 requests to ICANN under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP). A part of ICANN’s accountability initiatives, DIDP is “intended to ensure that information contained in documents concerning ICANN's operational activities, and within ICANN's possession, custody, or control, is made available to the public unless there is a compelling reason for confidentiality.”</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Through the DIDP, any member of the public can request information contained in documents from ICANN. We’ve written about the process <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-documentary-information-disclosure-policy-2013-i-didp-basics">here</a>, <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp">here</a> and <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii">here</a>. As a civil society group that does research on internet governance related topics, CIS had a variety of questions for ICANN. The 28 DIDP requests we have sent cover a range of subjects: from revenue and financial information, to ICANN’s relationships with its contracted parties, its contractual compliance audits, harassment policies and the diversity of participants in its public forum. We have blogged about each DIDP request where we have summarized ICANN’s responses.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Here are the DIDP requests we sent in:</p>
<div dir="ltr">
<table><colgroup><col width="147"><col width="137"><col width="152"><col width="119"><col width="135"></colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Dec 2014</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Jan/Feb 2015</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Aug/Sept 2015</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Nov 2015</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Apr/May 2016</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-1-icanns-expenditures-on-travel-meetings">ICANN meeting expenditure</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-6-revenues-from-gtld-auctions">Revenue from gTLD auction</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-11-netmundial-principles">Implementation of NETmundial principles</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-19-icann2019s-role-in-the-postponement-of-the-iana-transition">IANA transition postponement</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-22-reconsideration-requests-from-parties-affected-by-icann-action">Board Governance Committee Reports</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2">Granular revenue statements</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-7-globalisation-advisory-groups">Globalisation Advisory Groups</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-12-revenues">Raw data - Granular income data</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-20-is-presumptive-renewal-of-verisign2019s-contracts-a-good-thing">Presumptive renewal of registries</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-23-icann-does-not-know-how-diverse-its-comment-section-is">Diversity Analysis</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-3-cyber-attacks-on-icann">ICANN cyber attacks</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-8-organogram">Organogram</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-13-keeping-track-of-icann2019s-contracted-parties-registries">Compliance audits - registries</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-21-icann2019s-relationship-with-the-rirs">ICANN-RIR relationship</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Compliance audits</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-4-icann-and-the-netmundial-principles">Implementation of NETmundial outcome document</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-9-exactly-how-involved-is-icann-in-the-netmundial-initiative">Involvement in NETmundial Initiative</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-14-keeping-track-of-icann2019s-contracted-parties-registrars">Compliance audits - registrars</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-25-curbing-sexual-harassment-at-icann">Harassment policy</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1">Complaints to ICANN ombudsman</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-10-icann-does-not-know-how-much-each-rir-contributes-to-its-budget">RIR contract fees</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-16-icann-has-no-documentation-on-registrars2019-201cabuse-contacts201d">Registrar abuse contact</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">DIDP statistics *</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-15-what-is-going-on-between-verisign-and-icann">Verisign Contractual violations</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-27-on-icann2019s-support-to-new-gtld-applicants">gTLD applicant support program </a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-17-how-icann-chooses-their-contractual-compliance-auditors">Contractual auditors</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-28-icann-renews-verisign2019s-rzm-contract">Root Zone Maintenance agreements</a></p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr"><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-18-icann2019s-internal-website-will-stay-internal">Internal website</a></p>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
<td>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN’s responses were analyzed and rated between 0-4 based on the amount of information disclosed. The reasons given for the lack of full disclosure were also studied.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<div dir="ltr">
<table><colgroup><col width="73"><col width="568"></colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td colspan="2">
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">DIDP response rating</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">0</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">No relevant information disclosed</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">1</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Very little information disclosed; DIDP preconditions and/or other reasons for nondisclosure used.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">2</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Partial information disclosed; DIDP preconditions and/or other reasons for nondisclosure used.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">3</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">Adequate information disclosed; DIDP preconditions and/or other reasons for nondisclosure used.</p>
</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<p style="text-align: center;" dir="ltr">4</p>
</td>
<td>
<p dir="ltr">All information disclosed</p>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN has defined a set of preconditions under which they are not obligated to answer a request. These preconditions are generously used by ICANN to justify their lack of a comprehensive answer. The wording of the policy also allows ICANN to dodge answering a request if it doesn’t have the relevant documents already in its possession. The responses were also classified by the number of times a particular DIDP condition for non-disclosure was invoked. We will see why these weaken ICANN’s accountability initiatives. </p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<div dir="ltr"><br /><img src="https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/1o_D1vsv4byFYcXE1BfpcMtIe_ZxSAWwxZ-QMIQ0OlZ3y0UzANNyepK64ktsqNF-HmkIyw1rgnESLv_1PrHMuH3WKRQhnEaLhoghGCU3eWofqhBiBLjbu3Wz6nrmVdAw9GEH-2K2" alt="null" height="303" width="368" /></div>
<p dir="ltr">Of the 28 DIDP requests, only 14% were answered fully, without the use of the DIDP conditions of non-disclosure. Seven out of 28 or 40% of the DIDPs received a 0-rated answer which reflects extremely poorly on the DIDP mechanism itself. Of the 7 responses that received 0-rating, 4 were related to complaints and contractual compliance. We had asked for details on the complaints received by the ombudsman, details on contractual violations by Verisign and abuse contacts maintained by registrars for filing complaints. We received no relevant information.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">We have earlier written about the extensive and broad nature of the 12 conditions of non-disclosure that ICANN uses. These conditions were used in 24 responses out of 28. ICANN was able to dodge from fully answering 85% of the DIDP requests that they got from CIS. This is alarming especially for an organization that claims to be fully transparent and accountable. The conditions for non-disclosure have been listed in <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B3sI8lQtXMDTMmJoLXoxazFOVlU/view?usp=sharing">this document</a> and can be referred to while reading the following graph.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">On reading the conditions for non-disclosure, it seems like ICANN can refuse to answer any DIDP request if it so wished. These exclusions are numerous, vaguely worded and contain among them a broad range of information that should legitimately be in the public domain: Correspondence, internal information, information related to ICANN’s relationship with governments, information derived from deliberations among ICANN constituents, information provided to ICANN by private parties and the kicker - information that would be too burdensome for ICANN to collect and disseminate.</p>
<p dir="ltr"><img src="https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/CojQ-raMh1nblMO2TGtEJmrRE3MLKHSqltij-nrTdL4Cx2rzVtwzXZQBYBv0qpqxlZ_e0Ce1St7nnY6dN6dAn6G2VH-93iq2htQRQxmejjs-lXhUWNlGiPo9HpZlS69YbCFKEe7J" alt="null" height="425" width="624" /></p>
<p dir="ltr"> </p>
<p dir="ltr">As we can see from the graph, the most used condition under which ICANN can refuse to answer a DIDP request is F. Predictably, this is the most vaguely worded DIDP condition of the lot: “Confidential business information and/or internal policies and procedures.” It is up to ICANN to decide what information is confidential with no justification needed or provided for it. ICANN has used this condition 11 times in responding to our 28 requests.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">It is also necessary to pay attention to condition L which allow ICANN to reject “Information requests: (i) which are not reasonable; (ii) which are excessive or overly burdensome; (iii) complying with which is not feasible; or (iv) are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual.” This is perhaps the weakest point in the entire list due its subjective nature. Firstly, on whose standards must this information request be reasonable? If the point of a transparency mechanism is to make sure that information sought by the public is disseminated, should they be allowed to obfuscate information because it is too burdensome to collect? Even if this is fair given the time constraints of the DIDP mechanism, it must not be used as liberally as has been happening. The last sub point is perhaps the most subjective. If a staff member dislikes a particular requestor, this point would justify their refusal to answer a request regardless of its validity. This hardly seems fair or transparent. This condition has been used 9 times in our 28 requests.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Besides the DIDP non-disclosure conditions, ICANN also has an excuse built into the definition of DIDP. Since it is not obliged to create or summarize documents under the DIDP process, it can simply claim to not have the specific document we request and thus negate its responsibility to our request. This is what ICANN did with one of our requests for raw financial data. For our research, we required raw data from ICANN specifically with regard to its expenditure on staff and board members for their travel and attendance at meetings. As an organization that is answerable to multiple stakeholders including governments and the public, it is justified to expect that they have financial records of such items in a systematic manner. However, we were surprised to learn that ICANN does not in fact have these stored in a manner that they can send as attachments or publish. Instead they directed us to the audited financial reports which did little for our research. However, in response to our later request for granular data on revenue from domain names, ICANN explained that while they do not have such a document in their possession, they would create one. This distinction between the two requests seems arbitrary to us since we consider both to be important to public.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Nevertheless, there were some interesting outcomes from our experience filing DIDPs. We learnt that there has been no substantive work done to inculcate the NETmundial principles at ICANN, that ICANN has no idea which regional internet registry contributes the most to its budget, and that it does not store (or is not willing to reveal) any raw financial data. These outcomes do not contribute to a sense of confidence in the organization.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN has an opportunity to reform this particular transparency mechanism at its Workstream 2 discussions. ICANN must make use of this opportunity to listen and work with people who have used the DIDP process in order to make it useful, effective and efficient. To that effect, we have some recommendations from our experience with the DIDP process.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">That ICANN does not currently possess a particular document is not an excuse if it has the ability to create one. In its response to our questions on the IANA transition, ICANN indicated that it does not have the necessary documents as the multi stakeholder body that it set up is the one conducting the transition. This is somewhat justified. However, in response to our request for financial details, ICANN must not be able to give the excuse that it does not have a document in its possession. It and it alone has the ability to create the document and in response to a request from the public, it should.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN must also revamp its conditions for non-disclosure and make it tighter. It must reduce the number of exclusions to its disclosure policy and make sure that the exclusion is not done arbitrarily. Specifically with respect to condition F, ICANN must clarify how information was classified as confidential and why that is different from everything else on the list of conditions.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">Further, ICANN should not be able to use condition L to outright reject a DIDP request. Instead, there must be a way for the requester and ICANN to come to terms about the request. This could happen by an extension of the 1 month deadline, financial compensation by requester for any expenditure on ICANN’s part to answer the request or by a compromise between the requester and ICANN on the terms of the request. The sub point about requests made “by a vexatious or querulous individual” must be removed from condition L or at least be separated from the condition so that it is clear why the request for disclosure was denied.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">ICANN should also set up a redressal mechanism specific to DIDP. While ICANN has the Reconsideration Requests process to rectify any wrongdoing on the part of staff or board members, this is not adequate to identify whether a DIDP was rejected on justifiable grounds. A separate mechanism that deals only with DIDP requests and wrongful use of the non-disclosure conditions would be helpful. According to the icann bylaws, in addition to Requests for Reconsideration, ICANN has also established an independent third party review of allegations against the board and/or staff members. A similar mechanism solely for reviewing whether ICANN’s refusal to answer a DIDP request is justified would be extremely useful.</p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p dir="ltr">A strong transparency mechanism must make sure that its objective are to provide answers, not to find ways to justify its lack of answers. With this in mind, we hope that the revamp of transparency mechanisms after workstream 2 discussions leads to a better DIDP process than we are used to.</p>
<p><span id="docs-internal-guid-b9e801b8-28c6-b8f5-d9ad-ac67daa46694"></span></p>
<div dir="ltr"> </div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/if-the-didp-did-its-job'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/if-the-didp-did-its-job</a>
</p>
No publisherasvathaIANATransparency and AccountabilityInternet GovernanceICANNIANA TransitionTransparency2016-11-07T12:57:18ZBlog EntryICANN takes one step forward in its human rights and accountability commitments
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/article-19-akriti-bopanna-and-ephraim-percy-kenyanito-december-16-2019-icann-takes-one-step-forward-in-its-human-rights-and-accountability-commitments
<b>Akriti Bopanna and Ephraim Percy Kenyanito take a look at ICANN's Implementation Assessment Report for the Workstream 2 recommendations and break down the key human rights considerations in it. Akriti chairs the Cross Community Working Party on Human Rights at ICANN and Ephraim works on Human Rights and Business for Article 19, leading their ICANN engagement.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The article was first<a class="external-link" href="https://www.article19.org/resources/blog-icann-takes-one-step-forward-in-its-human-rights-and-accountability-commitments/"> published on Article 19</a> on December 16, 2019</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify;" />
