Centre for Internet and Society

Do we need the Aadhar scheme?

sunil — 2012-02-03T10:11:24Z

"Decentralisation and privacy are preconditions for security. Digital signatures don’t require centralised storage and are much more resilient in terms of security", Sunil Abraham in the Business Standard on 1 February 2012.

We don’t need Aadhar because we already have a much more robust identity management and authentication system based on digital signatures that has a proven track record of working at a “billions-of-users” scale on the internet with reasonable security. The Unique Identification (UID) project based on the so-called “infallibility of biometrics” is deeply flawed in design. These design disasters waiting to happen cannot be permanently thwarted by band-aid policies.

Biometrics are poor authentication factors because once they are compromised they cannot be re-secured unlike digital signatures. Additionally, an individual’s biometrics can be harvested remotely without his or her conscious cooperation. The iris can be captured remotely without a person’s knowledge using a high-res digital camera.

Biometrics are poor identification factors in a country where the registrars have commercial motivation to create ghost identities. For example, bank managers trying to achieve targets for deposits by opening benami accounts. Biometrics for these ghost identities can be imported from other countries or generated endlessly using image processing software. The de-duplication engine at the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) will be fooled into thinking that these are unique residents.

An authentication system does not require a centralised database of authentication factors and transaction details. This is like arguing that the global system of e-commerce needs a centralised database of passwords and logs or, to use an example from the real world, to secure New Delhi, all citizens must deposit duplicate keys to their private property with the police.

Decentralisation and privacy are preconditions for security. The “end-to-end principle” used to design internet security is also in compliance with Gandhian principles of Panchayat Raj. Digital signatures don’t require centralised storage of private keys and are, therefore, much more resilient in terms of security.

Biometrics as authentication factors require the government to store biometrics of all citizens but citizens are not allowed to store biometrics of politicians and bureaucrats. The state authenticates the citizen but the citizen cannot conversely authenticate the state. Digital signatures as an authentication factor, on the other hand, does not require this asymmetry since citizens can store public keys of state actors and authenticate them. The equitable power relationship thus established allows both parties to store a legally non-repudiable audit trail for critical transactions like delivery of welfare services. Biometrics exacerbates the exiting power asymmetry between citizens and state unlike digital signatures, which is peer authentication technology.

Privacy protections should be inversely proportional to power. The transparency demanded of politicians, bureaucrats and large corporations cannot be made mandatory for ordinary citizens. Surveillance must be directed at big-ticket corruption, at the top of the pyramid and not retail fraud at the bottom. Even for retail fraud, the power asymmetry will result in corruption innovating to circumvent technical safeguards. Government officials should be required by law to digitally sign the movement of resources each step of the way till it reaches a citizen. Open data initiatives should make such records available for public scrutiny. With support from civil society and the media, citizens will themselves address retail fraud. To solve corruption, the state should become more transparent to the citizen and not vice versa.

UIDAI’s latest 23-page biometrics report is supposed to dispel the home ministry’s security anxieties. It says “biometric data is collected by software provided by the UIDAI, which immediately encrypts and applies a digital signature.” Surely, what works for UIDAI, that is digital signatures, should work for citizens too. The report does not cover even the most basic attack — for example, the registrar could pretend that UIDAI software is faulty and harvest biometrics again using a parallel set-up. If biometrics are infallible, as the report proclaims, then sections in the draft UID Bill that criminalise attempts to defraud the system should be deleted.

The compromise between UIDAI and the home ministry appears to be a turf battle for states where security concerns trump developmental aspirations. This compromise does nothing to address the issues raised by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance, headed by the Bharatiya Janata Party’s Yashwant Sinha.

Read the original published in the Business Standard on 1 February 2012

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/do-we-need-the-aadhar-scheme

Sense and Censorship

sunil — 2012-01-31T06:15:38Z

The Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA) bills, at the US House of Representatives and Senate, respectively, appear to enforce property rights, but are, in fact, trade bills. This article by Sunil Abraham was published in the Indian Express on 20 January 2012.

