Centre for Internet and Society

Women arrested for Facebook post: Did cops act under Sena pressure?

praskrishna — 2012-11-21T11:17:37Z

After Bal Thackeray's death, during the Mumbai Bandh, a 21-year-old criticised the shutdown on her Facebook page — her friend approved of it — next thing they know, they are facing a case, and this morning they were arrested.

YP Singh, Alyque Padamsee, Rohan Joshi, Karuna Nundy and Pranesh Prakash took part in a discussion about the arrest of two girls over a Facebook comment. The discussion was aired in NDTV on November 19, 2012.

The anchor asked Pranesh Prakash:

Who are these people scrolling through people's Facebook posts and Twitter accounts, finding these comments and taking action?

Pranesh Prakash said that it could be anyone. The reality is doesn't really matter because the laws are written in such a way that if it is public and stuff that is on Facebook for different purposes can either be public or private, if it is public these laws can very often apply and that is a problem. We haven't quite figured out to what extent these laws apply. The IT Act section 66A for instance, is unconstitutional, section 295 A which has been applied, and section 505 which also seems to have been applied in this case make it a clear case of misappropriation of those provisions. These kind of arrests will happen. It doesn't quite matter if we have right laws at one level and it clearly doesn't help if we have bad laws. What we need to do at least in part to remedy the situation is to amend the IT Act to make it consonant and consistent with civil and political rights and to do so in multi-stakeholder fashion involving civil society, industry and government. Right now it doesn't protect privacy and freedom of speech as much as it should.

Watch the full video aired on NDTV

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/ndtv-video-ndtv-special-ndtv-24x7

Indians Rank Second For Online Snooping

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T06:10:24Z

Indians rank second globally when it comes to seeking details of private individuals online, as per Google transparency report.

The blog post was published in Indolink on November 23, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

India recorded for 2,319 requests for the entire period of 2012, where various government agencies have been looking for individual user details contained in online records, as reported by Dailybhaskar.com. U.S. topped the list with 7,969 requests, while Brazil was on the third spot with 1,566 requests.

It was seen that in the first six months this year, India made 2,319 requests involving 3,467 users, while the U.S. made 7,969 requests in the same period. Globally, it was seen that there were 20,938 requests for user data in the period of January-June. The data includes an individual’s complete Gmail account, chat logs, Orkut profile and search terms among others. Google prepares this report every six months, and was started in July-December 2009.

The report also stated that the percentage of data requests fully or partially complied with by India stood at 64 percent.

The Director for policy at Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), Pranesh Prakash said "Though India is a large country with a significant number of internet users, this data is nonetheless an indicator of growing surveillance," as reported by Daily Bhaskar.com.Apart from snooping on user details, Indian authorities are also known to send requests for taking down certain web content, which is considered to be sensitive for national security or defamatory in general. A new trend also revealed that untrue court orders are being used as a key instrument for the same.

On one hand the nation is seeking to go net savvy, while on the other hand authorities are looking to stamp authority on freedom of a larger population.

If was also noted that there were 20 court orders and 64 requests from executive/police that resulted in 596 items being taken down from the web between January and June this year. Comparatively, there were only eight court orders and 22 executive/police requests in January-June 2010, resulting in 125 items being taken down.

Google said “In response to a court order, we removed 360 search results. The search results were linked to 360 web pages that had adult videos, which allegedly violated an individual’s personal privacy,” as reported by Business Standard.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/indolink-november-2012-indians-rank-second-for-online-shopping

Interview with Pranesh Prakash

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T06:58:39Z

Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society talks to Mint’s Surabhi Agarwal about the controversial Section 66A of the IT Act and the government’s decision to tweak it.

This video was published in LiveMint on November 30, 2012:

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/livemint-november-30-2012-video-interview-with-pranesh-prakash

Yes, You Can Get Arrested for a Facebook Status Update Now

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T08:16:20Z

A 21-year-old Indian woman thought Mumbai shouldn't have been shutdown for the funeral of an Islamophobic leader. Broadcasting such opinions on Facebook was apparently grounds for arrest.

