The Centre for Internet and Society
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Advancing Cyberstability Final Report
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/advancing-cyberstability-final-report
<b>Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) was acknowledged in the final report of the Global Commission on Stability of Cyberspace</b>
<p>CIS had engaged with the Commission throughout the process. An issue brief authored by Elonnai Hickok and Arindrajit Basu was published by them last year. A submission made by Gurshabad Grover, Elonnai Hickok, Karan Saini and Arindrajit Basu was also acknowledged. See the <a class="external-link" href="https://cyberstability.org/report/#acknowledgements">list of acknowledgements here</a>.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/advancing-cyberstability-final-report'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/advancing-cyberstability-final-report</a>
</p>
No publisherAdminInternet Governance2019-11-13T14:25:59ZNews ItemIndia’s Role in Global Cyber Policy Formulation
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/lawfare-arindrajit-basu-november-7-2019-indias-role-in-global-cyber-policy-formulation
<b>The past year has seen vigorous activity on the domestic cyber policy front in India. On key issues—including intermediary liability, data localization and e-commerce—the government has rolled out a patchwork of regulatory policies, resulting in battle lines being drawn by governments, industry and civil society actors both in India and across the globe.</b>
<p>The article by Arindrajit Basu was <a class="external-link" href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/indias-role-global-cyber-policy-formulation">published in Lawfare</a> on November 7, 2019. The article was reviewed and edited by Elonnai Hickok and Justin Sherman.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; ">The onslaught of recent developments demonstrates how India can shape cyber policy debates. Among emerging economies, India is uniquely positioned to exercise leverage over multinational tech companies due to its sheer population size, combined with a rapid surge in users coming online and the country’s large gross domestic product. India occupies a key seat at the <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/g20-data/592606/">data governance table</a> alongside other players like the EU, China, Russia and the United States — a position the country should use to promote its interests and those of other similarly placed emerging economies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For many years, the Indian population has served as an economic resource for foreign, largely U.S.-based tech giants. Now, however, India is moving toward a regulatory strategy that reduces the autonomy of these companies in order to pivot away from a system that recently has been termed “<a href="https://swarajyamag.com/magazine/colonialism-20-truly">data colonialism</a>”—in which Western technologies use data-driven revenue bolstered by information extracted from consumers in the Global South to consolidate their global market power. The policy thinking underpinning India’s new grand vision still has some gaps, however.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Data Localization</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Starting with a circular from the Reserve Bank of India in April 2018, the Indian government has <a href="https://twitter.com/cis_india/status/1143096429298085889">introduced a range of policy instruments</a> mandating “<a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/the-localisation-gambit.pdf">data localization</a>”—that is, requiring that certain kinds of data must be stored in servers located physically within India. A snapshot of these policies is summarized in the table below.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><img src="https://cis-india.org/home-images/IndianLaws.jpg" alt="Indian Laws" class="image-inline" title="Indian Laws" /></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: -webkit-center; ">(</span><em>Source </em><a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/the-localisation-gambit.pdf" style="text-align: -webkit-center; "><em>here</em></a><em>. Design credit: Saumyaa Naidu</em><span style="text-align: -webkit-center; ">)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: -webkit-center; ">While there are <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/the-localisation-gambit.pdf">a number of</a> reasons for this maneuver, two in particular are in line with India’s broader vision of data sovereignty—broadly defined as the sovereign right of nations to govern data within their territory and/or jurisdiction in order to support their national interest for the welfare of their citizens. First, there is an incentive to keep data within India’s jurisdiction because of the cumbersome process through which Indian law enforcement agencies must go during criminal investigations in order to access data stored in the U.S. Second, data localization undercuts the <a href="https://theprint.in/tech/digital-colonialism-why-countries-like-india-want-to-take-control-of-data-from-big-tech/298217/">extractive economic models</a> used by U.S. companies operating in India by which the data generated by Indian citizens is collected in India, stored in data centers located largely in the U.S., and processed and analyzed to derive commercially valuable insights.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Both foreign players and smaller Indian private-sector actors were against this move. A <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/the-localisation-gambit.pdf">study</a> on the issue that I co-authored earlier this year with Elonnai Hickok and Aditya Chawla found that one of the reasons for this resistance involved the high costs of setting up the data centers that are needed to comply with the requirement. President Trump <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-g20-leaders-special-event-digital-economy-osaka-japan/">echoed</a> this sentiment when he explicitly opposed data localization during a meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi on the sidelines of the G-20 in June 2019.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At the same time, large Indian players such as Reliance and Paytm and Chinese companies like AliBaba and Xilink were in favor of localization—possibly because these companies could absorb the costs of setting up storage facilities while benefiting from the fixed costs imposed on foreign competition. In fact, some companies, such as AliBaba, <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/newsbuzz/alibaba-cloud-opens-second-data-centre-in-india/articleshow/65995570.cms">have already set up storage facilities in India.</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As my co-authors and I noted, data localization comes with various risks, both diplomatically and politically. So far, the issue has caused friction in U.S.-India trade relations. For example, before Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's trip to New Delhi in June, the Trump administration <a href="https://thewire.in/diplomacy/us-india-h1b-visa-data-localisation">reportedly</a> contemplated limiting H-1B visas for any country that implements a localization requirement. Further, on his trips to New Delhi, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross has <a href="https://www.medianama.com/2019/05/223-us-trade-secretary-wilbur-ross-highlights-data-localisation-high-tariffs-on-electronics-telecom-products-in-india-as-trade-issues/">regularly argued</a> that data localization restrictions are a barrier to U.S. companies and stressed the need to eliminate such barriers. Further, data localization poses several <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/where-your-data-really-technical-case-against-data-localization">technical challenges</a> as well as security risks. Mirroring data across multiple locations, as India’s <a href="https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Personal_Data_Protection_Bill,2018.pdf">Draft Personal Data Protection Bill</a> mandates, increases the number of physical data centers that need to be protected and thereby the number of vulnerable points that malicious actors can attack.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Recently, the Indian media have reported <a href="https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/policymakers-a-divided-lot-on-personal-data-bill-provisions/articleshow/70404637.cms?from=mdr&utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst">disagreements</a> between policymakers over data localization, along with speculation that the data storage requirement in the Draft Personal Data Protection Bill could be limited only to critical data—a term not defined in the bill itself—or be left to sectoral regulators, officials from individual government departments.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Our paper <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/the-localisation-gambit.pdf">recommended a dual approach</a>. In our view, data localization policy should include mandatory localization for critical sectors such as defense or payments data, while also adopting “conditional” localization for all other data. Under conditional localization, data should only be transferred to countries that (a) agree to share the personal data of Indian citizens with law enforcement authorities based on Indian criminal procedure laws (examples of such a mechanism may be an executive data-sharing agreement under the <a href="https://epic.org/privacy/cloud-act/">CLOUD Act</a>) and (b) have equivalent privacy and security safeguards. This approach would be in line with India’s overarching vision of data sovereignty and the goal of standing up to the hegemony of big tech and of U.S. internet regulations, while avoiding undue collateral damage to India’s global alliances.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Intermediary Liability</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In line with the goal of ensuring that big tech is answerable to the rule of law, the Indian government has also sought to regulate the adverse social impacts of some speech hosted by platforms. Rule 3(9) of the <a href="https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Draft_Intermediary_Amendment_24122018.pdf">Draft of the Information Technology Intermediaries Guidelines (Amendment) Rules, 2018,</a> released by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology in December 2019, takes up the interventionist mission of laws like the <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/germanys-bold-gambit-prevent-online-hate-crimes-and-fake-news-takes-effect">NetzDg</a> in Germany. The regulation would mandate that platforms use “automated tools or appropriate mechanisms, with appropriate controls, for proactively identifying and removing or disabling public access to unlawful information or content.” These regulations have prompted concerns from both the private sector and civil society groups that claim the proposal fails to address <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/Intermediary%20Liability%20Rules%202018.pdf">constitutional concerns</a> about algorithmic discrimination, excessive censorship and inappropriate delegation of legislative powers under Indian law. Further, some observers object that the guidelines adopt a “one-size-fits-all” approach to classifying intermediaries that does not differentiate between platforms that thrive on end-to-end encryption like WhatsApp and public platforms like Facebook.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In many ways, these guidelines—likely to be <a href="https://www.medianama.com/2019/10/223-intermediary-guidelines-to-be-notified-by-jan-15-2020-meity-tells-supreme-court/">notified</a><a href="https://www.medianama.com/2019/10/223-intermediary-guidelines-to-be-notified-by-jan-15-2020-meity-tells-supreme-court/"> (as an amendment to the Information Technology Act) as early as January 2020</a>—put the cart before the horse. Before devising regulatory models appropriate for India’s geographic scale and population, it is first necessary to conduct empirical research about the vectors through which misinformation spreads in India and how misinformation impacts different social, economic and linguistic communities, along with pilot programs for potential solutions to the misinformation problem. And it is imperative that these measures be brought in line with constitutional requirements.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Community Data and “Data as a Public Good”</h3>
<p>Another important question involves the precise meaning of “data” itself—an issue on which various policy documents have failed to deliver a consistent stance.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The first conceptualization of “community data” appears in both the <a href="https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Data_Protection_Committee_Report.pdf">Srikrishna Committee Report</a> that accompanied the <a href="https://meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/Personal_Data_Protection_Bill,2018.pdf">Draft Personal Data Protection Bill</a> in 2018 and the draft e-commerce policy. However, neither policy provides clarity on the concept of data.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">When defining community data, the Srikrishna Report endorses a collective protection of privacy as protecting an identifiable community that has contributed to community data. According to the Srikrishna Report, receiving collective protection requires the fulfillment of three key aspects. First, the data belong to an identifiable community. Second, the individuals in the community consent to being a part of the community. And third, the community as a whole consents to its data being treated as community data.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The <a href="https://dipp.gov.in/sites/default/files/DraftNational_e-commerce_Policy_23February2019.pdf">draft e-commerce policy</a> reconceptualizes the notion of community data as “societal commons” or a “national resource,” where the undefined ‘community” has rights to access data but the government has overriding control to utilize the data for welfare purposes. Unlike the Srikrishna Report, the draft e-commerce policy does not outline the key aspects of community data. This approach fails to demarcate a clear line between personal and nonpersonal data or to specify any practical guidelines or restrictions on how the government can use community data. For this reason, implementation of this policy could pose a threat to the right to privacy that the Indian Supreme Court recognized as a <a href="https://thewire.in/law/supreme-court-aadhaar-right-to-privacy">fundamental right</a> in 2017.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The second idea is that of “data as a public good.” This is described in Chapter 4 of the <a href="https://www.indiabudget.gov.in/economicsurvey/doc/vol1chapter/echap04_vol1.pdf">2019 Economic Survey Report</a>—a document published by the Ministry of Finance along with the Annual Financial Budget. The report explicitly states that any data governance framework needs to be deferential to privacy norms and the soon-to-be-enacted privacy law. The report further states that “personal data” of an individual in the custody of a government is a “public good” once the datasets are anonymized.