The Centre for Internet and Society
https://cis-india.org
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Data for Governance, Governance of Data, and Data Anxieties
https://cis-india.org/raw/data-for-governance-governance-of-data-and-data-anxieties
<b>The Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA) organised a panel discussion on 'The Data Explosion – How the Internet of Things will Affect Media Freedom and Communication Systems?' at Deutsche Welle's Global Media Forum 2016, held in Bonn, Germany during June 13-15, 2016. Sumandro Chattapadhyay was invited as one of the panelists.</b>
<p> </p>
<h2>Introduction to the Panel</h2>
<p>The emerging Internet of Things (IoT) will result in a vast network of Internet-connected devices that generate enormous volumes of data about human behavior and interactions. This data explosion will potentially reshape how media organizations both collect and report news, while at the same time fundamentally shifting how communications networks are organized worldwide. Yet currently most of the discussion about the IoT has focused on its spread in developed countries via the popularization of Internet-connected consumer devices.</p>
<p>In this panel we will discuss how the IoT may develop differently in the Global South and how it could present either a threat to open access to data and information, or an opportunity to improve media systems worldwide. We will also examine the impact of the data explosion in developing countries and what mechanisms need to be created in order to ensure the huge new mountain of data is used and governed responsibly.</p>
<p>The discussants were Carlos Affonso Souza (Director, <a href="http://itsrio.org/en/">Institute for Technology and Society</a> of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), Lorena Jaume-Palasi (Director for Communications, <a href="http://www.eurodig.org/">European Dialogue on Internet Governance, or EuroDIG</a>, Switzerland), and Sumandro Chattapadhyay (Research Director, the Centre for Internet and Society, India); and the conversation was led by Mark Nelson (Senior Director, <a href="http://www.cima.ned.org/">Center for International Media Assistance, or CIMA</a>, USA).</p>
<p><em>Source: <a href="http://www.dw.com/en/the-data-explosion-how-the-internet-of-things-will-affect-media-freedom-and-communication-systems/a-19116102">Deutsche Welle</a></em>.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2>Audio Recording</h2>
<iframe src="https://w.soundcloud.com/player/?url=https%3A//api.soundcloud.com/tracks/269045180&color=ff5500&auto_play=false&hide_related=false&show_comments=true&show_user=true&show_reposts=false" frameborder="no" scrolling="no" height="166" width="100%"></iframe>
<p> </p>
<h2>Things/Writings I have Mentioned</h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://aqicn.org/map/world/">Air Pollution in World: Real-time Air Quality Index Visual Map</a>.</li>
<li><a href="http://openenvironment.indiaopendata.com/#/airowl/">India Open Data Association - AirOwl</a>.</li>
<li><a href="http://openenvironment.indiaopendata.com/#/dashboard/">India Open Data Association - Open Environment Data Project</a>.</li>
<li><a href="http://scroll.in/article/805909/in-rajasthan-there-is-unrest-at-the-ration-shop-because-of-error-ridden-aadhaar">Anumeha Yadav - 'In Rajasthan, there is ‘unrest at the ration shop’ because of error-ridden Aadhaar'</a>.</li>
<li><a href="http://thewire.in/2016/05/16/before-geospatial-bill-a-long-history-of-killing-the-map-in-order-to-protect-the-territory-36453/">Sumandro Chattapadhyay and Adya Garg - 'Before Geospatial Bill: A Long History of Killing the Map in Order to Protect the Territory'</a>.</li>
<li><a href="http://savethemap.in/">Save the Map</a>.</li></ul>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/raw/data-for-governance-governance-of-data-and-data-anxieties'>https://cis-india.org/raw/data-for-governance-governance-of-data-and-data-anxieties</a>
</p>
No publishersumandroDigital NewsGeospatial Information Regulation BillUIDData SystemsDigital KnowledgeResearchAadhaarResearchers at Work2016-07-03T05:59:48ZBlog EntryCIS's Comments on the Draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-draft-geospatial-information-regulation-bill-2016
<b>The Centre for Internet and Society is alarmed by the Draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016, and has recommended that the proposed law be withdrawn in its entirety. It offered the following detailed comments as its submission.</b>
<h1>Comments on the Draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016</h1>
<p>by
<em>the Centre for Internet and Society</em></p>
<h2>1. Preliminary</h2>
<p>1.1. This submission presents comments and recommendations by the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) on the <a href="http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/GeospatialBill_05052016_eve.pdf">draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016</a> (“the draft bill” / “the proposed bill” / “the bill”).</p>
<h2>2. Centre for Internet and Society</h2>
<p><strong>2.1.</strong> The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from the perspectives of policy and academic research. The areas of focus include accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security. The academic research at CIS seeks to understand the reconfiguration of social processes and structures through the internet and digital media technologies, and vice versa.</p>
<p><strong>2.2.</strong> This submission is consistent with CIS’ commitment to safeguarding the public interest, and particularly the representing the interests of ordinary citizens and consumers. The comments in this submission aim to further the principles of people’s <em>right to information</em> regarding their own country, <em>openness-by-default</em> in governmental activities, <em>freedom of speech and expression</em>, and the various forms of <em>public good</em> that can emerge from greater availability of <em>open (geospatial) data</em> created by both public and private agencies, and the <em>innovations</em> made possible as a result.</p>
<h2>3. Comments</h2>
<h3>3.1. General Remarks</h3>
<p><strong>3.1.1.</strong> While CIS welcomes the intentions of the government to prevent use of geospatial information to undermine national security, the proposed bill completely fails to do so, infringes upon Constitutional rights, harms innovation, undermines the national initiatives of Digital India and Startup India, is completely impractical and unworkable, and it will lead to a range of substantial harms if the government actually seeks to enforce it.</p>
<p><strong>3.1.2.</strong> There are already laws in place that prevent the use of geospatial information to undermine national security. For instance, the <a href="http://www.archive.india.gov.in/allimpfrms/allacts/3314.pdf">Official Secrets Act, 1923</a> (“OSA”) already contains provisions — sections 3(2)(a), (b), and (c) — all of which would prevent a person from creating maps that undermine national security and would penalise their doing so. Section 5 of the OSA contains multiple provisions that penalise the possession and communication of maps that undermine “national security.” The penalties under the OSA range from imprisonment of up to 3 years all the way to imprisonment up to 14 years. Given this, there is absolutely no need to create yet another law to deal with maps that undermine “national security.” Indeed, it is the government’s stated policy to reduce the number of laws in India, whereas the proposed bill introduces a redundant new law that adds multiple layers of bureaucracy.</p>
<p><strong>3.1.3.</strong> The <a href="http://surveyofindia.gov.in/files/nmp/National%20Map%20Policy.pdf">National Mapping Policy, 2005</a>, already puts in place restrictions on wrongful depictions of India’s international boundaries, and as we explain below in section 3.4 of this document, even the National Mapping Policy is over-broad. Even if the government wishes to provide statutory backing to the policy, it should be a very different law that is far more limited in scope, and restricts itself to criminalising those who misrepresent India’s international boundary with an intention to mislead people into thinking that that is the official boundary of India as recognised by the Survey of India. CIS would support a law of such limited scope and mandate, provided it has an appropriate penalty.</p>
<p><strong>3.1.4.</strong> There would be much utility in a law that creates a duty on the Survey of India to make available, in the form of an open standard, an official electronic version of the maps that it creates, and expressly allows and encourages citizens and startups to reuse such official maps, however the Ministry of Home Affairs would not be the nodal ministry for such a law.</p>
<p><strong>3.1.5.</strong> <strong>We recommend that the proposed law be scrapped in its entirety.</strong></p>
<p><strong>3.1.6.</strong> We additionally provide an alternative manner of reducing the harms caused by this bill, in our comments below. By no means should these further comments be seen as a repudiation of our above position, since we do not feel the proposed bill, even with the inclusion of all of our recommendations, would truly further its stated aims. All our below recommendations would do is to reduce the bill’s harmful, and often unintended, consequences.</p>
<h3>3.2. Definition of “Geospatial Information” is over-broad, all- encompassing</h3>
<p><strong>3.2.1.</strong> The second part of the definition of “geospatial information” refers to all “graphic or digital data depicting natural or man-made physical features, phenomenon or boundaries of the earth or any information related thereto” that are “referenced to a co-ordinate system and having attributes.” (Section 2(1)(e)) As per the definition, this will include all geo-referenced information, and data, that is produced by everyday users as an integral part of various everyday uses of digital technologies. This will also include geo-referenced tweets and messages, location of public and private vehicles shared in the real-time with agencies tracking their location (from public transport authorities, to insurance agencies, etc.), location data of mobile phones collected and used by telecommunication service providers, location of mobile phones shared by the user with various kinds of service providers (from taxi companies to delivery agencies), etc.</p>