In developed countries like the US, intellectual property (IP) plays a dominant role in the economy, unlike in economies like India. Countries that have significant IP are keen to increase global and national enforcement activities, while countries with little domestic IP are keen to reduce outgoing royalties in the balance of payments and therefore, keen to expand alternatives, limitations and exceptions like copyleft licensing, compulsory/statutory licensing and fair dealing.

The loss of generic medicines, hardware based on open standards, public domain content, free and open source software, open access journal articles, etc will equally impoverish consumers in the US and in India. SOPA and PIPA, therefore, do not represent the will of the average American but rather the interests of the IP sector, which has tremendous influence in the Hill. There is one more layer of complication for policy-makers to consider as they work towards a compromise of interests in Internet governance — the tension between the old and the new. The incumbents — corporations with business models that have been rendered obsolete by technological developments — versus emerging actors who provide competing products and services, often with greater technological sophistication, higher quality, at a lower cost.

The US, in terms of policy and infrastructure, still controls the global Domain Name System (DNS) and consequently, post-SOPA/PIPA, can take unilateral trade action without worrying about national variations enabled by international law. These bills directly undermine the business models of many Indian companies — generic drug manufacturers like Ranbaxy, software service providers like Infosys, electronics manufacturers like Spice and players in many other sectors dominated by IP rights. So it is baffling that they have not added their voices to the global outcry.

SOPA and PIPA, if passed, will enable the US administration to take three-pronged action against IP infringers — seizure of domain names and DNS filtering, blocking of transactions by financial intermediaries and revocation of hosting by ISPs. While circumvention may still be possible, it will get increasingly laborious — something like the Great Firewall of China, but worse. Unfortunately, the implementation of these blunt policy instruments will require more and more public-funded surveillance and censorship.

The censorship potential of efforts like SOPA and PIPA may appeal to others, as autocratic and democratic regimes across the world have been keen to try technology-mediated social engineering — these efforts have been multiplied in the post-Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street world. Organised religion, social conservatives and those who have been at the receiving end of free speech would all want to shut down platforms like WikiLeaks and political movements like Anonymous and the Pirate Party.

These are equally dismal times for Internet governance in India. Google, Facebook and 20-odd other intermediaries are trying to avoid jail time at the hands of a Delhi court. However, ever since the IT Act amendments were put in place three years back, digital activists have been requesting intermediaries to register their protests early and often, regarding draconian provisions in the statute and in the associated rules. Their silence is going to be very expensive for all of us. We cannot depend on the private sector alone to defend our constitutional rights. As yet unpublished research from CIS demonstrates that private intermediaries only bother with defending freedom of expression when it undermines their business interests. Working with an independent researcher, we conducted a policy sting operation — faulty take-down notices were served to seven intermediaries asking for legitimate content to be taken down. In six of those cases, the intermediaries over-complied, in one case deleting all comments on a news article instead of just those comments identified in the notice. The only take-down that was resisted was one claiming that sale of diapers was “harmful to minors” under the Indian IT Act (because they caused nappy rash). It is clear that the IT Act and its associated rules have already had a chilling effect on online participation by Indians.

Fortunately for us, during the previous parliamentary session — Jayant Chaudhary, Lok Sabha MP from the Rashtriya Lok Dal, asked for the revision of rules concerning intermediaries, cyber-cafes and reasonable security practices. The next Parliament session is the last opportunity for the House to reject these rules and intervene for a free Internet.

The writer is executive director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society

Read the original published in the Indian Express

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/sense-and-censorship

The Quixotic Fight to Clean up the Web

sunil — 2012-01-26T20:53:02Z

The ongoing attempt to pre-screen online content won’t change anything. It will only drive netizens into the arms of criminals, writes Sunil Abraham in this article published in Tehelka Magazine, Vol 9, Issue 04, Dated 28 Jan 2012.

