Centre for Internet and Society

National IPR Policy Series : Comments on the Proposed Intellectual Property Rights Policy to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion

nehaa — 2015-04-12T11:39:16Z

On 13 November, 2014, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion had released a Call for Suggestions for India's proposed National IPR Policy. This is the Centre for Internet and Society's (CIS) submission for the same.

Submitted by CIS with inputs from Pranesh Prakash, Director, Nehaa Chaudhari, Programme Officer, Anubha Sinha, Programme Officer and Amulya P., Intern. Click to view the PDF.

I. Preliminary

I.1. This submission presents comments from the Centre for Internet and Society ("CIS")[1] on the proposed National Intellectual Property Rights Policy ("National IPR policy") to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India. ("DIPP").

I.2. CIS commends the DIPP for this initiative, and appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the National IPR Policy. CIS' comments are as stated hereafter.

II. Principles

II.1.1. The characterization of intellectual property rights may be two- fold- first, at their core, intellectual property rights, are temporary monopolies granted to inter alia, authors and inventors; and second, they are a tool to ensure innovation, social, scientific and cultural progress and further access to knowledge. This dual nature and purpose of intellectual property protection is particularly critical in developing economies such as India. Excessive intellectual property protection could result in stunted innovation and negatively impact various stakeholders. [2] It is therefore our submission that the development of the IPR Policy be informed by broader principles of fairness and equity, balancing intellectual property protections with limitations and exceptions/user rights such as those for research, education and access to medicines.

II.1.2. These comments will evaluate the recent developments in the intellectual property regime in India and point out instances for possible reform.

II.1.3. These comments have been divided into five sections, dealing with patents, openness, open access to scholarly works, copyright, and negotiating free trade agreements in that order.

III. Detailed Comments

III.1. Patents

III.1.1. Key Issues Regarding Patents

III.1.1.1. The key issues involving patents in India include compulsory licensing, uncertainty in software patenting, slow pace of examination of patent applications, inter alia.

III.1.1.2. CIS submits that the Indian intellectual property regime contains numerous safeguards to ensure that monopolies of intellectual property are not exercised to the detriment of the public and that the National IPR Policy should continue to reflect these ideals.

III.1.2. Software Patents and Dual Monopoly

III.1.2.1. Presently, software in India may be copyrighted and computer related inventions are patentable. CIS is of the opinion that this results in an ambiguity that could potentially result in a dual monopoly over the same subject matter. This ambiguity around the legality of software patents and the scope of patents on computer related inventions has existed since the Parliament introduced the term "per se" to section 3(k) through the Patent (Amendment) Act, 2002, persisting despite repeated attempts[3] to bring about clarity in the law (the most recent one being the Draft Guidelines on Computer Related Inventions, released in 2013 by the Indian patent office).

III.1.2.2. CIS believes that software is currently adequately protected under copyright, and does not merit patent protection. The software industry in its infancy grew by leaps and bounds in the absence of patents, and imposing twenty year monopolies is stunting the development of software, especially, in an industry where technology changes every two to five years.

III.1.2.3. Therefore, CIS is of the opinion that the National IPR Policy should recognise the danger of software patenting, and encourage the adoption of and development of alternatives to a strict intellectual property regime, for instance, Free/Open Source/Libre Software.

III.1.3. Compulsory Licensing of Patents

III.1.3.1. CIS believes that the current regime allowing for compulsory licensing of patents in India helps achieve a balance between the two concerns of rewarding inventions and making them available to the public during times of need, of the rights of the patent holder with his obligations to ensure availability of products at a reasonable price by allowing third parties who do not own the patent to license the use of the patent during the term of protection.[4] CIS believes that such a balance cannot be arrived at merely by market mechanisms. CIS further believes that achieving such a balance is important for a developing country like India as we have special concerns regarding access to healthcare and access to technologies that will protect our national interest.[5]

III.1.3.2. Therefore CIS submits that the National IPR policy should continue to make positive allowances for government involvement in this space, through the compulsory licensing of patents in certain situations.

III.1.4. Alternative Licensing Mechanisms

III.1.4.1. CIS believes that government participation in the patenting regime ensures that all interests are taken on board and the social costs of patents are kept in mind. CIS is of the opinion that the National IPR policy should be formed after careful consideration of alternative patent licensing mechanisms that could help achieve a balance between the interests of different stakeholders particularly because as a developing economy we have greater needs for access to medicines and technologies to ensure economic development.[6]

III.1.4.2. On patent pools: In the interests of ensuring development of technology and innovation while balancing the social costs of patents, CIS submits that the National IPR Policy should consider alternative licensing mechanisms such as patent pools which present an efficient legal arrangement to the different problems that arise when companies have complementary intellectual property rights and these rights are essential to new technologies being used and employed[7]. Such a licensing could be done with government participation to ensure standard royalty rates and standard agreements.

III.1.4.3. On tailoring patent strengths: Our patent system provides for a one size first all approach to patent terms. CIS believes that the National IPR Policy could suggest the adoption of a more studied approach to differential patent strengths that properly balances out the benefits of the innovation against social costs of patents both in the form of monopoly pricing and threats to subsequent pricing is required to ensure that our patent system is fair equitable and in our national interest.[8]

III.1.4.4. On royalty caps: CIS believes that the National IPR policy could encourage bringing back royalty caps for certain sectors as a means of regulating the market and ensuring that access to technologies is unharmed. CIS believes that this will serve the larger national interest and ensure technological development.[9]

III.2. Openness

III.2.1. Free and Open Source Software

III.2.1.1. Free and Open Source Software ("FOSS") has emerged as a key agent in information technology policy making in India. There has been an increased importance of free and open source software in education, governmental agencies, as recently demonstrated by the Indian Government's decision to shift to open source software, in sync with the Digital India initiative.[10]

III.2.1.2. CIS believes that the IPR policy should encourage free and open software in education, governmental agencies etc. CIS believes that this shift in open source software is necessary to keep our IPR policy in sync with developments in the digital world.

III.3. Open Access to Scholarly Works

III.3.1. Open Access Policies and Scientific and Scholarly Works

III.3.1.1. The benefits of implementing an open access policy with regard to scientific and scholarly works are manifold. Providing open access to scholarly research will ensure percolation of cutting edge research into the society. It has been often argued that restricted access to government funded research is unethical, since scientific research conducted by government agencies is partly, if not entirely, funded by the taxpayers' money.

III.3.1.2. Government Initiatives Towards Open Access

III.3.1.2.1. CIS believes that the steps taken in this regard by the Department of Biotechnology and Department of Science to make scientific research publicly available by developing an open access policy are laudable, especially from the view of increasing access to research undertaken at these institutions.

III.3.1.2.2. There are several other government agencies which have implemented open access policies, namely, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, Indian Council of Agricultural Research and Institute of Mathematical Sciences. CIS believes that this is step in the right direction

III.3.1.2.3. Copyright is the key instrument to effect open access policies. CIS believes that the work should be appropriately copyrighted to allow for free and open access to any interested person.

III.4. Copyright

III.4.1. Exceptions for Fair Dealings

III.4.1.1. The 2012, Amendment Act extended fair dealing exceptions in several ways; to sound recordings, videos, to the making of three dimensional works from two dimensional works,[11] to storing of electronic copies at non-commercial public libraries, [12] to rights of commercial rental.[13] While the Act touched upon some of the burning issues with regard to limitations and exceptions to copyright, CIS believes that it did miss out on laying down clear rules for issues like exceptions for educational institutions, libraries and archives which is currently being negotiated at the standing committee of the WIPO as an international instrument,[14] parallel importation of books for non-commercial libraries, and extending the current exceptions for education to distance education and digital education. CIS is of the opinion that while this was a step in the right direction the IPR policy should continue the trend of extending exceptions for fair dealing and should encourage forming general guidelines for fair dealings as it would help achieve goals of education and scientific and cultural progress.

III.4.1.2. CIS believes that it would be beneficial if general guidelines for fair dealing were provided for. These guidelines must not take away from existing fair dealing exceptions under the law, but should act as a framework to understand what constitutes fair dealing. CIS submits that this coupled with support for the International Treaty for Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives[15] and for International Treaty for Limitations and Exceptions for Educational and Research Institutions [16]would help serve national interest as it would help reduce the freezing effect by reducing the costs of using copyrighted work legitimately and ensure social and cultural progress. CIS submits that the National IPR policy should encourage the international instruments aimed at providing for exceptions and limitations for fair dealings.

III.4.2. Exceptions for Government Produced Works

III.4.2.1. CIS believes that the current exceptions for use of government produced works are far too limited and taxpayers must be free to use the works that they have paid for.[17] CIS submits that the National IPR policy should encourage the broadening of exceptions with regard to government produced works.

III.4.3. Compulsory Licensing

III.4.3.1. The Act allowed for compulsory licensing of foreign works[18] and put in place statutory licenses for broadcasters[19] CIS believes that this was a positive step that will encourage cultural and scientific education in India. CIS submits that compulsory licenses for copyrighted works help achieve goals of education, of scientific and cultural progress. CIS submits that the National IPR policy should encourage compulsory licensing of copyrighted works in certain situations for the promotion of access to knowledge and information.

III.4.4. Protection of Authors/ Performers Rights

III.4.4.1. The Act allowed for protection of author's rights regarding storing of their work in electronic medium[20] and for protection of rights of performers both commercial [21] and moral.[22] CIS believes that while this is in itself a positive step, there is need to ensure that such moral rights are not abused by authors or rights holders to stop discourse or to stop fair use and adequate measures to ensure the same must be put in place to avoid excessive intellectual property rights. CIS submits that the National IPR policy should discuss limitations to moral rights of authors and performers to make room for fair dealings.

III.4.5. Users Rights Regarding Cover Versions Of Songs

III.4.5.1. The Act allows for users to make cover versions of a sound recording required provided they comply with rules regarding notices and royalties. CIS believes that this is potentially problematic as even recording companies have acknowledged that the non-commercial cover versions help in increasing the popularity of the original and therefore help in the growth of the film and music industry and this new law could possibly stop individuals from making such cover versions due to fear of violating the law and therefore harm the film and music industry. Therefore, CIS believes that the National IPR policy should consider measures to provide more rights to the users in order to ensure development of the music and film industry; CIS believes that this is an instance of excessive intellectual property and is harmful to all stakeholders involved.

III.4.6. Relinquishment of Copyright and Creative Commons

III.4.6.1. The amended Section 21 of the Act now only requires a simply public notice from the author to relinquish his copyright as opposed to an application to the registrar of copyrights. CIS believes that this is a positive step as now the requirement under the rules can easily be satisfied by using a Creative Commons Zero license.[23] CIS submits that the National IPR policy should undertake similar steps to encourage the usage of creative commons licenses and thereby facilitate access to knowledge.

III.4.7. Term of Protection of Copyrights

III.4.7.1. The Act provided for an extension of term of copyright for photographs to almost double its earlier duration, [24] CIS believes that this is possibly harmful as it could lead to copyrighted works not entering the public domain for unnecessarily long periods of time and thereby harm progress in science and culture. In this regard CIS further believes that since the term of protections provided under our copyright law for all works extends beyond our international obligations, The National IPR policy should try to ensure that scientific and cultural development are not hindered by excessive terms of protection that go beyond the minimum owed under our international obligations.

III.4.8. Protection Of Rights Management Information

III.4.8.1. The amendment Act provided for protection of rights management information (RMI) and provided for both criminal and civil remedies in instances of unauthorised alteration or removal of RMIs.[25] CIS believes that these provisions are unnecessary as India does not have obligations to do so under international treaties and there is no actual demand for these rights as it is yet unclear how these rights help authors or performers. CIS submits that these provisions increase the costs for users who want to legitimately break these digital locks to obtain accessible formats for the information and that so long as the rights holder does not have an obligation to ensure that their works are accessible, provisions such as these cripple creativity and stunt industry growth.[26] Therefore CIS submits that the National IPR policy should help achieve a balance of concerns of users who want to legitimately break these digital locks on the one hand and the need to prevent digital piracy on the other.

III.4.9. Intermediary Liability

III.4.9.1. CIS submits that due to the IT (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011, there is a freezing effect on free speech on the internet as these rules are procedurally flawed and go against the principles of natural justice.[27] CIS believes that such a restraint on free speech harms creativity and innovation, to this end CIS submits that the National IPR policy should ensure free speech is not unfairly hindered by rules regarding copyright infringement.

III.4.10. Criminalization of Copyright Infringement

III.4.10.1. Individual non-commercial infringement of copyright is a crime under Section 63A of the Copyright Act [28] and is punishable by imprisonment which can extend to three years or a fine that can extend up to rs. 2,00,000/- CIS believes that this is an instance of excessive intellectual property protection; CIS is of the opinion that the civil remedies available for copyright enforcement are enough for copyright protection and that the criminal remedies under the Copyright Act, 1957 function only to ensure that there are obstacles to free and legitimate use of copyrighted material. CIS believes that such provisions are harmful for innovation within India and impose unnecessary costs on users.[29] Therefore CIS believes the National IPR policy should reconsider the question of criminalisation of copyright infringement and should ensure that any penal consequences are proportional to the act committed.

III.4.11. Concluding Remarks on Copyrights

III.4.11.1. In conclusion while India has what some call the most balanced approach to intellectual property law in the world today, [30] one that balances both the interests of the author and the copyrights holder as well as the end user and the overall public interest, there is room for improvement as far as adapting to the internet age is concerned, especially considering the easy appeal of forming an intellectual property regime that is excessive and in the end harms all the concerned stakeholders.

III.5. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)

III.5.1. Need for Transparency Regarding FTA Negotiations

III.5.1.1. India has lately been negotiating Free Trade Agreements with several developed nations, these are closed door negotiations and the texts of the meetings are not available to the public. CIS believes that these texts should be made available to the public to ensure transparency and to ensure all stakeholders know of any developments, CIS believes that public knowledge of the positions of various actors in any negotiation process will help ensure that such positions are taken keeping in mind the interests of all stakeholders and will ensure that any outcome from such negotiations will be in national interest.[31] CIS therefore submits that the National IPR policy should encourage transparency with regards to negotiations for free trade agreements.

III.5.2. FTAs with Developed Nations and TRIPS Plus Standards

III.5.2.1. Leaked drafts of the European Union- India FTA negotiations have revealed that provisions on intellectual property protection were extensive and affected the pharmaceuticals sector, these provisions, if agreed upon, could go well beyond India's obligations under the WTO and under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. In fact, developed countries including the US [32] and EU[33] have tried time again and again to encourage developing countries to adopt standards of IP protection in bilateral or regional trade investment agreements that go beyond TRIPS [34]

India has repeatedly indicated to the WTO that it was not willing to commit to an agreement beyond TRIPS.[35] These commitments could include data exclusivity protection measures, ever-greening of patents etc. [36]

CIS believes that despite the growing pressure from developed nations regarding various FTAs,[37] India must hold its ground and ensure that concerns about India's national interest and the difference in the development levels of the European Union or other developed countries and developing countries like India are kept in mind while negotiating obligations under international agreements. Therefore CIS believes that the National IPR policy should ensure that TRIPS plus standards are not acceptable to India as they will undermine our national interest and hinder development at the national level.[38]

III.5.3. Shift from Multilateral Forums to Bilateral FTA negotiations

III.5.3.1. CIS believes that the trend of shift in negotiations from a multilateral forum such as the WIPO or the WTO to a bilateral or a regional forum [39] is harmful as certain flexibilities are built into the TRIPS and therefore multilateral negotiations based on TRIPS will help pursue India's interests better. And therefore when possible, India must prefer negotiations at multilateral forums as opposed to bilateral or regional treaties, CIS believes that the National IPR policy should reflect the same preferences. [40]

IV. Concluding observations

IV.1. On patents, CIS submits that the National IPR policy reconsider software patenting, that encourage open source software, continue and strengthen that compulsory licensing and consider and study alternative licensing mechanisms as means to achieve a balancing of the interests of different stakeholders.

IV.2. On openness, CIS submits that the IPR policy should encourage free and open software in education, governmental agencies etc.

IV.3. On open access to scholarly work, CIS commends the work done by government agencies so far and submits that the IPR policy should encourage open access to scholarly works.

IV.4. On copyright, CIS submits that the IPR policy work toward strengthening and extending fair dealings provisions, supporting international instruments that strengthen fair dealing, encourage compulsory licensing. CIS submits that the IPR policy should work towards ensuring that protections for copyright such as terms of protection, intermediary liability, protection of rights management information, criminalisation of copyright infringement etc., do not harm other legitimate interests of users or unnecessarily restrict free speech.

IV.5. On FTAs, CIS submits that the IPR policy encourage transparency with regard to FTA negotiations, ensure that TRIPS plus standards are not accepted as they would harm national interest and to encourage multilateral negotiations over bilateral free trade agreements.

IV.6. CIS welcomes the initiative of the DIPP to form a National IPR policy, CIS believes that it is essential that such an IPR policy avoid excessive intellectual property rights protection and is formed keeping in mind goals of development and national interest.

IV.7. CIS is thankful to the DIPP for the opportunity to provide comments on the National IPR policy and would be privileged to work with the government on this and other matters in these areas.

[1] www.cis-india.org (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[2] The Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and Public Interest concluded after the Global Congress on Intellectual property and Public Interest in August 2011 attended by over 180 experts from 32 countries articulate this position perfectly. Available at: http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Washington-Declaration.pdf (Last Accessed:29/11/14)

[3] Shashank Singh, Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions: Mapping the Stakeholders' Response, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/guidelines-for-examination-of-computer-related-inventions (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[4] N.S. Gopalakrishnan, Compulsory License Under Indian Patent Law, MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Vol.22, 2015, pp.11-42.

[5] Raadhika Gupta, Compulsory Licensing under TRIPS: How Far it Addresses Public Health Concerns in Developing Nations, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, Vol.15, September 2010, pp.357-363. Available at: http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789/10211/1/JIPR%2015(5)%20357-363.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[6] Id.

[7] Nehaa Chaudhari, Pervasive Technologies: Patent Pools, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[8] One of the measures along which we could have differential patent strengths could be the time for the invention to reach the market, see, Benjamin N Roin, The case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based on the Time-to-Market of Inventions, UCLA Law Review, Vol.61, 2013, Available at: http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/10612849/Case%20for%20Tailoring%20Patent%20Awards%203-15-13.pdf?sequence=1 (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[9] Sunil Abraham, Patented Games, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/patented-games (Last Accessed: 30/11/14.

[10] See Nabi Hasan, Issues and Challenges in Open Source Software Environment with Special Reference to India, Available at: http://crl.du.ac.in/ical09/papers/index_files/ical-43_144_317_1_RV.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[11] Section 52(1), the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[12] Section 52(1) (n), the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[13] Zakir Thomas, Overview of Changes to the Indian Copyright Law, Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, Vo.17, July 2012, pp.324-334.

[14] See conclusions of the chair at the 23^rd session of the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights at the WIPO, Available at: http://www.eifl.net/wipo-sccr23-conclusions (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[15] For draft proposal of the treaty see IFLA, Treaty proposal on Limitations and Exceptions for Libraries and Archives, Available at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_27/sccr_27_2_rev.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[16] See The Draft WIPO Treaty on Exceptions and Limitations for the Persons with Disabilities, Educational and Research Institutions, Libraries and Archives, proposal by the African Group (document SCCR/22/12).Available at: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_22/sccr_22_12.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[17] See Section 52(q) of the Copyright Act, 1957.

[18] Section 31 and 31A, the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[19] Section 31D, the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[20] Section 14(1), the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[21] Id.

[22] Section 38B, the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[23] CIS, Comments on Draft Copyright Rules, 2012, available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/feedback-to-draft-copyright-rules-2012 (Last Accessed: 29/11/14).

[24] See Pranesh Prakash, Analysis of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2012, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/analysis-copyright-amendment-bill-2012

[25] Section 65B, The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[26] Pranesh Prakash, Technological Protection Measures in the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, Available at: http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/tpm-copyright-amendment (Last Accessed: 29/11/14).

[27] Rishabh Dara, Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet, 2011, Available at: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/intermediary-liability-in-india.pdf (Last Accessed: 30/11/14).

[28] Section 63A, Copyright Act 1957.

[29] See Right to Share: Principles on Freedom of Expression and Copyright in the Digital Age, Article19, Available at: http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3716/en/ (Last Accessed: 29/11/14).

[30] V Premanath, S Sivaram, Intellectual Property Systems in India: Progressing towards Greater Maturity and Diversity, Available at: http://iimahd.ernet.in/users/anilg/files/Articles/Emerging%20IPR%20Consciousness,%20vikalpa.pdf (Last Accessed: 29/11/14).

[31] Jan Wouters, Idesbald Goddeeries, Bregt Natens etc, Some Critical Issues in the EU -India Free Trade Agreement Negotiation, Working Paper No.102,KU Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications/working_papers/new_series/wp101-110/wp102-wouters-goddeeris-natens.pdf , February 2013, p.16.

Monika Ermert, Lack of Transparency in EU-India FTA Talks Spurs Requests for Halt, ip-watch, Available at: http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/09/03/lack-of-transparency-in-eu-india-fta-talks-spurs-requests-for-halt/ .

[32] The current policy of the US Trade Representative is seen to be reflected in the 2002 Trade Act available here: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hr3009enr/pdf/BILLS-107hr3009enr.pdf See HR3009.

[33] The current trade strategy for the EU can be found here http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/tradoc_152643.pdf .

[34] Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, Available at: http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ciprfullfinal.pdf , p.174.

[35] C. Correa, 'Negotiation of a Free Trade Agreement European Union-India: Will India Accept Trips-Plus

Protection?', (2009) Oxfam Deutschland and Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst Analysis,

http://www.oxfam.de/files/20090609_negotiationofafreetradeaggrementeuindia_218kb.pdf .

