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ICANN response to DIDP #31 on diversity
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-response-to-didp-31-on-diversity
<b>This post summarizes the response of ICANN to our inquiry on the diversity of their employees.</b>
<p>The file can be <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/didp-response">found here </a></p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify;">In our <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-31-diversity-of-employees-at-icann">31st DIDP request</a>, we had asked ICANN to disclose information pertaining to the diversity of employees based on their race and citizenship. ICANN states that they are an equal opportunities employer and to ascertain the extent of people from different backgrounds in their ranks, we were hoping to be given the information.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">However the response provided to us did not shed any light on this because of two reasons; firstly, ICANN has this information solely for two countries namely USA and Singapore as legislation in these countries compels employers to record this information. In the US, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that any organization with 100 or more employees have to file an Employer Information Report wherein the employment data is categorized by race/ethnicity/, gender and job category. Whereas in Singapore, information on race is gathered from the employee to assess which Self-Help group fund an employee should contribute to under Singaporean law.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Secondly, for the two countries, they refused to divulge information on the basis of their conditions of nondisclosure. The conditions pertinent here were:</p>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify;">Information provided by or to a government or international organization, or any form of recitation of such information, in the expectation that the information will be kept confidential and/or would or likely would materially prejudice ICANN's relationship with that party.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">Personnel, medical, contractual, remuneration, and similar records relating to an individual's personal information, when the disclosure of such information would or likely would constitute an invasion of personal privacy, as well as proceedings of internal appeal mechanisms and investigations. </li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">Drafts of all correspondence, reports, documents, agreements, contracts, emails, or any other forms of communication </li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><br />We had only enquired about the percentage of representation of employees at each level by their race or citizenship but this was deemed dangerous to disclose by ICANN. They did not volunteer anymore information such as an anonymized data set and hence we will now file a DIDP to ask them for the same.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Given the global and multi-stakeholder nature of the processes at ICANN, it is also of importance that their workforce represents true diversity as well. Their bylaws mandate diversity amongst its Board of Directors and some of its constituent bodies but there is no concrete proof of this being imbibed within their recruitment ICANN also did not think it was necessary to disclose our requested information in the benefit of public interest because it does not outweigh the harm that could be caused by the requested disclosure.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-response-to-didp-31-on-diversity'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-response-to-didp-31-on-diversity</a>
</p>
No publisherAkriti Bopanna and Akash SriramICANNInternet Governance2018-08-21T17:35:06ZBlog EntryIndia's Contribution to Internet Governance Debates
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/nlud-student-law-journal-sunil-abraham-mukta-batra-geetha-hariharan-swaraj-barooah-and-akriti-bopanna-indias-contribution-to-internet-governance-debates
<b>India's Contribution to Internet Governance Debates", an article by Sunil Abraham, Mukta Batra, Geetha Hariharan, Swaraj Barooah and Akriti Bopanna, was recently published in the NLUD Student Law Journal, an annual peer-reviewed journal published by the National Law University, Delhi.</b>
<h2>Abstract</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India is the leader that championed ‘access to knowledge’ and ‘access to medicine’. However, India holds seemingly conflicting views on the future of the Internet, and how it will be governed. India’s stance is evolving and is distinct from that of authoritarian states who do not care for equal footing and multi-stakeholderism.</p>
<hr />
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Introduction</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Despite John Perry Barlow’s defiant and idealistic Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace1 in 1996, debates about governing the Internet have been alive since the late 1990s. The tug-of-war over its governance continues to bubble among states, businesses, techies, civil society and users. These stakeholders have wondered who should govern the Internet or parts of it: Should it be the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)? The International Telecommunications Union (ITU)? The offspring of the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) - the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) or Enhanced Cooperation (EC) under the UN? Underlying this debate has been the role and power of each stakeholder at the decision-making table.States in both the global North and South have taken various positions on this issue.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Whether all stakeholders ought to have an equal say in governing the unique structure of the Internet or do states have sovereign public policy authority? India has, in the past, subscribed to the latter view. For instance, at WSIS in 2003, through Arun Shourie, then India’s Minister for Information Technology, India supported the move ‘requesting the Secretary General to set up a Working Group to think through issues concerning Internet Governance,’ offering him ‘considerable experience in this regard... [and] contribute in whatever way the Secretary General deems appropriate’. The United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and New Zealand have expressed their support for ‘equal footing multi-stakeholderism’ and Australia subscribes to the status quo.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s position has been much followed, discussed and criticised. In this article, we trace and summarise India’s participation in the IGF, UN General Assembly (‘UNGA’), ITU and the NETmundial conference (April 2014) as a representative sample of Internet governance fora. In these fora, India has been represented by one of three arms of its government: the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY), the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The DeitY was converted to a full-fledged ministry in 2016 known as the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY). DeitY and DoT were part of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) until 2016 when it was bifurcated into the Ministry of Communications and MeitY.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">DeitY used to be and DoT still is, within the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) in India. Though India has been acknowledged globally for championing ‘access to knowledge’ and ‘access to medicine’ at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and World Trade Organization (WTO), global civil society and other stakeholders have criticised India’s behaviour in Internet governance for reasons such as lack of continuity and coherence and for holding policy positions overlapping with those of authoritarian states.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We argue that even though confusion about the Indian position arises from a multiplicity of views held within the Indian government, India’s position, in totality, is distinct from those of authoritarian states. Since criticism of the Indian government became more strident in 2011, after India introduced a proposal at the UNGA for a UN Committee on Internet-related Policies (CIRP) comprising states as members, we will begin to trace India's position chronologically from that point onwards.</p>
<hr />
<ul>
<li> Download the paper published in NLUD Student Law Journal <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/indias-contribution-to-internet-governance-debates/">here</a></li>
<li>For a timeline of the events described in the article <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/indias-position-on-multi-stakeholderism-vs-multilateralism">click here</a></li>
<li>Read the paper published by NLUD Student Law Journal <a class="external-link" href="https://nludslj.webs.com/archives">on their website</a></li>
</ul>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/nlud-student-law-journal-sunil-abraham-mukta-batra-geetha-hariharan-swaraj-barooah-and-akriti-bopanna-indias-contribution-to-internet-governance-debates'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/nlud-student-law-journal-sunil-abraham-mukta-batra-geetha-hariharan-swaraj-barooah-and-akriti-bopanna-indias-contribution-to-internet-governance-debates</a>
</p>
No publisherSunil Abraham, Mukta Batra, Geetha Hariharan, Swaraj Barooah and Akriti BopannaFreedom of Speech and ExpressionICANNInternet GovernancePrivacy2018-08-16T15:38:02ZBlog EntryDIDP #31 Diversity of employees at ICANN
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-31-diversity-of-employees-at-icann
<b>We have requested ICANN to disclose information pertaining to the diversity of employees based on race and citizenship.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">This data is being requested to verify ICANN’s claim of being an equal opportunities employer. ICANN’s employee handbook states that they “...provide equal opportunities and are committed to the principle of equality regardless of race, colour, ethnic or national origin, religious belief, political opinion or affiliation, sex, marital status, sexual orientation, gender reassignment, age or disability.” The data on the diversity of employees based on race and nationality of their employees will depict how much they have stuck to their commitment to delivering equal opportunities to personnel in ICANN and potential employees.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The request filed by CIS can be <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/didp-request">accessed here</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-31-diversity-of-employees-at-icann'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-31-diversity-of-employees-at-icann</a>
</p>
No publisherAkash SriramFreedom of Speech and ExpressionICANNInternet Governance2018-08-21T09:26:48ZBlog EntryICANN Diversity Analysis
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-diversity-analysis
<b>The by-laws of The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) state that it is a non-profit public-benefit corporation which is responsible at the overall level, for the coordination of the “global internet's systems of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the internet's unique identifier systems”. As key stakeholders of ICANN are spread across the world, much of the communication discussing the work of ICANN takes place over email. This analysis of the diversity of participation at the ICANN processes, through a study of their mailing lists, was undertaken by Paul Kurian and Akriti Bopanna.</b>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The by-laws of The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) state that it is a non-profit public-benefit corporation which is responsible at the overall level, for the coordination of the “global internet's systems of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the internet's unique identifier systems”.<a href="#_ftn1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a>Previously, this was overseen by the Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) under a US Government contract but in 2016, the oversight was handed over to ICANN, as a global multi-stakeholder body.<a href="#_ftn2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> Given the significance of the multistakeholder nature of ICANN, it is imperative that stakeholders continue to question and improve the inclusiveness of its processes. The current blog post seeks to focus on the diversity of participation at the ICANN process.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">As stakeholders are spread across the world, much of the communication discussing the work of ICANN takes place over email. Various [or X number of ] mailing lists inform members of ICANN activities and are used for discussions between them from policy advice to organizational building matters. Many of these lists are public and hence can be subscribed to by anyone and also can be viewed by non-members through the archives.</p>
<p>CIS analysed the five most active mailing lists amongst the working group mailing lists from January 2016 to May 2018, namely:</p>
<ol><li>Outreach & Engagement,</li>
<li>Technology,</li>
<li>At-Large Review 2015 - 2019,</li>
<li>IANA Transition & ICANN Accountability, and</li>
<li>Finance & Budget mailing lists.</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We looked at the diversity among these active participants by focusing on their gender, stakeholder grouping and region. In order to arrive at the data, we referred to public records such as the Statement of Interests which members have to give to the Generic Names Supporting Organization(GNSO) Council if they want to participate in their working groups. We also used, where available, ICANN Wiki and the LinkedIn profiles of these participants. Given below are some of the observations we made subsequent to surveying the data. We acknowledge that there might be some inadvertent errors made in the categorization of these participants, but are of the opinion that our inference from the data would not be drastically affected by a few errors.</p>