<p><strong>3.2.2.</strong> We recommend that instead of regulating all kinds of geospatial information, and giving rise to a range of possible harms, the draft bill be revised to specifically address “sensitive geospatial information,” defined as geospatial information related to the “Prohibited Places” as defined in the Official Secrets Act 1923 (section 2(8)) which will allow the bill to effectively respond to its key stated concerns of ensuring “security, sovereignty and integrity of India.” Since the National Map Policy defines “Vulnerable Points” and “Vulnerable Areas” (para 3(b)) as the two main types of geospatial units associated with “Prohibited Places”, these terms should also be referred to in the revised version of the draft bill.</p>
<h3>3.3. Unreasonable regulation of acquiring and end-use of geospatial information</h3>
<p><strong>3.3.1.</strong> Section 3 of the draft bill states that “[s]ave as otherwise provided in this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder, or with the general or special permission of the Security Vetting Authority, no person shall acquire geospatial imagery or data including value addition” and “[e]very person who has already acquired any geospatial imagery or data ... including value addition prior to coming of this Act into effect, shall within one year from the commencement of this Act, make an application alongwith requisite fees to the Security Vetting Authority.” This effectively makes it illegal to acquire and maintain ownership of geospatial information that has not been subjected to security vetting.</p>
<p><strong>3.3.2.</strong> This draft bill doesn’t apply just to geospatial information that may undermine national security but covers all manners of geospatial information and modern geospatial technologies embedded in everyday digital devices and intimately connected to various electronic products and services, from cars to mobile phones, result in the creation and acquiring of various kinds of geo-referenced information, ranging from the geo-referenced photographs to locations shared with friends. Even ordinary users who are unknowingly looking at maps that contain sensitive geospatial information, which are illegal under the Official Secrets Act, are committing an illegal act under the draft bill, because the users temporarily acquires such sensitive geospatial information in her/his digital device, as part of the very act of browsing the map concerned. This clearly cannot be the intention of the bill. Thus we recommend deletion of the word “acquire.”</p>
<p><strong>3.3.3.</strong> Further, the insertion of the phrase “including value addition” in both Section 3(1) and 3(2) appears to suggest that all users who have created derivative products using geospatial information that includes sensitive data (that is data related to Prohibited Places) may be held liable under this draft bill, even if these users have not themselves collected or created such sensitive geospatial information, which was part of the original geospatial information published by the source map agency. This too cannot be the intention of the bill. Thus, we recommend deletion of the phrase “including value addition.”</p>
<p><strong>3.3.4.</strong> In the definition of the “Security Vetting of Geospatial Information” itself, it is mentioned that the process will include “screening of the credentials of the end-users and end-use applications, with the sole objective of protecting national security, sovereignty, safety and integrity.” (Section 2(1)(o)) This appears to indicate that all end-users of all electronic and analog services and products using geospatial information will have to be individually vetted before such services and products are used, which would cover a large proportion of the Indian population. This imposes an enormous and impractical burden on the Indian digital economy in particular, and the entire national economy in general, without improving national security. This too cannot be the intention of the draft bill. Thus, we recommend deletion of this phrase, and ensure that end users are not covered by the law.</p>
<p><strong>3.3.5.</strong> Given these specific characteristics of how modern geospatial technologies work, and how they provide a basis for various kinds of everyday use of electronic products and services, we would like to submit that the regulatory focus should be on large-scale and/or commercial dissemination, publication, or distribution of geospatial information, and not on the acts of acquiring, possessing, sharing, and using geospatial information. Further, the regulation in general should be aimed at the party owning the geospatial information in question, and not at the parties involved in its dissemination (say, Internet Service Providers) or in its generation or use (say, end-users).</p>
<h3>3.4. Removal of journalistic, political, artistic, creative, and speculative depictions of India from the scope of Section 6</h3>
<p><strong>3.4.1.</strong> Section 6 of the draft bill states that “[n]o person shall depict, disseminate, publish or distribute any wrong or false topographic information of India including international boundaries through internet platforms or online services or in any electronic or physical form.” Section 15 imposes a penalty for such wrong depiction of maps of India.</p>
<p><strong>3.4.2.</strong> Depictions of India, which do not purport to accurately represent the international boundaries as recognised by the Indian government should not be penalised. For instance, a map published in a newspaper article about India’s border disputes that shows the incorrect claims that the Chinese government has made over Indian territory would also be penalised as “wrong or false topographic information of India”, since there is a clear intention to depict the boundary as claimed by China. Criminalising such journalism cannot be the legitimate intent of such a provision.</p>
<p><strong>3.4.3.</strong> There are numerous instances which have been willfully depicting inaccurate and inauthentic maps of India with international borders for political ends. For instance, there are often depictions of India which show territories within present day Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka as part of an “Akhand Bharat.” Depictions of this sort should not be penalised. In doing so, would contradict the freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) without being a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2).</p>
<p><strong>3.4.4.</strong> Even depictions of India for purposes of speculative fiction would be penalised under this proposed bill unless they depict the official borders. This is clearly undesirable and would not be allowed as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2).</p>
<p><strong><em>*3.4.5.</em></strong>* Even geography students in schools and colleges who mis-draw the official map of India would be liable to penalties under the draft bill. This plainly, cannot be the intention of the drafters of this bill. The creator of a rough and inaccurate tourist map of an Indian city can also be identified as committing a criminal act under the proposed bill as she would be depicting “… wrong or false topographic information of India …”</p>
<p><strong>3.4.6.</strong> In brief: Merely depicting, disseminating, publishing or distributing any “wrong or false topographic information of India” should not be penalised. unless a person publishes and widely circulates an incorrect map of India while claiming that that represents the official international boundaries of India, such should not be penalised.</p>
<p><strong>3.4.7.</strong> CIS recommends that the bill should instead state: “No person shall depict, disseminate, publish, or distribute any topographic information purporting to accurately depict the international boundaries of India as recognised by the Survey of India unless he is authorised to do so by the Surveyor General of India; provided that usage by any person of the international boundaries as is electronically and in print made available by the Survey of India shall deemed to be usage that is authorised by the Surveyor General of India.”</p>
<h3>3.5. Absence of Publicly Available and Openly Reusable Standardised National Boundary of India</h3>
<p><strong>3.5.1.</strong> Given the lack of an reusable versions of maps of India, including of India’s official boundary as recognised by the Survey of India, it becomes impossible for people to accurately depict the boundary of India. We recommend that the bill requires the Survey of India to publish all “Open Series Maps,”as defined in the National Mapping Policy, 2005, including maps depicting the official international and subnational political and administrative boundaries of India, using open geospatial standards and under an open licence allowing such geospatial data to be used by citizens and all companies.</p>
<h3>3.6. Remove Requirement for Prior License for Acquire, Dissemination, Publication, or Distribution of Geospatial Information</h3>
<p><strong>3.6.1.</strong> Section 9 of the draft bill refers to “any person who wants to acquire, disseminate, publish, or distribute any geospatial information of India” (emphasis added), which can be interpreted as the need for a prior license before any person decides to acquire (including creation, collection, generation, and buying) geospatial information. This creates at least two problems:</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p>modern digital geospatial technologies have enabled everyday digital devices (like smartphones) to instantaneously acquire, disseminate, publish, and distribute geospatial information all the time when the person holding that device is looking at online digital maps, say Google Maps, or sharing location with their friends, online platforms and services and service providers (both local and foreign); and</p>
</li>
<li>
<p>the requirement of prior license involves payment of a “requisite fees” to the Security Vetting Authority, which may act as an arbitrary (since the fee might be based upon the volume of geospatial information to be acquired that one may not know fully determine before acquiring) and effective barrier to acquiring, dissemination, publication, or distribution of geospatial information even if it does not violate the concerns of “security, sovereignty, and integrity” in any manner. This requirement also impedes competition in the market, because new entrants to the geospatial industry may not have enough upfront capital to procure licenses.</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>3.6.2.</strong> Further, the requirement of necessary prior license for acquiring geospatial information does not seem to be a crucial component of the security vetting process, since the geospatial information, once acquired by the agency concerned, is in any case directed to be shared with the Security Vetting Authority for undertaking necessary expunging of sensitive or incorrect information.</p>