[36] S. Sharma, 'the EU-India FTA: Critical Considerations in a Time of Crisis', (2009) Centad Working Paper.

[37] Asit Ranjan Mishra, India to negotiate FTAs with emerging market nations, Livemint, Available at: http://www.livemint.com/Politics/RlJNxUXovjNVaRzQt9KXmO/India-to-negotiate-FTAs-with-emerging-market-nations.html .

[38] Sisule F Musungu and Graham Dutfield, Commission Multilateral Agreements and a TRIPS -Plus Word: the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), Available at: http://www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/WIPO_Musungu_Dutfield.pdf.

[39] For Trends, See Beginda Pakpahan, Deadlock in the WTO: What is next? Available at: http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum12_e/art_pf12_e/art19.htm .

[40] See Amit Sengupta, Do not trade away our lives, Vo.9, No.2, Indian Journal of Medical Ethics, 2012, Available at: http://www.issuesinmedicalethics.org/index.php/ijme/article/view/88/1047 .

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-on-proposed-ip-rights-policy-to-dipp

Interviews with App Developers: [dis]regard towards IPR vs. Patent Hype – Part II

samantha — 2014-08-19T03:51:39Z

The following is a second post within a series reporting on interviews conducted with 10 of Bangalore's mobile app developers and other industry stakeholders. Within this research, CIS attempts to understand how they engage with the law within their practice, particularly with respect to IP. Here we examine how these developers responded to a question on legal protection for their works.

Before one can identify the solution, one must first identify the problem. Yet, in order to understand the problem, we must first understand the individuals involved and the how the problem affects these individuals. We hope that the findings of this preliminary research initiative will provide sufficient groundwork to understand the problems that exist and the different ways of approaching them before determining the most suitable prospective option in changes at the policy level. In this case, the individuals under study are the key contributors to the mobile app space within India; and the problem, being those faced by them as they attempt to navigate an emerging and ambiguous ecosystem.

Previously, we looked at responses that were given across these mobile app developers interviewed which revealed how they orient notions of intellectual property within their practice and own products, specifically. Findings that were made included deductions that the majority of those interviewed developed mobile app products for clients, and in turn assigned ownership of their products to their clients. Just as well, they commonly shared an interest in leaving the services sector to create products of their own, with some of them already having made the transition within their business model.

Question 2: “How is your IP protected?”

Next, we asked how they go about protecting their intellectual property to get a feel of who is protecting their apps and who is not. In asking this question, we hoped to learn how they go about protecting their work via legal means. Across their various responses, we observed many patterns and contradictions which are conveyed here with reference to comments made across interviews. It is important to note, however, that no causal relations intend for be argued for, only suggested correlations.

How they responded

When asked, those interviewed responded with a variance in answers. Some simply stated that their work is not protected, while a few mentioned that they acquired trademark or intend to apply for trademark protection. One interviewee had a patent pending in India and the US, as well. In many of our conversations, developers mentioned that their code for their apps is under open source licenses, and a couple others entailed sharing that the content is under creative commons licenses, “individual licenses,” or joint copyright. Additionally, within one interview, one mentioned the use of encryption tools as a technical means of protection for their work.

“The concept of securing IP is relatively new within the Indian context... it becomes a question of priority between innovation and protection" — Aravind Krishnaswamy, Levitum

Of the developers interviewed, many exhibited some sort of confusion or misunderstanding related to the protection of their works by means of intellectual property rights (IPR). Those interviewed seemed to either express an interest to acquire IPR in the future for their products in the forms of patent or trademark protection, or expressed their appreciation for openness source licensing—or both! Beneath these immediate responses, however, many repeated patterns, as well as contradictions, are revealed. Conversations that followed within these interviewed entailed the opportunity to hear from personal experiences and opinions on different areas within their practice intersecting IPR.

Reasons for IPR protection

If a startup or SME is bootstrapped with very little cash flow to begin with, what would provoke or inspire one to pursue the process of acquiring patent protection then? Aravind Krishnaswamy of startup, Levitum, considers “the concept of securing IP is relatively new within the Indian context.” So if this is the case, why did so many developers interviewed express an interest in IPR?

For those who did express interest in acquiring IPR as protection for their mobile app products, most seemed to express an interest in proving ownership over their work, or preventing problems in the future. One developer's commented on how the mobile app market is a “new and potentially volatile area for software development.” For this reason, it was imperative that he and his team attempted to avoid trouble in the future, and ensure that they going about mobile app development the right and moral way.

Within another interview, developer, John Paul of mobile app SME, Plackal, explains his motives for seeking to acquire patent protection, the application for which is currently pending in India and the US: "For us, applying for a patent is primarily defensive. And if it does get infringed upon, it would give us a good opportunity to generate revenue from it." For the company's trademark, they sought to be able to enforce their ownership over their product's brand: “As a precautionary, we've trademarked the app so that should there be a situation where the app is pirated, we can claim ownership for that app.”

Security not so easily attainable

“To some extent, IPR law is only accessible after moving away from the startup phase."—John Paul, Plackal

However, for the startup especially, such protection does not come without a cost. For this reason, IPR is generally perceived as a gamble or tradeoff. It becomes a “question of priority between innovation and protection,” says Krishnaswamy. He continues in saying that, "I feel like even if it’s a great idea if someone else copies it, that’s some level of validation, but as a small company I’d rather be nimble in terms of how we build it up and get it to a certain point. We're trying to move fast and get something going, and then figure it out.” For Krishnaswamy and his team, securing a patent on an area where they feel they feel they have unique work is on their list of things to do, “It's something for us to revisit in the future.”

Paul explains that he and his team didn't always have IPR within reach: “To some extent, IPR law is only accessible after moving away from the startup phase.” So what discourages startups from acquiring IPR, or simply seeking it out?

Patent attorney and IP consultant, Arjun Bala explains that “there is a lot to figure out. One aspect is filling it out, the other is how you write it so that it is easily granted and gives you the right sort of patent protection you are looking for. It is a very complex process that requires a lot of technical and legal expertise.” But even if one successfully manoeuvres the IPR system, is protection guaranteed?

Business Financial Strategist of Out Sourced CFO & Business Advisory Services, Jayant Tewari, illustrates the lack of security for the SME in the patent system, specifically, in saying, “Since a patent becomes public domain on filing, it can be effectively infringed based on the filing, even before it is granted.” Tewari continues in stressing the irrelevance of patents for SMEs due to the difficulty of enforcement: “the infringement will be adjudicated after 2 years at an immense cost to the SME patent-holder, who will go commercially belly-up due to the infringement. The regime does not protect the SME at all.”

“It is easy to say 'this is the method and no once can copy', but unless the look and feel is the same, it is very hard to demonstrate that you have been infringed on.”
—Samuel Mani, Mani Chengappa & Mathur

Nevermind enforcement...

Not only did our interviews shed light on the difficulty for a startup developer to apply for and be granted protection for their intellectual property, but also for the enforcement of such. Partnering Lawyer, Samuel Mani, of technology-focused law firm, Mani Chengappa & Mathur, speaks to us about the extensive procedure required to prove one's ownership over their IP: “To demonstrate copyright infringement, it requires going into millions of lines of code—unless it is the interface that is copied, which is easily visible.” Mani continues on the enforcement of patent protection by saying, “For a patent, the scope is even wider. It is easy to say 'this is the method and no once can copy', but unless the look and feel is the same, it is very hard to demonstrate that you have been infringed on.”

Planting the initial seed

If there is arguably so much risk associated with applying for IPR protection, as well with enforcement, what specifically gets startups thinking about IPR initially within their practice? What experiences help them formulate their opinions on the matter, and which forms of IPR do they seek out?

Across interviews conducted, one particular observation entailed the tendency for developers to have worked in the past for corporate employers that have dealt with cases of infringement or have acquired IP protection. Almost half of those interviewed shared the fact that they worked for a corporate employer and became better familiar with different notions of intellectual property through that experience. It may not be too farfetched to suggest, then, that for the developer the idea of acquiring IPR protection is one that may be reinforced from previous employers or other successful development companies with IPR of their own.

Cofounder and developer for a medium-sized software development enterprise, Anoop[1] explained that it wasn't until after the success of his enterprise's first application with $1 million in sales, that they started thinking about intellectual property and began to understand the value of it. This newly attained understanding, however, had not been enough to sufficiently equip his team with the knowledge to properly secure protection. For them, going after patent protection turned out to be a pursuit in vain.

Loss of faith in patents for SMEs

Anoop shares his disappointing experience after attempting to secure a patent for one of their mobile apps:

“We burned our fingers with patents. We spent a lot of money for a game we invented about 3 years ago. We had a law firm in the US to help us. We applied for it, and it went through 3-4 revisions, costing us $25-30,000. We finally closed the file when we could not get it due to an existing patent. We were really surprised."

After much disappointment from not being successful in their attempts to acquire patent protection, however, Anoop came out of the experience with a new outlook on patents and their role for SMEs:

“They're meant for large companies as means to bully your competitor. Only big players with the capacity to file for a patent as soon as it takes off benefit. The existing system doesn’t really work for startup companies. In India and anywhere. It’s an expensive process. If you’re a startup who’s just bootstrapping, there’s no guarantee that you will get it. It’s going to take you years.”

Patent hype
Anoop is a prime example of developers in the startup space that fall victim to the promises of the patent system—only to be spat back out having exhausted their time and earnings. Already being aware of the probability for failure, Mani strongly discourages going after patent protection as a means of staying in the race. “With people spending millions on litigation, it is a recipe for disaster, especially considering the inherent delay of the Indian system.” For this reason, Mani stresses the importance of applying for the right protection.

Mani also suggests that the patent debate is driven by self-interest—people who simply make money off of application filing, regardless of whether or not the case succeeds. As a lawyer in the IT space, Mani claims to have turned away several prospective clients looking to patent their products when he insisted that such means of protection was not suitable for their product and interests...which brings us to an additional area of heated debate: the patentability of mobile apps.

Can mobile apps be patented?[2]

One concept that seemed to receive contested responses across interviews is that of the patentability of mobile apps in the first place. When asked if mobile apps could be patented, former lawyer and startup founder, Vivek Durai, of HumblePaper, put it blatantly in responding, “absolutely not.” Others offered explanations of the Indian Patent Law nuances regarding when a mobile app is patentable and when one is not.

While consulting a SME with their own patent application, Bala explains their approach to ensure the mobile app's eligibility for patent protection, while providing some insight into the Indian patent system:

“One approach that we've taken to getting a patent in India is it's not just a pure software, but a software plus a hardware—as in it requires a specific hardware to function. If [the software] makes the hardware perform better, then it has a technical effect... In which case, we have a better chance of getting a patent in India. If your software is agnostic to hardware, however, it is much more difficult to receive a patent in India.”

To patent or not to patent? (or any IPR for that matter)
To Tewari, on the other hand, the question of whether a mobile app can be patented is one entirely irrelevant. The question Tewari introduces into the developer's market strategy is not 'can I patent my app?' but instead, 'should I do so?' In response to which; he would predominantly reply: No.

“How [startup] mobile app developers regard IP laws—or better yet, disregard—is fine for their sake,” argues Tewari. Alternatively, he suggests developers learn how to maneuver the laws, to prevent themselves from arriving at any sticky situations after unknowingly using another's code. To his clients who have mobile apps of their own, he advises to use an open source equivalent of a piece of code if they do not have the rights to it. Doing so will help keep infringement upon others at a minimal and prevent litigation against oneself.

“How [startup] mobile app developers regard IP laws—or better yet, disregard—is fine for their sake."—Jayant Tewari, Out Sourced CFO & Business Advisory Services

Not all developers interviewed, however, aspired to acquiring patent protection. In fact, some strongly opposed software patents, while expressing their appreciation for openness across the developer community. The other side to the IPR-Open Source dichotomy will be examined in the blog post to follow, after which, we will then look at accounts of infringement and threats of litigation across mobile app developers interviewed.

To recap

By looking closely at the individual experiences across mobile app developers interviewed, we hope to begin to map out the mobile app ecosystem and the ways in which industry players engage with each other regarding their IPR. We also hope to begin to shed light on the different attitudes towards the law within one's practice, and how they shape their decisions related to their work. Only after doing so, may we be able to sufficiently assess how India's current IP laws govern this landscape.

Stay tuned for the next in this blog series! We hope that you may benefit from our findings in your own practice as a mobile app industry player or enthusiast, as well.

Notes:
[1] Name changed to protect the interviewee's identity

[2] In conducting interviews, our goal was not to test the legitimacy of responses, but instead, to map them out across various industry stakeholders. For this reason, this blog series will not be able to sufficiently respond to legal question, such as whether or not mobile apps are patentable to begin with. We intend to, however, undergo legal analysis of the Indian IPR system at its intersection with the mobile app space in India at a later stage in this project.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/interviews-with-app-developers-dis-regard-towards-ipr-vs-patent-hype-2013-part-ii

Patent Valuation and License Fee Determination in Context of Patent Pools

vikrant — 2014-07-09T09:46:16Z

The focus of this research paper is on an extremely limited though important aspect of patent pools — that of patent valuation and license fee determination. It is important to bear in mind that the concept of patent valuation and license fee determination as it exists independently is modified when it is applied in context of patent pools.

I. Introduction

A patent pool is essentially “An agreement between two or more patent owners to aggregate (pool) their patents and to license them to one another or third parties. Pools usually offer standard licensing terms to licensees and allocate a portion of the licensing fees (royalties) to patent owners according to a pre-set formula or procedure.[1]

A patent pool particularly faces intense scrutiny by way of competition/ antitrust law and each step of structuring of a patent pool has to be done keeping the prevalent norms of antitrust law in context. This article merely brushes with the antitrust aspect, as a discussion on that topic is beyond the scope of this particular article. However, suffice is to say that like other aspects of structuring of a patent pool, patent valuation and licensing fee determination is also subject to antitrust law concerns.

Part II of this research paper is a discussion as regards factors which determine patent value in context of a patent pool. Similarly, Part III is a discussion as regards factors that determine license fee in context of a patent pool. Thereafter, Part IV discusses the methods which are applied for patent valuation and license fee determination. A number of these methods are independent evaluation methods and hence their dynamics when applied in context of patent pools may need to be altered in light of the discussion in Parts II and III. Part V discusses certain aspects of actual patent pools in the technological field to better understand the principles which have been discussed in Parts II-IV. Finally, Part VI concludes this research paper.

II. Determination of Patent Value in a Patent Pool

One of the prominent pillars of a patent pool is an appropriate patent valuation process. Patent valuation is a difficult and subjective task.[2] Moreover, the result of a patent valuation independently outside of a pool might be quite different from when it is part of a pool transaction. A “pool regularizes the valuation of individual patents - making, as the United States Supreme Court put it, ‘a division of royalties according to the value attributed by the parties to their respective patent claims’”.[3] However, this value attribution process is not an arbitrary one but incredibly dynamic, and constantly evolving. This difficulty is furthered by the fact that the term “patent value” itself is subject to interpretation. Patent value essentially comprises of the economic benefit that the patent can bestow.[4]

A number of factors as discuss hereinafter determine the value of a patent. It is not necessary though that all the factors would come into play in context of every exercise of valuation of a patent in a pool. The factors determining patent value can be largely classified into a discussion as regards the types of patents in a patent pool in context of their relative importance and other complementary factors which further affect such importance.

A. Categories of Patents in a Patent Pool

Patents in a pool can be classified based on their necessity and quality. Thus, arises the concept of essential and non-essential patents and strong and weak patents.

Essential and Non-Essential Patents
As the terms indicate, essential patents are those which are imperative for the success of pool creation and thus naturally have considerably more value. Non-essential patents on the other hand are patents which though not imperative may bring efficiency advantages to the pool. However, what exactly comprises an essential patent is a subjective and constantly evolving definition determined by each patent pool according to its commercial needs and capabilities. For example, the number of patents in the MPEG-2 pool, all of which are declared to be essential to the MPEG-2 standard, increased from 27 in 1997 to more than 900 in 2010.[5]

Essential patents naturally have more economic value than non-essential patents.[6] “A pool that includes non-essential patents can increase prices for some consumers, while decreasing prices for other consumers.”[7] Also, inclusion of inessential patents can raise potential concerns about foreclosure of alternative technologies and higher royalties for some licenses than would have occurred if these patents were excluded from the pool.[8] These concerns though should be balanced against the costs of excluding potentially essential patents from the pool.[9] Such concerns were raised in context of the DVD 3C patent pool.[10] Thus, it has to be decided on a case by case scenario as to whether the patent pool will include only essential patents or both essential as well as non-essential patents.

“Whether a patent pool improves a market’s transactional efficiency depends on the competitive characteristics of the patents included within the pool’s offering.”[11] Properly demarcating all required patents for a technology is important during patent pool formation. Otherwise it may create a “hold out” problem where a patent owner will “hold out” for higher royalties, “knowing that the manufacturer has individually negotiated for and already acquired the rest of the necessary … patent licenses, and that the value of all those licenses depends on obtaining a license to its own patent.”[12] Essentiality of a patent can be determined based on certain characteristics of patents:

a. Blocking Patents
Blocking patents comprise of improvement patents on an existing technology. Thus, the improvement patent is deemed to be “subservient” to the earlier, “dominant’ patent”[13] and the subservient and dominant patents are said to block one another.[14] This is so because, the subservient patent cannot be exploited without infringing upon the dominant patent.[15] Likewise, the dominant patent cannot be developed in the improved embodiment without permission from the subservient patentee.[16] For example, the Wright brothers patents for aeroplane wings were improved upon by Glenn Curtiss and Alexander Graham Bell by using a set of wing flaps, or ailerons. The Curtiss patent, however, was found to infringe upon the Wright patent. As a result, Curtiss had no legal right to make, use, or sell his ailerons without a license from the Wright brothers, and the Wright brothers had no legal right to make, use, or sell Curtiss's commercially successful form of the stabilizing device. Their patents mutually infringed and blocked one another and they had to form a patent pool.[17] Similarly, public key encryption method was devised and patented at Stanford University, and licensed to Cylink. Soon thereafter, a team of scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology developed and patented an algorithm, and licensed its use to RSA. The RSA algorithm was successfully commercialized and became an industry standard. Cylink and RSA constituted blocking rival patents and the issue was resolved by formation of a patent pool.[18]

b. Complementary Patents
Complementary patents cover technologies that are largely lacking or inefficient absent a license to a separate patented product.[19] They occur as a consequence of independent invention. Thus, value of complementary patents increases when combined with a separate patented invention; they act synergistically, each increasing the value of the other.[20] “Two products or technologies are complements if an increase in the price of one of them reduces the demand for the other.”[21] For example, production of a light bulb requires patent rights to both the vacuum bulb as well as the filament.[22] A patent pool that only contains complementary patents may have substantial market power if the pool does not face competition from alternative or substitutable technology.[23] This though, could lead to the occurrence of royally stacking i.e. double-marginalization, which can occur when firms sell or license complementary products or technologies and demand is sensitive to price.[24] It refers to the addition of successive mark-ups by suppliers in a vertical relationship.[25]

c. Competing Patents

Competing patents result when there exist totally novel products or processes that provide market substitutes for patented goods, or when inventors sufficiently modify existing patented goods so that the original patent is deemed “invented around” and not infringed.[26] “Two products or technologies are substitutes if an increase in the price of one of them increases the demand for the other.”[27] A patent pool may obtain market power by obtaining control over substitutable patents too.[28] An individual who acquires the rights to a competing patent eliminates or significantly lessens his need for competing patents within or outside of the pool.[29] Thus, the value of a pool consisting of competing patents increases with acquisition of substitute patents.[30]

Strong and Weak Patents
A patent pool can comprise of strong as well as weak patents. The value accorded to the patents would naturally be in accordance with its “strength.” “‘Low patent quality’ is shorthand for such problems as overlapping claims, inappropriately broad claims, slow patent prosecution, and patents on obvious inventions.”[31] Patents are “probabilistic rights”[32] Their scope and extent often remains probabilistic until their claim determination which may often be done only upon adjudication. Similarly in situations of a patent flood,[33] the overall quality of patents may become lower.[34] The additional protection of the pool affords a weak patent enforcement rights that it may not have secured standing alone.[35] Thus, even weak and invalid patents become important and can be used to exclude competitors, for example for litigation threats.[36]

Some patent pools contain explicit agreements to support weak patents, such as covenants not to challenge patents, joint defense agreements, and allocation of patent rights to parties who are best able to defend them.[37] Some patent pools achieve a similar effect not by explicit agreements, but by creating an institutional environment where patentees find that it is mutually advantageous to recognize each other’s patents.[38]

B. Other Factors Determining Patent Value in Context of Patent Pool

Besides the patents themselves, other complementary criteria impact on patent value. These comprise of the holistic environment in which the patents subsist, as discussed hereinafter.

Subject matter of Invention
“Value is highly dependent upon the subject matter of the invention.”[39] Certain subject matter fields or innovations do not have sufficient commercial importance or market demand to warrant investments.

Scope of Invention
A particular subject where there is extensive minefield of patents already in existence is less likely to have considerable patent value due to the limited patent scope as opposed to a field where patents are relatively lacking and there is possibility of a broader patent scope. Analogously, “value of a patent is derived from an ability to preclude others from practicing the unique innovation described by the words of the patent’s claims.”[40] “Generalizing, a patent employing broad claim language is typically more valuable than a patent of narrowly written claims in the same technology arena.”[41]

Size of Patent Pool
The size of a patent pool i.e. the number of its members and their patents is an important facet in determining the value of patents involved. Greater the number more are the governance issues as well as royalty determination issues, which in turn affect the valuation of the patents. This though does not imply that pools should be of a specific size, only that their size should meet efficiency demands.