The article by David Wagner was published in the Atlantic Wire on November 29, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

A Muslim graduate student, Shaheen Dhada posted a note (of her iPhone message) on her timeline November 18th, writing, "Every day thousands of people die, but still the world moves on ... Today, Mumbai shuts down out of fear, not out of respect." Her status was written in reference to the death of Bal Thackeray, the late leader of Hindu extremist group Shiv Sena, responsible for repeated waves violence against Muslims in the Maharashtra state, according to the BBC. Another 21-year-old woman, Rinu Shrinivasan, was also arrested by Indian police for stoking "religious enmity." She'd simply clicked "like" on Dhada's post.

A mob of angry Thackeray supporters thronged around the police station Dhada's house. Others vandalized her uncle's clinic two days after her arrest. Mumbai newspaper The Hindu reports today that charges have been dropped against the two arrested women, but those observing the case are worried about the precedent this sets for free speech in India. "I have 3,500 followers on Twitter, and I'm pretty sure I annoy 100 of them on a daily basis," says Centre for Internet and Society director Pranesh Prakash. But should that mean he and others in India should picture themselves in handcuffs every time they type a potentially controversial status update? Retired Supreme Court Justice Markandey Katju tells NPR's Julie McCarthy that, at least in this case, the arrest was totally inappropriate:

You can mourn a death in whichever way you want, but you can't bring a whole city to a stoppage. So what this girl wrote was in consonance with the verdict of the Supreme Court—nothing illegal.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/the-atlantic-wire-november-29-2012-david-wagner-you-can-get-arrested-for-facebook-status-update-now

Govt tweaks enforcement of IT Act after spate of arrests

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T08:27:01Z

The government on Thursday tweaked the law to make it tougher for citizens to be arrested for online comments that are deemed offensive after recent arrests came in for heavy criticism by Internet activists, the media and other groups.

Surabhi Agarwal's article was published in LiveMint on November 29, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

This took place just before the Supreme Court was to hear a public interest litigation seeking an amendment to the Information Technology (IT) Act.

Complaints under the controversial Section 66A of the IT Act, which criminalizes “causing annoyance or inconvenience” online or electronically, can be registered only with the permission of an officer of or above the rank of deputy commissioner of police, and inspector general in metro cities, said a senior government official.

The government, however, has not amended the terms in the section that are said to be vague and subject to interpretation.

The public interest litigation against Section 66A filed by student Shreya Singhal came up in chief justice Altamas Kabir’s court on Thursday. The matter will be heard on Friday.

Two girls near Mumbai were arrested last week for criticizing on Facebook the shutdown in the city for Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackeray’s funeral. Earlier in November, a businessman in Puducherry was arrested for comments made on Twitter against finance minister P. Chidambaram’s son Karti Chidambaram.

According to people present at the meeting of the cyber regulatory advisory committee on Thursday, the Union government will issue guidelines to states with respect to the compliance of the new enforcement rules soon. The people didn’t want to be named. An official said the move was not related to the case.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society think tank, said that while the change in the law is a step in the right direction and will eliminate a lot of frivolous complaints, more needs to be done to make the legislation specific.

Chief justice Kabir said the apex court was considering taking suo motu cognisance of recent incidents.

Singhal contended in her plea that “the phraseology of section 66A of the IT Act, 2000, is so wide and vague and incapable of being judged on objective standards, that it is susceptible to wanton abuse and, hence, falls foul of Article 14, 19 (1)(a) and Article 21 of the Constitution.”

She submitted that “unless there is judicial sanction as a prerequisite to the setting into motion the criminal law with respect to freedom of speech and expression, the law as it stands is highly susceptible to abuse and for muzzling free speech in the country.”

The PIL was argued by Mukul Rohatgi, who said in his opening remarks that Section 66A was vague. Terms such as “offensive” and “annoyance” should be clearly defined as the section is part of criminal law, he said.