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, the report’s recommendation of setting up a government database that links several individual databases together leads to the <a href="https://thewire.in/government/india-vision-data-republic-dangers-privacy">“triangulation” problem</a>, in which individuals can be identified by matching different datasets together. The report further suggests that the same data can be sold to private firms (though it is unclear whether this includes foreign or domestic firms). This directly contradicts the characterization of a “public good”—which, by definition, must be <a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/public-good-economics">n</a><a href="https://www.britannica.com/topic/public-good-economics">onexcludable and nonrivalrous</a>—and is also at odds with the government’s vision of reining in big tech. The government has set up an expert committee to look into the scope of nonpersonal data, and the results of the committee’s deliberations <a href="https://www.medianama.com/2019/09/223-meity-non-personal-data-committee/">are likely to</a> influence the shape that India’s data governance framework takes across multiple policy instruments.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There is obviously a need to reassess and reevaluate the range of governance efforts and gambits that have emerged in the past year. With domestic cyber policy formulation pivots reaching a crescendo, we must consider how domestic cyber policy efforts can influence India’s approach to global debates in this space.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">India’s Contribution to Global Cyber Policy Debates</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As the largest democracy in the world, India is undoubtedly a key <a href="https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/reports/digital-deciders/">“digital decider”</a> in shaping the future of the internet. Multilateral cyber policy formulation efforts remain <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-potential-for-the-normative-regulation-of-cyberspace-implications-for-india">polarized</a>. The U.S. and its European allies continue to advocate for a free, rules-based conception of cyberspace with limited governmental interference. China and Russia, along with their Shanghai Cooperation Organisation allies, are pushing for a tightly regulated internet in which each state has the right to manage and define its “network frontiers” through domestic regulation free from external interference. To some degree, India is already influencing debate over the internet through its various domestic cyber policy movements. However, its participation in international debates has been lacking the vigor or coherence needed to clearly articulate India’s national interests and take up a global leadership role.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In shaping its contributions to global cyber policy formulation, India should focus its efforts on three key places: (a) internet governance forums that deliberate the governance of the technical architecture of the internet such as domain names, (b) cyber norms formulation processes that seek to establish norms to foster responsible behavior in cyberspace by states and nonstate actors in cyberspace, and (3) global debates on trade and cross-border data flows that seek to conceptualize the future of global digital trade relationships. As I discuss below, there are key divisions in Indian policy in each of these forums. To realize its grand vision in the digital sphere, India needs to do much more to make its presence felt.</p>
<p><em>Internet Governance Forums</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India’s stance on a variety of issues at internet governance forums has been inconsistent, switching repeatedly between <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/GCIG%20Volume%202%20WEB.pdf">multilateral and multistakeholder visions for internet governance.</a> A core reason for this uncertainty <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/indias-contribution-to-internet-governance-debates">is the participation of multiple Indian government</a> ministries, which often disagree with each other. At global internet governance forums, India has been represented either by the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (now renamed to Ministry of Electronics and Information Technoloft or the Department of Telecommunications (under the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology) or by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As my colleagues have documented <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/indias-contribution-to-internet-governance-debates">in a detailed paper,</a> India has been vocal in global internet governance debates at forums including the International Telecommunications Union, the Internet Governance Forum and the U.N. General Assembly. However, the Indian stance on <a href="https://www.diplomacy.edu/IGFLanguage/multistakeholderism">multistakeholderism</a> has been complex, with the MEA advocating for a multilateral stance while the other departments switched between multistakeholderism and “nuanced multilateralism”—which calls for multistakeholder participation in policy formulation but multilateral implementation. The paper also argues that there has been a decline recently in the vigor of Indian participation at forums such as the 2018 meeting of the Working Group on Enhanced Co-operation (WGEC 2.0), due to key personnel changes. For <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/indias-contribution-to-internet-governance-debates">example</a>, B.N. Reddy, who was a skilled and experienced negotiator for the MEA in previous forums, was transferred to another position before WGEC 2.0, and the delegation that attended the meeting did not make its presence felt as strongly or skillfully.</p>
<p><em>Cyber Norms for Responsible State Behavior in Cyberspace</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">With the exception of two broad and unoriginal statements at the <a href="https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/India.pdf">70th</a> and <a href="https://undocs.org/A/71/172">71st</a> sessions of the U.N. General Assembly, India has yet to make public its position on the multilateral debate on the proliferation of norms for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. During the <a href="https://dig.watch/events/open-ended-working-group-oewg-first-substantive-session">substantive session</a> of the Open-Ended Working Group held in September, India largely reaffirmed points made by other states, rather than carving out a new or original approach. The silence and ambiguity is surprising, as India has been represented on four of the five Groups of Governmental Experts (GGEs) set up thus far and has also been inducted into the 2019-2021 GGE that is set to revamp the global cyber norms process. (Due to the GGE’s rotational membership policy, India was not a member of the fourth GGE that submitted its report in 2015.)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, before becoming an evangelist of any particular norms, India has some homework to do domestically. It has yet to advance a clear, coherent and detailed public stance outlining its views on the application of international law to cyberspace. This public stance is necessary for two reasons. First, a well-reasoned statement that explains India’s stance on core security issues—such as the applicability of self-defense, countermeasures and international humanitarian law—would show India’s appetite for offensive and defensive strategies for external adversaries and allies alike. This would serve as the edifice of a potentially credible cyber deterrence strategy. Second, developing a public stance would help India to take advantage of the economic, demographic and political leverage that it holds and to assume a leadership role in discussions. The <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century">U.K.</a>, <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/frances-cyberdefense-strategic-review-and-international-law">France,</a> <a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/germanys-position-international-law-cyberspace">Germany</a>, <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/64490/estonia-speaks-out-on-key-rules-for-cyberspace/">Estonia</a>, <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Cuban-Expert-Declaration.pdf">Cuba</a> (backed by China and Russia) and the <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Brian-J.-Egan-International-Law-and-Stability-in-Cyberspace-Berkeley-Nov-2016.pdf">U.S.</a> have all made their positions publicly known with varying degrees of detail.</p>
<p><em>Data Transfers</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Unlike in other forums, Indian policy has been clearer in the cross-border data transfer debate. This is a foreign policy extension of India’s emphasis on localization and data sovereignty in domestic policy instruments. At the G-20 Summit in Osaka, India and the rest of the BRICS group (Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa) stressed the role that data play in economic development for emerging economies and reemphasized the need for <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0a8YsZQ0F6k&feature=youtu.be">data sovereignty</a>. India did not sign the <a href="https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/g20/2019-06-29-g20_declaration-declaration_g20.aspx?lang=eng">Osaka Declaration on the Digital Economy</a> that kickstarted the “Osaka Track”—a process whereby the 78 signatories agreed to participate in global policy discussions on international rule-making for e-commerce at the World Trade Organization (WTO). This was a continuation of India’s sustained efforts opposing the e-commerce moratorium at the WTO.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The importance of cross-border data flows in spurring the global economy found its way into the <a href="https://g20.org/pdf/documents/en/FINAL_G20_Osaka_Leaders_Declaration.pdf">Final G-20 Leaders Declaration</a>—which India signed. Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0a8YsZQ0F6k&feature=youtu.be">argued</a> that international rule-making on data transfers should not take place in plurilateral forums outside the WTO. Gokhale claimed that limiting the debate to the WTO would ensure that emerging economies have a say in the framing of the rules. The clarity expressed by the Indian delegation at the G-20 should be a model for more confident Indian leadership in this global cyber policy development space.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Looking Forward</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India is no newcomer to the idea of normative leadership. To overcome material shortcomings in the nation’s early years, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Indian prime minister, engineered a <a href="https://www.livemint.com/Opinion/h13WRfZP09BWA3Eg68TuVL/What-Narendra-Modi-has-Jawaharlal-Nehru-to-thank-for.html">normative pivot in world affairs</a> by championing the sovereignty of countries that had gained independence from colonial rule. In the years immediately after independence, the Indian foreign policy establishment sought to break the hegemony of the United States and the Soviet Union by advancing a foreign policy rooted in what came to be known as <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2016-09-19/india-after-nonalignment">“nonalignment.”</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Making sound contributions to foreign policy in cyberspace requires a variety of experts—international lawyers, computer scientists, geopolitical strategists and human rights advocates. Indian civil society and academia are brimming with tech policy enthusiasts from a variety of backgrounds who could add in-depth substance to the government’s cyber vision. Such engagement has begun to some extent at the domestic level: Most government policies are now opened up to consultation with stakeholders Yet there is still room for greater transparency in this process.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">India's cyber vision is worth fighting for. The continued monetization of data dividends by foreign big tech at the expense of India’s socioeconomic development needs to be countered. This can be accomplished by predictable and coherent policymaking that balances economic growth and innovation with the fundamental rights and values enshrined in the Indian Constitution, including the right to equality, freedom of speech and expression, and the right to life. But inherent contradictions in the conceptualization of personal data, delays in tabling the Personal Data Protection Bill, and uncertain or rushed approaches in several other regulatory policies are all fettering the realization of this vision. On core geopolitical issues, there exists an opportunity to set the rule-shaping agenda to favor India’s sovereign interests. With global cyber policy formulation in a state of flux, India has the economic, demographic and intellectual leverage to have a substantial impact on the debate and recraft the narrative in favor of the rapidly emerging Global South.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/lawfare-arindrajit-basu-november-7-2019-indias-role-in-global-cyber-policy-formulation'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/lawfare-arindrajit-basu-november-7-2019-indias-role-in-global-cyber-policy-formulation</a>
</p>
No publisherbasuCyber SecurityInternet Governance2019-11-13T14:13:33ZBlog EntryUN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy Consultation on 'Privacy and Gender'
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/un-special-rapporteur-on-the-right-to-privacy-consultation-on-privacy-and-gender
<b>Ambika Tandon was a speaker at the Consultation on Privacy and Gender organised by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy held at New York University, New York on October 30 - 31, 2019. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The consultation was held to receive feedback on the report on privacy and gender towards which Pallavi, Aayush, Pranav and Ambika sent comments. Ambika was a speaker in t<span>he session 'The Body: as Data, as Identity, as </span><span>Money Maker', chaired by Eva Blum-Dumontet from Privacy </span><span>International, with co-panelists Anja Kovacs, Director, Internet </span><span>Democracy Project, and Joana Varon, Director, Coding Rights.</span></p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/un-special-rapporteur-on-the-right-to-privacy-consultation-on-privacy-and-gender'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/un-special-rapporteur-on-the-right-to-privacy-consultation-on-privacy-and-gender</a>
</p>
No publisherAdminInternet GovernancePrivacy2019-11-02T06:39:25ZNews ItemOctober 2019 Newsletter
https://cis-india.org/about/newsletters/october-2019-newsletter
<b>CIS newsletter for October 2019:</b>
<table class="grid listing">