<p style="text-align: justify;">ICANN is the international non-profit organization that brings together various stakeholders to create policies aimed at coordinating the Domain Name System. Some of these stakeholders include representatives from government, civil society, academia, the private sector, and the technical community.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">During the recently concluded 66th International Meeting of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in Montreal (Canada); the ICANN board adopted by consensus the recommendations contained within the Work Stream 2 (WS2) Final Report. This report was generated as part of steps towards accountability after the September 30th 2016 U.S. government handing over of its unilateral control over ICANN, through its previous stewardship role of the Internet Assigned Names and Numbers Authority (IANA).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Workstream 2 Recommendations on Accountability are seen as a big step ahead in the incorporation of human rights in ICANN’s various processes, with over 100 recommendations on aspects ranging from diversity to transparency. An Implementation Team has been constituted which comprises the Co-chairs and the rapporteurs from the WS2 subgroups. They will primarily help the ICANN organization in interpreting recommendations of the groups where further clarification is needed on how to implement the same. As the next step, an Implementation Assessment Report has recently been published which looks at the various resources and steps needed. The steps are categorized into actions meant for one of the 3; the ICANN Board, Community and the ICANN organization itself. These will be funded by ICANN’s General Operating Fund, the Board and the org.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The report is divided into the following 8 issues: 1) Diversity, 2) Guidelines for Good Faith, 3) Recommendations for a Framework of Interpretation for Human Rights, 4) Jurisdiction of Settlement of Dispute Issues, 5) Recommendations for Improving the ICANN Office of the Ombudsman, 6) Recommendations to increase SO/ AC Accountability, 7) Recommendations to increase Staff Accountability and 8) Recommendations to improve ICANN Transparency.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This blog will take a look at the essential human rights related considerations of the report and how the digital rights community can get involved with the effectuation of the recommendations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Diversity</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The core issues concerning the issue of diversity revolve around the need for a uniform definition of the parameters of diversity and a community discussion on the ones already identified; geographic representation, language, gender, age, physical disability, diverse skills and stakeholder constituency. An agreed upon definition of all of these is necessary before its Board approval and application consistently through the various parts of ICANN. In addition, it is also required to formulate a standard template for diversity data collection and report generation. This sub group’s recommendations are estimated to be implemented in 6-18 months. Many of the recommendations need to be analyzed for compliance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) such as collecting of information relating to disability. For now, the GDPR is only referenced with no further details on how steps considered will either comply or contrast the law.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Good faith Guidelines</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Empowered Community (EC) which includes all the Supporting Organizations, At-Large-Advisory-Committee and Government Advisory Council, are called upon to conceptualize guidelines to be followed when individuals from the EC are participating in Board Removal Processes. Subsequent to this, the implementation will take 6-12 months.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Framework of Interpretation for Human Rights</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Central to the human rights conversation and finally approved, is the Human Rights Framework of Interpretation. However the report does not give a specific timeline for its implementation, only mentioning that this process will take more than 12 months. The task within this is to establish practices of how the core value of respecting human rights will be balanced with other core values while developing ICANN policies and execution of its operations. All policy development processes, reviews, Cross Community Working Group recommendations will need a framework to consider and incorporate human rights, in tandem with the Framework of Interpretation. It will also have to be shown that policies and recommendations sent to the Board have factored in the FOI.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Transparency</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The recommendations focus on the following four key areas as listed below:<br />1. Improving ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP).<br />2. Documenting and Reporting on ICANN’s Interactions with Governments.<br />3. Improving Transparency of Board Deliberations.<br />4. Improving ICANN’s Anonymous Hotline (Whistleblower Protection).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The bulk of the burden for implementation is put on ICANN org with the community providing oversight and ensuring ICANN lives up to its commitments under various policies and laws. Subsequent to this, the implementation will take 6-12 months.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>How the ICANN community can contribute to this work</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This is a defining moment on the future of ICANN and there are great opportunities for the ICANN multistakeholder community to continue shaping the future of the Internet. Some of the envisioned actions by the community include:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify;">
<li>monitoring and assessing the performance of the various ICANN bodies, and acting on the recommendations that emerge from those accountability processes. This will only be done through collaborative formulation of processes and procedures for PDPS, CCWGs etc to incorporate HR considerations and subsequently implementation of the best practices suggested for improving SO/ACs accountability and transparency;</li>
<li>conducting diversity assessments to inform objectives and strategies for diversity criteria;</li>
<li>supporting contracted parties through legal advice for change in their agreements when it comes to choice of law and venue recommendations;</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">contributing to conversations where the Ombudsman can expand his/her involvement that go beyond current jurisdiction and authority</li></ul>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/article-19-akriti-bopanna-and-ephraim-percy-kenyanito-december-16-2019-icann-takes-one-step-forward-in-its-human-rights-and-accountability-commitments'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/article-19-akriti-bopanna-and-ephraim-percy-kenyanito-december-16-2019-icann-takes-one-step-forward-in-its-human-rights-and-accountability-commitments</a>
</p>
No publisherAkriti Bopanna and Ephraim Percy KenyanitoFreedom of Speech and ExpressionICANNIANAInternet Governance2019-12-19T11:35:16ZBlog EntryIANA Transition Stewardship & ICANN Accountability (I)
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transitition-stewardship-icann-accountability-1
<b>This paper is the first in a multi-part series, in which we provide a background to the IANA transition and updates on the ensuing processes. An attempt to familiarise people with the issues at stake, this paper will be followed by a second piece that provides an overview of submitted proposals and areas of concern that will need attention moving forward. The series is a work in progress and will be updated as the processes move forward. It is up for public comments and we welcome your feedback.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In developing these papers we have been guided by Kieren McCarthy's writings in The Register, Milton Mueller writings on the Internet Governance Project, Rafik Dammak emails on the mailings lists, the constitutional undertaking argument made in the policy paper authored by Danielle Kehl & David Post for New America Foundation.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Introduction</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The 53rd ICANN</b> conference in Buenos Aires was pivotal as it marked the last general meeting before the IANA transition deadline on 30th September, 2015. The multistakeholder process initiated seeks communities to develop transition proposals to be consolidated and reviewed by the the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG). The names, number and protocol communities convened at the conference to finalize the components of the transition proposal and to determine the way forward on the transition proposals. The Protocol Parameters (IANA PLAN Working Group) submitted to ICG on 6 January 2015, while the Numbering Resources (CRISP Team) submitted on 15 January 2015. The Domain Names (CWG-Stewardship) submitted its second draft to ICG on 25 June 2015. The ICG had a face-to-face meeting in Buenos Aires and their proposal to transition the stewardship of the IANA functions is expected to be out for public comment July 31 to September 8, 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Parallelly, the CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability offered its first set of proposals for public comment in June 2015 and organised two working sessions at ICANN'53. More recently, the CCWG met in Paris focusing on the proposed community empowerment mechanisms, emerging concerns and progress on issues so far. <b><i>CIS reserves its comments to the CCWG till the second round of comments expected in July.</i></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This working paper explains the IANA Transition, its history and relevance to management of the Internet. It provides an update on the processes so far, including the submissions by the Indian government and highlights areas of concern that need attention going forward.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">How is IANA Transition linked to DNS Management?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The IANA transition presents a significant opportunity for stakeholders to influence the management and governance of the global network. The Domain Name System (DNS), which allows users to locate websites by translating the domain name with corresponding Internet Protocol address, is critical to the functioning of the Internet. The DNS rests on the effective coordination of three critical functions—the allocation of IP Addresses (the numbers function), domain name allocation (the naming function), and protocol parameters standardisation (the protocols function).</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">History of the ICANN-IANA Functions contract</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Initially, these key functions were performed by individuals and public and private institutions. They either came together voluntarily or through a series of agreements and contracts brokered by the Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and funded by the US government. With the Internet's rapid expansion and in response to concerns raised about its increasing commercialization as a resource, a need was felt for the creation of a formal institution that would take over DNS management. This is how ICANN, a California-based private, non-profit technical coordination body, came at the helm of DNS and related issues. Since then, ICANN has been performing the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions under a contract with the NTIA, and is commonly referred to as the IANA Functions Operator.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">IANA Functions</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In February 2000, the NTIA entered into the first stand-alone IANA Functions HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/sf_26_pg_1-2-final_award_and_sacs.pdf"contract<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a> with ICANN as the Operator. While the contractual obligations have evolved over time, these are largely administrative and technical in nature including:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>(1) the coordination of the assignment of technical Internet protocol parameters;</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>(2) the allocation of Internet numbering resources; and</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>(3) the administration of certain responsibilities associated with the Internet DNS root zone management;</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>(4) other services related to the management of the ARPA and top-level domains.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN has been performing the IANA functions under this oversight, primarily as NTIA did not want to let go of complete control of DNS management. Another reason was to ensure NTIA's leverage in ensuring that ICANN’s commitments, conditional to its incorporation, were being met and that it was sticking to its administrative and technical role.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Root Zone Management—Entities and Functions Involved</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA' s involvement has been controversial particularly in reference to the Root Zone Management function, which allows allows for changes to the<a href="http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/The%20Internet%20Domain%20Name%20System%20Explained%20for%20Non-Experts%20(ENGLISH).pdf"> </a><a href="http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/The%20Internet%20Domain%20Name%20System%20Explained%20for%20Non-Experts%20(ENGLISH).pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/The Internet Domain Name System Explained for Non-Experts (ENGLISH).pdf"</a>highest level of the DNS namespace<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> by updating the databases that represent that namespace. DNS namespace is defined to be the set of names known as top-level domain names or TLDs which may be at the country level (ccTLDs or generic (gTLDs). This<a href="https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf"> </a><a href="https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf">HYPERLINK "https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf"</a>function to maintain the Root was split into two parts<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a>—with two separate procurements and two separate contracts. The operational contract for the Primary (“A”) Root Server was awarded to VeriSign, the IANA Functions Contract—was awarded to ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These contracts created contractual obligations for ICANN as IANA Root Zone Management Function Operator, in co-operation with Verisign as the Root Zone Maintainer and NTIA as the Root Zone Administrator whose authorisation is explicitly required for any requests to be implemented in the root zone. Under this contract, ICANN had responsibility for the technical functions for all three communities under the IANA Functions contract.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN also had policy making functions for the names community such as developing<a href="https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files"> </a><a href="https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files">HYPERLINK "https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files"</a>rules and procedures and policies under <a href="https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files">HYPERLINK "https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files"</a>which any changes to the Root Zone File<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a> were to be proposed, including the policies for adding new TLDs to the system. The policy making of numbers and protocols is with IETF and RIRs respectively.<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf"</a>NTIA role in root zone management<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a> is clerical and judgment free with regards to content. It authorizes implementation of requests after verifying whether procedures and policies are being followed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This contract was subject to extension by mutual agreement and failure of complying with predefined commitments could result in the re-opening of the contract to another entity through a Request For Proposal (RFP). In fact, in 2011<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf"</a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">NTIA issued a RFP pursuant to ICANN</a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf"</a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">'</a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf"</a>s Conflict of Interest Policy.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Why is this oversight needed?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The role of the Administrator becomes critical for ensuring the security and operation of the Internet with the Root Zone serving as the directory of critical resources. In December 2014,<a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/"> </a><a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/">HYPERLINK "http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/"</a>a report revealed 300 incidents of internal security breaches<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a> some of which were related to the Centralized Zone Data System (CZDS) – where the internet core root zone files are mirrored and the WHOIS portal. In view of the IANA transition and given ICANN's critical role in maintaining the Internet infrastructure, the question which arises is if NTIA will let go of its Administrator role then which body should succeed it?</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Transition announcement and launch of process</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On 14 March 2014, the NTIA <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"</a>announced<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a> “<i>its intent to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder community”</i>. These key Internet domain name functions refer to the IANA functions. For this purpose, the NTIA<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"</a>asked<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a> the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to convene a global multistakeholder process to develop a transition proposal which has broad community support and addresses the following four principles:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;</li>
<li>Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;</li>
<li>Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and</li>