Senior advocate Harish Salve, who was also present during the hearing, said India guaranteed the right to “annoy” and there was no need to have a separate law.

Salve, who is in the process of filing an intervention on behalf of some technology companies, added that the section needed to be narrowed to specifically cater to private messages sent electronically and not social media communications.

He said the existing law of defamation should suffice and could be extended to include electronic communications. According to a lawyer who is part of the team representing Singhal, the petition also demanded that the law be made non-cognisable so that the police can’t make an arrest without an order from a magistrate.

“There has been a lot of misuse and abuse of the law recently and we want it to be struck down absolutely and also the court to issue guidelines,” he said.

Apart from the incident at Palghar in Thane district involving the two girls, Singhal’s PIL referred to an April incident in which a professor of chemistry from Jadavpur University in West Bengal, Ambikesh Mahapatra, was arrested for posting a cartoon concerning chief minister Mamata Banerjee on a social networking site.

She also referred to the Puducherry case as well as the May arrests of two Air India Ltd employees, V. Jaganatharao and Mayank Sharma, by the Mumbai Police under the IT Act for posting content on Facebook and Orkut against a trade union leader and some politicians.

Singhal has sought guidelines from the apex court to “reconcile Section 41 and 156 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) with Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution” and that offences under the Indian Penal Code and any other legislation, if they involve the freedom of speech and expression, be treated as a non-cognizable offences for the purposes of Sections 41 and 156 (1).

Section 41 of CPC empowers the police to arrest any person without an order from a magistrate and without a warrant in the event that the offence involved is a cognizable offence. Section 156 (1) empowers the investigation by the police into a cognizable offence without an order from a magistrate.

The government official present at the cyber regulatory advisory committee said the expressions used in Section 66A had been taken from different statutes around the world, including the UK and the US.

“There has been a broad consensus that the parameters of the law concerned might be in order but from a procedural standpoint there might be difficulty,” the official said.

Prakash said that while some of the terms in the section may be taken from legislation overseas, the penalty imposed under the Indian law is far more stringent at three years of imprisonment than, for instance, six months under the UK law. “Criminal offences can’t be put at the same level as something which causes insult.”

The cyber regulatory advisory committee meeting was attended by minister for communications and information technolgy Kapil Sibal, and secretaries of the department of telecommunications and information technology, besides representatives of technology companies such as Google and Facebook, industry associations and civil society.

The official also said that the situation will be reviewed every three to four months based on “ground realities”.

A government official said on condition of anonymity that the decision to revive the cyber regulatory advisory committee had been taken at a meeting in August. Section 66A was put on the agenda since it was the subject of much debate, he said. The meeting, however, was not a pre-emptive measure ahead of the PIL that was taken up in the Supreme Court. The official also said that the government will spell out its position in court in favour of the legislation.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/livemint-politics-november-29-2012-surabhi-agarwal-govt-tweaks-enforcement-of-it-act-after-spate-of-arrests

Comments on the Cinematograph (Amendment) Bill, 2021

Tanvi Apte, Anubha Sinha and Torsha Sarkar — 2021-07-05T05:59:52Z

In this submission, we examine the constitutionality and legality of the Cinematograph (Amendment) Bill, 2021, which was released by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.

This submission presents comments by CIS on the Cinematograph (Amendement) Bill, 2021 (“the Bill”) which were released on 18 June 2021 for public comments. These comments examine whether the proposed amendments are compatible with established constitutional principles, precedents, previous policy positions and existing law. While we appreciate the opportunity to submit comments, we note that the time allotted for doing so was less than a month (the deadline for submission was 2 July 2021). Given the immense public import in the proposed changes, and the number of stakeholders involved, we highlight that the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (MIB) should have provided more time in the final submission of comments.