<p><strong>3.6.3.</strong> We recommend revision of this section so that no prior license and/or permission is required for collection, acquiring, distribution, and/or use of geospatial information; instead, a framework may be established for monitoring of published geospatial information for purposes of ensuring geospatial information pertaining to “Prohibited Places,” as defined under the Official Secrets Act, is not made available to the general public by any person or entity under Indian jurisdiction, including, for instance, Indian subsidiaries and branches of foreign corporations.. Such a framework must not address the end-user of such geospatial information, but its publishers.</p>
<h3>3.7. Unenforceable jurisdictional scope</h3>
<p><strong>3.7.1.</strong> Section 5 of the draft bill states “[s]ave as otherwise provided in any international convention, treaty or agreement of which India is signatory or as provided in this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder, or with the general or special permission of the Security Vetting Authority, no person shall, in any manner, make use of, disseminate, publish or distribute any geospatial information of India, outside India, without prior permission from the Security Vetting Authority.”</p>
<p><strong>3.7.2.</strong> In compliance with this section, domestic and foreign companies and platforms will be required to obtain permission from the Security Vetting Authority of India prior to publishing, distributing etc. geospatial information. Similarly in the preliminary, the draft bill holds in person who commits an offence beyond India under the scope of the bill. The bill is thus proposing extraterritorial applicability of its provisions, yet the extent and method of enforcement of the same on other jurisdictions are kept unclear.</p>
<h3>3.8. Negative implications for rights of citizens</h3>
<p><strong>3.8.1.</strong> There are a number of sections in the draft bill which have negative implications for the rights of all users and potentially impinge on the constitutional rights of Indian citizens. These include:</p>
<p>a. Section 18(2) which empowers the Enforcement Authority to conduct a search without a judicial search order;</p>
<p>b. Section 17(3) which empowers the Enforcement Authority to conduct undefined surveillance and monitoring to enforce the Act;</p>
<p>c. Chapter (V) which penalises individuals with Rs. 1-100 Crores and/or seven years in prison for an offence under the act;</p>
<p>d. Section 22 which allows the government to take ownership of a person’s land if a financial penalty has not been paid;</p>
<p>e. Section 30(1) which holds, in the case of the offense being committed by a company, every person in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company, guilty and liable.</p>
<h3>3.9. Overly broad powers and responsibilities of the Apex Committee and Enforcement Authority, and lack of adequate oversight</h3>
<p><strong>3.9.1.</strong> Section 7(2) states that “[t]he Apex Committee shall do all such acts and deeds that may be necessary or otherwise desirable to achieve the objectives of the Act, including the following functions:...” The wording in this section is broad and open ended, and allows for the responsibilities of the Apex Committee to be expanded without clear oversight of such expansion.</p>
<p><strong>3.9.2.</strong> Similarly, section 17 established an “Enforcement Authority” for the purpose of carrying out surveillance and monitoring for enforcement of the draft bill. The Authority has been given a number of powers including the power of inquiry, the power to adjudicate, and the power to give directions. These powers have direct implications on the rights of individuals, yet the Authority is not subject to oversight or accountability requirements.</p>
<p><strong>3.9.3.</strong> We recommend that the powers and responsibilities of the Apex Committee and Enforcement Authority are narrowly defined in the draft bill itself, limited by the principle of necessity, and subject to independent oversight and accountability requirements.</p>
<h3>3.10. Remove the Security Vetting Authority’s power of delegation</h3>
<p><strong>3.10.1.</strong> Section 8(3) allows the Security Vetting Authority to delegate to any constituent member of the Authority, other subordinate committee, or officer powers and functions as it may deem necessary except the power to grant a licence. In practice, this will allow security vetting to be done by another institution and risks potential involvement of private agencies and/or quasi-governmental bodies.</p>
<p><strong>3.10.2.</strong> We recommend that the power of delegation should not be granted to the Security Vetting Authority.</p>
<h3>3.11. Negative implications for innovation and India’s digital economy</h3>
<p><strong>3.11.1.</strong> Section 3 of the draft bill states “[s]ave as otherwise provided in this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder, or with the general or special permission of the Security Vetting Authority, no person shall acquire geospatial imagery or data including value addition of any part of India either through any space or aerial platforms such as satellite, aircrafts, airships, balloons, unmanned aerial vehicles or terrestrial vehicles, or any other means whatsoever”. This effectively ensures that each and every user of geospatial data, products, services, and solutions — since all of these either include or are derivatives of geospatial information — would require prior permission from the Security Vetting Authority. This will substantially affect the existing and emerging digital economy in particular, and the entire economy in general.</p>
<p><strong>3.11.2.</strong> Further, Section 9 of the draft bill mandates that any person submitting an application for geospatial information to be vetted must pay a fee. As the provisions of the bill mandate that users approach the Security Vetting Authority for license to use geospatial information, this will impose an immense burden on all users of digital devices in and outside of India. CIS submits that imposition of this fee for security vetting be removed.</p>
<h3>3.12. Disproportionate penalty for acquisition of geospatial information</h3>
<p><strong>3.12.1.</strong> Section 12 states that “<em>[p]enalty for illegal acquisition of geospatial information of India.- Whoever acquires any geospatial information of India in contravention of section 3, shall be punished with a fine ranging from Rupees one crore to Rupees one hundred crore and/or imprisonment for a period upto seven years</em>.” Seven years in prison is disproportionate to the offense of acquiring geospatial information without vetting by the authority concerned. This is particularly true given the broad and all-encompassing definition of “geospatial information” in the draft bill, and the fact that the bill applies to individuals and companies both within and outside of India.</p>
<h3>3.13. Improper and inconsistent usage of terms in the draft bill</h3>
<p><strong>3.13.1.</strong> Section 4 of the draft bill regulates the visualization, publication, dissemination and distribution of geospatial information of India, while section 5 regulates use, dissemination, publication, and distribution of geospatial information outside of India. The definition of “visualization” remains unclear, and the act is only regulated in section 4. The section 6 of the draft bill uses the term ‘depict’, which is undefined as well. We submit that in this context terms are interchangeable, and the draft bill should either define them expressly to avoid ambiguity in interpretations, or consistently use only one throughout the draft bill.</p>
<p><strong>3.13.2.</strong> Section 11 (3) of the draft bill requires licensees to “[d]isplay the insignia of the clearance of the Security Vetting Authority on the security-vetted geospatial information by appropriate means such as water-marking or licence as relevant, while disseminating or distributing of such geospatial information.” We observe that geospatial information includes graphical representation, location coordinates, inter alia. While the former may be represented visually on an “as is” basis after the completion of the vetting, the latter may be used to perform other complex functions at the “back-end” (i.e., vendor-facing side) in various technologies. Water-marking and/or displaying of insignia would place undue burden on the licensee, depending on the kind of platform, service, or individual.</p>
<h3>3.14. Lack of reference to technical implementation guidance</h3>
<p><strong>3.14.1.</strong> The regulation, harmonisation, and standardisation of the collection, generation, dissemination etc. of geospatial information is a complex process that goes beyond a process of security vetting and that will require extensive technical implementation guidance from the government. At a minimum this could include quality assurance considerations and standard operating procedures, yet the draft bill makes no reference to the need for technical standards or guidance.</p>
<p><em>Comments prepared by Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Adya Garg, Pranesh Prakash, Anubha Sinha, and Elonnai Hickok.</em>
<em>Submitted by the Centre for Internet and Society, on June 3, 2016.</em></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-draft-geospatial-information-regulation-bill-2016'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-draft-geospatial-information-regulation-bill-2016</a>
</p>
No publisherpraneshFreedom of Speech and ExpressionGeospatial Information Regulation BillGeospatial DataNational Geospatial Policy2016-06-05T15:06:09ZBlog EntryProtecting the Territory, Killing the Map
https://cis-india.org/openness/protecting-the-territory-killing-the-map
<b>The politics of making and using maps in India has taken a sudden and complex turn with the publication of the draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016. Contrary to the expectations arising out of several government schemes that are promoting the development of the new digital economy in India – from start-ups to the ongoing expansion of connectivity network – the Bill seems to be undoing various economic and humanitarian efforts, and other opportunities involving maps. This article by Sumandro Chattapadhyay and Adya Garg was published by The Wire on May 16, 2016.</b>
<p> </p>
<p>Published by and cross-posted from <a href="http://thewire.in/2016/05/16/before-geospatial-bill-a-long-history-of-killing-the-map-in-order-to-protect-the-territory-36453/">The Wire</a>.</p>
<hr />