<li>Maintain the openness of the Internet.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The transition process has been split according to the three main communities naming, numbers and protocols.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Structure of the Transition Processes</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN performs both technical functions and policy-making functions. The technical functions are known as IANA functions and these are performed by ICANN are for all three communities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>I.<i> Naming function:</i></b> ICANN performs <b><i>technical and policy-making</i></b> for the names community. The technical functions are known as IANA functions and the policy-making functions relates to their role in deciding whether .xxx or .sucks should be allowed amongst other issues. There are two parallel streams of work focusing on the naming community that are crucial to completing the transition. The first, <b><i>Cross-Community Working Group to Develop an IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal on Naming Related Functions </i></b>will enable NTIA to transition out of its role in the DNS. Therefore, accountability of IANA functions is the responsibility of the CWG and accountability of policy-making functions is outside its scope. CWG has submitted its second draft to the ICG.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The second, <b><i>Cross-Community Working Group on Accountability (CCWG-Accountability)</i></b> is identifying necessary reforms to ICANN’s bylaws and processes to enhance the organization’s accountability to the global community post-transition. Therefore accountability of IANA functions is outside the scope of the CCWG. The CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability offered its first set of proposals for public comment in June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>II.<i> Numbers function:</i></b> ICANN performs only technical functions for the numbers community. The policy-making functions for numbers are performed by RIRs. CRISP is focusing on the IANA functions for numbers and has submitted their proposal to the ICG earlier this year.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>III.<i> Protocols function:</i></b> ICANN performs only technical functions for the protocols community. The policy-making functions for protocols are performed by IETF. IETF-WG is focusing on the IANA functions for protocols and has submitted their proposal to the ICG earlier this year.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Role of ICG</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">After receiving the proposals from all three communities the ICG must combine these proposals into a consolidated transition proposal and then seek public comment on all aspects of the plan. ICG’s role is crucial, because it must build a public record for the NTIA on how the three customer group submissions tie together in a manner that ensures NTIA’s<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions"</a>criteria<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a> are met and institutionalized over the long term. Further, ICG's final submission to NTIA must include a plan to enhance ICANN’s accountability based on the CCWG-Accountability proposal.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA Leverage</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Reprocurement of the IANA contract is <a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">HYPERLINK "http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/"</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">essential for ICANN</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">HYPERLINK "http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/"</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">'</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">HYPERLINK "http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/"</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">s</a><a href="http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/">HYPERLINK "http://www.newamerica.org/oti/controlling-internet-infrastructure/"</a> legitimacy<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a> in the DNS ecosystem and the authority to reopen the contract and in keeping the policy and operational functions separate meant that, NTIA could simply direct VeriSign to follow policy directives being issued from the entity replacing ICANN if they were deemed to be not complying. This worked as an effective leverage for ICANN complying to their commitments even if it is difficult to determine how this oversight was exercised. Perceptually, this has been interpreted as a broad overreach particularly, in the context of issues of sovereignty associated with ccTLDs and the gTLDs in their influence in shaping markets. However, it is important to bear in mind that the NTIA authorization comes after the operator, ICANN—has validated the request and does not deal with the substance of the request rather focuses merely on compliance with outlined procedure.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA's role in the transition process</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA in its<a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_second_quarterly_iana_report_05.07.15.pdf"> </a><a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_second_quarterly_iana_report_05.07.15.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_second_quarterly_iana_report_05.07.15.pdf"</a>Second Quarterly Report to the Congress<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a> for the period of February 1-March 31, 2015 has outlined some clarifications on the process ahead. It confirmed the flexibility of extending the contract or reducing the time period for renewal, based on community decision. The report also specified that the NTIA would consider a proposal only if it has been developed in consultation with the multi-stakeholder community. The transition proposal should have broad community support and does not seek replacement of NTIA's role with a government-led or intergovernmental organization solution. Further the proposal should maintain security, stability, and resiliency of the DNS, the openness of the Internet and must meet the needs and expectations of the global customers and partners of the IANA services. NTIA will only review a comprehensive plan that includes all these elements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Once the communities develop and ICG submits a consolidated proposal, NTIA will ensure that the proposal has been adequately “stress tested” to ensure the continued stability and security of the DNS. NTIA also added that any proposed processes or structures that have been tested to see if they work, prior to the submission—will be taken into consideration in NTIA's review. The report clarified that NTIA will review and assess the changes made or proposed to enhance ICANN’s accountability before initiating the transition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Prior to ICANN'53, Lawrence E. Strickling Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information and NTIA Administrator HYPERLINK "http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/stakeholder-proposals-come-together-icann-meeting-argentina"has posed some questions for consideration<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a> by the communities prior to the completion of the transition plan. The issues and questions related to CCWG-Accountability draft are outlined below:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Proposed <b><i>new or modified community empowerment tools—</i></b>how can the CCWG ensure that the creation of new organizations or tools will not interfere with the security and stability of the DNS during and after the transition? Do these new committees and structures <b><i>create a different set of accountability questions</i></b>?</li>
<li>Proposed membership model for community empowerment—have <b><i>other possible models</i></b> been thoroughly examined, detailed, and documented? Has CCWG designed stress tests of the various models to address how the multistakeholder model is preserved <b><i>if individual ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees opt out</i></b>?</li>
<li>Has CCWG developed stress tests to address the <b><i>potential risk of capture and barriers to entry for new participants</i></b> of the various models? Further, have stress tests been considered to address <b><i>potential unintended consequences of “operationalizing” groups</i></b> that to date have been advisory in nature?</li>
<li>Suggestions on improvements to the current Independent Review Panel (IRP) that has been criticized for its lack of accountability—how does the CCWG proposal <b><i>analyze and remedy existing concerns with the IRP</i></b>?</li>
<li>In designing a plan for improved accountability, should the CCWG consider what exactly is the <b><i>role of the ICANN Board within the multistakeholder model</i></b>? Should the <b><i>standard for Board action</i></b> be to confirm that the community has reached consensus, and if so, what <b><i>accountability mechanisms are needed</i></b> to ensure the Board operates in accordance with that standard?</li>
<li>The proposal is primarily focused on the accountability of the ICANN Board—has the CCWG considered <b><i>accountability improvements</i></b> that would apply to <b><i>ICANN management and staff or to the various ICANN Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees</i></b>?</li>
<li>NTIA has also asked the CCWG to <b><i>build a public record and thoroughly document</i></b> how the NTIA criteria have been met and will be maintained in the future.</li>
<li>Has the CCWG identified and <b><i>addressed issues of implementation </i></b>so that the community and ICANN can implement the plan as expeditiously as possible once NTIA has reviewed and accepted it.</li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA has also sought community’s input on timing to finalize and implement the transition plan if it were approved. The Buenos Aires meeting became a crucial point in the transtion process as following the meeting, NTIA will need to make a determination on extending its current contract with ICANN. Keeping in mind that the community and ICANN will need to implement all work items identified by the ICG and the Working Group on Accountability as prerequisites for the transition before the contract can end, the community’s input is critical.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">NTIA's legal standing</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On 25th February, 2015 the US Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation on 'Preserving the Multi-stakeholder Model of Internet Governance'<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14">[14]</a> heard from NTIA head Larry Strickling, Ambassador Gross and Fadi Chehade. The hearing sought to plug any existing legal loopholes, and tighten its administrative, technical, financial, public policy, and political oversight over the entire process no matter which entity takes up the NTIA function. The most important takeaway from this Congressional hearing came from Larry Strickling’s testimony<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15">[15]</a> who stated that NTIA has no legal or statutory responsibility to manage the DNS.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If <b><i>the NTIA does not have the legal responsibility to act, and its role was temporary; on what basis is the NTIA driving the current IANA Transition process without the requisite legal authority or Congressional mandate?</i></b> Historically, the NTIA oversight, effectively devised as a leverage for ICANN fulfilling its commitments have not been open to discussion.<a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/pdfnOquQlhsmM.pdf"> </a><a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/pdfnOquQlhsmM.pdf">HYPERLINK "http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/pdfnOquQlhsmM.pdf"</a>Concerns have also been raised<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16">[16]</a> on the lack of engagement with non-US governments, organizations and persons prior to initiating or defining the scope and conditions of the transition. Therefore, any IANA transition plan must consider this lack of consultation, develop a multi-stakeholder process as the way forward—even if the NTIA wants to approve the final transition plan.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Need to strengthen Diversity Principle</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Following submissions by various stakeholders raising concerns regarding developing world participation, representation and lack of multilingualism in the transition process—the Diversity Principle was included by ICANN in the Revised Proposal of 6 June 2014. Given that representatives from developing countries as well as from stakeholder communities outside of the ICANN community are unable to productively involve themselves in such processes because of lack of multilingualism or unfamiliarity with its way of functioning merely mentioning diversity as a principle is not adequate to ensure abundant participation. As CIS has pointed out<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17">[17]</a> before issues have been raised about the domination by North American or European entities which results in undemocratic, unrepresentative and non-transparent decision-making in such processes. Accordingly, all the discussions in the process should be translated into multiple native languages of participants in situ, so that everyone participating in the process can understand what is going on. Adequate time must be given for the discussion issues to be translated and circulated widely amongst all stakeholders of the world, before a decision is taken or a proposal is framed. This was a concern raised in the recent CCWG proposal which was extended as many communities did not have translated texts or adequate time to participate.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Representation of the global multistakeholder community in ICG</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Currently, the Co-ordination Group includes representatives from ALAC, ASO, ccNSO, GNSO, gTLD registries, GAC, ICC/BASIS, IAB, IETF, ISOC, NRO, RSSAC and SSAC. Most of these representatives belong to the ICANN community, and is not representative of the global multistakeholder community including governments. This is not representative of even a multistakeholder model which the US <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">HYPERLINK "http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design"</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">g</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">HYPERLINK "http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design"</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">ov</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">HYPERLINK "http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design"</a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">ernment </a><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design">HYPERLINK "http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design"</a>has announced<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18">[18]</a> for the transition; nor in the multistakeholder participation spirit of NETmundial. Adequate number of seats on the Committee must be granted to each stakeholder so that they can each coordinate discussions within their own communities and ensure wider and more inclusive participation.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's role in the transition process</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Another issue of concern in the pre-transition process has been ICANN having been charged with facilitating this transition process. This decision calls to question the legitimacy of the process given that the suggestions from the proposals envision a more permanent role for ICANN in DNS management. As Kieren McCarthy has pointed out <a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19">[19]</a>ICANN has taken several steps to retain the balance of power in managing these functions which have seen considerable pushback from the community. These include an attempt to control the process by announcing two separate processes<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20">[20]</a> – one looking into the IANA transition, and a second at its own accountability improvements – while insisting the two were not related. That effort was beaten down<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21">[21]</a> after an unprecedented letter by the leaders of every one of ICANN's supporting organizations and advisory committees that said the two processes must be connected.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Next, ICANN was accused of stacking the deck<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22">[22]</a> by purposefully excluding groups skeptical of ICANN’s efforts, and by trying to give ICANN's chairman the right to personally select the members of the group that would decide the final proposal. That was also beaten back. ICANN staff also produced a "scoping document"<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23">[23]</a>, that pre-empt any discussion of structural separation and once again community pushback forced a backtrack.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24">[24]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These concerns garner more urgency given recent developments with the community working <a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html">HYPERLINK "http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html"</a>groups<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25">[25]</a> and ICANN divisive view of the long-term role of ICANN in DNS management. Further, given HYPERLINK "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGwbYljtNyI#t=1164"ICANNHYPERLINK "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGwbYljtNyI#t=1164" HYPERLINK "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGwbYljtNyI#t=1164"President Chehade’s comments that the CWG is not doing its job<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26">[26]</a>, is populated with people who do not know anything and the “IANA process needs to be left alone as much as possible”. Fadi also specified that ICANN had begun the formal process of initiating a direct contract with VeriSign to request and authorise changes to be implemented by VeriSign. <b><i>While ICANN may see itself without oversight in this relationship with VeriSign, it is imperative that proposals bear this plausible outcome in mind and put forth suggestions to counter this.