Value of Patent Pool
The patents under the purview of a patent pool determine the pool’s value which in turn determines the value of the patents within as well as out of the pool. Value of a patent pool may be limited if certain holders of essential patents are not members.[42] This may occur due to various reasons such as if it was perceived that the patent may have more value as an independent entity, or due to strategic interests, or choice of joining different pools.[43] Correspondingly, if the patent pool does not contain all the patents it cannot curtail royalty stacking issues for the users. For example, Alcatel-Lucent pursued infringement claims for patents that it alleged covered the MPEG-2 standard and were not in the pool.[44]

While it is evident that collecting all necessary patents where the end product or standards is determined is extremely difficult, it becomes considerably more difficult where there is no predetermined or identifiable end-product.[45]

Patent Portfolio
Certain academic studies are of the opinion that “the real value of patents lies not in their individual significance, but instead in their aggregation into a patent portfolio: a strategic collection of distinct-but-related individual patents that, when combined, confer an array of important advantages upon the portfolio holder.”[46] This theory has been applied to explain the patent paradox where the patent intensity, i.e. patents obtained per research and development dollar has risen dramatically even as the expected value of individual patents has diminished.[47] Thus, greater the control of an entity over a portfolio of patents, more would be its negotiation power in context of valuation.

Signaling
It has been opined that the value of patents inheres not so much in the exclusivity they confer upon inventors, but rather in their ability to serve as credible signals.[48] Firms use patents to credibly convey information about the invention to the market who otherwise might not be willing to expend the costs necessary to obtain the information.[49]

Defensive Aspect
Patent value is also ascertained based on its use to serve as an insurance, whereby competing firms use them as “bargaining chips” to negotiate and secure certain niches in the marketplace.[50] This is so especially from the negotiation as well as the litigation viewpoint.

Valuation Dynamics
In context of certain subject matters, inability of the patents to be valued or possibility of dynamic changes in value creates problems in structuring the patent pool, or it might lead to issues of according over-value or under-value. For example, in the process of biological research, where hypotheses are often adjusted and experimentation continually refined, it is impossible to anticipate the particular value of a given research tool for an investigative procedure.[51] Similarly, in context of the Human Genome Sciences, the patent for the gene that encodes CCR5 protein, was likely not valued very highly, because of unsurity of its utility, which changed when independent research established its importance in the fight against HIV.[52]

C. Role of Independent Evaluator

Often, independent experts in the relevant technology are employed for patent valuation purposes. Their role includes the responsibility of providing a mechanism for determining the market value of each participating patent for the purpose of setting appropriate royalty rates within the patent pool.[53] Also, they would evaluate the current state of the art and determine which patents are essential and which aren’t.[54] An evaluator’s is a continuing responsibility throughout the existence of the duration of the patent pool to monitor developments in the field so as to ensure each patent’s essentiality and incorporate additional patents if necessary.[55] Concerns though have been expressed as regards the expert’s ability and impartiality.[56]

III. Determination of License Fee for a Patent Pool

Theorists, have suggested criteria to gauge viability of patent pools.[57] The various elements involved in structuring of a patent pool do not function in a vacuum. Each has an impact on the other and ultimately they determine in totum, the licensing fees.

A. Pool Dynamics

The factors catalyzing pool creation impact on the licensing fee that is set. A patent pool may primarily be structured due to government influence,[58] court influence,[59] commercial and business perspective,[60] to achieve or pursuant to standard setting,[61] and social objectives.[62] Accordingly, riders may be placed on creation of the pool and setting of licensing fees.

Analogously, members comprising the patent pool affect royalty determinations. Different perspectives can be observed in commercial entities as opposed to research entities or voluntary organizations. Similarly, the negotiation capabilities are different for established commercial conglomerates as opposed to entrepreneurs, or smaller entities.[63] Similarly, patent pools may distinguish between patent contributing licensees and mere licensees in fixing royalty rates.[64]

Furthermore, pool governance as well as nature of the pool would have an impact on royalty determination. Pools can essentially be of two types based on regulation of members or licensing- open and closed.[65] Correspondingly, the patent holders themselves may have different perspectives or expectations of their rights.

The negotiating entity too has an impact on royalty determination. “Agreements between the members of the patent pool and third parties can be established directly through patentees and licensees or indirectly through an entity specifically created to administer the pool.”[66] There are a considerable number of business models involved in context of a patent pool that define the parameters of the relationship between what are primarily classified as IP creators and IP consumers.[67] These dynamics have considerably altered with the strong and prolific emergence of IP intermediaries; they in turn affect the royalty rate negotiations.[68]

B. Negotiation Dynamics

License negotiations involve complicated factors, such as uncertain outcomes, asymmetric information about the values of technologies and the contributions of licensees to a technology's value, the credibility of disagreements, differential bargaining power and skill, and the individual circumstances of licensors and licensees.[69] Royalty determination depends on “the bargaining skills of patentees, their licensing objectives, the qualities of their patents, opportunity costs that patentees may have if they choose not to license their patents, the likelihood of injunctions, and the methods that courts apply to calculate infringement damages.” [70] Pool members act strategically to maximize their share of the pool’s revenues.[71] “The defining characteristic of patent ownership has been described as the right to extract royalties ‘as high as [one] can negotiate with the leverage’ of exclusivity.”[72] “The patent holder can ask for a high starting price; the potential infringer can counter by pointing to potential substitute technologies; and ultimately the process should yield a price that accurately reflects the marginal advantages of the patented technology.”[73] Again, negotiation strategies include deploying a number of tactics by corporates to whittle down an independent inventor’s patience and his price, thus reducing the licensing fee from the desired amount.[74] Correspondingly, there is no average length of time or amount of money needed for successfully creating a patent pool; it depends on the number of members involved in the negotiations and their commitment and willingness to negotiate an appropriate price.[75]

Timing of the license negotiation too has an impact on determination of the royalty scheme. Licensing can occur in two primary settings: ex ante licensing, i.e. prior to pool formation; and ex post, i.e. post pool formation. In ex ante licensing, the manufacturer has a choice to alter existing products to incorporate the patented features, and can thus perform a rational cost-benefit analysis prior to making any product alterations.[76] Analogously, a holdout who demands royalties prior to the final organization of the pool can only demand a royalty that reflects the additional value that his new patent adds to the collection.[77] If he demands more than this value, the pool will work around the holdout’s patent by adopting a different standard, adjusting the patent pool to cover slightly different technology, or dissolving itself.[78] In ex post licensing, on the other hand, a holdout is in a stronger negotiating position, and can demand not only the marginal value of his patent, but also the switching costs that would be incurred if the established standard or licensing regime were limited by a court injunction.[79] Complicating this situation are licenses that are granted ex ante but negotiated ex post.

Furthermore, patent pools are generally voluntary collaborations; however, it is also possible to compel parties to join the pool or risk losing revenue from a large segment of the industry.[80] Depending on the situation, the negotiation dynamics and hence the royalty scheme would be affected.

Rules governing damages for patent infringement also affect patentees’ decision to join a pool or to license independently, as the threat of injunctive relief can provide a patentee with bargaining power that can be disproportional to the number of patents he owns.[81]

C. Terms of License

The terms of the license considerably influence royalty determination. These include, nature of licensed products,[82] character of license- whether exclusive or non-exclusive,[83] granting clause, geographic scope of the license, field of use governed by the license, provision of sublicensing, grantback provisions, future usage governance, non-assertion clauses, reach-through provisions, termination clause, and licensee’s ability to challenge patents in the pool.

Included herein too would be the treatment of after-acquired patents, which in turn can be classified into two types: (1) improvement patents based on a patented technology licensed by another member of the patent pool; and (2) patents unrelated to patented technologies licensed to the members of the patent pool.[84]

License governance in context of graduated and progressive licensing would also influence royalty determination. This would include “provisions for pool members to license their patents without licensing all the patents in a pool”[85] And the freedom “to license their patents bilaterally, i.e., outside of the pool structure.”[86]

IV. Methods for Patent Valuation and License Fee Determination

There are three basic methods of valuation: the cost method,[87] the market method,[88] and the income method.[89] In context of patent valuation, these methods find varied expressions. “A truly accurate assessment of patent value requires intensive legal and technical evaluation of individual patents.”[90] The economics literature, however, has also proposed several proxies for patent value based on objective and readily available information.[91]

In context of patent pools the dynamics of patent valuation methods is altered and they need to be viewed through the prism of factors discussed in Part II. This doesn’t imply that approaches to objective patent valuation are not relevant.[92] “However, such valuation approaches focus only on characteristics of patents at the time of issue and neglect to consider what happens afterwards.”[93] “Technology developments or price fluctuations, among many factors, may alter the relationship between two patents … In turn, this may decrease the value of any static analysis conducted by experts.”[94]

Determination of the licensing fee of a patent pool is based on the joint affect of certain transactions. Again, as with patent valuation, so also with licensing fee determination, in context of patent pools, the factors discussed in Part III need to be given heed. The transactions influencing licensing fee determination essentially comprise of valuation of the patent, which in turn is used to set a royalty rate pertaining to allocation of various fees received by licensing of the pool patents. Thus, royalty payment is comprised of two components: a royalty rate and a royalty base, upon which the rate is applied.[95]

A. Determining an Appropriate Royalty Base

The scope of the royalty base can be determined in two principal ways- apportionment and entire market value rule.

The apportionment principle implies that when a patent reads on the entirety of an infringing product, the royalty base should be the total value of the sales (or use) of that product.[96] When the patent at issue covers only a component of the infringing product, the value of the sales or uses of that item must be apportioned between the patented invention and the remaining unpatented components.[97] Thus, the principle aims at allocating awards in proportion to contribution, and is not based on any value attributable to the infringer’s or third parties’ inventions.[98] Thus, essentially, a licensor garners a royalty fee in proportion to the number of infringed patents owned by him.

The entire market value rule, recognizes that the economic value added to a product by a patented component may be greater than the value of the component alone.[99] Thus, this rule focuses on whether the patented component drives demand for the entire product, and if it is so, then the patentee may treat all revenue from the infringing product as an appropriate royalty base.[100]

B. Setting Royalty Rates

Royalty rates are typically a percentage rate and thus reflects the proportion of the base value that the patented technology contributes.[101] Various approaches have emerged in determining royalty rates; these could be adapted in context of patent pools.

Rule of Thumb
This approach suggests that the licensor should receive 25 percent of the licensee’s gross profit from the licensed technology.[102]Thus, this rule’s purpose is not the valuation of a technology per se, but rather the apportionment of a technology’s value between the licensor and licensee.[103] The percentage split between the licensor and licensee should be adjusted upwards or downwards to take into account the parties’ respective investment and risk in the licensed technology.[104]

Numerical Proportionality
According to this approach, royalty entitlement of the holder of patents essential to a standard should be calculated in light of the proportional contribution of that patent owner’s essential patents compared to the total contribution of all other essential patents reading on the standard.[105] This method rests on the proposition that every patent is of equal value.[106]

Industry Standards / Market or Comparable Technology Method
Under this approach, the worth of a patent is determined by examining the royalty rates garnered in similar past transactions.[107]

Discounted Cash Flow
This approach proposes that patent price can be expressed as the present value of the future stream of economic benefits derived from ownership, which includes projected sales of products (or components) based on the patent over its expected life or any increased share of sales as compared to competitors, net of any capital requirements of production.[108] To implement it, one must determine (1) the future cash flows generated by the patent in question and (2) an appropriate discount rate.[109]

Ranking
This approach compares the intellectual property asset to be valued to comparable intellectual property assets on a subjective or objective scale.[110] There are five components to a ranking method: (i) scoring criteria; (ii) scoring system; (iii) scoring scale; (iv) weighting factors; and (v) decision table; these components are used to calculate a composite score for an asset, which is then compared to the average score for a comparable intellectual property asset to determine the relative value.[111]

Cost-based Rate Setting
This approach proposes that the patent holder’s cost of obtaining the invention and its patent forms the basis of the royalty rate; a profit margin is simply tacked onto the innovation cost.[112]

Surrogate Measures
Surrogate measures value patents by reference to the patents themselves.[113] They can be largely categorized into: (1) the number of patents issued to a company; (2) payment of patent maintenance fees i.e. patents which are regularly renewed are more valuable; (3) prior art citations i.e. more a patent is cited, more is its value; (4) characteristics of litigated patents i.e. patents which are the subject matter of litigation are more valuable.[114]

Disaggregation Methods
There are two basic types of disaggregation methods - value disaggregation and income disaggregation.[115] The former apportions some fraction of total value to intellectual property assets by setting the value of intangible assets equal to the value of a firm minus the firm’s monetary and tangible assets from to determine the value of the intangible assets.[116] The latter apportions some fraction of total earnings of a firm, based upon various factors, to intellectual property assets.[117]

Option Methods
This approach views an investment in intellectual property as an option to develop the intellectual property further, or to abandon the intellectual property, depending upon future technical and market information.[118]

Competitive Advantage Valuation (R)
The major premise of the CAV method is that intellectual property assets have no inherent value; the value of intellectual property assets resides entirely in the value of the tangible assets which incorporate them.[119] The minor premise of the CAV method is that the value of a given intellectual property asset can best be measured by the competitive advantage which that asset contributes to a product, process, or service.[120] In its most general form, CAV method consists of following six basic steps[121]:

The intellectual property asset to be valued (IPA) is associated with a product and the product’s net present value is calculated.
The product's net present value is apportioned among tangible assets, intangible advantages and intellectual property assets. (There are three groups of intellectual property assets: technical [utility patents, functional software copyrights and technical trade secrets]; reputational [trademarks, service marks and brand names]; and operational [business method patents and proprietary business processes].
The product is associated with competition parameters which can be used to compare the product to substitute products and competition parameter weights are calculated. (There are three groups of competition parameters: technical [price and performance], reputational [recognition and impression], and operational [cost and efficiency]. Weights are calculated for each parameter group and for individual parameters within each group).
The IPA is associated with an individual competition parameter and the IPA's competitive advantage relative to substitute intellectual property assets is calculated. (Substitute intellectual property assets are assets which are incorporated in substitute products and associated with the same competition parameter as the IPA).
The IPA is associated with complementary intellectual property assets and the IPA's competitive advantage relative to complementary intellectual property assets is calculated. (Complementary intellectual property assets are assets which are incorporated in the same product and associated with the same parameter group as the IPA).
The value of the IPA is calculated by apportioning a share of the product's intellectual property asset value to the IPA based upon the IPA's competitive advantage contribution relative to substitute and complementary intellectual property assets. If the IPA is associated with multiple products, the IPA's relative competitive advantage contribution to each product is calculated and these contributions are summed to calculate the total value of the IPA. If the IPA is associated with multiple parameters, the IPA's relative competitive advantage contribution for each parameter is calculated and these contributions are summed to calculate the total value of the IPA.

Georgia Pacific
The fifteen factors enumerated in the Georgia Pacific case, several of which repeat approaches discussed above, are used in royalty rate determination:[122]

The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit.
The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold.
The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain its patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether they are inventor and promoter.
The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of its non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.
The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial success; and its current popularity.
The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.
The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention.
The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that use.
The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions.
The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
The opinion testimony of qualified experts.

The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent licensee-which desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention-would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a license.

Academics have prescribed modification to the approach towards these factors analyzing that the relevant questions in calculating a reasonable royalty fall into four basic categories: (1) whether the patentee in fact produces a product in the market; (2) the contribution made by the patented technology compared to the next best alternative; (3) the number and importance of other inputs necessary to make that technology work; and (4) evidence of how the market has actually valued the patent, to the extent it differs from the outcome of (1), (2), and (3).[123]

V. Patent Pool Examples

The following discussion highlights certain aspects of patent pools from real world examples. These examples are restricted to the technological field. Study of these aspects is of value in understanding the concepts discussed hereinbefore.

A. Manufacturers Aircraft Association (MAA)

The MAA was formed in 1917 in U.S.

Apart from the “foundational” patents of Glenn Curtiss and the Wright Brothers, which had substantial royalty rates, most licensing was conducted on a royalty-free basis, with mutual forbearance from infringement suits as the real payment for the exchange.[124]

The MAA was open to anyone who wished to use the Wright-Curtiss designs for a $1000 initiation fee and a licensing fee of $200 per aircraft built; these funds were to be distributed primarily between the Wright and Curtiss interests until each received a sum of $2,000,000 or their key patents expired.[125] MAA retained $ 25 (12.5%) to cover its administrative expenses, $ 135 (67.5%) was paid to the Wright-Martin Aircraft Corporation and $ 40 (20%) was paid to the Curtiss-Burgess Airplane & Motor Corporation.[126]

Patents added to the pool after its formation were divided into two classes- normal patents were licensed into the pool for all to use, with no special royalty payout going to the inventor or firm; exceptional patents earned ongoing royalties, in an amount determined by a formal arbitration procedure.[127]

The MAA also included a grant-back provision that applied to after-acquired patents.[128]

MAA’s members could license their patents to non-members if the terms were no more favorable than to members and any MAA member could withdraw at any time, but its patents in the pool at the time of withdrawal would remain.[129]

B. Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG)

MPEG technology allows for transmission and storage of digital video and audio signals. It was formed by the Trustees of Columbia University, Fujitsu Limited, General Instrument Corp., Lucent Technologies Inc., Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Electric Corp., Philips Electronics N.C., Scientific Atlanta, Inc., and Sony Corp. in 1997. The patent pool for the MPEG-2 standard is administered by a common license administrator- MPEG-LA

MPEG-LA is required to grant licenses to any potential licensees, without discrimination and at a reasonable royalty rate.

MPEG LA offers a portfolio of MPEG-2 systems licenses with a fixed royalty for each licensed mobile MPEG-2 systems signal receiver and a different fixed royalty for all other MPEG-2 systems devices.[130] Additional patents, not included in the portfolio, are available for specific implementations.[131]

The pool offers a standardized five-year license to all prospective licensees.[132] The licensing royalties do not change if patents are added to the portfolio during the five-year licensing period, although the royalty rate may increase by up to 25% in a license renewal.[133] Each patent in the pool is valued equally.[134]

The license has a grant-back provision that requires the licensee to grant to the licensor and other portfolio licensees a nonexclusive license, under fair and reasonable terms and conditions, on any essential patent that the licensee has a right to license.[135]

There exists a partial termination right given to licensors, who may request that MPEG-LA terminate the license of that licensor’s IPR to a particular licensee, if that licensee has sued the licensor for infringement of an MPEG-2 essential or “related” patent or refused to license a related patent on fair and reasonable terms.[136]

C. DVD

Sony, Philips and Pioneer organized the DVD3C patent pool in 1998 for the licensing of patents that are “essential” to comply with the DVD-Video or DVD-ROM standard specifications.

Royalty payments are allocated under guidelines set by the Ground Rules for Royalty

Allocation rather than on subjective analysis by an expert.[137] The royalty rate in standard licenses is not related to fluctuations in the market price of a licensed product; also, the royalty rate is not computed on a per-patent basis and does not fluctuate as patents are added or removed, therefore, the same royalty rate is payable when using one essential patent as when using several.[138]

Hitachi, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Time Warner, Toshiba, and Victor organized the DVD6C patent pool in 1999 again for the licensing of patents that are “essential” to comply with the DVD-Video or DVD-ROM standard specifications.

The DVD6C pool is also governed by the “Ground Rules for Royalty Allocation” guidelines.[139] The royalties are 4% of the net selling price of the product or U.S. $4.00 per product, whichever is higher. Royalties for DVD decoders are 4% of the net selling price of the product or U.S. $1.00 per product, whichever is higher.[140]

The DVD6C agreement contains a grant-back clause, which, requires licensees to grant each of the licensing companies of DVD6C (and their licensees) a non-exclusive license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms to use any of their patents that are deemed essential for the manufacture, use or sale of DVD Products; this grantback is restricted only to those DVD products actually licensed to the licensee.[141]

D. 3G Mobile Telephony

The 3G Patent Platform Partnership was formed in 1999. The purpose of the 3G Patent Platform Partnership is to allow for “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” access to rights essential for implementing the W-CDMA 3GPP standard.[142]

There are three form contracts associated with the Platform: the Framework Agreement, the Standard License, and the Interim License.[143] The Framework Agreement gives each member the choice either to license its essential patents according to the Standard License or to negotiate terms directly with a licensee.[144] The Standard License prescribes standardized royalties for licenses, to be determined by an independent commission.[145] If the patent owner foregoes the Standard License and fails to come to terms in bilateral negotiations, the Interim License comes into effect which has the same royalty terms as the Standard License.[146]

E. Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG)

The Bluetooth SIG was formed in 1997 to provide a technology for interconnection of mobile phones, computers, laptops, printers, PDAs, and other devices via a short-range radio frequency band; SIG oversees the development of Bluetooth standards and its licensing.[147]

SIG’s member companies are divided into three different classes- (1) promoter company, which are intensely engaged in the strategic and technical development of Bluetooth wireless technology; they include Agere, Ericsson, Intel, Lenovo, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, and

Toshiba; (2) associate members, who are licensed to use Bluetooth specifications and trademarks; (3) adopted members, which use published specifications and trademarks, but do not influence the specification process, nor do they have early access to unpublished specifications.[148]

SIG licenses to member companies on a royalty-free basis, but, associate members pay an annual fee based on their company’s annual revenue, with “small” associates (less than $100 million USD/year) paying $7,500 USD/year and “large” associates (more than $100 million USD/year) paying $35,000 USD/year; adopted members are not required to pay an annual fee.[149]

VI. Conclusion

As is evident, patent valuation and license fee determination are extremely subjective and case based. Moreover, their dynamics alter according to the situation, as in the context of patent pools. This dynamism is furthered by the fact that there are no strict or universal formulas or procedures which can be applied in such determinations. Furthermore, such determinations cannot be made in a vacuum but are subject to the cascading effect of a multitude of factors comprised of the holistic technological environment that may not be just restricted to the innovation in question.

