Centre for Internet and Society

Comments on the Draft Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions

puneeth — 2013-08-02T08:27:03Z

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) submitted the below comments to the office of the Controller General of Patents Designs & Trademarks, Mumbai on July 26, 2013.

July 26, 2013

To,
The Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks
Bhoudhik Sampada Bhavan,
Antop Hill, S. M. Road,
Mumbai - 400 037

Subject: Comments on the Draft Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions
The Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) would like to commend the Office of Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks (“Controller General”) for preparing and inviting comments on the Draft Guidelines on Computer Related Inventions (“Guidelines”). With respect to the Guidelines, CIS would like to submit the following comments:

Background

The patent examiner is the most important link in the chain of patent law as he/she acts as the gatekeeper to defend the boundaries of patent law. This is especially so in the case of CRIs as the debate is centered on the question of the subject matter of patents. We are in full agreement with the position of excluding computer programs per se from patent protection. Especially given that they already qualify for protection under both copyright and trademark law. The question of patenting CRIs is problematic as such inventions have a high rate of obsolence. To avoid this, CRIs need to meet a higher standard during patent examination. It is in this interest that CIS presents the following comments on the Guidelines.

Scope of Section 3(k) , paragraph 2.4:
"Therefore, the re-instatement of the original phraseology of section 3 (k) clearly indicates that the legislature intended to retain the original scope of exclusion and did not approve its widening under this sub-section as attempted through the ordinance."

The Guidelines correctly identify the position of law as regards Section 3(k) and the evolution of the provision through the 2002 and 2004 amendments. However, it does not explain the meaning of the provision with regard to the way it applies to patent examination. The meaning of Section 3(k) is to exclude the grant of patents for computer programs per se based on the subject matter test.

So, the proposition here is that if a patent application were to fall in the category of nonpatentable subject matter, the patent should not be awarded. This should be made clearer for the benefit of prospective patent applicants and examiners. Our submission is that the explanation to Section 3(k) should include the subject matter test.
Definition of “per se”, paragraph 3.11:
The term “per se” is not defined in Indian statutes and hence, for interpretation of this term, the general dictionary meaning may be used.

In our comment on the 2010 Patent Manual, we had asked for clarification on the meaning of the phrase “per se” in Section 3(k).[1] While the Guidelines attempt to clarify the meaning, referring to the dictionary meaning of the phrase creates numerous issues. The phrase per se was first used in the European Patent Convention and the Proposed EU Directive on CRIs where per se was taken to mean on the face of it.

When similar phraseology was used in the Indian Act, some groups felt that this should be interpreted similarly rather than to mean by itself. The Guidelines do refer to the latter meaning. But the issue is with the use of the phrase in the provision and its cumulative meaning. So, it would help if the Guidelines, while explaining the meaning of the phrase also clarify that 3(k) means computer programs by themselves.
Definitions of “algorithm”, “software”, “hardware” and “firmware”, paragraph 3
Once again the Guidelines make reference to the Oxford Dictionary while defining these words. It is understandable that there is some difficulty in defining them as there are no statutes that explicitly define these words. However, the definitions in the Dictionary pertain to general usage and the implications of these words can change based on context. In this regard, it would be useful for the patent examiner to consult an expert while dealing with the usage of these terms or at least use a technical dictionary that defines these words as per their usages in that particular field.
Claims concerning CRIs- subject matter, paragraph 4
This Section correctly identifies the categories under which claims are made in patent applications for CRIs. However, even before making such categories, the applications must be tested on the question of subject matter. As pointed out earlier, if an invention falls outside defined subject matter, it should not be granted a patent.

The number of patents filed has gone up by almost 50% this year[2] and there is a need to dispose off, applications in a speedy but efficient manner. It must also be noted that there have been many cases where business methods and algorithms have been passed off as inventions and granted patents. [3] In order to avoid such errors and reduce transaction costs, it would help to carry out a preliminary subject matter evaluation at the outset.
Examination Procedure, paragraph 5
The examination procedure of patent applications relating to CRIs is common with other inventions to the extent of considering novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability.

The Guidelines suggest that CRIs can be tested on the same standards as other inventions on the above three questions. However, CRIs differ from other inventions. Most CRIs are an incremental innovation on existing CRIs. Many CRIs also become obsolete in a very short time. In the field of data storage for instance, the first CD was invented in 1982, DVD in 1995 and the flash drive in 1999. While each of these inventions was far superior to their predecessor, the time between each incremental innovation has drastically reduced.

If an invention can become obsolete in as little as 2 years, it would make little sense to grant monopoly rights for 20 years. So even if a CRI passes the three tests of novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability, it needs to be evaluated from the perspective of its possible obsolence. In such a scenario, the examiner should look at the history of innovation in that particular field to ascertain that the invention does not become obsolete in a short time.

Inventive Step, paragraph 5.3
(ja) "inventive step" means a feature of an invention that involves technical advance as compared to the existing knowledge or having economic significance or both and that makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art;

The Guidelines quote Section 2(ja) of the Patents Act and refer to the IPAB decision in the Enercon case to explain the meaning of inventive step. But, the meaning of certain terms, like “technical advance” and “person skilled in the art” is unclear.

With respect to “technical advance”, one could infer the meaning from (4) of the quote from the Enercon case (citing Windsurfing and Pozzoli) which reads:
Imputing to a normally skilled but unimaginative addressee what was common general knowledge in the art at the priority date

However, as Prof. NS Gopalakrishnan notes, the standards for what is an inventive step differs based on the industry.[4] For instance, the pharmaceutical industry has a relatively lower standard for inventiveness when compared to other industries.[5] Given the unique nature of CRIs, it is important to clarify to what the standard for inventiveness or the “technical advance” is in this case.

In the same respect, the meaning of “person skilled in the arts” also needs explanation in relation to CRIs. This is especially so since the patentable subject matter as per the Guidelines are software attached to a hardware device. As per the case of Schlumberger v. EMGS[6] before the English Court of Appeals, in case of inventions which involve the “marriage of skills”, a person skilled of arts can be a team of persons. The case also held that the person who judges sufficiency and the person from whose standpoint nonobviousness is judged are different. Given the range of areas that are involved in CRIs, a person skilled of art would have no set description and would more often than not be a team of people.
Ordering of paragraphs 5.4.5 to 5.4.7
These paragraphs deal with the subject matter test. Paragraphs 5.4.5 and 5.4.6 deal with computer programs and the implications of the use of the phrase “per se”. Paragraph 5.4.7 deals with business method, mathematical method and other excluded patents as per law. As argued earlier, the subject matter evaluation needs to be made in the first instance. So a patent examiner must be made aware of the exclusions at first and then the exception or the dilution of such exclusion. These paragraphs seem to accomplish this in the reverse order. For greater clarity we propose that the paragraphs be ordered as: 5.4.7, 5.4.5 followed by 5.4.6.
Flow Chart Showing Procedure of Examination, paragraph 9
The flow chart shows a step by step process of examining CRIs. However, the subject matter determination is done towards the end. There is debate on whether there should be a set order for examining patents. However, in the case of CRIs there must be an exception as the statute explicitly prohibits certain types of patents (business method, algorithm etc). As argued earlier, in order to reduce transaction costs, the subject matter test must be made at the very beginning. There should at least be a preliminary determination as to Section 3(k) to reject patent applications for those inventions that can easily be classified under this provision.

[1]. See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/cis-submission-draft-patent-manual-2010 (Accessed on 23rd July, 2013).

[2]. See http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/science/number-of-patent-applications-up-nearly-50-thisyear/
article4508058.ece (Accessed on 23rd July, 2013).

[3]. See for business method patents granted in India: http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/2013/01/guest-post-whyare-
business-method.html (Accessed on 19th July, 2013).

[4]. NS Gopalakrishnan and TG Agitha, “Principles of Intellectual Property” (1st ed. 2009), at 91.

[5]. Ibid.

[6]. [2010] EWCA Civ 819.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-on-draft-guidelines-for-computer-related-inventions

Comments on Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion Discussion Paper on Standard Essential Patents and their Availability on Frand Terms

Anubha Sinha, Nehaa Chaudhari and Rohini Lakshane — 2016-05-03T02:30:15Z

The Centre for Internet & Society gave its comments to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. The comments were prepared by Anubha Sinha, Nehaa Chaudhari and Rohini Lakshané.

Download the PDF To access other submissions to the DIPP Discussion Paper on SEP and FRAND, please click here

Authors

I. PRELIMINARY

1. This submission presents comments by the Centre for Internet and Society, India ("CIS") on the Discussion Paper on Standard Essential Patents and their Availability on FRAND Terms (dated 01 March, 2016), released by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion ("the DIPP"), Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India (" the discussion paper/ discussion paper").

2. CIS commends the DIPP for its efforts at seeking inputs from various stakeholders on this important and timely issue. CIS is thankful for the opportunity to put forth its views.

3. This submission is divided into three main parts. The first part, 'Preliminary', introduces the document; the second part, 'About CIS', is an overview of the organization; and, the third part, 'Submissions on the Issues', answers the questions raised in the discussion paper. A list of annexures and their URLs is included at the end of the document.

II. ABOUT CIS

4. CIS is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with diverse abilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, freedom of speech and expression, intermediary liability, digital privacy, and cyber-security.

5. CIS values the fundamental principles of justice, equality, freedom and economic development. This submission is consistent with CIS' commitment to these values, the safeguarding of general public interest and the protection of India's national interest at the international level. Accordingly, the comments in this submission aim to further these principles. In addition, the comments are in line with the aims of the Make in India and Digital India initiatives of the Government of India.

III. SUBMISSION ON THE ISSUES FOR RESOLUTION

6. The following sections provide CIS' views and recommendations on the issues enumerated in section 11 of the discussion paper:

a) Whether the existing provisions in the various IPR-related legislations, especially the Patents Act, 1970 and antitrust legislations, are adequate to address the issues related to SEPs and their availability on FRAND terms? If not, then can these issues be addressed through appropriate amendments to such IPR-related legislations? If so, what changes should be affected?

A.1. The issues related to Standard Essential Patents ("SEPs") and their licensing on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory ("FRAND") basis lie at the intersection of intellectual property ("IP") law and competition law . As such, in India, the Patents Act, 1970 ("the Patents Act") and, the Competition Act, 2002 ("the Competition Act") are the relevant legislations to be studied. These have been recently discussed, most recently, by Justice Bakhru in his comprehensive order inTelefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (Publ) v. Competition Commission of India and Another.

A.2. It is our submission that at the moment, amendments to the Patents Act and the Competition Act may not be preferred. As Justice Bakhru has noted in the aforesaid decision, there is no conflict between the remedies in the Patents Act and in the Competition Act, and, the pursuit of rights and remedies under one of these legislations does not bar a party from pursuing rights and remedies in the other. Further, under both legislations, there are scenarios for the respective authorities - the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks ("the Controller") and the Competition Commission of India (" the CCI") for the Patents Act and for the Competition Act respectively - to seek inputs from each other.

A.3. We also note that the CCI is a fairly nascent regulator; one whose jurisdiction is not yet a settled matter of law. While the judgment in the Ericsson-CCI case is indeed a good beginning, we do not believe that the matter has been conclusively decided. Accordingly, given the complex legal questions involved, over not just the interpretation of the Patents Act and the Competition Act, but also constitutional issues around the jurisdiction of regulators and the power of judicial review of the courts, we believe that it would be prudent to examine the ruling of the courts on these issues in some detail, before considering amendments.

A.4. In addition, we are of the opinion that our IP law, and, our competition law, fully honor our international commitments, including the requirements under the TRIPS Agreement. As such, we would urge the Government of India to not enter into free trade agreements including, inter alia, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, that threaten our use of TRIPS flexibilities, and, impose 'TRIPS-plus' obligations.

A.5. We also urge the Government of India to adopt a balanced National IPR Policy, and, a National Competition Policy, both of which has been in abeyance for a considerable amount of time. We believe that these policies are crucial to realize the objectives of the Make in India and Digital India initiatives. At the same time, we submit that these policies be balanced, taking into account the interests of all stakeholders, developed through an extensive consultative process, and, suitably modified based on feedback.

b) What should be the IPR policy of Indian Standard Setting Organizations in developing Standards for Telecommunication sector and other sectors in India where Standard Essential Patents are used?

B.1. The discussion paper identifies four Standard Setting Organizations ("SSOs") in India, namely, the Telecom Standards Development Society of India ("TSDSI"), the Telecommunication Engineering Center ("TEC"), the Bureau of Indian Standards (" BIS"), the Global ICT Standardization Forum for India ("GISFI"), and, the Development Organization of Standards for Telecommunications in India ("DOSTI"). Comments on each of their policies have been made in the following paragraphs.

B.2. The BIS does not have an intellectual property rights ("IPR") policy of its own. The BIS Act, 2016 does not include one either. As the discussion paper notes, the BIS refers to the IPR policies of the relevant international SSO in the context of technology implemented in India, that is the same or equivalent to the ones developed or maintained by the respective SSOs.We recommend that BIS adopt an IPR policy at the earliest, factoring in India specific requirements differences: a large and exponentially growing mobile device market makes it possible for manufacturers, patent owners and implementers alike to achieve financial gains even with a low margin ("India specific requirements"). In addition, our comments on the IPR policy of the TSDSI in paragraph B.4. of this submission (below), may also be considered for the content of the BIS' future policy on IPR.

B.3 . According to the discussion paper, the TEC considers the IPR policies of the International Telecommunication Union. We recommend that like the BIS, the TEC also adopt its own IPR policy, factoring in the India specific requirements detailed above. In addition, our comments on the IPR policy of the TSDSI in paragraph B.4. of this submission (below), may also be considered for the content of the BIS' future policy on IPR.

B.4. The TSDSI, a relatively new standards body, has defined an IPR policy . In respect of this policy, the following observations are presented. First, this policy notes that IPR owners should be adequately and fairly rewarded.Second, it requires members to disclose essential IPRs in a "timely fashion." Third, as per its policy, the TSDSI can request the owner of an essential IPR to undertake, within three months, to license it irrevocably on FRAND terms. At the same time, the policy also states that the (aforesaid) ask may be subject to the condition that licensees agree to reciprocate. Should such an undertaking not be forthcoming, the TSDSI may suspend work on the standard or technical specification in question, or, adopt another course of action. Fourth, the policy identifies two scenarios for the non availability of licences prior to publication, based on the existence, or, the lack thereof, of alternative technologies. In the event of a lack of alternative technology, the policy requires a member to disclose in writing its reasons for not licensing its patents. Following this, it is submitted that there is no clarity on the concrete steps that the TSDSI would adopt in case the efforts to convince a member to license their essential IPRs, fail. The policy only states that "the TSDSI shall take further action as deemed fit." The same is also true where the IPR owner is not a member of the TSDSI. Fifth, the policy also envisages a scenario of non-availability post publication. The procedure for dealing with this is akin to the one detailed above, with the TSDSI asking for a written explanation, considering further action, including the possible withdrawal of the standard or technical specification in question. Sixth, it is observed that the policy does not require a commitment from its members to refrain from seeking injunctive relief. Seventh, it is accordingly recommended that the policy be suitably modified (a) to include India specific requirements discussed above; (b) to require a commitment from its members, that they refrain from seeking injunctive relief; (c) to delete the condition where FRAND negotiations may be subject to a condition of reciprocity; (d) to identify in detail the procedure to be followed in case of patent 'hold-ups' and patent 'hold-outs'; (e) to identify in detail the procedure to be followed in case of refusal to license by TSDSI members, and, non-members, both; and, (f) to include a detailed process on the declassification of a standard or technical specification.

B.5. The IPR policy of GISFI, is substantially similar to the IPR policy of the TSDSI, discussed in paragraph B.4. of this submission (above). Inter alia, GISFI's IPR policy also does not indicate the specific steps to be taken in case an IPR owner refuses to license essential IPRs for which no alternative technology is available. This is true in the cases both, where the refusal is by a member, and, by a non-member. Our recommendations on the IPR policy of the TSDSI in paragraph B.4. of this submission (above), may also be considered for the GISFI's IPR policy.

B.6. According to the discussion paper, the IPR policy of the DOSTI resembles that of the GIFSI. It is submitted that these policies are similar in the context of refusal to license by a member or non-member, and, like the TSDSI and the GISFI, the DOSTI also requires the patent holder to license its IPR irrevocably on FRAND terms. Accordingly, we reiterate our comments on the IPR policy of the TSDSI in paragraph B.4. of this submission (above). The aforesaid recommendations may also be considered to be relevant for the DOSTI's IPR policy.

B.7. We are also of the opinion that it would be useful for Indian SSOs to consider recommending the use of royalty-free licenses for IPRs. Illustratively, the World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C") and the Open Mobile Alliance ("OMA") encourage royalty-free licensing.

c) Whether there is a need for prescribing guidelines on working and operation of Standard Setting Organizations by Government of India? If so, what all areas of working of SSOs should they cover?

C.1. In our opinion, in a milieu where instances of SEP litigation are becoming increasingly complex, and, there is a tangible threat of the abuse of the FRAND process, it might be useful for the Government of India to make suggestions on the working of Indian SSOs.

C.2. It is suggested that the Government of India develop Model Guidelines that may be adopted by Indian SSOs, taking into account India specific requirements, including the ones detailed in paragraph B.2. of this submission (above). We believe that this measure will also enable the fulfilment of the objectives of the Make in India and Digital India initiatives.

C.3. We recommend that various stakeholders, including IP holders, potential licensees and users of IP, civil society organizations, academics, and, government bodies, including the the Indian Patent Office ("IPO"), the Department of Telecommunications, the DIPP, TRAI, and, the CCI be consulted in the creation of these Model Guidelines.

C.4. In our opinion, the Model Guidelines may cover (a) the composition of the SSO; (b) the process of admitting members; (c) the process of the determination of a standard or technical specification; (d) the process of declassification of a standard or technical specification; (e) the IPR Policy; (f) resolution of disputes; (g) applicable law.

d) Whether there is a need for prescribing guidelines on setting or fixing the royalties in respect of Standard Essential Patents and defining FRAND terms by Government of India? If not, which would be appropriate authority to issue the guidelines and what could be the possible FRAND terms?

D.1. In light of the inadequacies in the IPR policies (discussed above) of various SSOs in India, as well the the spate of ongoing patent infringement lawsuits around mobile technologies, we recommend that the Government of India intervene in the setting of royalties and FRAND terms.

D.2. We propose that the Government of India initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and apply a compulsory license with a five per cent royalty. Further details of this proposal have been enumerated in answer to question 'f' of the discussion paper (below).