<p>The global history of cartography is intimately linked with political needs and economic interests, from the public depiction of sovereign territories to navigating treacherous seas to (wrongly) ‘discover’ the land of spices. In India, the politics of making and using maps has taken a sudden and complex turn with the publication of the draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016. Contrary to the expectations arising out of several government schemes that are promoting the development of the new digital economy in India – from start-ups to the ongoing expansion of connectivity network – the Bill seems to be undoing various economic and humanitarian efforts, and other opportunities involving maps, by imposing strict guidelines and harsh penalties on the use of maps by private actors, commercial or otherwise.</p>
<p>The <a href="http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/GeospatialBill_05052016_eve.pdf">introductory note to the Bill</a> clearly states its primary objective is to ensure the protection of ‘security, sovereignty and integrity of India.’ The concern around ‘security’ is not new when it comes to regulating cartographic activities. It is prominently addressed across the current set of policies and guidelines that govern mapping in India: 1) the National Map Policy, 2005 (“NMP”) and associated guidelines issued by the Survey of India, 2) the Remote Sensing Data Policy, 2011 that regulates satellite-based mapping, and 3) the Civil Aviation Requirement, 2012, which regulates mapping and photography using flights and drones. Protection of ‘sovereignty and integrity,’ however, does not find a mention in any of these map-related policies.</p>
<p>There have of course been several incidents where the government has taken steps (including the temporary blocking of service) against companies that have represented Indian national boundaries that are not in accordance with official maps. Such companies include Google, The Economist, and Al Jazeera. Two companies that have gotten away with no consequences after publicly showing maps of India without certain border regions, interestingly, are <a href="http://www.scoopwhoop.com/news/kashmir-missing-from-india-map/">Facebook</a> and <a href="http://thewire.in/2015/05/14/chinese-state-owned-television-shows-india-map-sans-jammu-kashmir-arunachal-1698/">CCTV</a>.</p>
<p>In the absence of such provisions in the existing map-related policies, thus far, the government has pursued legal action against such ‘anti-national’ depiction of Indian territory under Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000, the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (restricting the collection and sharing of information about ‘prohibited places’), the Customs Act, 1962 (prohibiting the export and import of certain maps), and the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1990.</p>
<p>Though this present Bill has come into public attention rather suddenly, the Indian State has been planning for a comprehensive legal framework for both enabling and restricting mapping, since the coming of the NMP itself. The first avatar of this effort was the Indian Survey Act that was heard about in 2007, but was never made public. More recently, the first report towards the National Geospatial Information Policy (now called the National Geospatial Policy) came out in 2012. Instead of waiting for this comprehensive policy to be discussed and notified, the Bill seems to have come in a hurry to propose a narrowly designed legal instrument. As is often the problem with such precise devices that also want to be exhaustive, the Bill promises much more collateral damage than actual solutions – it ends up killing the map in the name of protecting the territory.</p>
<p>A quick look at case law on map-related disputes informs us about the motivations of the state in enacting this Bill. A major controversy around ‘sovereignty’ in the field of mapping has been about the depiction of international boundaries of India by Google. After several incidents of conflicts between Google’s map makers and the Indian State regarding the depiction of India’s national boundary, the Survey of India filed a police complaint in 2014. As a result, Google presently shows different map tiles to users from India (according to the boundary specified by the Indian State) and different tiles to users from elsewhere. This geo-targeted solution to the depiction of international borders under dispute has been practiced by Google in the case of other countries too, most notably for Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Ukraine and (independent) Crimea.</p>
<p>The internal security concerns have also fuelled conflicts with mapping companies. In 2013, the ‘mapathon’ organised by Google faced a lawsuit for not asking for prior permission from the Survey of India for this exercise in user-contributed mapping. This was preceded by a petition filed by J. Mohanraj in the Madras High Court seeking a complete ban on the Google Earth and Bhuvan (run by ISRO) map applications on the ground that they were both providing information that could be used for planning acts of terror. The petitioner’s argument referred to the provisions of the NMP, and also alleged that such mapping practices violated the individual rights of a person under Article 21 of the Constitution. The court, however, held (2008) that the petitioner was unable to produce any specific “Guidelines/Rules/Law laid down by the Central/State Governments, prohibiting the private organisations or any other individuals to Interactive Mapping Program, covering vast majority of the Planet”.</p>
<p>The trouble with Google re-opened earlier this year as the Pathankot air base was attacked. Incidentally, Vishal Saini, the winner of the 2013 mapathon by Google, contributed to mapping the features of the very same city. Promptly after the attack in January, Lokesh Kumar Sharma filed a case in the Delhi High Court alleging that the availability of sensitive information (from an internal security point-of-view) on Google Maps created security vulnerabilities. In a rather curious manner, the court disposed of the case on February 24, claiming that it has learned from the Additional Solicitor General that ‘steps are in progress to regulate the publication of aerial/satellite geospatial data.’ In hindsight, we see that this was in reference to the draft Bill.</p>
<p>This Bill, evidently, is a product of the Indian State’s inefficient attempts at regulating the making and circulation of maps and geospatial data in digital times. The Bill ends up disregarding the actual features of digital geospatial data and how it forms a fundamental basis (and asset) for today’s digital economy, and, instead, decides to settle for a form of regulation that is much better suited (if at all) to a pre-digital and pre-liberalisation condition. The regulatory measures proposed by the Bill do not only cause worry but also bewilderment. Take for example Section 3 that states that ‘no person shall acquire geospatial imagery or data including value addition of any part of India’ without being expressly given permission for the same or being vetted by the nodal agency set up by the Bill. If implemented strictly, this may mean that you will have to ask for permission and/or security vetting before dropping a pin on the map and sharing your coordinates with your friend or a taxi service. Both involve creating/acquiring geospatial information, and potentially adding value to the map/taxi service as well.</p>
<p>Let’s take an even more bizarre hypothetical situation – the Security Vetting Agency being asked to go through the entire geospatial data chest of Google everyday (or as soon as it is updated) and it taking up to ‘ three months from the date of receipt’ of the data to complete this checking so that Google Maps can tell you how crowded a particular street was three months ago.</p>
<p>Further, a key term that the Bill does not talk about is ‘big data.’ The static or much-slowly-changing geospatial data such as national boundaries and which-military-institute-is-located-where are really the tiny minority of the global geospatial information. The much larger and crucial part is of course the fast-moving big geospatial data – from geo-referenced tweets, to GPS systems of cars, to mobile phones moving through the cities and regions. Addressing such networked data systems, where all data can quite easily be born-georeferenced, and the security and privacy concerns that are engendered by them, should be the ultimate purpose of, and challenge for, a future-looking Geospatial Information Regulation Act.</p>
<p>The present Bill imposes an undesirable bureaucratic structure of licenses and permits upon the GIS industry in the country in particular, and on all sections of the economy using networked devices in general. This will only end up restricting the size of the GIS industry to a few dominant players. For all creators and users of maps for non-commercial, developmental, and humanitarian interests, this Bill appears to be an imminent threat, even if it is never actually applied.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/openness/protecting-the-territory-killing-the-map'>https://cis-india.org/openness/protecting-the-territory-killing-the-map</a>
</p>
No publishersumandroGeospatial Information Regulation BillOpen DataOpen Government DataGeospatial DataOpenness2016-05-17T10:37:14ZBlog EntryLegal Challenges to Mapping in India #1 - Laws, Policies, and Cases
https://cis-india.org/openness/legal-challenges-to-mapping-in-india-1-laws-policies-cases
<b>Responding to the draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill and the draft National Geospatial Policy made public recently, this post provides an overview of the present configuration of laws, policies, and guidelines that provides the legal framework in India for governance of creation and sharing of geospatial data in India. The post also studies these policies in action by describing the key legal cases around the creation and use of geospatial data. The next post of this series will document the reflections and opinions of the key geospatial industry actors in India, as well as the free and open source mapping community.</b>
<p> </p>
<p><strong>1.</strong> <a href="#1">Introduction</a></p>
<p><strong>2.</strong> <a href="#2">Mapping the Legal Journey of Geospatial Data: Past to Present</a></p>
<p><strong>2.1.</strong> <a href="#2-1">National Map Policy, 2005</a></p>
<p><strong>2.2.</strong> <a href="#2-2">Guidelines issued by Survey of India</a></p>
<p><strong>2.3.</strong> <a href="#2-3">Remote Sensing Data Policy (RSDP)</a></p>
<p><strong>2.4.</strong> <a href="#2-4">Civil Aviation Rules</a></p>
<p><strong>3.</strong> <a href="#3">Incidents of Legal Actions Faced by Agencies</a></p>
<p><strong>3.1.</strong> <a href="#3-1">Google's Mapathon in Legal Trouble</a></p>
<p><strong>3.2.</strong> <a href="#3-2">One Country - Two Boundaries</a></p>
<p><strong>3.3.</strong> <a href="#3-3">J. Mohanraj v Google and Others</a></p>