[1] Krista L. Cox, The Medicines Patent Pool: Promoting Access and Innovation for Life-Saving Medicines Through Voluntary Licenses 4 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 293 (Summer, 2012) citing IGWG Briefing Paper on Patent Pools: Collective Management of Intellectual Property--The Use of Patent Pools to Expand Access to Essential Medical Technologies, Knowledge Ecology International, (June 3, 2007) quoting Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent Pools, in Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property, Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society 123 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).

[2] Jer Rutton Kavasmaneck v Gharda Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. (Suit No.2932 of 2011; Decided On: 20.03.2012) Bombay H.C. (Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) including the patent right is valuable right for all the commercial purposes. These intangible assets play important role in any financial assessment of the trade/commercial or the market. It changes from time to time, market to market, person to person based upon the situations. If valuation is always a complex and flexible issue and a matter of discussion and debate in business strategies. The patent valuation involves many described and undescribed elements).

[3]Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1293 (October 1996) citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931).

[4] Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent Portfolios Through Analytical Techniques 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 463 (Spring, 2007).

[5] Richard J. Gilbert, Ties That Bind: Policies to Promote (Good) Patent Pools 77 Antitrust L.J. 1 (2010) MPEG LA Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Ass’t Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (June 26, 1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf; MPEG LA, MPEG-2 Patent Portfolio License Briefing (Aug. 4, 2010).

[6] See Kramer, supra n.4 at 463 (essential patents of technical standards are more valuable, on average, than the general population of patents).

[7] Gilbert, supra n.5.

[8] Id.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.citing DVD 3C Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Ass't Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Garrard R. Beeney, Esq., Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (Dec. 16, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf.

[11]R. Justin Koscher, A Patent Pool's White Knight: Individual Licensing Agreements And The Procompetitive Presumption 20 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 53 (Fall, 2009).

[12] Daniel Lin, Research versus Development: Patent Pooling, Innovation And Standardization In The Software Industry 1 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 274 (2002).

[13] Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma 16 Yale J. on Reg. 359 (Summer, 1999).

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.

[17] Id.

[18] Id.

[19] Id.

[20] Michael A. Sanzo, Antitrust Law And Patent Misconduct In The Proprietary Drug Industry 39 Vill. L. Rev. 1209 (1994).

[21] Gilbert, supra n.5.

[22] Carlson, supra n.13.

[23] Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment Of Current Law And Policy 38 Rutgers L. J. 539 (Winter, 2007).

[24] Gilbert, supra n.5.

[25] Id.

[26] Carlson, supra n.13.

[27] Gilbert, supra n.5.

[28] Nelson, supra n.23.

[29] David S. Taylor, The Sinking Of The United States Electronics Industry Within Japanese Patent Pools 26 GW J. Int'l L. & Econ. 181 (1992).

[30] Id.

[31] Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 309 (2002).

[32] Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Frontiers of Intellectual Property: Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991 (June, 2007).

[33] Meurer, supra n.31 (A patent flood occurs when many inventors apply for patents on similar inventions during an interval of a few years).

[34] Id.

[35] Robert P. Greenspoon and Catherine M. Cottle, Don't Assume A Can Opener: Confronting Patent Economic Theories With Licensing And Enforcement Reality 12 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 194 (2011).

[36] Meurer, supra n.31.

[37] Gilbert supra n.5 citing the cross-licensing arrangement between the Singer Manufacturing Company and Gegauf, contained provisions by which each of the parties agreed not to bring any infringement action against the other. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 178 (1963).

[38] Gilbert supra n.5.

[39] Kramer, supra n.4.

[40] Id.

[41] Id.

[42] Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Patents, and the National Smart Grid 32 Pace L. Rev. 641 (Summer Issue, 2012).

[43] Gilbert, supra n.5 (To the extent that a patent pool successfully lowers total royalties relative to independent licensing, this leaves ‘headroom’ available for an independent licensor outside the pool to charge a high royalty for its patent).

[44] Id. citing Multimedia Patent Trust v. Microsoft Corp., et al., 525 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

[45] Chase A. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis: Current Solutions To The Anticommons Threat 12 J. High Tech. L. 487 (2012); Damien Geradin and Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Value Apportionment Rules for Complex, Multi-Patent Products 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 763 (2010 / 2011) (the typical semiconductor chip likely involves hundreds, perhaps more, patents. In turn, that chip may be intended for use in a laptop computer, the other components of which involve hundreds, or more, patents. Without knowing how many patents actually read on a product, and how many have holders who will actively seek licensing fees, it can be exceedingly difficult to assign the contributed value to those that are known).

[46] Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (November, 2005); Elizabeth M. Bailey, Gregory K. Leonard and Mario A. Lopez, Making Sense Of “Apportionment” In Patent Damages 12 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 255 (2011) (combining patented technologies typically creates value that is greater than the sum of the parts. For example, patent pools often bring together various technologies that are necessary to create the product in question. The stand-alone value of any one patent in the pool may be low or close to zero unless combined with the other patents in the pool).

[47] Parchomovsky and Wagner, supra n.46.

[48] Id.

[49] Id.

[50] Id.

[51] Scott Iyama, The USPTO's Proposal of a Biological Research Tool Patent Pool Doesn't Hold Water 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1223 (March, 2005).

[52] Bradley J. Levang, Evaluating the Use of Patent Pools For Biotechnology: A Refutation to the USPTO White Paper Concerning Biotechnology Patent Pools 19 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 229 (December, 2002).

[53] Courtney C. Scala, Making the Jump From Gene Pools to Patent Pools: How Patent Pools Can Facilitate the Development of Pharmacogenomics 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1631 (July, 2009).

[54] Id.

[55] Id.

[56] R. Justin Koscher, A Patent Pool's White Knight: Individual Licensing Agreements And The Procompetitive Presumption 20 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 53 (Fall, 2009) citing DVD-6 Business Review Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, to Carey R. Ramos, Esq., of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison (June 10, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.htm.

[57] Alexander Lee, Examining the Viability of Patent Pools for the Growing Nanotechnology Patent Thicket, 3 Nanotechnology L. & Bus. 317 (2006) suggests that to determine the viability of using a patent pool in a market, companies should ponder the following list of nine criteria: (1) product development driven by standards; (2) moderate fragmentation of patent landscape; (3) at least five pool members; (4) each member working on specific subcomponent of a product; (5) willingness of patent holders to negotiate; (6) commitment by members to create the pool; (7) an industry that is in the later stages of product development; (8) certainty of patent ownership; and (9) a patent pool clear of potential antitrust violations.

[58] See Gilbert, supra n.5 discussing the Manufacturers Aircraft Association, where the U.S. government used the threat of compulsory licensing to compel the pioneers of the aircraft industry to form a patent pool in 1917. The industry was enmeshed in litigation over the scope and validity of patents, and some patentees, particularly the Wright-Martin Company, were demanding royalties that the government and other aircraft manufacturers deemed excessive. Creation of the Manufacturers Aircraft Association patent pool resolved the litigation chaos. The government negotiated a portfolio license from the pool with a royalty of $ 200 per aircraft, which was a fraction of the royalty that Wright-Martin was demanding for a single patent ($ 1,000 per aircraft).

[59] See Carlson, supra n.13 discussing that pool agreements are frequently employed as a means of settling existing litigation, and citing examples including patent pools in the laser eye surgery, and the public key encryption industries;

also see Lemley & Shapiro, Frontiers of Intellectual Property, supra n.32 discussing that the average royalty rate granted in all reasonable-royalty cases is 13.13% of the price of the infringing product, which is much higher than that of patent licenses negotiated without litigation.

[60] See Greenspoon and Cottle, supra n.35 discussing the value of patents as a form of currency that can be used to further goals unrelated to market creation or entry. Such goals can be to improve a firm's competitive position when trying to acquire start-up funds, to improve negotiating terms when licensing other patents, and to reduce the chance of paying excessive royalties to external patent owners;

also see, Gilbert, supra n.5 discussing how different business strategies can cause firms to pool their patents with some firms, but not with others, citing the example of emergence of two pools to license DVD patents as a consequence of differing approaches to industry standards. One explanation offered for the existence of two separate pools is that the two groups could not reach an accord about their respective shares of joint royalty payments.

[61] See Gilbert, supra n.5 discussing how some pools license their patents royalty-free or at royalties that are deliberately held below profit-maximizing levels in an effort to promote adoption of new technologies covered by their patents, citing the example of the Bluetooth Special Interest Group and the Multimedia Home Platform. The article also discusses patent pools formed to license patents that are necessary to implement a defined standard, such as MPEG encoding, DVDs, or mobile telephony.

[62] See Gilbert, supra n.5 discussing pools that limit royalties to promote social objectives rather than to profit from new products citing examples of companies, universities, and research organizations such as Syngenta- an agricultural technology company, the Public Intellectual Property Resource for Agriculture, the SARS IP Working Group, and the UNITAID pool for AIDS medications.

[63] Yuichi Watanabe, Patent Licensing And The Emergence Of A New Patent Market 9 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 445 (2009) (The current state of affairs shows that the patent licensing market strongly favors larger corporations over smaller ones, enabling the larger corporations to reap much of the market opportunities and benefits while limiting them to smaller patentees).

[64] Roger B. Andewelt, Practical Problems In Counseling And Litigating: Analysis Of Patent Pools Under The Antitrust Laws 53 Antitrust L.J. 611 (October 11, 1984/October 12, 1984) (Pools typically contain restrictions on those who join the pool by contributing patents and/or those who take licenses under the pooled patents).

[65]Chase A. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis: Current Solutions To The Anticommons Threat 12 J. High Tech. L. 487 (2012).

[66] Ann Weilbaecher, PSY.D., Diseases Endemic in Developing Countries: How to Incentivize Innovation 18 Ann. Health L. 281 (Summer, 2009).

[67] Greenspoon and Cottle, supra n.35 identify five general types of entities that license and enforce patents: (1) Individual inventors with a single patent; (2) Individual serial inventors; (3) Non-Practicing Entities; (4) Operating companies who practice inventions acquired from others; and (5) Operating companies who practice inventions developed in-house.

[68] See, Raymond Millien and Ron Laurie, A Survey Of Established & Emerging IP Business Models 9 Sedona Conf. J. 77 (2008) discussing various models, viz. Patent Licensing and Enforcement Companies, Institutional IP Aggregators/Acquisition Funds, IP/Technology Development Companies, Licensing Agents, Litigation Finance/Investment Firms, IP Brokers, IP-Based M&A Advisory Firms, IP Auction Houses, On-Line IP/Technology Exchanges, Clearinghouses, Bulletin Boards, and Innovation Portals, IP-Backed Lending, Royalty Stream Securitization Firms, Patent Rating Software and Valuation Services, University Technology Transfer Intermediaries, IP Transaction Exchanges & Trading Platforms/IP Transaction Best Practices Development Communities, Defensive Patent Pools, Funds and Alliances, Technology/IP Spinout Financing, and Patent-Based Public Stock Indexes.

[69] Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations In Standard-Setting Organizations 77 Antitrust L.J. 855 (2011).

[70] Gilbert, supra n.5

[71] Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra n.3.

[72] Alan Devlin, Standard-Setting And The Failure Of Price Competition 65 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 217 (2009) citing Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).

[73]Doug Lichtman, Understanding The Rand Commitment 47 Hous. L. Rev. 1023 (2010).

[74] Peter N. Detkin, Leveling The Patent Playing Field 6 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 636 (Summer, 2007).

[75] Lee, infra n.57.

[76] Kelce Wilson, The Four Phases of Patent Usage 40 Cap. U.L. Rev. 679 (Summer, 2012).

[77]Gavin D. George, What is Hiding in the Bushes? eBay's Effect on Holdout Behavior in Patent Thickets, 13 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev. 557 (2007).

[78] Id.

[79] Id

[80]Daniel R. Cahoy and Leland Glenna, Private Ordering and Public Energy Innovation Policy 36 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 415 (Spring, 2009).

[81] Gilbert, supra n.5; See for example, Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra n.3 describing how in the airplane cross-licensing agreement, it provides that a board of arbitrators may decide in any case what reward should be paid to individual patent owners and this is based not upon the official determination of patentability by the Patent Office, but upon the unofficial determination of the importance of the invention by a board of arbitrators.

[82] See Andewelt, supra n.64 (The scope and variety of patents included vary considerably from pool to pool. Some pools are limited to patents covering a single commercial device. Others contain numerous and diverse patents relating to different devices in different markets).

[83] See, Scala, supra n.53 discussing how the non-exclusive character of a license is particularly important for those firms holding patents whose full utility is unascertainable at the time of the formation of the pool.

[84] Dustin R. Szakalski, Progress In The Aircraft Industry And The Role Of Patent Pools And Cross-Licensing Agreements 2011 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 1 (Spring 2011).

[85] Ed Levy, et. al, Patent Pools And Genomics: Navigating A Course To Open Science? 16 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75 (Winter, 2010).

[86] Id.

[87] Ted Hagelin, Technology and Legal Practice Symposium Issue: Valuation of Intellectual Property Assets: An Overview 52 Syracuse L. Rev. 1133 (2002) (The cost method of valuation measures the value of an asset by the cost to replace the asset with an identical or equivalent asset. The assumption underlying the cost method of valuation is that the cost to purchase or develop a new asset is commensurate with the economic value that the asset can provide during its life).

[88] Id. (The market method values an asset based upon comparable transactions between unrelated parties).

[89] Id. (The income method values an asset based upon the present value of the net economic benefit (net future income stream) expected to be received over the life of the asset).

[90] Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls Or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis Of Nonpracticing Entities 110 Colum. L. Rev. 114 (January, 2010).

[91]Id.

[92]Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System 62 Hastings L.J. 297 (December, 2010).

[93] Id.

[94]R. Justin Koscher, A Patent Pool's White Knight: Individual Licensing Agreements And The Procompetitive Presumption 20 DePaul J. Art Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 53 (Fall, 2009).

[95] Geradin and Layne-Farrar, supra n.45.

[96] Id.

[97] Id.

[98] Id.

[99] Id.

[100] Id.

[101] Id.

[102] Hagelin, supra n.87; also see, Geradin and Layne-Farrar, supra n.45.

[103] Id.

[104] Id.

[105] Geradin and Layne-Farrar, supra n.45.

[106] Id.

[107] Hagelin, supra n.87; also see, Geradin and Layne-Farrar, supra n.45.

[108] Geradin and Layne-Farrar, supra n.45.

[109] Malcolm T. "Ty" Meeks & Charles A. Eldering, PhD, Patent Valuation: Aren’t We Forgetting Something? Making the Case for Claims Analysis in Patent Valuation by Proposing a Patent Valuation Method and a Patent-Specific Discount Rate Using the CAPM 9 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 194 (Fall, 2010).

[110] Hagelin, supra n.87.

[111] Id.

[112] Geradin and Layne-Farrar, supra n.45.

[113] Hagelin, supra n.87.

[114] Id.; Meeks & Eldering, supra n.109.

[115] Hagelin, supra n.87.

[116] Id.

[117] Id.

[118] Id.

[119] Id.

[120] Id.

[121] Id.

[122] Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

[123] Daralyn J. Durie and Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach To Calculating Reasonable Royalties 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 627 (Summer, 2010).

[124] Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra n.3.

[125] Michael Mattioli, Communities Of Innovation 106 Nw. U.L. Rev. 103 (Winter, 2012).

[126] Szakalski, supra n.84.

[127] Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra n.3.

[128] Mattioli, supra n.125.

[129] Szakalski, supra n.84.

[130] Gilbert, supra n.5.

[131] Carlson, supra n.13.

[132] Id.

[133] Id.

[134] Id.

[135] Lin, supra n.12.

[136] Dorothy Gill Raymond, Benefits and Risks Of Patent Pooling For Standard-Setting Organizations 16 Antitrust ABA 41 (Summer, 2002).

[137] David Serafino, Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management Structures, KEI Research Note 2007:6, Knowledge Ecology International, 4 June 2007.

[138] Id.

[139] Id.

[140] Id.

[141] Id.

[142] Id.

[143] Michael R. Franzinger, Latent Dangers in a Patent Pool: The European Commission's Approval of the 3G Wireless Technology Licensing Agreements 91 Calif. L. Rev. 1693 (December, 2003).

[144] Id.

[145] Id.

[146] Id.

[147] David Serafino, Survey of Patent Pools Demonstrates Variety of Purposes and Management Structures, KEI Research Note 2007:6, Knowledge Ecology International, 4 June 2007.

[148] Id.

[149] Id.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-valuation-and-license-fee-determination-in-context-of-patent-pools

Cultural Interests vs. Modernization: Robert Shapiro on IPR & Innovation in India

samantha — 2014-04-03T10:54:08Z

Last Friday March 28, 2014, prominent economist and chairman of Sonecon, llc, Dr. Robert Shapiro, lead a discussion on the roles of IPR and FDI in innovation. Within his research findings, Shapiro argues for India to adopt a stricter IP regime in order to attract higher rates of FDI in pharmaceuticals and other industries, and in turn, to spur a more successful economy.

The closed door round-table discussion had been organized by policy research and advocacy organization, T he Takshashila Institute, and hosted by Cobalt, a recently opened co-working space in Bangalore. The event's speaker, Robert Shapiro, has advised U.S. President Bill Clinton, British Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and U.S. Vice President Albert Gore, as well as AT&T, Exxon-Mobil and Google, on economic policy and security matters. Recently he co-authored an economic research paper, titled, How India Can Attract More Foreign Direct Investment, Create Jobs and Increase GDP, which can be accessed here.

Within this paper, Shapiro and Dr. Aparna Mathur of the American Enterprise Institute argue that the most effective way for India to attract “further investment and job creation for improving the innovation environment in India” is by respecting the intellectual property rights of foreign investors—specifically within the pharmaceutical sector. The main points made by Shapiro within his session and research paper will be looked at closer to follow.

FDI to spur innovation

Shapiro started the session by introducing the controversy over the role of innovation in economic processes. Contrary to the belief that the majority of economists share—that innovation happens outside the economy incidentally “because someone happens to have a bright idea”—Shapiro suggests that innovation plays a much more integral role within an economy, and even goes as far as considering innovation the most powerful underlying factor (possibly more so than education). Shapiro asserts that without innovation, “every economy has to stall out,” and what prevents this is new capital changing productivity and growth rates; and in India's case: through foreign direct investment (FDI).

With reference to China's manufacturing sectors, Shapiro depicts the immense benefits stemming from FDI. As a direct effect, he states that not only do new technologies come in but new ways of financing and management are brought in as well. The bulk of the impact of FDI, however, is an indirect function, resulting from a “spillover effect” at a regional level as more and more companies begin to adopt the ways of the new enterprises. The impact of innovation, however, is an exclusive function of how effectively it is applied. In order to maximize foreign investment, Shapiro stresses the need to eradicate any barriers to new businesses so that they may adopt and adapt to the new incoming technologies.

On several occasions within his address and the accompanying discussion, Shapiro had asserted India as being an outlier in terms of FDI, with emphasis on India's FDI rates being half of those of Malaysia and Thailand (countries implied to be incomparable to India in an economic sense). He admits that he does not understand the reasons for this discrepancy, as standard economic factors alone cannot explain this; such as a country's market size, availability of labour, and quality of infrastructure (despite India's room for improvement here).

In order to understand India's FDI rates then, Shapiro offers the importance of considering the political factors at play to the same extent as the economic ones (if not, more) with some of such factors being: the state's attitudes towards property rights, bankruptcy regime, levels of corruption, and the enforcement of contracts and intellectual property rights.

And it is supposedly here, at this last factor, where the central issue lies for India.

IP as a product of cultural decisions

As new ideas continue to dwarf the value of physical capital, economies are increasingly composite of these intangible assets (intellectual property)—such as patents, copyright, software and name brands—or at least within the US economy anyway. These intellectual asset-intensive economies are not limited to industries such as pharmaceuticals, software, and IT hardware (as one might initially suspect); rather, those of media, automobiles, beverages and tobacco and other consumer goods. In 2011, Shapiro states, half of US industries equalled or exceeded the three former industries in intellectual assets. These industries, which had formerly been sectors based on production, have now outsourced their production schemes to India and China.

Shapiro explains these economic trends as a function of a repeated set of choices in support of American values of growth, prosperity, and individualism. He continues in saying that cultural values are also important to consider when trying to undergo modernization. A country with more traditional values would be wrong to strive to modernize at the same rate as that of the US, for example. In such a case, modernizing at a much slower rate is advisable, and if this is unfavourable, Shapiro alternatively suggests that “you can sometimes change culture by changing the law.”

But how are US and Indian industries comparable, then, if India's economy is arguably a platform for production of US-owned intellectual assets? What are the odds that Indian companies will actually own their resulting innovations stemming from foreign investments? Presumably not very high.

And what sets of choices has India made to reflect its own sets of cultural values and principles in contrast to those of the US?

Consequences of a weak IP regime and over-regulation

Within his recent research paper, Shapiro recounts Indian laws related to IPR over the years and how the country's weak international IP regime has paved the way for its thriving generic pharmaceutical industry. Through enforcing restrictions on patent filings, shorter patent terms, and compulsory licensing, the Indian Patent Office enabled the manufacturing of domestic pharmaceutical products without having to pay outgoing royalty (or to a lesser degree) in promotion of increased access to medicines for Indians at much more affordable prices.