Read our full submission here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-cinematograph-amendment-bill-2021

Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet 2011

Rishabh Dara — 2012-04-21T18:05:58Z

Intermediaries are widely recognised as essential cogs in the wheel of exercising the right to freedom of expression on the Internet. Most major jurisdictions around the world have introduced legislations for limiting intermediary liability in order to ensure that this wheel does not stop spinning. With the 2008 amendment of the Information Technology Act 2000, India joined the bandwagon and established a ‘notice and takedown’ regime for limiting intermediary liability.

On the 11th of April 2011, the Government of India notified the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules 2011 that prescribe, amongst other things, guidelines for administration of takedowns by intermediaries. The Rules have been criticised extensively by both national and international media. The media has projected that the Rules, contrary to the objective of promoting free expression, seem to encourage privately administered injunctions to censor and chill free expression. On the other hand, the Government has responded through press releases and assured that the Rules in their current form do not violate the principle of freedom of expression or allow the government to regulate content.

This study has been conducted with the objective of determining whether the criteria, procedure and safeguards for administration of the takedowns as prescribed by the Rules lead to a chilling effect on online free expression. In the course of the study, takedown notices were sent to a sample comprising of 7 prominent intermediaries and their response to the notices was documented. Different policy factors were permuted in the takedown notices in order to understand at what points in the process of takedown, free expression is being chilled.

The results of the paper clearly demonstrate that the Rules indeed have a chilling effect on free expression. Specifically, the Rules create uncertainty in the criteria and procedure for administering the takedown thereby inducing the intermediaries to err on the side of caution and over-comply with takedown notices in order to limit their liability and as a result suppress legitimate expressions. Additionally, the Rules do not establish sufficient safeguards to prevent misuse and abuse of the takedown process to suppress legitimate expressions.

Of the 7 intermediaries to which takedown notices were sent, 6 intermediaries over-complied with the notices, despite the apparent flaws in them. From the responses to the takedown notices, it can be reasonably presumed that not all intermediaries have sufficient legal competence or resources to deliberate on the legality of an expression. Even if such intermediary has sufficient legal competence, it has a tendency to prioritise the allocation of its legal resources according to the commercial importance of impugned expressions. Further, if such subjective determination is required to be done in a limited timeframe and in the absence of adequate facts and circumstances, the intermediary mechanically (without application of mind or proper judgement) complies with the takedown notice.

The results also demonstrate that the Rules are procedurally flawed as they ignore all elements of natural justice. The third party provider of information whose expression is censored is not informed about the takedown, let alone given an opportunity to be heard before or after the takedown. There is also no recourse to have the removed information put-back or restored. The intermediary is under no obligation to provide a reasoned decision for rejecting or accepting a takedown notice. The Rules in their current form clearly tilt the takedown mechanism in favour of the complainant and adversely against the creator of expression.

The research highlights the need to:

increase the safeguards against misuse of the privately administered takedown regime;

reduce the uncertainty in the criteria for administering the takedown;

reduce the uncertainty in the procedure for administering the takedown;

include various elements of natural justice in the procedure for administering the takedown; and

replace the requirement for subjective legal determination by intermediaries with an objective test.

This executive summary is a research output of the Google Policy Fellowship 2011. The Centre for Internet & Society was the host organization. For the entire paper along with references, please write to rishabhdara@gmail.com or sunil@cis-india.org

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/intermediary-liability-in-india

FOEX Live

geetha — 2014-07-07T12:36:49Z

Selections of news on online freedom of expression and digital technology from across India (and some parts of the world)

For feedback, comments and any incidents of online free speech violation you are troubled or intrigued by, please email Geetha at geetha[at]cis-india.org or on Twitter at @covertlight.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/foex-live

Delhi High Court Orders Blocking of Websites after Sony Complains Infringement of 2014 FIFA World Cup Telecast Rights

sinha — 2014-07-08T07:02:16Z

Of late the Indian judiciary has been issuing John Doe orders to block websites, most recently in Multi Screen Media v. Sunit Singh and Others. The order mandated blocking of 472 websites, out of which approximately 267 websites were blocked as on July 7, 2014. This trend is an extremely dangerous one because it encourages flagrant censorship by intermediaries based on a judicial order which does not provide for specific blocking of a URL, instead provides for blocking of the entire website.