<p><strong>4.</strong> <a href="#4">Conclusion</a></p>
<p><strong>5.</strong> <a href="#5">References</a></p>
<p><strong>6.</strong> <a href="#6">Author Profile</a></p>
<hr />
<h2 id="1">1. Introduction</h2>
<blockquote>“Maps, like faces, are the signature of history.” – Will Durant <strong>[1]</strong></blockquote>
<p>Throughout the course of history geospatial information has played an important role in technological, economic, political and cultural dimensions of the human society. With technological developments taking place, the field of mapping – that is collection, analysis, and representation of geospatial data – is continuously evolving. On the face of it, creation of geospatial data seems to be an exclusive scientific and technological matter. However, the political and economic facets of geospatial data are often as predominant and complex as its scientific practice. Continuing from the colonial era, the political facet of mapping emerged significantly in the public discourse from the 1990s onwards as digital technologies amplified the ability of non-governmental actors to collect, generate, and share geospatial data, in the form of maps or otherwise <strong>[2]</strong>. This 'democratisation' of the ability to map and share private/user-generated maps structurally undermined the government's ability to have an authoritative and universal voice when it comes to geospatial depiction of the nation and its various components. Similar to the other upsurges in the digitized world, which is often followed by an introduction of legal provisions in order to keep access to and use of digital data under mechanisms of monitoring and permission, mapping in India has also has subsequently been governed under policies addressing both terrestrial mapping and remote sensing. Concerns of national security, naturally, have driven much of these policies.</p>
<p>This post focuses on providing an overview of the present configuration of laws, policies, and guidelines that provides the legal framework in India for governance of creation and sharing of geospatial data in India. The post also studies these policies in action by describing the key legal cases around the creation and use of geospatial data. The next post of this series will document the reflections and opinions of the key geospatial industry actors in India, as well as the free and open source mapping community.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2 id="2">2. Mapping the Legal Journey of Geospatial Data: Past to Present</h2>
<blockquote>“We know every inch of the nation, because we map every inch of it!” – Survey of India <strong>[3]</strong></blockquote>
<p>Aforementioned slogan adopted by the primary organization responsible for mapping all geospatial data in India indicates the importance of the geospatial data and mapping the same. While it indicates the importance of having access to mapping data in order to be aware of the geospatial features of one’s country, it also cleverly reveals the vulnerability that having access to mapped data brings. The phrase can be said to imply that mapping every inch of the country leads to information about every inch of the nation which is useful if in the hands of government agency but repugnant to security if in the hands of external agencies. This conflict between access to information about the country and the security concerns arising from such an open access has led to a rich evolution of legal policies governing the same.</p>
<p>Set up in 1767, Survey of India (hereinafter “SOI”) was required to map the terrains of India to fulfill the commercial and political convenience of the East India Company <strong>[4]</strong>. During these colonial times, maps were considered to be essential for governmental purposes and thus their dissemination to unauthorized persons was barred by Clause 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 <strong>[5]</strong>. Thus, till 1950s mapping was being governed by the colonial provisions which maps restricted to official use only <strong>[6]</strong>. With independence, the functions of the SOI shifted mainly towards providing information for the defense forces <strong>[7]</strong>.</p>
<p>An important change came in the form of orders and notifications by Ministry of Defence (hereinafter “MOD”) during 1960s, the major one being the 1965 order that permitted distribution of maps of scale 1:4 M <strong>[8]</strong>. The Map Restriction Policy of the MOD, however, imposed categorical restrictions on sharing of maps, aerial photos, and all geophysical data for various parts of India - with a focus on international border areas in the North-Eastern state, and the coastal zone that included several large cities like Chennai, Kochi, Kolkata, and Mumbai <strong>[9]</strong>. Dr. Manosi Lahiri notes that "[t]his had a far reaching effect on the mapping culture of independent India and perpetuated the perception among many that maps were a security threat" <strong>[10]</strong>." By 1971, however, the functions of SOI extended to catering to inter alia all development activities and was hence brought under the ambit of Department of Science and Technology <strong>[11]</strong>.</p>
<p>However, the catalytic transformation came in the form of National Map Policy, 2005 which made SOI the nodal governmental agency for dealing with all processes involving geospatial data. While harping for open access to geospatial data, the policy accompanied by corresponding guidelines have largely restricted the power to map geospatial data to SOI. The Policy and the guidelines have been discussed in detail as under.</p>
<h3 id="2-1">2.1. National Map Policy, 2005</h3>
<p>The National Map Policy, 2005 (hereinafter, “NMP”) was announced by the Central Government on May 19, 2005 <strong>[12]</strong>. The preamble of the policy identifies the importance of high quality spatial data in various facets such as socio-economic development, conservation of natural resources, infrastructure development etc <strong>[13]</strong>. Topographic map database constitutes the foundation of all spatial data and its production, maintenance, and dissemination has been assigned as a responsibility to SOI, which is to "liberalize access" to spatial data without compromising upon security concerns. Thus, the conflict between national security and right to have access to information regarding one’s country is clearly highlighted in the policy as a need for enactment of the same. Thus, the policy objectives include access to National Topographic Database (NTDB) <strong>[14]</strong> and promotion of geospatial based intelligence, subject to confirmation to national standards of SOI.</p>
<p>In order to realize the security concerns, inter alia, a dual-classification was created amongst the maps, namely - i) <strong>Defence Series Maps (“DSM”)</strong> and ii) <strong>Open Series Maps (“OSM”)</strong>. While the former constitutes of topographical maps that mainly cater to defence and security requirements of the country, the latter supports developmental activities. Hence, DSMs whether in analogue or digital form, fall under the classified category and the power to issue guidelines pertaining to their use vests digit mainly for developmental purposes, they are not openly accessible by ipso facto and need to gain the ‘unrestricted’ tag after clearance from MOD. A table specifying the distinction between DSMs and OSMs in detail has been provided below:</p>
<hr />
<table>
<tbody>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Topic</th>
<th>Defence Series Maps (“DSM”)</th>
<th>Open Series Maps (“OSM”)</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why are these maps used?</td>
<td>The maps under this series cater to defence and security requirements of the country.</td>
<td>The maps under this series are useful in supporting various developmental activities in the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the technical classifications?</td>
<td>Everest/WGS-84 Datum and Polyconic/UTM Projection) on various scales (with heights, contours and full content without dilution of accuracy).</td>
<td>In UTM Projection on WGS-84 datum, bearing different map sheet numbers. (And as provided in Annexure B of the NMP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who can use these maps?</td>
<td>Maps (in analogue or digital forms) for the entire country will be classified.</td>
<td>Both hard copy and digital form will become “Unrestricted” after obtaining a one-time clearance of the Ministry of Defence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How can the maps be used?</td>
<td>Guidelines regarding the use of DSMs will be formulated by the Ministry of Defence.</td>
<td>Guidelines regarding the use of OSMs will be formulated by SOI regarding aspects like procedure for access, further dissemination /sharing, ways and means of protecting business and commercial interests of SOI etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<hr />
<p>While the DSMs are completely classified, restrictive provisions regarding usage and dissemination of OSMs have also been incorporated in the policy. OSMs are not allowed to show any civil and military Vulnerable Areas and Vulnerable Points (VA’s/VP’s). OSMs on a scale larger than 1:1 needs to be disseminated either by sale or an agreement, which will allow the agency to add its own value to the maps obtained, and to share these maps with others.</p>
<p>The primary transaction between SOI and the agency as well as all the subsequent transactions between the agency and other users have to be registered in the Map Transaction Registry for records. While the Map Transaction Registry forms an important part of the NMP, no such registry information has been made available on the official website of SOI as indicated by the screenshot below.</p>
<img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cis-india/website/master/img/SurveyOfIndia_MapTransactionRegistry.png" alt="Map Transaction Registry, Survey of India" />
<h6>Map Transaction Registry, Survey of India, URL: <a href="http://www.surveyofindia.gov.in/pages/view/48">http://www.surveyofindia.gov.in/pages/view/48</a></h6>
<p> </p>
<p>The policy allows users to publish maps on hard copy or web (with or without GIS interface) subject to a certification from SOI in case of depiction of international boundaries. The policy also upholds the validity of the previous MOD notifications pertaining to mapping subject to the modifications introduced by the policy and authorises SOI to issue further guidelines corresponding to the policy.</p>
<h3 id="2-2">2.2. Guidelines issued by Survey of India</h3>