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Highlights for October 2019</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify;">Gurshabad Grover <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/openness/news/gurshabad-grover-nominated-to-join-advisory-group-on-open-source-software-for-iso-iec-jtc-1">has been nominated</a> through the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) to be a member of the Advisory Group on Open Source Software for ISO/IEC JTC 1.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">In the wake of the Christchurch terror attacks, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Jacinda Ardern, and the President of France, Emmanuel Macron co-chaired the Christchurch Call to Action in May 2018 to “bring together countries and tech companies in an attempt to bring to an end the ability to use social media to organise and promote terrorism and violent extremism.” <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/tanaya-rajwade-elonnai-hickok-and-raouf-kundil-peedikayil-october-31-2019-comments-to-christchurch-call">CIS sent its comments to the Call</a>.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">Over the past decade, a few private online intermediaries, by rapid innovation and integration, have turned into regulators of a substantial amount of online speech. Such concentrated power calls for a high level of responsibility on them to ensure that the rights of the users online, including their rights to free speech and privacy, are maintained. CIS has <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/torsha-sarkar-suhan-s-and-gurshabad-grover-october-30-2019-through-the-looking-glass">analyzed the companies' transparency reports</a> for government requests for user data and content removal.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">The Department of Labour convened an interaction program of sorts at Vikas Soudha in Bangalore on 21st October, 2019 to hear the issues plaguing the emergent gig economy. Bharath Gururagavendran has <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/department-of-labour-interaction-program-online-business-platforms">thrown more light on this</a> in a blog post.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">CIS <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-the-united-nations-human-rights-commission-report-on-gender-and-privacy">presented a response</a> to the ‘Gender issues arising in the digital era and their impacts on women, men and individuals of diverse sexual orientations gender identities, gender expressions and sex characteristics. </li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">CIS <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aayush-rathi-ambika-tandon-amruta-mahuli-october-25-2019-comments-to-code-on-social-security">made a submission</a> to the draft Code on Social Security, 2019 prepared by the Government of India’s Ministry of Labour and Employment.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">On October 17, 2019, the UN Special Rapporteur (UNSR) on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, Philip Alston, released his thematic report on digital technology, social protection and human rights. Understanding the impact of technology on the provision of social protection – and, by extent, its impact on people in vulnerable situations – <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy-international-ambika-tandon-october-17-2019-mother-and-child-tracking-system-understanding-data-trail-indian-healthcare">has been part of the work CIS has been doing</a>.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">A case study titled <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/artificial-intelligence-in-the-delivery-of-public-services-elonnai-hickok-pranav-bidare-arindrajit-basu-siddharth-october-16-2019-farming-the-future">Farming the Future: Deployment of Artificial Intelligence in the agricultural sector in India</a> was published as a chapter in the joint UNESCAP-Google publication titled Artificial Intelligence in Public Service Delivery. </li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">In response to our call for contributions and reflections on ‘Decolonising the Internet’s Languages’ in August, we are delighted to announce that <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/raw/stil-2020-selected-contributions">we received 50 submissions, in over 38 languages!</a> From all these extraordinary offerings, we have selected nine that we will invite and support the contributors to expand further.</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">In <a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/raw/big-data-reproductive-health-india-mcts">a case study undertaken as part of the Big Data for Development</a> (BD4D) network, Ambika Tandon evaluates the Mother and Child Tracking System (MCTS) as data-driven initiative in reproductive health at the national level in India.</li></ul>
</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<h3>CIS and the News</h3>
<p>The following articles and research papers were authored by CIS secretariat during the month:</p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/modern-war-institute-september-30-2019-arindrajit-basu-and-karan-saini-setting-international-norms-cyber-conflict-hard-doesnt-mean-stop-trying">Setting International Norms of Cyber Conflict is Hard, But that Doesn't Mean that We Should Stop Trying</a> (Arindrajit Basu and Karan Saini; Modern War Institute; September 30, 2019).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/raw/digital-domestic-work-india-announcement">Digital mediation of domestic and care work in India: Project Announcement</a> (Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi; Feminist Internet Research Network, APC; October 1, 2019).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/raw/doing-standpoint-theory">Doing Standpoint Theory</a> (Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi; Gender IT; October 10, 2019).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/fountain-ink-october-12-2019-arindrajit-basu-we-need-a-better-ai-vision">We need a better AI vision</a> (Arindrajit Basu; Fountainink; October 12, 2019).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/artificial-intelligence-in-the-delivery-of-public-services-elonnai-hickok-pranav-bidare-arindrajit-basu-siddharth-october-16-2019-farming-the-future">Farming the Future: Deployment of Artificial Intelligence in the agricultural sector in India</a> (Elonnai Hickok, Arindrajit Basu, Siddharth Sonkar and Pranav M B; UNESCAP-Google publication titled Artificial Intelligence in Public Service Delivery; October 16, 2019).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy-international-ambika-tandon-october-17-2019-mother-and-child-tracking-system-understanding-data-trail-indian-healthcare">The Mother and Child Tracking System - understanding data trail in the Indian healthcare systems</a> (Ambika Tandon; Privacy International; October 17, 2019).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/raw/indian-express-nishant-shah-october-20-2019-digital-native-in-your-face-artificial-intelligence-biometric-facial-recognition-smart-technologies">Facial recognition at airports promises convenience in exchange for surveillance</a> (Nishant Shah; Indian Express; October 20, 2019).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-orfonline-october-21-2019-politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace">“Politics by other means”: Fostering positive contestation and charting ‘red lines’ through global governance in cyberspace</a> (Arindrajit Basu; Global Policy and ORF; October 21, 2019).</li></ul>
<h3>CIS in the News</h3>
<p>CIS secretariat was consulted for the following articles published during the month in various publications:</p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/newsminute-october-1-2019-theja-ram-why-conviction-rate-for-cyber-crime-cases-in-karnataka-is-abysmally-low">Why conviction rate for cyber crime cases in Karnataka is abysmally low</a> (Theja Ram; News Minute; October 1, 2019).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-shreya-nandi-prathma-sharma-october-15-2019-will-fastag-raise-privacy-concerns">Will FASTag raise privacy concerns</a>? (Shreya Nandi and Prathma Sharma; Livemint; October 15, 2019).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/reuters-annie-banerji-october-17-2019-indias-hiv-positive-trans-people-find-new-strength-in-technology">India's HIV-positive trans people find 'new strength' in technology</a> (Annie Banerji; Reuters; October 17, 2019). Also mirrored in Jakarta Post and ETHealthworld.com.</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-asmita-bakshi-october-18-2019-dystopia-vs-development">Dystopia vs development: The Kashmir paradox</a> (Asmita Bakshi; Livemint; October 19, 2019).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/news-central-october-21-2019-puja-bhattacharjee-trending-hate-against-muslims">Trending Hate Against Muslims: Is Twitter Complicit? </a>(Puja Bhattacharjee; News Central; October 21, 2019).</li></ul>
<h2><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/a2k">Access to Knowledge</a></h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Access to Knowledge is a campaign to promote the fundamental principles of justice, freedom, and economic development. It deals with issues like copyrights, patents and trademarks, which are an important part of the digital landscape.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify;">Wikipedia</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Under a grant from Wikimedia Foundation we are doing a project for the growth of Indic language communities and projects by designing community collaborations and partnerships that recruit and cultivate new editors and explore innovative approaches to building projects.</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><span style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Blog Entry </strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/a2k/analysis-on-the-strategies-of-mozilla-and-wiki-communities-on-gender-gap-aspects-1">Analysis on the strategies of Mozilla and Wiki communities on gender gap aspects</a> (Bhuvana Meenakshi; October 3, 2019).</li></ul>
<ul></ul>
<h2><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance">Internet Governance</a></h2>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Tunis Agenda of the second World Summit on the Information Society has defined internet governance as the development and application by governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles of shared principles, norms, rules, decision making procedures and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet. As part of internet governance work we work on policy issues relating to freedom of expression primarily focusing on the Information Technology Act and issues of liability of intermediaries for unlawful speech and simultaneously ensuring that the right to privacy is safeguarded as well.</p>
<h3>Freedom of Speech & Expression</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Under a grant from the MacArthur Foundation, CIS is doing research on the restrictions placed on freedom of expression online by the Indian government and contribute studies, reports and policy briefs to feed into the ongoing debates at the national as well as international level. As part of the project we bring you the following outputs:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Research Paper</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/designing-a-human-rights-impact-assessment-for-icann2019s-policy-development-processes">Designing a Human Rights Impact Assessment for ICANN’s Policy Development Processes</a> (Collin Kure, Akriti Bopanna and Austin Ruckstuhl; October 3, 2019).</li></ul>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Submissions / Analysis</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/torsha-sarkar-suhan-s-and-gurshabad-grover-october-30-2019-through-the-looking-glass">Through the looking glass: Analysing transparency reports</a> (Torsha Sarkar, Suhan S and Gurshabad Grover; October 30, 2019).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/tanaya-rajwade-elonnai-hickok-and-raouf-kundil-peedikayil-october-31-2019-comments-to-christchurch-call">CIS’ Comments to the Christchurch Call </a>(Tanaya Rajwade, Elonnai Hickok, and Raouf Kundil Peedikayil; October 31, 2019).</li></ul>
<p><strong>Blog Entry</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/department-of-labour-interaction-program-online-business-platforms">Department of Labour Interaction Program: Online Business Platforms</a> (Bharath Gururagavendran; edited by Ambika Tandon; October 29, 2019). </li></ul>
<ul></ul>
<p><strong>Participation in Events</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/roundtable-discussion-on-intermediary-liability">Roundtable Discussion on Intermediary Liability</a> (Organized by SFLC and the Dialogue; New Delhi; October 17, 2019). Tanaya Rajwade participated in a roundtable discussion on intermediary liability.</li></ul>
<h3></h3>
<h3>Gender</h3>
<p><strong>Participation in Event</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/due-diligence-project-fgd-by-un-women">Due Diligence Project FGD by UN Women</a> (Organized by UN; UN House, New Delhi; October 11, 2019). Radhika Radhakrishnan attended a focussed group discussion.</li></ul>
<h3>Privacy</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Under a grant from Privacy International and IDRC we are doing a project on surveillance. CIS is researching the history of privacy in India and how it shapes the contemporary debates around technology mediated identity projects like Aadhar. As part of our ongoing research, we bring you the following outputs:</p>
<p><strong>Submissions</strong></p>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-the-united-nations-human-rights-commission-report-on-gender-and-privacy">Comments to the United Nations Human Rights Commission Report on Gender and Privacy</a> (Aayush Rathi, Ambika Tandon and Pallavi Bedi; October 24, 2019). </li>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aayush-rathi-ambika-tandon-amruta-mahuli-october-25-2019-comments-to-code-on-social-security">Comments to the Code on Social Security, 2019</a> (Aayush Rathi , Amruta Mahuli and Ambika Tandon; October 27, 2019).</li></ul>
<p><strong>Participation in Events</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bsides-delhi-2019-security-conference">BSides Delhi 2019 Security Conference</a> (Organized by Bsides Delhi; New Delhi; October 11, 2019).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/participation-in-iso-iec-jtc-1-sc-27-meetings">ISO/IEC JTC 1 SC 27 meetings</a> (Organized by ISO/IEC JTC; Paris; October 14 - 18, 2019). Gurshabad Grover participated in the meetings. </li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/un-special-rapporteur-on-the-right-to-privacy-consultation-on-privacy-and-gender">UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy Consultation on 'Privacy and Gender'</a> (Organized by UN Special Rapporteur; New York University, New York; October 30 - 31, 2019).</li></ul>
<ul></ul>
<h3>Artificial Intelligence / Digital Technology</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">With origins dating back to the 1950s Artificial Intelligence (AI) is not necessarily new. However, interest in AI has been rekindled over the recent years due to advancements of technology and its applications to real-world scenarios. We conduct research on the existing legal and regulatory parameters:</p>
<p><strong>Blog Entry</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ai-for-good-event-report-on-workshop-conducted-at-unbox-festival">AI for Good</a> (Shweta Mohandas and Saumyaa Naidu; edited by Elonnai Hickok; October 9, 2019). </li></ul>
<p><strong>Participation in Events</strong></p>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify;">
<div id="_mcePaste"><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/nipfp-seminar-on-exploring-policy-issues-in-the-digital-technology-arena">NIPFP Seminar on Exploring Policy Issues in the Digital Technology Arena</a> (Organized by Indian Institute of Advanced Study; Shimla; October 10 - 11, 2019). Anubha Sinha participated in this seminar as a discussant.</div>
</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">