</i></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The<a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html"> </a><a href="http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html">HYPERLINK "http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html"</a>update from IETF on the ongoing negotiation with ICANN on their proposal<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27">[27]</a> related to protocol parameters has also flagged that ICANN is unwilling to cede to any text which would suggest ICANN relinquishing its role in the operations of protocol parameters to a subsequent operator, should the circumstances demand this. ICANN has stated that agreeing to such text now would possibly put them in breach of their existing agreement with the NTIA. Finally,<a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712"> </a><a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712">HYPERLINK "https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712"</a><a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712">ICANN </a><a href="https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712">HYPERLINK "https://twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712"</a>Board Member, Markus Kummer<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28">[28]</a> stated that if ICANN was to not approve any aspect of the proposal this would hinder the consensus and therefore, the transition would not be able to move forward.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN has been designated the convenor role by the US government on basis of its unique position as the current IANA functions contractor and the global coordinator for the DNS. However it is this unique position itself which creates a conflict of interest as in the role of contractor of IANA functions, ICANN has an interest in the outcome of the process being conducive to ICANN. In other words, there exists a potential for abuse of the process by ICANN, which may tend to steer the process towards an outcome favourable to itself.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><i>Therefore there exists a strong rationale for defining the limitations of the role of ICANN as convenor.</i></b> The community has suggested that ICANN should limit its role to merely facilitating discussions and not extend it to reviewing or commenting on emerging proposals from the process. Additional safeguards need to be put in place to avoid conflicts of interest or appearance of conflicts of interest. ICANN should further not compile comments on drafts to create a revised draft at any stage of the process. Additionally, ICANN staff must not be allowed to be a part of any group or committee which facilitates or co-ordinates the discussion regarding IANA transition.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">How is the Obama Administration and the US Congress playing this?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Even as the issues of separation of ICANN's policy and administrative role remained unsettled, in the wake of the Snowden revelations, NTIA initiated the long due transition of the IANA contract oversight to a global, private, non-governmental multi-stakeholder institution on March 14, 2014. This announcement immediately raised questions from Congress on whether the transition decision was dictated by technical considerations or in response to political motives, and if the Obama Administration had the authority to commence such a transition unilaterally, without prior open stakeholder consultations. Republican<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-internet-icann-idUSKBN0OI2IJ20150602"> </a><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-internet-icann-idUSKBN0OI2IJ20150602">HYPERLINK "http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-internet-icann-idUSKBN0OI2IJ20150602"</a>lawmakers have raised concerns about the IANA transition plan <a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29">[29]</a>worried that it may allow other countries to capture control.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">More recently,<a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2251"> </a><a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2251">HYPERLINK "https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2251"</a>Defending Internet Freedom Act<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30">[30]</a> has been re-introduced to US Congress. This bill seeks ICANN adopt the recommendations of three internet community groups, about the transition of power, before the US government relinquishes control of the IANA contract. The bill also seeks ownership of the .gov and .mil top-level domains be granted to US government and that ICANN submit itself to the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), a legislation similar to the RTI in India, so that its records and other information gain some degree of public access.It has also been asserted by ICANN that neither NTIA nor the US Congress will approve any transition plan which leaves open the possibility of non-US IANA Functions Operator in the future.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Funding of the transition</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Obama administration is also<a href="http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393"> </a><a href="http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393">HYPERLINK "http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393"</a>fighting a Republican-backed Commerce, Justice, Science, and <a href="http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393">HYPERLINK "http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393"</a>Related Agencies Appropriations Act (H.R. 2578)<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31">[31]</a> which seeks to block NTIA funding the IANA transition. One provision of this bill restricts NTIA from using appropriated dollars for IANA stewardship transition till the end of the fiscal year, September 30, 2015 also the base period of the contact in function. This peculiar proviso in the Omnibus spending bill actually implies that Congress believes that the IANA Transition should be delayed with proper deliberation, and not be rushed as ICANN and NTIA are inclined to.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The IANA Transition cannot take place in violation of US Federal Law that has defunded it within a stipulated time-window. At the Congressional Internet Caucus in January 2015, NTIA head Lawrence Strickling clarified that NTIA will “not use appropriated funds to terminate the IANA functions...” or “to amend the cooperative agreement with Verisign to eliminate NTIA's role in approving changes to the authoritative root zone file...”. This implicitly establishes that the IANA contract will be extended, and Strickling confirmed that there was no hard deadline for the transition.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">DOTCOM Act</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Communications and Technology Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee<a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/markup/communications-and-technology-subcommittee-vote-dotcom-act"> </a><a href="http://energycommerce.house.gov/markup/communications-and-technology-subcommittee-vote-dotcom-act">HYPERLINK "http://energycommerce.house.gov/markup/communications-and-technology-subcommittee-vote-dotcom-act"</a>amended the DOTCOM Act<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32">[32]</a>, a bill which, in earlier drafts, would have halted the IANA functions transition process for up to a year pending US Congressional approval. The bill in its earlier version represented unilateral governmental interference in the multistakeholder process. The new bill reflects a much deeper understanding of, and confidence in, the significant amount of work that the global multistakeholder community has undertaken in planning both for the transition of IANA functions oversight and for the increased accountability of ICANN. The amended DOTCOM Act would call for the NTIA to certify – as a part of a proposed GAO report on the transition – that <i>“the required changes to ICANN’s by-laws contained in the final report of ICANN’s Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability and the changes to ICANN’s bylaws required by ICANN’s IANA have been implemented.” </i>The bill enjoys immense bipartisan support<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33">[33]</a>, and is being lauded as a prudent and necessary step for ensuring the success of the IANA transition.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> IANA Functions Contract <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/sf_26_pg_1-2-final_award_and_sacs.pdf> accessed 15th June 2015</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Daniel Karrenberg, The Internet Domain Name System Explained For Nonexperts <http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/The%20Internet%20Domain%20Name%20System%20Explained%20for%20Non-Experts%20(ENGLISH).pdf> accessed 15 June 2015</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> David Post and Danielle Kehl, Controlling Internet Infrastructure The “IANA Transition” And Why It Matters For The Future Of The Internet, Part I (1st edn, Open Technology Institute 2015) <https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Iana.org, 'IANA — Root Files' (2015) <https://www.iana.org/domains/root/files> accessed 11 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> 'NTIA's Role In Root Zone Management' (2014). <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntias_role_root_zone_management_12162014.pdf> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> <i>Contract</i> ( 2011) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11102011_solicitation.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> Kieren McCarthy, 'Confidential Information Exposed Over 300 Times In ICANN Security Snafu' <i>The Register</i> (2015) <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/30/confidential_information_exposed_over_300_times_in_icann_security_snafu/> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> NTIA, ‘NTIA Announces Intent To Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions’ (2014) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> NTIA, ‘NTIA Announces Intent To Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions’ (2014) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a> NTIA, ‘NTIA Announces Intent To Transition Key Internet Domain Name Functions’ (2014) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a> David Post and Danielle Kehl, <i>Controlling Internet Infrastructure The “IANA Transition” And Why It Matters For The Future Of The Internet, Part I</i> (1st edn, Open Technology Institute 2015) <https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/2964-controlling-internet-infrastructure/IANA_Paper_No_1_Final.32d31198a3da4e0d859f989306f6d480.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a> National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 'REPORT ON THE TRANSITION OF THE STEWARDSHIP OF THE INTERNET ASSIGNED NUMBERS AUTHORITY (IANA) FUNCTIONS' (NTIA 2015) <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_second_quarterly_iana_report_05.07.15.pdf> accessed 10 July 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a> Lawrence Strickling, 'Stakeholder Proposals To Come Together At ICANN Meeting In Argentina' <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2015/stakeholder-proposals-come-together-icann-meeting-argentina> accessed 19 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a> Philip Corwin, 'NTIA Says Cromnibus Bars IANA Transition During Current Contract Term' <http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150127_ntia_cromnibus_bars_iana_transition_during_current_contract_term/> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a> Sophia Bekele, '"No Legal Basis For IANA Transition": A Post-Mortem Analysis Of Senate Committee Hearing' <http://www.circleid.com/posts/20150309_no_legal_basis_for_iana_transition_post_mortem_senate_hearing/> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">[16]</a><i> Comments On The IANA Transition And ICANN Accountability Just Net Coalition</i> (2015) <http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/pdfnOquQlhsmM.pdf> accessed 12 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17">[17]</a> The Centre for Internet and Society, 'IANA Transition: Suggestions For Process Design' (2014) <http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18">[18]</a> The Centre for Internet and Society, 'IANA Transition: Suggestions For Process Design' (2014) <http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-suggestions-for-process-design> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19">[19]</a> Kieren McCarthy, 'Let It Go, Let It Go: How Global DNS Could Survive In The Frozen Lands Outside US Control Public Comments On Revised IANA Transition Plan' <i>The Register</i> (2015) <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/05/26/iana_icann_latest/> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20">[20]</a> Icann.org, 'Resources - ICANN' (2014) <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-08-14-en> accessed 13 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21">[21]</a> <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/correspondence/crocker-chehade-to-soac-et-al-18sep14-en.pdf> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22">[22]</a> Richard Forno, '[Infowarrior] - Internet Power Grab: The Duplicity Of ICANN' (<i>Mail-archive.com</i>, 2015) <https://www.mail-archive.com/infowarrior@attrition.org/msg12578.html> accessed 10 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23">[23]</a> ICANN, 'Scoping Document' (2014) <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-transition-scoping-08apr14-en.pdf> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24">[24]</a> Milton Mueller, 'ICANN: Anything That Doesn’T Give IANA To Me Is Out Of Scope |' (<i>Internetgovernance.org</i>, 2014) <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2014/04/16/icann-anything-that-doesnt-give-iana-to-me-is-out-of-scope/> accessed 12 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25">[25]</a> Andrew Sullivan, '[Ianaplan] Update On IANA Transition & Negotiations With ICANN' (<i>Ietf.org</i>, 2015) <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> accessed 14 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26">[26]</a> <i>DNA Member Breakfast With Fadi Chehadé (2015-02-11)</i> (The Domain Name Association 2015).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27">[27]</a> Andrew Sullivan, '[Ianaplan] Update On IANA Transition & Negotiations With ICANN' (<i>Ietf.org</i>, 2015) <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html> accessed 14 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28">[28]</a> Mobile.twitter.com, 'Twitter' (2015) <https://mobile.twitter.com/arunmsukumar/status/603952197186035712> accessed 12 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29">[29]</a> Alina Selyukh, 'U.S. Plan To Cede Internet Domain Control On Track: ICANN Head' <i>Reuters</i> (2015) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/02/us-usa-internet-icann-idUSKBN0OI2IJ20150602> accessed 15 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30">[30]</a> 114th Congress, 'H.R.2251 - Defending Internet Freedom Act Of 2015' (2015).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31">[31]</a> John Eggerton, 'House Bill Blocks Internet Naming Oversight Handoff: White House Opposes Legislation' <i>Broadcasting & Cable</i> (2015) <http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/house-bill-blocks-internet-naming-oversight-handoff/141393> accessed 9 June 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32">[32]</a> <i>Communications And Technology Subcommittee Vote On The DOTCOM Act</i> (2015).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33">[33]</a> Timothy Wilt, 'DOTCOM Act Breezes Through Committee' <i>Digital Liberty</i> (2015) <http://www.digitalliberty.net/dotcom-act-breezes-committee-a319> accessed 22 June 2015.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transitition-stewardship-icann-accountability-1'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transitition-stewardship-icann-accountability-1</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiICANNIANAInternet GovernanceIANA Transition2015-07-31T14:56:26ZBlog EntryCIS Response to ICANN's proposed renewal of .org Registry
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/akriti-bopanna-april-28-2019-cis-response-to-icanns-proposed-renewal-of-org-registry
<b>We thank ICANN for the opportunity to comment on this issue of its proposed renewal of the .org Registry Agreement with the operator, Public Interest Registry (PIR). Supporting much of the community , we too find severe issues with the proposed agreement. These centre around the removal of price caps and imposing obligations being currently deliberated in an ongoing Policy Development Process (PDP). </b>
<h3>Presumption of Renewal</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS has, in the past, questioned the need for a presumption of renewal in registry contracts and it is important to emphasize this <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-regi stry-market-structure">within the context of this comment as well</a>. We had, also, asked ICANN for their rationale on having such a practice with reference to their contract with Verisign to which they responded saying:</p>
<p class="callout" style="text-align: justify; ">“Absent countervailing reasons, there is little public benefit, and some significant potential for disruption, in regular changes of a registry operator. In addition, a significant chance of losing the right to operate the registry after a short period creates adverse incentives to <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-20-is-presumptive-renewal-of-verisign2019s-contr acts-a-good-thing">favor short term gain over long term investment</a>.”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This logic can presumably be applied to the .org registry, as well, yet a re-auction of ,even, legacy top-level domains can only serve to further a fair market, promote competition and ensure that existing registries do not become complacent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These views were supported in the course of the PDP on Contractual Conditions - Existing Registries in 2006 wherein competition was seen useful for better pricing, operational performance and contributions to registry infrastructure. It was also noted that most service industries incorporate a presumption of competition as opposed to one of renewal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/response-to-icanns-proposed-renewal-of-org-registry"> </a></p>