<h4>The following findings were observed:</h4>
<ul>
<li>A total of 218 participants were present on the 5 mailing lists that were looked at.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">Of these,, 92 were determined to be active participants (participants who had sent more than the median number of mails in their working group) out of which 75 were non-staff members. </li></ul>
<h4>Among the active non-staff participants:</h4>
<ul>
<li>Out of the 75 participants, <strong>56</strong> (<strong>74.7%</strong>) were male and <strong>19</strong> (<strong>25.3%</strong>) were female.<br /><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/Gender.png" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="Gender" /><br /><br /><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/StakeholderGroup.png" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="Stakeholder Group" /></li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><strong>57.3%</strong> were identified to be members of the industry and technological community and 1.3% were identified as government representatives. 8.0% were representatives from Academia, 25.3% represented civil society and the remaining 8.0% were from fields that were uncategorizable with respect to the above, but were related to law and consultancy.<br /><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/Region.png" alt="null" class="image-inline" title="Region" /></li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">Only 14.7% of the participants were from Asia while the majority belonged to Africa and then North America with 24% and 22.7% participation respectively</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">Within Asia, we identified only one active participant from China.</li></ul>
<h3>Concerns</h3>
<ul>
<li>The vast number of the people participating and as an extension, influencing ICANN work are male constituting three fourth of the participants.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">The mailing list are dominated by individuals from industry.. This coupled with the relative minority presence of the other stakeholders creates an environment where concerns emanating from other sections of the society could be overshadowed.</li>
<li>Only 14.7% of the participants were from Asia, which is concerning since 48.7% of internet users worldwide belong to Asia.<a href="#_ftn1"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a></li>
<li>China which has the world’s largest population of internet users (700 million people)<a href="#_ftn2"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> had only one active participant on these mailing lists.</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;">ICANN being a global multistakeholder organization should ideally have the number of representatives from each region be proportionate to the number of internet users in that region. In addition to this, participation of women on these mailing lists need to increase to ensure that there is inclusive contribution in the functioning of the organization. We did not come across any indication of participation of individuals of non binary genders.</p>
<hr align="left" size="1" width="100%" />
<p><a href="#_ftnref1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a> https://cis-india.org/telecom/knowledge-repository-on-internet-access/icann</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a> https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2016-10-01-en</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a> https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-diversity-analysis'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann-diversity-analysis</a>
</p>
No publisherakritiICANNFeaturedHomepageInternet Governance2018-08-29T11:19:46ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #30 - Employee remuneration structure at ICANN
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-30-enquiry-about-the-employee-pay-structure-at-icann
<b>We have requested ICANN to disclose the employee pay structure at ICANN with specific enquiries about the payment across the institutional hierarchy, gender, and region.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We have requested ICANN to disclose information pertaining to the income of each employee based on the following grounds. We had hoped this information will increase ICANN's transparency regarding their remuneration policies however ths was not the case, they either referred to their earlier documents who do not have concrete information or stated that the relevant documents were not in their possession. Their response to the respective questions were:</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Average salary across designations</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">ICANN responded by referring to their FY18 Remuneration Practices document which states, “ICANN uses a global compensation expert consulting firm to provide comprehensive benchmarking market data (currently Willis Towers Watson, Mercer and Radford). The market study is conducted before the salary review process. Estimates of potential compensation adjustments typically are made during the budgeting process based on current market data. The budget is then approved as part of ICANN’s overall budget planning process.”</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Average salary for female and male employees</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">ICANN responded by saying “ICANN org’s remuneration philosophy and practice is not based upon gender” which is why they said that they have “no documentary information in ICANN org’s possession, custody or control that is responsive to this request.” However, the exact average salaries of female and male employees was not provided nor any information that could that could give us an idea as to whether the remuneration of their employees was in accordance with the above claim.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Bonuses - frequency at which it is given and upon what basis</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">ICANN responded by referring to “Discretionary At-Risk Component” section in their FY18 Remuneration Practices document which states,”The amount of at-risk pay an individual can earn is based on a combination of both the achievement of goals as well as the behaviors exhibited in achieving those goals… The Board has approved a framework whereby those with ICANN Org are eligible to earn an at-risk payment of up to 20 percent of base compensation as at-risk payment based on role and level in the organization, with certain senior executives eligible for up to 30 percent.” The duration over which the employees are eligible to receive an “at-risk” payment was given to be “twice a year".</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Average salary across regions for the same region</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">ICANN responded by saying,”compensation may vary across the regions based on currency differences, the availability of positions in a given region, market conditions, as well as the type of positions that are available in a given region. “ They also added that they have no documentary information in their possession, custody or control that is responsive to this request.</p>
<hr />
<p>The request filed by Paul Kurian may be <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/didp-request-30">found here</a>. ICANN's response can be <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/icann-response-to-kurian">read here</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-30-enquiry-about-the-employee-pay-structure-at-icann'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-30-enquiry-about-the-employee-pay-structure-at-icann</a>
</p>
No publisherPaul Kurian and Akriti BopannaICANNInternet Governance2018-08-24T06:57:39ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #29 - Revenue breakdown by source for FY 2017
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-29-revenue-breakdown-by-source-for-fy-2017
<b>We requested ICANN for financial information they have not yet provided for the period ending June 2017.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">ICANN publication of its financial records for 2017 were missing a crucial document which lists down their revenue as per the all the legal entities as sources who contributed to it including Regional Internet Registries, various registrars and their source of origin among other details. We have requested them for this document in order to get a better idea of the how these entities contribute to ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In response to our DIDP, ICANN notified us that they are in the process of compiling this report for the year ending June 2017 and will publish the same by 31st of May, 2018. Further they remarked that this procedure of making public their revenue by source was developed as part of ICANN’s enhancements to transparency in response to CIS’s earlier DIDP which was submitted in 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The said report will be published on their Financial page within the time frame mentioned.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-29-revenue-breakdown-by-source-for-fy-2017'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-29-revenue-breakdown-by-source-for-fy-2017</a>
</p>
No publisherakritiICANNInternet Governance2018-04-26T11:06:16ZBlog EntryICANN 61 Readout
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-61-readout
<b>Akriti Bopanna attended an ICANN61 Readout session on the 19th of April at the International Institute of Information Technology at Electronic City in Bengaluru. </b>
<p>Click to read the agenda <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/icann-61-agenda">here</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-61-readout'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/icann-61-readout</a>
</p>
No publisherAdminICANNInternet Governance2018-05-05T09:18:03ZNews ItemAnalysis of ICANN revenue shows ambiguity in their records
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-of-icann-financials-from-2012-2016
<b>We, The Centre for Internet and Society, have been instrumental in having ICANN become transparent about their revenue with our persistent requests for their sources of revenue. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Click to <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/icann-analysis">download</a> a PDF of the Analysis</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify;">In 2014, CIS' Sunil Abraham demanded greater financial transparency of ICANN at both the Asia Pacific IGF and the ICANN Open Forum at the IGF. Later that year, CIS was provided with a list of ICANN's sources of revenue for the financial year 2014, including payments from registries, registrars, sponsors, among others, by ICANN India Head Mr. Samiran Gupta.This was a big step for CIS and the Internet community, as before this, no details on granular income had ever been publicly divulged by ICANN on request.<a name="_ftnref1"><sup>1</sup></a> Our efforts have resulted in this information now being publicly available from the years 2012 onwards. We then decided to analyze all these years of financial data collaborating with Ashoka fellow Arjun Venkatraman and following are our observations:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To get a clear picture of ICANN's revenue, it can be seen that over the years it has been growing steadily. In 2016 it was 1.7 times the revenue it made in 2012.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/icann1.jpg" alt="ICANN's total revenue from 2012 to 2016" class="image-inline" title="ICANN's total revenue from 2012 to 2016" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">A breakdown by country reveals that a significantly higher proportion of their revenue is from sources registered in the United States.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/icann2.jpg" alt="Country wise contribution to ICANN revenue" class="image-inline" title="Country wise contribution to ICANN revenue" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">It is also interesting to note that revenue from China has seen a spike in the past 2 years, especially in the period of 2015-2016. Verisign CEO, James Bidzos confirmed in an interview to analysts that Chinese activity had surprised them as well though they expected the activity to slow down in the second quarter of 2016.<a name="_ftnref2"><sup>2</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/icann3.jpg" alt="Country wise contribution without USA" class="image-inline" title="Country wise contribution without USA" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Verisign also happens to be the top paying customer for ICANN every year, running the .com/.net names. Their payments are orders of magnitude greater than payments made by any other single entity or even several collective entities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/icann4.jpg" alt="Highest contributing individual entities" class="image-inline" title="Highest contributing individual entities" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">ICANN differentiates its sources of revenues by each class of entity which stand for the following:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify;">
<li>RYN - Registry</li>
<li>OTH - Other</li>
<li>RYG - Registry</li>
<li>RIR - Regional Internet Registry</li>
<li>RYC - ccTLD (Top Level Domains)</li>
<li>IDN - Internationalized Domain Names</li>
<li>RAR - Registrar</li>