The High Court of Delhi on June 23, 2014 issued a John Doe injunction restraining more than 400 websites from broadcasting 2014 FIFA world cup matches. News reports indicate that the Single judge bench of Justice V. Kameswar Rao directed the Department of Telecom to issue appropriate directions to ISPs to block the websites that Multi Screen Media provided, as well as “any other website identified by the plaintiff” in the future. On July 4, Justice G. S. Sistani permitted reducing the list to 219 websites.

Background

Multi Screen Media (MSM) is the official broadcaster for the ongoing 2014 FIFA World Cup tournament. FIFA (the Governing body) had exclusively licensed rights to MSM which included live, delayed, highlights, on demand, and repeat broadcast of the FIFA matches. MSM complained that the defendants indulged in hosting, streaming, providing access to, etc, thereby infringing the exclusive rights and broadcast and reproduction rights of MSM.

The court in the instant order held that the defendants had prima facie infringed MSM’s broadcasting rights, which are guaranteed by section 37 of the Copyright Act, 1957. In an over-zealous attempt to pre-empt infringement the court called for a blanket ban on all websites identified by MSM. Further, the court directed the concerned authorities to ensure ISPs complied with this order and block the websites mentioned by MSM presently, and other websites which may be subsequently be notified by MSM.

Where the Court went Wrong

The court stated that MSM successfully established a prima facie case, and on its basis granted a sweeping injunction to MSM ordering blocking 471 second level domains. I’d like to point out numerous flaws with the order-

Dissatisfactory "Prima facie case"

In my opinion the court could have scrutinised the list of websites provided by MSM more carefully. There is nothing in the order to suggest that evidence was proffered by MSM in support of the list. The order reveals that the list was prepared by MarkScan, a “consulting boutique dedicated to (the client’s) IP requirements in the cyberspace and the Indian sub-continent.” The list throws up names such as docs.google.com, goo.gl & ad.ly (provide URL shortening service only), torrent indexing websites, IP addresses, online file streaming websites, etc., at a cursory glance. Evidently, perfectly legitimate websites have been targeted by an ill conducted search and shoddily prepared list which may lead to blocking of legitimate content on account of no verification by the court. 471 websites out of 472 mentioned in the first list are second level domains and 23 websites have been listed twice.

2. Generic order which abysmally fails to identify specific infringing URLS

Out of the 472 websites (list provided in the order by MarkScan)-

471 are file streaming websites, video sharing websites, file lockers, URL shorteners, file storage websites; only one is a specific URL [http://www.24livestreamtv.com/brazil-2014-fifa-world-cup-football-%20%C2%A0%C2%A0live-streaming-online-t ].

The order calls for blocking of complete websites. This is in complete contradiction to the 2012 Madras High Court’s order in R K Productions v BSNL which held that only a particular URL where the infringing content is kept should be blocked, rather than the entire website. The Madras High Court order had also made it mandatory for the complainants to provide exact URLs where they find illegal content, such that ISPs could block only that content and not the entire site. MSM did not adhere to this and I have serious doubts if the defendants brought the distinguishing Madras High Court judgment to the attention of the bench. The entire situation is akin to MarkScan scamming MSM by providing their clients a dodgy list, and MSM scamming the court and the public at large.

3. Lack of Transparency – Different blocking messages on different ISPs

The message displayed uniformly on blocked websites was:

"This website/URL has been blocked until further notice either pursuant to court orders or on the directions issued by the Department of Telecommunications."

I observed that a few websites showed the message “Error 404 – File or Directory not found” without the blocking message (above) on the network provider Reliance, and same Error 404 with the blocking message on the network provider Airtel highlighting the non-transparent manner of adherence to the order. Further, both the messages do not indicate the end period of the block.