<div id="_mcePaste"><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/ai-opera-ai-as-a-total-work-of-art">AI Opera- AI as a total work of art</a> (Organized by Goethe; Bangalore; October 11, 2019). Shweta Mohandas and Mira were panelists.</div>
</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">
<div id="_mcePaste"><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/panelist-at-launch-of-google-unescap-ai-report">Launch of Google-UNESCAP AI Report</a> (Organized by Google; United Nations Convention Centre; Bangkok; October 16, 2019). Arindrajit Basu was a speaker.</div>
</li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">
<div id="_mcePaste"><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/discussion-at-cyfy-on-technology-policy-and-national-security-building-21st-century-curricula-in-india2019s-law-schools">Discussion at CyFy on Technology, Policy and National Security: Building 21st Century Curricula in India’s Law Schools</a> (Organized by Centre for Communication Governance, National Law University, Delhi and Observer Research Foundation; Villa Medici, Taja Mahal Hotel, Man Singh Road, New Delhi; October 20, 2019).</div>
</li></ul>
<h3></h3>
<h3><a style="text-align: justify;" class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/raw">Researchers@Work</a></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The researchers@work programme at CIS produces and supports pioneering and sustained trans-disciplinary research on key thematics at the intersections of internet and society; organise and incubate networks of and fora for researchers and practitioners studying and making internet in India; and contribute to development of critical digital pedagogy, research methodology, and creative practice.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Announcement</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/raw/stil-2020-selected-contributions">State of the Internet's Languages 2020: Announcing selected contributions</a>! (P.P. Sneha; November 1, 2019).</li></ul>
<p><strong>Case Study</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/raw/big-data-reproductive-health-india-mcts">Big Data and Reproductive Health in India: A Case Study of the Mother and Child Tracking System</a> (Ambika Tandon; October 17, 2019).</li></ul>
<p>Participation in Event</p>
<ul>
<li style="text-align: justify;"><a class="external-link" href="https://cis-india.org/raw/dtil-2019-from-conversations-to-actions">Decolonizing the Internet’s Languages 2019 - From Conversations to Actions</a> (Organized by Whose Knowledge; London; October 23 - 24, 2019). P.P. Sneha participated in this meeting.</li></ul>
<p><strong>Blog Entries</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://medium.com/rawblog/mobilizing-online-consensus-net-neutrality-and-the-india-subreddit-90f58a7429ed">Mobilizing Online Consensus: Net Neutrality and the India Subreddit</a> (Sujeet George; October 1, 2019).</li>
<li><a class="external-link" href="https://medium.com/rawblog/how-green-is-the-internet-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-8fccaf6fecca">How Green is the Internet? The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly</a> (Aishwarya Panicker; October 11, 2019).</li></ul>
<ul></ul>
<hr />
<h3><a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/">About CIS</a></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify;">CIS is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security. The academic research at CIS seeks to understand the reconfigurations of social and cultural processes and structures as mediated through the internet and digital media technologies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><strong>Follow CIS on:</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Twitter:<a href="http://twitter.com/cis_india"> http://twitter.com/cis_india</a></li>
<li>Twitter - Access to Knowledge: <a href="https://twitter.com/CISA2K">https://twitter.com/CISA2K</a></li>
<li>Twitter - Information Policy: <a href="https://twitter.com/CIS_InfoPolicy">https://twitter.com/CIS_InfoPolicy</a></li>
<li>Facebook - Access to Knowledge:<a href="https://www.facebook.com/cisa2k"> https://www.facebook.com/cisa2k</a></li>
<li>E-Mail - Access to Knowledge: a2k@cis-india.org</li>
<li>E-Mail - Researchers at Work: raw@cis-india.org</li>
<li>List - Researchers at Work: <a href="https://lists.ghserv.net/mailman/listinfo/researchers">https://lists.ghserv.net/mailman/listinfo/researchers</a></li></ul>
<p><strong>Support CIS:</strong></p>
<p>Please help us defend consumer and citizen rights on the Internet! Write a cheque in favour of 'The Centre for Internet and Society' and mail it to us at No. 194, 2nd 'C' Cross, Domlur, 2nd Stage, Bengaluru - 5600 71.</p>
<p><strong>Collaborate with CIS:</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">We invite researchers, practitioners, artists, and theoreticians, both organisationally and as individuals, to engage with us on topics related internet and society, and improve our collective understanding of this field. To discuss such possibilities, please write to Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, at sunil@cis-india.org (for policy research), or Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Research Director, at sumandro@cis-india.org (for academic research), with an indication of the form and the content of the collaboration you might be interested in. To discuss collaborations on Indic language Wikipedia projects, write to Tanveer Hasan, Programme Officer, at tanveer@cis-india.org.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><em>CIS is grateful to its primary donor the Kusuma Trust founded by Anurag Dikshit and Soma Pujari, philanthropists of Indian origin for its core funding and support for most of its projects. CIS is also grateful to its other donors, Wikimedia Foundation, Ford Foundation, Privacy International, UK, Hans Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, and IDRC for funding its various projects</em>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/about/newsletters/october-2019-newsletter'>https://cis-india.org/about/newsletters/october-2019-newsletter</a>
</p>
No publisherpraskrishnaInternet GovernanceAccess to Knowledge2019-12-06T04:53:41ZPage CIS’ Comments to the Christchurch Call
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/tanaya-rajwade-elonnai-hickok-and-raouf-kundil-peedikayil-october-31-2019-comments-to-christchurch-call
<b>In the wake of the Christchurch terror attacks, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Jacinda Ardern, and the President of France, Emmanuel Macron co-chaired the Christchurch Call to Action in May 2018 to “bring together countries and tech companies in an attempt to bring to an end the ability to use social media to organise and promote terrorism and violent extremism.”</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Fifty one supporters, including India, and eight tech companies have jointly agreed to a set of non-binding commitments and ongoing collaboration to eliminate violent and extremist content online. Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, Google, and Amazon are all among the online service provider signatories that released a joint statement welcoming the call and committing to a nine-point action plan.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Call has been hailed by many as a step in the right direction, as it represents the first collaboration between governments and the private sector companies to combat the problem of extremist content online at this scale. However, the vagueness of the commitments outlined in the Call and some of the proposed mechanisms have raised concerns about the potential abuse of human rights by both governments and tech companies.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This response is divided into two parts - Part One examines the call through the lens of human rights, and Part Two thinks through the ways in which India can adhere to the commitments in the Call, and compares the current legal framework in India with the commitments outlined in the Call.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Click to read the <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/cis2019-comments-to-the-christchurch-call">comments here</a>. The comments were prepared by Tanaya Rajwade, Elonnai Hickok, and Raouf Kundil Peedikayil and edited by Gurshabad Grover and Amber Sinha.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/tanaya-rajwade-elonnai-hickok-and-raouf-kundil-peedikayil-october-31-2019-comments-to-christchurch-call'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/tanaya-rajwade-elonnai-hickok-and-raouf-kundil-peedikayil-october-31-2019-comments-to-christchurch-call</a>
</p>
No publisherTanaya Rajwade, Elonnai Hickok, and Raouf Kundil PeedikayilFreedom of Speech and ExpressionSocial MediaInternet Governance2019-11-04T14:13:13ZBlog EntryThrough the looking glass: Analysing transparency reports
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/torsha-sarkar-suhan-s-and-gurshabad-grover-october-30-2019-through-the-looking-glass
<b>An analysis of companies' transparency reports for government requests for user data and content removal</b>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Over the past decade, a few private online intermediaries, by rapid innovation and integration, have turned into regulators of a substantial amount of online speech. Such concentrated power calls for a high level of responsibility on them to ensure that the rights of the users online, including their rights to free speech and privacy, are maintained. Such responsibility may include appealing or refusing to entertain government requests that are technically or legally flawed, or resisting gag orders on requests. For the purposes of measuring a company’s practices regarding refusing flawed requests and standing up for user rights, transparency reporting becomes useful and relevant.Making information regarding the same public also ensures that researchers can build upon such data and recommend ways to improve accountability and enables the user to understand information about when and how governments are restricting their rights.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">For some time in the last decade, Google and Twitter were the only major online platforms that published half-yearly transparency reports documenting the number of content take down and user information requests they received from law enforcement agencies. In 2013 however, that changed, when the Snowden leaks revealed, amongst other things, that these companies were often excessively compliant with requests from US’ intelligence operations, and allowed them backdoor surveillance access to user information. Subsequently, all the major Silicon Valley internet companies have been attempting to publish a variance or other of transparency reports, in hopes of re-building their damaged goodwill, and displaying a measure of accountability to its users.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The number of government requests for user data and content removal has also seen a steady rise. In 2014, for instance Google noted that in the US alone, they observed a 19% rise for the second half of the year, and an overall 250% jump in numbers since Google began providing this information. As per a study done by Comparitech, India sent the maximum number of government requests for content removal and user data in the period of 2009 - 2018.8 This highlights the increasing importance of accessible transparency reporting.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">Initiatives analysing the transparency reporting practices of online platforms, like The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)’s Who Has Your Back? reports, for instance, have developed a considerable body of work tracing these reporting practices, but have largely focused at them in the context of the United States (US). In our research, we found that the existing methodology and metrics to assess the transparency reports of online platforms developed by organisations like the EFF are not adequate in the Indian context. We identify two reasons for developing a new methodology:</p>
<ol>
<li style="text-align: justify;">Online platforms make available vastly different information for US and India. For instance, Facebook breaks up the legal requests it receives for US into eight different classes (search warrants, subpoenas, etc.). Such a classification is not present for India. These differences are summarised in Annexure </li>
<li style="text-align: justify;">The legal regimes and procedural safeguards under which states can compel platforms to share information or take content down also differ. For instance, in India, an order for content takedown can be issued either under section 79 and its allied rules or under section 69A and its rules, each having their own procedures and relevant authorities. A summary of such provisions for Indian agencies is given in Annexure 3.</li></ol>
<p style="text-align: justify;">These differences may merit differences in the methodology for research into understanding the reporting practices of these platforms, depending on each jurisdiction’s legal context.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In this report, we would be analyzing the transparency reports of online platforms with a large Indian user-base, specifically focusing on data they publish about user information and takedown requests received from Indian governments’ and courts.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">First, we detail our methodology for this report, including how we selected platforms whose transparency reports we analyse, and then specific metrics relating to information available in those reports. For the latter, we collate relevant metrics from existing frameworks, and propose a standard that can be applicable for our research.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">In the second part, we present company-specific reports. We identify general trends in the data published by the company, and then compare the available data to the best practices of transparency reporting that we proposed.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/A%20collation%20and%20analysis%20of%20government%20requests%20for%20user%20data%20%20and%20content%20removal%20from%20non-Indian%20intermediaries%20.pdf">Download the full report</a>. The report was edited by Elonnai Hickok. Research assistance by Keying Geng and Anjanaa Aravindan.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/torsha-sarkar-suhan-s-and-gurshabad-grover-october-30-2019-through-the-looking-glass'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/torsha-sarkar-suhan-s-and-gurshabad-grover-october-30-2019-through-the-looking-glass</a>
</p>
No publisherTorsha Sarkar, Suhan S and Gurshabad GroverFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernancePrivacy2019-11-02T05:48:59ZBlog EntryDepartment of Labour Interaction Program: Online Business Platforms
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/department-of-labour-interaction-program-online-business-platforms
<b>The Department of Labour convened an interaction program of sorts at Vikas Soudha in Bangalore on 21st October, 2019 to hear the issues plaguing the emergent gig economy.</b>