<li>SPN - Sponsor</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/icann5.jpg" alt="Contribution of entities by class" class="image-inline" title="Contribution of entities by class" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><span style="text-align: justify;">It is evident that the Registries and Registrars contribute the most to revenue however the classification of these groups in itself is ambiguous. RYG and RYN both stand for registry but we do not find any explanation given for the double entry for a single group. Secondly, Sponsors are included yet it is unclear how they have sponsored ICANN, whether through travel and accommodation of personnel or any other mode of institutional sponsorship. The Regional Internet Registries are clubbed under one heading and as a consequence it is not possible to determine individual RIR contribution such as how much did APNIC pay for the Asia and Pacific region. The total payment made by RIRs is a small fraction of the payments made by many other entities and they all pay through the Numbers Resources Organization (NRO), who is listed as paying from Uruguay however the MOU creating the NRO does not specify their location as being there. The NRO website states that " </span><em> RIRs may be audited by external parties with regards to their financial activities or their operations. RIRs may also allow third parties to report security incidents with regards to their services." </em><span style="text-align: justify;"> </span><a name="_ftnref3"><sup>3</sup></a><span style="text-align: justify;"> Their records show that financial disclosure is done in an inconsistent manner with the last publication from AFRINIC being for the year 2013 </span><a name="_ftnref4"><sup>4</sup></a><span style="text-align: justify;"> while the RIPE NCC who coordinates the area of Central Europe, Middle East and Russia last published an annual report for the year 2016 but had no financial information in it. </span><a name="_ftnref5"><sup>5</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The most frequently found words in their sources which can give us an idea of the structure of the contributing entity yields the following result.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/icann6.jpg" alt="Different structures of the sources" class="image-inline" title="Different structures of the sources" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Several clients have registered multiple corporate entities to increase their payments to ICANN such as DropCatch, Everest and Camelot. <a name="_ftnref6"><sup>6</sup></a> The first of them, DropCatch, is a domain drop catcher, essentially selling expired domain names to the highest bidder. By the end of 2016, about 43% of all ICANN-accredited registrars were controlled by them. <a name="_ftnref7"><sup>7</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Many clients have reported themselves from different countries over the years as well such as 'Verisign Sarl' which has been reported as originating from Switzerland and in a different year from the United States. <a name="_ftnref8"><sup>8</sup></a> Another curious case is of the entity, 'Afilias plc', which when categorized as a sponsor (SPN) is reported from Ireland however as a registry (both RYG and RYN) is reported from the United States. Some entities have originated from one place such as the United Arab Emirates and then moved to other countries such as India.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">To summarize, the key takeaways from the information we have dissected so far are:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">- ICANN's revenue has been steadily increasing with the 2016 seeing a 1.6 times increase of its revenue generated in 2012.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">- United States is the country that most of the revenue originates from.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">- After the US, China is now the largest contribution to ICANN revenue, significantly increase their contributions from 2015.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">- Verisign is the top contributing entity, their contribution much greater than other entities.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">- Registries and Registrars are the main sources of revenue though there is ambiguity as to the classifications provided by ICANN such as the difference between RYG and RYN. The mode of contribution of sponsors exactly is not highlighted either.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">- Several entities have been listed from different places in different years, sometimes depending on the role they have played such as whether they are a sponsor or registry. Registering multiple corporate entities to acquire more registrars has occurred as well.</p>
<hr style="text-align: justify;" />
<div id="_ftnref1" style="text-align: justify;">
<p>1<a name="_ftn1"></a>. Venkataraman, P. (2017). <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis2019-efforts-towards-greater-financial-disclosure-by-icann"><em>CIS' Efforts Towards Greater Financial Disclosure by ICANN</em> .</a> [online] The Centre for Internet and Society.[Accessed 14 Mar. 2018].</p>
</div>
<div id="_ftnref2" style="text-align: justify;">
<p>2<a name="_ftn2"></a>. Murphy, K. (2016). <a href="http://domainincite.com/20361-verisign-has-great-quarter-but-sees-china-growth-slowing"><em> Verisign has great quarter but sees China growth slowing | Domain Incite - Domain Name Industry News, Analysis & Opinion </em></a> . [online] DomainIncite. [Accessed 14 Mar. 2018].</p>
</div>
<div id="_ftnref3" style="text-align: justify;">
<p>3<a name="_ftn3"></a>. Nro.net. (2018). <a href="https://www.nro.net/about-the-nro/rir-accountability/"><em> RIR Accountability Questions and Answers | The Number Resource Organization </em> </a>. [online] [Accessed 11 Mar. 2018].</p>
</div>
<div id="_ftnref4" style="text-align: justify;">
<p><a name="_ftn4"></a> 4. <a class="external-link" href="https://www.afrinic.net/images/AFRINIC_Auditors_Report_2013.pdf">African Network Information Centre - Annual Report</a></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftnref5" style="text-align: justify;">
<p>5.<a name="_ftn5"></a> <a class="external-link" href="https://www.ripe.net/participate/meetings/gm/meetings/may-2017/supporting-documents/ripe-ncc-annual-report-2016.pdf">RIPE Network Coordination Centre Annual Report 2016</a></p>
</div>
<div id="_ftnref6" style="text-align: justify;">
<p>6.<a name="_ftn6"></a> Murphy, K. (2016). <a href="http://domainincite.com/21309-dropcatch-spends-millions-to-buy-five-hundred-more-registrars"> DropCatch spends millions to buy FIVE HUNDRED more registrars | Domain Incite - Domain Name Industry News, Analysis & Opinion </a> . [online] DomainIncite.[Accessed 13 Mar. 2018].</p>
</div>
<div id="_ftnref7" style="text-align: justify;">
<p>7.<a name="_ftn7"></a> Id</p>
</div>
<div id="_ftnref8" style="text-align: justify;">
<p style="text-align: justify;">8.<a name="_ftn8"></a> Detailed list is available on request</p>
</div>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-of-icann-financials-from-2012-2016'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-of-icann-financials-from-2012-2016</a>
</p>
No publisherSunil Abraham, Arjun Venkatraman and Akriti BopannaICANNInternet Governance2018-04-27T10:01:26ZBlog EntryWhy Presumption of Renewal is Unsuitable for the Current Registry Market Structure
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure
<b>With the recent and much protested renewal of the .net legacy Top-Level-Domain (TLD), the question of the appropriate method of renewal has again come to the forefront. While this seems relatively uncontroversial to most, Padma Venkataraman, a law student and intern at CIS looks at presumptive renewal through a critical lens. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">With the recent renewal of the .net legacy Top-Level-Domain (TLD), the question of the appropriate method of renewal is worth reconsidering. When we talk about presumption of renewal for registry agreements, it means that the agreement has a reasonable renewal expectancy at the end of its contractual term. According to the current base registry agreement, it shall be renewed for 10-year periods, upon expiry of the initial (and successive) term, unless the operator commits a fundamental and material breach of the operator’s covenants or breach of its payment obligations to ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure">Download the entire blog post here</a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/why-presumption-of-renewal-is-unsuitable-for-the-current-registry-market-structure</a>
</p>
No publisherPadma VenkataramanICANNTransparencyInternet GovernanceAccountability2017-10-31T02:53:26ZBlog EntryCIS’ Efforts Towards Greater Financial Disclosure by ICANN
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis2019-efforts-towards-greater-financial-disclosure-by-icann
<b>CIS has been working towards enhancing transparency and accountability at ICANN since 2014. While initial efforts have resulted in ICANN revealing its sources of income in a granular fashion in 2015, we are yet to see this level of transparency become a default approach within ICANN. Here, Padma Venkataraman chronologically maps CIS’ efforts at enhancing financial transparency and accountability at ICANN, while providing an outline of what remains to be done. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>With the $135 million sale of .web,<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a> the much protested renewal of the .net agreement<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><span>[2]</span></sup></a> and the continued annual increase in domain name registrations,<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><span>[3]</span></sup></a> among other things, it is no surprise that there are still transparency and accountability concerns within the ICANN Community. CIS, as part of its efforts to examine the functioning of ICANN’s accountability mechanisms, has filed many DIDP requests till date, in a bid for greater transparency of the organisation’s sources of revenues.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>1.Efforts towards disclosure of revenue break-up by ICANN</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>- 2014</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>- 2015</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>- 2017</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>2.The need for granularity regarding historical revenues</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>-----</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>1.Efforts towards disclosure of revenue break-up by ICANN</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>- 2014</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In 2014, CIS’ Sunil Abraham demanded greater financial transparency of ICANN at both the Asia Pacific IGF and the ICANN Open Forum at the IGF. Later that year, CIS was provided with a list of ICANN’s sources of revenue for the financial year 2014, including payments from registries, registrars, sponsors, among others, by ICANN India Head Mr. Samiran Gupta.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><span>[4]</span></sup></a> This was a big step for CIS and the Internet community, as before this, no details on granular income had ever been publicly divulged by ICANN on request.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>However, as no details of historical revenue had been provided, CIS filed a DIDP request in December 2014, seeking financial disclosure of revenues for the years 1999 to 2014, in a detailed manner - similar to the 2014 report that had been provided.<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><span>[5]</span></sup></a> It sought a list of individuals and entities who had contributed to ICANN’s revenues over the mentioned time period.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In its response, ICANN stated that it possessed no documents in the format that CIS had requested, that is, it had no reports that broke down domain name income and revenue received by each legal entity and individual.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup><span>[6]</span></sup></a> It stated that as the data for years preceding 2012 were on a different system, compiling reports of the raw data for these years would be time-consuming and overly burdensome. ICANN denied the request citing this specific provision for non-disclosure of information under the DIDP.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup><span>[7]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>- 2015</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In July 2015, CIS filed a request for disclosure of raw data regarding granular income for the years 1999 to 2014.<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup><span>[8]</span></sup></a> ICANN again said that it would be a huge burden ‘to access and review all the raw data for the years 1999 to 2014 in order to identify the raw data applicable to the request’.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup><span>[9]</span></sup></a> However, it mentioned its commitment to preparing detailed reports on a go-forward basis - all of which would be uploaded on its Financials page.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup><span>[10]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>- 2017</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>To follow up on ICANN’s commitment to granularity, CIS sought a detailed report on historical data for income and revenue contributions from domain names for FY 2015 and FY 2016 in June 2017.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup><span>[11]</span></sup></a> In its reply, ICANN stated that the Revenue Detail by Source reports for the last two years would be out by end July and that the report for FY 2012 would be out by end September.