GOOGLE AND Facebook’s ongoing case in the Delhi High Court over offensive online content is curious in three ways. First, the complaint does not mention the IT Act, 2000. Prior to the 2008 amendment, intermediaries (in this case, Google, Facebook, etc) had no immunity. But after the amendment, intermediaries have significant immunity and are not considered liable unless takedown notices are ignored.

Second, it is curious that the complaint does not mention specific individuals or groups directly responsible for authoring the allegedly offensive material. Only intermediaries have been explicitly named. If specific content items have been submitted in court then it is curious that specific accounts and users have not been charged with the same offences.

Three, Delhi-based journalist Vinay Rai claims that takedown notices and requests for user information were ignored by the intermediaries. As yet, unpublished research at the Centre for Internet and Society has reached the exact opposite conclusion. We sent fraudulent takedown notices to seven of the largest intermediaries in India as part of a policy sting operation. Six of them over-complied and demonstrated no interest in protecting freedom of expression. Our takedown notices were complied with even though they were largely nonsensical. It is therefore curious that Rai’s takedown notices were ignored.

Under Section 79 of the IT Act, the intermediary must not “initiate the transmission”, “select the receiver of the transmission” and “select or modify the information contained in the transmission”. In other words, they must not possess “actual knowledge” of the content. This would be absolutely true if intermediaries acted as “dumb pipes” or “mere conduits”. But today, they have reactive “human filters” ensuring conformance to community guidelines that often go beyond constitutional limits on freedom of expression.

For example, Facebook deletes breastfeeding photographs if a certain proportion of the breast is visible, despite numerous protests. Intermediaries also use proactive “machine filters” to purge their networks of pornography and copyright infringing content. In order to retain immunity under the IT Act, intermediaries would have to demonstrate that they have no “actual knowledge”. This would also imply that they cannot proactively filter or pre-screen content without becoming liable for illegal content.

More sophisticated “machine filters” will continue to be built for social media platforms as computing speeds increase and costs decrease dramatically. But there will be significant collateral damage — the vibrancy of online Indian communities will be diminished as legitimate content will be removed and this in turn will retard Internet adoption rates. Free media, democratic governance, research and development, culture and the arts will all be fundamentally undermined. So whether pre-censorship is technically feasible is an irrelevant question. The real question is what limits on freedom of expression are reasonable in the Internet age.

The legal tussle is yet another chance for reflecting on the shortcomings of the IT Act

Censorship is like prohibition, illegal content will persist, the mafia will profit and ordinary citizens will be implicated in criminal networks. Use of anonymising proxies, circumvention tools and encryption technologies will proliferate, frustrating network optimisation efforts and law enforcement activities.

This is yet another opportunity for reflecting on the shortcomings of the ITAct. A lot of the confusion and anxiety today emerges from vague language, unconstitutional limits on freedom of expression, multi-tiered blanket surveillance provisions, blunt security policy measures contained in the statute and its associated rules. The next Parliament session is the last opportunity for MPs to ask for the rules for intermediaries, cyber cafes and reasonable security practices to be revisited. The MP who musters the courage to speak will be dubbed a superhero.

As told to Shonali Ghosal. Sunil Abraham is Executive director, centre for internet and society and can be contacted at sunil@cis-india.org. The original article was published in Tehelka.

Illustration by Sudeep Chaudhuri

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/quixotic-fight-to-clean-the-web

US Clampdown Worse than the Great Firewall

sunil — 2012-01-26T20:42:14Z

If you thought China’s Internet censorship was evil, think again. American moves to clean up the Web could hurt global surfers, writes Sunil Abraham in this article published in Tehelka, Volume 8, Issue 50, 17 December 2011.