<hr />
<p><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/response-to-icanns-proposed-renewal-of-org-registry"> <strong>Download the file</strong></a> to access our full response.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/akriti-bopanna-april-28-2019-cis-response-to-icanns-proposed-renewal-of-org-registry'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/akriti-bopanna-april-28-2019-cis-response-to-icanns-proposed-renewal-of-org-registry</a>
</p>
No publisherakritiFreedom of Speech and ExpressionICANNIANAInternet Governance2019-04-28T02:16:40ZBlog EntryNETmundial and Suggestions for IANA Administration
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-and-suggestions-for-iana-administration
<b>Following NTIA's announcement to give up control over critical Internet functions, the discussion on how that role should be filled has gathered steam across the Internet governance space.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This post maps the discussion across the NETmundial submissions and presents six emerging evolution scenarios related to the IANA functions:</p>
<ol>
<li>Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body</li>
<li>Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body</li>
<li>No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body</li>
<li>No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body</li>
<li>Multiplication of TLD registries and root servers</li>
<li>Maintenance of status quo</li>
</ol><ol> </ol>
<hr />
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">I. Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The proposal under this category demands for the separation of IANA function from technical policy making, and suggests that the IANA function be transferred to an intergovernmental body.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Such proposal is listed below:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th><th>Proposal No.</th><th>Name of Proposal</th><th>Organization</th><th>Sector</th><th>Region</th><th>Link</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>The Next Best Stage for the Future of Internet Governance is Democracy</td>
<td>Global Geneva</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Geneva, Switzerland</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/the-next-best-stage-for-the-future-of-internet-governance-is-democracy/305">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/the-next-best-stage-for-the-future-of-internet-governance-is-democracy/305</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This proposal by Global Geneva seeks the establishment of an intergovernmental organisation called World Internet Organisation (WIO), under which IANA (which is understood to be essentially technical and concerning safety and security of the Internet would be located. WIO would additionally have a special link/status/contract with IANA to avoid unwanted interference from governments. A 75% majority at WIO would be requested to act/modify/contest an IANA decision, making it difficult for governments to go beyond reasonable and consensual demands. WIO would act in concert with World Internet Forum, under which ICANN would be located, whereby it would make policy decisions regarding gTLDs apart from its other present functions.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">II. Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There are certain proposals whereby it is proposed that IANA function should be separated from technical policy making, or ICANN, and IANA function, which is perceived to be a purely administrative one in such submissions, should be handed over to some sort of non-multilateral organisation, which take different forms in each proposal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Most such submissions have emerged from the civil society or the technical community.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Internet Governance Project submission envisions the creation of a DNS Authority under whose umbrella IANA would function. The DNS Authority would be separate from ICANN. This proposal has been endorsed by the submissions of InternetNZ as well as Article 19 and Best Bits. Avri Doria’s submission, along with the submission of APC, envisions the establishment of an independent IANA, separate from the technical policy function. Such independence is sought to be preceded by a transition period by a body called IANA Stewardship Group which would be constituted mostly by members from the technical community. IANA is sought to be governed via MoUs with all stakeholders, on the same lines as the MoU between ICANN and the IETF, as described in RFC2860, RFC6220. The focus of these MoUs would not be policy but will be on performance and adherence to service level agreements.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These submissions are listed below:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th><th>Proposal No.</th><th>Name of Proposal</th><th>Organisation</th><th>Sector</th><th>Region</th><th>Link</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Roadmap for Globalising IANA: Four Principles and a Proposal for Reform</td>
<td>Internet Governance Project</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>North America</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-globalizing-iana-four-principles-and-a-proposal-for-reform-a-submission-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/96">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-globalizing-iana-four-principles-and-a-proposal-for-reform-a-submission-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/96</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Roadmap for the Further Evolution of the Internet Governance Ecosystem- ICANN</td>
<td>Article 19 and Best Bits</td>
<td>Civil Society<br /></td>
<td>Global</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem-icann/109">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem-icann/109</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Content Contribution to NetMundial on the Roadmap for the Futher Evolution of the IG Ecosystem regarding the Internationalisation of the IANA Function</td>
<td>InternetNZ</td>
<td>Technical Community</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/content-contribution-to-netmundial-on-the-roadmap-for-the-futher-evolution-of-the-ig-ecosystem-regarding-the-internationalisation-of-the-iana-function/130">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/content-contribution-to-netmundial-on-the-roadmap-for-the-futher-evolution-of-the-ig-ecosystem-regarding-the-internationalisation-of-the-iana-function/130</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>One Possible Roadmap for IANA Evolution</td>
<td>Avri Doria, Independent Researcher</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/one-possible-roadmap-for-iana-evolution/153">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/one-possible-roadmap-for-iana-evolution/153</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>APC Proposals for the Further Evolution of the Internet Governance Ecosystem</td>
<td>Association for Progressive Communications (APC)</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>APC is an international organisation with its executive director's office in South Africa</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/apc-proposals-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/280">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/apc-proposals-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/280</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">III. No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These submissions propose that the IANA function should come under a multilateral body. However they do not suggest the separation of IANA function from policymaking, or from ICANN; or they are at least silent on this latter issue. 2 such proposals come from the civil society and 2 from the government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A list of these submissions is provided below:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Sl. No.</th><th>Proposal No.</th><th>Name of Proposal<br /></th><th>Organisation</th><th>Sector</th><th>Region</th><th>Link</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Roadmaps for Further Evolution of Internet Governance</td>
<td>Association for Proper Internet Governance</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmaps-for-further-evolution-of-internet-governance/65">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmaps-for-further-evolution-of-internet-governance/65</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Russian Parliament Submission to NET mundial</td>
<td>State Duma of the Russian Federation (Parliament of the Russia)</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/themes/133">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/themes/133</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>Contribution from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Global Multiskaeholder (sic) Meeting for the Future of the Internet, 23-24 April 2014 Sao Paulo, Brazil</td>
<td>Cyber Space National Center, Iran</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Islamic Republic of Iran</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-from-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-to-the-global-multiskaeholder-meeting-for-the-future-of-the-internet-23-24-april-2014-sao-paolo-brazil/236">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-from-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-to-the-global-multiskaeholder-meeting-for-the-future-of-the-internet-23-24-april-2014-sao-paolo-brazil/236</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>Towards Reform of Global Internet Governance</td>
<td>The Society for Knowledge Commons</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>India and Brazil</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/towards-reform-of-global-internet-governance/240">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/towards-reform-of-global-internet-governance/240</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">IV. No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These submissions do not consider the issue of separation of IANA function from policymaking, or ICANN, or at least do not state an opinion on the separation of IANA function from ICANN. However, they do suggest that the control of IANA should be held by a non-multilateral body, and not the US Government.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Many of these submissions also suggest that the oversight of ICANN should be done by a non-multilateral body, therefore it makes sense that the IANA function is administered by a non-multilateral body, without its removal from the ICANN umbrella.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A list of such submissions is provided below:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th><th>Proposal No.</th><th>Name of Proposal</th><th>Organisation</th><th>Sector</th><th>Region</th><th class=" tt_icon_asc">Link</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Norwegian Contribution to the Sao Paulo Meeting</td>
<td>Norwegian government</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Norway, Europe</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/norwegian-government/137">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/norwegian-government/137</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Contribution from the GSM Association to the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance</td>
<td>GSMA</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-from-the-gsm-association-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/141">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-from-the-gsm-association-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/141</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Contribution of Telefonica to NETmundial</td>
<td>Telefonica, S.A.</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-of-telefonica-to-netmundial/143">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-of-telefonica-to-netmundial/143</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>ETNO Contribution to NETmundial</td>
<td>ETNO [European Telecommunications Network Operators' Association]</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/etno-contribution-to-netmundial/148">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/etno-contribution-to-netmundial/148</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>French Government Submission to NETmundial</td>
<td>French Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>France</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/french-government-submission-to-netmundial/154">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/french-government-submission-to-netmundial/154</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Nominet Submission on Internet Governance Principles and the Roadmap</td>
<td>Nominet</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/nominet-submission-on-internet-governance-principles-and-the-roadmap/156">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/nominet-submission-on-internet-governance-principles-and-the-roadmap/156</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Submission by AHCIET to the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance. NETmundial</td>
<td>AHCIET</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/submission-by-ahciet-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance-netmundial/157">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/submission-by-ahciet-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance-netmundial/157</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Spanish Government Contribution to the Global Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance</td>
<td>Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism, Spain</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/multistakeholder-human-rights-stability-gac/165">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/multistakeholder-human-rights-stability-gac/165</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Roadmap for the Further Evolution of the Internet Governance Ecosystem</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/177">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/177</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>Roadmap for the Future Development of the Internet Governance Ecosystem</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td style="text-align: justify; "><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-future-development-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/196">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-future-development-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/196</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>Orange Contribution for NETmundial</td>
<td>Orange Group</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Deputy to the Chief Regulatory Officer Orange Group</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/orange/199">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/orange/199</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>Submission on Internet Governance Principles and Roadmap for the Further Evolution of the Internet Governance Ecosystem</td>
<td>Kuwait Information Technology Society</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/kuwait-information-technology-society-kits-submission-on-internet-governance-principles-and-roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/214">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/kuwait-information-technology-society-kits-submission-on-internet-governance-principles-and-roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/214</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>Content Submission by the Federal Government of Mexico</td>
<td>Secretara de Comunicaciones y Transportes, Mexico</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/content-submission-by-the-federal-government-of-mexico/219">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/content-submission-by-the-federal-government-of-mexico/219</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>Better Understanding and Co-operation for Internet Governance Principles and Its Roadmap</td>
<td>Japan Internet Service Providers Association</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/better-understanding-cooperation-for-internet-governance-principles-its-roadmap/222">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/better-understanding-cooperation-for-internet-governance-principles-its-roadmap/222</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>Deutsche Telekom’s Contribution for to the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance</td>
<td>Deutsche Telekom AG</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Germany / Europe</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/deutsche-telekom-s-contribution-for-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/225">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/deutsche-telekom-s-contribution-for-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/225</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>NRO Contribution to NETmundial</td>
<td>NRO (for AFRINIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, RIPE-NCC)</td>
<td>Technical Community</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/nro-contribution-to-netmundial/259">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/nro-contribution-to-netmundial/259</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>Evolution and Internationalisation of ICANN</td>
<td>CGI.br- Brazilian Internet Steering Committee</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/evolution-and-internationalization-of-icann/263">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/evolution-and-internationalization-of-icann/263</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>Addressing Three Prominent “How To” Questions on the Internet Governance Ecosystem Future</td>
<td>Luis Magalhes, Professor at IST of University of Lisbon, Portugal; Panelist of ICANN’s Strategy Panel on the Role in the Internet Governance System</td>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/addressing-three-prominent-how-to-questions-on-the-internet-governance-ecosystem-future/294">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/addressing-three-prominent-how-to-questions-on-the-internet-governance-ecosystem-future/294</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>NETmundial Content Submission- endorsed by NIC Mexico</td>