<p>Under the powers vested by the NMP, SOI has issued detailed clarificatory guidelines in furtherance of the policy <strong>[15]</strong>. The restrictions arising on mapping of geospatial data can be attributed to two major factors namely, Security concerns and Copyright provisions <strong>[16]</strong>. Under the guidelines, copyright of both digital and analogue maps has been vested with the SOI. Penal consequences have been mentioned as a result of violation of SOI’s copyrights. In furtherance of security concerns, the guidelines uphold the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) Notification No. 118-Cus./F.No.21/ 5/62-Cus. I/VIII dated 4th May 1963 which prohibits the export of all maps/digital data in 1: 250K and larger scales through any means. Digital Topographical data has been an exclusive licensing domain of only Indian individuals, organisations, firms or companies.</p>
<p>While paper maps can be accessed from SOI offices against payment of price, digitisation of maps has been strictly made forbidden by the guidelines. Ownership of digital data has been vested completely with the SOI and can only be gained against payment after application through a specified proforma.</p>
<h3 id="2-3">2.3 Remote Sensing Data Policy (RSDP)</h3>
<p>In 2011, the confusion pertaining to applicability of NMP to both territorial and satellite mapping was resolved with the release of the Remote Sensing Data Policy (RSDP). The policy recognized the importance of remote sensing data and noted that it was largely used by government and non-government users from Indian and foreign remote sensing satellites. However, again banking upon the need for security considerations, the policy was released with the purpose of “…managing and/ or permitting the acquisition/dissemination of remote sensing data in support of developmental activities" <strong>[17]</strong>. Department of Science (DOS) was made the nodal government agency for all actions pertaining to remote sensing data under the policy.</p>
<p>A basic perusal of the policy indicates a parallelism between the RSDP and the NMP. Thus, similar to NMP, RSDP assures of a government managed Indian Remote Sensing Satellites (IRS) Programme, the data produced by which will be solely owned by the government and other users could only be provided with licences if need be. Any attempt at acquiring and/or dissemination of remote sensing data within India requires permission through the nodal government agency. National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC) of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO)/ DOS is vested with the authority to acquire and disseminate all satellite remote sensing data in India, both from Indian and foreign satellites. NRSC is also supposed to maintain a systematic National Remote Sensing Data Archive, and a log of all acquisitions/ sales of data for all satellites. Thus, nodal government agencies were created for both terrestrial mapping and satellite imagery, former being SOI and latter NRSC.</p>
<h3 id="2-4">2.4 Civil Aviation Rules</h3>
<p>Aerial instruments and aircrafts act as important instruments for geophysical surveys and mapping. Thus, this area does not go ungoverned. While, till date, India doesn’t impose an explicit bar on foreign registered aircraft overflying its territory for aerial photography and geo-physical survey, the same is subject to prior clearance under rule 158 and 158A of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 on account of safety and security concerns, the procedure for which has been given under Civil Aviation Rules (CAR) <strong>[18]</strong>. CAR is applicable to inter alia agencies undertaking aerial photography, geophysical surveys etc. An application is required to be made as per Annexure E which inter alia requires confinement of photography/sensing to the exact area as applied and cleared by the Ministry of Defence. The application is forwarded by DGCA to the Ministry of Defence and other agencies responsible for issuing NOC.</p>
<p>DGCA’s restrictions extends to voluntary geographic information with prohibition of civilian drones in India. Unmanned drones are an important equipment used for the purpose of collecting geo-spatial data. The ban on flying drones in India exist from October, 2014 but is not in common knowledge <strong>[19]</strong>. While it is argued that drones could harm people and lead to chances of crashing, the major argument has always been the use of drones by anti-national elements to peruse sensitive places for plotting terror attacks <strong>[20]</strong>. While there is an ambiguity regarding using drones in India, flying drones over defence establishments and historical places is completely banned <strong>[21]</strong>. Thus, civilians using drones for clicking pictures of monuments etc. have often been confronted by the police <strong>[22]</strong>.</p>
<p>Thus, there is no single policy that acts as a deterrent for mapping in India but an accumulation of multiple policies, guidelines and legal provisions that are used by departments of government to restrict mapping in the name of security. These restrictions have also witnessed incidents in their furtherance as detailed below.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2 id="3">3. Incidents of Legal Actions Faced by Agencies</h2>
<p>Since the advent of restrictive mapping policies, numerous incidents have come forth when agencies have found themselves faced by legal actions for violating such policies. In recent times, these incidents were publicly highlighted in 1998 when the sale of the CD-Roms of Delhi Guide Maps created by Eicher were prohibited <strong>[23]</strong>. Eicher has been one of the oldest players of the private mapping market, creating city and road maps for India in the private sector for public distribution. While having faced a ban in earlier times, it is also one of the few companies been able to access the SOI data for value addition. It works in collaboration with SOI now, often launching products in ‘strategic alliance’ with them. After the implementation of NMP, we have witnessed two major legal controversies, both involving SOI on one hand and Google on the other.</p>
<h3 id="3-1">3.1. Google's Mapathon in Legal Trouble</h3>
<p>In furtherance of Google’s constant endeavour to have every nook and corner mapped, Google holds a competition called ‘Mapathon’ each year <strong>[2]</strong>. The competition invites people to map their local surroundings incentivised by lucrative prizes to winners. However, an initiative launched for purely mapping purposes had to face a large legal hurdle in the year of 2013. Google-Mapathon, 2013, held in February-March, had declared Vishal Saini as the 1st winner who had mapped the military-prone city of Pathankot. According to legal provisions governing mapping practices in India, civil and military Vital Areas (VAs) /Vital Points (VPs) cannot be shown on maps in public domain <strong>[25]</strong>. Thus, the tech-giant found itself amidst legal controversy for having held the competition without permission from Survey of India after a concern raised by BJP’s Tarun Vijay. A case was filed by SOI at the R.K. Puram Police Station. The primary contention was that the “Mapathon 2013 activity is likely to jeopardise national security interest and violates the National Map Policy. Citizens of the country, who are ignorant of the legal consequences, are likely to violate the law of the land” <strong>[26]</strong>.</p>
<p>Considering the involvement of a U.S. based company, the investigation was handed over to CBI During the probe, it was alleged by then Surveyor General of India Swarna Subba Rao that Google did not refrain from “polluting” <strong>[27]</strong> the internet with classified material despite having been asked so. Further, then Additional Surveyor-General of India R.C. Padhi wrote claimed that “The Survey of India is only mandated to undertake ‘Restricted’ category surveying and mapping, and no other government/private organisations or any individual are authorised to do so” <strong>[28]</strong>. He told Reuters that some of the information provided by locals to Google could be ‘sensitive’ and the security of the nation could not be compromised at any cost <strong>[29]</strong>.</p>
<p>Google on the other hand said that its primary motive was to map local information of daily needs such as hospitals, restaurants, markets etc. and the competition was in tandem with national laws. Further, it was heard that Google had been approached regarding Mapathon by SOI and it had replied with intimation of willingness to talk to SOI. However, SOI had not reverted back and Google was always ready and willing to talk out the matter. However, the much hyped case did not have a substantial result and CBI had to close the probe on account of lack of evidence <strong>[30]</strong>.</p>
<p>Considered a thing of past, the controversy resurfaced in the recent times of January, 2016 post the Pathankot Air Base strike <strong>[31]</strong>. Google was dragged to the court for having displayed sensitive geospatial data regarding Pathankot that made possible an airstrike at the location. An injunction was sought to refrain Google from showing sensitive military areas and defence establishments on the maps made available by it. While the injunction was refused, Delhi High Court had asked the centre and the additional solicitor to look into the same and keep the court apprised. Thus, this can be termed as an open and unfinished matter ongoing legal contemplation.</p>
<p>While it is understandable that some areas are considered as vulnerable due to security concern. The lost keeps changing often leading to transgression into security places. But the major point being the list of vulnerable areas is classified and not released to public. In absence of such a list, how is it possible for google to vet its data to comply with security concerns.</p>
<h3 id="3-2">3.2. One Country - Two Boundaries</h3>
<p>Another major legal controversies in the field of geospatial mapping has been with regards to wrong depiction of international boundaries of India by Google. A basic perusal of the official website of SOI provides a list of only three documents under the tab of ‘Public Awareness’, all dealing with the crime of depicting wrong Indian boundaries <strong>[32]</strong>. While one of them includes the certified map with correct boundaries, to be complied with, other is a gazette notification bringing the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1961 which criminalized the act of showing wrong depiction of boundaries. Section 69A of the IT Act has also been used earlier to restrict access to links depicting incorrect maps of India <strong>[33]</strong> though it only speaks about restricting public access to data, necessary in the interest of Sovereignty and Integrity inter alia, the section per se does not deal with dissemination of geos-spatial data.</p>