D.3. Our motivations for this proposal are many-fold. In our opinion, it is near-impossible for potential licensees to avoid inadvertent patent infringement. As a part of our ongoing research on technical standards applicable to mobile phones sold in India, we have found nearly 300 standards so far . It is submitted that carrying out patent searches for all the standards would be extremely expensive for potential licensees. Further, even if such searches were to be carried out, different patent owners, SSOs and potential licensees disagree on valuation, essentiality, enforceability, validity, and coverage of patents. In addition, some patent owners are non-practising entities ("NPEs") and may not be members of SSOs. The patents held by them are not likely to be disclosed. More importantly, home-grown manufacturers that have no patents to leverage and may be new entrants in the market would be especially disadvantaged by such a scenario. Budget phone manufacturers, standing to incur losses either as a result of heavy licensing fees, or, potential litigation, may close down. Alternatively, they may pass on their losses to consumers, driving the now-affordable phones out of their financial reach. With the objectives of Make in India and Digital India in sight, it is essential that Indian consumers continue to have access to devices within their purchasing power.

e) On what basis should the royalty rates in SEPs be decided? Should it be based on Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Component (SSPPC), or on the net price of the Downstream Product, or some other criterion?

E.1. It is our submission that royalty rates for SEPs should be based on the smallest saleable patent practising component ("SSPPC"). Most modern telecommunication and IT devices are complex with numerous technologies working in tandem. Different studies indicate that the number of patents in the US applicable to smartphones is between 200,000 and 250,000. A comprehensive patent landscape of mobile device technologies conducted by CIS reveals that nearly 4,000 patents are applicable to mobile phones sold in India. It is thus extremely difficult to quantify the exact extent of interaction and interdependence between technologies in any device, in such a way that the exact contribution of the patented technology to the entire device can be determined.

E.2. The net cost of the device is almost always several times that of the chipset that implements the patented technology. Armstrong et al have found that the cost of a 4G baseband chip costs up to $20 including royalties in a hypothetical $400 phone sold in the US. One of the litigating parties in the ongoing patent infringement lawsuits in India has stated that one of the reasons for preferring to leverage its patents as downstream as possible in the value chain is that it will earn the company more royalties . In instances where patent exhaustion occurs much earlier in the value chain, such as in the case of the company's cross-licenses with Qualcomm (another company that owns patents to chip technologies), the company does not try to obtain royalties from the selling prices of devices for the cross-licensed technologies. It is submitted that such market practices could be detrimental to the government's objectives such as providing a mobile handset to every Indian by 2020 as a part of the Digital India programme . It is also worth noting in this context that the mobile device is the first and only medium of access to the Internet and telecom services for a large number of Indians, and, consequently, the only gateway to access to knowledge, information and critical services, including banking.

E.3. The discussion paper notes that J. Gregory Sidak, having studied the proceedings before the Delhi High Court, approved of the manner in which the court determined royalties. In his paper, Sidak(2015) notes that in determining royalties, the court relied, inter alia, on the decision of CSIRO v.Cisco ("the CSIRO case"), a 2015 decision of the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 2015. We humbly disagree with the opinion of the Delhi High Court on the manner of determining royalties, and, with Sidak's approval of the same.

E.4. It is our submission that the CSIRO case relied on a previous judgment, which we disagree with. The decision, a 2014 district court judgment, analogises the determination of royalties on SEPs to the determination of royalties on a copyrighted book. The court notes, "[b]asing a royalty solely on chip price is like valuing a copyrighted book based only on the costs of the binding, paper, and ink needed to actually produce the physical product. While such a calculation captures the cost of the physical product, it provides no indication of its actual value." In our opinion, this analogy is flawed. While a book is a distinct product as a whole, a mobile phone is a sum-total of its parts. If at all, a mobile phone could be compared with a book with several authors, as multiple technologies belonging to several patent holders are implemented in it. This judgement bases valuation for one set of technologies on the whole device, thus awarding compensation to the licensor even for those technologies implemented in the device that are not related to the licensed technologies. In our opinion, charging royalty on the net selling price of a device for one technology or one set of technologies is thus more like a referral scheme and less like actual compensation for the value added. Accordingly, royalties must be charged on the SSPPC principle.

f) Whether total payment of royalty in case of various SEPs used in one product should be capped? If so, then should this limit be fixed by Government of India or some other statutory body or left to be decided among the parties?

F.1. CIS has proposed a compulsory licensing fee of five per cent on a patent pool of critical mobile technologies. The rationale for this figure is the royalty cap imposed by India in the early 1990s.

F.2. As part of regulating foreign technology agreements, the (former) Department of Industrial Development (later merged with the DIPP) capped royalty rates in the early 1990s. Payment of royalties was capped at either a lump sum payment of $2 million, or, 5 percent on the royalty rates charged for domestic sale, and, 8 percent for export of goods pertaining to "high priority industries". Royalties higher than 5 percent or 8 percent, as the case may be, required securing approval from the government.

F.3. While the early 1990s (specifically, 1991) was too early for the mobile device manufacturing industry to be listed among high priority industries, the public announcement by the government covered computer software, consumer electronics, and electrical and electronic appliances for home use. The cap on royalty rates was lifted by the DIPP in 2009.

F.4. It is submitted in the case of mobile device technology, we are witnessing a situation similar to that of the 1990s. In this sphere, most of the patent holders are multinational corporations which results in large royalty amounts leaving India. At the same time, in our opinion, litigation over patent infringement in India has limited the manufacture and sale of mobile devices of homegrown brands.

F.5. We believe that the aforementioned developments are detrimental to the Make in India and Digital India initiatives of the Government of India, and, the government's aim of encouraging local manufacturing, facilitating indigenous innovation, as well as strengthening India's intellectual property regime. It is our submission, therefore, that the payment of royalties on SEPs be capped.

F.6. We submit that such a measure is particularly important, given the nature of SEP litigation in India. While SEP litigation in India is indeed comparable to international SEP litigation on broader issues raised, specifically competition law concerns, but differs crucially where the parties are concerned. International SEP litigation is largely between multinational corporations with substantial patent portfolios, capable of engaging in long drawn out litigations, or engaging in other strategies including setting off against each other's patent portfolios. Dynamics in the Indian market differ - with a larger SEP holder litigating against smaller manufacturers, many of whom are indigenous, home-grown.

F.7. In June, 2013, we had recommended to the erstwhile Hon'ble Minister for Human Resource Development that a patent pool of essential technologies be established, with the compulsory licensing mechanism. Subsequently, in February, 2015, we reiterated this request to the Hon'ble Prime Minister. We propose that the Government of India initiate the formation of a patent pool of critical mobile technologies and mandate a five percent compulsory license. As we have stated in our request to the Hon'ble Prime Minister, we believe that such a pool would "possibly avert patent disputes by ensuring that the owners' rights are not infringed on, that budget manufacturers are not put out of business owing to patent feuds, and that consumers continue to get access to inexpensive mobile devices. Several countries including the United States issue compulsory licenses on patents in the pharmaceutical, medical, defence, software, and engineering domains for reasons of public policy, or to thwart or correct anti-competitive practices."

F.8. We believe that such a measure is not in breach of our international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.

g) Whether the practice of Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA) leads to misuse of dominant position and is against the FRAND terms?

G.1. The issue of Non Disclosure Agreements ("NDAs") in SEP/FRAND litigation is a contentious one. Patent holders argue that they are essential to the license negotiation process to protect confidential information, whereas potential licensees submit that NDAs result in the imposition of onerous conditions.

G.2. In India's SEP litigation, the use of NDAs has been raised as an issue in at least two cases - separately by Intex and by iBall , in their cases against Ericsson. Intex and iBall have both claimed that the NDAs that Ericsson asked them to sign were onerous, and favoured Ericsson.

G.3. According to Intex, the NDA in question would result in high legal costs for Intex, and, would render it unable to disclose crucial information to its vendors (who had agreed to supply to Intex on the condition that Intex was not infringing on any patents).

G.4. According to iBall, the parties had agreed to enter a global patent license agreement ("GPLA") but Ericsson insisted on an NDA. Upon receiving the terms of the NDA, iBall claimed before the CCI that Ericsson's refusal to identify the allegedly infringed SEPs; the threat of patent infringement proceedings; the attempt to coax iBall to enter into a "one-sided and onerous NDA"; the tying and bundling patents irrelevant to iBall's products by way of a GPLA; demanding unreasonably high royalties by way of a certain percentage value of handset as opposed to the cost of actual patented technology used all constituted abuse of Ericsson's dominant position under Section 4 of the Competition Act.

G.5. In India, the law on misuse (abuse) of dominant position by an 'enterprise' is found primarily in Section 4 of the Competition Act (read with Section 2(h) of the Competition Act, which defines 'enterprise'). In its recent decision in the Ericsson-CCI case , the Delhi High Court has found Ericsson to be an 'enterprise' for the purposes of the Competition Act, and hence subject to an inquiry under Section 4 of the same legislation. In the same decision, the court has also recognised the jurisdiction of the CCI to examine Ericsson's conduct for abuse of behaviour, based on complaints by Micromax and Intex. The use of NDAs is one of the grounds on which the parties have complained to the CCI.

G.6. Pending a final determination by the CCI (and subsequent appeals), it would be premature to make an absolute claim on whether the use of NDAs results in an abuse of dominant position in all instances. However, the following submissions are made: First, the determination of misuse/abuse of dominant position is influenced by a number of factors , i.e., such a determination should be made on a case to case basis. Second, the market regulator, the CCI, is best situated to determine (a) abuse of dominance, and (b) whether the use of NDAs by an enterprise constitutes an abuse of its dominance. Third, the question of whether the use of NDAs constitutes misuse of dominance needs to be addressed in two parts - (a) whether the use of the NDA itself is abusive, irrespective of its terms and, (b) whether the use of certain specific terms renders the NDA abusive. Fourth, NDAs could potentially lead to the patent owner abusing its dominant position in the market, as well as result in an invalidation of FRAND commitments and terms. NDAs make it impossible to determine if a patent holder is engaging in discriminatory licensing practices. Fifth, NDAs are especially harmful in the case of NPEs-- companies that hold patents and monetise them but don't build or manufacture the components or devices that implement the technology associated with the patents.

h) What should be the appropriate mode and remedy for settlement of disputes in matters related to SEPs, especially while deciding FRAND terms? Whether Injunctions are a suitable remedy in cases pertaining to SEPs and their availability on FRAND terms?

H.1. The licensing of SEPs on FRAND terms requires the parties to negotiate "reasonable" royalty rates in good faith, and apply the terms uniformly to all willing licensees. It is our submission that if the parties cannot agree to FRAND terms, they may enter into binding arbitration. Further, if all efforts fail, there exist remedies under the Patents Act and the Competition Act, 2002 to address the issues.

H.2. Section 115 of the Patents Act empowers the court to appoint an independent scientific adviser " to assist the court or to inquire and report upon any such question of fact or of opinion (not involving a question of interpretation of law) as it may formulate for the purpose. " Such an independent adviser may inform the court on the technical nuances of the matter.

H.3. Further, under the Patents Act, pending the decision of infringement proceedings the Court may provide interim relief, if the plaintiff proves first, a prima facie case of infringement; second, that the balance of convenience tilts in plaintiff's favour; and, third, that if an injunction is not granted the plaintiff shall suffer irreparable damage. H.4. However, it is our suggestion that courts adopt a more cautious stance towards granting injunctions in the field of SEP litigation. First, in our opinion, injunctions may prove to be a deterrent to arrive at a FRAND commitment, in particular, egregiously harming the willing licensee. Second, especially in the Indian scenario, where litigating parties operate in vastly different price segments (thereby targeting consumers with different purchasing power), it is difficult to establish that "irreparable damage" has been caused to the patent owner on account of infringement. Third, we note the approach of the European Court of Justice, which prohibited the patent holder from enforcing an injunction provided a willing licensee makes an offer for the price it wishes to pay to use a patent under the condition that it deposited an amount in the bank as a security for the patent holder. Fourth, we also note the approach of the Federal Trade Commission in the USA, which only authorizes patent holders to seek injunctive relief against potential licensees who have either stated that they will not license a patent on any terms, or refuse to enter into a license agreement on terms that have been set in the final ruling of a court or arbitrator. Further, as Contreras (2015) observes, that the precise boundaries of what constitutes as an unwilling licensee remains to be seen. We observe a similar ambiguity in Indian jurisprudence, and accordingly submit that courts should carefully examine the conduct of the licensee to injunct them from the alleged infringement.

i) What steps can be taken to make the practice of Cross-Licensing transparent so that royalty rates are fair & reasonable?

I.1. The Patents Act requires patentees and licensees to submit a statement on commercial working of the invention to the Controller every year. Form 27 under section 146(2) of the Act lists the details necessary to be disclosed for compliance of the requirement of "working". A jurisprudential analysis reveals the rationale and objective behind this mandatory requirement. Undeniably, the scheme of the Indian patent regime makes it amply clear that "working" is a very important requirement, and the public as well as competitors have a right to access this information in a timely manner, without undue hurdles. Indeed, as the decision in Natco Pharma v. Bayer Corporation reveals, the disclosures in Form 27 were crucial to determining the imposition of a compulsory license on the patentee. Thus, broadly, Form 27 disclosures can critically enable willing licensees to access patent "working" information in a timely manner.

I.2. However, there has been little compliance of this requirement by the patentees, despite the IPO reiterating the importance of compliance through the issuance of multiple public notices (suo motu and in response to a public interest litigation filed in 2011 ), and, reminding the patentees that non-compliance is punishable with a heavy fine. Findings of research submitted by one of the parties in the writ of the 2011 public interest litigationShamnad Basheer v. Union of India and others reveal as follows. First, a large number of Form 27s are unavailable for download from the website of the IPO. This possibly indicates that the forms have either not been filed by the patentees with the IPO, or have not been uploaded (yet) by the IPO. Second, a large number of filings in the telecom sector remain incomplete.

I.3. In 2015, CIS queried the IPO website for Form 27s of nearly 4,400 patents. CIS' preliminary research (ongoing and unpublished) echoes findings similar to the ones disclosed in the case discussed in paragraph I.2. of this submission (above).

I.4. In view of the submissions above, CIS makes the following recommendations to make the practice of cross-licensing transparent so that royalty rates are fair & reasonable: first, that there be a strict enforcement of the submission of Form 27s on a regular and timely basis by the patentees; and, second, that guidelines may be drawn up on whether it was discriminatory to charge no royalties (whether on the SSPPU or on the whole device) for a patent holder in a cross-licensing arrangement with another, when it charges royalty on the selling price of the device from a non-cross-licensor.

j) What steps can be taken to make the practice of Patent Pooling transparent so that royalty rates are fair & reasonable?

J.1. Patent pools can be understood as an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or to third parties. Thus, the creation of a patent pool makes use of the legal instrument of licensing, similar to the practice of cross-licensing. Insofar, we reiterate our recommendations made in paragraph I.3. of this submission (above), which apply to the answer to the instant question.

J.2. In furtherance of the recommendation above, we also propose the alteration of the Form 27 template to include more disclosures. Presently, patentees are required to to declare number of licensees and sub-licensees. We specifically propose that the format of Form 27 filings be modified to include patent pool licenses, with an explicit declaration of the names of the licensees and not just the number.

J.3. It is also our submission that patent pools be required to offer FRAND licenses on the same terms to both members and non-members of the pool.

k) How should it be determined whether a patent declared as SEP is actually an Essential Patent, particularly when bouquets of patents are used in one device?

K.1. We submit that several studies on the essentiality of SEPs indicate that only a small percentage of SEPs are actually essential. A study conducted byGoodman and Myers (2004) showed that only 21% of SEPs pertaining to the 3G standard in the US were deemed to be actually essential. Another study conducted by the same authors in 2009 for WCDMA patents showed that 28% SEPs were essential.

K.2. In our opinion, first, the methodology adopted by Goodman and Myers could be replicated to determine the "essential" nature of an SEP. Second, while adopting their methodology, it would be useful to address some of the issues over which these studies were critiqued. Accordingly, we suggest that (a) laboratory tests may be conducted by an outside expert or by a commercial testing laboratory, and not at an in-house facility owned by either parties, so as to eliminate in the lab results; and, (b) expert opinions may be considered in order to determine essentiality.

l) Whether there is a need of setting up of an independent expert body to determine FRAND terms for SEPs and devising methodology for such purpose?

L.1. In our opinion, there is no need for an independent expert body to determine FRAND terms for SEPs and devising the methodology for such a purpose. The existing legal and regulatory framework is reasonably equipped to determine FRAND terms. A more detailed submission on the existing framework and suggested changes has been made in our answer to question 'a' of the discussion paper (above).

L.2. However, we observe that Indian courts, tribunals and the CCI are yet to endorse a methodology for making FRAND determinations. The judgments of the Delhi High Court do not provide a conclusive rationale or methodology for the imposition of royalty rates in the respective matters.

L.3. We submit that in the absence of definitive Indian jurisprudence for determination of FRAND terms, American jurisprudence provides certain guidance. Contreras (2015) informs us about the various case law American courts and regulators have developed and adhered to whilst making such determinations.The dominant analytical framework for determining "reasonable royalty" patent damages in the United States today was set out in 1970 by the District Court for the Southern District of New York in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp . While this may be used as a guiding framework, the question of methodology remains far from settled.

m) If certain Standards can be met without infringing any particular SEP, for instance by use of some alternative technology or because the patent is no longer in force, what should be the process to declassify such a SEP?

M.1. In our opinion, if a standard can be met without infringing a patent declared to be "essential" to it, then the patent is not actually "essential". In this instance, the methods suggested in response to question 'k' of the discussion paper (above) could be used to declassify the SEP.

M.2. We further submit that if a patent is no longer in force, that is, if it has expired, then it ceases to be patent, and therefore an SEP. The process to declassify such an SEP could be simply to declare it an expired patent.

M.3. In addition, if it is possible to implement a certain standard by using an alternative technology, then the SEP for such a standard is not actually an SEP. However, the scale of operations and that of mass manufacturing and compatibility requirements in devices and infrastructure mean that it is unlikely to have different methods of implementing the same standard.

M.4. In general, it is our submission that an Indian SSO could maintain a publicly accessible database of SEPs found to be invalid or non-essential in India.

7. We reiterate our gratitude to the DIPP for the opportunity to make these submissions. In addition to our comments above, we have shared some of our research on this issue, in the 'Annexures', below.

8. It would be our pleasure and privilege to discuss these comments with the DIPP; and, supplement these with further submissions if necessary. We also offer our assistance on other matters aimed at developing a suitable policy framework for SEPs and FRAND in India, and, working towards the sustained innovation, manufacture and availability of mobile technologies in India.

On behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, 22 April, 2016

Anubha Sinha - anubha@cis-india.org | Nehaa Chaudhari - nehaa@cis-india.org

Rohini Lakshané - rohini@cis-india.org

___________________________________________________________________________

___________________________________________________________________________

ANNEXURES

___________________________________________________________________________

● Anubha Sinha, Fuelling the Affordable Smartphone Revolution in India, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/digital-asia-hub-the-good-life-in-asias-21-st-century-anubha-sinha-fueling-the-affordable-smartphone-revolution-in-india (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Nehaa Chaudhari, Standard Essential Patents on Low-Cost Mobile Phones in India: A Case to Strengthen Competition Regulation?, available at http://www.manupatra.co.in/newsline/articles/Upload/08483340-C1B9-4BA4-B6A9-D6B6494391B8.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Nehaa Chaudhari, Pervasive Technologies:Patent Pools, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-pools (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Nehaa Chaudhari, The Curious Case of the CCI:Competition Law and SEP Regulation in India, presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-curious-case-of-the-cci-competition-law-and-sep-regulation-in-indi a (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Nehaa Chaudhari, Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low Cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licences, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Prof Jorge L. Contreras and Rohini Lakshané, Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756486 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, CIS, List of technical standards and IP types (Working document), available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8SgjShAjhbtaml5eW50bS01d2s/view?usp=sharing (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, Open Letter to Prime Minister Modi, February 2015, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/open-letter-to-prime-minister-modi (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, FAQ: CIS' proposal to form a patent pool of critical mobile technology, September 2015, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/faq-cis-proposal-for-compulsory-licensing-of-critical-mobile-technologies (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, Joining the dots in India's big-ticket mobile phone patent litigation, May 2015, last updated October 2015, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/joining-the-dots-in-indias-big-ticket-mobile-phone-patent-litigation (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, Compilation of Mobile Phone Patent Litigation Cases in India, March 2015, last updated April 2016, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/compilation-of-mobile-phone-patent-litigation-cases-in-india , (last accessed April 22, 2016).

● Rohini Lakshané, Patent landscaping in the Indian Mobile Device Marketplace, presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and Public Interest, December 2015, available at https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B8SgjShAjhbtME45N245SmowOGs (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

● Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva, Patent Valuation and Licence Fee Determination in the Context of Patent Pools, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/patent-valuation-and-license-fee-determination-in-context-of-patent-pools (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

************

This submission has been authored by (alphabetically) Anubha Sinha, Nehaa Chaudhari and Rohini Lakshané, on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, India.

See The Centre for Internet and Society, available at http://cis-india.org (last accessed 22 April, 2016) for details of the organization, and, our work.

Make in India, available at http://www.makeinindia.com/home (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Digital India, available at http://www.digitalindia.gov.in/ (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

See Nehaa Chaudhari, The Curious Case of the CCI:Competition Law and SEP Regulation in India, presented at the 4th Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-curious-case-of-the-cci-competition-law-and-sep-regulation-in-india (last accessed 21 April, 2016) for further details on relevant provisions.

In the High Court of Delhi, W.P.(C) 464/2014 & CM Nos. 911/2014 & 915/2014, judgment delivered on 30 March, 2016. Hereafter referred to as the Ericsson-CCI judgment.

Id.

Under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, and, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, for the High Courts and the Supreme Court, respectively.

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

KEI Staff, 2015 October 15 version: RCEP IP Chapter, available at http://keionline.org/node/2472 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

BIS Act, 2016, available at http://www.bis.org.in/bs/bsindex.asp (last accessed 21 April, 2016).

TSDSI, Intellectual Property Rights Policy, available at http://www.tsdsi.org/media/Help/2014-12-17/TSDSI-PLD-40-V1.0.0-20141217.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Id at Clause 3.1.

Id at Clause 5.1.

Id at Clause 5.2.

Id at Clause 5.5.

Id at Clauses 7.1. and 7.2.

Id at Clause 7.2.1.a (iii).

Id at Clause 7.2.1.b(iii).

Id at Clause 7.3.

GISFI, Intellectual Property Rights Policy, available at http://www.gisfi.org/ipr_policy/gisfi_intellectual_property_righ.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Id at Clauses 6.2.1.a(iii) and 6.2.1.b(iii).

See W3C, Patent Policy, available at https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/ (last accessed 22 April, 2016) for more details on their royalty-free licences.

See OMA, Use Agreement, available at http://openmobilealliance.org/about-oma/policies-and-terms-of-use/use-agreement/ (last accessed 22 April, 2016) for more details on their royalty-free licences.

See Rohini Lakshané, Open Letter to PM Modi, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/open-letter-to-prime-minister-modi (last accessed 22 April, 2016) for further details of CIS' proposal.

Rohini Lakshané, CIS, List of Technical Standards and IP Types (Working document), available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8SgjShAjhbtaml5eW50bS01d2s/view?usp=sharing (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. at 2015; See also, for e.g., RPX Corporation, Amendment No. 3 to Form S-l, 11 Apr. 2011, at 59, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1509432/000119312511101007/ds1a.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016), quoting - "Based on our research, we believe there are more than 250,000 active patents relevant to today's smartphones…".; See further Steve Lohr, Apple- Samsung Case Shows Smartphone as Legal Magnet, New York Times, 25 Aug. 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/technology/apple-samsung-case-shows-smartphone-as-lawsuit-magnet.html (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Jorge L. Contreras and Rohini Lakshané, Patents and Mobile Devices in India: An Empirical Survey, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756486 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Ann Armstrong, Joseph J. Mueller and Timothy D. Syrett, The Smartphone- Royalty Stack:Surveying Royalty Demands for the Components Within Modern Smartphones, available at https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/Documents/The-Smartphone-Royalty-Stack-Armstrong-Mueller-Syrett.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Florian Mueller, Ericsson Explained Publicly why it Collects Patent Royalties from Device (Not Chipset) Makers, available at http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/01/ericsson-explained-publicly-why-its.html (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Romit Guha and Anandita Singh Masinkotia, PM Modi's Digital India Project:Government to Ensure that Every Indian has a Smartphone by 2019, available at http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-08-25/news/53205445_1_digital-india-india-today-financial-services (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Nehaa Chaudhari, Standard Essential Patents on Low-Cost Mobile Phones in India: A Case to Strengthen Competition Regulation?, available at http://www.manupatra.co.in/newsline/articles/Upload/08483340-C1B9-4BA4-B6A9-D6B6494391B8.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

See part 10.2.2. of the Discussion Paper, at page 25.

J.Gregory Sidak, FRAND in India:The Delhi High Court's Emerging Jurisprudence on Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, available at http://jiplp.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/06/11/jiplp.jpv096.full (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in No. 6:11-cv-00343-LED, decided on 03 December, 2015, available at. http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/15-1066.Opinion.12-1-2015.1.PDF (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Id.

Kumkum Sen, News on Royalty Payments Brings Cheer in New Year, available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/news-on-royalty-payment-brings-cheer-in-new-year-110010400044_1.html (last accessed 21 April, 2016).

See Sanjana Govil, Putting a Lid on Royalty Outflows- How the RBI Can Help Reduce India's IP Costs, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/lid-on-royalty-outflows (last accessed 21 April, 2016), for a discussion on the introduction of royalty caps in the early 1990s, and its success in reducing the flow of money out of India.

Supra note 33.

Nehaa Chaudhari, Letter for Establishment of Patent Pool for Low-cost Access Devices through Compulsory Licenses, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/letter-for-establishment-of-patent-pool-for-low-cost-access-devices (last accessed 21 April, 2016).

Supra note 26.

Rohini Lakshané, FAQ: CIS' proposal to form a patent pool of critical mobile technology, September 2015, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/faq-cis-proposal-for-compulsory-licensing-of-critical-mobile-technologies (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Id.

See the Ericsson-CCI case, supra note 6, for Intex's submissions as discussed by Justice Bakhru.

Id.

Rohini Lakshané, Compilation of Mobile Phone Patent Litigation Cases in India, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/compilation-of-mobile-phone-patent-litigation-cases-in-india (last accessed 21 April, 2016).

See the Ericsson-CCI case, supra note 6, at paragraph 19.2.

Supra note 47.

See the Ericsson-CCI judgment, supra note 6, at paragraphs 88-105.

Section 19(4) of the Competition Act. See also Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India and Another, (2010) 10 SCC 744.

Section 115 of the Patents Act, 1970.

Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp. and ZTE Deutschland, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 16 July 2015 in GmbH C-170/13.

Third Party United States Fed. Trade Commission's Statement on the Public Interest, In re Certain Wireless Communication Devices, Portable Music and Data Processing Devices, Computers and Components Thereof, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Inv. No. 337-TA-745 (Jun. 6, 2012).

Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing Current Debates in Standard Setting and Antitrust Through a Historical Lens, 80 Antitrust Law Journal 39 (2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2374983 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2374983 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Section 146(2) of the Patents Act, 1970..

Sai Vinod, Patent Office Finally Takes Form 27s Seriously, available at http://spicyip.com/2013/02/patent-office-finally-takes-form-27s.html (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Order No. 45/2013 (Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai), available at http://www.ipab.tn.nic.in/045-2013.htm (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Intellectual Property India, Public Notice, available at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/iponew/publicNotice_Form27_12Feb2013.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016) and Intellectual Property India, Public Notice, available at http://ipindia.nic.in/iponew/publicNotice_24December2009.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Supra note 57.

Id.

See research findings available at http://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FORM-27-WP-1R-copy.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

In the High Court of Delhi, W.P.(C) 5590/2015. This litigation is currently ongoing. See, illustratively, Mathews P. George, Patent Working in India: Delhi HC issues notice in Shamnad Basheer v. Union of India & Ors. - I, available at http://spicyip.com/2015/09/patent-working-in-india-delhi-hc-issues-notice-in-shamnad-basheer-v-union-of-india-ors-i.html (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

In response to an RTI request made to the IPO in Mumbai for forms unavailable on the website, CIS received a reply stating, "As thousand [sic] of Form -27 are filed in this office, it is very difficult to segregate Form-27 for the patent numbers enlisted in your RTI application as it needs diversion of huge official staff/ manpower and it will affect day to day [sic] work of this office." This research is ongoing and unpublished. Please contact us for a copy of the RTI application and the response received.

WIPO Secretariat, Patent Pools and Antitrust - A Comparative Analysis, available at https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wipo.int%2Fexport%2Fsites%2Fwww%2Fip-competition%2Fen%2Fstudies%2Fpatent_pools_report.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Form 27, The Patents Act, available at http://ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/manual/HTML%20AND%20PDF/Manual%20of%20Patent%20Office%20Practice%20and%20Procedure%20-%20html/Forms/Form-27.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

David J. Goodman and Robert A. Myers, 3G Cellular Standards and Patents, available at http://patentlyo.com/media/docs/2009/03/wirelesscom2005.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Darien CT, Review of Patents Declared as Essential to WCDMA through December, 2008, available at http://www.frlicense.com/wcdma1.pdf (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Supra note 67.

Donald L. Martin and Carl De Meyer, Patent Counting, a Misleading Index of Patent Value: A Critique of Goodman & Myers and its Uses, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=949439 (last accessed 22 April, 2016).

Rohini Lakshané, Joining the Dots in India's Big-Ticket Mobile Phone Patent Litigation, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/joining-the-dots-in-indias-big-ticket-mobile-phone-patent-litigation (last accessed 22 April, 2016). See also supra note 47 for more details.

Supra note 55.

318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and aff'd, 446 F. 2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).

2015

They filed it in 2011

The 2011 filing only includes pharma, BTW: http://spicyip.com/docs/Form%2027s.pdf. Also, this writ is from May 2015: http://spicyip.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/FORM-27-WP-1R-copy.pdf Anyway, I'll leave it as it is.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-on-department-of-industrial-policy-and-promotion-discussion-paper-on-standard-essential-patents-and-their-availability-on-frand-terms

Comments and Suggestions to the Draft Patent Manual March 2019

Achal Prabhala, Feroz Ali, Ramya Sheshadri, Roshan John and Anubha Sinha — 2019-04-05T02:15:07Z

A coordinated civil society response to the consultation on the Patent Manual. CIS provided comments on patenting of computer related inventions.

On behalf of the accessibsa project (www.accessibsa.org), the Médecins Sans Frontières Access Campaign (https://msfaccess.org/) and the Centre for Internet and Society (www.cis-india.org) , as well as numerous endorsing organisations and individuals across Indian Civil Society, we are pleased to present our comments, feedback and suggestions on the draft Manual of Patent Office Practice and Procedure, Version 3, published on 1 March 2019, to which your office invited comment from all stakeholders.

The Indian Patent Office (IPO) on 1 March 2019, published a draft of the “Manual of Patent Office Practice and Procedure, Version 3.0” (hereafter, the “Manual”). This draft extends upon the previous Manual, Version 01.11, dated 22 March 2011, which is currently the Manual in force.

At the outset, we should note that the current draft Manual does not differ substantially from the version in force. Aside from a few updations (for instance, noting the Indian Supreme Court decision in the Novartis case of 2013, as regarding Section 3(d) of Indian patent law), the current Manual under consideration is similar in most aspects to the Manual in force. However, given that several provisions in the current Manual in force were insufficient to implement Indian patent law as it was intended even in 2011, as well as the fact that there have been numerous developments in law, scholarship and practice since the time the Manual was last updated in 2011, we urge the IPO to take this opportunity to reflect upon the developments in patent law and practice, as well as the extensive scholarship now available to us.

Preamble: Indian patent law was substantially amended in 2005, and we began the process of implementing this law a few years later. Today, in 2019, we have data and evidence from almost 14 years of practice, and we suggest that the IPO fully incorporate all learnings available to us, to bring the full force of Indian patent

law into effect, as originally intended. The Manual of the Patent Office has the potential to be a comprehensive handbook on implementing patent law for all stakeholders including patent agents, applicants and the courts. The current version, in the manner proposed, is not. Our suggestions, if adopted in entirety, would make this so: furthermore, our suggestions provide a much-needed opportunity to correct course, by understanding and correcting the failures of the system to implement the original and far-sighted provisions in the Indian patent law amendment of 2005.

Overarching themes: Several of our suggestions for the current Manual under consideration are systemic, and, as such, require broad and serious attention to completely overhaul.

Structure: The Manual under consideration is badly composed and incomplete. Tabular columns are an inappropriate format for a patent manual. Furthermore and separately, the IPO makes use of several instances of “Guidelines” when examining patents. The IPO currently consults, among others, Guidelines for pharmaceuticals, biotechnology and computer related inventions. These guidelines are randomly categorized, badly deployed, hard to locate and amended haphazardly, without notice or any attention. There is no excuse for the IPO Guidelines to not form a part of the Patent Office Manual, thus giving them stability, and subjecting them to a transparent and participative process, like the rest of the Manual. Lastly, the Guidelines should evolve to covering the examination of Biologics as a distinct category, as we should with other frontier technology, such as Artificial Intelligence and Synthetic Biology.

Coherence: We have three inter-locking layers in the patent system in India: the patents act, the patent rules and the patent manual (which should incorporate the patent examination guidelines). The IPO is currently soliciting suggestions for the draft Patent Office Manual, while it has an ongoing amendment to the Patents (Amendment) Rules, 2018. We expect the final Rules to be published shortly; however, we are also being asked to provide suggestions on the Manual, without any knowledge of what the IPO’s final version of the Rules will look like. (For instance, the Patent Rules have suggested a procedural change in how pre-grant patent oppositions will be conducted in India; however, since the Rules are not final, it is unclear how they integrate with the Manual, and how we can comment on the process, since the status of the Patent Rules remains unclear). Furthermore, the Manual makes no reference to the Rules. As such, the IPO should decide and publish a final version of the Rules, and only then solicit feedback on the Manual (which it could do in the current time by extending the date of feedback on the Manual). Regardless, the IPO must achieve coherence and cohesion between its many layers, including the patents act, the patent rules, and the patent manual. This coherence, if achieved, would allow the Manual to serve as a handbook for all stakeholders involved in the patent system, including serving as a basis for open-book exams for patent agents.

Updation: Patent law and practice are fast evolving fields. The IPO necessarily needs to keep up with the pace of technology, as well as evolving interpretations of existing patent law provisions. For instance, the Indian Supreme judgment in the Novartis case was announced in 2013; however, it has taken over 6 years for this important judgment to formally reflect in the work of the Patent Office Manual, despite being Indian law for these 6 years. The IPO, therefore, needs to update the Manual and the examination guidelines, frequently – at least as frequently as major events in technology and the law require.

Transparency & Accountability: In the current time, stakeholders in the Indian patent system, be they multinational corporations or ordinary members of Indian society, are faced with considerable challenges when attempting to view patent information. Despite the IPO having made information

available online for some years, the information on Indian patents is needlessly limited, often inaccurate, often incomplete, and frequently unavailable. On occasion, this is due to insufficient disclosure on the part of the applicant, but overwhelmingly, it is because the IPO is not well organized and insufficiently invested in transparency or accountability. For instance, mandating pharmaceutical patent applicants to provide an INN (International non-proprietary name) on all applications where the information is available, would invaluably assist in extending the transparency and utility of the IPO’s functioning with the Indian public. Patent information in India is the right of every Indian citizen to have, and we have made several suggestions by which the IPO can move towards complying with our constitutional right to information.

Specific themes: Drawing from law, scholarship and practice over the last 14 years of Indian patent law, we strongly urge the IPO to consider these very specific suggestions on having their work comply with the spirit and letter of Indian patent law.

Focus on Biologics: Biologics are a relatively new category of therapy that have quickly become the world’s most expensive medicines emerging as critical therapies in areas like cancer. 7 out of 10 of the world’s best-selling medicines are biologics, and they will play only an increasingly important part in public health in India. Therefore, identifying, understanding and examining patent applications on biologics is of crucial importance to Indian citizens. The IPO would benefit from identifying biologics as a critical category; providing them their distinct field of invention; as well as developing guidelines and practices for evaluating biologics, along with other frontier technology that emerges.

Expedited examination: Since 2016, expedited examination of patents has been the law. More recently, there are reports that the IPO is considering PPH partnerships with some rich country economies such as Japan. This is unwise, especially since even in the extended examination currently underway, the IPO has faced several challenges. We strongly suggest that the IPO needs to evidence the ability to manage the ordinary processes in place with accuracy and compliance with Indian law, before attempting to expedite the said processes, especially since the non-functioning of the patents side of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) has meant that India has not had a corrective mechanism for any incorrect grants that may have been made at the IPO since May 2016.

Check exceptions to patentability first: The law, as has evolved in the Novartis Case in the Supreme Court, and the Roche vs Cipla case before the Delhi High Court, clearly points towards applying all exceptions to patentability under Sections 3 & 4 of the Indian Patents Act, first, before applying the test of patentability under Section 2 (1)(j). Such a procedure would make the work of the IPO more efficient, as well as fair.