<td>NIC Mexico</td>
<td>Technical Community</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/netmundial-content-submission-endorsed-by-nic-mexico/302">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/netmundial-content-submission-endorsed-by-nic-mexico/302</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">V. Multiplication of TLD registries and Root Servers</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These submissions are based on the assumption that reform in the current ICANN/IANA administrative structure is impossible as the US government is unlikely to give up its oversight role over both. Instead, these submissions suggest that multiple TLD registries and root servers should be created as alternatives to today’s IANA/ICANN so that a healthy market competition can be fostered in this area, rather than fostering monopoly of IANA.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A list of such submissions is provided below:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th><th>Proposal No.</th><th>Name of Proposal</th><th>Organisation</th><th>Sector</th><th>Region</th><th>Link</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Internet Governance: What Next?</td>
<td>EUROLINC</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>France, Europe</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/internet-governance-what-next/129">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/internet-governance-what-next/129</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>The Intergovernance of the InterPLUS</td>
<td>INTLNET</td>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>France</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/the-intergovernance-of-the-interplus/293">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/the-intergovernance-of-the-interplus/293</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>VI. Maintenance of status quo</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These submissions are based on the “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” principle, and are of the opinion that there is no need to change the administration of IANA function as it functions efficiently in the current system.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A list of such submissions is provided below:</p>
<table class="plain">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Sl.No.</th><th>Proposal No.</th><th>Name of Proposal</th><th>Organisation</th><th>Sector</th><th>Region</th><th>Link</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>United Kingdom Government Submission</td>
<td>Department For Culture Media and Sport, United Kingdom Government</td>
<td>Government<br /></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/united-kingdom-government-submission/79">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/united-kingdom-government-submission/79</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>Perspectives from the Domain Name Association</td>
<td>Domain Name Association</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td><a class="external-link" href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/perspectives-from-the-domain-name-association/249">http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/perspectives-from-the-domain-name-association/249</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<hr />
<p>Read more on <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-iana-role-structures" class="internal-link">ICANN/IANA: Role and Structural Considerations</a> (PDF Document, 1215 Kb)</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-and-suggestions-for-iana-administration'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-and-suggestions-for-iana-administration</a>
</p>
No publishersmarikaICANNIANAInternet GovernanceNETmundial2014-04-23T04:00:49ZBlog EntryBrazil passes Marco Civil; the US-FCC Alters its Stance on Net Neutrality
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/brazil-passes-marco-civil-us-fcc-alters-stance-on-net-neutrality
<b>Hopes for the Internet rise and fall rapidly. Yesterday, on April 23, 2014, Marco Civil da Internet, the Brazilian Bill of Internet rights, was passed by the Brazilian Senate into law. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Marco Civil</i>, on which we <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/marco-civil-da-internet">blogged</a> previously, includes provisions for the protection of privacy and freedom of expression of all users, rules mandating net neutrality, etc. Brazil celebrated the beginning of NETmundial, a momentous first day about which Achal Prabhala <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-day-0">blogs</a>, with President Rousseff’s approval of the<i> Marco Civil</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At about the same time, news <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/568be7f6-cb2f-11e3-ba95-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2zmtOMMj0">broke</a> that the US Federal Communications Commission is set to propose new net neutrality rules. In the wake of the <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jan/14/net-neutrality-internet-fcc-verizon-court">Verizon net neutrality decision</a> in January, the proposed new rules will <a href="http://www.pcworld.com/article/2147520/report-us-fcc-to-allow-payments-for-speedier-traffic.html">prohibit</a> Internet service providers such as Comcast from slowing down or blocking traffic to certain websites, but permit fast lane traffic for content providers who are willing to pay for it. This fast lane would prioritise traffic from content providers like Netflix and Youtube on commercially reasonable terms, and result in availability of video and other content at higher speeds or quality. An interesting turn-around, as <i>Marco Civil</i> expressly mandates net neutrality for all traffic.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/brazil-passes-marco-civil-us-fcc-alters-stance-on-net-neutrality'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/brazil-passes-marco-civil-us-fcc-alters-stance-on-net-neutrality</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaIANAInternet GovernanceNETmundialICANNMarco Civil2014-04-24T10:05:32ZBlog EntryCIS Comments: Enhancing ICANN Accountability
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability
<b>On May 6, 2014, ICANN published a call for public comments on "Enhancing ICANN Accountability". This comes in the wake of the IANA stewardship transition spearheaded by ICANN and related concerns of ICANN's external and internal accountability mechanisms. Centre for Internet and Society contributed to the call for comments.</b>
<h3><strong>Introduction:</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On March 14, 2014, the US National Telecommunications and Information Administration <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">announced its intent</a> to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multi-stakeholder Internet governance community. ICANN was tasked with the development of a proposal for transition of IANA stewardship, for which ICANN subsequently <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/draft-proposal-2014-04-08-en">called for public comments</a>. At NETmundial, ICANN President and CEO Fadi Chehadé acknowledged that the IANA stewardship transition and improved ICANN accountability were <a href="http://www.internetcommerce.org/issuance-of-netmundial-multistakeholder-statement-concludes-act-one-of-2014-internet-governance-trifecta/">inter-related issues</a>, and <a href="http://blog.icann.org/2014/05/icanns-accountability-in-the-wake-of-the-iana-functions-stewardship-transition/">announced</a> the impending launch of a process to strengthen and enhance ICANN accountability in the absence of US government oversight. The subsequent call for public comments on “Enhancing ICANN Accountability” may be found <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/enhancing-accountability-2014-05-06-en">here</a>.</p>
<h3><strong>Suggestions for improved accountability:</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the event, Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) wishes to limit its suggestions for improved ICANN accountability to matters of reactive or responsive transparency on the part of ICANN to the global multi-stakeholder community. We propose the creation and implementation of a robust “freedom or right to information” process from ICANN, accompanied by an independent review mechanism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Article III of ICANN Bye-laws note that “<i>ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness</i>”. As part of this, Article III(2) note that ICANN shall make publicly available information on, <i>inter alia</i>, ICANN’s budget, annual audit, financial contributors and the amount of their contributions, as well as information on accountability mechanisms and the outcome of specific requests and complaints regarding the same. Such accountability mechanisms include reconsideration (Article IV(2)), independent review of Board actions (Article IV(3)), periodic reviews (Article IV(4)) and the Ombudsman (Article V).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Further, ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (“DIDP”) sets forth a process by which members of the public may request information “<i>not already publicly available</i>”. ICANN <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">may respond</a> (either affirmatively or in denial) to such requests within 30 days. Appeals to denials under the DIDP are available under the reconsideration or independent review procedures, to the extent applicable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While ICANN has historically been prompt in its response to DIDP Requests, CIS is of the view that absent the commitments in the AoC following IANA stewardship transition, it would be desirable to amend and strengthen Response and Appeal procedures for DIDP and other, broader disclosures. Our concerns stem from the fact that, <i>first</i>, the substantive scope of appeal under the DIDP, on the basis of documents requested, is unclear (say, contracts or financial documents regarding payments to Registries or Registrars, or a detailed, granular break-up of ICANN’s revenue and expenditures); and <i>second</i>, that grievances with decisions of the Board Governance Committee or the Independent Review Panel cannot be appealed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Therefore, CIS proposes a mechanism based on “right to information” best practices, which results in transparent and accountable governance at governmental levels.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>First</i>, we propose that designated members of ICANN staff shoulder responsibility to respond to information requests. The identity of such members (information officers, say) ought to be made public, including in the response document.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Second</i>, an independent, third party body should be constituted to sit in appeal over information officers’ decisions to provide or decline to provide information. Such body may be composed of nominated members from the global multi-stakeholder community, with adequate stakeholder-, regional- and gender-representation. However, such members should not have held prior positions in ICANN or its related organizations. During the appointed term of the body, the terms and conditions of service ought to remain beyond the purview of ICANN, similar to globally accepted principles of an independent judiciary. For instance, the Constitution of India forbids any disadvantageous alteration of privileges and allowances of judges of the <a href="http://www.constitution.org/cons/india/p05125.html">Supreme Court</a> and <a href="http://www.constitution.org/cons/india/p06221.html">High Courts</a> during tenure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Third</i>, and importantly, punitive measures ought to follow unreasonable, unexplained or illegitimate denials of requests by ICANN information officers. In order to ensure compliance, penalties should be made continuing (a certain prescribed fine for each day of information-denial) on concerned officers. Such punitive measures are accepted, for instance, in Section 20 of India’s Right to Information Act, 2005, where the review body may impose continuing penalties on any defaulting officer.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Finally</i>, exceptions to disclosure should be finite and time-bound. Any and all information exempted from disclosure should be clearly set out (and not merely as categories of exempted information). Further, all exempted information should be made public after a prescribed period of time (say, 1 year), after which any member of the public may request for the same if it continues to be unavailable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS hopes that ICANN shall deliver on its promise to ensure and enhance its accountability and transparency to the global multi-stakeholder community. To that end, we hope our suggestions may be positively considered.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><strong>Comment repository</strong>:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All comments received by ICANN during the comment period (May 6, 2014 to June 6, 2014) may be found <a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06may14/">at this link</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaIANAInternet GovernanceNETmundialICANNAccountability2014-06-10T13:03:57ZBlog EntryResponse by the Centre for Internet and Society to the Draft Proposal to Transition the Stewardship of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) Functions from the U.S. Commerce Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/response-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-to-the-draft-proposal-to-transition-the-stewardship-of-the-internet-assigned-numbers-authority-iana-functions-from-the-u-s-commerce-department2019s-national-telecommunications-and-information-administration
<b>This proposal was made to the Global Multistakeholder Community on August 9, 2015. The proposal was drafted by Pranesh Prakash and Jyoti Panday. The research assistance was provided by Padmini Baruah, Vidushi Marda, and inputs from Sunil Abraham.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For more than a year now, the customers and operational communities performing key internet functions related to domain names, numbers and protocols have been negotiating the transfer of IANA stewardship. India has dual interests in the ICANN IANA Transition negotiations: safeguarding independence, security and stability of the DNS for development, and promoting an effective transition agreement that internationalizes the IANA Functions Operator (IFO). Last month the IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG) set in motion a public review of its combined assessment of the proposals submitted by the names, numbers and protocols communities. In parallel to the transition of the NTIA oversight, the community has also been developing mechanisms to strengthen the accountability of ICANN and has devised two workstreams that consider both long term and short term issues. This 2 is our response to the consolidated ICG proposal which considers the proposals for the transition of the NTIA oversight over the IFO.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-response-to-draft-proposal-to-transition-the-stewardship-of-the-internet-assigned-numbers-authority-iana-functions-from-the-u-s-commerce-department2019s-national-telecommunications-and-information-administration" class="internal-link">Click to download</a> the submission.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/response-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-to-the-draft-proposal-to-transition-the-stewardship-of-the-internet-assigned-numbers-authority-iana-functions-from-the-u-s-commerce-department2019s-national-telecommunications-and-information-administration'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/response-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-to-the-draft-proposal-to-transition-the-stewardship-of-the-internet-assigned-numbers-authority-iana-functions-from-the-u-s-commerce-department2019s-national-telecommunications-and-information-administration</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshIANAInternet GovernanceIANA Transition2015-11-29T06:35:12ZBlog EntryIANA Transition & ICANN Accountability Process and India' s Position
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/iana-transition-icann-accountability-process-indian-position
<b>Jyoti Panday participated in the workshop organized by CCAOI on "IANA Transition & ICANN Accountability Process and India' s Position" on May 30, 2015. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Dr Ajay Kumar launched the IANA Transition Report and set the context for the workshop. Dr Mahesh Uppal was the moderator of the panel and other participants included Mr Samiran Gupta, ICANN providing an overview of the current status on the transition, Mr Parminder Singh, IT for Change and Mr Rahul Sharma, DSCI sharing concerns of different stakeholders.<br /><br />The panel also saw discussion on issues in the transition process that are of relevance to India and what should their position going forward including ensuring the efficiency of ICANN Functions included in the CWG draft proposal.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS raised issues around financial accountability and the role of ICANN in shaping markets therefore the urgent need for improving transparency and accountability measures.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The report launched at the workshop is <a class="external-link" href="http://www.ccaoi.in/UI/links/fwresearch/Study%20on%20the%20Indian%20Perspective%20on%20IANA%20transition.pdf">available here</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/iana-transition-icann-accountability-process-indian-position'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/iana-transition-icann-accountability-process-indian-position</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiICANNIANAInternet GovernanceIANA Transition2015-08-23T09:26:06ZNews ItemIANA Transition: A Case of the Emperor’s New Clothes?