Shapiro argues that this disregard for foreign IPR discourages foreign companies from wanting to enter the Indian market in the future for fear of imitation products coming about to their detriment. Shapiro argues that if India adopted stronger IP rights and enforcement, FDI to the country's pharmaceutical industry would increase drastically; more so, if India adopted an IP system comparable to the US, FDI flows could even rise by 83 per cent per year, making it a centre for innovative pharmaceutical R&D. Just as well its access to new innovative drugs would increase by 5 per cent, contributing to a higher life expectancy and a larger work force (Shapiro, p. 3, 2014).

An IP regime comparable to the US and Europe, Shapiro suggests, promotes both endogenous and exogenous growth while bringing about competitive markets “with pockets of monopolies throughout.” Such [patent] regimes have evolved over decades and “simply work well,” he states. Also, in requiring patent applicants to publish all secrets—that which makes the invention novel—others are given the ability to benefit from such knowledge.

So then, is India wrong in making decisions in accordance with its own set of cultural values and principles if they are not necessarily in accordance with those of the US?

Arguably not. However, as Shapiro demonstrates, such decisions may bare consequence in India's pursuit to modernize as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that is not exactly in compliance with Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) standards. India may also be missing out on greater importation of technologies if foreign companies fear that their products will be imitated by local companies. According to Shapiro, India's services sector (including banking, insurance, outsourcing, R&D, courier and technology testing services) contribute to 60 per cent of the country's GDP, yet have declined in FDI for several reasons including the country's weak IP regime, as well as government regulations capping the maximum investments of foreign companies (Shapiro, p. 37, 2014).

Which brings us to the notion of market deregulation as a mechanism of promoting FDI. Shapiro suggests this to be essential for India to enable a more even playing ground for new and emerging players to compete. A regulatory issue arises when new companies are up against companies receiving government subsidies. In this way, such regulations may also prohibit companies from reorganizing to implement new technologies or practices, undermining the spillover effects that FDI can bring about.

IPR adoption vs. innovation

Shapiro stresses the importance in not only allowing companies to implement new technologies, but to encourage them to do so as well. A common mistake developing countries make, he says, is trying to be the source of innovation: “Although it's nice to be the source of innovation, what is more important is to adopt innovation of others.” In response, a contribution to discussion made by a fellow attendee commented on the inclination of developing countries to first duplicate, then adapt, and then innovate for themselves.

So what is India left to do then? How do Indian companies navigate along the fine line distinguishing between adopting new technologies and duplicating them? And if innovation is so integral to a country's economy, will merely adopting and adapting to emerging foreign technologies suffice for the country's economy? Or can India only progress away from “duplication” with stricter IPR enforcement?

While citing studies based in Europe, Shapiro illustrates the relationship between IP regimes and inventions. The study's findings displayed that while there is no relationship between IPR and occurrences of inventions, there is correlation between IPR and the kinds of inventions. Jurisdictions with strict IP laws and greater IP protection were likelier to bring about inventions with significant business value, while the inventions of other jurisdictions without IPR did not entail the same level of business value—one cannot simply reverse-engineer a food invention for study, he says.

This is not as to say that Indian companies cannot innovate. “India has a lot of innovators,” Shapiro says, “but they're in California and New York and Washington.” Even in these hubs for innovation, the Indian demographic is highly disproportionate, and estimated to be 20-40 per cent of the workforce, suggesting the potential of Indians in terms of innovation. Shapiro poses the question: “Why are they leaving?” and stresses the importance in India understanding this phenomenon.

The modernization tradeoff

Is the departure of some of India's innovators another consequence of the country's path to modernization whilst maintaining cultural values? Just as some foreign pharmaceutical companies may stay far away from the Indian market?

If so, is India truly better off in striving for redemption from under the close watch of the US and in pursuit of foreign direct investment? What opportunities or cultural values might be abandoned within the domestic market in favour of foreign bodies, then? And more specifically, what would a stricter IP regime mean for the future of the generic pharmaceutical industry, and in turn, the cost of access for medicines that are presently only affordable through the bypassing of international IP standards?

Just as Shapiro gives importance to the consideration of political and cultural factors at play within one's economy, it is, then, essential to look beyond what the US wants for India economically to factor in what India wants for its own economy and the cultural and political reasons for such. I think we can both agree on the significance of India considering the consequences of resulting economic decisions (i.e., regarding market regulating and IP enforcement) from proxies inclusive of Indian consumers, as well as international bodies to the extent of the global systems that India is implicated in.

But what about the question of innovation for India's economy? In the tradeoff between innovation (and prosperity) versus duplication (and accessibility), is a country of 1.2 billion people with different cultural values and economic needs really fair game to be idealized as “comparable to the US” in terms of its economic laws? Economist Robert Shapiro seems to think so.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cultural-interests-v-international-economy-robert-shapiro-on-ipr-innovation-in-india

The Game of IPR: Insights from the 6th Global Intellectual Property Convention in Hyderabad

samantha — 2014-01-31T09:56:10Z

IP practitioners and IP creators were among the 1700 participants to gather at the Hyderabad International Convention Centre earlier this month. Here, CIS had the opportunity of listening in on perspectives around the “Optimization of economic value of innovation & IPR in the global market” while attending numerous talks and sessions that were held over the course of the convention’s three days.

One of the event's speakers, Mr. Narendra Sabharwal, IPR-Chair of FICCI, speaks of the immense value of IPR, while serving as protection as well as collateral for investors. (Photo credit: GIPC 2014)

This year’s Global Intellectual Property Convention (GIPC) was held in Hyderabad January 16-18, 2014 by ITAG Business Solutions Ltd. in association with the Institute of International Trade (iitrade). As the 6th of its kind, the event was held in hopeful contribution “towards society with the active support and cooperation of the IP fraternity,” says ITAG Founder and Director, Dr. D. R. Agarwal, while offering a “good opportunity for learning and business networking through one to one interaction in a pre-arranged manner under a conducive environment.”

The theme at bay had been “Optimizing the economic value of innovation & IPR in global market.” In respect of this central focus, common themes across panel discussions and workshops included IP management, monetisation, application drafting, and litigation, with particular emphasis on India’s ‘Pharma’ industry. Over 100 speakers and panelists shared their personal knowledge from experience in the industry, and largely consisted of representatives from law firms, IP consultancies, pharmaceutical companies, and business organisations; all of which from India, Europe and the USA. As an attendee representing the Centre for Internet & Society (CIS), a research institute that works to address issues related to intellectual property (IP) reform, I had the privilege of listening to such perspectives on intellectual property from an alternative outlook.

On the other hand, if exploiting too much by “abusing one’s monopoly, you are [setting] certain conditions, which are neither germane nor connected to the patent, and more than what is statutory permissible.” Kumaran stresses the necessity for the intellectual property right (IPR) holder to comply to the rights given by statutory law.

The name of the game is the quality of drafting. It is the first and last chance." Vaidya D.P.,

Lakshmi Kumaran & Sridharan

Mr. Narendra Sabharwal, Panellist and IPR-Chair for the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce (FICCI), sought to demonstrate the immense value of innovation and IPR in technology, arts and culture globally, in explaining that a large portion of the EU’s GDP (39%), and employment (26%) are derived from IP-intensive industries (See study by European Patent Office here). Also argued was that enterprises and institutions can increase value through licensing of products and services, while also serving as protection, and which can then become “excellent collateral for investors,” he says. Among other points made, Sabharwal mentioned the need for more incubators in India. Currently, India acquires 200 new incubators each year compared to China’s 8000 new incubators annually. Opening more incubators will encourage innovation, he argues, leading to more marketable products and solutions.

Mr. William H. Manning, Partner of Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P (USA), took on the role of the story teller while sharing particularly interesting cases of previous clients. Manning had explained the necessity to ask one question over and over throughout the entire IPR application process; that question being: “What difference does the invention make?”

In doing so, Manning was even able to take what would have been an ‘incremental’ patent—which is just distinct enough from prior art to get by—and turn it into a ‘foundational’ patent—generally adopted by the industry for 10-20 years before moving to a different technology. The better of these two types, however, is the ‘pioneering’ patent, an inventive leap in itself. This client success story definitely affirmed Speaker and Director of Lakshmi Kumaran & Sridharan, Vaidya D. P., when he said that “the name of the game is the quality of drafting. It is the first and last chance.” Manning had also claimed that 99.9% of patent in India are said to be incremental patents, with none being pioneering—at least not from the patent applications he’s seen in his 34 years of experience, anyway.

Also a rule of this game is the “Take now—pay later” rule, according to Manning, in which enterprises may “ignore the problem for now and move ahead with the product. If somebody sues you for patent litigation…. Take now—pay later.” Here, he makes reference to the judgements enterprises may make when misusing or infringing upon an IPR, while assessing the worth of doing so with the risks that may lie ahead. Often, an enterprise may find that it is more worthwhile to misuse or infringe and reap the benefits in the “now” while knowing there may be a chance they will have to “pay later.”

Throughout the convention, what I expected to be the elephant in the auditorium was surprisingly addressed quite often. Best said by Panellist, Mr. Mohan Dewan, “IPR only becomes an asset when it is misused or infringed upon.” Principal to R K Dewan & Co., Dewan compares IP rights with car insurance, which can only be cashed in when the car is stolen.

Applying for an IPR is a game in itself, that requires much knowledge of how it is played. Grab those power-ups or get eaten.	He then posed the question “how can we increase the economic value of an asset?”—presumingly so that one can capitalize when opportunity comes knocking—and responded to it in recommending the following measures: 1) ensuring one’s IPR is as strong as possible by drafting it according to national standards, 2) optimal protection—it is easier to register more than one at once! 3) diligence in auditing and licensing, and 4) staying alert and questioning what people are doing around you. These are only a few excerpts of the event’s many talks and panel discussions, yet these insights alone help to reveal the nature of the system where intellectual property rights reign. This is surely a system to be familiar with if it is within one’s interest to receive IPR for protection, yet I find it difficult to stop at the word “protection.” When you must learn how to play the game to ensure that you stay in it, I would say that IPR can extend well beyond protection, to be better off referred to as strategy. A strategy that enables you to reach a higher level and protects you from your opponents’ wrath. The higher the level, the more power-ups in reach and the higher you go. All the while undermining their chances of climbing up to where you are, and knocking them to even lower levels when possible. Lucky for you the majority of players are still stuck at level 1, but the nasty ones may be right behind you.

Applying for an IPR is a game in itself, that requires much knowledge of how it is played. Grab those power-ups or get eaten.

He then posed the question “how can we increase the economic value of an asset?”—presumingly so that one can capitalize when opportunity comes knocking—and responded to it in recommending the following measures: 1) ensuring one’s IPR is as strong as possible by drafting it according to national standards, 2) optimal protection—it is easier to register more than one at once! 3) diligence in auditing and licensing, and 4) staying alert and questioning what people are doing around you.

These are only a few excerpts of the event’s many talks and panel discussions, yet these insights alone help to reveal the nature of the system where intellectual property rights reign. This is surely a system to be familiar with if it is within one’s interest to receive IPR for protection, yet I find it difficult to stop at the word “protection.” When you must learn how to play the game to ensure that you stay in it, I would say that IPR can extend well beyond protection, to be better off referred to as strategy.

A strategy that enables you to reach a higher level and protects you from your opponents’ wrath. The higher the level, the more power-ups in reach and the higher you go. All the while undermining their chances of climbing up to where you are, and knocking them to even lower levels when possible. Lucky for you the majority of players are still stuck at level 1, but the nasty ones may be right behind you.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-game-of-ipr-insights-from-the-6th-global-intellectual-property-convention-in-hyderabad

Dictionary words in software patent guidelines puzzle industry

praskrishna — 2013-09-04T06:20:24Z

Terms not defined in draft guidelines on patents for computer-related inventions leaves room for misinterpretation

The article by C.H.Unnikrishnan was published in Livemint on August 26, 2013. The Centre for Internet and Society's work on access to knowledge is mentioned.

Could the simple Latin phrase, per se, which translates as “in itself”, lead to confusion in verifying whether a computer-related invention deserves a patent or not? Some members of the $108 billion Indian information technology industry, intellectual property (IP) law firms and anti-patent lobby groups say it can.

The inclusion of some terms that are not defined by local laws in the government’s draft guidelines on patents for computer-related inventions (CRIs) leaves room for ambiguity and misinterpretation when examiners grant or reject such a patent, they say. The guidelines were released in early August.

The terms include ‘per se’, algorithm, hardware, firmware —and CRI itself.

CRI “has not been defined in any of the Indian statutes and is construed to mean, for the purpose of these guidelines, any invention which involves the use of computers, computer networks or other programmable apparatus and includes such inventions, one or more features of which are realized wholly or partially by means of a computer programme/programmes”, the Indian Patent Office (IPO) acknowledged in the draft guidelines, and called for feedback from industry stakeholders by 8 August.

	Patent examination is the most crucial function performed by a patent office. An examiner verifies the invention claims made by an applicant by relying on scientific parameters, industrial applicability and previously known technologies, among others, to decide whether the claims are genuine and deserve a patent. IPO’s draft guidelines are aimed at helping examiners in this task. However, with new technologies, the task of granting or rejecting patents has become tougher, as acknowledged by the patent office, in its draft guidelines. The confusion is only compounded with the inclusion of dictionary terms such as per se. The Indian Patent Law does not contain any specific provision regarding the protection of computer software that includes programs, musical and artistic works, studio and video recordings, databases and preparation material and associated documents such as manuals. India does not grant pure software patents (i.e., a patent over a “computer programme per se”).

Patent examination is the most crucial function performed by a patent office. An examiner verifies the invention claims made by an applicant by relying on scientific parameters, industrial applicability and previously known technologies, among others, to decide whether the claims are genuine and deserve a patent.

IPO’s draft guidelines are aimed at helping examiners in this task. However, with new technologies, the task of granting or rejecting patents has become tougher, as acknowledged by the patent office, in its draft guidelines. The confusion is only compounded with the inclusion of dictionary terms such as per se.

The Indian Patent Law does not contain any specific provision regarding the protection of computer software that includes programs, musical and artistic works, studio and video recordings, databases and preparation material and associated documents such as manuals. India does not grant pure software patents (i.e., a patent over a “computer programme per se”).

Software, instead, is protected by the Copyright Law, similar to literary and aesthetic works.

In the feedback, a copy which was reviewed by Mint, India’s largest software services exporter Tata Consultancy Services Ltd (TCS), said it “is happy to note that IPO is taking the right steps in the direction of protecting inventions...Moving from the notion of ‘Computer Implemented Invention’ to ‘Computer Related Invention’ itself is a positive shift...”

	“Primary objective of the CRI guidelines, as expected and understood by the stakeholders, is to deliberate on the meaning of “per se” in Section 3(k) for Software Inventions with example pertaining to Software Inventions and not interpret them to be the Hardware-led inventions,” said TCS in its feedback. It added that “while examining the technical character of a CRI, mere usage of the words such as enterprise, business, business rules, supply-chain, order, sales, transactions, commerce, payment, etc. in the (patent) claims should not lead to conclusion of the CRI being just a ‘Business Method’ without any technical character. These terminologies actually qualify the contextual utility and fitment of the inventions..”

“Primary objective of the CRI guidelines, as expected and understood by the stakeholders, is to deliberate on the meaning of “per se” in Section 3(k) for Software Inventions with example pertaining to Software Inventions and not interpret them to be the Hardware-led inventions,” said TCS in its feedback.

It added that “while examining the technical character of a CRI, mere usage of the words such as enterprise, business, business rules, supply-chain, order, sales, transactions, commerce, payment, etc. in the (patent) claims should not lead to conclusion of the CRI being just a ‘Business Method’ without any technical character. These terminologies actually qualify the contextual utility and fitment of the inventions..”

According to Rajiv Kumar Choudhari, a lawyer specializing in IT patent law, a computer program is software ‘per se’ because there may be no transformation of data/signal/input, or there is no tangible benefit to the device if this software is run on the device. “The benefit to the device may be in terms of efficiency, or increase/decrease in certain attributes,” he said in a blog in SpicyIP where he analyzed software patenting position in India earlier.

In such cases, if the applicant fails to define the exact benefit to the device in a tangible manner, the examiner may refuse to grant a patent. In January 2012, for instance, the Delhi patent office rejected a software patent application filed by Netomat Inc., on grounds that it did not fulfil the requirement of Section 3(k).

According to section 3(k) of the Indian Patent Act, “a mathematical or business method or computer programs per se or algorithms” are not inventions.

Between 2006 and 2011, the latest available data, 34,967 IT patent applications were filed with the Indian patent office. It granted about 5,594 patents during the same period.

“We hope that through this consultation (feedback) the prevailing evaluation methods for computer related inventions will become more efficient and encourage the Industry to file and protect their IP. However, we have some major concerns related to the draft guidelines,” said Nassom, the country’s software lobby body.

Overall, the guidelines appear to be “restrictive and may be a hindrance to grant of patents in India, even when such rights would be granted in other countries like Europe, Japan, etc,” said Nasscom, adding that “over a period of time”, it will discourage innovative activities from being carried out in India.

For instance, Nasscom pointed out that since the patent office has not defined ‘per se’, the phrase “computer program per se” should mean a set of instructions by itself or computer program by itself. “This meaning is generally accepted even in the UK and before the EPO (European Patent Office),” it added. The software lobby body has suggested that the scope of the “per se” limitation in Section 3(k) should be changed to cover hardware features, irrespective of whether the features are novel or not.

The guidelines, said Nasscom, seem to imply that for computer program-related claims to be allowed, the software needs to be “machine specific”, which “will unfortunately exclude patent protection for any computer-implemented invention designed to be interoperable across platforms, and not specific to a machine”.

In its feedback to the patent office, the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), an organization that works on Internet privacy-related issues, underscored the complexity that new technologies could introduce by citing the example of CRIs in the field of data storage.

The first compact disc (CD) was invented in 1982, the digital video disc (DVD) in 1995 and the flash drive in 1999.

“While each of these inventions was far superior to their predecessor, the time between each incremental innovation has drastically reduced,” CIS noted in its feedback

“If an invention can become obsolete in as little as 2 years, it would make little sense to grant monopoly rights for 20 years. So even if a CRI passes the three tests of novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability, it needs to be evaluated from the perspective of its possible obsolescence. In such a scenario, the examiner should look at the history of innovation in that particular field to ascertain that the invention does not become obsolete in a short time.”

Also consider for instance the term, “business methods”. It involves a whole gamut of activities in a commercial or industrial enterprise relating to transaction of goods or services but “the claims are at times drafted not directly as business methods but apparently with hitherto available technical features such as Internet, networks, satellites, tele-communications, etc”, the draft stated.

“The exclusions are carved out for all business methods and, therefore, if in substance the claims relate to business method even with the help of technology, they are not considered patentable,” the guidelines added.

The Japan intellectual Property Association, in its reaction to the India’s new CRI patenting guidelines, also noted that recent computers, including processors or memories, mostly do not rely on any specific programs.

“In addition, software-related inventions should be patentable originally for their functioning on the basis of novel computer programs in combination with general purpose devices. However, these computer-related inventions would be excluded from protection under the new standards for patentability,” it cautioned.

The draft guidelines “have interpreted and applied Section 3(k) of the Indian Patent Act 1970 in a more restrictive way to conclude as to what is patentable, which is a cause of concern to various stakeholders”, said Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FICCI) in its reaction.

Software patents remain an emotive issue.

Their proponents argue that patents promote investment in research and development, accelerate software development by making previously unknown and not obvious software inventions public and protect IP of software companies. They also encourage the creation of software companies and jobs and increase the valuation of small companies, the proponents add.

Critics counter that traditional copyright has provided sufficient protection to facilitate massive investment in software development and that most software patents cover either trivial inventions or inventions that would have been obvious to persons of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.

Globally, patents in the IT and software sector are being revisited due to litigation and compensation claims over misuse of patents including the much-hyped patent battle of Apple Inc. with Samsung Electronics and Google Inc. with Microsoft Corp.

In June 2008, technology companies including Google, Intel Corp, Oracle Corp, Cisco and Hewlett-Packard Co. set up the ‘Allied Security Trust’ to address the risk of patent-infringement suits by buying those patents which they feel are most important to their businesses.

AST has 26 members from Europe, North America and Asia. It buys patents that its members have expressed interest from the patent holder, and the cost would be deducted from those companies’ Escrow accounts. AST argues that non-practicing entities, or NPEs, also known as patent trolls, produce no products or services of their own, and yet acquire patents—sometimes hundreds of them—with the sole intention of asserting their right and conduct patent litigation to extract settlements or licensing fees.

In 2008, AST estimated that it costs operating companies an average of $3.2 million through the end of discovery and $5.2 million through trial to defend cases in which there is more than $25 million at stake.

The costs of determining if a particular piece of software infringes any issued patents are too high and the results too are uncertain. A software patent costs, on average, around $20,000, it said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/livemint-august-26-2013-ch-unnikrishnan-dictionary-words-in-software-patent-guidelines-puzzle-industry

Comments on the Draft Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions

puneeth — 2013-08-02T08:27:03Z

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) submitted the below comments to the office of the Controller General of Patents Designs & Trademarks, Mumbai on July 26, 2013.

July 26, 2013

To,
The Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks
Bhoudhik Sampada Bhavan,
Antop Hill, S. M. Road,
Mumbai - 400 037

Subject: Comments on the Draft Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions
The Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) would like to commend the Office of Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (“Controller General”) for preparing and inviting comments on the Draft Guidelines on Computer Related Inventions (“Guidelines”). With respect to the Guidelines, CIS would like to submit the following comments:

Background

The patent examiner is the most important link in the chain of patent law as he/she acts as the gatekeeper to defend the boundaries of patent law. This is especially so in the case of CRIs as the debate is centered on the question of the subject matter of patents. We are in full agreement with the position of excluding computer programs per se from patent protection. Especially given that they already qualify for protection under both copyright and trademark law. The question of patenting CRIs is problematic as such inventions have a high rate of obsolence. To avoid this, CRIs need to meet a higher standard during patent examination. It is in this interest that CIS presents the following comments on the Guidelines.