TWO PARTICULARLY terrible pieces of legislation — the PROTECT-IP Act and the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) — have been introduced in the US Senate and House of Representatives. If passed, the US administration will be empowered to shut down specific websites using the same four measures it employed in its failed attempt to shut down WikiLeaks — domain name system (DNS) filtering, blocking financial transfers via financial intermediaries, revoking hosting and sanitising search engine results. SOPA represents the perfect policy interest overlap between a State clamping down on freedom of expression and IPR-holders protecting their obsolete business models. After all it was Bono who publicly articulated the unspoken desire of many right-holders: “We know from China’s ignoble effort to suppress online dissent that it’s perfectly possible to track content.”

China fortunately only censors the Internet for its own citizens, the Great Firewall does not, for example, prevent access to knowledge by Indian netizens. SOPA will enable the US to censor the global Internet unilaterally. The Great Firewall can be circumvented using tools like Tor, but SOPA will in many ways make its targets disappear for the average user. DNS filtering, even when implemented in a single country, has global consequences. DNS, one of the foundational mechanisms of the Internet, is an address look-up service that allows users to translate domain names (e.g. cisindia.org — easier for humans to remember) into IP addresses (e.g. 202.190.125.69 — easier for machines). The most critical servers in the global DNS hierarchy are the root servers, or today’s server clusters. Mandated DNS filtering would result in some DNS servers returning different IP addresses than other DNS servers for certain domain names. With PROTECT-IP and SOPA, these global consequences would be at unprecedented levels given that seven of the 13 server clusters that constitute the DNS root fall within US jurisdiction. We already have some indication where this is headed. The US Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency announced recently that it has seized 150 domain names for alleged IPR infringement.

We must remember that IPR policy in some countries has been configured in public interest to take advantage of the exceptions and limitations afforded by the TRIPS (trade-related aspects of IPR) agreement. In others, even though the letter of the law goes beyond TRIPS requirements, access by ordinary citizens is protected because of poor enforcement of these maximalist policies. E-commerce platforms that sell Micromax, Karbonn, Spice and Lava mobile phones that are manufactured in China may be taken offline because an American court is convinced of patent infringement. An online publisher of George Orwell’s books, which are public domain in Russia, India and South Africa but still under copyright in the US and Europe, may have its Paypal account blocked.

After the witch-hunt against WikiLeaks, policymakers have realised the extent of American hypocrisy

In the recent past, activists in authoritarian regimes and democracies with draconian Internet laws have leveraged US Internet freedom rhetoric. This was first deployed by Hillary Clinton in early 2010 after Google’s melodramatic withdrawal from China. Even then, many observers were convinced that this was just selective tokenism and the real agenda was domination of global markets by US-based MNCs. Today, after the witch-hunts against WikiLeaks and Anonymous, global policymakers have realised the extent of American hypocrisy.

Fortunately, opposition for SOPA has cut across traditional political and ideological divides — libertarians, liberal human rights organisations and political conservatives who believe in small government and also modern- day capitalists like Google, Facebook and Twitter. Let us pray that Kapil Sibal registers his protest with the Obama administration to protect the online aspirations of millions of Indian citizens and entrepreneurs.

Read the original published in Tehelka here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/us-clampdown

That’s the unkindest cut, Mr Sibal

sunil — 2011-12-12T04:59:00Z

There’s Kolaveri-di on the Internet over Kapil Sibal’s diktat to social media sites to prescreen users’ posts. That diktat goes far beyond the restrictions placed on our freedom of expression by the IT Act. But, says Sunil Abraham of the Centre for Internet and Society, India is not going to be silenced online.

Thanks to leaked reports about unpublicised meetings that communications minister Kapil Sibal had with social media operators – or Internet intermediaries, to use legalese — such as Facebook, Google and Indiatimes.com, censorship policy in India has gained public attention, and caused massive outrage.

According to The New York Times India Ink reportage, quoting unnamed sources from the Internet intermediaries, Mr Sibal demanded proactive and pre-emptive screening of posts that people make on social media sites, ostensibly to filter out or remove “offensive” content and hate speech. In a television interview, however, the minister denied he wanted to censor what Indians thought and shared with others online.