Making anti-evergreening provisions work: The Manual currently does not capture the guidelines explicitly laid out in the Indian Supreme Court’s judgment in the Novartis case. Specific principles relating to how to apply Section 3(d) were laid out in the judgment which have no reflection in the Manual. Like with Section 3(d), applicants also routinely circumvent other anti-evergreening provisions in Indian law, such as Section 3(e) and 3(i). Sometimes, these provisions are circumvented alone; other times, when combined, applicants take advantage of the confusion and adduce evidence on one ground, and then use that as a basis to circumvent the other grounds. To apply anti-evergreening provisions in Indian patent law efficiently and fairly, we suggest an anti-

evergreening checklist that will facilitate this process, and which we recommend be an official part of the examiner’s report, both within the process and as a reported output.

Computer related inventions: The Manual currently does not adequately regulate Computer Related Inventions (CRIs). We suggest the introduction of a 3-step test to comprehensively regulate the patentability of mathematical methods, business methods, computer programmes and algorithms as laid down in the Indian Patents Act. Furthermore, we suggest ways in which the law can be applied more carefully within the Manual to detect camouflaging of claims, with an intent to confuse the IPO and Indian patent examiners, especially when conjoined to computer technology, by noting that (1) mathematical methods may sometimes be claimed as “technological development”, (2) that business methods must be evaluated as such, regardless of their application through computers, computer programmes, computer networks or other programmable apparatus, and that (3) that the scope of algorithms needs to be extended to any invention where the function claimed to be performed can only be carried out by means of a computer programme.

Finally, while the nature of our comments and suggestions are deep and extensive, we are aware that we have also asked for the system to be evaluated in full, rather than in parts. As such, the Indian Patent ecosystem is large and complex, and the IPO has been engaged with setting the Patent Rules (under finalization), the Patent Office Manual (the subject of our commentary in this communication) as well as the Examining Guidelines (which we recommend move from being arbitrarily categorized and extended to becoming a formal part of the Patent Office Manual).

In order to comprehensively react to changes to the Indian Patent ecosystem, we require the opportunity to comment comprehensively on a range of inter-linked proposals.

In this spirit, we hope you will allow us – as civil society – to react, once more, to the Patent Rules (as connected to the Patent Office Manual) as well as each of the Examining Guidelines (old and new, i.e. including those intended such as for biologics), in the interests of fairness and transparency. We look forward to assisting you at every step of this process.

Thank you for your time. We trust that, as civil society researchers, activists and academics, who have devoted a considerable number of years towards the research of intellectual property, and the protection of public interests and human rights in India, our submission will be considered seriously and acted upon. We remain, of course, at your disposal, should you or your office have any questions – which we will gladly answer.

Sincerely,

Achal Prabhala, Feroz Ali, Ramya Sheshadri, Roshan John and Anubha Sinha

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/comments-and-suggestions-to-the-draft-patent-manual-march-2019

CIS' submission to Indian Patent Office on Examples of Excluded Patentable subject-matter under Section 3(k) for incorporation in the yet-to-be-released Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions

sinha — 2016-02-22T09:36:52Z

The Patent Office had put the Guidelines on Computer Related Inventions, 2015 in abeyance last month. This step was taken after several stakeholders including CIS made representations to the Office about serious substantive legal issues in the document. In furtherance of the consultative process, a meeting was conducted in Mumbai with various stakeholders, chaired by the Controller General of Patents Design Trademarks (“CGPTDM”). Anubha Sinha participated in the meeting, after which the CGPTDM invited submissions from stakeholders on specific examples on exclusions from patentability under section 3(k) of the Patents Act, 1970, for possible incorporation in the Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions.

This post contains CIS' submission on specific examples on exclusions from patentability under section 3(k). You may view the Guidelines here. To read the letter sent to the PMO, click here. To read CIS' analysis of the Guidelines, click here.

It is worth noting that the IPO requested for negative examples of patentability [CRIs that cannot be patented under the Act]. While it is commendable that the IPO sought inputs from stakeholders for negative examples, stakeholders have often requested the IPO to provide positive examples of patentable CRIs. The yet-to-be-released-Guidelines should also mention a sufficient number of positive examples to provide better clarity to stakeholders.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES ON EXCLUSION FROM PATENTABILITY OF COMPUTER RELATED INVENTIONS
to
THE HON'BLE CONTROLLER GENERAL OF PATENTS DESIGNS AND TRADEMARKS
by
THE CENTRE FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY, INDIA

I. PRELIMINARY

1. This submission presents specific examples on exclusions from patentability, under section 3(k) of the Patents Act, 1970, for possible incorporation in the Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions.

2. This submission is based on the Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions released in September 2015("2015 Guidelines/ Guidelines"). The Guidelines are in abeyance, presently.

3. The Centre for Internet and Society ("CIS") commends the Hon'ble Controller General of Patents Designs and Trademarks ("CGPTDM"), Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India for its efforts at seeking inputs from various stakeholders. CIS is thankful for the opportunity to have been a part of this discussion since 2008; and to provide this submission in furtherance of of the feedback process continuing from the stakeholders' meeting conducted by the Hon'ble CGPTDM on 19.01.2016.

II. OVERVIEW

4. The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-governmental organization engaged in research and policy work in the areas of, inter alia, intellectual property rights, access to knowledge and openness.[1] This submission is consistent with CIS' commitment to safeguarding general public interest, and the interests and rights of various stakeholders involved. Accordingly, this submission aims to further these principles.

III. SUBMISSIONS

5. Broadly, we submit that the Guidelines narrowed the legal exclusions on patentable subject matter in section 3(k). Consequently, the Guidelines were arguably in violation of section 3(k).

6. To supply clarity to the examination procedure, CIS has proposed a definition to "computer programme per se" in its previous submissions to the Indian Patent Office :

"Computer programme per se in the relevant clause means (a) any computer programme in the abstract, (b) any computer programme expressed in source code form, including source code recorded on an information storage medium, or (c) any computer programme that can be executed or executes on a general purpose computer, including computer programme object code designed for execution on a general purpose computer that is recorded on an information storage medium."[2]

Further, since the inclusion of computer programmes in a broader application should not render the application ineligible subject matter, CIS previously proposed an addition to the test:

"We propose a new part to the subject-matter test to make the clause clearer. The Manual should specify that "the computer programme portions of any claimed invention should be treated as if it were covered by prior art and patentability should thus be determined with respect to the other features of the invention". This way, we can ensure that an invention which merely uses or implements a computer programme is not granted patent on the basis of the inventiveness of the computer programme per se." [3]

7. Accordingly, CIS would like to highlight examples of specific patent applications on exclusions from patentability, under section 3(k) of the Patents Act, 1970, for considering their possible incorporation in the Guidelines. The applications are:

7.1 Application No.: 112/CHE/2008

Title: Bill payment card method and system

The Asst. Controller General correctly examined and rejected the invention on the grounds of it purely relating to a business method and processor configured software. Applicant had contended, inter alia, that the method claimed a series of steps being executed with hardware features , including a communication network, communication link and other hardware peripherals intrinsic to the execution of the claimed method.

Further, in their reply to the objections in the FER, the applicants stated:

" There is present a database to perform the functions of the card electronically. The processor is configured to receive information, transmit information and/or authorize the card and associated information thereof. The processor may be configured to produce reports, issue reports, confirmation receipt etc.

It also consists of a card which may include electronic and/or magnetic features e.g. a microprocessor, memory and an electronic chip, a magnetic strip, a USB flash drive and a wireless communication device. The card may be configured to communicate with a wired devices, such as by USB, coaxial cable..."

"...The whole process brings out technical effect in a way that this system allows for the payment of bills without the use of a bank account, credit card, or money order. Hence it is a system with technical features producing technical effect. Hence, enhancement of a business or teaching a way in which a business is carried out is essentially not the the prime motive of the instant invention. With its technical character, technical features and enhancement in business comes as by-product of the implementation of the instant invention."

The invention was rejected.

7.2 Application No.: 48/CHE/2005

Title: Structured approach to software specification

The applicant asserted in their reply to the FER[4] that the claims related to an information managing system including at least on processing unit, a system memory, a system bus, a LAN, a remote computer, a video adapter and monitor and a software architecture performing a particular task or implement particular abstract data types. As a result, they contended that the said invention did not fall under the purview of section 3(k) of the Indian Patents Act, 1970.

The application was correctly rejected by the Controller in the first instance itself.

7.3 Application No.: 2019/CHENP/2004

Title: Apparatus and method of a distributed capital system

The FER included objections regarding lack of novelty, inventiveness, lack of constructive features, lack of support for the word "means" , objections towards a business method, computer program per- se towards an algorithm (objections incl. 3(k)) per se and also towards claims relating to mere medium etc.

Further, it was stated by the Office that even the amended claims failed to overcome the said objections because, inter alia, " the subject matter of the claims related to a method of carrying out financial transactions with one or more parties in a Distributed capital system implemented by pure software I algorithms per-se. The said method is a mere business method/algorithm which is implemented in a computer network through software modules."[5]

The invention was rejected.

7.4. Application No.: 4986/DELNP/2006

Title: A method of tracking a radio frequency signal by means of electronic equipment.

The objections in the FER were that, the subject matter claimed fell within the scope section 3(k) as amended by the Patents (Amendment) Act 2005, for being algorithm based method. Subject matter as described and claimed in computer program product claims as well fell within the scope of section 3(k), for being relating to computer program per se. The examination correctly disregarded the implementation of the invention on electronic equipment.

The invention was rejected.

7.5 Application No.: 1405/MUMNP/2008

Title: Method for determining an output value from a sensor in automation engineering

Order issued u/s 15 clearly pointed out that the contribution of the applicant was a mathematical method to determine the output variable from the input variable. And since mathematical methods were intellectual in nature, the invention lacked technical advancement.

The invention was rejected.

7.6. Application No.: 914/CHE/2007

Title: A system, method to generate transliteration and method for generating decision tree to obtain transliteration

One of the claims read:

"A system to generate transliteration of source language script into target language script using decision tree based technique with automated supervised learning, said system comprising of

i. a device having memory;

ii. an input device for entering text;

iii. transliteration engine to maintain patterns and predetermined rules used in transliteration of source language script into target language script;

iv. a display device for displaying entered text and transliterated textl and

v. an interface to enable typing in any language and optionally to integrate the transliteration system into existing web-pages."

The application was correctly rejected by the Examiner for on grounds of falling under section 3(k), inter alia.

8. CIS welcomes the initiative of the Hon'ble CGPTDM to provide said illustrative examples. CIS believes that it is essential that the Guidelines avoid violation of section 3(k), and are formed complying with the Indian Patents Act, 1970 and relevant judicial decisions; and keeping in mind the legislative intent.

9. CIS would be willing discuss these submissions with the Hon'ble CGPTDM; and supplement them with further submissions if necessary, and offer any other assistance towards the efforts at developing a Guidelines for Examination of Computer Related Inventions.

On behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society
Anubha Sinha
Programme Officer

[1] See www.cis-india.org for details about CIS' work.

[2] Pranesh Prakash, CIS' submission on Draft Patent Manual 2010 , available at < http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-submission-draft-patent-manual-2010 >

[3] Ibid.

[4] See First Examination Report, available at <48-CHE-2005 EXAMINATION REPORT REPLY RECEIVED 31-05-2013.pdf>

[5] See First Examination Report for Application No.: 2019/CHENP/2004

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-submission-to-indian-patent-office-on-examples-of-excluded-patentable-subject-matter-under-section-3-k-for-incorporation-in-the-yet-to-be-released-guidelines-for-computer-related-inventions

CIS' Submission to DIPP and CGPDTM at meeting with IP Stakeholders

sinha — 2017-12-13T14:31:54Z

The Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks held a meeting with IP stakeholders on December 7, 2017, chaired by the Secretary, DIPP, to take suggestions on improving procedures and functioning of the Office. Anubha Sinha attended the meeting and requested the DIPP to improve compliance of uploading Form 27s by patentees and ensure proper enforcement of related provisions within the Indian Patent Act, 1970. Additionally, we sent a detailed submission to the Office, drawing from our recent research. Thanks to Rohini Lakshane and Aman Goyal for their inputs.

Submission to the Department of Industrial Planning and Promotion (DIPP) at Meeting with IP Stakeholders on 07 December, 2017

1. As the DIPP is aware, the Indian mobile device manufacturing industry is mired in issues related to licensing of standard essential patents (SEPs). Disputes have resulted in imposition of heavy interim royalty rates on Indian manufacturers, payable to foreign SEP holders. Section 146(2) of the Patent Act, 1970 mandates patentees to provide information on working of patents, which is crucial for willing licensees to access patent working information in a timely manner. This requirement, that the details of patent working be disclosed by patentees supports the goal of making unworked patents available for compulsory licensing in India, both to promote economic development and public access to patented products. Penalties for failing to furnish such information (via Form 27) are steep, potentially resulting in fines or imprisonment.

2. We note that in 2009, 2013 and 2015 the Controller issued public notices calling on patent owners to comply with their obligations to file statements of working on Form 27. Further, on February 12, 2013, the Indian Patent Office (IPO) announced plans to make Form 27 submissions for the year 2012 available to the public via the IPO website.

3. We commend the efforts of the IPO, however, our empirical research on ICT innovations[i] as well as by Prof. Shamnad Basheer (on ICT and pharmaceutical sector)[ii] reveals that there are serious lapses as far as compliance and enforcement of statutory provisions mandating filing of Form 27 are concerned.

4. In the past year, we studied data available from 2009- 2016 for the mobile device sector, and could only identify and access 4,916 valid Forms 27, corresponding to 3,126 mobile device patents, leaving 1,186 Indian patents for which a Form 27 could have been filed, but was not found.[iii] For a surprising number of Form 27s (3%) the working status of the relevant patent was not designated.

Even among the Form 27s that had been obtained, almost none contained useful information regarding the working of the subject patents or fully complying with the informational requirements of the Indian Patent Rules. Many patentees simply omitted required descriptive information from their forms without any explanation.[iv]

Via our research we also gathered complaints raised by patentees and industry observers regarding the structure of the Form 27 requirement itself. For example, patents covering complex, multi-component products that embody dozens of technical standards and thousands of patents may not necessarily be amenable to the individual-level data requested by Form 27.

5. Regardless, we submit that these technical difficulties should not hinder the critical statutory requirement placed on patent holders to diligently comply with Form 27 compliance. In the context of licensing of SEPs, several stakeholders recently suggested solutions as revealed from our study of the submissions made to the TRAI Consultation on Promoting Local Telecom Manufacturing[v]:

Two industry associations, namely Telecom Equipment Manufacturers Association of India (TEMA) and Telecom Equipment & Services Export Promotion Council (TEPC) and a telecommunication enabler Vihan Network Limited recommended that a modified and longer version of Form 27 (Form 27S) may be designed for SEP holders that should apply right at the filing stage. Section 159 of the Patent Act, 1970 empowers the central government to make such modifications to the form, as necessary.[vi]
Further, Prof. T Ramakrishna (MHRD Chair on Intellectual Property Rights) at NLSIU, specifically recommended that Form 27 may be amended to include a new column, which may require the patent holder to declare if their patent forms a part of any standard and in case of affirmative answer – the name of the Standard Setting Organisation and corresponding standard of which it is a part.

6. Further, we would like to draw attention to how our study was limited by the technical capabilities of the Indian Patent Office’s online Form 27 repository, such as[vii]:

IPAIRS returned either a 404 error or Connection Time Out ("site is taking too long to respond") http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/search/index.aspx. In our opinion, it could be redirected to InPASS as it uses the same search engine as InPASS. Further, http://ipindia.nic.in/patsea.htm returned a 404 error.
Some PDFs of the forms comprise scanned image files without OCR of the text. This makes them inaccessible to the visually impaired, and prevents search and discoverability of their content. This also makes them less usable by preventing copying and selection of text.
In some cases, it was difficult to identify which one in the list of documents associated with a patent is Form 27, because of obscure filenames.

For example, for Patent Number 262228, Form 27 was named 68.262228.pdf, as found on IPAIRS.
For Patent number 260603, the filename for Form 27 was "ipindiaonline.gov.in_epatentfiling_online_frmPreview.asp.pdf" on IPAIRS.

Inconsistency in search results found on IPAIRS. Searching for the peripheral documents of the patents, returned the results, "No PDF found" for one full week. The next week, the documents started showing. Some searches returned results for an entirely different patent number.
Sometimes, Form 27 found on InPASS was not found on IPAIRS and vice versa.
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7. We are thankful to DIPP for the opportunity to make these submissions. It would be our pleasure and privilege to discuss these submissions and recommendations in details with the DIPP. We also offer our assistance on other matters aimed at developing a suitable policy framework for SEPs and FRAND in India, and, working towards sustained innovation, manufacture and availability of mobile technologies in India.

Annexure

Complete Data of CIS’ Study[i]

[i] See Contreras, Jorge L. and Lakshané, Rohini and Lewis, Paxton, Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products (October 1, 2017). NYU Journal of Intellectual Property & Entertainment Law; Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004283

[ii] See Shamnad Basheer, Making Patents Work: Of IP Duties and Deficient Disclosures, 7 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 3, 16-17 (2017).

[iii] Supra note 1.

[iv] Refer to Appendix for a breakdown of compliance of Form 27 by patent holders in the mobile device sector.

[v] See TRAI’s Consultation Paper on Promoting Local Telecom Equipment Manufacturing dated 18.09.2017 and the responses, available here: http://trai.gov.in/consultation-paper-promoting-local-telecom-equipment-manufacturing?page=2

[vi] Section 159 of the Patent Act, 1970 empowers the central government to make rules. Accordingly, the Rule 131 of the Patents Rules, 2003 prescribes Form 27 as the manner in which section 146(2) of the Act is to be implemented.

[vii] An email by Rohini Lakshane (CIS) compiling these issues was sent to Dr. K.S. Kardam (Senior Joint Controller of Patents and Designs - ‎Indian Patent Office) on 09.09.2017.

[viii] See Contreras, Jorge L. and Lakshané, Rohini and Lewis, Paxton, Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products (October 1, 2017). NYU Journal of Intellectual Property & Entertainment Law; Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004283

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-submissions-to-dipp-and-cgptdm-at-meeting-with-ip-stakeholders

CIS' Submission on Statement of Working of Patents

sinha — 2018-04-21T15:32:00Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) made a submission to the Indian Patent Office on the issue of Statement of Working as per Form 27 under the Patents Act, 1970.

Select stakeholders were invited to the consultation meeting held on April 6, 2018. Anubha Sinha attended it along with a few other public-spirited stakeholders. She made a statement stressing on the requirement of the patent system to serve the welfare-purpose and not create mere non-working/ blocking monopolies; and that the argument of representatives of patentees about non-working of patents being the existing norm, and that they cannot be questioned about this, is absolutely against the central tenets of patent law. All written submissions can be accessed here.