<p>The blog post was edited by Ambika Tandon.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The meeting was called to hear and address the grievances of gig workers, (employed by online business platforms) in the presence of their employers. The meeting was presided by the esteemed Labour Minister, Shri. Suresh Kumar, and the Secretary to the Labour Department, Shri Manivannan. The Minister began by disclosing that union members and delivery partners employed by online delivery companies (Swiggy, Zomato, Ola, Flipkart, etc.) had approached his office, with several complaints pertaining to the legal treatment or lack thereof, of gig workers across the nation. They also further identified the day-to-day concerns that they had to face (i.e. health & pay-related issues) as a consequence of their non-recognition under the labour law frameworks in the country.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">"<i>The majority of the delivery boys that aggregators (e.g. Swiggy, Ola, Uber, etc.) employ are full-time workers who depend solely on these companies for their income</i>." That was the refrain of most of the spokespeople supporting the cause of gig workers. These were some of the representatives who spoke on behalf of the gig workers employed by online aggregators:</p>
<ol>
<li>Mr. G. S. Kumar (Food Delivery Partners Association)</li>
<li>Mr. Tanveer Pasha (Ola driver)</li>
<li>Mr. M. Manjunath (Auto Chalaka Okkuta) </li>
<li>Mr. Amit Gupta (Brand Strategist) </li>
<li>Ms. Kaveri (Researcher) </li>
<li>Mr. Basavaraj (Food Delivery Association)</li>
</ol>
<p><strong><i>"The delivery partners employed by online aggregators should be treated as full-time employees"</i></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. G.S Kumar, an office-bearer at the Food Delivery Partners Samithi set the context for the conversation, by identifying at the very outset that the term "delivery partners" is a misnomer and that they are largely full-time employees. They are further straddled with family commitments, health concerns, and dwindling pay structures. As such, he proclaimed that they are deserving of the protections statutorily available to employees (in the traditional sense of the term) under the extant labour legislations. It was also specifically highlighted by Mr. K.S. Kumar, that in status quo, delivery boys cannot avail of ESI, or PF benefits.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Furthermore, the protections the companies make available are also quite abysmal, for instance a Rs. 2 lakh accidental cover that's rarely ever paid. The practical exigencies of their itinerant lifestyles inhibit them from maintaining strict compliance with the protocols that are unfortunately condition precedents to obtaining the benefits they so desperately require. The language of these policies in the fine print often contains conditions that are quite hard to satisfy, and as such, the benefits remain inaccessible to the vast majority of drivers employed by these online business platforms. Adding value to this criticism of Mr. K.S. Kumar, Mr. Basavaraj later clarified that conditions such as requiring 24 hours of admittance for the processing of insurance claims, makes it nigh impossible for drivers plying the roads to ever materially avail of health or accidental insurance.</p>
<p><strong><i>"Ola/Uber drivers face serious health risks, as they ply the roads of Bangalore, and require functional insurance"</i></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Tanveer Pasha, a member of the Ola/Uber Drivers Association, discussed the lived experiences of these delivery boys who ply the road, travelling nearly fifteen to twenty kilometres for each trip in peak Bangalore traffic. He narrated stories of trauma and violence faced by drivers, such as instances of heart attacks and accidents, which made the conversation a little heated. The minister then deftly interjected, by requesting them to be solution-centric, while discussing their grievances, as this aids the government's ability to balance the competing interests of both the aggregators and the gig workers.</p>
<p><strong><i>"A Government ombudsman is required to address the grievances of gig workers"</i></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To that effect, M. Manjunath from the Auto and Taxi Association asserted that insurance is a basic right that should be provided to the employees. Amit Gupta, Brand Strategist, spoke on behalf of his sister, previously employed at Swiggy, and stated that an ombudsman empowered to take complaints, even from gig workers, should be created. He believed this was imperative given that aggregators are de facto free to violate the terms and conditions prescribed in the employment order, as they have the resources to see the case through in court, whereas employees don't have much recourse, outside of trade unions. He concluded that for these delivery partners devoid of the right to collectivize, it becomes crucially important to maintain at the very least, a Government ombudsman.</p>
<p><strong><i>"Aggregators should not profit off of the positive network effects gained through delivery partners, and simultaneously deny their right to protest unfair business practices"</i></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Ms. Kaveri, a researcher on the conditions of gig workers, brought to light some of the more egregious problems that are faced by these workers. For instance, they are removed from employment, at a moment's notice if they attempt to protest, and to that effect, she stated that Zomato had fired an employee that very day because he was supposed to participate in the meeting and make his case. She further specified that it was patently unfair to allow these aggregators to profit off of the positive network effects gained solely because of the delivery partners, and subsequently engage in cost-cutting practices like reducing the incentives that they receive.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In response to these claims, the Labour Minister invited representatives of online platforms to shed some clarity on the concerns raised by the gig workers they employ.</p>
<p>These were some of the representatives who spoke on behalf of the online aggregators:</p>
<ol>
<li>Mr. Manjunath (Flipkart) </li>
<li>Mr. Panduranga (Legal Team, Swiggy) </li>
<li>Mr. Ashok Kumar (Zomato) </li>
</ol>
<p><strong><i>"Flipkart does provide significant benefits to its fixed-term contractors"</i></strong></p>
<p>Mr. Manjunath clarified his position on these issues, with regards to Flipkart, by stating that there is a tripartite classification amongst people who work there:</p>
<p>a) Full-time employees</p>
<p>b) Fixed Term Contractors (e.g. 8 or 10-month contract)</p>
<p>c) Interns</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">He further affirmed that even for fixed term contractors, Flipkart offers ESI, and PF benefits. He also specified that they don't hire more employees or fixed-term contractors during peak season, but rather hire only interns to meet demand, as it offers the inexperienced interns a chance to gain industry exposure as well.</p>
<p><strong><i>"Swiggy empowers the agency of its delivery partners, and provides necessary benefits" </i></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Panduranga, from the legal department at Swiggy, in direct response to the concerns about Swiggy, stated that the gig economy is emergent and that Swiggy and other such aggregators are merely technology platforms, facilitating end-to-end services (between different stakeholders, e.g. customer-driver-restaurant). In that sense, he clarified that the delivery partners they employ have the right to accept or deny deliveries and that there is no compulsion to commit to the work. Moreover, he specified that merely logging off the app frees up a delivery partner of his or her time. He opined that they have the freedom to work for multiple companies, and the process of joining and leaving is highly flexible. In that sense, he stated that a large number of students and after-office hours employees are the ones employing these apps as a means to generating quick cash flows (and as such, should not be treated as full-time employees). He also mentioned that there is up to 1 lakh for medical expenses, (which are currently being disbursed), and Rs. 5 lakhs for accidental death coverage as well. Mr. Ashok Kumar from Zomato also reaffirmed the statements of Mr. Panduranga.</p>
<p><strong><i>"Incentive and disincentive structures coercively compel gig workers to work hours akin to full-time employees"</i></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Basavaraj from the Food delivery Association/Samithi, along with all the other representatives clarified that it is extremely unlikely that the majority of gig workers are part-time and only in it for generating quick money. Instead, the majority of gig workers work 9-12-hour workdays, and in that sense, are really no different from traditional employees. Basavaraj stated that an examination of the travel logs of delivery partners will make it clear whether the majority of workers are part-time or full time. He also pointed out that incentive and disincentive structures coercively compel drivers to work long hours with poor working conditions. For example, drivers who don't operate during peak hours do not receive the incentives they are promised. Further, the manner of advertisement of these jobs is itself insidious, as the salary offering is inclusive of the money one would receive if they also met their incentive-targets. Basavaraj specified that the deceptive advertising of these companies is what leads to massive hordes of gig workers working, in essence, full-time jobs, and as such, they must require the protection of their rights enshrined under labour legislations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There was also collective agreement from the spokespeople making a case on behalf of the gig workers, that the benefits provided on paper (health insurance for accident cases) are rarely ever provided, and that the process of acquiring the same is rife with hassles. However, this was met with fervent opposition from the spokespeople representing the online aggregators, who contended that these insurance payments were being sanctioned freely without inconvenience.</p>
<p><strong><i>Concluding Observations of the Labour Minister</i></strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Labour Minister, Shri. Suresh Kumar, identified that this is an emergent issue; one that requires serious consideration, as the gig economy is here to stay. He reaffirmed the social responsibility of the Government to inspect this matter and set up a legal framework, as it concerns the deprivation of agency for lakhs of people working as gig workers in the state, and across the country. He also affirmed that he is cognizant of the business interests at play. To that effect, he declared that the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Shri. Balakrishnan would examine the relevant data at hand, hold necessary meetings with both parties, and submit a report on the creation of a prospective framework to regulate gig economies within one month. He stated that the Government will set up a framework with governing rules and regulations, based on the report submitted. He concluded by emphasizing the necessity for both parties to be trusting of one another and not render the working dynamic adversarial, however oppositional their competing interests maybe, as trust is a constitutive component of conflict resolution.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/department-of-labour-interaction-program-online-business-platforms'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/department-of-labour-interaction-program-online-business-platforms</a>
</p>
No publisherBharath GururagavendranFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet Governance2019-10-29T06:05:56ZBlog EntryComments to the Code on Social Security, 2019
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aayush-rathi-ambika-tandon-amruta-mahuli-october-25-2019-comments-to-code-on-social-security
<b>This submission presents a response by researchers at the Centre for Internet & Society, India (CIS) to the draft Code on Social Security, 2019 (hereinafter “ Draft Code ”) prepared by the Government of India’s Ministry of Labour and Employment.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS is an 11-year old non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research oninternet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. Through itsdiverse initiatives, CIS explores, intervenes in, and advances contemporary discourse andregulatory practices around internet, technology, and society in India, and elsewhere.Current focus areas include cybersecurity, privacy, freedom of speech and artificialintelligence. CIS is also producing research at the intersection of labour, gender andtechnology.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS is grateful for the opportunity to put forth its views and comments. Our comments are captured in the prescribed format in the table, <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/comments-to-the-code-on-social-security-2019">click here</a> to view the full comments.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aayush-rathi-ambika-tandon-amruta-mahuli-october-25-2019-comments-to-code-on-social-security'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/aayush-rathi-ambika-tandon-amruta-mahuli-october-25-2019-comments-to-code-on-social-security</a>
</p>
No publisherAayush Rathi , Amruta Mahuli and Ambika TandonSocial SecurityInternet Governance2019-10-27T03:57:15ZBlog EntryComments to the United Nations Human Rights Commission Report on Gender and Privacy
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-the-unhrc-report-on-gender-and-privacy
<b>This submission to UNHRC presents a response by researchers at the CIS to ‘gender issues arising in the digital era and their impacts on women, men and individuals of diverse sexual orientations gender identities, gender expressions and sex characteristics’. It was prepared by Aayush Rathi, Ambika Tandon, and Pallavi Bedi in response to a report of consultation by a thematic taskforce established by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy on ‘Privacy and Personality’ (hereafter, HRC Gender Report).</b>
<p> </p>
<h4>HRC Gender Report - Consultation version: <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/SR_Privacy/2019_HRC_Annex2_GenderReport.pdf" target="_blank">Read</a> (PDF)</h4>
<h4>Submitted comments: <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/comments-to-the-united-nations-human-rights-commission-report-on-gender-and-privacy" target="_blank">Read</a> (PDF)</h4>
<hr />
<p>The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), India, is an 11-year old non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. Through its diverse initiatives, CIS explores, intervenes in, and advances contemporary discourse and regulatory practices around internet, technology, and society in India,and elsewhere. Current focus areas include cybersecurity, privacy, freedom of speech, labour and artificial intelligence. CIS has been taking efforts to mainstream gender across its programmes, as well as develop specifically gender-focused research using a feminist approach.</p>
<p>CIS appreciates the efforts of Dr. Elizabeth Coombs, Chair, Thematic Action Stream Taskforce on “A better understanding of privacy”, and those of Professor Joseph Cannataci, Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy. We are also grateful for the opportunity to put forth our views and comment on the HRC Gender Report.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-the-unhrc-report-on-gender-and-privacy'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-the-unhrc-report-on-gender-and-privacy</a>
</p>
No publisherAayush Rathi, Ambika Tandon and Pallavi BediPrivacyGenderInternet GovernanceResearchGender, Welfare, and PrivacyResearchers at Work2019-12-30T17:40:20ZBlog EntryTrending Hate Against Muslims: Is Twitter Complicit?