<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup><span>[12]</span></sup></a> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b><span>2.The need for granularity regarding historical revenues</span></b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In 2014, CIS asked for disclosure of a list of ICANN’s sources of revenue and detailed granular income for the years 1999 to 2014. ICANN published the first but cited difficulty in preparing reports of the second. In 2015, CIS again sought detailed reports of historical granular revenue for the same period, and ICANN again denied disclosure claiming that it was burdensome to handle the raw data for those years. However, as ICANN agreed to publish detailed reports for future years, CIS recently asked for publication of reports for the FYs 2012, 2015 and 2016. Reports for these three years were uploaded according to the timeline provided by ICANN.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>CIS appreciates ICANN’s cooperation with its requests and is grateful for their efforts to make the reports for FYs 2012 to 2016 available (and on a continued basis). However, it is important that detailed information of historical revenue and income from domain names for the years 1999 to 2014 be made publicly available. It is also crucial that consistent accounting and disclosure practices are adopted and made known to the Community, in order to avoid omissions of statements such as Detail Revenue by Source and Lobbying Disclosures, among many others, in the annual reports - as has evidently happened for the years preceding 2012. This is necessary to maintain financial transparency and accountability, as an organisation’s sources of revenues can inform the dependant Community about why it functions the way it does. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>It will also allow more informed discussions about problems that the Community has faced in the past and continues to struggle with. For example, while examining problems such as ineffective market competition or biased screening processes for TLD applicants, among others, this data can be useful in assessing the long-term interests, motives and influences of different parties involved.</span></p>
<hr />
<p> </p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-07-28-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-07-28-en</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup><span>[2]</span></sup></a><span> Report of Public Comment Proceeding on the .net Renewal. </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/report-comments-net-renewal-13jun17-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/report-comments-net-renewal-13jun17-en.pdf</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup><span>[3]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/cct-metrics-domain-name-registration-2016-06-27-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/cct-metrics-domain-name-registration-2016-06-27-en</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><sup><span>[4]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014"><span>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><sup><span>[5]</span></sup></a><span> DIDP <span>Request no - 20141222-1, </span>22 December 2014. </span><a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2"><span>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-2</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><sup><span>[6]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-21jan15-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-21jan15-en.pdf</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><sup><span>[7]</span></sup></a><span> Defined Conditions for Non-Disclosure - <span>Information requests: (i) which are not reasonable; (ii) which are excessive or overly burdensome; (iii) complying with which is not feasible; or (iv) are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual.</span></span></p>
<p><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><sup><span>[8]</span></sup></a><span> DIDP <span>Request no - 20150722-2, 22 July 2015. </span></span><a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-12-revenues"><span>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-12-revenues</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><sup><span>[9]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-2-21aug15-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-2-21aug15-en.pdf</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><sup><span>[10]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-2-21aug15-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-response-20150722-2-21aug15-en.pdf</span></a><span>; </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/financials-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/financials-en</span></a></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><sup><span>[11]</span></sup></a><span> DIDP Request No. 20170613-1, 14 June 2017. </span></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><sup><span>[12]</span></sup></a> <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-20170613-1-marda-obo-cis-response-13jul17-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/didp-20170613-1-marda-obo-cis-response-13jul17-en.pdf</span></a></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis2019-efforts-towards-greater-financial-disclosure-by-icann'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis2019-efforts-towards-greater-financial-disclosure-by-icann</a>
</p>
No publisherPadma VenkataramanICANNTransparencyInternet GovernanceAccountability2017-10-31T02:10:11ZBlog EntryICANN’s Problems with Accountability and the .WEB Controversy
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy
<b>The Post-Transition IANA promised enhanced transparency and accountability to the global multistakeholder community. The series of events surrounding the .WEB auction earlier this year has stirred up issues relating to the lack of transparency and accountability of ICANN. This post examines the .WEB auction as a case study to better understand exact gaps in accountability.</b>
<h2>Chronological Background of the .WEB Auction</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In June 2012, ICANN launched a new phase for the creation and operation of Generic Top-Level Domains (gTLDs). After confirming the eligibility of seven applicants for the rights of the .WEB domain name, ICANN placed them in a string contention set (a group of applications with similar or identical applied for gTLDs).<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>[<i>Quick Note</i>: ICANN procedure encourages the resolving of this contention set by voluntary settlement amongst the contending applicants (also referred to as a private auction), wherein individual participation fees of US $185,000 go to ICANN and the auction proceeds are distributed among the bidders. If a private auction fails, the provision for a last resort auction conducted by ICANN is invoked - here the total auction proceeds go to ICANN along with the participation fees.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><span>[2]</span></sup></a>]</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In June 2016, NuDotCo LLC, a bidder that had previously participated in nine private auctions without any objection, withdrew its consent to the voluntary settlement. Ruby Glen LLC, another bidder, contacted NDC to ask if it would reconsider its withdrawal, and was made aware of changes in NDC’s Board membership, financial position, management and a potential change in ownership, by NDC’s Chief Financial Officer.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><span>[3]</span></sup></a> Concerned about the transparency of the auction process, Ruby Glen requested ICANN to postpone the auction on June 22, in order to investigate the discrepancies between NDC’s official application and its representation to Ruby Glen.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><span>[4]</span></sup></a> The Vice President of ICANN’s gTLD Operations and the independent ICANN Ombudsman led separate investigations, both of which were limited to few e-mails seeking NDC’s confirmation of status quo. On the basis of NDC’s denial of any material changes, ICANN announced that the auction would proceed as planned, as no grounds had been found for its postponement.<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><span>[5]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>On July 27, NDC’s winning bid – USD 135 million – beat the previous record by $90 million, <i>doubling ICANN’s total net proceeds</i> from the past fifteen auctions it had conducted.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup><span>[6]</span></sup></a> Soon after NDC’s win, Verisign, Inc., the market giant that owns the .com and .net domain names, issued a public statement that it had used NDC as a front for the auction, and that it had been involved in its funding from the very beginning. Verisign agreed to transfer USD 130 million to NDC, allowing the latter to retain a $5 million stake in .WEB.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup><span>[7]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Ruby Glen LLC filed for an injunction against the transfer of .WEB rights to NDC, and sought expedited discovery<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup><span>[8]</span></sup></a> against ICANN and NDC in order to gather evidentiary support for the temporary restraining order.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup><span>[9]</span></sup></a> Donuts Inc., the parent company of Ruby Glen, simultaneously filed for recovery of economic loss due to negligence, fraud and breach of bylaws among other grounds, and Affilias, the second highest bidder, demanded that the .WEB rights be handed over by ICANN.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup><span>[10]</span></sup></a> Furthermore, at ICANN57, Affilias publicly brought up the issue in front of ICANN’s Board, and Verisign followed with a rebuttal. However, ICANN’s Board refused to comment on the issue at that point as the matter was still engaged in ongoing litigation.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup><span>[11]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<h2>Issues Regarding ICANN’s Assurance of Accountability</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Post-Transition IANA promised enhanced transparency and accountability to the global multistakeholder community. The series of events surrounding the .WEB auction has stirred up issues relating to the lack of transparency and accountability of ICANN. ICANN’s arbitrary enforcement of policies that should have been mandatory, with regard to internal accountability mechanisms, fiduciary responsibilities and the promotion of competition, has violated Bylaws that obligate it to operate ‘consistently, neutrally, objectively, and fairly, without singling out any particular party for discriminatory treatment’.<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup><span>[12]</span></sup></a> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Though the US court ruled in favour of ICANN, the discrepancies that were made visible with regard to ICANN’s differing emphasis on procedural and substantive compliance with its rules and regulations, have forced the community to acknowledge that corporate strategies, latent interests and financial advantages undermine ICANN’s commitment to accountability. The approval of NDC’s ridiculously high bid with minimal investigation or hesitation, even after Verisign’s takeover, signifies pressing concerns that stand in the way of a convincing commitment to accountability, such as:</span></p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Lack of Substantive Fairness and Accountability at ICANN (A Superficial Investigation)</span></li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN’s Sketchy Tryst with Legal Conformity</span></li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Financial Accountability of ICANN’s Auction Proceeds</span></li>