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/digital-asia-hub-october-6-2016-vidushi-marda-iana-transition
<b>Transparency is key to engaging meaningfully with ICANN. CIS has filed the most number of Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP) requests with ICANN, covering a range of subjects including its relationships with contracted parties, financial disclosure, revenue statements, and harassment policies. Asvatha Babu, an intern at CIS, analysed all responses to our requests and found that only 14% of our requests were answered fully.</b>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The post was published by <a class="external-link" href="https://www.digitalasiahub.org/2016/10/06/iana-transition-a-case-of-emperor-in-new-clothes/?utm_content=buffer48f31&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer">Digital Asia Hub</a> on October 6, 2016.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify;" />
<p style="text-align: justify;">In March 2014, the US Government committed to ending its contract with ICANN to run the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), and also announced that it would hand over control to the “global multistakeholder community”. The conditions for this handover were that the changes must be developed by stakeholders across the globe, with broad community consensus.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Further, it was indicated that any proposal must support and enhance the multistakeholder model; maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet Domain Name System (DNS); meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services and maintain the openness of the Internet. Further, it must not replace the NTIA role with a solution that is government-led or by an inter-governmental organisation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="p1"><span class="s1">These conditions were met, ICANN’s Supporting Organisations (SO’s) and Advisory Committees (ACs) accepted transition proposals, and these proposals were then accepted by the ICANN Board as well, putting the transition in motion. But not quite. The “global multistakeholder community” still had to wait for approval from the NTIA and the US government, both of whom eventually approved the proposal. The latter’s approval was confirmed after considerable uncertainty due to <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/04/05/cruz_slams_dns_overseer_icann_again/"><span class="s2">Senator Ted Cruz</span><span class="s3">’</span><span class="s2">s efforts</span></a> to stop the transition, due to his belief that the transition was an exercise of the US government handing over control of the internet to foreign governments. Notwithstanding this, on 29th September, the US Senate passed a short term bill to keep the US Government funded till the end of the year, without a rider on the IANA transition. The next hurdle was a lawsuit filed in federal court in Texas by the attorney generals of four states to stop the handover of the IANA contract. As on the 30</span><span class="s4"><sup>th</sup></span><span class="s1"> of September, the court <a href="http://www.circleid.com/pdf/iana_hearing_minute_160930.pdf"><span class="s5">denied</span></a> the Plaintiffs’ Application, thus allowing the transition to proceed. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="p1"><span class="s1">What does this transition mean? What does it change? The transition, while a welcome step, leaves much to be desired in terms of tangible change, primarily because it fails to address the most important question, that of ICANN jurisdiction. It is important to have the Internet’s core Domain Name System (DNS) functioning free from the pressures and control of a single country or even a few countries; the transition does not ensure this, as the Post Transition IANA entity (PTI) will be under Californian jurisdiction, just like ICANN was pre-transition. The entire ICANN community has been witness to a single American political figure <a href="https://www.cruz.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=2795"><span class="s5">almost derailing</span></a> its meticulous efforts simply because he could; and in many ways these events cemented the importance of having diversity in terms of legal jurisdiction of ICANN, the PTI and the root zone maintainer.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">My colleague Pranesh Prakash has identified <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo-topic-at-icann"><span class="s5">11 reasons</span></a> why the question of jurisdiction is important to consider during the IANA transition. Some of these issues depend on where ICANN, the PTI and the root zone maintainer are situated, some depend on the location of the office in question and still others depend on contracts that ICANN enters into. ICANN’s new bylaws state that it <em>will be situated in California</em>, the post transition IANA entities bylaws also make a Californian jurisdiction <em>integral</em> to its functioning. As an alternative, the Centre for Internet & Society has called for the “jurisdictional resilience” of ICANN, encompassing three crucial points: legal immunity for core technical operators of Internet functions (as opposed to policymaking venues) from legal sanctions or orders from the state in which they are legally situated, division of core Internet operators among multiple jurisdictions, and jurisdictional division of policymaking functions from technical implementation functions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="p1"><span class="s1">Transparency is also key to engaging meaningfully with ICANN. CIS has filed the most number of Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP) requests with ICANN, covering a range of subjects including its relationships with contracted parties, financial disclosure, revenue statements, and harassment policies. Asvatha Babu, an intern at CIS, analysed all responses to our requests and found that only 14% of our requests were answered fully. 40% of our requests had no relevant answers disclosed at all (these were mostly to do with complaints and contractual compliance). To illustrate the importance of engaging with ICANN transparency, CIS has focused on understanding ICANN’s sources of income since 2014. This is because we believe that conflict of interest can only be properly understood by following the money in a granular fashion. This information was not publicly available, and in fact, it seemed like <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know"><span class="s2">ICANN didn</span><span class="s3">’</span><span class="s2">t know where it got its money from, either</span></a>. It is only through the DIDP process that we were able to <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014"><span class="s5">get ICANN to disclose</span></a> sources of income, and figures along with those sources for a single financial year. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="p1"><span class="s1">ICANN prides itself on being transparent and accountable, but in reality it is not. The most often used exception to avoid answering DIDP requests has been “Confidential business information and/or internal policies and procedures”, which in itself is a testament to ICANN’s opacity. Another condition for non-disclosure allows ICANN to reject answering “Information requests: (i) which are not reasonable; (ii) which are excessive or overly burdensome; (iii) complying with which is not feasible; or (iv) are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual.”. These exemptions are not only vague, they are also extremely subjective: again, demonstrative of the need for enhanced accountability and transparency within ICANN. Key issues have not been addressed even at the time that the transition is formally underway. The grounds for denying DIDP requests are still vague and wide, effectively giving ICANN the discretion to decline answering difficult questions, which is unacceptable from an entity that is at the center of the multi-billion dollar domain name industry. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;" class="p1"><span class="s1">ICANN’s jurisdictional resilience and enhanced accountability are particularly vital for countries in Asia. Its policies, processes and functioning have historically been skewed towards western and industry interests, and ICANN can neither be truly global nor multistakeholder till such countries can engage meaningfully with it in a transparent fashion. The IANA transition is, of course, largely political, and may <em>symbolise </em>a transition to the global multistakeholder community, but in reality, it changes very little, if anything. </span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/digital-asia-hub-october-6-2016-vidushi-marda-iana-transition'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/digital-asia-hub-october-6-2016-vidushi-marda-iana-transition</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiIANAInternet GovernanceIANA Transition2016-11-03T06:20:46ZBlog EntryICANN 57
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-57-hyderabad
<b>ICANN 57 is being hosted by the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology, Government of India from November 3 to 9, 2016 in Hyderabad at Hyderabad International Convention Centre. Vidushi Marda participated in the event as a speaker.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As part of her work for the Cross Community Working Party on ICANN's Corporate and Social Responsibility to Respect Human Rights, Vidushi <a class="external-link" href="https://community.icann.org/display/gnsononcomstake/Meeting+Notes?preview=/53772757/63146891/Presentation%20CCWP%20HR%20ICANN57%20complete%203.pdf">presented her work on the Human Rights Impact of new gTLD Subsequent Procedures</a> in Hyderabad.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s Minister of Law & Justice and Minister of Electronics and Information Technology Ravi Shankar Prasad reiterated India’s commitment to the multistakeholder model during the Opening Ceremony of the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers’ (ICANN’s) 57th Public Meeting. The meeting, also known as ICANN57, is taking place in Hyderabad, India, from November 3 – 9, 2016 and has convened thousands of the global Internet community members (both on-site and remotely) to discuss and develop policies related to the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS). It is hosted by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), with support from the Government of Telangana.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN57 is the first post-IANA stewardship transition public meeting and also the first Annual General Meeting under the new Meetings Strategy. ICANN meetings are held three times a year in different regions to enable attendees from around the world to participate in person. These meetings offer a variety of sessions such as workshops, open forums and working meetings on the development and implementation of Internet policies. ICANN meetings offer the best opportunity for face-to-face discussions and exchange of opinions among attendees dedicated to the continued stable and secure operation of the Domain Name System.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For more info about the event, visit the <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/press-material/release-2016-11-05-en">ICANN website</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-57-hyderabad'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-57-hyderabad</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionICANNIANAInternet Governance2016-11-08T01:14:37ZNews ItemNETmundial Roadmap: Defining the Roles of Stakeholders in Multistakeholderism
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-roadmap-defining-roles-of-stakeholders-in-multistakeholderism
<b>NETmundial, one of the most anticipated events in the Internet governance calendar, will see the global community convening at Sao Paolo, with an aim to establish 'strategic guidelines related to the use and development of the Internet in the world.' This post analyses the submissions at NETmundial that focused on Roadmap, towards an understanding of stakeholder roles in relation to specific governance functions and highlighting the political, technical and architectural possibilities that lie ahead. </b>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><b>Introduction</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A technically borderless Internet, in a world defined by national boundaries, brings many challenges in its wake. The social, ethical and legal standards of all countries are affected by technical standards and procedures, created by a few global players. This disparity in capacity and opportunities to participate and shape Internet policy, fuelled by Edward Snowden's revelations led to the development of the Global Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance or <a href="http://netmundial.br/">NETmundial</a>. Set against, an urgent need for interdisciplinary knowledge assessment towards establishing global guiding principles with respect to the technological architecture and the legal framework of the Internet–NETmundial is seen as a critical step in moving towards a global policy framework for Internet Governance (IG). As stakeholder groups from across the world come together to discuss future forms of governance, one of the most widely discussed issues will be that of Multistakeholderism (MSism).</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><b>Multistakeholderism</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The governance structure of the Multistakeholder model is based on the notion, that stakeholders most impacted by decisions should be involved in the process of decision making. The collaborative multistakeholder spirit has been widely adopted within the Internet Governance fora, with proponents spread across regions and communities involved in the running, management and use of the Internet. So far, MSism has worked well in the coordination of technical networking standards and efforts to set norms and best practices in defined areas, in the realm of technical governance of the Internet. However, the extension of MSism beyond truly voluntary, decentralized and targeted contexts and expanding its applicability, to other substantive areas of Internet Governance is proving a challenge. Beyond defining how the process of policymaking should be undertaken, <a href="http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/networks-and-states">MSism does not provide any guidance on substantive policy issues of Internet governance</a>. With the increasing impact of Internet technology on human lives and framed against the complexity of issues such as security, access and privacy, the consensus on MSism is further rendered unattainable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The need for contextualizing the model aside, as with most policy negotiations certain open concepts and words have also prevented agreement and adoption of MSism as the best way forward for IG. One such open and perhaps, the most contentious issue with respect to the legitimacy of MSism in managing Internet functions is the role of stakeholders. A key element of MSism is that decisions will be made by and including all relevant stakeholders. Stakeholder groups are broadly classified to include governments, technical community and academia, private sector and civil society. With each stakeholder representing diverse and often conflicting interests, creating a consensus process that goes beyond a set of rules and practices promising a seat at the negotiation table and is supportive of broad public interest is a challenging task that needs urgent addressing.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This post aims to add to the discourse on defining the role and scope of stakeholders' decision-making powers, towards a better understanding of the term "in their respective role". Addressing the complexity of functions in managing and running the Internet and the diversity of stakeholders that are affected and hence should be included in decision making, I have limited the scope of my analysis to cover three broad internet management functions:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Technical: Issues related to infrastructure and the management of critical Internet resources</li>
<li>Policy: Issues relating to the developmental aspects, capacity building, bridging digital divide, human rights</li>
<li>Implementation: Issues relating to the use of the Internet including jurisdictional law, legislation spam, network security and cybercrime </li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While this may be an oversimplification of complex and interconnected layers of management and coordination, in my opinion, broad categorisation of issues is necessary, if not an ideal starting point for the purpose of this analysis. I have considered only the submissions categorised under the theme of Roadmap, seeking commonalities across stakeholder groups and regions on the role of stakeholders and their participation in the three broad functions of technology, policy and implementation<b>. </b></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><b>Towards a definition of respective roles: Analysis NETmundial submissions on Roadmap</b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There were a total of 44 submissions specific to Roadmap with civil society (20) contributing more than any other group including academia (7), government (4), technical community (5), private sector (3) and other (5). MSism sees support across most stakeholder groups and many submissions highlight or agree on participation and inclusion in decision making processes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Regionally, submissions from North (24) were dominated by USA (10) with contributions cutting across academia (4), civil society (2), technical community (2) and other (2). Brazil (5) contributed the most to submissions from South (15), followed by Argentina (3). The submissions were consistent with the gender disparity prevalent in the larger technology community with only 12 females contributing submissions. An overwhelming number of submissions (38), thought that the multistakeholder (MS) model needs further definition or improvements, however, suggestions on how best to achieve this varied widely across stakeholders and regional boundaries. Only 16 submissions referenced or suggested Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in its present capacity or with an expanded policy role as a mechanism of implementing MSism on the Internet.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Many submissions referred <b>to issues related to the management of critical internet resources (CIRs)</b>, the role of ICANN and US oversight of IANA functions. A total of 11 submissions referred to or specified governance processes with respect to technical functions and issues related to critical resources with civil society (5) and academia (3) contributing the most. In an area that perhaps has the most direct relevance to their work, the technical community was conspicuous with just two submissions making any concrete recommendations. The European Commission was the only governmental organisation that addressed this issue, recommending an expansion of the role of IGF. There were no specific recommendations from the private sector.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The suggestions on oversight and decision making mechanism were most conflicted for this category of Internet functions and included:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>setting up a technical advisory group, positioned within a new intergovernmental body <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/files/305.pdf">World Internet Organization (WIO)</a> framework;</li>
<li><a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-globalizing-iana-four-principles-and-a-proposal-for-reform-a-submission-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/96">splitting IANA functions</a> into protocol parameters, that Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) will be responsible for and IP address-related functions retained by ICANN </li>
<li>expanding the role of IGF, possibly creating an <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/cybersecurity-related-international-institutions-an-assessment-and-a-framework-for-nations-strategic-policy-choices/264">IGF Secretariat</a></li>
<li>expanding the role of <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem-icann/109">Government Advisory Committee (GAC)</a> to mainstream government representatives participation within supporting organisations, in particular the Generic Name Supporting Organisation (GNRO)</li>
<li>expanding the role of <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/cybersecurity-related-international-institutions-an-assessment-and-a-framework-for-nations-strategic-policy-choices/261">private sector</a> </li>
<li>expanding the role of ICANN with multistakeholder values</li>