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/news-central-october-21-2019-puja-bhattacharjee-trending-hate-against-muslims
<b>Twitter claimed that it had ‘prevented’ the Hashtag while it had not.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The blog post by Puja Bhattacharjee was <a class="external-link" href="https://newscentral24x7.com/kamlesh-tiwari-murder-hate-muslims-yogi-adityanath-bjp-rss-twitter-trends/">published in News Central</a> on October 21, 2019. Pranesh Prakash was quoted in it.</p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.news24.com/Columnists/AlistairFairweather/In-darkies-Africa-20091106" rel="noopener" target="_blank">In 2009, Twitter took down a trending hashtag. The hashtag in question started in South Africa and had the word “darkie” in it. </a>That word is not a slur in South Africa, but it was used as a slur against the African Americans community in the USA. On receiving complaints, Twitter immediately removed that from trending topics though it was a clash of meanings between two different places.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On Sunday evening, a hashtag of more insidious nature was trending in India. The hashtag <a href="https://twitter.com/search?q=%23%E0%A4%AE%E0%A5%81%E0%A4%B8%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%B2%E0%A4%BF%E0%A4%AE%E0%A5%8B_%E0%A4%95%E0%A4%BE_%E0%A4%B8%E0%A4%82%E0%A4%AA%E0%A5%82%E0%A4%B0%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%A3_%E0%A4%AC%E0%A4%B9%E0%A4%BF%E0%A4%B7%E0%A5%8D%E0%A4%95%E0%A4%BE%E0%A4%B0">#मुस्लिमो_का_संपूर्ण_बहिष्कार</a>, translated literally means “Total boycott of Muslims”. The incident is ominous given <a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/on-religion/the-violent-toll-of-hindu-nationalism-in-india" rel="noopener" target="_blank">rising apprehension across the world</a> that India is now in the grip of a violent form of Hindu Nationalism. The tweets in support of the hashtags were mostly from right-wing accounts, some of which not only called for the boycott of Muslims but also celebrated the persecution of Uighurs in China.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Speaking to <em>NewsCentral24x7.com</em>, a Twitter spokesperson claimed that it had ‘prevented’ the hashtag from trending: “There are Rules for trends and we have prevented this hashtag from trending as it is in violation of the Twitter Rules”. (<em>Full statement at the end of the story)</em></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However this was patently false since many users pointed out that the hashtag <a href="https://twitter.com/atti_cus/status/1186261563105132545" rel="noopener" target="_blank">continued to trend</a> even after Twitter’s statement. In Delhi, the hashtag continues to trend at number one. More disturbingly, as reported by <em><a href="https://thewire.in/communalism/ministers-hate-accounts-twitter-follow-boycott-muslims" rel="noopener" target="_blank">The Wire</a> </em>some of the accounts tweeting in support of the hashtags are followed by the Prime Minister and several cabinet ministers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Also Read: <a class="post-title post-url" href="https://newscentral24x7.com/hate-crimes-muslims-madhya-pradesh-officer-change-name-communal-modi-government/" rel="noopener" target="_blank"> Need To Change Name To Save Myself From Sword Of Hate: Muslim Bureaucrat From M.P. On The Atmosphere Of Hate In Modi II</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Pranesh Prakash, co-founder of Centre for Internet and Society, says that Twitter usually does not ban a hashtag. “They can remove it from trending and if people use it offensively, then they can ban that person or that tweet…. Twitter should put out a statement apologizing for and condemning this given they condemn white nationalists in the US.” he says.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The hashtag was started ostensibly in retaliation of the murder Kamlesh Tiwari, 45, the president of the Hindu Samaj Party. Over the weekend, the police arrested five people in connection to the murder.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, Kamlesh Tiwari in his last<a href="https://scroll.in/video/941132/kamlesh-tiwari-murder-his-last-facebook-live-video-and-his-mothers-statement-blame-bjp" rel="noopener" target="_blank"> Facebook Live video</a> before his murder protested the removal of his security by the Yogi Adityanath government and trying to hatch a conspiracy to kill him. His mother echoed his sentiments and has come out to say that there is no communal angle to his murder.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The matter once again raises questions about the responsibility Big-Tech platforms like Twitter need to discharge in monitoring and combating hate speech. Many organizations in the USA, UK and Australia such as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the Women, Action and the Media (WAM!), Online Hate Prevention Institute and Sentinel Groups for Genocide Prevention have become increasingly invested in combating hate speech online by targeting Internet intermediaries and asking them to take greater responsibility in moderating content, in addition to raising awareness among users.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">An interactive map showing the trends of the hashtag from October 20 evening till October 21 morning in the sub-continent.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, in India, the government’s proposed changes to Section 79 of the IT Act for restricting hate speech has led to fears of widespread censorship. The Internet Freedom Foundation published a <a href="https://internetfreedom.in/india-must-resist-the-lure-of-the-chinese-model-of-surveillance-and-censorship-intermediaryrules-righttomeme-saveourprivacy/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">comprehensive blog</a> on why such an amendment is undesirable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In a report released in 2017, the Law Commission of India recommended broadening the existing provisions of hate speech to include other criteria that are based on their gender and sexuality.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“It does not look at underlying reforms. Like understanding the link to violence and whether it should only be a provision which should apply to members of a minority community -linguistic, caste, religion,” says Apar Gupta, executive director, Internet Freedom Foundation</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">He says if lawmakers are unwilling to substantively tinker with definitions in a very real and substantial way, they should come up with procedural safeguards instead.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Twitter or any social media company has two levels of obligation – its own obligations towards its users which is under the terms of service contract under which it can proactively take down a speech if there is a violation of those standards. “They have a degree of discretion to do it as well. This is where most of the content takedowns happen which also results in a certain amount of criticism because they lack the consistency desired by people,” says Gupta.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The second level of compliance is when a legal notice is sent by a judicial or executive authority. If they do not comply, their online immunity from liability for the content posted by the user can be removed and they can be prosecuted as an accessory or abettor to the content published on their platform. “Twitter can block the hashtag but what we are looking for is a much more credible law enforcement response based on the content of each tweet,” Gupta adds.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In her book,<em> HATE: Why We Should Resist it With Free Speech, Not Censorship by Nadine Strossen</em>, the author <a href="https://www.cato.org/blog/counter-speech-offers-effective-remedy-hate-speech">argues that</a> that censorial measures are ineffective and do not promote equality. Instead, Strossen, recommends forceful counter-speech and activism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">“In 2016, a report was issued about counterspeech on Twitter, coauthored by a group of scholars from the United States and Canada. The report, which included the first review of the “small body” of existing research about online counterspeech, concluded that hateful and other “extremist” speech was most effectively “undermined” by counterspeech rather than by removing it,” she writes.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><em>Editors Note: </em>The hashtag discussed above is absolutely horrifying and historically widespread calls for ‘boycott’ have preceded genocide. While on one hand we cannot allow hate speech to become an excuse for governments to curb non-harmful, legal speech, the censor or counter debate cannot be allowed to become a veil for big-tech to wash its hands off the matter. There is now significant reportage which shows that hate speech essentially benefits social media platforms and therefore they are unwilling to curb it. In this specific case the double standards twitter has displayed in being prompt in one country while unresponsive in other is also a very disturbing aspect.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Full statement by Twitter:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><em>“At Twitter our singular goal is to<a href="https://twitter.com/jack/status/969234275420655616" rel="noopener" target="_blank"> improve the health of the public conversation</a>, including ensuring the safety of people who use our service. As outlined in our<a href="https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy" rel="noopener" target="_blank"> Hateful Conduct Policy</a>, we do not tolerate the abuse or harassment of people on the basis of religion. As <a href="https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-trending-faqs" rel="noopener" target="_blank">per our Help Center</a>, there are Rules for trends and we have prevented this hashtag from trending as it is in violation of the Twitter Rules. If people on Twitter see something that violates the Twitter Rules, the most important thing they can do is<a href="https://help.twitter.com/en/safety-and-security/report-a-tweet" rel="noopener" target="_blank"> report it</a>, by clicking the drop down arrow at the top of the Tweet and selecting “Report Tweet.”</em></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/news-central-october-21-2019-puja-bhattacharjee-trending-hate-against-muslims'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/news-central-october-21-2019-puja-bhattacharjee-trending-hate-against-muslims</a>
</p>
No publisherPuja BhattacharjeeFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet Governance2019-10-23T00:54:41ZNews ItemNIPFP Seminar on Exploring Policy Issues in the Digital Technology Arena
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/nipfp-seminar-on-exploring-policy-issues-in-the-digital-technology-arena
<b>Anubha Sinha participated in this seminar as a discussant on the "Regulating emerging technologies" panel. The event was held at Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla on October 10 - 11, 2019.