</ol> <ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>The Lack of Substantive Fairness and Accountability in its Screening Processes: </span></span></li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Ruby Glen’s claim that ICANN conducted a cursory investigation of NDC’s misleading and unethical behaviour brought to light the ease and arbitrariness with which applications are deemed valid and eligible. </span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Disclosure of Significant Details Unique to Applicant Profiles:</span></span></i> <span>In the initial stage, applications for the gTLD auctions require disclosure of background information such as proof of legal establishment, financial statements, primary and secondary contacts to represent the company, officers, directors, partners, major shareholders, etc. At this stage, TAS User Registration IDs, which require VAT/tax/business IDs, principal business address, phone, fax, etc. of the applicants, are created to build unique profiles for different parties in an auction.<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"><sup><span>[13]</span></sup></a> Any important change in an applicant’s details would thus significantly alter the unique profile, leading to uncertainty regarding the parties involved and the validity of transactions undertaken. NDC’s application clearly didn’t meet the requirements here, as its financial statements, secondary contact, board members and ownership all changed at some point before the auction took place (either prior to or post submission of the application).<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"><sup><span>[14]</span></sup></a></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Mandatory Declaration of Third Party Funding:</span></span></i><span> Applications presupposing a future joint venture or any organisational unpredictability are not deemed eligible by ICANN, and if any third party is involved in the funding of the applicant, the latter is to provide evidence of such commitment to funding at the time of submission of its financial documents.<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"><sup><span>[15]</span></sup></a> Verisign’s public announcement that it was involved in NDC’s funding from the very beginning (well before the auction) and its management later, proves that NDC’s failure to notify ICANN made its application ineligible, or irregular at the very least.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"><sup><span>[16]</span></sup></a></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Vague Consequences of Failure to Notify ICANN of Changes:</span></span></i><span> If in any situation, certain material changes occur in the composition of the management, ownership or financial position of the applicant, ICANN is liable to be notified of the changes by the submission of updated documents. Here, however, the applicant may be subjected to re-evaluation if a <i>material change</i> is concerned, <i>at ICANN’s will</i> (there is no mention of what a material change might be). In the event of failure to notify ICANN of changes that would lead the previous information submitted to be false or misleading, ICANN <i>may</i> reject or deny the application concerned.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"><sup><span>[17]</span></sup></a> NDC’s absolute and repeated denial of any changes, during the extremely brief e-mail ‘investigation’ conducted by ICANN and the Ombudsman, show that at no point was NDC planning on revealing its intimacy with Verisign. No extended evaluation was conducted by ICANN at any point.<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18"><sup><span>[18]</span></sup></a> Note: The arbitrary power allowed here and the vague use of the term ‘material’ obstruct any real accountability on ICANN’s part to ensure that checks are carried out to discourage dishonest behaviour, at all stages.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Arbitrary Enforcement of Background Checks:</span></span></i><span> In order to confirm the eligibility of all applicants, ICANN conducts background screening during its initial evaluation process to verify the information disclosed, at the individual and entity levels.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19"><sup><span>[19]</span></sup></a> The applicants may be asked to produce any and all documents/evidence to help ICANN complete this successfully, and any relevant information received from ‘any source’ may be taken into account here. However, this screening is conducted only with regard to two criteria: general business diligence and criminal history, and any record of cybersquatting behaviour.<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20"><sup><span>[20]</span></sup></a> In this case, ICANN’s background screening was clearly not thorough, in light of Verisign’s confirmed involvement since the beginning, and at no point was NDC asked to submit any extra documents (apart from the exchange of e-mails between NDC and ICANN and its Ombudsman) to enable ICANN’s inquiry into its business diligence.<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21"><sup><span>[21]</span></sup></a> Further, ICANN also said that it was not <i>required</i> to conduct background checks or a screening process, as the provisions only mention that ICANN is <i>allowed</i> to do so, when it feels the need.<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22"><sup><span>[22]</span></sup></a> This ludicrous loophole hinders transparency efforts by giving ICANN the authority to ignore any questionable details in applications it desires to deem eligible, based on its own strategic leanings, advantageous circumstances or any other beneficial interests.</span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN’s deliberate avoidance of discussing or investigating the ‘allegations’ against NDC (that were eventually proved true), as well as a visible compromise in fairness and equity of the application process point to the conclusion it desired. </span></p>
<h3><span><span>ICANN’s Sketchy Tryst with Legal Conformity:</span></span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN’s lack of <i>substantive compliance</i>, with California’s laws and its own rules and regulations, leave us with the realisation that efforts towards transparency, enforcement and compliance (even with emphasis on the IANA Stewardship and Accountability Process) barely meet the procedural minimum. </span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Rejection of Request for Postponement of Auction:</span></span></i><span> ICANN’s intent to ‘initiate the Auction process once the composition of the set is stabilised’ implies that there must be no pending accountability mechanisms with regard to any applicant.<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23"><sup><span>[23]</span></sup></a> When ICANN itself determines the opening and closing of investigations or reviews concerning applicants, arbitrariness on ICANN’s part in deciding <i>on which date</i> the mechanisms are to be deemed as <i>pending</i>, may affect an applicant’s claim about procedural irregularity. In this case, ICANN had already scheduled the auction for July 27, 2016, before Ruby Glen sent in a request for postponement of the auction and inquiry into NDC’s eligibility on June 22, 2016.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24"><sup><span>[24]</span></sup></a> Even though the ongoing accountability mechanisms had begun after initiation of the auction process, ICANN confirmed the continuance of the process without assurance about the stability of the contention set as required by procedure. Ruby Glen’s claim about this violation in auction rules was dismissed by ICANN on the basis that there must be no pending accountability mechanisms at the <i>time of scheduling</i> of the auction.<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25"><sup><span>[25]</span></sup></a> This means that if any objection is raised or any dispute resolution or accountability mechanism is initiated with regard to an applicant, at any point after fixing the date of the auction, the auction process continues even though the contention set may not be stabilised. This line of defence made by ICANN is not in conformity with the purpose behind the wording of its auction procedure as discussed above.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Lack of Adequate Participation in the Discovery Planning Process:</span></span></i><span> In order to gather evidentiary support and start the discovery process for the passing of the injunction, ICANN was required to engage with Ruby Glen in a conference, under Federal law. However, due to a disagreement as to the <i>extent</i> of participation required from both parties involved in the process, ICANN recorded only a single appearance at court, after which it refused to engage with Ruby Glen.<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26"><sup><span>[26]</span></sup></a> ICANN should have conducted a thorough investigation, based on both NDC’s and Verisign’s public statements, and engaged more cooperatively in the conference, to comply substantively with its internal procedure as well jurisdictional obligations. Under ICANN’s Bylaws, it is to ensure that an applicant <i>does not assign</i> its rights or obligations in connection with the application to another party, as NDC did, in order to promote a competitive market and ensure certainty in transactions.<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27"><sup><span>[27]</span></sup></a> However, due to its lack of substantive compliance with due procedure, such bylaws have been rendered weak.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Demand to Dismiss Ruby Glen’s Complaint:</span></span></i><span> ICANN demanded the dismissal of Ruby Glen’s complaint on the basis that the complaint was vague and unsubstantiated.<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28"><sup><span>[28]</span></sup></a> After the auction, Ruby Glen’s allegations and suspicions about NDC’s dishonest behaviour were confirmed publicly by Verisign, making the above demand for dismissal of the complaint ridiculous.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Inapplicability of ICANN’s Bylaws to its Contractual Relationships:</span></span></i><span> ICANN maintained that its bylaws are not part of application documents or contracts with applicants (as it is a not-for-profit public benefit corporation), and that ICANN’s liability, with respect to a breach of ICANN’s foundational documents, extends only to officers, directors, members, etc.<a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29"><sup><span>[29]</span></sup></a> In addition, it said that Ruby Glen had not included any facts that suggested a duty of care arose from the contractual relationship with Ruby Glen and Donuts Inc.<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30"><sup><span>[30]</span></sup></a> Its dismissal of and considerable disregard for fiduciary obligations like duty of care and duty of inquiry in contractual relationships, prove the contravention of promised commitments and core values (integral to its entire accountability process), which are to ‘apply in the broadest possible range of circumstances’.<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31"><sup><span>[31]</span></sup></a></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>ICANN’s Legal Waiver and Public Policy:</span></span></i><span> Ruby Glen had submitted that, under the California Civil Code 1668, a covenant not to sue was against policy, and that the legal waiver all applicants were made to sign in the application was unenforceable.<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32"><sup><span>[32]</span></sup></a> This waiver releases ICANN from ‘any claims arising out of, or related to, any action or failure to act’, and the complaint claimed that such an agreement ‘not to challenge ICANN in court, irrevocably waiving the right to sue on basis of any legal claim’ was unconscionable.<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33"><sup><span>[33]</span></sup></a> However, ICANN defended the enforceability of the legal waiver, saying that only a covenant not to sue that is <i>specifically designed</i> to avoid responsibility for own fraud or willful injury is invalidated under the provisions of the California Civil Code.<a href="#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34"><sup><span>[34]</span></sup></a> A waiver, incorporating the availability of accountability mechanisms ‘<i>within ICANN’s bylaws</i> to challenge any final decision of ICANN’s with respect to an application’, was argued as completely valid under California’s laws. It must be kept in mind that challenges to ICANN’s final decisions can make headway <i>only</i> through its own accountability mechanisms (including the Reconsideration Requests Process, the Independent Review Panel and the Ombudsman), which are mostly conducted by, accountable to and applicable at the discretion of the Board.<a href="#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35"><sup><span>[35]</span></sup></a> This means that the only recourse for dissatisfied applicants is through processes managed by ICANN, leaving no scope for independence and impartiality in the review or inquiry concerned, as the .WEB case has shown.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Note</span></span></i><span>: ICANN has also previously argued that its waivers are not restricted by S. 1668 because the parties involved are sophisticated - without an element of oppression, and that these transactions don’t involve public interest as ICANN doesn’t provide necessary services such as health, transportation, etc.<a href="#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36"><sup><span>[36]</span></sup></a> Such line of argument shows its continuous refusal to acknowledge responsibility for ensuring access to an essential good, in a diverse community, justifying concerns about ICANN’s commitment to accessibility and human rights.</span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Required to remain accountable to the stakeholders of the community through <i>mechanisms listed in its Bylaws</i>, ICANN’s repeated difficulty in ensuring these mechanisms adhere to the purpose behind jurisdictional regulations confirm hindrances to impartiality, independence and effectiveness.</span></p>