Legality of John Doe orders in Website Blocking

It is pertinent to reiterate the ‘misuse’ of John Doe orders to block websites in India. The judiciary has erred in applying the John Doe order to protect copyrightable content on the internet. While the R K Productions v BSNL case appears reasonable in terms of permitting blocking of only URL specific content, the application of John Doe order to block websites remains unfounded in law. Ananth Padmanabhan in a three part study (Part I, II and III) had earlier analysed the improper use of John Doe injunctions to block websites in India. The John Doe order was conceived by US courts to pre-emptively remedy the irreparable damages suffered by copyright holders on account of unidentified/unnamed infringers. The interim injunction allowed collection of evidence from infringers, who were identified later as certain defendants and the final relief was accordingly granted. The courts routinely advocated judicious use of the order, and ensured that the identified defendants were provided and informed of their right to apply to the court within twenty four hours for a review of the order and a right to claim damages in an appropriate case. Therefore, the John Doe order applied against primary infringers per se.

On the other hand, whilst extending this remedy in India the courts have unfortunately placed onus on the conduit i.e. the ISP to block websites. This is tantamount to providing final relief at the interim stage, since all content definitely gets blocked; however, this hardly helps in identifying the actual infringer on the internet. The court is prematurely doling out blocking remedies to the complaining party, which, legally speaking should be meted out only during the final disposition of the case after careful examination of the evidence available. Thus, the intent of a John Doe order is miserably lost in such an application. Moreover, this lends an arbitrary amount of power in the hands of intermediaries since ISPs may or may not choose to approach the court for directions to specifically block URLs which provide access to infringing content only.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/delhi-high-court-orders-blocking-of-websites-after-sony-complains-infringement-of-2014-fifa-world-cup-telecast-rights

Free Speech and Civil Defamation

gautam — 2014-07-08T08:31:18Z

Does defamation become a tool in powerful hands to suppress criticism? Gautam Bhatia examines the strict and unrealistic demands of defamation law, and concludes that defamation suits are a weapon to silence dissent and bad press.

Previously on this blog, we have discussed one of the under-analysed aspects of Article 19(2) – contempt of court. In the last post, we discussed the checking – or “watchdog” – function of the press. There is yet another under-analysed part of 19(2) that we now turn to – one which directly implicates the press, in its role as public watchdog. This is the issue of defamation.

Unlike contempt of court – which was a last-minute insertion by Ambedkar, before the second reading of the draft Constitution in the Assembly – defamation was present in the restrictions clause since the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee’s first draft, in 1947. Originally, it accompanied libel and slander, before the other two were dropped for the simpler “reasonable restrictions… in the interests of… defamation.” Unlike the other restrictions, which provoked substantial controversy, defamation did not provoke extended scrutiny by the Constituent Assembly.

In hindsight, that was a lapse. In recent years, defamation lawsuits have emerged as a powerful weapon against the press, used primarily by individuals and corporations in positions of power and authority, and invariably as a means of silencing criticism. For example, Hamish MacDonald’s The Polyester Prince, a book about the Ambanis, was unavailable in Indian bookshops, because of threats of defamation lawsuits. In January, Bloomsbury withdrew The Descent of Air India, which was highly critical of ex-Aviation Minister Praful Patel, after the latter filed a defamation lawsuit. Around the same time, Sahara initiated a 200 crore lawsuit against Tamal Bandyopadhayay, a journalist with The Mint, for his forthcoming book, Sahara: The Untold Story. Sahara even managed to get a stay order from a Calcutta High Court judge, who cited one paragraph from the book, and ruled that “Prima facie, the materials do seem to show the plaintiffs in poor light.” The issue has since been settled out of Court. Yet there is no guarantee that Bandyopadhyay would have won on merits, even with the absurd amount claimed as damages, given that a Pune Court awarded damages of Rs. 100 crores to former Justice P.B. Sawant against the Times Group, for a fifteen-second clip by a TV channel that accidentally showed his photograph next to the name of a judge who was an accused in a scam. What utterly takes the cake, though, is Infosys serving legal notices to three journalistic outlets recently, asking for damages worth Rs. 200 crore for “loss of reputation and goodwill due to circulation of defamatory articles.”