Centre for Internet and Society - India’s (CIS) submission to the Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks (CGPDTM) pertaining to Stakeholders Meeting regarding issues related to Working of patents under the Patents Act, 1970

As the CGPDTM is aware, the Indian mobile device manufacturing industry is mired in issues related to licensing of standard essential patents (SEPs). Disputes have resulted in imposition of heavy interim royalty rates on Indian manufacturers, payable to foreign SEP holders. Section 146 and Rule 131 of the Patents Act, 1970 mandate patentees to provide information on working of patents, which is crucial for willing licensees to access patent working information in a timely manner. This requirement, that the details of patent working be disclosed by patentees supports several policy goals, firstly, of making the Indian population benefit from commercial use of the invention; secondly, prevents patentees from creating blocking monopolies – from obtaining and maintaining patents for the purpose of blocking others from developing technologies in the vicinity of the patented inventions; and thirdly, by showing that reasonable requirements of the public are met (or not), directly impacts the implementation of the compulsory licensing scheme of the Patents Act, 1970.
We note that in 2009, 2013 and 2015 the CGPDTM issued public notices calling on patent owners to comply with their obligations to file statements of working on Form 27. Further, on February 12, 2013, the Indian Patent Office (IPO) announced plans to make Form 27 submissions for the year 2012 available to the public via the IPO website. However, these measures have not yielded any significant progress, as patentees and licensees continue to not comply or defectively comply with the statutory requirements.
CIS’ empirical research on ICT innovations reveals that there are serious lapses as far as compliance and enforcement of statutory provisions mandating filing of Form 27 are concerned. In the past year, we studied data available from 2009- 2016 for the mobile device sector, and could only identify and access 4,916 valid Forms 27, corresponding to 3,126 mobile device patents, leaving 1,186 Indian patents for which a Form 27 could have been filed, but was not found. For a surprising number of Form 27s (3%) the working status of the relevant patent was not even designated.

Even among the Form 27s that had been obtained, almost none contained useful information regarding the working of the subject patents or fully complying with the informational requirements of the Indian Patent Rules. Many patentees simply omitted required descriptive information from their forms without any explanation.

Via our research we also gathered complaints raised by patentees and industry observers regarding the structure of the Form 27 requirement itself. For example, patents covering complex, multi-component products that embody dozens of technical standards and thousands of patents may not necessarily be amenable to the individual-level data requested by Form 27.

Thus, our findings support the arguments and findings made by the petitioners in the ongoing matter of Shamnad Basheer v. Union of India and Ors.
Regardless, we submit that these technical difficulties should not hinder the critical statutory requirement placed on patent holders to diligently comply with Form 27 compliance. In the context of licensing of SEPs, several stakeholders recently suggested solutions as revealed from the submissions made to the TRAI Consultation on Promoting Local Telecom Manufacturing:

Two industry associations, namely Telecom Equipment Manufacturers Association of India (TEMA) and Telecom Equipment & Services Export Promotion Council (TEPC) and a telecommunication enabler Vihan Network Limited recommended that a modified and longer version of Form 27 (Form 27S) may be designed for SEP holders that should apply right at the filing stage. Section 159 of the Patent Act, 1970 empowers the central government to make such modifications to the form, as necessary.

Further, Prof. T Ramakrishna (MHRD Chair on Intellectual Property Rights) at NLSIU, specifically recommended that Form 27 may be amended to include a new column, which may require the patent holder to declare if their patent forms a part of any standard and in case of affirmative answer – the name of the Standard Setting Organisation and corresponding standard of which it is a part.

We recommend that the form may be amended to make it more comprehensive and suitable for obtaining necessary information. The same information should be made publicly accessible, in order to satisfy the Indian citizen that the patent is being properly worked.
Further, we would like to draw attention to our findings on deficient technical capabilities of the Indian Patent Office’s online Form 27 repository:
Some PDFs of the forms comprise scanned image files without OCR of the text. This makes them inaccessible to the visually impaired, and prevents search and discoverability of their content. This also makes them less usable by preventing copying and selection of text.

In some cases, it was difficult to identify which one in the list of documents associated with a patent is Form 27, because of obscure filenames.

For example, for Patent Number 262228, Form 27 was named 68.262228.pdf, as found on IPAIRS.

For Patent number 260603, the filename for Form 27 was "ipindiaonline.gov.in_epatentfiling_online_frmPreview.asp.pdf" on IPAIRS.

Inconsistency in search results found on IPAIRS. Searching for the peripheral documents of the patents, returned the results, "No PDF found" for one full week. The next week, the documents started showing. Some searches returned results for an entirely different patent number.

Sometimes, Form 27 found on InPASS was not found on IPAIRS and vice versa.

Runtime errors occur due to browser caching. IPAIRS returned either a 404 error or Connection Time Out ("site is taking too long to respond") http://ipindiaonline.gov.in/patentsearch/search/index.aspx. In our opinion, it could be redirected to InPASS as it uses the same search engine as InPASS. Further, http://ipindia.nic.in/patsea.htm returned a 404 error.
We are thankful to the Indian Patent Office for the opportunity to make these submissions. It would be our pleasure and privilege to discuss these submissions and recommendations in details at the Stakeholders’ Meeting on 21 March, 2018.

On behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society, March 16, 2018
Anubha Sinha, anubha@cis-india.org

See Trimble, Markela, Patent Working Requirements: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (2016). Available at http://www.law.uci.edu/lawreview/vol6/no3/Trimble.pdf

See Contreras, Jorge L. and Lakshané, Rohini and Lewis, Paxton, Patent Working Requirements and Complex Products (October 1, 2017). NYU Journal of Intellectual Property & Entertainment Law; Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3004283

Supra note (ii).

Refer to Appendix for a breakdown of compliance of Form 27 by patent holders in the mobile device sector.

See Shamnad Basheer, Making Patents Work: Of IP Duties and Deficient Disclosures, 7 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 3, 6-17 (2017).

Also, see https://spicyip.com/shamnad-basheer-v-union-of-india-ors

See TRAI’s Consultation Paper on Promoting Local Telecom Equipment Manufacturing dated 18.09.2017 and the responses, available here: http://trai.gov.in/consultation-paper-promoting-local-telecom-equipment-manufacturing?page=2

Section 159 of the Patent Act, 1970 empowers the central government to make rules. Accordingly, the Rule 131 of the Patents Rules, 2003 prescribes Form 27 as the manner in which section 146(2) of the Act is to be implemented.

An email by Rohini Lakshane (CIS) compiling these issues was sent to Dr. K.S. Kardam (Senior Joint Controller of Patents and Designs - ‎Indian Patent Office) on 09.09.2017.

Click to download the submission by CIS made on March 16, 2018 here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-submission-on-statement-of-working-of-patents

CIS Submission on Draft Patent Manual 2010

pranesh — 2014-05-29T06:47:32Z

The patent office has released a revised version of the Draft Manual of Patent Practice and Procedure. Section 8.03.06.10 of the Manual deals with patenting of computer programmes. CIS is happy to note the many improvements in this draft of the Manual from the previous version. CIS made its submission along with a few suggestions that it thinks would make the document even better.

The section has been entirely reformulated and a few of the changes made to the previous version are welcome.

Positive changes in the Manual

The provisions relating to making software with “technological features” and “technical applications” which were present in the previous version have been completely eliminated. Thus, the “technical applications”of a computer programme will not make an otherwise unpatentable computer programme patentable subject matter. This also eliminates the need to arrive at a definition of “technical applications” or “technological features”.
The term “computer implemented inventions” which found no place in the Patent Act, 1970 but was introduced in the previous version of the manual without proper explanation or definition has been eliminated.
The Manual expressly states that mathematical methods (8.03.06.10.b) and business methods (8.03.06.10.c) are not patentable irrespective of the language in which they claims are couched or the form in which they are claimed.
Computer programme products which were considered to be patentable subject matter in the previous version of the manual are considered to be unpatentable subject matter in the new version. The Manual clearly explains computer programme products to be nothing but computer programme per se stored in a computer readable medium. (8.03.06.10.d)
The Manual recognises that no computer programme can be functional without hardware to execute the programme. This means that any computer programme cannot become patentable subject matter merely because it is associated with some hardware. (8.03.06.10.g)
A computer programme which runs on a general purpose known computer is expressly held to be unpatentable subject matter. This is undoubtedly a welcome inclusion since it helps eliminate claims relating to a mere computer programme which may have been considered patentable simply because such computer programme is run using a general purpose computer. This is one of the common ways in which Section 3(k) is circumvented to obtain patent for claims which are for a computer programme per se.

Contentious provisions of the Manual which require amendment/explanation are as follows:

Clause 8.03.06.10.a

Under this provision, mathematical methods, business methods, computer programmes per se and algorithms are not considered as patentable inventions. In relation to computer programs, the law provides a qualification that what is not patentable is only computer program per se.

While this restates the statute correctly, it does so without offering any explanation, which would be preferable. The Manual should explain the scope of the term “per se” and clear the ambiguity surrounding it. The Manual should clearly provide reasons for any computer programme to fall in either category.

We suggest using the following definition of computer programme per se, which has previously been submitted to the Patent Office1:

Computer programme per se in the relevant clause means (a) any computer programme in the abstract, (b) any computer programme expressed in source code form, including source code recorded on an information storage medium, or (c) any computer programme that can be executed or executes on a general purpose computer,2 including computer programme object code designed for execution on a general purpose computer that is recorded on an information storage medium.3

Clause 8.03.06.10.e

If a claim in a patent application is not directed at a computer programme per se it could be patentable, if all other patentability conditions are met. This provision thus necessitates distinguishing computer programmes per se from other types of inventions that use or implement computer programmes.

The clause, while seeking to distinguish computer programmes per se from inventions which use or implement computer programmes, does make clear what “implement computer programmes” means, nor does it clarify what “computer programme per se” is. A relevant suggestion for a definition for “computer programme per se” has been provided above, which would address this problem.

Clause 8.03.06.10.f

The computer programmes are often claimed in the form of algorithms as method claims or system claims with some ‘means’ indicating the function of flow charts or process steps. The algorithm related claims may be even wider than the computer programme claimed by itself, for a programme represents a particular set, the algorithm expresses the principles .

We find that this clause has no relevance to explaining patentability of computer programmes and thus suggest that the same be deleted from the Manual. The Manual should however make it clear that in algorithm-related claims, if the function claimed to be performed by the invention can be done only by means of a computer programme, such claims are not patentable.

Clause 8.03.06.10.g

Essentially, all computer programmes need a combination with some hardware for their functionality. In an application for patent for a new hardware system, the possibility of a computer programme forming part of the claims cannot be ruled out. It has to be carefully considered as to how integrated is the novel hardware with the computer programme. Further, it is also to be considered whether the machine is programme specific or the programme is machine specific. A computer programme which may work on any general purpose known computer does not meet the requirement of patentability.

With regard to cases of computer programmes being combined with hardware, the Manual seems to suggest that the patentability of the combination is dependent on “how integrated the novel hardware [is] with the computer programme.” This language is very vague and ambiguous. In case of an application for patent for a new hardware system, the Manual should make it clear that such claim is eligible only if the inventive conribution resides entirely in the hardware. The Manual should also require the patent applicant to demonstrate exactly how the inventive step resides in the hardware separable from the computer programme.
We propose a new part to the above test to make the clause clearer. The Manual should specify that “the computer programme portions of any claimed invention should be treated as if it were covered by prior art and patentability should thus be determined with respect to the other features of the invention”. This way, we can ensure that an invention which merely uses or implements a computer programme is not granted patent on the basis of the inventiveness of the computer programme per se.
It is indeed laudable that the Manual makes it clear that a computer programme which may work on any general purpose known computer does not meet the requirement of patentability. This should make it clear that a computer programme cannot be patentable simply because it is executed by a special purpose computer as long as a general purpose computer can also execute the same. We suggest the following definition of a general purpose computer, which has already been proposed to the Patent Office, be used:4

A general-purpose computer here means a device capable of running multiple unrelated programs, often simultaneously for different purposes. It will comprise at least of: (1) one or more central processing units, (2) one or more input devices that are not specific to any one program, (3) memory, (4) one or more non volatile mass storage devices, and (5) one or more output devices. However, a general-purpose computer does not include a device that itself represents an inventive contribution to the art.

Clause 8.03.06.10.h

Method claims, whether independent or dependent, reciting computer programs without process limitations in the form of hardware features are not allowable. For a method reciting computer programme to be patentable, it must clearly recite into it limiting hardware integers that enable the program to function .

The Clause dilutes the standard set in the previous clauses. It seems to suggest that any method claim is patentable as long as it is connected to hardware which enable the program to function and define its limitations/scope. This position is untenable since no method claim can be purely a computer programme and use of computer programmes for any specific task would necessarily require hardware to implement the same. Therefore the requirement of hardware limitation to make a computer programme patentable is essentially allowing for any computer programme to be patentable. Not only is such a limitation redundant but it also renders the “per se” requirement in Section 3(k) meaningless. Further, the meaning of the term “hardware integers” in the Clause is unclear. For the purpose of this comment, we assume that it refers to hardware features. The Manual should ensure that the method claim has significant per or post processing activity and is not merely combined with hardware to be patent-eligible. This ensures that any computer programme is not granted patent merely because it has certain trivial pre or post processing activities associated with it.

Clause 8.03.06.10.i

Claims directed at computer programs coupled to hardware, enabling the hardware to perform a certain function may be allowable, if such an invention meets all other conditions of patentability.

The Clause is restating the content of Clause 8.03.06.10.e and our comments on this Clause remain the same as our comments for Clause 8.03.06.10.e.

Requirement of Disclosure

We suggest that the Manual require that an application claiming patent for a computer programme (which does not constitute computer programme per se) necessarily disclose the entire source code. This ensures that the invention can perform exactly all those functions that are described in the patent application. Since different computer programmes can be written (with each having different source code) to perform the same function, it is of utmost importance that the applicant demonstrate the workability of the invention described in the application and such proof can be provided only by disclosing the source code.

Purpose of the Manual

There is no clarity on the purpose and authority of the Manual. We do not know if the Manual attempts to explain the provisions of the Patent Act, 1970 to an applicant or is meant to provide guidance to patent examiners or be binding upon them. If a patent official acts in a manner contradictory to the Manual, the consequences of such action is unclear. The Manual should clarify these questions.

This definition was formulated and submitted by Knowledge Commons, Delhi to the Indian Patent Office in response to the earlier version of the draft manual. The definition was formulated through the collective efforts of Prabir Purkayastha, Richard Fontana of Red Hat, Venkatesh Hariharan, Tahir Amin, Mishi Chowdhury of Software Freedom Law Centre and Jaijit Bhattacharya. See http://osindia.blogspot.com/2009/04/computer-programme-per-se-conundrum.html
We propose the following definition of a general purpose computer - A general-purpose computer here means a device capable of running multiple unrelated programs, often simultaneously for different purposes. It will comprise at least of: (1) one or more central processing units, (2) one or more input devices that are not specific to any one program, (3) memory, (4) one or more non volatile mass storage devices, and (5) one or more output devices. However, a general-purpose computer does not include a device that itself represents an inventive contribution to the art. See also Infra n. 3.
An information storage medium means any disc, tape, perforated media or other information storage device, which, if fed into or located in a computer or computer based equipment is capable of reproducing any information, other than an information storage medium that itself represents an inventive contribution to the art.
This definition was formulated and submitted by Knowledge Commons, Delhi to the Indian Patent Office in response to the earlier version of the draft manual. See http://osindia.blogspot.com/2009/04/computer-programme-per-se-conundrum.html

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-submission-draft-patent-manual-2010

CIS RTI REQUEST TO DIPP - NUMBER 1 - FEBRUARY, 2015

nehaa — 2015-04-14T17:17:53Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-rti-request-to-dipp-number-1-february-2015

CIS Comments on the Draft National Policy on Electronics

pranesh — 2011-11-01T00:05:32Z

These were the comments submitted by CIS to the request for comments put out by the Department of Information Technology on its draft 'National Policy on Electronics'.

The Department of Information Technology must be commended for taking the initiative to create this policy which aims to reduce India’s dependence on other countries for crucial electronic hardware requirements, and to increase Indian production to such a capacity as to not only serve India’s increasing demand for electronics, but to fulfil foreign demand as well.

We have mainly focused our comments on the implications of the patent regime on this laudable goal.

Technology Transfer

An area that the policy is silent on is technology transfer. In relation to technology, the main bargain embedded in the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of the WTO was the increase in the level of protection offered under patent laws of developing countries in exchange for increased transfer of technological know-how from the developed countries. While India has increased patent protection in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement, there has been no commensurate transfer of technology from countries which are currently hubs of electronics know-how.

One important example is China’s policy on transfer of technology along the whole value chain to enable domestic firms to gain technological expertise.

The Association of American Manufacturing notes, “One of the most potent weapons China has used to move up the value chain is forced technology transfer … It is only through the acquisition (rather than internal development) of sophisticated technologies that Chinese companies have been able to rapidly enter and expand in sophisticated industries ….”

This insistence on technology transfer as a national policy has served China well, and their experience should be incorporated into India’s National Policy on Electronics. This is not to say that India should not internally develop our own technological capabilities, but that the Indian government must use the policy space available to it to ensure that acquisition of technological capabilities happens alongside.

Outflow of Foreign Exchange as Royalties Creating Adverse Balance of Payments

The latest data from the World Bank shows that our balance of payments is increasing adversely at an alarming rate, and has now reached over USD 2.38 billion.

Our royalty and licence fee payments have kept on increasing at an astounding rate.

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees payments (current USD)

1991	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
49,565,208	845,949,436	1,159,824,391	1,528,826,913	1,860,283,808	2,437,500,663

Meanwhile India’s income is gaining slowly and erratically, and in 20100 reached USD 59.6 million.

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees, receipts (current USD)

1991	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
615,525	13,445,053	30,690,000	27,211,957	38,128,141	59,560,687

This bleeds the Indian economy through a very inefficient outflow of capital. Insisting on transfer of technology is an important component in slowing down this trend.

Linking of Value Chain and Preferential Treatment

One important clarification that is needed in the policy (specifically clause IV.1.3) is that “domestically manufactured electronic products” is intended to mean not those products for which the last part of value has been added in India. This way essentially non-Indian products with Indian branding can be seen to be “domestically manufactured electronic products”. The longer the Indian part of the value chain, the more preference it should be given, and holding by Indian companies of essential patent rights (or the availability of greater number of components of the product under royalty-free, FRAND and RAND licences) could be an important criteria. This will also encourage the transfer of technological know-how to Indian firms.

Preferential Treatment

Some may argue that the provision of preferential treatment to domestic manufacturers contravenes the GATT Agreement, however the GATT Agreement itself provides a usable exception in Article 3(8):

Article III: National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation

8 (a) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale.

(b) The provisions of this Article shall not prevent the payment of subsidies exclusively to domestic producers, including payments to domestic producers derived from the proceeds of internal taxes or charges applied consistently with the provisions of this Article and subsidies effected through governmental purchases of domestic products.