<li>expanding the role of <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/internet-ecosystem-naming-and-addressing-shared-global-services-and-operations-and-open-standards-development/243">all stakeholders</a> </li>
<li>implementing changes that <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem-and-the-future-of-the-internet/291">do not necessarily require legislative acts</a> or similar hard law approaches and implementation does not necessitate international treaties or intergovernmental structures</li>
<li>establishing a new non-profit corporation <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-globalizing-iana-four-principles-and-a-proposal-for-reform-a-submission-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/96">DNS Authority (DNSA)</a> combining the IANA Functions and the Root Zone Maintainer roles in </li>
<li>improving <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/evolution-and-internationalization-of-icann/263">transparency and accountability of current bodies</a> managing CIRs</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">16 submissions referred to <b>issues related to policy development and implementation </b>including developmental aspects, capacity building, bridging digital divide and human rights. All submissions called for a reform or further definition of MSism and included recommendations from civil society (5), academia (4), technical community (2), governments (2), private sector (1) and Other (2). All stakeholder groups across regions, unanimously agreed that all stakeholders within their respective role should have a role in decision making and within public policy functions. There was however, no broad consensus on the best way to achieve this.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Specific recommendations and views captured on who should be involved in policy related decision making and what possible frameworks could be developed included:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>improving <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/bottom-up-oversight-in-multistakeholder-organizations/237">existing intergovernmental organizations</a></li>
<li>creating <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmaps-for-further-evolution-of-internet-governance/65">Internet Ad Hoc Group</a> </li>
<li><a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmaps-for-further-evolution-of-internet-governance/65">modularization of ICANN’s functions</a> </li>
<li>creating a <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/one-possible-roadmap-for-iana-evolution/153">stewardship group IETF, ICANN and the RIRs</a></li>
<li>creating an <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/one-possible-roadmap-for-iana-evolution/153">independent IANA</a> as an International NGO with host country agreements governed by its MOUs-defined by the IANA Stewardship Group prior to the signing of MOUs with IANA Partners</li>
<li>creating a <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/democratising-global-governance-of-the-internet/164">'new body'</a> to develop international level public policies in concerned areas; seek appropriate harmonization of national level policies; and facilitate required treaties, conventions and agreements</li>
<li>responsibility of the definition of these policies rests within the <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-future-development-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/196">States as an inalienable right</a></li>
<li><a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/bottom-up-oversight-in-multistakeholder-organizations/237">continuity of bottom-up oversight</a> enables a better view of an organization and thus better accountability as government oversight will destroy multistakeholder character</li>
<li><a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/dsci-submission-on-roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-internet-governance-ecosystem/256">evolving global governance norms</a> that separate DNS maintenance from policies on TLDs, as well as public policies that intersect with nations’ rights to make them</li>
<li><a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/cybersecurity-related-international-institutions-an-assessment-and-a-framework-for-nations-strategic-policy-choices/261">policy makers incrementally develop formal and informal relationships</a></li>
<li><a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/apc-proposals-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/280">dealing with conflict of interest and ensuring pluralism</a></li>
<li><a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/iis-contribution-on-internet-governance-ecosystem-and-roadmap/288">full multi-stakeholder framework</a> including possible establishment of Working Groups where all parties concerned are represented</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">18 submissions referred to <b>issues related to the implementation of standards </b>including issues relating to the use of the Internet including jurisdiction, law, legislation, spam, network security and cybercrime. All submissions called for a reform or further definition of MSism values and included recommendations from civil society (8), academia (3), technical community (3), governments (2), private sector (1) and other (1). Stakeholders from academia (5), civil society (3) and government (1) collectively called for the reform of ICANN guided by multistakeholder values, but did not specify how this reform would be achieved.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Specific recommendations on the improvements of institutional frameworks and arrangements for issues related to implementation of standards included:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>establishment of double system of arbitrage/settlement placed under <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/the-next-best-stage-for-the-future-of-internet-governance-is-democracy/305">World Internet Forum (WIF)</a> scrutiny and under the neutral oversight and arbitrage of the UN general secretariat</li>
<li><a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/from-forum-to-net-nations/292">new legal instruments</a> in establishing MS model need to be adopted</li>
<li>establishment of the <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/democratising-global-governance-of-the-internet/164">Internet Technical Oversight and Advisory Board (ITOAB)</a> replace the US government's current oversight role </li>
<li>multilateral frameworks with <a href="http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/dsci-submission-on-roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-internet-governance-ecosystem/256">oversight role of governments</a> </li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In summation, the classification of Internet functions discussed above, presents a very broad view of complex, dynamic and often, interrelated relationships amongst stakeholder groups. However, even within these very broad categories there are various interpretations of how MSism should evolve.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To come back to the very beginning of this post, NETmundial is an important step towards a global policy framework for Internet governance. This is the first meeting outside formal processes and it is difficult to know what to expect, partly as the expectations are not clear and range widely across stakeholders. Whatever the outcome, NETmundial's real contribution to Internet Governance has been sparking anew, the discourse on multistakeholderism and its application on the Internet through the creation of a spontaneous order amongst diverse actors and providing a common platform for divergent views to come together.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-roadmap-defining-roles-of-stakeholders-in-multistakeholderism'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-roadmap-defining-roles-of-stakeholders-in-multistakeholderism</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiICANNIANAInternet GovernanceNETmundial2014-04-28T12:51:40ZBlog EntryNETmundial Day 2
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-day-2
<b>Fadi Chehade, the ICANN boss, closed NETmundial 2014 with these words "In Africa we say if you want to go first, go alone, but if you want to go far, go together." He should have added: And if you want to go nowhere, go multi-stakeholder.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For all the talk of an inclusive global meeting, there was exactly <span><a href="http://ajantriks.github.io/netmundial/map_no_contrib_govt.html">one governmental submission from the African continent</a></span>, and it was from Tunisia; and the overall rate of submissions from Africa and West Asia were <a href="http://ajantriks.github.io/netmundial/map_no_contrib.html">generally very low</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The outcome document perfectly reflects the gloss that the "multi-stakeholder" model was designed to achieve: an outcome that is celebrated by businesses (and by all embedded institutions like ICANN) for being harmless, met with relief by governments for not upsetting the status quo, all of it lit up in the holy glow of "consensus" from civil society.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Of course there was no consensus. Civil society groups who organised on Day 0 put up their <a href="http://pastebin.com/3uK9KbR0%20">position</a>: the shocking omission of a strong case for net neutrality, ambiguous language on surveillance, weak defences of free expression and privacy. All valid points. But it's striking that civil society takes such a pliant position towards authority: other than exactly two spirited protests (one against the data retention in Marco Civil, and the other against the NSA's mass surveillance program) there was no confrontation, no provocation, no passionate action that would give civil society the force it needs to win. If we were to compare this to other international struggles, the gay rights battle, or its successor, the AIDS medicines movement, for instance - what a difference there is. People fought to crush with powerful, forceful action. Only after huge victories with public and media sympathy, and only after turning themselves into equals of the corporations and governments they were fighting, did they allow themselves to sit down at the table and negotiate nicely. Internet governance fora are marked by politeness and passivity, and perhaps - however sad - it's no wonder that the least powerful groups in these fora always come away disappointed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It's also surprising that there is no language in the outcome document that explicitly addresses the censorious threat posed by the global expansion of a sovereign application of copyright, as seen most vividly in the proposed <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protests_against_SOPA_and_PIPA">SOPA/PIPA</a> legislation in the United States. The outcome document has language that seems to more or less reflect the <a href="http://bestbits.net/netmundial-proposals/">civil society proposal</a>, and it's possible that a generous interpretation of the language could mean that it opposes the selective, restrictive and damaging application of what the intellectual property industries want to accomplish on the Internet. But it's puzzling that the language isn't stronger or more explicit, and even more puzzling that civil society doesn't seem to want to fight for such language.</p>
<p>This seems like an appropriate time to end the multi-stakeholder diaries. <a href="http://ajantriks.github.io/netmundial/track_multistakeholder.html">Hasn't the word been used enough?</a> Here is one last instalment. We thank the kind folks who gave us their time.</p>
<p>Q: What does "multi-stakeholder" mean? What is "multi-stakeholderism"?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>A large part of the discourse prior to the NETmundial conference has been centered around the issue of what is the best structural system to regulate a global network – this has commonly been portrayed as a choice between a multistakeholder system – which broadly speaking, aims to place ‘all stakeholders’ on equal footing – against multilateralism – a recognized concept in International law / the Comity of Nation States, where a nation state is recognized as the representative of its citizens, making decisions on their behalf and in their interests.</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>In our opinion, the issue is not about the dichotomy between multilateralism and multistakeholderism; it is about what functions or issues can legitimately be dealt with through each of the processes in terms of adequately protecting civil liberties and other public interest principles – including the appropriate enforcement of norms. For instance, how do you deal with something like cyber warfare without the consent of states? Similarly, how do we address regulatory issues such as determining (and possibly subsidizing) costs of access, or indeed to protect a right of a country against unilateral disconnection?</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>.....The crux of the matter rests in deciding which is the best governance ‘basket’ to include a particular issue within – taken from both a substantive and enforcement perspective. The challenge is trying to demarcate issues to ensure that each is dealt with effectively by placing it in an appropriate bucket.</i> <i>(The full post can be accessed </i><a href="http://www.knowledgecommons.in/brasil/en/multilateral-and-multistakeholder-responsibilities/">here</a><i>).</i><br /><b>Rishab Bailey</b> from the Society for Knowledge Commons (India)</p>
<p class="PreformattedText" style="text-align: justify; "><i>If I would have signed the campaign </i><a href="http://wepromise.eu/">http://wepromise.eu</a><i> as a candidate to the European Parliament I would have made it an election promise to defend "the principle of multistakeholderism".</i></p>
<p class="PreformattedText" style="text-align: justify; "><i>That means that I "support free, open, bottom-up, and multi-stakeholder models of coordinating the Internet resources and standards - names, numbers, addresses etc" and that I "support measures which seek to ensure the capacity of representative civil society to participate in multi-stakeholder forums." Further, I "oppose any attempts by corporate, governmental or intergovernmental agencies to take control of Internet governance."</i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>My very rudimentary personal view is basically that it's a bad idea to institutionalise conflicting competences.</i><br /><b>Erik Josefsson</b>, Adviser on Internet policies for the Greens/EFA group in the European Parliament</p>
<hr />
<p>And so it <a href="http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf">ends</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-day-2'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-day-2</a>
</p>
No publisherachalICANNIANAInternet GovernanceNETmundial2014-04-25T04:58:26ZBlog EntryNETmundial Day 1
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-day-1
<b>Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff's speech at the opening of NETmundial in São Paulo was refreshingly free of the UN-speak that characterised virtually every single other presentation this morning. The experience of sitting for five hours in a room where the word "multi-stakeholder" is repeated at the rate of five mentions per minute is not for the faint-hearted; it almost makes you wish for more of the straight-talking tough-love of people like Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Surveillance was mentioned by a few brave souls. Two peaceful, silent - and rather effective - protests broke out during the opening speeches; one, against the data retention clause in Brazil's otherwise path-breaking and brand-new law for civil rights on the Internet, Marco Civil, and another for honouring US NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden and urging <a href="https://twitter.com/Lhunthendrix/status/458975285049053184/photo/1">action against surveillance</a>. Sadly for Brazilian civil society, the Marco Civil protestations went unheard, and Rousseff signed the bill into law in full.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There were lots of speeches. Lots. If you missed them, here's a handy <a href="http://ajantriks.github.io/netmundial/word_freq_org_type.html">visualisation</a> you can use to catch up quickly: just add some prepositions and conjunctions, and you'll have a perfectly anodyne and universally acceptable bureaucrat/politician keynote address.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The afternoon was given over to assimilating previously received comments on the <a href="http://document.netmundial.br/">outcome</a> document and adding new ones from people in the room. Much contention, much continuity, lots of hard work, lots of nitpicking (some of it even useful) and lots of ambiguity; after more consultation - the slog goes on until tomorrow afternoon - the outcome document will be laid to rest. Lunch was excellent: there's a reason the Grand Hyatt São Paulo costs as much as it does.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Our quest to plumb the depths of multi-stakeholderism continued: we thank the kind folks who gave us their time and allowed us to record them.</p>
<p>Q: What does "multi-stakeholder" mean? What is "multi-stakeholderism"?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Multi-stakeholderism to me is the ability to engage with every stakeholder and have them in the room, and have them understand that it is not an equal opportunity for all. I also understand that civil society and academia will never be at the same place as business, which has far more resources, or governments, which have the sovereign right to make laws, or even the technical community, which is often missing from the policy dialogue. There are three things which are important to me: (1) Will I be able to make interventions not just in the dialogue but in the decision making process? For me, that is key. (2) Do I have recourse in a process which might be multilateral or inter-governmental - do I have recourse when international treaties are ratified or signed, because they become binding national laws? and (3) What is it that happens to dissent in a process that is not multi-stakeholder? I think even the ITU (the International Telecommunications Union) has taken cognizance of multi-stakeholderism. So it's not new, but it's also not old or accepted, which is why we contest it. We will never have equal stakeholders. And who gets to represent the stakeholder communities? I don't think power imbalances get resolved, and I think it's a deeply flawed process. It's not perfect. But what worries me is the alternative. So give me a better alternative.</i><br /><b>Subi Chaturvedi</b>, Media for Change/ Lady Shriram College (India)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Simply put, multi means many components, and stakeholders are people who have the stakes. So multi-stakeholder means many people who are informed to take the process forward. The process is still on: it's evolving. The idea is that everyone who has an interest should bring it forward, and the dialogue must be balanced. Proof of concept is important - it's not about taking a dogmatic position but a scientific position. Business is concerned about the justification around return on investment.</i><br /><b>Jimson Olufuye</b>, Africa ICT Alliance (Nigeria)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Everyone who has a stake in the use and operation of the Internet should have a stake in the way it is managed. I think we shouldn't be considering this as a power game - it's not winner takes all. Decision making should be as much as possible consensual, where no one has a veto power.</i><br /><b>Getachew Engida</b>, Deputy Director-General, UNESCO (France)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>It is very simple. I think people are complicating matters. It's not a power game. The Internet is fundamentally a global network of interconnected computers. People have become not only consumers of information but providers of information, so the stakes in the media/ICT world are massive. Unprecedented. Therefore, around major issues confronting the Internet, decision making should be as participatory as possible.</i><br /><b>Indrajit Banerjee</b>, Director, UNESCO (France)</p>
<hr />
<p><b>Additional Links</b></p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0KemK8YbHrI">Watch Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff's speech at the opening of NETmundial</a></li>
<li>Follow Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt on <a class="external-link" href="https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/458996103162376193">Twitter</a></li>
</ul>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-day-1'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-day-1</a>
</p>
No publisherachalICANNIANAInternet GovernanceNETmundial2014-04-24T09:02:49ZBlog Entry