Something is very wrong here. The plaintiffs are invariably politicians or massive corporate houses, and the defendants are invariably journalists or newspapers. The subject is always critical reporting. The damages claimed (and occasionally, awarded) are astronomical – enough to cripple or destroy any business – and the actual harm is speculative. A combination of these factors, combined with a broken judicial system in which trials take an eternity to progress, leading to the prospect of a lawsuit hanging perpetually over one’s head, and financial ruin just around the corner, clearly has the potential to create a highly effective chilling effect upon newspapers, when it come to critical speech on matters of public interest.

One of the reasons that this happens, of course, is that extant defamation law allows it to happen. Under defamation law, as long as a statement is published, is defamatory (that is, tending to lower the reputation of the plaintiff in the minds of reasonable people) and refers to the plaintiff, a prima facie case of defamation is made out. The burden then shifts to the defendant to argue a justification, such as truth, or fair comment, or privileged communication. Notice that defamation, in this form, is a strict liability offence: that is, the publisher cannot save himself even if he has taken due care in researching and writing his story. Even an inadvertent factual error can result in liability. Furthermore, there are many things that straddle a very uncomfortable barrier between “fact” and “opinion” (“opinions” are generally not punishable for defamation): for example, if I call you “corrupt”, have I made a statement of fact, or one of opinion? Much of reporting – especially political reporting – falls within this slipstream.

The legal standard of defamation, therefore, puts almost all the burden upon the publisher, a burden that will often be impossible to discharge – as well as potentially penalising the smallest error. Given the difficulty in fact-checking just about everything, as well as the time pressures under which journalists operate, this is an unrealistic standard. What makes things even worse, however, is that there is no cap on damages, and that the plaintiff need not even demonstrate actual harm in making his claims. Judges have the discretion to award punitive damages, which are meant to serve both as an example and as a deterrent. When Infosys claims 2000 crores, therefore, it need not show that there has been a tangible drop in its sales, or that it has lost an important and lucrative contract – let alone showing that the loss was caused by the defamatory statement. All it needs to do is make abstract claims about loss of goodwill and reputation, which are inherently difficult to verify either way, and it stands a fair chance of winning.

A combination of onerous legal standards and crippling amounts in damages makes the defamation regime a very difficult one for journalists to operate freely in. We have discussed before the crucial role that journalists play in a system of free speech whose underlying foundation is the maintenance of democracy: a free press is essential to maintaining a check upon the actions of government and other powerful players, by subjecting them to scrutiny and critique, and ensuring that the public is aware of important facts that government might be keen to conceal. In chilling journalistic speech, therefore, defamation laws strike at the heart of Article 19(1)(a). When considering what the appropriate standards ought to be, a Court therefore must consider the simple fact that if defamation – as it stands today – is compromising the core of 19(1)(a) itself, then it is certainly not a “reasonable restriction” under 19(2) (some degree of proportionality is an important requirement for 19(2) reasonableness, as the Court has held many times).

This is not, however, a situation unique to India. In Singapore, for instance, “[political] leaders have won hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages in defamation cases against critics and foreign publications, which they have said are necessary to protect their reputations from unfounded attacks” – the defamation lawsuit, indeed, was reportedly a legal strategy used by Lee Kuan Yew against political opponents.

Particularly in the United States, the European Union and South Africa, however, this problem has been recognised, and acted upon. In the next post, we shall examine some of the legal techniques used in those jurisdictions, to counter the chilling effect that strict defamation laws can have on the press.