Thus, by crafting any further regulation under this policy to fit within this exception, India would not fall afoul of its obligations under GATT.

Cybersecurity and Source Code

An important aspect of the cybersecurity that is discussed in clause IV.5 is the ability to validate the lack of malicious code in the electronics used in strategically important infrastructure. For this, manufacturers must be required to provide the source code as part of government tenders in strategically important infrastructure.

Distinction between Innovation and Intellectual Property

The Electronic Development Fund must seek to promote innovation, research and development, and commercialization of products, and must be used to strategically acquire patents. Promotion of patents is not an end in itself, unlike promotion of innovation and ensuring that research and development reaches markets through commercialization. Patents are only a means to an end, and may sometimes be strategically useful, and often stand in way of gaining optimal use of technology by markets due to their monopolistic nature. Thus, it is recommended that “promotion of IP” be dropped from this clause, and instead “promotion of strategic acquirement and use of patents” be substituted in its place.

National Electronics Mission

The National Electronics Mission should not only have industry participation but also participation from academia and civil society.

Funding

The issue of funding for the initiatives outlined in this policy must be addressed as well.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/comments-draft-national-policy-on-electronics

CCI allowed to probe Ericsson: FAQs on Ericsson’s disputes with Micromax and Intex

nehaa — 2016-05-01T13:46:52Z

The blog post is an analysis of the recent decision of the Delhi High Court, clarifying that the Competition Commission of India could investigate Ericsson for a violation of competition law. A shorter version of this blog post was published in the Quint on April 30, 2016.

Read the original article published by Quint on April 30 here.

The mobile phone is the sole access point to the internet for about half of India’s population. It has an important role to play in India’s development story, one that is amplified given the central government’s focus on leveraging the internet for better governance. The government has recognized this importance, evidenced through electronics manufacturing incentives and, a stated commitment to ensure ‘universal access to mobile connectivity’. Homegrown brands, including Micromax and Intex, with their affordable, low-cost mobile phones, play an important role in this development story.

In March, 2013, the Swedish multinational, Ericsson, sued Micromax for patent infringement, setting in motion a series of events, with the potential to disturb India’s mobile phone dream. Then, last month, the Delhi High Court (the Court) recognized the authority of the market regulator - the Competition Commission of India (CCI) - to probe Ericsson for its allegedly anticompetitive conduct.

Why did Ericsson sue Micromax?

Ericsson claims that Micromax’s mobile phones infringe its standard essential patents (SEPs) on mobile phone technologies, including 3G and EDGE.

How are some patents identified as SEPs?

International Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) – such as ETSI or IEEE - recognize international standards. 3G and Wi-Fi are examples of such internationally recognized standards.

According to the SSOs, the determination of standards depends on consensus, driven by their members. After a standard is determined, SEP owners (including Ericsson) voluntarily disclose which of their patents are essential to the determined standard, and, undertake to license these on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms, to any willing licensee.

Does this give rise to legal issues?

This process results in a variety of (well-documented) legal questions, many of which have been raised in India’s SEP litigation, and have been alluded to by the Court in the present judgment. The Court has recognized the potential for SEPs to create dominant positions for their owners, noting that “any technology accepted as a standard would have to be mandatorily followed [emphasis, mine] by all enterprises in the particular industry.”

Some other legal issues around SEPs include the enforceability of FRAND commitments; determining what would constitute ‘fair’, ‘reasonable’ and, ‘non-discriminatory’; the possibility of non/incomplete disclosure by patent owners; and, a refusal by licensees to negotiate FRAND terms in good faith. A related issue that has received comparatively less attention is the essentiality of peripheral or, non standard but essential patents, where there is no obligation to license on FRAND terms.

Have there been other SEP infringement suits filed in India?

Yes. Besides Micromax, Ericsson has also sued other low-cost mobile phone sellers/manufacturers, homegrown and otherwise, for patent infringement. These include Intex, Lava, Gionee, Xia and iBall. In addition, Vringo has also sued ZTE and Asus, separately. [In this article, we will limit ourselves to a discussion on Ericsson’s suits against Micromax and Intex.]

What did Micromax and Intex do after being sued by Ericsson?

Ericsson’s suits were followed by deliberations between the parties (Ericsson and Micromax, and, Ericsson and Intex, independently) and some interim orders by the Court. This litigation is ongoing, and final orders are awaited.

Meanwhile, both Micromax and Intex have pursued a series of other remedies. Intex has filed applications for the revocation of Ericsson’s patents. In addition, Micromax and Intex have each filed separate complaints under India’s Competition Act, 2002 before the CCI, alleging that Ericsson had abused its dominant position. This is a punishable offence under Indian competition law.

Micromax and Intex have both claimed that Ericsson’s royalty rates were excessive. In addition, Micromax has objected to Ericsson’s use of the threat of injunctions and custom seizures, and, has also claimed that Ericsson’s conduct results in a denial of market access for Indian handset manufacturers. Intex has alleged, inter alia, that it was forced into signing an onerous non disclosure agreement by Ericsson; and, that it was forced to negotiate licences without a complete disclosure of its patents by Ericsson.

The CCI, finding there to be a prima facie case in each of the above complaints, ordered the Director General to undertake an investigation into the allegations made by both – Micromax and Intex. These orders were challenged by Ericsson in the Court.

On what grounds did Ericsson challenge the CCI’s orders?

Briefly, Ericsson argued-

(a) that the issue was one of patent law, which barred the applicability of competition law;

(b) that it was not an ‘enterprise’ under the Competition Act, 2002, and, that the CCI was empowered to check anticompetitive conduct only of ‘enterprises’;

(d) that since the disputes between the parties were already being heard in other proceedings before the Court, the CCI could not adjudicate them; and,

(e) that Intex and Micromax were barred from making such allegations. Ericsson opined that since they had challenged its ownership of the SEPs, through revocation of petition applications (filed by Intex), and a denial of infringement claims (by Micromax), they could not now present a complaint premised on it being the owner of those same SEPs.

What did the Court hold?

Rejecting Ericsson’s arguments, the Court held that the CCI did [emphasis, mine] have the jurisdiction to examine if Ericsson’s conduct was anticompetitive, finding it to be an ‘enterprise’ under the Competition Act, 2002. However, the Court was clear that the CCI’s actions could be subject to judicial review by the High Court. It also found that the mere applicability of the Patents Act, 1970, did not bar the applicability of competition law, since the legislations covered distinct fields and served different purposes. Further, it opined that Micromax and Intex were free to explore alternative remedies; neither this pursuit, nor, the pendency of disputes on similar issues before the Court, was a bar to the CCI’s jurisdiction.

Interestingly, while not adjudicating the issue of Ericsson’s abuse of dominance in this particular case, Justice Bakhru, citing its conduct as presented by the other parties said that in some cases, “such conduct, if it is found, was directed in pressuring an implementer to accept non-FRAND terms, would amount to an abuse of dominance.”

What does the judgment mean for India’s homegrown brands?

The judgment is a boost for India’s home grown manufacturers in their battle against global patent holders. However, while it certainly validates the role and powers of India’s young market regulator, it will no doubt be appealed. One also expects multiple appeals over the CCI’s findings in the present and, future similar cases.

It is impossible to predict the outcome of legal proceedings in SEP litigation. Accordingly, Micromax, Intex (and others) would do well to augment their own patent portfolios (either by filing their own patents, or, by acquiring those of other companies). This may create a more level playing field, opening up alternate channels of negotiation, including, cross-licensing. They may also seek access to Ericsson’s SEPs under the compulsory licensing mechanism in India’s patent law.

What does the government have to say?

The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion has recently released a discussion paper on these issues, inviting comments from stakeholders. It would be unsurprising if the government intends to regulate this space, given the strong implications for not just its flagship Make in India and Digital India programs, but also its foreign policy narrative on protecting IPRs and fostering innovation. Immediate welcome steps from the government would be a final word on the National IPR Policy, and, the adoption of the National Competition Policy, awaited since 2014 and 2011, respectively.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/the-quint-nehaa-chaudhari-april-30-2016-cci-allowed-to-probe-ericsson

Arguments Against the PUPFIP Bill

pranesh — 2011-09-12T11:03:09Z

The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill (PUPFIP Bill) is a new legislation being considered by Parliament, which was introduced in the 2008 winter session of the Rajya Sabha. It is modelled on the American Bayh-Dole Act (University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act) of 1980. On this page, we explore some of the reasons that the bill is unnecessary, and how it will be harmful if passed.

Summary

How is the legislation unnecessary?

The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.
Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

How is the legislation harmful?

Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retards innovation.
The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.
Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of “public funded IP”.
It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.
It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.
Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.
Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

Arguments

How is the legislation unnecessary?

1) The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.

The idea behind the Bayh-Dole Act was that the research funded by the government (and owned, in the US, by the government) was being underutilized. In 1980, over 28,000 unlicensed patents lay with the U.S. government.[1] The Act shifted the title of such works from the government to the University or small business that conducted the research, thus allowing them to take out patents on the research outputs. In India, under present laws, the researcher(s) own the rights over their research whether they be government-funded or not. Usually, due to employment contracts, the research institutes already have the right to patent their inventions. Thus, currently, there is no need for an enabling legislation in this regard, as there was in the U.S.

In fact, currently, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has over 5173 patents (counting both those in force and those under dispute), while only 222 patents are licensed (with 68 of them being under dispute). Thus, even with the IP being in the institute's hands, there is a "problem" situation similar to that which necessitated Bayh-Dole in the U.S. Thus, quite contrary to the aims of the Act, further patenting will only lead to a situation of even more underutilized patents.

2) Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

At a recent seminar held at NUJS Kolkata on the PUPFIP Bill, it was revealed that while IIT-Kharagpur’s TTO-equivalent (called the Sponsored Research & Industrial Consultancy division - SRIC) currently handles over Rs.300 crores through 850 projects, only around Rs. 5-15 crores (exact figures weren't available) are currently made through its patent portfolio.[2] Thus patents don't seem, on the face of things, to be the best way of ensuring technology transfer. Indeed, the oft-cited 28,0000 unlicensed patents held by the U.S. government were composed primarily of patents for which industry had refused to take exclusive licences.[3]

Many contend that one of the most important functions of a patent is to get inventors to disclose their inventions rather than keep them as secrets. This reason for awarding a patent is invalidated if stronger protection is granted to trade secrets (no term limit, for instance) than for patents. Secondly, this reason for granting patents is not valid in case of government-funded research in academia and research institutes. The culture of publication and the economy of reputation are sufficient to ensure disclosure. Even without these intrinsic factors, there grant requirements can necessitate publication. If mere publication is believed to be insufficient, then the government would do well to ask for technology dissemination plans before grants are made. At any rate, monopoly rights in the form of patents are thoroughly unnecessary.

How is the legislation harmful?

1) Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retard innovation.

It sees protection of IPR as the sole means of encouraging innovation and driving research to the doorstep of consumers. The trend around the world is that of exploring alternative forms of spurring innovation. Even in India, CSIR has gone for an innovative "Open Source Drug Discovery" project, which has proven very successful so far. Furthermore, recent literature shows that excessive patenting is harming research and innovation by creating gridlocks.[4] If platform technologies and basic research (such as SNP) gets mired in patents, then the transaction costs increase (not only in terms of money, but more importantly in administrative terms). This ends up in research clearances getting blocked, and thus retards innovation. It must be remembered that intellectual property is not only an output, but also an input. The more aggressively the outputs are guarded and prevented from being shared, the more the inputs will be affected. The study of patent thickets and gridlocks has reached such a stage that the U.S. law has been changed to reflect this. Firstly, the Bayh-Dole Act was amended in 2000 to state that the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act were to be carried out "without unduly encumbering future research and discovery". Now, the courts (in the Bilski case) have increased the standard of obviousness in patent law (which means that less patents will be granted). Furthermore, the U.S.P.T.O. and the U.S. Senate are currently considering means of overhauling the U.S. patent system, which many fear is close to breaking down due to over-patenting. All these are signs that the footsteps we are seeking to follow are themselves turning back.

2) The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.

While the CSIR labs pursue patents aggressively, they also run the OSSD project. The latter might not be permissible if the Act is passed as it stands. Furthermore, this would increase the number of underutilized patents, which is a problem faced currently by CSIR, which has had an aggressive patent policy since the 1990s. Unlicensed patents constitute around 93% of CSIR's total patent portfolio. (In contrast, MIT averages around 50% licensing of patents.) If aggressive patenting is made mandatory, it adds substantially to administrative costs of all institutes which receive any grants from the government. These institutes might not be large enough to merit a dedicated team of professionals to handle

3) Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of "public funded IP".

This leads to a ridiculous need to attempt to commercialise all government-funded research literature (and the government funds science research, social sciences, arts, etc.). Furthermore, while the definition of "public funded IP" includes copyrights, trademarks, etc., yet the substantive provisions seem to only include those forms of IP which have to be registered compulsorily (copyright and trademark don't -- copyright comes into existence when an original work is expressed in a medium, and trademark can come into existence by use). Importantly, seeking to commercialise all copyrighted works of research would hamper the movement for open access to scholarly literature. The inititative towards open access to scholarly literature is something that National Knowledge Commission has recommended, and is a move that would result in increased dissemination of public-funded research, which seems to be an aim of the PUPFIP Bill as well.

4) It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.

This bill would increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research, because of the additional burden of patent royalties.

Public funds research -> Institute patents research -> Pharma MNC gets exclusive license over research -> Drug reaches market.

Assuming an exclusive licence: Cost of the drug = cost of manufacturing, storage, etc. + mark-up (monopolistic) cost + cost of licence.

Thus, in effect, the public has to pay twice for the research: it pays once to enable the scientist to conduct the research, and once again in the form of royalties to have that research brought to the marketplace.

5) It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.

The former could happen since institutions and individual scientists have a financial incentive to shift their focus away from fundamental research; the latter, conversely, because the filings and bureaucracy involved could drive scientists away from reporting or even engaging in industrial research [pdf]. Faculty and researcher involvement in the business of licensing is a sub-optimal usage of their talents, and there are scientists who would rather stay away from business (as is shown by the intake of former industry-researchers into government-funded labs such as those of CSIR).

6) Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.

This will bring about a shift in science and research which is always done upon others' work. This is why in the U.S., the National Institute of Health (N.I.H.) has sought to ensure (without any legal authority) that it only finances that research that on single nucleotide polymorphism (S.N.P.) which is not patented, and is shared freely amongst scholars. Since this requirement of the N.I.H.'s does not have any legal backing (since it is contradictory to the Bayh-Dole Act), institutions are free to get the grant from N.I.H. and then go ahead and patent their inventions.

7) Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

The bill allows for both assignment of licences as well as exclusive licences. Both of these enable monopolistic pricing to be undertaken by the licensee/assignee. There are not even any mechanisms in the Act to ensure, for instance, that a public call is made to ascertain that no parties are willing to consider a non-exclusive licence. Patents are generally said to grant a monopoly right because of the opportunity to recover costs of research and development. When the research is being done by public-funded money, there is no justification for monopoly rights on that research, since there are no excessive costs to recover.

Footnotes:

[1] See So et al. and Thursby and Thursby, quoted in the National Knowledge Commission's letter to the Prime Minister.

[2] See Prof. Vivekanandans' presentation "Patenting and Technology Transfer-the IIT Khargpur Experience"

[3] See Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol e262 (2008)

[4] See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998)

Additional Resources

On the PUPFIP Bill

February 5, 2004: NIPER holds parallel session of Indian Science Congress (Express Pharma)
October 27, 2006: Susan Finston, India to Propose New Technology Transfer Legislation (Bayh-Dole 25)
January 16, 2007: National Knowledge Commision's Letter to Indian Prime Minister (National Knowledge Commission)
April 15, 2007: Archita Bhatta, Proposed IPR law raises concern (Down to Earth)
May 31, 2007: Science & Technology needs to be core of the economic development says Kapil Sibal (PIB Press Release)
November 13, 2007: Government Accords Approval to National Biotechnology Development Strategy (PIB Press Release)
February 1, 2008: Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Indian Government Hopes Bill Will Stimulate Innovation (Science)
February 19, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Exporting Bayh Dole to India: Whither Transparency? (Part 1) (Part 2) (SpicyIP)
March 17, 2008: Kalpana Pathak, Varsities may soon own patent rights (Business Standard)
March 17, 2008: P.T. Jyothi Datta, Public-funded research may pay dividends for scientists (Business Line)
March 17, 2008: Joff Wild, India considers Bayh-Dole style legislation (IAM Magazine)
April 30, 2008: M.K. Unnikrishnan and Pradeepti Nayak, Lessons from Bayh Dole Act and its relevance to India (PharmaBiz)
July 2008: Sean M. O'Connor, Historical Context of U.S. Bayh-Dole Act: Implications for Indian Government Funded Research Patent Policy (STEM Newsletter)
July 7, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Mysterious Indian "Bayh Dole" Bill: SpicyIP Procures a Copy (SpicyIP)
July 09, 2008: Latha Jishnu, Does India need a Bayh-Dole Act? (Business Standard)
September 2008: V.C. Vivekanandan, Transplanting Bayh-Dole Act- Issues at Stake Authors (13 Journal of Intell. Prop. 480)
September 18, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Indian Patent Bill: Let's not be too hasty (SciDev.net)
October 28, 2008: Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol e262 (2008)
October 31, 2008: Cabinet gives approval for Protection and Utilization of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008 (PIB Press Release)
November 2008: Annette Lin et al., The Bayh-Dole Act and Promoting the Transfer of Technology of Publicly Funded-Research (UAEM White Paper on the Proposed Indian Bayh-Dole Analogue)
November 1, 2008: Editorial: Not in Public Interest (Mint)
November 12, 2008: Ben Butkus, As India Mulls Bill Modeled on Bayh-Dole, Critics Claim It May Stifle Innovation (Biotech Transfer Weekly)
December 16, 2008: Pranesh Prakash, Indian "Bayh Dole" Bill before Parliament (Commons Law)
January 23, 2009: Editorial: Time to Rethink Intellectual Property Laws (SciDev.net)
March 12, 2009: Feroz Ali Khader, Does Patenting Research Change the Culture of Science? (The Hindu)
April 24, 2009: Sunil Abraham & Pranesh Prakash, Does India Need Its Own Bayh-Dole? (Indian Express)
September 21, 2009: C.H. Unnikrishnan, Proposed Patent Bill Is Flawed, Say Experts (Mint)
September 23, 2009: Editorial: An Idea That's A Patent Misfit (Mint)
October 2009: Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Model in Developing Countries: Reflections on the Indian Bill on Publicly Funded Intellectual Property (UNCTAD - ICTSD Policy Brief No. 5)
January 2010: Amit Shovon Ray & Sabyasachi Saha, Patenting Public-Funded Research for Technology Transfer: A Conceptual-Empirical Synthesis of US Evidence and Lessons for India (ICRIER Working Paper No. 244)
January 2010: Mrinalini Kochupillai, The Protection and Utilization of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008: A Critique in the Light of India's Innovation Environment, 15 J. Intell. Prop. Rights 19 (2010)
January 16, 2010: Amit Shovon Ray & Sabyasachi Saha, Intellectual Bottlenecks (Financial Express)
January 21, 2010: Latha Jishnu, Perils of the US Model (Business Standard)
January 22, 2010: Rema Nagarajan, Scientists Fume Over New Patent Bill (Times of India)
January 26, 2010: Shamnad Basheer, The Problem with Patents (Mint)
February 5, 2010: Shalini Butani, Public Research May Become More Private (Business Line)
February 8, 2010: Anika Gupta, Scientists Want Changes in Innovation Bill (Mint)
February 9, 2010: C.H. Unnikrishnan, Parliament Panel Wants Govt Review on Innovation Bill (Mint)
February 15, 2010: Leena Menghaney, A Bad Example from the U.S. (Down to Earth)
February 19, 2010: Pranesh Prakash, A Patent Conundrum (Indian Express)
SpicyIP coverage by tag 'Bayh Dole'
Presentations from NUJS, Kolkata conference on the PUPFIP Bill