</b>
<p>Click to view the <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/exploring-policy-issues-in-the-digital-technology-arena">agenda here</a>. The session briefs can be <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/session-briefs">seen here</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/nipfp-seminar-on-exploring-policy-issues-in-the-digital-technology-arena'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/nipfp-seminar-on-exploring-policy-issues-in-the-digital-technology-arena</a>
</p>
No publisherAdminPrivacyDigital KnowledgeInternet GovernanceDigital TechnologiesDigital India2019-10-20T07:40:16ZNews ItemDiscussion at CyFy on Technology, Policy and National Security: Building 21st Century Curricula in India’s Law Schools
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/discussion-at-cyfy-on-technology-policy-and-national-security-building-21st-century-curricula-in-india2019s-law-schools
<b>Arindrajit Basu attended the session and gave comments on the course outline which included thoughts on:</b>
<ol>
<li>Threshold of technical knowledge-comparison with WTO law</li>
<li>Need for India-centric approaches both in domestic and foreign policy</li>
<li>Possibility of executive training of senior diplomats</li>
<li>Need to include fintech security in the syllabus</li>
<li>Necessity of international law as a tool of conflict 6. Sustained collaboration between think-tanks and universities</li>
</ol>
<p> </p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The event was organized by Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi and Observer Research Foundation at Villa Medici, Taja Mahal Hotel, Man Singh Road, New Delhi.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/discussion-at-cyfy-on-technology-policy-and-national-security-building-21st-century-curricula-in-india2019s-law-schools'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/discussion-at-cyfy-on-technology-policy-and-national-security-building-21st-century-curricula-in-india2019s-law-schools</a>
</p>
No publisherAdminCyber SecurityInternet GovernanceFinancial Technology2019-10-20T07:23:11ZNews ItemDue Diligence Project FGD by UN Women
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/due-diligence-project-fgd-by-un-women
<b>On October 11, 2019, Radhika Radhakrishnan attended a focussed group discussion at the UN House, New Delhi, organized by UN Women for their multi-country research study on online violence (Due Diligence Project).</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The purpose of the discussion was to provide a better understanding of the nature and the scope of this form of VAWG and to provide recommendations to inform policies, plans, programming and advocacy on the issue.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/due-diligence-project-fgd-by-un-women'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/due-diligence-project-fgd-by-un-women</a>
</p>
No publisherAdminDue DiligenceInternet GovernancePrivacy2019-10-20T07:11:13ZNews ItemRoundtable Discussion on Intermediary Liability
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/roundtable-discussion-on-intermediary-liability
<b>Tanaya Rajwade participated in a roundtable discussion on intermediary liability organised by SFLC and the Dialogue in New Delhi on October 17, 2019.</b>
<p>Click to view the <a class="external-link" href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/internet-liability">agenda</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/roundtable-discussion-on-intermediary-liability'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/roundtable-discussion-on-intermediary-liability</a>
</p>
No publisherAdminFreedom of Speech and ExpressionInternet GovernanceIntermediary Liability2019-10-20T07:08:11ZNews Item“Politics by other means”: Fostering positive contestation and charting ‘red lines’ through global governance in cyberspace
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-orfonline-october-21-2019-politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace
<b>The past year has been a busy one for the fermentation of global governance efforts in cyberspace with multiple actors-states, industry, and civil society spearheading a variety of initiatives. Given the multiplicity of actors, ideologies, and vested interests at play in this ecosystem, any governance initiative will be, by default, political, and desirably so.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: justify; ">Arindrajit Basu's essay for this year's Digital Debates: The CyFy Journal </span><a class="external-link" href="https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Digital_Debates_2019_V7.pdf" style="text-align: justify; ">was published jointly by Global Policy and ORF</a><span style="text-align: justify; ">. It was written in response to a framing essay by Dennis Broeders under the governance theme. The article was edited by Gurshabad Grover. </span><i style="text-align: justify; "> Arindrajit also acknowledges the contributions of the editorial team at ORF: Trisha, Akhil and Meher.</i></p>
<hr />
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There is no silver bullet that will magically result in universally acknowledged rules of the road. Instead, through consistent probing and prodding, the global community must create inclusive processes to galvanize consensus to ensure that individuals across the world can repose trust and confidence in their use of global digital infrastructure.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> This includes both ‘red lines’ applicable to clearly prohibited acts of cyberspace and softer norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace, that arise from an application of the tenets of International Law to cyberspace.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Infrastructure is political</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Networked infrastructures typically originate when a series of technological systems with varying technical standards converge, or when a technological system achieves dominance over other self-contained technologies.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> Through this process of convergence, networked infrastructures must adapt to a variety of differing political conditions, legal regulations and governance practices.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> Internet infrastructure was never self-contained technology, but an amalgamation of systems, protocols, standards and hardware along with the standards bodies, private actors and states that define it.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> The architecture has always been deeply socio-technical<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> and any attempt to severe the technology from the politics of internet governance would be a fool’s errand.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Politics catalyzed the development of the technological infrastructure that lead to the creation of the internet. During the heyday of nuclear brinkmanship between the USA and USSR, Paul Baran, an engineer with the US Department of Defense think tank RAND Corporation was tasked with building a means of communication that could continue running even if some parts were to be knocked out by a nuclear war.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn7"><sup>[7]</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As Baran’s ‘Bomb proof network’ morphed into the US Department of Defense funded ARPANET, it was initially apparent that it was not meant for either mass or commercial use, but instead saw its nurturing in the US as a tool of strategic defense.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn8"><sup>[8]</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This enabled the US to retain a disproportionate -- and till the 1990s, relatively uncontested -- influence on internet governance. As the internet rapidly expanded across the globe, various actors found that single state control over an invaluable global resource was unjust.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> Others (9which included US Senator Ted Cruz), argued that the internet would be safer in the hands of the United States than an international forum whose processes could be reduced to stalemate as a result of politicized conflict between democratic and non-democratic states who seek to use online spaces as an instrument of suppression.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> The ICANN and IANA transitions were therefore not rooted in technical considerations but much-needed geopolitical pressure from states and actors who felt ‘disregarded’<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> in the governance of the internet. An inclusive multi-stakeholder process fueled by inclusive geopolitical contestation is far more effective in the long run and has the potential of respecting the rights of ‘disregarded’ communities all across the globe far more than a unilateral process that ignores any voices of opposition.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is now clear that despite its continued outsized influence, the United States is no longer the only major state player in global cyber governance. China has propelled itself as a major political and economic challenger to the United States across several regimes<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn12"><sup>[12]</sup></a>, including in the cyber domain. China’s export of the ‘information sovereignty’<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> doctrine at various cyber norms proliferation fora, including at the United Nations-Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), and regional forums like the Shanghai Co-operation (SCO), is an example of its desire to impose its ideological clout on global conceptions of the internet.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As a rising power, China’s aspirations in global internet governance are not limited to ideology. China is at an ‘innovation imperative’, where it needs to develop new technologies to retain its status and fuel long-term growth.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> This locks it into direct economic, and therefore strategic competition with the United States that seeks to retain control over the same supply chains and continues to assert its economic and military superiority.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">China has dominated the 5G space in an unprecedented way, and has been a product of a concerted ‘whole of government’ effort.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn15"><sup>[15]</sup></a> Beijing charted out an industrial policy that enabled the deployment of 5G networks as a key national priority.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn16"><sup>[16]</sup></a> China has also successfully weaponized global technical standard-setting efforts to promote its geo-economic interests.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn17"><sup>[17]</sup></a> Reeling from the failure of its domestic 3G standard that was ignored globally, China realised the importance of the ‘first-movers’ advantage’ in setting standards for companies and businesses.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn18"><sup>[18]</sup></a> Through an aggressive strategic push at a number of international bodies such as the International Telecommunications Union, China’s diplomatic pivot has allowed it to push standards established domestically with little external input, thereby giving Chinese companies the upper hand globally.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn19"><sup>[19]</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Politics continues to frame the technical solutions that enable cybersecurity.19 Following Snowden’s revelations, some stakeholders in the global community have shaped their politics to frame the problem as one of protecting individuals’ data from governments and private companies looking to extract and exploit it. The technical solutions developed in this frame are encryption standards and privacy enhancing technologies. However, intelligence agencies continue to frame the problem differently: they see it as an issue of collecting and aggregating data in order to identify malicious actors and threat vectors. The technical solutions they devise are increased surveillance and data analysis -- problems the first framing intended to solve. The techno-political gap, both in academic scholarship and global norms proliferation efforts continues to jeopardize attempts at framing cybersecurity governance.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn20"><sup>[20]</sup></a> Instead of artificially depoliticizing technology, it is imperative that we ferment political contestation in a manner that holistically promulgates the perception that internet infrastructure can be trusted and utilised by individuals and communities around the world.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">Fostering ‘red lines’ and diffusing ‘unpeace’ in cyberspace</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">‘Unpeace’ in cyberspace continues to ferment through ‘below the threshold’ operations that do not amount to the ‘use of force’ as per Article 2(4), or an ‘armed attack’ triggering the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This makes the application of jus ad bellum (‘right to war’) inapplicable to most cyber operations.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn21"><sup>[21]</sup></a> However, the application of ‘jus in bello’ (law that governs the way in which warfare is conducted) or International Humanitarian Law (IHL) does not require armed force to be of a specific intensity but seeks to protect civilians and prevent unnecessary suffering. Therefore the principles of IHL that have evolved in The Geneva Conventions should be used as red lines that limit collateral damage as a result of cyber operations.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn22"><sup>[22]</sup></a> No state should conduct cyber operations that intend to harm civilians, and should us all means at its disposal to avoid this harm to civilians. It should act in line with the principles of necessity<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn23"><sup>[23]</sup></a> and proportionality.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn24"><sup>[24]</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Cultivating ‘red lines’ is easier said than done. The debate around the applicability of IHL to cyberspace was one of the reasons for the breakdown of the fifth UN-GGE in 2017.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn25"><sup>[25]</sup></a> States have also been reluctant to state their positions on the rules developed by the International Group of Experts (IGE) in the Tallinn Manual.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn26"><sup>[26]</sup></a> This is due to two main reasons. First, not endorsing the rules may allow them to retain operational advantages in cyberspace where they continue engaging in cyber operations without censure. Second, even those states who wish to apply and adhere to the rules hesitate to do so in the absence of effective processes that censure states that do not comply with the rules.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Both these issues stem from the difficulties in attributing a cyber attack to a state as cyber attacks are multi-stage, multi-step and multi-jurisdictional, which makes the attacker several degrees removed from the victim.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn27"><sup>[27]</sup></a> Technical challenges to attribution, however should not take away from international efforts that adopt an integrated and multi-disciplinary approach to attribution which must be seen as a political process working in conjunction with robust technical efforts.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn28"><sup>[28]</sup></a> The Cyber Peace Institute, which was set up earlier in September 2019, and adopts an ecosystem approach to studying cyber attacks, thereby improving global attribution standards may institutionally serve this function.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn29"><sup>[29]</sup></a> As attribution processes become clearer and hold greater political weight, an increasing number of states are likely to show their cards and abandon their policy of silence and ambiguity -- a process that has already commenced with a handful of states releasing clear statements on the applicability of international law in cyberspace.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn30"><sup>[30]</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Below the threshold operations are likely to continue. However, the process of contestation should result in the international community drawing out norms that ensure that public trust and confidence in the security of global digital infrastructure is not eroded. This would include norms such as protecting electoral infrastructure or a prohibition on coercing private corporations to aid intelligence agencies in extraterritorial surveillance29 The development of these norms will take time and repeated prodding. However, given the entangled and interdependent nature of the global digital economy, protracted effort may result in universal consensus in some time.</p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">The Future of Cyber Diplomacy</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The recently rejuvenated UN driven norms formulation processes are examples of this protracted effort. Both the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) and Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) processes are pushing states towards publicly declaring their positions on multiple questions of cyber governance, which will only further certainty and predictability in this space. The GGE requires all member states to clearly chart out their position on the applicability of various questions of International Law, which will be included as an Annex to the final report and is definitely a step in the right direction.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">There are multiple lessons from parliamentary diplomacy culminating in past global governance regimes that negotiators in these processes can borrow from.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn31"><sup>[31]</sup></a> As in the past, the tenets of international law can influence collective expectations and serve as a facilitative mechanism for chalking out bargaining points, and driving the negotiations within an inclusive, efficient and understandable framework.