<h3><span><span>The Financial Accountability of ICANN’s Auction Proceeds:</span></span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The use and distribution of significant auction proceeds accruing to ICANN have been identified by the internet community as issues central to financial transparency, especially in a future of increasing instances of contention sets. </span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Private Inurement Prohibition and Legal Requirements of Tax-Exempted Organisations:</span></span></i> <span>Subject to California’s state laws as well as federal laws, tax exemptions and tax-deductible charitable donations (available to not-for-profit public benefit corporations) are dependent on the fulfillment of jurisdictional obligations by ICANN, including avoiding contracts that may result in excessive economic benefit to a party involved, or lead to any deviation from purely charitable and scientific purposes.<a href="#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37"><sup><span>[37]</span></sup></a> ICANN’s Articles require that it ‘<i>shall</i> pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet’.<a href="#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38"><sup><span>[38]</span></sup></a> Due to this, ICANN’s accumulation of around USD 60 million (the total net proceeds from over 14 contention sets) since 2014 has been treated with unease, making it impossible to ignore the exponential increase in the same after the .WEB controversy.<a href="#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39"><sup><span>[39]</span></sup></a> With its dedication to a bottom-up, multi-stakeholder policy development process, the use of a single and ambiguous footnote, in ICANN’s Guidebook, to tackle the complications involving significant funds that accrue from last resort auctions (without even mentioning the arbiters of their ‘appropriate’ use) is grossly insufficient.<a href="#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40"><sup><span>[40]</span></sup></a> </span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Need for Careful and Inclusive Deliberation Over the Use of Auction Proceeds:</span></span></i><span> At the end of the fiscal year 2016, ICANN’s balance sheet showed a total of USD 399.6 million. However, the .WEB sale amount was not included in this figure, as the auction happened after the last date (June 30, 2016).<a href="#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41"><sup><span>[41]</span></sup></a> Around seven times the average winning bid, a USD 135 million hike in ICANN’s accounts shows the need for greater scrutiny on ICANN’s process of allocation and distribution of these auction proceeds.<a href="#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42"><sup><span>[42]</span></sup></a> While finding an ‘appropriate purpose’ for these funds, it is important that ICANN’s legal nature under US jurisdiction as well as its vision, mission and commitments be adhered to, in order to help increase public confidence and financial transparency.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>The CCWG Charter on New gTLD Auction Proceeds:</span></span></i><span> ICANN has always maintained that it recognised the concern of ‘significant funds accruing as a result of several auctions’ at the outset.<a href="#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43"><sup><span>[43]</span></sup></a> In March 2015, the GNSO brought up issues relating to the distribution of auction proceeds at ICANN52, to address growing concerns of the community.<a href="#_ftn44" name="_ftnref44"><sup><span>[44]</span></sup></a> A Charter was then drafted, proposing the formation of a Cross-Community Working Group on New gTLD Auction Proceeds, to help ICANN’s Board in allocating these funds.<a href="#_ftn45" name="_ftnref45"><sup><span>[45]</span></sup></a> After being discussed in detail at ICANN56, the draft charter was forwarded to the various supporting organisations for comments.<a href="#_ftn46" name="_ftnref46"><sup><span>[46]</span></sup></a> The Charter received no objections from 2 organisations and was adopted by the ALAC, ASO, ccNSO and GNSO, following which members and co-chairs were identified from the organisations to constitute the CCWG.<a href="#_ftn47" name="_ftnref47"><sup><span>[47]</span></sup></a> It was decided that while ICANN’s Board will have final responsibility in disbursement of the proceeds, the CCWG will be responsible for the submission of proposals regarding the mechanism for the allocation of funds, keeping ICANN’s fiduciary and legal obligations in mind.<a href="#_ftn48" name="_ftnref48"><sup><span>[48]</span></sup></a> While creating proposals, the CCWG must recommend how to avoid possible conflicts of interest, maintain ICANN’s tax-exempt status, and ensure diversity and inclusivity in the entire process.<a href="#_ftn49" name="_ftnref49"><sup><span>[49]</span></sup></a> It is important to note that the CCWG cannot make recommendations ‘regarding which organisations are to be funded or not’, but is to merely submit a <i>proposal</i> for the <i>process</i> by which allocation is undertaken.<a href="#_ftn50" name="_ftnref50"><sup><span>[50]</span></sup></a> ICANN’s Guidebook mentions possible uses for proceeds, such as ‘<i><span>grants to support new gTLD applications or registry operators from communities’</span></i><span>, the creation of a fund for ‘<i>specific projects for the benefit of the Internet community’, </i>the ‘<i>establishment of a security fund to expand use of secure protocols’</i>, among others, to be decided by the Board.<a href="#_ftn51" name="_ftnref51"><sup><span>[51]</span></sup></a></span></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>A Slow Process and the Need for More Official Updates:</span></span></i><span> The lack of sufficient communication/updates about any allocation or the process behind such, in light of ICANN’s current total net auction proceeds of USD 233,455,563, speaks of an urgent need for a decision by the Board (based on a recommendation by CCWG), regarding a <i>timeframe</i> for the allocation of such proceeds.<a href="#_ftn52" name="_ftnref52"><sup><span>[52]</span></sup></a> However, the entire process has been very slow, with the <i>first</i> CCWG meeting on auction proceeds scheduled for 26 January 2016, and the lists of members and observers being made public only recently.<a href="#_ftn53" name="_ftnref53"><sup><span>[53]</span></sup></a> Here, even parties interested in applying for the same funds at a later stage are allowed to participate in meetings, as long as they include such information in a Statement of Interest and Declaration of Intention, to satisfy CCWG’s efforts towards transparency and accountability.<a href="#_ftn54" name="_ftnref54"><sup><span>[54]</span></sup></a> </span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The worrying consequences of ICANN’s lack of financial as well as legal accountability (especially in light of its controversies), reminds us of the need for constant reassessment of its commitment to substantive transparency, enforcement and compliance with its rules and regulations. Its current obsessive courtship with only <i>procedural</i> regularity must not be mistaken for a greater commitment to accountability, as assured by the post-transition IANA.</span></p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 2. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.p</span></a><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>df</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup><span>[2]</span></sup></a> <span>4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup><span>[3]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><sup><span>[4]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><sup><span>[5]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 4-7. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><sup><span>[6]</span></sup></a><span> PLAINTIFF RUBY GLEN, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE THIRD PARTY DISCOVERY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR THE COURT TO ISSUE A SCHEDULING ORDER, 3.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-motion-court-issue-scheduling-order-26oct16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-motion-court-issue-scheduling-order-26oct16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><sup><span>[7]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz"><span>https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><sup><span>[8]</span></sup></a> <span>An expedited discovery request can provide the required evidentiary support needed to meet the Plaintiff’s burden to obtain a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. (</span><a href="http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/winter2014-0227-using-expedited-discovery-with-preliminary-injunction-motions.html"><span>http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/winter2014-0227-using-expedited-discovery-with-preliminary-injunction-motions.html</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><sup><span>[9]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 2. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><sup><span>[10]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="http://domainincite.com/20789-donuts-files-10-million-lawsuit-to-stop-web-auction"><span>http://domainincite.com/20789-donuts-files-10-million-lawsuit-to-stop-web-auction</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.thedomains.com/2016/08/15/afilias-asks-icann-to-disqualify-nu-dot-cos-135-million-winning-bid-for-web/"><span>https://www.thedomains.com/2016/08/15/afilias-asks-icann-to-disqualify-nu-dot-cos-135-million-winning-bid-for-web/</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><sup><span>[11]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="http://www.domainmondo.com/2016/11/news-review-icann57-hyderabad-india.html"><span>http://www.domainmondo.com/2016/11/news-review-icann57-hyderabad-india.html</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><sup><span>[12]</span></sup></a> <span>Art III, Bylaws of Public Technical Identifiers, ICANN. (</span><a href="https://pti.icann.org/bylaws"><span>https://pti.icann.org/bylaws</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13"><sup><span>[13]</span></sup></a> <span>1.4.1.1, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-39.(</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14"><sup><span>[14]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15"><sup><span>[15]</span></sup></a> <span>1.2.1; 1.2.2, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-21. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16"><sup><span>[16]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz"><span>https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17"><sup><span>[17]</span></sup></a> <span>1.2.7, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-30. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18"><sup><span>[18]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 4. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19"><sup><span>[19]</span></sup></a> <span>1.1.2.5, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-8. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20"><sup><span>[20]</span></sup></a> <span>1.2.1, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-21. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21"><sup><span>[21]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 7. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22"><sup><span>[22]</span></sup></a> <span>6.8; 6.11, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-5 (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>);</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 10. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23"><sup><span>[23]</span></sup></a> <span>1.1.2.10, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24"><sup><span>[24]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25"><sup><span>[25]</span></sup></a><span> DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 8. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26"><sup><span>[26]</span></sup></a> <span>26(f); 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (</span><a href="https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-viii-provisional-and-final-remedies/rule-65-injunctions-and-restraining-orders/"><span>https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-viii-provisional-and-final-remedies/rule-65-injunctions-and-restraining-orders/</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-v-disclosures-and-discovery/rule-26-duty-to-disclose-general-provisions-governing-discovery/"><span>https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-v-disclosures-and-discovery/rule-26-duty-to-disclose-general-provisions-governing-discovery/</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27"><sup><span>[27]</span></sup></a> <span>6.10, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-6. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/reviews/specific-reviews/cct"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/reviews/specific-reviews/cct</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28"><sup><span>[28]</span></sup></a><span> 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 6. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>) </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29"><sup><span>[29]</span></sup></a> <span>DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 8. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30"><sup><span>[30]</span></sup></a> <span>PLAINTIFF RUBY GLEN, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, 12.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-opposition-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-07nov16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-opposition-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-07nov16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31"><sup><span>[31]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://archive.icann.org/en/accountability/frameworks-principles/legal-corporate.htm"><span>https://archive.icann.org/en/accountability/frameworks-principles/legal-corporate.htm</span></a><span>); Art. 1(c), Bylaws for ICANN. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32"><sup><span>[32]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&sectionNum=1668"><span>http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&sectionNum=1668</span></a><span>); NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 24. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33"><sup><span>[33]</span></sup></a><span> 6.6, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-4. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34"><sup><span>[34]</span></sup></a> <span>DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 18. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35"><sup><span>[35]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/mechanisms-2014-03-20-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/mechanisms-2014-03-20-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36"><sup><span>[36]</span></sup></a> <span>AMENDED REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 4. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-dca-reply-memo-support-icann-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-14apr16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-dca-reply-memo-support-icann-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-14apr16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37"><sup><span>[37]</span></sup></a><span> 501(c)(3), Internal Revenue Code, USA. (</span><a href="https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-section-501-c-3-organizations"><span>https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-section-501-c-3-organizations</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38"><sup><span>[38]</span></sup></a> <span>Art. II, Public Technical Identifiers, Articles of Incorporation, ICANN. (</span><a href="https://pti.icann.org/articles-of-incorporation"><span>https://pti.icann.org/articles-of-incorporation</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39"><sup><span>[39]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/alacpolicydev/At-Large+New+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Discussion+Paper+Workspace"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/alacpolicydev/At-Large+New+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Discussion+Paper+Workspace</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40"><sup><span>[40]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/policy"><span>https://www.icann.org/policy</span></a><span>); 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41"><sup><span>[41]</span></sup></a><span>5, Internet Corporation for ASsigned Names and Numbers, Fiscal Statements As of and for the Years Ended June 30, 2016 and 2015. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun16-en.pdf</span></a><span>);</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="http://domainincite.com/21204-icann-has-400m-in-the-bank?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+DomainIncite+%28DomainIncite.com%29"><span>http://domainincite.com/21204-icann-has-400m-in-the-bank?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+DomainIncite+%28DomainIncite.com%29</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42"><sup><span>[42]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/28/someone_paid_135m_for_dot_web"><span>http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/28/someone_paid_135m_for_dot_web</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43"><sup><span>[43]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref44" name="_ftn44"><sup><span>[44]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref45" name="_ftn45"><sup><span>[45]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref46" name="_ftn46"><sup><span>[46]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref47" name="_ftn47"><sup><span>[47]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>); </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref48" name="_ftn48"><sup><span>[48]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ccwg-charter-07nov16-en.pdf"><span>https://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ccwg-charter-07nov16-en.pdf</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref49" name="_ftn49"><sup><span>[49]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref50" name="_ftn50"><sup><span>[50]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/CCWG+Charter"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/CCWG+Charter</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref51" name="_ftn51"><sup><span>[51]</span></sup></a><span> 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref52" name="_ftn52"><sup><span>[52]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions/proceeds"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions/proceeds</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref53" name="_ftn53"><sup><span>[53]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=63150102"><span>https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=63150102</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref54" name="_ftn54"><sup><span>[54]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy</a>
</p>
No publisherPadma VenkataramanICANNTransparencyInternet GovernanceAccountability2017-10-28T15:49:38ZBlog EntryComments from the Centre for Internet and Society on Renewal of .NET Registry Agreement
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-from-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-renewal-of-net-registry-agreement
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is grateful for the opportunity to comment on the proposed renewal of the .NET Registry Agreement.</b>
<p>With inputs from Sunil Abraham and Pranesh Prakash</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS would like to express its strong opposition to the proposed renewal. This is for three primary reasons:</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Inconsistency with ICANN’s core values</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is important to consider the proposed renewal in light of two Core Values which are meant to guide the decisions and actions of ICANN. <br /> <br />Section 1.2.(b)(iii) of the Bylaws contemplates ICANN’s responsibility to, “ Where feasible and appropriate, depending on market mechanisms to promote and sustain a competitive environment in the DNS market;” and S ection 1.2(b)(iv) envisages, “Introducing and promoting competition in the registration of domain names where practicable and beneficial to the public interest as identified through the bottom-up, multistakeholder policy development process;”. <br /> <br />The presumptive renewal of the .NET Registry agreement precludes an open tender, thereby significantly undermining competition in the DNS market. It ignores the public interest consideration, as the absence of competitive pressure on the contract also means the absence of pressure to lower user costs.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Historical accident</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Verisign’s operations over .NET is a historical accident; one that does not justify its collection of .NET revenues in perpetuity. <span></span><span>Policies for Contractual Compliance of</span> <span>Existing Registries</span> was approved in 2007 to include presumptive renewal. However, during the deliberations in that Policy Development Process, there was significant objection to presumption of renewal of registry contracts; with constituencies and individuals pointing out that such renewal was blatantly anti competitive, and allowed for presumption to prevail even in the case of material breaches.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The proposed agreement contemplates using a portion of Registry Level </b><br />Transaction Fees to create a “special restricted fund for developing country Internet communities to enable further participation in the ICANN mission for these stakeholders.” This form of tokenism to the global south will do little to achieve meaningful participation and diversity of civil society. .NET should instead, be opened to a competitive bid and open tender, in order to encourage innovators from around the world to benefit from it.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Irregularity of contract</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The argument that the proposed changes are to bring the contract in line with other gTLD registry agreements doesn't hold because this contract is in itself completely irregular: it was not entered into after a competitive process that other gTLD registry agreements are subject to; and it is not subject to the price sensitivity that other contracts are either.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-from-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-renewal-of-net-registry-agreement'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-from-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-renewal-of-net-registry-agreement</a>
</p>
No publishervidushiICANNInternet Governance2017-06-06T13:35:53ZBlog EntryCIS representation at ICANN 58
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/cis-representation-at-icann-58
<b>The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) organized ICANN 58 at Copenhagen from March 9 to March 16, 2017. On behalf of the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS), Vidushi Marda participated in the event and made a presentation.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS' focus at ICANN can broadly be divided into four heads: human rights, jurisdiction, transparency and accountability. Since March last year, we have also been pushing for changes in ICANN's expected standards of behavior, along with adoption of an anti harassment policy. After the IANA transition in September last year, the community is now divided into sub groups (SGs) that look into different issues for ICANN post transition, including the 4 that CIS works on. More information on ICANN 58 can be <a class="external-link" href="https://meetings.icann.org/en/copenhagen58">accessed here</a>.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/cis-representation-at-icann-58'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/cis-representation-at-icann-58</a>
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No publisherpraskrishnaICANNInternet Governance2017-03-28T14:22:22ZNews ItemComments on the Proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-proposed-icann-community-anti-harassment-policy
<b>ICANN sought community input on the Proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy on 7 November 2016. In response to this the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) submitted its comments.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We at CIS are grateful for the opportunity to comment on the proposed ICANN Community Anti-Harassment Policy (“Policy”). We provide our specific comments to the Policy below, in three sections. The first section addresses the<i> Terms of </i><i>Participation</i>, the second deals with the <i>Reporting</i><i> and Complaint</i><i> Procedure</i>, and the third places on record our observations on questions and issues for further consideration which have not been covered by the Policy.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Besides various other observations, CIS broadly submitted:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The attempt to provide an exhaustive definition of “Specified Characteristics” results in its meaning being unclear and exclusionary.</li>
<li>CIS strongly supports the phrase “including, but not limited to” that is followed by a bulleted list of inappropriate conduct.</li>
<li>The word “consent” is entirely missing from the draft policy even though the deciding factor in the “appropriateness” of an act or conduct is active and explicit consent to the act by both/ all individuals involved.</li>
<li>There is a need for clarity of communication platforms. The current Policy fails to specify instances of face-to-face and online communications.</li>
<li>The policy fails to account for a body of persons (as is provided for in the IETF policy) for the redressal of harassment complaints.</li>
<li>The provision for an informal resolution of a harassment issue is problematic as it could potentially lead to negative consequences for the complainant. </li>
<li>The Ombudsperson’s discretion in the determination of remedial action is detrimental to transparency and accountability.</li>
<li>The Policy in its current form lacks provisions for ensuring privacy and confidentiality of the complainant as well as interim relief while the Ombudsperson is looking into the complaint</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Read the Complete Submission <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/comments-on-icann-anti-harassment-policy.pdf">here</a></b></p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-proposed-icann-community-anti-harassment-policy'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-proposed-icann-community-anti-harassment-policy</a>
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No publisherPadma Venkataraman, Rohini Lakshané, Sampada Nayak and Vidushi MardaICANNInternet Governance2017-01-13T15:56:40ZBlog EntryNavigating the 'Reconsideration' Quagmire (A Personal Journey of Acute Confusion)
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/navigating-reconsideration-quagmire-a-personal-journey-of-acute-confusion
<b>An earlier analysis of ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy already brought to light our concerns about the lack of transparency in ICANN’s internal mechanisms. Carrying my research forward, I sought to arrive at an understanding of the mechanisms used to appeal a denial of DIDP requests. In this post, I aim to provide a brief account of my experiences with the Reconsideration Request process that ICANN provides for as a tool for appeal.</b>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Backdrop: What is the Reconsideration Request Process?</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Reconsideration Request process has been laid down in Article IV, Section 2 of the</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Bylaws. Some of the key aspects of this provision have been outlined below<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><sup>[1]</sup></sup></a>,</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>ICANN is obligated to institute a process by which a person <i>materially affected </i>by ICANN action/inaction can request review or reconsideration.</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>To file this request, one must have been adversely affected by actions of the staff or the board that contradict ICANN’s policies, or actions of the Board taken up without the Board considering material information, or actions of the Board taken up by relying on false information.</li>
<li>A separate Board Governance Committee was created with the specific mandate of reviewing Reconsideration requests, and conducting all the tasks related to the same.</li>
<li>The Reconsideration Request must be made within 15 days of:
<ul>
<li>FOR CHALLENGES TO BOARD ACTION: the date on which information about the challenged Board action is first published in a resolution, unless the posting of the resolution is not accompanied by a rationale, in which case the request must be submitted within 15 days from the initial posting of the rationale;</li>