One is tempted to believe him. He was, after all, the amicus for the landmark People’s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) wiretapping judgment of 1996, which is pivotal to protecting our civil liberties when using communication technology in India.

Last week, though, Mr Sibal came out in public with his demands, saying that there was a lot of content that risked hurting the sensibilities of people and could lead to violence. “It was brought to my notice some of the images and content on platforms like Facebook, Twitter and Google are extremely offensive to the religious sentiments of people ...”We will not allow Indian sentiments and religious sentiments of large sections of the community to be hurt,” he said.

There was even a threat of state action if Internet companies did not comply with demands to screen content before it was posted online.

The NYT blogpost said, however, quoting executives from the Internet companies Mr Sibal had reportedly met, that the minister showed them a Facebook page that maligned Congress president Sonia Gandhi and told them, “This is unacceptable.”

Google responded to Mr Sibal by releasing its Transparency Report, saying that out of 358 items that it had been requested to remove between January and June 2011, only eight requests pertained to hate speech, while as many as 255 complaints were against “government criticism”.

Indian netizens raged against Mr Sibal, and very quickly #IdiotKapil Sibal was ‘trending’ on Twitter, with thousands posting comments against attempts to ‘censor’ Internet content. Much has changed, in Mr Sibal’s reckoning, between 1996 and 2011.

So, what’s all the fuss over ‘pre-screening’ and what’s at stake here? Critics of Mr Sibal say, our freedom of speech and expression is under threat. They see a pattern in the way the government has sought to impose rules and restrictions on Internet and telecommunications players, with demands on BlackBerry-maker RIM to give it access to its users’ email and messenger content, on telecom players to install electronic surveillance equipment and let the government eavesdrop as it sees fit, and on the likes of Google and Yahoo to part with email content and users’ details.

It all started with the amendments to the Information Tech-nology Act 2000 in 2008. Together, they constitute damaging consequences for citizens, including the creation of a multi-tier blanket surveillance regime, inappropriate security recommendations, and undermining freedom of speech and expression.

The amendments passed in 2008 — without any discussion in Parliament – did solve some existing policy concerns, but simultaneously introduced new ones. For instance, Section 66, introduced during this amendment, criminalises sending offensive messages through any ICT-based communication service.

Offensive messages are described as “grossly offensive, menacing character..... or causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will.” These terms are not defined in the IT Act or in any other existing law, rules or case-law, except for a couple of exceptions such as what constitutes “criminal intimidation”. These limits on the freedom of expression go well beyond Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which only permits “reasonable restrictions...in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.”

If Mr Sibal himself were to don his lawyer’s coat again and launch a legal challenge to Section 66, in all likelihood, courts in India would strike it down as unconstitutional.

Section 79, which was amended, brought into being an intermediary liability regime. This was in part precipitated by the arrest of Avnish Bajaj, the former CEO of bazee.com in December 2004 for the infamous Delhi Public School MMS clip which was being sold on his e-commerce platform. Policy-makers were, however, convinced to follow international best practices and grant intermediaries immunity under certain conditions.

Just as the postal department is not considered liable for the content of letters or telecom operators liable for the content of phone conversations, Internet intermediaries, too, were to be considered “dumb pipes” or “common carriers” of content produced and distributed by users. Intermediaries therefore earned immunity from legal action so long as they acted upon take-down notices, or written requests for deletion of illegal content.

Section 79 was further clarified in April this year when the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules were notified. Stakeholders from the technology industry, media and civil society had sent feedback to the Department of Information Technology under the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology in February, but DIT choose to ignore the feedback and finalised rules with serious flaws in them. For one, a standardised “Terms of Service” that focused on limits on free expression had to be implemented by all intermediaries – forcing a one-size-fits-all approach.

Content that was 'harmful to minors' was not permissible regardless of the target market of the website. All intermediaries were supposed to act upon take-down notices within 36 hours, something that a Google may be able to do, but an average blogger could not.