<p>It was in the year of 2014, that on the directions of Department of Science and Technology, SOI filed a complaint against Google at the Dehradun Police Station for depiction of international boundaries not in a “wrong manner” i.e. not in compliance with Government of India authentication <strong>[34]</strong>. The result was that today Google shows different boundaries on Indian domain, in compliance with SOI and different on International domain.</p>
<p>Google was also involved in a controversy when in 2009, Google maps for India marked areas of Arunachal Pradesh, including its capital Itanagar and Tawang, in China <strong>[35]</strong>. It was followed by an apology from Google and an immediate rectification for Indian users. However, Google uses a different version for China and the world creating disparity in the boundary depiction <strong>[36]</strong>.</p>
<p>Google has not been the only platform having faced the anger of Indian community for wrong depiction. In 2011, copies of the Economist Magazine were seized for having depicted the map of Kashmir divided between India, Pakistan and China <strong>[37]</strong>. For similar reasons, Al-Jazeera was taken off air by the Indian government after a 5-day ban imposed under Section 69A of the IT Act <strong>[38]</strong>. Modi’s visit to Queensland University of Technology was accompanied by an “unqualified apology” from the authorities for having depicting Indian map without portions of Kashmir <strong>[39]</strong>. Urban Development Department of Bihar also ended up show-causing one of its employees for putting up wrong map on its website and substituting the same with SOI’s version after media attention <strong>[40]</strong>. India seems to be the country often having been angered due to wrong depictions of maps.</p>
<p>While India seems to be actively involved in Geo-politics, it isn’t the only country Google has fallen in legal trouble with, for wrongly depicting International Boundaries. In 2010, Google gained a lot of media attention for allegedly starting the ‘First Google Maps War’ <strong>[41]</strong>. It occurred when a Nicaraguan official led his forces to the Costa Rican territory on other side of the customary border and used Google Maps as a proof to deny trespassing. Nicaragua and Costa Rica have a long territorial dispute and Google seem to have fuelled it by depicting the Nicaraguan version of border according to which that area of Cost Rican territory came within the boundaries of Nicaragua <strong>[42]</strong>. Despite Nicaragua’s petition to Google to not accept Costa Rica’s petition to shift borders, Google voluntarily changed its borders to comply with the Costa Rican stance <strong>[43]</strong>.</p>
<p>Another such incident followed in the case of Google’s depiction of Dutch-German border with respect to Dollart Bay <strong>[44]</strong>. Germany claimed the border to be closer to Dutch land while Dutch claimed it to be more towards centre. Google, however, chose to depict a self-version that transferred the German city of Emden to the territorial control of Netherlands. This infuriated the city which resorted to expressing its displeasure and asking Google to change the depiction. Google, this time, however remained dormant and no amendment in the depiction of Dutch-German border could be witnessed.</p>
<p>At the time of Crimean referendum supporting independence, U.N. had passed a resolution condemning the same and supporting territorial integrity of Ukraine. Google, however, believed in the contrary and was quick to bring changes into its maps to depict formation of independent Crimea <strong>[45]</strong>. Rather than a mistake, this time, Google had adopted a stance against the UN resolution and used its maps to vocalize the same.</p>
<p>Similarly during the inclusion of South Sudan in the U.N.G.A., while members voted, they were unaware of the exact territorial division between North and South Sudan. It was then that Google initiated the process of collecting geo-spatial information regarding South Sudan from locals in order to better the territorial integrity <strong>[46]</strong>.</p>
<p>Thus, Google has times and again fallen into criticism for wrong depiction of international boundaries and even varied depictions of boundaries as per the perspective of the political entity. However, “Popularity does not bestow authority” <strong>[47]</strong> and Google’s maps cannot be accurately relied upon for proving sovereign territorial holds. Thus, most of the international incidents have witnessed countries resorting to peaceful petitions to Google informing it regarding the inaccuracy of the border and requesting a shift in the same. Hardly has the world witnessed penal provisions being invoked against Google for depicting versions other than the perceived ones.</p>
<h3 id="3-3">3.3. J. Mohanraj v Google and Others</h3>
<p>Apart from the above two incidents, another pertinent case is the 2008 judgment by the Madras High Court in J. Mohanraj v (1) Secretary To Government, Delhi; (2) Indian Space Research Organisation, Bangalore; (3) Google India Private Limited, Bangalore . A writ petition was filed by Mohanraj seeking a complete ban on Google Earth and ‘Bhuvan’; mapping initiatives by Google and ISRO respectively <strong>[48]</strong>.</p>
<p>The petition was allegedly filed in public interest considering the security apparatus of Indian Government along with the threat posed by the terrorists. The petitioner claimed that the initiatives such as Google Earth used high quality satellite imagery to display bird’s eye view of various establishments including minute details and were bound to cover defense establishments and sensitive areas, posing a threat to Indian security. Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam’s speech was referred to indicate his views against such open creation of geospatial data. The provisions of the NMP was highlighted and it was alleged that such mapping practices violated the individual rights of a person under Article 21 of the Constitution. Further, it was claimed that such practices could only be taken up by SOI and were outside the purview of private organizations.</p>
<p>However, the Court held that the petitioner was unable to produce any specific “Guidelines/Rules/Law laid down by the Central/State Governments, prohibiting the private organisations or any other individuals to Interactive Mapping Program, covering vast majority of the Planet”. Since the court could only interpret existing provisions and not lay down guidelines, passed the judgment against the petitioners.</p>
<p>From the above explained incident it seems that the NMP per se does not refrain creation of mapping data by agencies other than SOI. The centre of the conflict seems to lie with the interpretation of the policy by SOI claiming itself to be the exclusive agency entitled to map data. Hence, often though complaints and cases are filed against such activities, no concrete consequence emerges from the same. Further, the courts have also neglected the grievance of the issue and given ambiguous judgments in most cases. Thus no judicial sanction or opposition to the SOI’s guidelines exist till date often allowing SOI to continue with following its own version. While these cannot be termed as a solution, they definitely indicate towards the root of the problem.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2 id="4">4. Conclusion</h2>
<p>It can be concluded from above compilation of legal provisions and incidents that it is perhaps SOI’s interpretation to NMP that gives rise to exclusive authority to map geospatial data and not the policy per se. The objective of the policy clearly advocates for promotion of the use of geospatial knowledge and intelligence. More than one provision under the SOI guidelines indicate towards the arbitrary abuse of power. First, a provision regarding ‘Settlement of disputes’ has been included in the guidelines. Secretary, Department of Science & Technology has been vested with binding decision making powers in case of a dispute on the applicability or interpretation of the guidelines between the SOI and any other person. Thus, instead of a judicial forum, an executive authority has been vested with quasi-judicial powers. Such a dispute resolution mechanism cannot be considered as devoid of bias towards the governmental agency, hampering fair and equal justice. Second, SOI assumed the power of mapping data but under the guidelines considers itself devoid of complete responsibility for the loss caused to any person on account of failure of proper dissemination of data. Third, the SOI has reserved the right to add, delete, modify or amend every provision of the guidelines at any time without assigning any reason or notice.</p>
<p>While depiction of wrong boundaries has been specifically been criminalized and can be accepted as symbolic of sovereign hold over contentious territorial areas, it hardly fulfills a security purpose other than acting as a proof to the international community. The incident regarding Mapathon, on the other hand, though did not result in penal consequences towards Google, seem counterproductive in the first place for asking for a ban on increase of geospatial resource data. Considering the same, prudency demands that India also adopt policies and measures that are more peaceful and accommodating in nature such as resolving territorial matters by talking out with Google and other agencies. The current and proposed stringent penal provisions only act as dis-incentivising measures for geo-spatial agencies to map India, which is not the motive sought to be achieved by the bill.</p>
<p>However, the interpretation of the policy cannot be blamed alone for restrictions such as depiction of VAs and VPs have been specifically mentioned in the policy. Above mentioned policies and guidelines have often been criticized for being overly restrictive in nature and a consequence of colonial hangover. In times of crowdsourcing of mapping data, the need of the hour exist in critically analysing the existent policies and their interpretation. The same is especially so in the absence of a high quality digital version of the correct boundary of India. While a map in PDF form has been put up by Survey of India, the same cannot be converted to digital form to be complied with or used to resolve territorial disputes of detailed nature. This makes it absolutely impossible to completely comply with the Indian version of the boundaries without a proper resource acting as a comparison check. The need of the hour is for the Government to release less ambiguous and specific details as to what it considers to be outside the scope of private mapping and the correct boundaries along with a less stringent policy framework so that India can protect its security, sovereignty and integrity while promoting creation and dissemination of geo-spatial data.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2 id="5">5. References</h2>