<li>FOR CHALLENGES TO STAFF ACTION: the date on which the party submitting the request became aware of, or reasonably should have become aware of, the challenged staff action, and</li>
<li>FOR CHALLENGES TO BOARD OR STAFF INACTION: the date on which the affected person reasonably concluded, or reasonably should have concluded, that action would not be taken in a timely manner</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>.The Board Governance Committee is given the power to summarily dismiss a reconsideration request if:
<ul>
<li>the requestor fails to meet the requirements for bringing a Reconsideration Request;</li>
<li>it is frivolous, querulous or vexatious; or </li>
<li>the requestor had notice and opportunity to, but did not, participate in the public comment period relating to the contested action, if applicable</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>If not summarily dismissed, the Board Governance Committee proceeds to review and reconsider.</li>
<li>A requester may ask for an opportunity to be heard, and the decision of the Board Governance Committee in this regard is final.</li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>The basis of the Board Governance Committee’s action is public written record information submitted by the requester, by third parties, and so on.</li>
<li>The Board Governance Committee is to take a decision on the matter and make a final determination or recommendation to the Board within 30 days of the receipt of the Reconsideration request, unless it is impractical to do so, and it is accountable to the Board to make an explanation of the circumstances that caused the delay.</li>
<li>The determination is to be made public and posted on the ICANN website.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN has provided a neat infographic to explain this process in a simple fashion, and I am reproducing it here:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/Reconsideration.jpg" alt="Reconsideration" class="image-inline" title="Reconsideration" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(Image taken from <span></span><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/accountability/reconsiderationen</span>)</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Our Tryst with the Reconsideration Process</span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Grievance</b><br />Our engagement with the Reconsideration process began with the rejection of two of our requests (made on September 1, 2015) under ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy. The requests sought information about the registry and registrar compliance audit process that ICANN maintains, and asked for various documents pertaining to the same<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><sup>[2]</sup></sup></a>:</p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Copies of the registry/registrar contractual compliance audit reports for all the audits carried out as well as external audit reports from the last year (20142015).</li>
<li>A generic template of the notice served by ICANN before conducting such an audit.</li>
<li>A list of the registrars/registries to whom such notices were served in the last year.</li>
<li>An account of the expenditure incurred by ICANN in carrying out the audit process.</li>
<li>A list of the registrars/registries that did not respond to the notice within a reasonable period of time.</li>
<li>Reports of the site visits conducted by ICANN to ascertain compliance.</li>
<li>Documents which identify the registries/registrars who had committed material discrepancies in the terms of the contract.</li>
<li>Documents pertaining to the actions taken in the event that there was found to be some form of contractual noncompliance.</li>
<li>A copy of the registrar selfassessment form which is to be submitted to ICANN.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN integrated both the requests and addressed them via one response on 1 October, 2015 (which can be found <span></span><span>here</span>). In their response, ICANN inundated us with already available links on their website explaining the compliance audit process, and the processes ancillary to it, as well as the broad goals of the programme none of which was sought for by us in our request. ICANN then went on to provide us with information on their ThreeYear Audit programme, and gave us access to some of the documents that we had sought, such as the preaudit notification template, list of registries/registrars that received an audit notification, the expenditure incurred to some extent, and so on .</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Individual contracted party reports were denied to us on the basis of their grounds for nondisclosure. Further, and more disturbingly, ICANN refused to provide us with the names of the contracted parties who had been found under the audit process to have committed discrepancies. Therefore, a large part of our understanding of the way in which the compliance audit process works remains unfinished.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">What we did</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Dissatisfied with this response, I went on to file a Reconsideration request (number 1522) as per their standard format on November 2, 2015. (The request filed can be accessed <span></span><span>here</span>).As grounds for reconsideration, I stated that “<i>As a part of my research I was tracking the ICANN compliance audit process, and therefore required access to audit reports in cases where discrepancies where formally found in their actions. This is in the public interest and therefore requires to be disclosed...While providing us with an array of detailed links explaining the compliance audit process, the ICANN staff has not been able to satisfy our actual requests with respect to gaining an understanding of how the compliance audits help in regulating actions of the registrars, and how they are effective in preventing breaches and discrepancies.</i>” Therefore, I requested them to make the records in question publicly available “<i>We request ICANN to make the records in question, namely the audit reports for individual contracted parties that reflect discrepancies in contractual compliance, which have been formally recognised as a part of your enforcement process. We further request access to all documents that relate to the expenditure incurred by ICANN in the process, as we believe financial transparency is absolutely integral to the values that ICANN stands by.</i>”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>The Board Governance Committee’s response</b><sup>3</sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The determination of the Board Governance Committee was that our claims did not merit reconsideration, as I was unable to identify any “<i>misapplication of policy or procedure by the ICANN Staff</i>”, and my only issue was with the substance of the DIDP Response itself, and <i>substantial disagreements with a DIDP response are not proper bases for reconsideration </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(emphasis supplied).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The response of the Board Governance Committee was educative of the ways in which they determine Reconsideration Requests. Analysing the DIDP process, it held that ICANN was well within its powers to deny information under its defined Conditions for NonDisclosure, and denial of substantive information did not amount to a procedural violation. Therefore, since the staff adhered to established procedure under the DIDP, there was no basis for our grievance, and our request was dismissed..</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Furthermore, as a postscript, it is interesting to note that the Board Governance Committee delayed its response time by over a month, by its own admission “<i>In terms of the timing of the BGC’s recommendation, it notes that Section 2.16 of Article IV of the Bylaws provides that the BGC shall make a final determination or recommendation with respect to a reconsideration request within thirty days, unless impractical. To satisfy the thirtyday deadline, the BGC would have to have acted by 2 December 2015. However, due to the timing of the BGC’s meetings in November and December, the first practical opportunity for the BGC to consider Request 1522 was 13 January 2016.</i>”<sup>4</sup></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Whither do I wander now?</span><b> </b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To me, this entire process reflected the absurdity of the Reconsideration request structure as an appeal mechanism under the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy. As our experience indicated, there does not seem to be any way out if there is an issue with the substance of ICANN’s response. ICANN, commendably, is particular about following procedure with respect to the DIDP. However, what is the way forward for a party aggrieved by the flaws in the existing policy? As I had <span></span><span>analysed</span> <span>earlier</span>, the grounds for ICANN to not disclose information are vast, and used to deny a large chunk of the information requests that they receive. How is the hapless requester to file a meaningful appeal against the outcome of a bad policy, if the only ground for appeal is noncompliance with the procedure of said bad policy? This is a serious challenge to transparency as there is no other way for a requester to acquire information that ICANN may choose to withold under one of its myriad clauses. It cannot be denied that a good information disclosure law ought to balance the free disclosure of information with the holding back of information that truly needs to be kept private.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><sup>[3]</sup></sup></a><a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><sup>[4]</sup></sup></a> However, it is this writer’s firm opinion that even instances where information is witheld, there has to be a stronger explanation for the same, and moreover, an appeals process that does not take into account substantive issues which might adversely affect the appellant falls short of the desirable levels of transparency. Global standards dictate that grounds for appeal need to be broad, so that all failures to apply the information disclosure law/policy may be remedied.<sup>6</sup> Various laws across the world relating to information disclosure often have the following as grounds for appeal: an inability to lodge a request, failure to respond to a request within the set time frame, a refusal to disclose information, in whole or in part, excessive fees and not providing information in the form sought, as well as a catchall clause for other failures.<sup>7</sup></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Furthermore, independent oversight is the heart of a proper appeal mechanism in such situations<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><sup>[5]</sup></sup></a>; the power to decide the appeal must not rest with those who also have the discretion to disclose the information, as is clearly the case with ICANN, where the Board Governance Committee is constituted and appointed by the ICANN Board itself [one of the bodies against whom a grievance may be raised].</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><span>Suggestions</span><b> </b></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We believe ICANN, in keeping with its global, multistakeholder, accountable spirit, should adopt these standards as well, especially now that the transition looms around the corner. Only then will the standards of open, transparent and accountable governance of the Internet upheld by ICANN itself as the ideal be truly, meaningfully realised. Accordingly, the following standards ought to be met with:</p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li>Establishment of an independent appeals authority for information disclosure cases</li>
<li>Broader grounds for appeal of DIDP requests</li>
<li>Inclusion of disagreement with the substantive content of a DIDP response as a ground for appeal.</li>
<li>Provision of proper reasoning for any justification of the witholding of information that is necessary in the public interest.</li>
</ol>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<ol style="text-align: justify; "> </ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Article IV, Section 2, ICANN Bylaws, 2014 <i>available at </i>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylawsen/#IV</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Copies of the request can be found <span></span><span>here</span> and <span></span><span>here</span>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> Katherine Chekouras, <i>Balancing National Security with a Community's RighttoKnow: Maintaining </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Public Access to Environmental Information Through EPCRA 's NonPreemption Clause</i>, 34 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev 107, (2007).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Toby Mendel, <i>Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Study</i> 151 (2nd edn, 2008).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Id</i>, at 152</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><sup>3</sup>4 Available <span></span><span>here</span>. https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/reconsideration1522cisfinaldetermination13jan16en.pdf</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> Mendel, <i>supra </i>note 6.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/navigating-reconsideration-quagmire-a-personal-journey-of-acute-confusion'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/navigating-reconsideration-quagmire-a-personal-journey-of-acute-confusion</a>
</p>
No publisherPadmini Baruah and Geetha HariharanICANNInternet Governance2016-11-30T13:48:41ZBlog Entry