Scope of Section 3(k) , paragraph 2.4:
"Therefore, the re-instatement of the original phraseology of section 3 (k) clearly indicates that the legislature intended to retain the original scope of exclusion and did not approve its widening under this sub-section as attempted through the ordinance."

The Guidelines correctly identify the position of law as regards Section 3(k) and the evolution of the provision through the 2002 and 2004 amendments. However, it does not explain the meaning of the provision with regard to the way it applies to patent examination. The meaning of Section 3(k) is to exclude the grant of patents for computer programs per se based on the subject matter test.

So, the proposition here is that if a patent application were to fall in the category of nonpatentable subject matter, the patent should not be awarded. This should be made clearer for the benefit of prospective patent applicants and examiners. Our submission is that the explanation to Section 3(k) should include the subject matter test.
Definition of “per se”, paragraph 3.11:
The term “per se” is not defined in Indian statutes and hence, for interpretation of this term, the general dictionary meaning may be used.

In our comment on the 2010 Patent Manual, we had asked for clarification on the meaning of the phrase “per se” in Section 3(k).[1] While the Guidelines attempt to clarify the meaning, referring to the dictionary meaning of the phrase creates numerous issues. The phrase per se was first used in the European Patent Convention and the Proposed EU Directive on CRIs where per se was taken to mean on the face of it.

When similar phraseology was used in the Indian Act, some groups felt that this should be interpreted similarly rather than to mean by itself. The Guidelines do refer to the latter meaning. But the issue is with the use of the phrase in the provision and its cumulative meaning. So, it would help if the Guidelines, while explaining the meaning of the phrase also clarify that 3(k) means computer programs by themselves.
Definitions of “algorithm”, “software”, “hardware” and “firmware”, paragraph 3
Once again the Guidelines make reference to the Oxford Dictionary while defining these words. It is understandable that there is some difficulty in defining them as there are no statutes that explicitly define these words. However, the definitions in the Dictionary pertain to general usage and the implications of these words can change based on context. In this regard, it would be useful for the patent examiner to consult an expert while dealing with the usage of these terms or at least use a technical dictionary that defines these words as per their usages in that particular field.
Claims concerning CRIs- subject matter, paragraph 4
This Section correctly identifies the categories under which claims are made in patent applications for CRIs. However, even before making such categories, the applications must be tested on the question of subject matter. As pointed out earlier, if an invention falls outside defined subject matter, it should not be granted a patent.

The number of patents filed has gone up by almost 50% this year[2] and there is a need to dispose off, applications in a speedy but efficient manner. It must also be noted that there have been many cases where business methods and algorithms have been passed off as inventions and granted patents. [3] In order to avoid such errors and reduce transaction costs, it would help to carry out a preliminary subject matter evaluation at the outset.
Examination Procedure, paragraph 5
The examination procedure of patent applications relating to CRIs is common with other inventions to the extent of considering novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability.

The Guidelines suggest that CRIs can be tested on the same standards as other inventions on the above three questions. However, CRIs differ from other inventions. Most CRIs are an incremental innovation on existing CRIs. Many CRIs also become obsolete in a very short time. In the field of data storage for instance, the first CD was invented in 1982, DVD in 1995 and the flash drive in 1999. While each of these inventions was far superior to their predecessor, the time between each incremental innovation has drastically reduced.

If an invention can become obsolete in as little as 2 years, it would make little sense to grant monopoly rights for 20 years. So even if a CRI passes the three tests of novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability, it needs to be evaluated from the perspective of its possible obsolence. In such a scenario, the examiner should look at the history of innovation in that particular field to ascertain that the invention does not become obsolete in a short time.

Inventive Step, paragraph 5.3
(ja) "inventive step" means a feature of an invention that involves technical advance as compared to the existing knowledge or having economic significance or both and that makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art;

The Guidelines quote Section 2(ja) of the Patents Act and refer to the IPAB decision in the Enercon case to explain the meaning of inventive step. But, the meaning of certain terms, like “technical advance” and “person skilled in the art” is unclear.

With respect to “technical advance”, one could infer the meaning from (4) of the quote from the Enercon case (citing Windsurfing and Pozzoli) which reads:
Imputing to a normally skilled but unimaginative addressee what was common general knowledge in the art at the priority date

However, as Prof. NS Gopalakrishnan notes, the standards for what is an inventive step differs based on the industry.[4] For instance, the pharmaceutical industry has a relatively lower standard for inventiveness when compared to other industries.[5] Given the unique nature of CRIs, it is important to clarify to what the standard for inventiveness or the “technical advance” is in this case.

In the same respect, the meaning of “person skilled in the arts” also needs explanation in relation to CRIs. This is especially so since the patentable subject matter as per the Guidelines are software attached to a hardware device. As per the case of Schlumberger v. EMGS[6] before the English Court of Appeals, in case of inventions which involve the “marriage of skills”, a person skilled of arts can be a team of persons. The case also held that the person who judges sufficiency and the person from whose standpoint nonobviousness is judged are different. Given the range of areas that are involved in CRIs, a person skilled of art would have no set description and would more often than not be a team of people.
Ordering of paragraphs 5.4.5 to 5.4.7
These paragraphs deal with the subject matter test. Paragraphs 5.4.5 and 5.4.6 deal with computer programs and the implications of the use of the phrase “per se”. Paragraph 5.4.7 deals with business method, mathematical method and other excluded patents as per law. As argued earlier, the subject matter evaluation needs to be made in the first instance. So a patent examiner must be made aware of the exclusions at first and then the exception or the dilution of such exclusion. These paragraphs seem to accomplish this in the reverse order. For greater clarity we propose that the paragraphs be ordered as: 5.4.7, 5.4.5 followed by 5.4.6.
Flow Chart Showing Procedure of Examination, paragraph 9
The flow chart shows a step by step process of examining CRIs. However, the subject matter determination is done towards the end. There is debate on whether there should be a set order for examining patents. However, in the case of CRIs there must be an exception as the statute explicitly prohibits certain types of patents (business method, algorithm etc). As argued earlier, in order to reduce transaction costs, the subject matter test must be made at the very beginning. There should at least be a preliminary determination as to Section 3(k) to reject patent applications for those inventions that can easily be classified under this provision.

[1]. See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/cis-submission-draft-patent-manual-2010 (Accessed on 23rd July, 2013).

[2]. See http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/science/number-of-patent-applications-up-nearly-50-thisyear/
article4508058.ece (Accessed on 23rd July, 2013).

[3]. See for business method patents granted in India: http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/2013/01/guest-post-whyare-
business-method.html (Accessed on 19th July, 2013).

[4]. NS Gopalakrishnan and TG Agitha, “Principles of Intellectual Property” (1st ed. 2009), at 91.

[5]. Ibid.

[6]. [2010] EWCA Civ 819.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-on-draft-guidelines-for-computer-related-inventions

Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low-cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licenses

nehaa — 2013-06-27T08:06:50Z

On June 27, 2013, CIS sent a letter for establishment of a patent pool for low cost access devices through compulsory licenses.

M. Mangapati Pallam Raju
Minister for Human Resource Development
Shastri Bhavan
New Delhi 110 001

27 June 2013

Dear Dr. Pallam Raju,

Subject: Establishment of a Patent Pool for Low-Cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licences

We at the Centre for Internet and Society would like to commend you for the progressive stand you have adopted that while the government is committed to low-cost access devices, students should be able to decide “on which device, whether it is a mobile phone or iPad or Aakash or regular com-puter, they access the content”. It is imperative, though, that low-cost access devices (LCAD) be available to students, and thus the Mehta Committee report rightly acknowledges the importance of the Aakash project as central to the National Mission on Education through Information and Com-munications Technology (NMEICT). We propose a solution that would ensure both easy access to affordable devices for students to enable the NMEICT mission, as well as ensure that the MHRD focus more on educational content than devices.

We would urge you to enable access to LCADs by establishing a patent pool of essential technolo-gies (the ‘Aakash patent pool’) through the issue of compulsory licences. There are, at present in-ternationally, thousands of granted patents and tens of thousands of other intellectual property claims in respect of mobile and tablet technologies. The multiplicity of claims and cross-claims makes it impossible to manufacture, without exposure to adverse claims, generic and affordable tab-let devices. As you know, the assertion of multiple adverse and competing intellectual property claims is one of the main reasons that the Aakash tablet project is stalled. Already the multi-billion dollar patent wars in the US and Europe between Apple, Samsung, and other device manufacturers, are coming to India with Ericsson suing Micromax, India’s second-largest seller of phones and tab-lets, for Rs. 100 crore just a few weeks ago.

The establishment of a patent pool of essential technologies will redress this imminent failure and will enable the manufacturing of affordable tablet devices in compliance with the NMEICT. To es-tablish such a patent pool, the current patents applicable to mobile and tablet devices must be com-pulsorily licensed to a common pool and manufacturers who wish to sell their devices at an afford-able price would be allowed, at uniform terms and conditions, to utlise these patented technologies. This will simultaneously ensure that all patent-holders will benefit from royalty payments and that all manufacturers will gain access to the requisite patented technologies in a fair manner without adverse claims. The manufacturers who benefit from the pool could be required to give the Indian government credit by displaying the Aakash logo on their devices.

In order to establish such a patent pool, it is necessary to, firstly, identify the relevant technologies, and all patent-holders of such technologies, and secondly, compulsorily licence the patents in re-spect of the identified relevant technologies to the patent pool for fair and uniform consideration. Once the patent pool is established, rules may be issued to govern access to the pooled patents, regulate the manufacturing process and prevent misuse. The Patent Act, 1970 contains provisions to permit compulsory licensing of patents by the Controller of Patents on an application made in this behalf. Section 84(1)(b) read with section 84(4) of the Patents Act, 1970 enables the issue of a com-pulsory licence in respect of a patented invention if it “is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price”.[1]

The establishment of a patent pool will directly promote public interest by advancing and deepening education in India and will also facilitate the realisation of the NMEICT.[2]

Establishing a patent pool for tablet technologies will also stimulate manufacturing in the informa-tion technology and electronics sectors in India. The National Manufacturing Policy, 2011 identifies information technology hardware and electronics and telecommunication equipment as industries of strategic significance that demand special encouragement. The Policy calls for “sector-specific pol-icy interventions” in special focus sectors where India enjoys the benefit of cost competitiveness. It is possible that, if implemented, the patent pool and the Aakash project will become global symbols of India's technological ability. While the farsightedness of the Indian Patent Act and policymakers has resulted in India becoming the “pharmacy of the world”, similar farsightedness may now result in India becoming the “electronics hub of the world”.

Forming such a patent pool for affordable access devices will prove to be a huge opportunity for education, and the credit for that would go to the Indian government and to the MHRD in particular. Further, some of the most important patent pools of the past have only come into existence after government intervention, such as the avionics patent pool proposed by the Secretary of the U.S. Navy during World War I and the radio patent pool, also created as a result of intervention by the U.S. Government. For these and other reasons, we urge you to consider establishing a patent pool for technologies relevant to the manufacture of affordable tablets and other similar devices. We will be happy to meet you, at your convenience, to talk about the legal and other issues involved in such a project.

Thank you.

Yours sincerely,

Sunil Abraham
Executive Director

Copies to:

Dr. Shashi Tharoor, Hon’ble Minister of State for Human Resource Development;
Shri Jitin Prasada, Hon’ble Minister of State for Human Resource Development;
Shri Ashok Thakur, Secretary;
Smt. Amita Sharma, Additional Secretary;
Shri Amit Khare, Joint Secretary.

[1].Compulsory licensing has long been favoured in India to enable public access to essential technologies. The Report on the Revision of the Patent Law, 1959 by a Committee headed by Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar advocated a strong compulsory licensing regime that formed the basis for the unamended Patents Act, 1970. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of India in the matter of Novartis v. Union of India (CA 2706-2716 of 2009) creates a judicially enforceable precedent in respect of enabling affordable access to patented technologies in the public interest.

[2]. In addition, the decision of the Controller of Patents, Mumbai, in NATCO Pharma and Bayer Corporation (CL Application 1 of 2011) that upheld the issue of a compulsory licence in respect of a particular pharmaceutical promotes the principle of affordable access to essential technologies. The issuance of a compulsory licence to establish a patent pool will not violate India's commitments under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organisation.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices

Hacking, Modding & Making

praskrishna — 2012-04-09T09:51:41Z

Seeber's electronics laboratory is a room in a unit he shares with his mother. Every available space is taken up with teetering towers of electronic parts, writes Brendan Shanahan for GQ.

Like subprime lending or the line at the motor registry, patent and copyright laws control all our lives but no one really understands them. In the world of DIY Tech, however, it is not a subject that can be ignored.

" If they are infringing on patents then it's a question you have to ask within the individual jurisdiction," says Abraham. "In many jurisdictions design many not have protection. Whether it's legal or illegal is an open question."

At its heart Abraham's argument is pragmatic: the developing world, especially China, is too big to stop. Companies can fight patent wars in every world territory, hire private detectives, pressure governments and prosecute consumers who buy rip-off products, but, ultimately, they won't win. The genie is out of the bottle.

"If something has been made technologically possible, we cannot make it illegal and hope that everyone will now pretend that this is no longer technologically possible," says Abraham. "We can't have the government checking everyone's iPod and laptop. The better move is to change the model."

Abraham has many suggestions for making copyright law more flexible to benefit manufacturers and consumers. One thing is certain: in a world in which Amazon, not even five years after the launch of the Kindle, is now selling more e-books than all hard copy books combined, and technology such as 3D printing will soon be standard, it would be unwise to cling to old certainities. The music industry may come to be regarded as merely the canary in a digital coalmine of failed industries.

Read the full post here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/hacking-modding-making

Patented Games

sunil — 2012-03-08T12:14:22Z

Some prefer Steve Jobs, patron saint of perfection, others prefer Nicholas Negroponte, messiah of the masses. While Mr Jobs may be guilty of contributing to the digital divide, Mr Negroponte may have contributed to bridging it with his innovation: the One Laptop Per Child, also known as the $100 laptop or XO. Sunil Abraham's column was published in the Economic Times on 8 March 2012.

Much ink has been spilt celebrating the contributions of both, but if we were to judge them by utilising evidence from the market, their technologies are used by a rather thin section of the pyramid.

For this writer, however, the real heroes are entrepreneurs from China and Taiwan who make technology that is used by millions of Indians and other consumers across the globe. Sometimes it comes with domestic branding and with all the right peripherals - for example, in India, the Popkorn, which costs only Rs 6,699. It features support for two SIM cards, a receiver for analogue terrestrial television, a receiver for FM radio, a 3.2-megapixel camera, boom-box style internal speakers and, most impressively, a pica projector. It ships with a tripod stand, external speakers, a torch and a laser pointer. It is a classroom in a box. At other times, it comes as a Shanzhai clone of a branded product - for example, the Blackcherry, at one-sixth the price-point with twice the number of cameras as the Blackberry. Some Shanzhai phones support four SIM cards and ship with a spare battery.

Dual- and quad-SIM support is critical in developing countries, especially Africa, where regulation has failed to rationalise interconnection costs. Most of the global south is yet to harvest the digital dividend, so TV reception is very useful indeed. And the additional battery is invaluable for rural entrepreneurs who are not sure whether their next halt will sync with the local load-shedding schedule.

The same with the focus on audio capabilities, reflecting the communal usage patterns. Unlike many expensive big-brand phones that require purchase of additional software, these phones often have in-built support for a wide variety of proprietary and open file formats.

These products are unavailable in the US and Europe because they would be sued out of the market by rights-holders or snuffed out by enforcement activities. David Drummond, Google's chief legal officer, says "smartphones might involve as many as 2,50,000 (largely questionable) patent claims". But there are three important differences for the Indian consumer. One, many of these patents are registered in the US, Europe and Japan and, therefore, prevent others from securing those patents in other jurisdictions. But it does not prevent Indian or Chinese entrepreneurs from using the patents. Two, unlike the US patent law, the Indian Patent Act does not consider "mathematical or a business method or computer program per se or algorithms" as inventions. And three, Indian courts, unlike their US and European counterparts, are less likely to grant injunctions preventing sale or use of any device.

Patent pools are a century-old policy tool for reducing royalties and uncertainty for manufacturers and consumers. In 1917, the US government forced aircraft patent-holders, including the famous Wright Brothers, into a patent pool that allowed 60 firms to produce planes at reduced royalty costs without worrying about litigation. Since then, the US government has issued thousands of compulsory licences in many different domains. Patent pools do exist in some areas of mobile technologies such as GSM and video file formats, but more patent pools are needed.

The Chinese government has used standards policy in the past to reduce outgoing royalties on information and communication technologies. They promoted or mandated indigenous standards either as a negotiating tactic with rights-holders or to benefit from cross-licensing of domestic IP. Some standards include TD-SCDMA, as an alternative to Qualcomm's CDMA, EVD as an alternative to the DVD standard, and CBHD as an alternative to Sony's Blu-ray. The potential savings were quite significant. In the words of Ma Jun, Deutsche Bank's chief China economist, "There is almost no profit for Chinese DVD makers as they have to pay about $7 in licensing fees to foreign patent holders per DVD player, which are sold at around $20 only - both at home and abroad."

In addition to patent and standards policy, royalty caps have been used to ensure access to innovative technologies. Till the end of 2009, the Indian government had imposed a royalty cap of 5% on domestic sales and 8% on exports. If a company wanted to pay higher royalties, permission had to be secured from an inter-ministerial Project Approval Board. Between 1991 and 2009, only 8,062 approvals were granted, indicating our government was keen to reduce outgoing royalties. Policymakers could reconsider reintroducing such royalty caps for devices that cost less than $200.

(The author is with the Centre for Internet and Society)

Read the original published in the Economic Times

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/patented-games

CIS Comments on the Draft National Policy on Electronics

pranesh — 2011-11-01T00:05:32Z

These were the comments submitted by CIS to the request for comments put out by the Department of Information Technology on its draft 'National Policy on Electronics'.

The Department of Information Technology must be commended for taking the initiative to create this policy which aims to reduce India’s dependence on other countries for crucial electronic hardware requirements, and to increase Indian production to such a capacity as to not only serve India’s increasing demand for electronics, but to fulfil foreign demand as well.

We have mainly focused our comments on the implications of the patent regime on this laudable goal.

Technology Transfer

An area that the policy is silent on is technology transfer. In relation to technology, the main bargain embedded in the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of the WTO was the increase in the level of protection offered under patent laws of developing countries in exchange for increased transfer of technological know-how from the developed countries. While India has increased patent protection in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, there has been no commensurate transfer of technology from countries which are currently hubs of electronics know-how.

One important example is China’s policy on transfer of technology along the whole value chain to enable domestic firms to gain technological expertise.

The Association of American Manufacturing notes, “One of the most potent weapons China has used to move up the value chain is forced technology transfer … It is only through the acquisition (rather than internal development) of sophisticated technologies that Chinese companies have been able to rapidly enter and expand in sophisticated industries ….”

This insistence on technology transfer as a national policy has served China well, and their experience should be incorporated into India’s National Policy on Electronics. This is not to say that India should not internally develop our own technological capabilities, but that the Indian government must use the policy space available to it to ensure that acquisition of technological capabilities happens alongside.

Outflow of Foreign Exchange as Royalties Creating Adverse Balance of Payments

The latest data from the World Bank shows that our balance of payments is increasing adversely at an alarming rate, and has now reached over USD 2.38 billion.

Our royalty and licence fee payments have kept on increasing at an astounding rate.

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees payments (current USD)

1991	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
49,565,208	845,949,436	1,159,824,391	1,528,826,913	1,860,283,808	2,437,500,663

Meanwhile India’s income is gaining slowly and erratically, and in 20100 reached USD 59.6 million.

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees, receipts (current USD)

1991	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
615,525	13,445,053	30,690,000	27,211,957	38,128,141	59,560,687

This bleeds the Indian economy through a very inefficient outflow of capital. Insisting on transfer of technology is an important component in slowing down this trend.

Linking of Value Chain and Preferential Treatment

One important clarification that is needed in the policy (specifically clause IV.1.3) is that “domestically manufactured electronic products” is intended to mean not those products for which the last part of value has been added in India. This way essentially non-Indian products with Indian branding can be seen to be “domestically manufactured electronic products”. The longer the Indian part of the value chain, the more preference it should be given, and holding by Indian companies of essential patent rights (or the availability of greater number of components of the product under royalty-free, FRAND and RAND licences) could be an important criteria. This will also encourage the transfer of technological know-how to Indian firms.

Preferential Treatment

Some may argue that the provision of preferential treatment to domestic manufacturers contravenes the GATT Agreement, however the GATT Agreement itself provides a usable exception in Article 3(8):

Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation

8 (a) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale.

(b) The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic products.

Thus, by crafting any further regulation under this policy to fit within this exception, India would not fall afoul of its obligations under GATT.

Cybersecurity and Source Code

An important aspect of the cybersecurity that is discussed in clause IV.5 is the ability to validate the lack of malicious code in the electronics used in strategically important infrastructure. For this, manufacturers must be required to provide the source code as part of government tenders in strategically important infrastructure.