<p><strong>[1]</strong> SV Srikantia, 'Restriction on maps: A denial of valid geographic information,' [2000] 79(4), Current Science 484.</p>
<p><strong>[2]</strong> Fatima Alam, 'Mapping the politics of cartography,' Infosys Science Foundation, 31 March 2015, <a href="http://www.infosysblogs.com/infosysprize/2015/03/mapping_the_politics_of_cartog_2.html">http://www.infosysblogs.com/infosysprize/2015/03/mapping_the_politics_of_cartog_2.html</a>, accessed 11 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[3]</strong> 'About Us,' Survey of India, <a href="http://www.surveyofindia.gov.in/pages/view/10-about-us">http://www.surveyofindia.gov.in/pages/view/10-about-us</a>, accessed 11 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[4]</strong> Ibid.</p>
<p><strong>[5]</strong> R Ramachandran, 'Public Access to Indian Geographical Data,' [2000] 79(4) Current Science 450.</p>
<p><strong>[6]</strong> Ibid.</p>
<p><strong>[7]</strong> Supra, 4.</p>
<p><strong>[8]</strong> “Scale represents the relationship of the distance on the map/data to the actual distance on the ground. Map detail is determined by the source scale of the data: the finer the scale, the more detail.” Seen at <a href="http://gif.berkeley.edu/documents/Scale_in_GIS.pdf">http://gif.berkeley.edu/documents/Scale_in_GIS.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[9]</strong> Dr. Manosi Lahiri, 'Survey & Mapping in India: The Regulatory Framework,' Directions Magazine India, <a href="https://www.mlinfomap.com/Pdf/Survey&Mapping-Lahiri%202.1.pdf">https://www.mlinfomap.com/Pdf/Survey&Mapping-Lahiri%202.1.pdf</a>, accessed 11 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[10]</strong> Ibid.</p>
<p><strong>[11]</strong> Supra, 2.</p>
<p><strong>[12]</strong> ‘Guidelines for implementing National Map Policy,’ Survey of India, <a href="http://surveyofindia.gov.in/files/nmp/Guidlines%20for%20Implementing%20National%20Map%20policy.pdf">http://surveyofindia.gov.in/files/nmp/Guidlines%20for%20Implementing%20National%20Map%20policy.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[13]</strong> 'National Map Policy, 2005, Preamble,' Survey of India, <a href="http://surveyofindia.gov.in/files/nmp/National%20Map%20Policy.pdf">http://surveyofindia.gov.in/files/nmp/National%20Map%20Policy.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[14]</strong> Ibid, Objectives.</p>
<p><strong>[15]</strong> Supra, 11.</p>
<p><strong>[16]</strong> Supra, 5.</p>
<p><strong>[17]</strong> 'Remote Sensing Data Policy, 2011,' National Remote Sensing Centre, Indian Space Research Organisation, <a href="http://www.nrsc.gov.in/Remote_Sensing_Data_Policy">http://www.nrsc.gov.in/Remote_Sensing_Data_Policy</a>.</p>
<p><strong>[18]</strong> Civil Aviation Requirement Section 3 Air Transport Series ‘F’ Part I Issue I, 12th October 2010.</p>
<p><strong>[19]</strong> Nandagopal Rajan, 'Why India needs rules for flying drones, soon' (The Indian Express, 9 July, 2015) <a href="http://indianexpress.com/article/technology/gadgets/why-india-needs-rules-for-flying-drones-soon/">http://indianexpress.com/article/technology/gadgets/why-india-needs-rules-for-flying-drones-soon/</a> accessed 11 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[20]</strong> TNN, 'Now, flying a drone can land you in prison' (The Times of India, 15 February, 2016) <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jaipur/Now-flying-a-drone-can-land-you-in-prison/articleshow/50990613.cms">http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/jaipur/Now-flying-a-drone-can-land-you-in-prison/articleshow/50990613.cms</a>, accessed 11 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[21]</strong> Ibid.</p>
<p><strong>[22]</strong> Supra, 19; 20.</p>
<p><strong>[23]</strong> Supra, 5.</p>
<p><strong>[24]</strong> tech2 news staff, 'Why is Google’s Mapathon in hot waters in India? All you need to know' (Tech-2, 12 Aug, 2015) <a href="http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/why-is-googles-mapathon-in-hot-waters-in-india-all-you-need-to-know-228810.html">http://tech.firstpost.com/news-analysis/why-is-googles-mapathon-in-hot-waters-in-india-all-you-need-to-know-228810.html</a>, accessed 6 May 2016</p>
<p><strong>[25]</strong> Supra, 12.</p>
<p><strong>[26]</strong> Supra, 24.</p>
<p><strong>[27]</strong> ‘PTI, 'Google ‘polluted Internet’ with classified material: Survey of India' (The Hindu, 10 August, 2014) <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/internet/mapathon-2013-row-google-polluted-internet-with-classified-material-says-survey-of-india/article6300853.ece">http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/technology/internet/mapathon-2013-row-google-polluted-internet-with-classified-material-says-survey-of-india/article6300853.ece</a>, accessed 11 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[28]</strong> Sandeep Joshi, ‘Google didn’t take permission for Mapathon’ (The Hindu, 24 April, 2013) <a href="http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/google-didnt-take-permission-for-mapathon/article4648589.ece">http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/google-didnt-take-permission-for-mapathon/article4648589.ece</a>, accessed 6 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[29]</strong> Supra, 24.</p>
<p><strong>[30]</strong> Abhishek Sharan, 'CBI may close probe against Google in Mapathon case' (Hindustan Times, 12 February, 2015) <a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/cbi-may-close-probe-against-google-in-mapathon-case/story-CgZYWoP9NgYA3xVepjr5bN.html">http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/cbi-may-close-probe-against-google-in-mapathon-case/story-CgZYWoP9NgYA3xVepjr5bN.html</a>, accessed 6 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[31]</strong> PTI, 'Pathankot attack: Sensitive sites on Google Maps under Delhi HC scanner' (Times of India, 15 January, 2016) <a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Pathankot-attack-Sensitive-sites-on-Google-Maps-under-Delhi-HC-scanner/articleshow/50596143.cms">http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Pathankot-attack-Sensitive-sites-on-Google-Maps-under-Delhi-HC-scanner/articleshow/50596143.cms</a>, accessed 6 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[32]</strong> ‘Public Awareness,' Survey of India, <a href="http://www.surveyofindia.gov.in/pages/display/190-public-awareness">http://www.surveyofindia.gov.in/pages/display/190-public-awareness</a>), accessed 6 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[33]</strong> Aman Sharma, '7-year jail, Rs 100 crore fine soon for showing PoK, Arunachal as disputed' (The Economic Times, 05 May 2016) <a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/7-year-jail-rs-100-crore-fine-soon-for-showing-pok-arunachal-as-disputed/articleshow/52117889.cms">http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/7-year-jail-rs-100-crore-fine-soon-for-showing-pok-arunachal-as-disputed/articleshow/52117889.cms</a>, accessed 6 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[34]</strong> Jaspreet Sahni 'Survey of India files complaint against Google maps for wrong depiction of India's boundaries' (News18, 13 December 2014) <a href="http://www.news18.com/news/india/survey-of-india-files-complaint-against-google-maps-for-wrong-depiction-of-indias-boundaries-731101.html">http://www.news18.com/news/india/survey-of-india-files-complaint-against-google-maps-for-wrong-depiction-of-indias-boundaries-731101.html</a>, accessed 6 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[35]</strong> Itanagar agencies, 'Arunachal fumes over wrong map on iPhone4' (Deccan Herald, 04 October, 2010) <a href="http://www.deccanherald.com/content/101784/F">http://www.deccanherald.com/content/101784/F</a>, accessed 6 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[36]</strong> CC, 'How Google represents disputed borders between countries' (The Economist, 04 September, 2014) <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/09/economist-explains-1">http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/09/economist-explains-1</a>, accessed 6 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[37]</strong> The Kashmir Walla, 'Ten Maps of Kashmir That Angered India' (The Kashmir Walla, 14 May, 2015) <a href="http://thekashmirwalla.com/2015/05/ten-maps-of-kashmir-that-angered-india/">http://thekashmirwalla.com/2015/05/ten-maps-of-kashmir-that-angered-india/</a>accessed 11 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[38]</strong> Ibid.</p>
<p><strong>[39]</strong> Ibid.</p>
<p><strong>[40]</strong> Ibid.</p>
<p><strong>[41]</strong> Frank Jacobs, 'The First Google Maps War' (The New York Times, 28 February, 2012) <a href="http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/the-first-google-maps-war/">http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/the-first-google-maps-war/</a>, accessed 11 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[42]</strong> Ethan Merel, 'Google’s World: The Impact of "Agnostic Cartographers" on the State-Dominated International Legal System' [2016] <em>Columbia Journal of Transnational Law</em> 442-444.</p>
<p><strong>[43]</strong> Ibid.</p>
<p><strong>[44]</strong> Europe, 'Google map gives German harbour to Netherlands' (BBC, 23 February, 2011) <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12558741">http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-12558741</a>, accessed 11 May 2016.</p>
<p><strong>[45]</strong> Supra, 42, 448.</p>
<p><strong>[46]</strong> Ibid, 449.</p>
<p><strong>[47]</strong> Supra, 47.</p>
<p><strong>[48]</strong> <em>J. Mohanraj v (1) Secretary To Government, Delhi; (2) Indian Space Research Organisation, Bangalore; (3) Google India Private Limited, Bangalore, 2008 Indlaw MAD 3562</em>.</p>
<p> </p>
<h2 id="6">6. Author Profile</h2>
<p><strong>Adya Garg</strong> is a law student at West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata and has completed her second year. An ardent *SRK fan*, and a dancer at heart, she loves reading books in her free time. Always excited about exploring new fields, she never misses an opportunity to work on areas outside her legal curriculum.</p>
<p> </p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/openness/legal-challenges-to-mapping-in-india-1-laws-policies-cases'>https://cis-india.org/openness/legal-challenges-to-mapping-in-india-1-laws-policies-cases</a>
</p>
No publisherAdya GargGeospatial Information Regulation BillOpen DataOpen Government DataGeospatial DataOpenness2016-05-11T13:43:11ZBlog Entry