Two, the vague terms introduced in Section 66A were left undefined. Intermediaries were asked to sit on judgment on the question of whether an article, image or video was causing 'inconvenience'.

Three, all principles of natural justice were ignored – the person responsible for posting the content would not be informed, s/he would not be given an opportunity to file a counter-notice to challenge the intermediary’s decision in court.

Four, the rules left it open for economically or politically motivated actors to seriously damage opponents online using fraudulent take-down notices, instead of treating abuse of the take-down notice system as an offence.

How the take-down system terrorises free expression on the Internet was illustrated when the Centre for Internet and Society, where this author works, undertook a research project. A pro-bono independent researcher who led the exercise sent fraudulent take-down notices to seven Internet companies in India. These included some of the largest and most popular Indian and foreign search engines, news portals and social media platforms.

Although they all employ the most competent lawyers in the country, six of the seven intermediaries over-complied, confirming our worst fears. In one case, a news portal deleted not just the specific comment that was mentioned in the take-down notice but 14 other comments as well. Most importantly, it must be pointed out, the comment identified in the take-down notice was itself an excellent piece of writing that could not be construed as “offensive” by any stretch!

In the single exception to the rule, one e-commerce portal refused to act upon a take-down notice trying to prevent the sale of diapers on the grounds that it was “harmful to minors”, rightly dismissing the notice as frivolous. But that exception simply proved a rule: Private intermediaries use their best lawyers to protect their commercial interests, but are highly risk-averse and do not value freedom of expression, unless it affects their bottomline.

Proactive and pre-emptive screening of social media content, as Mr Sibal has demanded, will only further compromise online civil liberties in what’s already a dismal situation. In short, we move from a post-facto to a pre-emptive censorship regime.

In fact, given the magnitude of the task of pre-screening in a nation with a 100 million Internet users and growing, such an intense censorship regime will mean not only that what Indian citizens say or post will be censored by private companies, but those private companies will, in turn, use machines to screen what humans are saying and doing! After all, otherwise, companies would require armies of human censors to screen the millions of posts that are made on Twitter and Facebook every minute.

But the Supreme Court has held that even the executive arm of government cannot engage in censorship prior to publication, let alone ordering private companies to do so. In any case, it’s a policy that’s bound to fail, for both technical reasons and for its failure to take into account human motivations.

Machines, as we know, continue to be poor judges of the nuances of human expression and will likely cause massive damage to the idea of public debate. Humans, on the other hand, will begin to circumvent machine filters – for example, content labelled as PRON instead of PORN will go through.

Draconian crackdown on certain types of fringe content is likely to have the counterproductive result of the general society developing an unhealthy obsession for exactly such content. Despite the comprehensive censorship controls in Saudi Arabia, for instance, pornography consumption is rampant, usually accessed via pirated satellite TV and circulated using personal computing devices and mobile phones.

But all is not lost yet, perhaps. Faced with the barrage of criticism, Mr Sibal has now called for public consultations on the issue of pre-screening content. There’s hope yet for freedom of speech and expression in India. Thanks to the Internet, a throwback to 1975 simply does not look possible.

Sunil Abraham is executive director of the Centre for Internet and Society, Bengaluru. He wrote this article in the Deccan Chronicle on December 11, 2011. Read the original here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/unkindest-cut-mr-sibal

India’s dreams of web censorship

sunil — 2012-03-26T06:59:36Z

If you are offended by this post, please contact Kapil Sibal, India’s telecoms and IT minister, and he will make sure it is promptly taken down.

Actually, if Sibal has his way and you are offended by this post, the armies of people to be employed by internet companies operating in India to monitor their sites for potentially offensive material – whether it originates in India or abroad – will ensure that it is removed before it can even be published. And good luck to all of them with that.

That, anyway, was the gist of Sibal’s combative press conference in the courtyard of his Delhi home on Tuesday, the day after the New York Times reported he had met executives from Google, Facebook, Yahoo and Microsoft to discuss the preemptive removal of “offensive material”.