On Bayh-Dole

Newspapers and Magazines

Academic Journals

Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovation, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1031 (2005)
Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol. e262 (2008)
Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 289 (2003)
David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Aiedonis, Numbers, Quality, and Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?, 1 Innovation Pol'y Econ. 187 (2000)
David C. Mowery, et al., Learning to Patent: Institutional Experience, Learning, and the Characteristics of U.S. University Patents After the Bayh-Dole Act, 1981-1992, 48 Mgmt. Sci. 73 (2002)
Donald Kennedy, Editorial: Enclosing the Research Commons, 294 Science 2249 (2001)
F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 Colorado J. Telecomm. High Tech. L. 167 (2009)
Henry Steck, Corporatization of the University: Seeking Conceptual Clarity, 585 Annals of Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 66 (2003)
Jason Owen-Smith, Trends and Transitions in the Institutional Environment for Public and Private Science, 49 Higher Educ. 91 (2005)
Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 Science 1052 (2003)
Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Who is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing, 48 Mgmt. Sci. 90 (2002)
Josh Lerner, Review of 'Ivory Tower', 43 J. Econ. Litt. 510 (2005)
Joshua B. Powers, R&D Funding Source and University Technology Transfer: What is Stimulating Universities to Be More Entrepreneurial?, 45 Research in Higher Educ. 1 (2004)
Lita Nelsen, The Rise of Intellectual Property Protection in the American University, 279 Science 1460 (1998)
Marcia Angell & Arnold S. Relman, Patents, Profits & American Medicine: Conflicts of Interest in the Testing & Marketing of New Drugs, 131 Daedalus 102 (2002)
Maria Jelenik, Review: Two Books on Technology Transfer, 50 Admin. Sci. Q. 131 (2005) (Review of 'Ivory Tower')
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998)
Rebecca Henderson, et al., Universities as a Source of Commercia Technology: A Detailed Analsis of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 80 Rev. Econ. Statistics 119 (1998)
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsorded Research, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1663 (1996)
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Richard R. Nelson, Public vs. Proprietary Science: A Fruitful Tension?, 131 Daedalus 89 (2002)
Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 240 (2001)
Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories about the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. Econ. Issues 1031 (1998)
Thomas A. Massaro, Innovation, Technology Transfer, and Patent Policy: The University Contribution, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1729 (1996)
Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, Universities and the Market for Intellectual Property in the Life Sciences, 17 J. Pol'y Analysis Mgmt. 253 (1998)
William M. Sage, Funding Fairness: Public Investment, Proprietary Rights and Access to Health Care Technology, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1737 (1996)
Zach W. Hall & Christopher Scott, University-Industry Partnership, 291 Science 553 (2001)

Resources

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/publications/pupfip/why-no-pupfip

Arguments Against Software Patents in India

pranesh — 2012-03-13T10:43:12Z

CIS believes that software patents are harmful for the software industry and for consumers. In this post, Pranesh Prakash looks at the philosophical, legal and practical reasons for holding such a position in India. This is a slightly modified version of a presentation made by Pranesh Prakash at the iTechLaw conference in Bangalore on February 5, 2010, as part of a panel discussing software patents in India, the United States, and the European Union.

This blog post is based on a presentation made at the iTechLaw conference held on February 5, 2010. The audience consisted of lawyers from various corporations and corporate law firms. As is their wont, most lawyers when dealing with software patents get straight to an analysis of law governing the patenting of computer programmes in India and elsewhere, and seeing whether any loopholes exist and can be exploited to patent software. It was refreshing to see at least some lawyers actually going into questions of the need for patents to cover computer programs. In my presentation, I made a multi-pronged case against software patents: (1) philosophical justification against software patents based on the nature of software; (2) legal case against software patents; (3) practical reasons against software patents.

Preamble

Through these arguments, it is sought to be shown that patentability of software is not some arcane, technical question of law, but is a real issue that affect the continued production of new software and the everyday life of the coder/hacker/software programmer/engineer as well as consumers of software (which is, I may remind you, everywhere from your pacemaker to your phone). A preamble to the arguments would note that the main question to ask is: why should we allow for patenting of software? Answering this question will lead us to ask: who benefits from patenting of software. The conclusion that I come to is that patenting of software helps three categories of people: (1) those large software corporations that already have a large number of software patents; (2) those corporations that do not create software, but only trade in patents / sue on the basis of patents ("patent trolls"); (3) patent lawyers. How they don't help small and medium enterprises nor society at large (since they deter, rather than further invention) will be borne out by the rest of these arguments, especially the section on practical reasons against software patents.

What are Patents?

Patents are a twenty-year monopoly granted by the State on any invention. An invention has to have at least four characteristics: (0) patentable subject matter; (1) novelty (it has to be new); (2) inventive step / non-obviousness (even if new, it should not be obvious); (3) application to industry. A monopoly over that invention, thus means that if person X has invented something, then I may not use the core parts of that invention ("the essential claims") in my own invention. This prohibition applies even if I have come upon my invention without having known about X's invention. (Thus, independent creation is not a defence to patent infringement. This distinguishes it, for instance, from copyright law in which two people who created the same work independently of each other can both assert copyright.) Patents cover non-abstract ideas/functionality while copyright covers specific expressions of ideas. To clarify: imagine I make a drawing of a particular machine and describe the procedure of making it. Under patent law, no one else can make that particular machine, while under copyright law, no one can copy that drawing.

Philosophical Justification Against Software Patents

Even without going into the case against patents per se (lack of independent creation as a defence; lack of 'harm' as a criterion leading to internalization of all positive externalities; lack of effective disclosure and publication; etc.), which has been done much more ably by others like Bessen & Meurer (especially in their book Patent Failure) and Boldrin & Levine (in their book Against Intellectual Monopoly, the full text of which is available online).

But there is one essentially philosophical argument against software as subject matter of a patent. Software/computer programs ("instructions for a computer"), as any software engineer would tell you, are merely algorithms ("an effective method for solving a problem using a finite sequence of instructions") that are meant to be understood by a computer or a human who knows how to read that code.

Algorithms are not patentable subject matter, as they are mere expressions of abstract ideas, and not inventions in themselves. Computer programs, similarly, are abstract ideas. They only stop being abstract ideas when embodied in a machine or a process in which it is the machine/process that is the essential claim and not the software. That machine or process being patented would not grant protection to the software itself, but to the whole machine or process. Thus the abstract part of that machine/process (i.e., the computer program) could be used in any other machine/process, as it it is not the subject matter of the patent. Importantly, just because software is required to operate some machine would then not mean that the machine itself is not patentable, just that the software cannot be patented in guise of patenting a machine.

Legal Case Against Software Patents

In India, section 3(k) of the Patent Act reads:

(3) The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act: (k) a mathematical or business method or computer programme (sic) per se or algorithms.

As one can see, computer programs are place in the same category as "mathematical methods", "algorithms", and "business methods", hence giving legal validity to the idea propounded in the previous section that computer programs are a kind of algorithms (just as algorithms are a kind of mathematical method).

Be that as it may, the best legal minds in India have had to work hard at understanding what exactly "computer programme per se" means. They have cited U.S. case law, U.K. case law, E.U. precedents, and sought to arrive at an understanding of how per se should be understood. While understanding what per se means might be a difficult job, it is much easier to see what it does not mean. For that, we can look at the 2004 Patent Ordinance that Parliament rejected in 2005. In that ordinance, sections 3(k) and (ka) read as follows:

(3) The following are not inventions within the meaning of this Act: (k) a computer programme per se other than its technical application to industry or a combination with hardware; (ka) a mathematical method or a business method or algorithms.

Thus, it is clear that the interpretation that "computer programme per se" excludes "a computer programme that has technical application to industry" and "a computer programme in combination with hardware" is wrong. By rejecting the 2004 Ordinance wording, Parliament has clearly shown that "technical application to industry" and "combination with hardware" do not make a computer programme patentable subject matter.

Indeed, what exactly is "technical application to industry"? "Technical" has various definitions, and a perusal through those definitions would show that barely any computer program can be said not to relate to a technique, not involve "specialized knowledge of applied arts and sciences" (it is code, after all; not everyone can write good algorithms), or not relate to "a practical subject that is organized according to scientific principles" or is "technological". Similarly, all software is, by definition, meant to be used in combination with hardware. Thus, it being used in combination with hardware must not, as argued above, give rise to patentability of otherwise unpatentable subject matter category.

In 2008, the Patent Office published a new 'Draft Manual Of Patent Practice And Procedure' in which it sought to allow patenting of certain method claims for software inventions (while earlier the Patent Office objected to method claims, allowing only device claims with hardware components). This Draft Manual was withdrawn from circulation, with Shri N.N. Prasad (then Joint Secretary of DIPP, the department administering the Patent Office) noting that the parts of the Manual on sections 3(d) and 3(k) had generated a lot of controversy, and were ultra vires the scope of the Manual (which could not override the Patent Act). He promised that those parts would be dropped and the Manual would be re-written. A revised draft of the Manual has not yet been released. Thus the interpretation provided in the Draft Manual (which was based heavily on the interpretation of the U.K. courts) cannot not be relied upon as a basis for arguments in favour of the patentability of software in India.

In October 2008, CIS helped organize a National Public Meeting on Software Patents in which Indian academics, industry, scientists, and FOSS enthusiasts all came to the conclusion that software patents are harmful for both the industry as well as consumers.

Practical Reasons Against Software Patents

This is going to be an attempt at distilling and simplifying some of the main practical arguments against patenting of software.

There are traditionally four incentives that the patent system caters to: (1) incentive to invent; (2) incentive to disclose; (3) incentive to commercialize; and (4) incentive to invent substitutes. Apart from the last, patenting of software does not really aid any of them.

Patent Landmines / Submarine Patents / Patent Gridlocks / No Exception for Independent Creation

Given that computer programs are algorithms, having monopolies over such abstract ideas is detrimental to innovation. Just the metaphors say a lot about software patents: landmines (they cannot be seen/predicted); submarines (they surface out of the blue); gridlocks (because there are so many software patents around the same area of computing, they prevent further innovation in that area, since no program can be written without violating one patent or the other).

Imagine the madness that would have ensued had patents been granted when computer programming was in its infancy. Imagine different methods of sorting (quick sort, bubble sort) that are part of Computer Science 101 had been patented. While those particular instances aren't, similar algorithms, such as data compression algorithms (including the infamous LZW compression method), have been granted patents. Most importantly, even if one codes certain functionality into software independently of the patent holder, that is still violative of the patent. Computer programs being granted patents makes it extremely difficult to create other computer programs that are based on the same abstract ideas. Thus incentives # (1) and (3) are not fulfilled, and indeed, they are harmed. There is no incentive to invent, as one would always be violating one patent or the other. Given that, there is no incentive to commercialize what one has invented, because of fear of patent infringement suits.

An apt illustration of this is the current difficulty of choosing a royalty-free video format for HTML 5, as it shows, in practical terms, how difficult it is to create a video format without violating one patent or the other. While the PNG image format was created to side-step the patent over the LZW compression method used in the GIF image format, bringing Ogg Theora or Dirac (both patent-free video format) to surpass the levels of H.264/MPEG-4 AVC or VC-1 will be very difficult without infringing dozens if not hundreds of software patents. Chris DiBona of Google, while talking about improving Ogg Theora as part of its inclusion in HTML 5 specifications said, "Here’s the challenge: Can Theora move forward without infringing on the other video compression patents?" Just the number of companies and organization that hold patents over H.264 is astounding, and includes: Columbia University, Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute of Korea (ETRI), France Télécom, Fujitsu, LG Electronics, Matsushita, Mitsubishi, Microsoft, Motorola, Nokia, Philips, Robert Bosch GmbH, Samsung, Sharp, Sony, Toshiba, and Victor Company of Japan (JVC). As is the amount of royalties to be paid ("[t]he maximum royalty for these rights payable by an Enterprise (company and greater than 50% owned subsidiaries) is $3.5 million per year in 2005-2006, $4.25 million per year in 2007-08 and $5 million per year in 2009-10"; with royalty per unit of a decoder-encoder costing upto USD 0.20.)

Indeed, even the most diligent companies cannot guard themselves against software patents. FFII estimates that a very simple online shopping website would violate twenty different patents at the very least. Microsoft recently lost a case against i4i when i4i surfaced with a patent covering custom XML as implemented in MS Office 2003 and MS Office 2007. As a result Microsoft had to ship patches to its millions of customers, to disable the functionality and bypass that patent. The manufacturers of BlackBerry, the Canadian company Research in Motion, had to shell out USD 617 million as settlement to NTP over wireless push e-mail, as it was otherwise faced with the possibility of the court shutting down the BlackBerry service in the U.S. This happened despite there being a well-known method of doing so pre-dating the NTP patents. NTP has also filed cases against AT&T, Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile, Verizon Wireless, and Palm Inc. Microsoft was also hit by Visto Corporation over those same NTP patents, which had been licensed to Visto (a startup).
- Don't These Cases Show How Software Patents Help Small Companies?
  
  The astute reader might be tempted to ask: are not all of these examples of small companies getting their dues from larger companies? Doesn't all of this show that software patents actually help small and medium enterprises (SMEs)? The answer to that is: no. To see why, we need to note the common thread binding i4i, NTP, and Visto. None of them were, at the time of their lawsuits, actually creating new software, and NTP was an out-and-out "non-practising entity"/"patent holding company" AKA, patent troll. i4i was in the process of closing shop, and Visto had just started up. None of these were actually practising the patent. None of these were producing any other software. Thus, none of these companies had anything to lose by going after big companies. In other words, the likes of Microsoft, RIM, Verizon, AT&T, etc., could not file counter-suits of patent infringement, which is normally what happens when SMEs try to assert patent rights against larger corporations. For every patent that the large corporation violates of the smaller corporation, the smaler corporation would be violating at least ten of the larger corporation's. Software patents are more helpful for software companies as a tool for cross-licensing rather than as a way of earning royalties. Even this does not work as a strategy against patent trolls.
Thus, the assertion that was made at the beginning is borne out: software patents help only patent trolls, large corporations that already have large software patent portfolios, and the lawyers who draft these patents and later argue them out in court.
Term of Patents

Twenty years of monopoly rights is outright ludicrous in an industry where the rate of turnover of technology is much faster -- anywhere between two years and five months.
Software Industry Progressed Greatly Without Patents

In India, software patents have never been asserted in courts (even though many have been illegally granted), yet the software industry in India is growing in leaps and bounds. Similarly, most of the big (American) giants of the software industry today grew to their stature by using copyright to "protect" their software, and not patents.
Copyright Exists for Software

As noted above, the code/expression of any software is internationally protected by copyright law. There is no reason to protect the ideas/functionality of that software as well.
Insufficient Disclosure

When ordinary computer programmers cannot understand what a particular software patent covers (which is the overwhelming case), then the patent is of no use. One of the main incentives of the patent system is to encourage gifted inventors to share their genius with the world. It is not about gifted inventors paying equally gifted lawyers to obfuscate their inventions into gobbledygook so that other gifted inventors can at best hazard a guess as to precisely what is and is not covered by that patent. Thus, this incentive (#2) is not fulfilled by the current system of patents either -- not unless there is a major overhaul of the system. This ties in with the impossibility of ensuring that one is not violating a software patent. If a reasonably smart software developer (who are often working as individuals, and as part of SMEs) cannot quickly ascertain whether one is violating patents, then there is a huge disincentive against developing software in that area at all.
Software Patents Work Against Free/Libre/Open Source Software

Software patents hinder the development of software and FOSS licences, as the licensee is not allowed to restrict the rights of the sub-licensees over and above the restrictions that the licensee has to observe. Thus, all patent clearances obtained by the licensee must be passed on to the sub-licensees. Thus, patented software, though most countries around the world do not recognize them, are generally not included in the default builds of many FOSS operating systems. This inhabits the general adoption of FOSS, since many of the software patents, even though not enforceable in India, are paid heed to by the software that Indians download, and the MP3 and DivX formats are not enabled by default in standard installations of a Linux OS such as Ubuntu.

Conclusion

Currently, the U.S. patent system is being reviewed at the administrative level, the legislative level, as well as the judicial level. At the judicial level, the question of business method patents (and, by extension, software patents) is before the Supreme Court of the United States of America in the form of Bilski v. Kappos. Judge Mayer of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC, which heard In re Bilksi) noted that "the patent system has run amok". The Free Software Foundation submitted a most extensive amicus curiae brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, filled with brilliant analysis of software patents and arguments against the patentability of software that is well worth a read.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/arguments-against-software-patents

A Guide to Key IPR Provisions of the Proposed India-European Union Free Trade Agreement

glover — 2011-08-30T13:06:03Z

The Centre for Internet and Society presents a guide for policymakers and other stakeholders to the latest draft of the India-European Union Free Trade Agreement, which likely will be concluded by the end of the year and may hold serious ramifications for Indian businesses and consumers.

In its ongoing negotiation for a FTA with the EU, a process that began in 2007 and is expected to end sometime this year, India has won several signicant IP-related concessions. But there remain several IP issues critical to the maintenance of its developing economy, including its robust entrepreneurial environment, that India should contest further before ratifying the treaty. This guide covers the FTA's IP provisions that are within the scope of CIS' policy agenda and on which India has negotiated favorable language, as well as those provisions that it should re-negotiate or oppose.

Download the guide here, and please feel free to comment below.

You may also download a chart comparing the language proposed by India and the EU respectively with that included in the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).