Distinction between Innovation and Intellectual Property

The Electronic Development Fund must seek to promote innovation, research and development, and commercialization of products, and must be used to strategically acquire patents. Promotion of patents is not an end in itself, unlike promotion of innovation and ensuring that research and development reaches markets through commercialization. Patents are only a means to an end, and may sometimes be strategically useful, and often stand in way of gaining optimal use of technology by markets due to their monopolistic nature. Thus, it is recommended that “promotion of IP” be dropped from this clause, and instead “promotion of strategic acquirement and use of patents” be substituted in its place.

National Electronics Mission

The National Electronics Mission should not only have industry participation but also participation from academia and civil society.

Funding

The issue of funding for the initiatives outlined in this policy must be addressed as well.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/comments-draft-national-policy-on-electronics

CIS Submission on Draft Patent Manual 2010

pranesh — 2014-05-29T06:47:32Z

The patent office has released a revised version of the Draft Manual of Patent Practice and Procedure. Section 8.03.06.10 of the Manual deals with patenting of computer programmes. CIS is happy to note the many improvements in this draft of the Manual from the previous version. CIS made its submission along with a few suggestions that it thinks would make the document even better.

The section has been entirely reformulated and a few of the changes made to the previous version are welcome.

Positive changes in the Manual

The provisions relating to making software with “technological features” and “technical applications” which were present in the previous version have been completely eliminated. Thus, the “technical applications”of a computer programme will not make an otherwise unpatentable computer programme patentable subject matter. This also eliminates the need to arrive at a definition of “technical applications” or “technological features”.
The term “computer implemented inventions” which found no place in the Patent Act, 1970 but was introduced in the previous version of the manual without proper explanation or definition has been eliminated.
The Manual expressly states that mathematical methods (8.03.06.10.b) and business methods (8.03.06.10.c) are not patentable irrespective of the language in which they claims are couched or the form in which they are claimed.
Computer programme products which were considered to be patentable subject matter in the previous version of the manual are considered to be unpatentable subject matter in the new version. The Manual clearly explains computer programme products to be nothing but computer programme per se stored in a computer readable medium. (8.03.06.10.d)
The Manual recognises that no computer programme can be functional without hardware to execute the programme. This means that any computer programme cannot become patentable subject matter merely because it is associated with some hardware. (8.03.06.10.g)
A computer programme which runs on a general purpose known computer is expressly held to be unpatentable subject matter. This is undoubtedly a welcome inclusion since it helps eliminate claims relating to a mere computer programme which may have been considered patentable simply because such computer programme is run using a general purpose computer. This is one of the common ways in which Section 3(k) is circumvented to obtain patent for claims which are for a computer programme per se.

Contentious provisions of the Manual which require amendment/explanation are as follows:

Clause 8.03.06.10.a

Under this provision, mathematical methods, business methods, computer programmes per se and algorithms are not considered as patentable inventions. In relation to computer programs, the law provides a qualification that what is not patentable is only computer program per se.

While this restates the statute correctly, it does so without offering any explanation, which would be preferable. The Manual should explain the scope of the term “per se” and clear the ambiguity surrounding it. The Manual should clearly provide reasons for any computer programme to fall in either category.

We suggest using the following definition of computer programme per se, which has previously been submitted to the Patent Office1:

Computer programme per se in the relevant clause means (a) any computer programme in the abstract, (b) any computer programme expressed in source code form, including source code recorded on an information storage medium, or (c) any computer programme that can be executed or executes on a general purpose computer,2 including computer programme object code designed for execution on a general purpose computer that is recorded on an information storage medium.3

Clause 8.03.06.10.e

If a claim in a patent application is not directed at a computer programme per se it could be patentable, if all other patentability conditions are met. This provision thus necessitates distinguishing computer programmes per se from other types of inventions that use or implement computer programmes.

The clause, while seeking to distinguish computer programmes per se from inventions which use or implement computer programmes, does make clear what “implement computer programmes” means, nor does it clarify what “computer programme per se” is. A relevant suggestion for a definition for “computer programme per se” has been provided above, which would address this problem.

Clause 8.03.06.10.f

The computer programmes are often claimed in the form of algorithms as method claims or system claims with some ‘means’ indicating the function of flow charts or process steps. The algorithm related claims may be even wider than the computer programme claimed by itself, for a programme represents a particular set, the algorithm expresses the principles .

We find that this clause has no relevance to explaining patentability of computer programmes and thus suggest that the same be deleted from the Manual. The Manual should however make it clear that in algorithm-related claims, if the function claimed to be performed by the invention can be done only by means of a computer programme, such claims are not patentable.

Clause 8.03.06.10.g

Essentially, all computer programmes need a combination with some hardware for their functionality. In an application for patent for a new hardware system, the possibility of a computer programme forming part of the claims cannot be ruled out. It has to be carefully considered as to how integrated is the novel hardware with the computer programme. Further, it is also to be considered whether the machine is programme specific or the programme is machine specific. A computer programme which may work on any general purpose known computer does not meet the requirement of patentability.

With regard to cases of computer programmes being combined with hardware, the Manual seems to suggest that the patentability of the combination is dependent on “how integrated the novel hardware [is] with the computer programme.” This language is very vague and ambiguous. In case of an application for patent for a new hardware system, the Manual should make it clear that such claim is eligible only if the inventive conribution resides entirely in the hardware. The Manual should also require the patent applicant to demonstrate exactly how the inventive step resides in the hardware separable from the computer programme.
We propose a new part to the above test to make the clause clearer. The Manual should specify that “the computer programme portions of any claimed invention should be treated as if it were covered by prior art and patentability should thus be determined with respect to the other features of the invention”. This way, we can ensure that an invention which merely uses or implements a computer programme is not granted patent on the basis of the inventiveness of the computer programme per se.
It is indeed laudable that the Manual makes it clear that a computer programme which may work on any general purpose known computer does not meet the requirement of patentability. This should make it clear that a computer programme cannot be patentable simply because it is executed by a special purpose computer as long as a general purpose computer can also execute the same. We suggest the following definition of a general purpose computer, which has already been proposed to the Patent Office, be used:4

A general-purpose computer here means a device capable of running multiple unrelated programs, often simultaneously for different purposes. It will comprise at least of: (1) one or more central processing units, (2) one or more input devices that are not specific to any one program, (3) memory, (4) one or more non volatile mass storage devices, and (5) one or more output devices. However, a general-purpose computer does not include a device that itself represents an inventive contribution to the art.

Clause 8.03.06.10.h

Method claims, whether independent or dependent, reciting computer programs without process limitations in the form of hardware features are not allowable. For a method reciting computer programme to be patentable, it must clearly recite into it limiting hardware integers that enable the program to function .

The Clause dilutes the standard set in the previous clauses. It seems to suggest that any method claim is patentable as long as it is connected to hardware which enable the program to function and define its limitations/scope. This position is untenable since no method claim can be purely a computer programme and use of computer programmes for any specific task would necessarily require hardware to implement the same. Therefore the requirement of hardware limitation to make a computer programme patentable is essentially allowing for any computer programme to be patentable. Not only is such a limitation redundant but it also renders the “per se” requirement in Section 3(k) meaningless. Further, the meaning of the term “hardware integers” in the Clause is unclear. For the purpose of this comment, we assume that it refers to hardware features. The Manual should ensure that the method claim has significant per or post processing activity and is not merely combined with hardware to be patent-eligible. This ensures that any computer programme is not granted patent merely because it has certain trivial pre or post processing activities associated with it.

Clause 8.03.06.10.i

Claims directed at computer programs coupled to hardware, enabling the hardware to perform a certain function may be allowable, if such an invention meets all other conditions of patentability.

The Clause is restating the content of Clause 8.03.06.10.e and our comments on this Clause remain the same as our comments for Clause 8.03.06.10.e.

Requirement of Disclosure

We suggest that the Manual require that an application claiming patent for a computer programme (which does not constitute computer programme per se) necessarily disclose the entire source code. This ensures that the invention can perform exactly all those functions that are described in the patent application. Since different computer programmes can be written (with each having different source code) to perform the same function, it is of utmost importance that the applicant demonstrate the workability of the invention described in the application and such proof can be provided only by disclosing the source code.

Purpose of the Manual

There is no clarity on the purpose and authority of the Manual. We do not know if the Manual attempts to explain the provisions of the Patent Act, 1970 to an applicant or is meant to provide guidance to patent examiners or be binding upon them. If a patent official acts in a manner contradictory to the Manual, the consequences of such action is unclear. The Manual should clarify these questions.

This definition was formulated and submitted by Knowledge Commons, Delhi to the Indian Patent Office in response to the earlier version of the draft manual. The definition was formulated through the collective efforts of Prabir Purkayastha, Richard Fontana of Red Hat, Venkatesh Hariharan, Tahir Amin, Mishi Chowdhury of Software Freedom Law Centre and Jaijit Bhattacharya. See http://osindia.blogspot.com/2009/04/computer-programme-per-se-conundrum.html
We propose the following definition of a general purpose computer - A general-purpose computer here means a device capable of running multiple unrelated programs, often simultaneously for different purposes. It will comprise at least of: (1) one or more central processing units, (2) one or more input devices that are not specific to any one program, (3) memory, (4) one or more non volatile mass storage devices, and (5) one or more output devices. However, a general-purpose computer does not include a device that itself represents an inventive contribution to the art. See also Infra n. 3.
An information storage medium means any disc, tape, perforated media or other information storage device, which, if fed into or located in a computer or computer based equipment is capable of reproducing any information, other than an information storage medium that itself represents an inventive contribution to the art.
This definition was formulated and submitted by Knowledge Commons, Delhi to the Indian Patent Office in response to the earlier version of the draft manual. See http://osindia.blogspot.com/2009/04/computer-programme-per-se-conundrum.html

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-submission-draft-patent-manual-2010

A Guide to Key IPR Provisions of the Proposed India-European Union Free Trade Agreement

glover — 2011-08-30T13:06:03Z

The Centre for Internet and Society presents a guide for policymakers and other stakeholders to the latest draft of the India-European Union Free Trade Agreement, which likely will be concluded by the end of the year and may hold serious ramifications for Indian businesses and consumers.

In its ongoing negotiation for a FTA with the EU, a process that began in 2007 and is expected to end sometime this year, India has won several signicant IP-related concessions. But there remain several IP issues critical to the maintenance of its developing economy, including its robust entrepreneurial environment, that India should contest further before ratifying the treaty. This guide covers the FTA's IP provisions that are within the scope of CIS' policy agenda and on which India has negotiated favorable language, as well as those provisions that it should re-negotiate or oppose.

Download the guide here, and please feel free to comment below.

You may also download a chart comparing the language proposed by India and the EU respectively with that included in the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).

Following is a summary of CIS' findings:

India has become a de facto leader of developing countries at the WTO, and an India-EU FTA seems likely to provide a model for FTAs between developed and developing states well into the future.
The EU has proposed articles on reproduction, communication, and broadcasting rights which could seriously undermine India's authority to regulate the use of works under copyright as currently provided for in the Berne Convention, as well as narrowing exceptions and limitations to rights under copyright.
The EU asserts that copyright includes "copyright in computer programs and in databases," without indicating whether such copyright exceeds that provided for in the Berne Convention. Moreover, by asserting that copyright "includes copyright in computer programs and in databases," the EU has left open the door for the extension of copyright to non-original databases.
India should explicitly obligate the EU to promote and encourage technology transfer -- an obligation compatible with and derived from TRIPS -- as well as propose a clear definition of technology transfer.
The EU has demanded India's accession to the WIPO Internet Treaties, the merits of which are currently under debate as India moves towards amending its Copyright Act, as well as several other international treaties that India either does not explicitly enforce or to which it is not a contracting party.
In general, the EU's provisions would extend terms of protection for material under copyright, within certain constraints, further endangering India's consumer-friendly copyright regime.
An agreement to establish arrangements between national organizations charged with collecting and distributing royalty payments may obligate such organizations in India collect royalty payments for EU rights holders on the same basis as they do for Indian rights holders, and vice versa in the EU, but more heavily burden India.
The EU has proposed a series of radical provisions on the enforcement of IPRs that are tailored almost exclusively to serve the interests of rights holders, at the expense of providing safety mechanisms for those accused of infringing or enabling infringers.
The EU has proposed, under cover of protecting intermediate service providers from liability for infringement by their users, to increase and/or place the burden on such providers of policing user activity.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/a-guide-to-the-proposed-india-european-union-free-trade-agreement

Arguments Against Software Patents in India

pranesh — 2012-03-13T10:43:12Z

CIS believes that software patents are harmful for the software industry and for consumers. In this post, Pranesh Prakash looks at the philosophical, legal and practical reasons for holding such a position in India. This is a slightly modified version of a presentation made by Pranesh Prakash at the iTechLaw conference in Bangalore on February 5, 2010, as part of a panel discussing software patents in India, the United States, and the European Union.

This blog post is based on a presentation made at the iTechLaw conference held on February 5, 2010. The audience consisted of lawyers from various corporations and corporate law firms. As is their wont, most lawyers when dealing with software patents get straight to an analysis of law governing the patenting of computer programmes in India and elsewhere, and seeing whether any loopholes exist and can be exploited to patent software. It was refreshing to see at least some lawyers actually going into questions of the need for patents to cover computer programs. In my presentation, I made a multi-pronged case against software patents: (1) philosophical justification against software patents based on the nature of software; (2) legal case against software patents; (3) practical reasons against software patents.

Preamble

Through these arguments, it is sought to be shown that patentability of software is not some arcane, technical question of law, but is a real issue that affect the continued production of new software and the everyday life of the coder/hacker/software programmer/engineer as well as consumers of software (which is, I may remind you, everywhere from your pacemaker to your phone). A preamble to the arguments would note that the main question to ask is: why should we allow for patenting of software? Answering this question will lead us to ask: who benefits from patenting of software. The conclusion that I come to is that patenting of software helps three categories of people: (1) those large software corporations that already have a large number of software patents; (2) those corporations that do not create software, but only trade in patents / sue on the basis of patents ("patent trolls"); (3) patent lawyers. How they don't help small and medium enterprises nor society at large (since they deter, rather than further invention) will be borne out by the rest of these arguments, especially the section on practical reasons against software patents.

What are Patents?

Patents are a twenty-year monopoly granted by the State on any invention. An invention has to have at least four characteristics: (0) patentable subject matter; (1) novelty (it has to be new); (2) inventive step / non-obviousness (even if new, it should not be obvious); (3) application to industry. A monopoly over that invention, thus means that if person X has invented something, then I may not use the core parts of that invention ("the essential claims") in my own invention. This prohibition applies even if I have come upon my invention without having known about X's invention. (Thus, independent creation is not a defence to patent infringement. This distinguishes it, for instance, from copyright law in which two people who created the same work independently of each other can both assert copyright.) Patents cover non-abstract ideas/functionality while copyright covers specific expressions of ideas. To clarify: imagine I make a drawing of a particular machine and describe the procedure of making it. Under patent law, no one else can make that particular machine, while under copyright law, no one can copy that drawing.

Philosophical Justification Against Software Patents

Even without going into the case against patents per se (lack of independent creation as a defence; lack of 'harm' as a criterion leading to internalization of all positive externalities; lack of effective disclosure and publication; etc.), which has been done much more ably by others like Bessen & Meurer (especially in their book Patent Failure) and Boldrin & Levine (in their book Against Intellectual Monopoly, the full text of which is available online).

But there is one essentially philosophical argument against software as subject matter of a patent. Software/computer programs ("instructions for a computer"), as any software engineer would tell you, are merely algorithms ("an effective method for solving a problem using a finite sequence of instructions") that are meant to be understood by a computer or a human who knows how to read that code.

Algorithms are not patentable subject matter, as they are mere expressions of abstract ideas, and not inventions in themselves. Computer programs, similarly, are abstract ideas. They only stop being abstract ideas when embodied in a machine or a process in which it is the machine/process that is the essential claim and not the software. That machine or process being patented would not grant protection to the software itself, but to the whole machine or process. Thus the abstract part of that machine/process (i.e., the computer program) could be used in any other machine/process, as it it is not the subject matter of the patent. Importantly, just because software is required to operate some machine would then not mean that the machine itself is not patentable, just that the software cannot be patented in guise of patenting a machine.

Legal Case Against Software Patents

In India, section 3(k) of the Patent Act reads:

(3) The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act: (k) a mathematical or business method or computer programme (sic) per se or algorithms.

As one can see, computer programs are place in the same category as "mathematical methods", "algorithms", and "business methods", hence giving legal validity to the idea propounded in the previous section that computer programs are a kind of algorithms (just as algorithms are a kind of mathematical method).

Be that as it may, the best legal minds in India have had to work hard at understanding what exactly "computer programme per se" means. They have cited U.S. case law, U.K. case law, E.U. precedents, and sought to arrive at an understanding of how per se should be understood. While understanding what per se means might be a difficult job, it is much easier to see what it does not mean. For that, we can look at the 2004 Patent Ordinance that Parliament rejected in 2005. In that ordinance, sections 3(k) and (ka) read as follows:

(3) The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act: (k) a computer programme per se other than its technical application to industry or a combination with hardware; (ka) a mathematical method or a business method or algorithms.

Thus, it is clear that the interpretation that "computer programme per se" excludes "a computer programme that has technical application to industry" and "a computer programme in combination with hardware" is wrong. By rejecting the 2004 Ordinance wording, Parliament has clearly shown that "technical application to industry" and "combination with hardware" do not make a computer programme patentable subject matter.

Indeed, what exactly is "technical application to industry"? "Technical" has various definitions, and a perusal through those definitions would show that barely any computer program can be said not to relate to a technique, not involve "specialized knowledge of applied arts and sciences" (it is code, after all; not everyone can write good algorithms), or not relate to "a practical subject that is organized according to scientific principles" or is "technological". Similarly, all software is, by definition, meant to be used in combination with hardware. Thus, it being used in combination with hardware must not, as argued above, give rise to patentability of otherwise unpatentable subject matter category.

In 2008, the Patent Office published a new 'Draft Manual Of Patent Practice And Procedure' in which it sought to allow patenting of certain method claims for software inventions (while earlier the Patent Office objected to method claims, allowing only device claims with hardware components). This Draft Manual was withdrawn from circulation, with Shri N.N. Prasad (then Joint Secretary of DIPP, the department administering the Patent Office) noting that the parts of the Manual on sections 3(d) and 3(k) had generated a lot of controversy, and were ultra vires the scope of the Manual (which could not override the Patent Act). He promised that those parts would be dropped and the Manual would be re-written. A revised draft of the Manual has not yet been released. Thus the interpretation provided in the Draft Manual (which was based heavily on the interpretation of the U.K. courts) cannot not be relied upon as a basis for arguments in favour of the patentability of software in India.

In October 2008, CIS helped organize a National Public Meeting on Software Patents in which Indian academics, industry, scientists, and FOSS enthusiasts all came to the conclusion that software patents are harmful for both the industry as well as consumers.

Practical Reasons Against Software Patents

This is going to be an attempt at distilling and simplifying some of the main practical arguments against patenting of software.

There are traditionally four incentives that the patent system caters to: (1) incentive to invent; (2) incentive to disclose; (3) incentive to commercialize; and (4) incentive to invent substitutes. Apart from the last, patenting of software does not really aid any of them.

Patent Landmines / Submarine Patents / Patent Gridlocks / No Exception for Independent Creation

Given that computer programs are algorithms, having monopolies over such abstract ideas is detrimental to innovation. Just the metaphors say a lot about software patents: landmines (they cannot be seen/predicted); submarines (they surface out of the blue); gridlocks (because there are so many software patents around the same area of computing, they prevent further innovation in that area, since no program can be written without violating one patent or the other).

Imagine the madness that would have ensued had patents been granted when computer programming was in its infancy. Imagine different methods of sorting (quick sort, bubble sort) that are part of Computer Science 101 had been patented. While those particular instances aren't, similar algorithms, such as data compression algorithms (including the infamous LZW compression method), have been granted patents. Most importantly, even if one codes certain functionality into software independently of the patent holder, that is still violative of the patent. Computer programs being granted patents makes it extremely difficult to create other computer programs that are based on the same abstract ideas. Thus incentives # (1) and (3) are not fulfilled, and indeed, they are harmed. There is no incentive to invent, as one would always be violating one patent or the other. Given that, there is no incentive to commercialize what one has invented, because of fear of patent infringement suits.

An apt illustration of this is the current difficulty of choosing a royalty-free video format for HTML 5, as it shows, in practical terms, how difficult it is to create a video format without violating one patent or the other. While the PNG image format was created to side-step the patent over the LZW compression method used in the GIF image format, bringing Ogg Theora or Dirac (both patent-free video format) to surpass the levels of H.264/MPEG-4 AVC or VC-1 will be very difficult without infringing dozens if not hundreds of software patents. Chris DiBona of Google, while talking about improving Ogg Theora as part of its inclusion in HTML 5 specifications said, "Here’s the challenge: Can Theora move forward without infringing on the other video compression patents?" Just the number of companies and organization that hold patents over H.264 is astounding, and includes: Columbia University, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute of Korea (ETRI), France Télécom, Fujitsu, LG Electronics, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, Philips, Robert Bosch GmbH, Samsung, Sharp, Sony, Toshiba, and Victor Company of Japan (JVC). As is the amount of royalties to be paid ("[t]he maximum royalty for these rights payable by an Enterprise (company and greater than 50% owned subsidiaries) is $3.5 million per year in 2005-2006, $4.25 million per year in 2007-08 and $5 million per year in 2009-10"; with royalty per unit of a decoder-encoder costing upto USD 0.20.)