The press conference was prompted by uproar that swept Twitter on Monday night – one of the sites, incidentally, that Sibal would like to monitor – and was carried live on all major news channels.

Social networking sites have gained a lot of traction in India and are much used by politicians, celebrities and the burgeoning, young middle class.

"I believe that no reasonable person aware of the sensibilities of large sections of communities in this country and aware of community standards as they are applicable in India would wish to see this content in the public domain," Sibal said, referring to "offensive material" he had shown some reporters prior to the conference. He added that the government did not believe in censorship.

According to the NYT, Sibal showed a group of IT execs a Facebook page that criticized Sonia Gandhi, president of the Congress Party, calling it "unacceptable".

"We will remove any content that violates our terms, which are designed to keep material that is hateful, threatening, incites violence or contains nudity off the service," Facebook said in a statement.

Microsoft did not respond to requests for comment. Google said it would issue a statement later in the day.

Sibal first approached the companies on September 5, giving them four weeks to present proposals for how they might comply with his request, he said. With no response by October 19, the ministry sent a reminder. On November 29, Sibal again met with the IT execs. They responded on Monday, saying they could not comply.

An Indian employee of one of foreign tech company, when asked about Sibal’s demand that each outfit set up dedicated teams to monitor content in real time, let out an extended, almost hysterical laugh, before regaining composure and asking: "Do you know how many users we have?"

Indeed, even in a country with low internet penetration like India – 100m people regularly use the internet, less than 10 per cent of India’s 1.2bn population – the task of monitoring real-time content generated on millions of sites opens up legal wormholes and is technically impossible, Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet & Society, told beyondbrics.

"Technically what he’s asking for is an impossibility: it’s not possible in the age of web 2.0 to manually curate or censor social media content," he said. “This is obvious to all of us. Isn’t it strange that the minister of IT, who seems to understand a lot of complex issues, is actually in favour of something like this?"

Abraham warned that the focus on blasphemous and vaguely defined "offensive" speech was dangerous, noting that the Hindu profession of belief in multiple gods is blasphemous to Muslims, Christians and Jews.

But Sibal was defiant.

Asked what would be deemed "offensive", he said: “We will define it, don’t worry, certainly, we will evolve guidelines…to ensure that such blasphemous content” is not publicly available in India.

Asked whether his idea was technically feasible, he responded: "It is a feasible proposition, and we will inform you how as and when, we will inform you as and when."

When it was pointed out that the internet was a global phenomenon and that content originating outside of India might be hard to control, Sibal said: "We will certainly ask [companies] to give us information even on content posted outside of India – we will ask them for information, we will evolve guidelines and mechanisms to deal with the issue."

So, again, if you are offended by this post, feel free to drop him a line. And good luck.

The original blog post was published by the Financial Time's beyondbrics on December 6, 2011. Sunil Abraham was quoted in this blog post. Read it here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/web-censorship

Nishant Shah

sunil — 2008-11-01T07:57:58Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/uploads/nishantshah1.gif

Tin Chen

sunil — 2009-09-08T04:56:25Z

Tin Chen holding camera.

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Pylons

sunil — 2008-09-26T13:26:58Z

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Route map for CCMG-JMI

admin — 2008-09-21T14:43:16Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/content-access/CCMG_Location.gif

J. T. D'souza

sunil — 2008-09-23T10:50:54Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/software-patents/JTDs-position-on-DPM.pdf

PDF Format

admin — 2011-08-23T03:06:23Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/standards/uploads/response-to-indian-open-standards-policy-09-sept-2008.pdf

Oo.org Format

admin — 2011-08-23T03:06:49Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/standards/uploads/response-to-indian-open-standards-policy-10-sept-2008.odt

MS Format

admin — 2011-08-23T03:07:11Z

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Open Access Day Flyer

sunil — 2008-10-31T09:24:39Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/openness/publications/content-access/open%20access%20day%20flyer.pdf