Following is a summary of CIS' findings:

India has become a de facto leader of developing countries at the WTO, and an India-EU FTA seems likely to provide a model for FTAs between developed and developing states well into the future.
The EU has proposed articles on reproduction, communication, and broadcasting rights which could seriously undermine India's authority to regulate the use of works under copyright as currently provided for in the Berne Convention, as well as narrowing exceptions and limitations to rights under copyright.
The EU asserts that copyright includes "copyright in computer programs and in databases," without indicating whether such copyright exceeds that provided for in the Berne Convention. Moreover, by asserting that copyright "includes copyright in computer programs and in databases," the EU has left open the door for the extension of copyright to non-original databases.
India should explicitly obligate the EU to promote and encourage technology transfer -- an obligation compatible with and derived from TRIPS -- as well as propose a clear definition of technology transfer.
The EU has demanded India's accession to the WIPO Internet Treaties, the merits of which are currently under debate as India moves towards amending its Copyright Act, as well as several other international treaties that India either does not explicitly enforce or to which it is not a contracting party.
In general, the EU's provisions would extend terms of protection for material under copyright, within certain constraints, further endangering India's consumer-friendly copyright regime.
An agreement to establish arrangements between national organizations charged with collecting and distributing royalty payments may obligate such organizations in India collect royalty payments for EU rights holders on the same basis as they do for Indian rights holders, and vice versa in the EU, but more heavily burden India.
The EU has proposed a series of radical provisions on the enforcement of IPRs that are tailored almost exclusively to serve the interests of rights holders, at the expense of providing safety mechanisms for those accused of infringing or enabling infringers.
The EU has proposed, under cover of protecting intermediate service providers from liability for infringement by their users, to increase and/or place the burden on such providers of policing user activity.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/a-guide-to-the-proposed-india-european-union-free-trade-agreement

“Made in India” Innovation Policy

praskrishna — 2016-09-22T01:15:40Z

In this post they emphasize upon the need for data-driven IP policy making in India.

This blog post written by Prof Collen Chien and Prof Contreras, and published this week (September 19, 2016) on SpicyIP mentions CIS' patent landscaping study.

A few weeks ago we were honored to participate in Jindal Global Law School’s Conference on “Innovation for Shared Prosperity”. Much of the conversation was centered on the important topic of how intellectual property (IP) policy can best support manufacturing and entrepreneurship initiatives like the “Startup India” and “Make in India”. In turn, we believe it’s also important to think about how best to foster IP policies that are truly “made in India”. In light of India’s history of implementing certain IP policies because it had to, not because it wanted to, for example recent homegrown commitments to strengthen the patent system by reducing the time to patent are notable.

The record is already replete with examples of indigenous innovation by Indian policymakers. Whether section 3(d), Form 27 patent working disclosures, or the “Middle Path” approach to requiring deposits in standards essential patent disputes – agree or disagree with them, these Indian approaches to innovation policy are themselves innovative.

But one problem that we have observed is that the data available to develop and evaluate Indian IP policies tends to be thin. With respect to patents, for example, it is hard to access patent records, as there are often long delays before patent applications, patent working disclosures and other documents are uploaded to the Indian Patent Office (IPO) web site, notwithstanding statutory requirements and IPO policies. While there have been some published reports of cases and published decisions (Mathur 2007, Ghosh 2012), it is generally hard, as it is in other jurisdictions, to match patent filings to them to court filings, assignment records, citations, prior art and other metrics of interest. This isn’t true just of India but many other countries. But to support world class, data-driven policy making, support for analytical work, combined with data access, is needed. This is particularly important given the demonstrated gap between rules on the books, which may appear harmonized, and rules in practice, which are not.

In developing policy, it is often useful to start with the ultimate policy goal – whether it be further improving the country’s ranking on the Innovation Index or taking a place at the international standard setting table – and then developing data-based metrics to demonstrate progress toward that goal. The assumptions behind conflicting policy positions can then be tested and vetted against actual experience within the Indian setting. It is through these processes that a “made in India” innovation policy will be truly indigenous, reflecting not only political mandates and theories, but the demonstrated experience of India’s technical, business, and legal communities.

Historically, there have been relatively few empirical studies to support data-based policy making. In the non-exhaustive list below, we highlight several studies and reports (some our own) that demonstrate the usefulness and power of empirical data:

One topic about which there have been an exceptional number of empirical studies is the Indian pharmaceutical sector. Duggan and collaborators (2012, 2014) studied the relationship between drug prices and pharmaceutical patent issuances in India, and Lanjouw and Cockburn (2000) and Nandkumar and Srikanth (2011) explored the relationship between Indian patent issuance and strength and R&D spending. Recently Sampat and Shadlen have found that policies to discourage so-called “secondary” drug patents in India and Brazil have had little direct effect.

With the initiation by foreign patent holders a few years ago of infringement suits against a variety of domestic Indian and Chinese smartphone manufacturers, many wondered how much of the Indian mobile device patent landscape was already in the hands of foreign companies. Contreras, together with Rohini Lakshané of the Centre for Internet and Society, conducted a study to find out. Their results were telling: of approximately 23,500 total Indian patents and published patent applications in the mobile device sector, only 50, about 0.00% were owned by Indian companies. It is hoped that this eye-opening result will help mobilize Indian firms and policy makers to address the lack of Indian participation in international technology standardization efforts.

WIPO publishes statistics yearly about India’s relative rank with respect to a number of innovation metrics. While many are aware that India ranked 66th in this year’s Global Innovation Index, up 15 places from 2015 (Switzerland ranked 1st), WIPO’s 2015 IP indicators report contains other findings: that India ranks in the top 15 globally in terms of patent filing activity, that non-residents are using the Indian Patent Office more heavily than are residents (Fig. 2, p. 23) and that recent filings have been dominated by computer technology, organic fine chemistry and pharmaceuticals. Others have relied on WIPO statistics to compare India’s performance with that of China and other BRIC countries.

India is by nature an innovative nation. Its innovative spirit manifests itself both in terms of technology creation as well as policy development. Nevertheless, without robust, reproducible and broadly accessible data, policy decisions will continue to be based on intuition, guesswork and partisan advocacy by those having the most to gain from the system. We encourage the Indian government and academy to continue to devote resources to develop a robust data culture within the Indian intellectual property community and to make the underlying data as widely available as quickly as possible.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/news/spicy-ip-september-19-2016-prof-colleen-v-chien-and-prof-jorge-l-contreras-made-in-india-innovation-policy

'We Need to Proactively Ensure that People Can't File Patents Representative of the Creativity of a FOSS Community'

rohini — 2015-09-27T11:51:50Z

Rohini Lakshané attended “Open Innovation, Entrepreneurship, and Our Digital Culture” in Bangalore on August 13, 2015. Major takeaways from the event are documented in this post.

Speakers: Prof. Eben Moglen, Keith Bergelt, and Mishi Choudhary; Panel discussion moderator: Venkatesh Hariharan. See the event page here. The organizers republished Rohini's report on their website.

Prof. Eben Moglen on FOSS and entrepreneurship

The culture of business in the 21^st century needs open source software or free software because there is one Internet governed by one set of rules, protocols and APIs that make it possible for us to interact with each another. The Internet made everybody interdependent on everybody else. Startup culture needs free and open source software (FOSS) because startups are an insurgency, a guerrilla activity in business. The incumbents in a capitalistic world dislikes competition and detests that existing resources, such as FOSS, enable insurgents to circumvent some of the steep curve that they had to climb in order to become incumbents.
Hardware is developing in ways that make the idea of proprietary development of software obsolete. There is no large producer of proprietary software that isn't also dependent on FOSS. Microsoft Cloud is based on deployments that do not use Windows but are based on FOSS. The era of Android as a semi-closed, semi-proprietary form of FOSS is over. Big and small companies around the world are exploiting the open source nature of Android.
Free software is a renewable resource not a commodity. Management is needed to avoid over-consumption or destruction of the FOSS ecosystem. Software is to the 21^st century economic life what coal, steel, and rare earth metals were at the end of the previous century.
FOSS turned out to be about developing human brains. It turned out to be about using human intelligence in software better. Earlier universities, engineering colleges and research institutions were the greatest manufacturers and users of FOSS. Now businesses of all sizes are.
When Richard Stallman and Prof. Eben Moglen set out to make GPL free, they initiated a large public discussion process, the primary goal of which was to ensure that individual developers have as much right to talk and to be heard as loudly as the largest firms in the world. At the end of the negotiation process, 35 or 36 of the largest patent holders in the IT industry accepted the basic agreement to be a part of the commons. --- Incumbents like people to pay for a seat at the table. Paying to have an opinion is a pretty serious part of the landscape of the patent system.

Prof. Eben Moglen on Digital India

Every e-governance project that the Indian government buys should use FOSS. The very nature of the way the citizens and governments interact can come to be mediated by software that people can read, understand, modify, and improve. An enormous ecosystem will come up -- a kind of public–private partnership (PPP) in the improvement of governance and government services, which is far more useful than most other forms of PPP conceptualised in the developed world in the 20^th century.
Everybody has a stake in the success of this policy. Several corporations are working against this policy as they once stated that they do not need FOSS.
The biggest market for both making and consuming software in the world is in India, because the science done here will dominate global software making, which in turn will define how the Internet works, which in turn will define society. One can't develop the largest society on earth by reinventing the wheel. The government is going to understand that only the sharing of knowledge and the sharing of forms of inventing would enable the largest society in the world to develop itself freely and take its place in the forefront of digital humanity.
If every state government's data centre across India is going to be turned into a cloud, one state might have VMWare, another might have AWS, and so on, it would be disastrous. To prevent this, all e-governance activities of every state government and federal agency in India could be conducted in one, big, homogeneous Indian cloud. This would enable utility computing across the country for all citizens, which would also make room for citizen computing to happen. When one moves towards architectures of omnipresent utility computing with large amounts of memory flatly available to everybody, one is going to be describing a national computing environment for a billion people. We can't even begin to model it until we start accomplishing it.
Prof. Eben Moglen's ambition is that there comes a time not very long from now when basic data science is taught in Indian secondary schools. The software is free and all the big data sets are public. A nation of a 100 million data scientists rules the world.

Keith Bergelt on the Open Invention Network

Over the past 10 years, Open Invention Network (OIN) has emerged as the largest patent non-aggression community in the history of technology. It has around 1,700 participants and is adding almost 2 participants every day. In the last quarter, OIN had approximately 200 licensees.
There is now a cultural transformation where companies are recognising that where OIN members collaborate, they shouldn't use patents to stop or slow down progress. Where members compete, they choose to invent while utilising defensive patents publications. What we are doing is a patent collaboration and a technical collaboration that exists in major projects around the world.
OIN has been making a major effort since January 2015 to spend more time in India and China to be able to ensure that the technological might and expertise represented in the two countries can be a part of the global community, and that global projects can start here. “We can expect to leverage the expertise of the community to be able to drive innovation from here [India and China]. It's not about IBM investing a billion dollars a year since 1999 and having some birthright to driving the open source initiatives around the world or about Google or Red Hat or anyone else. You have the ability to impact major changes and we want to be able to support you in the name of freedom of action as participants.”

Panel Discussion

Patent Wars and Innovation

In the past 5 to 7 years, patent wars in the handset segment of the information technology (IT) market have wasted tens of billions of dollars on litigation, and on raising the price of patent armaments. This patent litigation was purely an economic loss to the IT industry and it contributed nothing. If the patent system strangles invention, non-profit groups, non-commercial bodies, free software makers, and start-ups cannot invent freely.
Defensive patent publications, such as those made by IBM, lead to the gross underestimation of the inventive power and output of the company. People are struggling to find something to evaluate the productive output of an entity – startup, micro-industry or macro-industry. Patents are being used inappropriately and it's part of the corruption of the patent system. Any venture capitalist (VC) who believes that either the innovative capacities or the potential success factors of a start-up are tied to its patents should know that there are only a minuscule number of cases where patents are the differentiator. The differentiators required in order to sustain business are how smart the people are, how quickly they innovate, and how quickly they are able to adapt to complex situations. We see a trend in the US of not equating patents with innovation. The core-developer and hacker communities are largely anti-patent.
However, the flip side is that if the FOSS communities do not patent defensively, i.e., acquire and publish patents for their inventions in order to prevent others from getting patents in one jurisdiction or another, patent trolls will eventually encroach on the communities' inventive output. The only people making money out of this whole process are lawyers. It is slowing down the uptake of technology by creating fears and doubts in the system.
FOSS communities didn't qualify everything produced in the 23 years of (Linus') Linux, which would have let the service serve as stable prior art, preventing other people from filing patents. We can debate what is patentable subject matter in general or whether software should be patentable, but in the meantime if we can be proactive and file everything that we have in defensive publications and make it accessible to the patent and trademark offices here and around the world, we will have far fewer patents. We need to be activists in making sure that people can't file patents that are representative of the creativity of a community.
The Chinese government has instituted a programme designed to produce defensive publications in order to capture all the inventiveness across their industries, to be able to ensure that the quality of what ultimately gets patented is at least as high.
The US has a massive repository called ip.com, which is with every patent examiner of the USPTO.
India does not grant software patents as per section 3(k) of the Indian Patents Act, but that doesn't mean that no software patents are being granted. One of the empirical studies conducted by the Software Freedom Law Centre (SFLC) in India shows that 98.3% of the [telecom and computing technology] patents granted till 2013 went to multinational corporations. Almost none of the assignees are Indian.
In the context of the ongoing patent infringement law suits filed in the Delhi High Court by Ericsson [link]: The Delhi High Court has had a reputation of being very pro-intellectual property from the beginning.
Also, there is pressure from trade organisations. In August 2015, Ericsson along with ASSOCHAM invited the Director General of the Competition Commission of India to present a paper about why patents are good. It is essential to determine how the rules of conflict of interest apply here. This is exactly what the pharmaceutical industry would do. The only bodies who would object are Doctors Without Borders (MSF) or some local organisations who realise that high priced patented drugs is not what India needs and that we do not need to have the same IP policy as the US or Japan. We only need a different policy.
The Special 301 Report of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) is a big sham, and it suggests that India doesn't have strict enforcement of IP law. India does, unlike China.
Accenture has been granted a software patent in India. The patent is about an expert present in a remote location transferring knowledge to somebody who is listening in another location. Universities offering MOOCs, BPOs, and many other services would fall under such a patent. SFLC spent four years trying to fight this patent. The first defence of Accenture's battery of lawyers was that they won't use the patent.
Patents of very low quality are being bought at very high prices. The tax system or the subsidy system for innovation regards all patents as equal. This is a pricing failure and that should be corrected by other forms of intervention. The pendulum has already begun to swing the other way. Alice Corp was the third consecutive and unanimous ruling by the US Supreme Court that abstract ideas are not patentable. Patent applications pertaining to business methods and algorithms are increasingly being rejected by the USPTO after the ruling.

Prof. Eben Moglen on Facebook:

Facebook is a badly designed technology because there is one Man in the Middle who keeps all the logs. The privacy problem with Facebook is not just about what people post. It's about surveillance and data mining of web reading behaviour. It is a social danger that ought not to exist. I have said since 2010 is that we can't forbid it; let's replace it. It means bringing the web back as a writeable medium for people in an easy way. What I see as next-generation architecture could just as well be described as Tim Burners Lee's previous generation architecture.

You have to be able to trust the Internet. If you can't, you are going to be living in the shadow of govt surveillance, corporate surveillance, the fear of identity theft, and so on. We need to be able to explain to people what kind of software they can trust and what kind they can't. Distributed social networking will happen; it's not that difficult a problem.

An example of federated networking is Freedombox, a cheap hardware doing router jobs using free software in ways that encourage privacy. The pilot project for Freedombox has been deployed in little villages in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. These routers don't deliver logs to a thug in a hoodie in Menlo Park.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/we-need-to-proactively-ensure-that-people-cant-file-representatives-of-the-creativity-of-a-foss-community

Centre for Internet and Society

Comments on the Draft Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions

Background

Comments on Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion Discussion Paper on Standard Essential Patents and their Availability on Frand Terms

Rohini Lakshané, Joining the Dots in India's Big-Ticket Mobile Phone Patent Litigation, available at http://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/joining-the-dots-in-indias-big-ticket-mobile-phone-patent-litigation (last accessed 22 April, 2016). See also supra note 47 for more details.

Comments and Suggestions to the Draft Patent Manual March 2019

CIS' submission to Indian Patent Office on Examples of Excluded Patentable subject-matter under Section 3(k) for incorporation in the yet-to-be-released Guidelines for Computer Related Inventions

7.1 Application No.: 112/CHE/2008

7.2 Application No.: 48/CHE/2005

7.3 Application No.: 2019/CHENP/2004

7.4. Application No.: 4986/DELNP/2006

7.5 Application No.: 1405/MUMNP/2008

7.6. Application No.: 914/CHE/2007

CIS' Submission to DIPP and CGPDTM at meeting with IP Stakeholders

Submission to the Department of Industrial Planning and Promotion (DIPP) at Meeting with IP Stakeholders on 07 December, 2017

CIS' Submission on Statement of Working of Patents

CIS Submission on Draft Patent Manual 2010

Positive changes in the Manual

CIS RTI REQUEST TO DIPP - NUMBER 1 - FEBRUARY, 2015

CIS Comments on the Draft National Policy on Electronics

Technology Transfer

Outflow of Foreign Exchange as Royalties Creating Adverse Balance of Payments

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees payments (current USD)

Table: India’s royalty and licence fees, receipts (current USD)

Linking of Value Chain and Preferential Treatment

Preferential Treatment

Cybersecurity and Source Code

Distinction between Innovation and Intellectual Property

National Electronics Mission

Funding

CCI allowed to probe Ericsson: FAQs on Ericsson’s disputes with Micromax and Intex

Arguments Against the PUPFIP Bill

Summary

How is the legislation unnecessary?

How is the legislation harmful?

Additional resources

Arguments

How is the legislation unnecessary?

1) The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.

2) Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

How is the legislation harmful?

1) Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retard innovation.

2) The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.

3) Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of "public funded IP".

4) It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.

5) It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.

6) Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.

7) Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

Additional Resources

On the PUPFIP Bill

On Bayh-Dole

Arguments Against Software Patents in India

Preamble

What are Patents?

Philosophical Justification Against Software Patents

Legal Case Against Software Patents

Practical Reasons Against Software Patents

Patent Landmines / Submarine Patents / Patent Gridlocks / No Exception for Independent Creation

Don't These Cases Show How Software Patents Help Small Companies?

Term of Patents

Software Industry Progressed Greatly Without Patents

Copyright Exists for Software

Insufficient Disclosure

Software Patents Work Against Free/Libre/Open Source Software

Conclusion

A Guide to Key IPR Provisions of the Proposed India-European Union Free Trade Agreement

“Made in India” Innovation Policy

'We Need to Proactively Ensure that People Can't File Patents Representative of the Creativity of a FOSS Community'