Indeed, even the most diligent companies cannot guard themselves against software patents. FFII estimates that a very simple online shopping website would violate twenty different patents at the very least. Microsoft recently lost a case against i4i when i4i surfaced with a patent covering custom XML as implemented in MS Office 2003 and MS Office 2007. As a result Microsoft had to ship patches to its millions of customers, to disable the functionality and bypass that patent. The manufacturers of BlackBerry, the Canadian company Research in Motion, had to shell out USD 617 million as settlement to NTP over wireless push e-mail, as it was otherwise faced with the possibility of the court shutting down the BlackBerry service in the U.S. This happened despite there being a well-known method of doing so pre-dating the NTP patents. NTP has also filed cases against AT&T, Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless, and Palm Inc. Microsoft was also hit by Visto Corporation over those same NTP patents, which had been licensed to Visto (a startup).
- Don't These Cases Show How Software Patents Help Small Companies?
  
  The astute reader might be tempted to ask: are not all of these examples of small companies getting their dues from larger companies? Doesn't all of this show that software patents actually help small and medium enterprises (SMEs)? The answer to that is: no. To see why, we need to note the common thread binding i4i, NTP, and Visto. None of them were, at the time of their lawsuits, actually creating new software, and NTP was an out-and-out "non-practising entity"/"patent holding company" AKA, patent troll. i4i was in the process of closing shop, and Visto had just started up. None of these were actually practising the patent. None of these were producing any other software. Thus, none of these companies had anything to lose by going after big companies. In other words, the likes of Microsoft, RIM, Verizon, AT&T, etc., could not file counter-suits of patent infringement, which is normally what happens when SMEs try to assert patent rights against larger corporations. For every patent that the large corporation violates of the smaller corporation, the smaler corporation would be violating at least ten of the larger corporation's. Software patents are more helpful for software companies as a tool for cross-licensing rather than as a way of earning royalties. Even this does not work as a strategy against patent trolls.
Thus, the assertion that was made at the beginning is borne out: software patents help only patent trolls, large corporations that already have large software patent portfolios, and the lawyers who draft these patents and later argue them out in court.
Term of Patents

Twenty years of monopoly rights is outright ludicrous in an industry where the rate of turnover of technology is much faster -- anywhere between two years and five months.
Software Industry Progressed Greatly Without Patents

In India, software patents have never been asserted in courts (even though many have been illegally granted), yet the software industry in India is growing in leaps and bounds. Similarly, most of the big (American) giants of the software industry today grew to their stature by using copyright to "protect" their software, and not patents.
Copyright Exists for Software

As noted above, the code/expression of any software is internationally protected by copyright law. There is no reason to protect the ideas/functionality of that software as well.
Insufficient Disclosure

When ordinary computer programmers cannot understand what a particular software patent covers (which is the overwhelming case), then the patent is of no use. One of the main incentives of the patent system is to encourage gifted inventors to share their genius with the world. It is not about gifted inventors paying equally gifted lawyers to obfuscate their inventions into gobbledygook so that other gifted inventors can at best hazard a guess as to precisely what is and is not covered by that patent. Thus, this incentive (#2) is not fulfilled by the current system of patents either -- not unless there is a major overhaul of the system. This ties in with the impossibility of ensuring that one is not violating a software patent. If a reasonably smart software developer (who are often working as individuals, and as part of SMEs) cannot quickly ascertain whether one is violating patents, then there is a huge disincentive against developing software in that area at all.
Software Patents Work Against Free/Libre/Open Source Software

Software patents hinder the development of software and FOSS licences, as the licensee is not allowed to restrict the rights of the sub-licensees over and above the restrictions that the licensee has to observe. Thus, all patent clearances obtained by the licensee must be passed on to the sub-licensees. Thus, patented software, though most countries around the world do not recognize them, are generally not included in the default builds of many FOSS operating systems. This inhabits the general adoption of FOSS, since many of the software patents, even though not enforceable in India, are paid heed to by the software that Indians download, and the MP3 and DivX formats are not enabled by default in standard installations of a Linux OS such as Ubuntu.

Conclusion

Currently, the U.S. patent system is being reviewed at the administrative level, the legislative level, as well as the judicial level. At the judicial level, the question of business method patents (and, by extension, software patents) is before the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the form of Bilski v. Kappos. Judge Mayer of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC, which heard In re Bilksi) noted that "the patent system has run amok". The Free Software Foundation submitted a most extensive amicus curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, filled with brilliant analysis of software patents and arguments against the patentability of software that is well worth a read.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/arguments-against-software-patents

Arguments Against the PUPFIP Bill

pranesh — 2011-09-12T11:03:09Z

The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill (PUPFIP Bill) is a new legislation being considered by Parliament, which was introduced in the 2008 winter session of the Rajya Sabha. It is modelled on the American Bayh-Dole Act (University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act) of 1980. On this page, we explore some of the reasons that the bill is unnecessary, and how it will be harmful if passed.

Summary

How is the legislation unnecessary?

The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.
Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

How is the legislation harmful?

Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retards innovation.
The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.
Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of “public funded IP”.
It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.
It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.
Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.
Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

Arguments

How is the legislation unnecessary?

1) The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.

The idea behind the Bayh-Dole Act was that the research funded by the government (and owned, in the US, by the government) was being underutilized. In 1980, over 28,000 unlicensed patents lay with the U.S. government.[1] The Act shifted the title of such works from the government to the University or small business that conducted the research, thus allowing them to take out patents on the research outputs. In India, under present laws, the researcher(s) own the rights over their research whether they be government-funded or not. Usually, due to employment contracts, the research institutes already have the right to patent their inventions. Thus, currently, there is no need for an enabling legislation in this regard, as there was in the U.S.

In fact, currently, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has over 5173 patents (counting both those in force and those under dispute), while only 222 patents are licensed (with 68 of them being under dispute). Thus, even with the IP being in the institute's hands, there is a "problem" situation similar to that which necessitated Bayh-Dole in the U.S. Thus, quite contrary to the aims of the Act, further patenting will only lead to a situation of even more underutilized patents.

2) Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

At a recent seminar held at NUJS Kolkata on the PUPFIP Bill, it was revealed that while IIT-Kharagpur’s TTO-equivalent (called the Sponsored Research & Industrial Consultancy division - SRIC) currently handles over Rs.300 crores through 850 projects, only around Rs. 5-15 crores (exact figures weren't available) are currently made through its patent portfolio.[2] Thus patents don't seem, on the face of things, to be the best way of ensuring technology transfer. Indeed, the oft-cited 28,0000 unlicensed patents held by the U.S. government were composed primarily of patents for which industry had refused to take exclusive licences.[3]

Many contend that one of the most important functions of a patent is to get inventors to disclose their inventions rather than keep them as secrets. This reason for awarding a patent is invalidated if stronger protection is granted to trade secrets (no term limit, for instance) than for patents. Secondly, this reason for granting patents is not valid in case of government-funded research in academia and research institutes. The culture of publication and the economy of reputation are sufficient to ensure disclosure. Even without these intrinsic factors, there grant requirements can necessitate publication. If mere publication is believed to be insufficient, then the government would do well to ask for technology dissemination plans before grants are made. At any rate, monopoly rights in the form of patents are thoroughly unnecessary.

How is the legislation harmful?

1) Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retard innovation.

It sees protection of IPR as the sole means of encouraging innovation and driving research to the doorstep of consumers. The trend around the world is that of exploring alternative forms of spurring innovation. Even in India, CSIR has gone for an innovative "Open Source Drug Discovery" project, which has proven very successful so far. Furthermore, recent literature shows that excessive patenting is harming research and innovation by creating gridlocks.[4] If platform technologies and basic research (such as SNP) gets mired in patents, then the transaction costs increase (not only in terms of money, but more importantly in administrative terms). This ends up in research clearances getting blocked, and thus retards innovation. It must be remembered that intellectual property is not only an output, but also an input. The more aggressively the outputs are guarded and prevented from being shared, the more the inputs will be affected. The study of patent thickets and gridlocks has reached such a stage that the U.S. law has been changed to reflect this. Firstly, the Bayh-Dole Act was amended in 2000 to state that the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act were to be carried out "without unduly encumbering future research and discovery". Now, the courts (in the Bilski case) have increased the standard of obviousness in patent law (which means that less patents will be granted). Furthermore, the U.S.P.T.O. and the U.S. Senate are currently considering means of overhauling the U.S. patent system, which many fear is close to breaking down due to over-patenting. All these are signs that the footsteps we are seeking to follow are themselves turning back.

2) The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.

While the CSIR labs pursue patents aggressively, they also run the OSSD project. The latter might not be permissible if the Act is passed as it stands. Furthermore, this would increase the number of underutilized patents, which is a problem faced currently by CSIR, which has had an aggressive patent policy since the 1990s. Unlicensed patents constitute around 93% of CSIR's total patent portfolio. (In contrast, MIT averages around 50% licensing of patents.) If aggressive patenting is made mandatory, it adds substantially to administrative costs of all institutes which receive any grants from the government. These institutes might not be large enough to merit a dedicated team of professionals to handle

3) Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of "public funded IP".

This leads to a ridiculous need to attempt to commercialise all government-funded research literature (and the government funds science research, social sciences, arts, etc.). Furthermore, while the definition of "public funded IP" includes copyrights, trademarks, etc., yet the substantive provisions seem to only include those forms of IP which have to be registered compulsorily (copyright and trademark don't -- copyright comes into existence when an original work is expressed in a medium, and trademark can come into existence by use). Importantly, seeking to commercialise all copyrighted works of research would hamper the movement for open access to scholarly literature. The inititative towards open access to scholarly literature is something that National Knowledge Commission has recommended, and is a move that would result in increased dissemination of public-funded research, which seems to be an aim of the PUPFIP Bill as well.

4) It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.

This bill would increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research, because of the additional burden of patent royalties.

Public funds research -> Institute patents research -> Pharma MNC gets exclusive license over research -> Drug reaches market.

Assuming an exclusive licence: Cost of the drug = cost of manufacturing, storage, etc. + mark-up (monopolistic) cost + cost of licence.

Thus, in effect, the public has to pay twice for the research: it pays once to enable the scientist to conduct the research, and once again in the form of royalties to have that research brought to the marketplace.

5) It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.

The former could happen since institutions and individual scientists have a financial incentive to shift their focus away from fundamental research; the latter, conversely, because the filings and bureaucracy involved could drive scientists away from reporting or even engaging in industrial research [pdf]. Faculty and researcher involvement in the business of licensing is a sub-optimal usage of their talents, and there are scientists who would rather stay away from business (as is shown by the intake of former industry-researchers into government-funded labs such as those of CSIR).

6) Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.

This will bring about a shift in science and research which is always done upon others' work. This is why in the U.S., the National Institute of Health (N.I.H.) has sought to ensure (without any legal authority) that it only finances that research that on single nucleotide polymorphism (S.N.P.) which is not patented, and is shared freely amongst scholars. Since this requirement of the N.I.H.'s does not have any legal backing (since it is contradictory to the Bayh-Dole Act), institutions are free to get the grant from N.I.H. and then go ahead and patent their inventions.

7) Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

The bill allows for both assignment of licences as well as exclusive licences. Both of these enable monopolistic pricing to be undertaken by the licensee/assignee. There are not even any mechanisms in the Act to ensure, for instance, that a public call is made to ascertain that no parties are willing to consider a non-exclusive licence. Patents are generally said to grant a monopoly right because of the opportunity to recover costs of research and development. When the research is being done by public-funded money, there is no justification for monopoly rights on that research, since there are no excessive costs to recover.

Footnotes:

[1] See So et al. and Thursby and Thursby, quoted in the National Knowledge Commission's letter to the Prime Minister.

[2] See Prof. Vivekanandans' presentation "Patenting and Technology Transfer-the IIT Khargpur Experience"

[3] See Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol e262 (2008)

[4] See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998)

Additional Resources

On the PUPFIP Bill

February 5, 2004: NIPER holds parallel session of Indian Science Congress (Express Pharma)
October 27, 2006: Susan Finston, India to Propose New Technology Transfer Legislation (Bayh-Dole 25)
January 16, 2007: National Knowledge Commision's Letter to Indian Prime Minister (National Knowledge Commission)
April 15, 2007: Archita Bhatta, Proposed IPR law raises concern (Down to Earth)
May 31, 2007: Science & Technology needs to be core of the economic development says Kapil Sibal (PIB Press Release)
November 13, 2007: Government Accords Approval to National Biotechnology Development Strategy (PIB Press Release)
February 1, 2008: Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Indian Government Hopes Bill Will Stimulate Innovation (Science)
February 19, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Exporting Bayh Dole to India: Whither Transparency? (Part 1) (Part 2) (SpicyIP)
March 17, 2008: Kalpana Pathak, Varsities may soon own patent rights (Business Standard)
March 17, 2008: P.T. Jyothi Datta, Public-funded research may pay dividends for scientists (Business Line)
March 17, 2008: Joff Wild, India considers Bayh-Dole style legislation (IAM Magazine)
April 30, 2008: M.K. Unnikrishnan and Pradeepti Nayak, Lessons from Bayh Dole Act and its relevance to India (PharmaBiz)
July 2008: Sean M. O'Connor, Historical Context of U.S. Bayh-Dole Act: Implications for Indian Government Funded Research Patent Policy (STEM Newsletter)
July 7, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Mysterious Indian "Bayh Dole" Bill: SpicyIP Procures a Copy (SpicyIP)
July 09, 2008: Latha Jishnu, Does India need a Bayh-Dole Act? (Business Standard)
September 2008: V.C. Vivekanandan, Transplanting Bayh-Dole Act- Issues at Stake Authors (13 Journal of Intell. Prop. 480)
September 18, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Indian Patent Bill: Let's not be too hasty (SciDev.net)
October 28, 2008: Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol e262 (2008)
October 31, 2008: Cabinet gives approval for Protection and Utilization of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008 (PIB Press Release)
November 2008: Annette Lin et al., The Bayh-Dole Act and Promoting the Transfer of Technology of Publicly Funded-Research (UAEM White Paper on the Proposed Indian Bayh-Dole Analogue)
November 1, 2008: Editorial: Not in Public Interest (Mint)
November 12, 2008: Ben Butkus, As India Mulls Bill Modeled on Bayh-Dole, Critics Claim It May Stifle Innovation (Biotech Transfer Weekly)
December 16, 2008: Pranesh Prakash, Indian "Bayh Dole" Bill before Parliament (Commons Law)
January 23, 2009: Editorial: Time to Rethink Intellectual Property Laws (SciDev.net)
March 12, 2009: Feroz Ali Khader, Does Patenting Research Change the Culture of Science? (The Hindu)
April 24, 2009: Sunil Abraham & Pranesh Prakash, Does India Need Its Own Bayh-Dole? (Indian Express)
September 21, 2009: C.H. Unnikrishnan, Proposed Patent Bill Is Flawed, Say Experts (Mint)
September 23, 2009: Editorial: An Idea That's A Patent Misfit (Mint)
October 2009: Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Model in Developing Countries: Reflections on the Indian Bill on Publicly Funded Intellectual Property (UNCTAD - ICTSD Policy Brief No. 5)
January 2010: Amit Shovon Ray & Sabyasachi Saha, Patenting Public-Funded Research for Technology Transfer: A Conceptual-Empirical Synthesis of US Evidence and Lessons for India (ICRIER Working Paper No. 244)
January 2010: Mrinalini Kochupillai, The Protection and Utilization of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008: A Critique in the Light of India's Innovation Environment, 15 J. Intell. Prop. Rights 19 (2010)
January 16, 2010: Amit Shovon Ray & Sabyasachi Saha, Intellectual Bottlenecks (Financial Express)
January 21, 2010: Latha Jishnu, Perils of the US Model (Business Standard)
January 22, 2010: Rema Nagarajan, Scientists Fume Over New Patent Bill (Times of India)
January 26, 2010: Shamnad Basheer, The Problem with Patents (Mint)
February 5, 2010: Shalini Butani, Public Research May Become More Private (Business Line)
February 8, 2010: Anika Gupta, Scientists Want Changes in Innovation Bill (Mint)
February 9, 2010: C.H. Unnikrishnan, Parliament Panel Wants Govt Review on Innovation Bill (Mint)
February 15, 2010: Leena Menghaney, A Bad Example from the U.S. (Down to Earth)
February 19, 2010: Pranesh Prakash, A Patent Conundrum (Indian Express)
SpicyIP coverage by tag 'Bayh Dole'
Presentations from NUJS, Kolkata conference on the PUPFIP Bill

On Bayh-Dole

Newspapers and Magazines

Academic Journals

Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovation, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1031 (2005)
Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol. e262 (2008)
Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 289 (2003)
David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Aiedonis, Numbers, Quality, and Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?, 1 Innovation Pol'y Econ. 187 (2000)
David C. Mowery, et al., Learning to Patent: Institutional Experience, Learning, and the Characteristics of U.S. University Patents After the Bayh-Dole Act, 1981-1992, 48 Mgmt. Sci. 73 (2002)
Donald Kennedy, Editorial: Enclosing the Research Commons, 294 Science 2249 (2001)
F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 Colorado J. Telecomm. High Tech. L. 167 (2009)
Henry Steck, Corporatization of the University: Seeking Conceptual Clarity, 585 Annals of Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 66 (2003)
Jason Owen-Smith, Trends and Transitions in the Institutional Environment for Public and Private Science, 49 Higher Educ. 91 (2005)
Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 Science 1052 (2003)
Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Who is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing, 48 Mgmt. Sci. 90 (2002)
Josh Lerner, Review of 'Ivory Tower', 43 J. Econ. Litt. 510 (2005)
Joshua B. Powers, R&D Funding Source and University Technology Transfer: What is Stimulating Universities to Be More Entrepreneurial?, 45 Research in Higher Educ. 1 (2004)
Lita Nelsen, The Rise of Intellectual Property Protection in the American University, 279 Science 1460 (1998)
Marcia Angell & Arnold S. Relman, Patents, Profits & American Medicine: Conflicts of Interest in the Testing & Marketing of New Drugs, 131 Daedalus 102 (2002)
Maria Jelenik, Review: Two Books on Technology Transfer, 50 Admin. Sci. Q. 131 (2005) (Review of 'Ivory Tower')
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998)
Rebecca Henderson, et al., Universities as a Source of Commercia Technology: A Detailed Analsis of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 80 Rev. Econ. Statistics 119 (1998)
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsorded Research, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1663 (1996)
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Richard R. Nelson, Public vs. Proprietary Science: A Fruitful Tension?, 131 Daedalus 89 (2002)
Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 240 (2001)
Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories about the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. Econ. Issues 1031 (1998)
Thomas A. Massaro, Innovation, Technology Transfer, and Patent Policy: The University Contribution, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1729 (1996)
Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, Universities and the Market for Intellectual Property in the Life Sciences, 17 J. Pol'y Analysis Mgmt. 253 (1998)
William M. Sage, Funding Fairness: Public Investment, Proprietary Rights and Access to Health Care Technology, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1737 (1996)
Zach W. Hall & Christopher Scott, University-Industry Partnership, 291 Science 553 (2001)

Resources

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/publications/pupfip/why-no-pupfip

Centre for Internet and Society

National IPR Policy Series : Comments on the Proposed Intellectual Property Rights Policy to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion

I. Preliminary

II. Principles

Interviews with App Developers: [dis]regard towards IPR vs. Patent Hype – Part II

Question 2: “How is your IP protected?”

Patent Valuation and License Fee Determination in Context of Patent Pools

I. Introduction

II. Determination of Patent Value in a Patent Pool

A. Categories of Patents in a Patent Pool

B. Other Factors Determining Patent Value in Context of Patent Pool

C. Role of Independent Evaluator

III. Determination of License Fee for a Patent Pool

A. Pool Dynamics

B. Negotiation Dynamics

C. Terms of License

IV. Methods for Patent Valuation and License Fee Determination

A. Determining an Appropriate Royalty Base

B. Setting Royalty Rates

V. Patent Pool Examples

A. Manufacturers Aircraft Association (MAA)

B. Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG)

C. DVD

D. 3G Mobile Telephony

E. Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG)

VI. Conclusion

Cultural Interests vs. Modernization: Robert Shapiro on IPR & Innovation in India

FDI to spur innovation

IP as a product of cultural decisions

Consequences of a weak IP regime and over-regulation

IPR adoption vs. innovation

The modernization tradeoff

The Game of IPR: Insights from the 6th Global Intellectual Property Convention in Hyderabad

Dictionary words in software patent guidelines puzzle industry

Comments on the Draft Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions

Background

Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low-cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licenses

Hacking, Modding & Making

Patented Games

CIS Comments on the Draft National Policy on Electronics

Technology Transfer

Outflow of Foreign Exchange as Royalties Creating Adverse Balance of Payments

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees payments (current USD)

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees, receipts (current USD)

Linking of Value Chain and Preferential Treatment

Preferential Treatment

Cybersecurity and Source Code

Distinction between Innovation and Intellectual Property

National Electronics Mission

Funding

CIS Submission on Draft Patent Manual 2010

Positive changes in the Manual

A Guide to Key IPR Provisions of the Proposed India-European Union Free Trade Agreement

Arguments Against Software Patents in India

Preamble

What are Patents?

Philosophical Justification Against Software Patents

Legal Case Against Software Patents

Practical Reasons Against Software Patents

Patent Landmines / Submarine Patents / Patent Gridlocks / No Exception for Independent Creation

Don't These Cases Show How Software Patents Help Small Companies?

Term of Patents

Software Industry Progressed Greatly Without Patents

Copyright Exists for Software

Insufficient Disclosure

Software Patents Work Against Free/Libre/Open Source Software

Conclusion

Arguments Against the PUPFIP Bill

Summary

How is the legislation unnecessary?

How is the legislation harmful?

Additional resources

Arguments

How is the legislation unnecessary?

1) The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.

2) Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

How is the legislation harmful?

1) Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retard innovation.

2) The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.

3) Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of "public funded IP".