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn32"><sup>[32]</sup></a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Both processes will be politicized as before with states seeking to use these as fora for furthering national interests. However, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Protracted contestation is preferable to unilateralism where a select group of states decides the future of cyber governance. The inclusive, public format of the OEWG running in parallel to the closed-door deliberations at the GGE enables concerted dialogue to continue. Most countries had voted for the resolutions setting up both these processes and while the end-game is unknown, it appears that states remain interested in cultivating cyber norms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Of course, the USA and its NATO allies had voted against the resolution setting up the OEWG and Russia, China and the SCO allies had voted against the resolution resurrecting the GGE. However, given the economic interests of all states in a relatively stable cyberspace, it is clear that both these blocks desire global consensus on some rules of the road for responsible behaviour in cyberspace. This means that both processes may arrive at certain similar outcomes. These outcomes might over time evolve into norms or even crystallise into rules of customary international law if they are representative of the interests of a large number of states.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">However, sole reliance on state-centric mechanisms to achieve a stable governance regime may be misplaced. As seen with Dupont’s contribution to the Montreal Protocol that banned the global use of Chloro-Fluoro-Carbons (CFCs)<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn33"><sup>[33]</sup></a> or the International Committee of the Red Cross’s concerted efforts in rallying states to sign the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn34"><sup>[34]</sup></a>, norm-entrepreneurship and the mantle of leadership in norm-entrepreneurship need not be limited to state actors. Non-state actors often have the gifts of flexibility and strategic neutrality that make them a better fit for this role than states. Microsoft’s leadership and its ascent to this leadership mantle in the cyber governance space must therefore be taken heed off. The key role it played in charting out the CyberSecurity Tech Accords, Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace and its most recent initiative, the Cyber Peace Institute, must be commended. However, the success of its entrepreneurship relies on how well it can work both with multilateral mechanisms under the aegis of the United Nations and multi-stakeholder fora such as the Global Commission on Stability in Cyberspace. This will lead to a cohesive set of rules that adequately govern the conduct of both state and non-state actors in cyberspace.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is unfortunate, however, that most governance efforts in cyberspace are driven by the United States or China or their allies. For example, only UK<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn35"><sup>[35]</sup></a>, France<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn36"><sup>[36]</sup></a>, Germany,<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn37"><sup>[37]</sup></a> Estonia<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn38"><sup>[38]</sup></a>,Cuba<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn39"><sup>[39]</sup></a> (backed by China and Russia), and the USA<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn40"><sup>[40]</sup></a> have all engaged in public posturing advocating their ideological position on the applicability of International Law in cyberspace in varying degrees of detail with other countries largely remaining silent. Other emerging economies need to get into the game to make the process more representative and equitable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">More recently, India has begun to take a leadership role in the global debate on cross-border data transfers, spurred largely by their domestic political and policy ecosystem championing ‘digital nationalism.’ At the G20 summit in Osaka in July this year, India, alongside the BRICS grouping emphasized the development dimensions of data for emerging economies and pushed the notion of ‘data sovereignty’-broadly understood as the sovereign right of nations to govern data within their territories/jurisdiction in the national interest and for the welfare of its people.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn41"><sup>[41]</sup></a> Resisting calls from Western allies including the United States to get on board Japan’s initiative promoting the free flow of data across borders, Vijay Gokhale also mentioned that discussions on data flows must not take place at plurilateral forums outside the World Trade Organization as this would prevent inclusive discussions.<a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_edn42"><sup>[42]</sup></a>This form of posturing should be sustained by emerging economies like India and extended to the security domain as well through which the hegemony that a few powerful actors retain over the contours of cyber governance can be reduced.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To paraphrase Clausewitz, technological governance is the conduct of politics by other means. Internet infrastructure has become so deeply intertwined with the political ethos of most countries that it has become the latest front for geopolitical contestation among state and non-state actors alike. Politicizing cyber governance prevents a deracinated approach to the process that ignores simmering inequalities, power asymmetries and tensions that a limited technical lens prevents us from viewing.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The question is, not if but how cyber governance will be politicized. Will it be a politics of inclusion that protects the rights of the disregarded and adequately represents their voices in line with the requirements of International Law, or will it be a politics of convenience through which states and non-state actors utilise cyber governance for reaping strategic dividends? The global cyber policy ecosystem must continue the battle to ensure that the former remains essential.</p>
<hr />
<h3>Endnotes</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> Arindrajit Basu and Elonnai Hickok (2018) “<a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/cyberspace-and-external-affairs" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Cyberspace and External Affairs: A memorandum for India</a>”, 8-13.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref2"><sup>[2]</sup></a> In its draft definition of cyber stability, <a href="https://cyberstability.org/news/request-for-consultation-definition-of-stability-of-cyberspace/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace has adopted a bottom up user centric definition of Cyber Stability where individuals can be confident in the stability of cyberspace as opposed to an objective top-down determination of cybersecurity metrics</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> PN Edwards, GC Bowker Jackson SJ, R Williams 2009. Introduction: an agenda for infrastructure studies. J. Assoc. Inf. Syst.10(5):364–74</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref4"><sup>[4]</sup></a> Brian Larkin, “ The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure” Annual Rev. Anthropol 2013,42:327-43</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> Ibid.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref6"><sup>[6]</sup></a> Kieron O’Hara and Wendy Hall, “<a href="https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.206web.pdf" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Four Internets: The Geopolitics of Digital Governance</a>” CIGI Report No.208, December 2018.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> Cade Metz, “<a href="https://www.wired.co.uk/article/h-bomb-and-the-internet" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Paul Baran, the link between nuclear war and the internet</a>” Wired, 4th Sept. 2012.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> Kal Raustila (2016) “Governing the Internet” American Journal of International Law 110:3,491</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref9"><sup>[9]</sup></a> Samantha Bradshaw, Laura DeNardis, Fen Osler Hampson, Eric Jardine & Mark Raymond, <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no17.pdf" rel="noopener" target="_blank">The Emergence of Contention in Global Internet Governance</a> 3 (Global Comm’n on Internet Governance, Paper Series No. 17, July 2015).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> Klint Finley, "<a href="https://www.wired.com/2016/10/internet-finally-belongs-everyone/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">The Internet Finally Belongs to Everyone</a>”, Wired, March 18th, 2016.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref11"><sup>[11]</sup></a> Richard Stewart (2014), Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation and Responsiveness” AJIL 108:2</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref12"><sup>[12]</sup></a> Tarun Chhabra, Rush Doshi, Ryan Hass and Emilie Kimball, “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/research/global-china-domains-of-strategic-competition-and-domestic-drivers/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Global China: Domains of strategic competition and domestic drivers</a>” Brookings Institution, September 2019.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref13"><sup>[13]</sup></a> According to this view, a state can manage and define its ‘network frontiers; through domestic legislation or state policy and patrol information at it state borders in any way it deems fit. Yuan Yi,. “网络空间的国界在哪 ” [Where Are the National Borders of cyberspace]? 学习时报.May 19, 2016.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> Anthea Roberts, Henrique Choer Moraes and Victor Ferguson (2019), “<a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=3389163" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Toward a Geoeconomic Order in International Trade and Investment</a>” (May 16, 2019).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref15"><sup>[15]</sup></a> Eurasia Group (2018), “The Geopolitics of 5G”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref16"><sup>[16]</sup></a> Ibid.( In 2013, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Science and technology (MOST) established the IMT-2020 5G Promotion Group to push for a government all-industry alliance on 5G.)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref17"><sup>[17]</sup></a> Bjorn Fagersten&Tim Ruhlig (2019), "<a href="https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/uipublications/2019/ui-brief-no.-2-2019.pdf" rel="noopener" target="_blank">China’s standard power and it’s geopolitical implications for Europe</a>” Swedish Institute for International Affairs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref18"><sup>[18]</sup></a> Alan Beattie, “Technology: how the US, EU and China compete to set industry standards” Financial Times, Jul 14th, 2019</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref19"><sup>[19]</sup></a> Laura Fitchner, Walter Pieters.,&Andre Herdero Texeira(2016). Cybersecurity as a Politikum: Implications of Security Discourses for Infrastructures. In Proceedings of the 2016 New Security Paradigms Workshop (36-48). New York: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref20"><sup>[20]</sup></a> Michael Crosston,” Phreak the Speak: The Flawed Communications within cyber intelligentsia” in Jan-Frederik Kremer and Benedikt Muller,”Cyberspace and International Relations: Theory, Prospects and Challenges (2013, Springer) 253.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref21"><sup>[21]</sup></a> “<a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/fundamental-principles-ihl" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Fundamental Principles of International Humanitarian Law</a>".</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref22"><sup>[22]</sup></a> Veronique Christory “<a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/fundamental-principles-ihl" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Cyber warfare: IHL provides an additional layer of protection</a>” 10 Sept. 2019.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref23"><sup>[23]</sup></a> See (The “<a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/military-necessity" rel="noopener" target="_blank">principle of military necessity</a>” permits measures which are actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose and are not otherwise prohibited by international humanitarian law. In the case of an armed conflict, the only legitimate military purpose is to weaken the military capacity of the other parties to the conflict.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref24"><sup>[24]</sup></a> See <a href="https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/proportionality" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Proportionality</a>; The principle of proportionality prohibits attacks against military objectives which are “expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref25"><sup>[25]</sup></a> Declaration by Miguel Rodriguez, Representative of Cuba, <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Cuban-Expert-Declaration.pdf" rel="noopener" target="_blank">At the final session of group of governmental experts on developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security</a> (June 23 2017).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref26"><sup>[26]</sup></a> Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany (2018), “ A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice” AJIL 112:4</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref27"><sup>[27]</sup></a> David Clark and Susan Landau. “Untangling Attribution.” Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard University) 2 (2011</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref28"><sup>[28]</sup></a> Davis, John S., Benjamin Adam Boudreaux, Jonathan William Welburn, Jair Aguirre, Cordaye Ogletree, Geoffrey McGovern and Michael S. Chase. Stateless Attribution: Toward International Accountability in Cyberspace. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, (2017). At</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref29"><sup>[29]</sup></a> See “<a href="https://cyberpeaceinstitute.org/latest-insights/2019-09-26-cyberpeace-institute-to-lead-global-action-againstcyberattacks" rel="noopener" target="_blank">CyberPeace Institute to Support Victims Harmed by Escalating Conflicts in Cyberspace</a>”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref30"><sup>[30]</sup></a> Dan Efrony and Yuval Shany (2018), “ A Rule Book on the Shelf? Tallinn Manual 2.0 on Cyberoperations and Subsequent State Practice” AJIL 112:4</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref31"><sup>[31]</sup></a> Arindrajit Basu and Elonnai Hickok (2018), “<a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/files/gcsc-research-advisory-group.pdf" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Conceptualizing an International Security architecture for cyberspace</a>”.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref32"><sup>[32]</sup></a> Monica Hakimi (2017), “The Work of International Law,” Harvard International Law Journal 58:1.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref33"><sup>[33]</sup></a> James Maxwell and Forrest Briscoe (2007),” There’s money in the air: The CFC Ban and Dupont’s Regulatory Strategy” Business Strategy and the Environment 6, 276-286.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref34"><sup>[34]</sup></a> Francis Buignon (2004). “The International Committee of the Red Cross and the development of international humanitarian law.” Chi. J. Int’l L.5: 19137</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref35"><sup>[35]</sup></a> Jeremy Wright, “<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/cyber-and-international-law-in-the-21st-century" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Cyber and International Law in the 21st Century</a>” Govt. UK.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref36"><sup>[36]</sup></a> Michael Schmitt, “<a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/66194/frances-major-statement-on-international-lawand-cyber-an-assessment/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">France’s Major Statement on International Law and Cyber: An Assessment</a>” Just Security, September 16th, 2019.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref37"><sup>[37]</sup></a> Nele Achten, "<a href="https://www.lawfareblog.com/germanys-position-international-law-cyberspace" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Germany’s Position on International Law in Cyberspace</a>”, Lawfare, Oct 2, 2018,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref38"><sup>[38]</sup></a> Michael Schmitt, “<a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/64490/estonia-speaks-out-on-key-rules-for-cyberspace/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Estonia Speaks out on Key Rules for Cyberspace</a>” Just Security, June 10, 2019.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref39"><sup>[39]</sup></a> <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Cuban-Expert-Declaration.pdf" rel="noopener" target="_blank">https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Cuban-Expert-Declaration.pdf</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref40"><sup>[40]</sup></a> <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Brian-J.-Egan-International-Law-and-Stabilityin-Cyberspace-Berkeley-Nov-2016.pdf" rel="noopener" target="_blank">https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Brian-J.-Egan-International-Law-and-Stabilityin-Cyberspace-Berkeley-Nov-2016.pdf</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref41"><sup>[41]</sup></a> Justin Sherman and Arindrajit Basu, "<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/fostering-strategic-convergencein-us-india-tech-relations-5g-and-beyond/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">Fostering Strategic Convergence in US-India Tech Relations: 5G and Beyond</a>”, The Diplomat, July 03, 2019.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace-56811/#_ednref42"><sup>[42]</sup></a> Aditi Agrawal, "<a href="https://www.medianama.com/2019/07/223-india-and-tech-policy-at-the-g20-summit/" rel="noopener" target="_blank">India and Tech Policy at the G20 Summit</a>”, Medianama, Jul 1, 2019.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-orfonline-october-21-2019-politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/arindrajit-basu-orfonline-october-21-2019-politics-by-other-means-fostering-positive-contestation-and-charting-red-lines-through-global-governance-in-cyberspace</a>
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No publisherbasuCyberspaceInternet Governance2019-10-21T15:40:38ZBlog Entry