We discussed the use of civil defamation laws as weapons to stifle a free and critical press. One of the most notorious of such instances also birthed one of the most famous free speech cases in history: New York Times v. Sullivan. This was at the peak of the civil rights movement in the American South, which was accompanied by widespread violence and repression of protesters and civil rights activists. A full-page advertisement was taken out in the New York Times, titled Heed Their Rising Voices, which detailed some particularly reprehensible acts by the police in Montgomery, Alabama. It also contained some factual errors. For example, the advertisement mentioned that Martin Luther King Jr. had been arrested seven times, whereas he had only been arrested four times. It also stated that the Montgomery police had padlocked students into the university dining hall, in order to starve them into submission. That had not actually happened. On this basis, Sullivan, the Montgomery police commissioner, sued for libel. The Alabama courts awarded 500,000 dollars in damages. Because five other people in a situation similar to Sullivan were also suing, the total amount at stake was three million dollars – enough to potentially boycott the New York Times, and certainly enough to stop it from publishing about the civil rights movement.

In his book about the Sullivan case, Make No Law, Anthony Lewis notes that the stakes in the case were frighteningly high. The civil rights movement depended, for its success, upon stirring public opinion in the North. The press was just the vehicle to do it, reporting as it did on excessive police brutality against students and peaceful protesters, practices of racism and apartheid, and so on. Sullivan was a legal strategy to silence the press, and its weapon of choice was defamation law.

In a 9 – 0 decision, the Supreme Court found for the New York Times, and changed the face of free speech law (and, according to Lewis, saved the civil rights movement). Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan made the crucial point that in order to survive, free speech needed “breathing space” – that is, the space to make errors. Under defamation law, as it stood, “the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public criticism [is] an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive.” And under the burden of proving truth, “would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is, in fact, true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." For these reasons, Justice Brennan laid down an “actual malice” test for defamation – that is, insofar as the statement in question concerned the conduct of a public official, it was actionable for defamation only if the publisher either knew it was false, or published it with “reckless disregard” for its veracity. After New York Times, this standard has expanded, and the press has never lost a defamation case.

There are some who argue that in its zeal to protect the press against defamation lawsuits by the powerful, the Sullivan court swung the opposite way. In granting the press a near-unqualified immunity to say whatever it wanted, it subordinated the legitimate interests of people to their reputation and their dignity to an intolerable degree, and ushered in a regime of media unaccountability. This is evidently what the South African courts felt. In Khulamo v. Holomisa, Justice O’Regan accepted that the common law of defamation would have to be altered so as to reflect the new South African Constitution’s guarantees of the freedom of speech. Much like Justice Brennan, she noted that “the media are important agents in ensuring that government is open, responsive and accountable to the people as the founding values of our Constitution require”, as well as the chilling effect in requiring journalists to prove the truth of everything they said. Nonetheless, she was not willing to go as far as the American Supreme Court did. Instead, she cited a previous decision by the Supreme Court of Appeals, and incorporated a “resonableness standard” into defamation law. That is, “if a publisher cannot establish the truth, or finds it disproportionately expensive or difficult to do so, the publisher may show that in all the circumstances the publication was reasonable. In determining whether publication was reasonable, a court will have regard to the individual’s interest in protecting his or her reputation in the context of the constitutional commitment to human dignity. It will also have regard to the individual’s interest in privacy. In that regard, there can be no doubt that persons in public office have a diminished right to privacy, though of course their right to dignity persists. It will also have regard to the crucial role played by the press in fostering a transparent and open democracy. The defence of reasonable publication avoids therefore a winner-takes-all result and establishes a proper balance between freedom of expression and the value of human dignity. Moreover, the defence of reasonable publication will encourage editors and journalists to act with due care and respect for the individual interest in human dignity prior to publishing defamatory material, without precluding them from publishing such material when it is reasonable to do so.”

The South African Constitutional Court thus adopts a middle path between the two opposite zero-sum games that are traditional defamation law, and American first amendment law. A similar effort was made in the United Kingdom – the birthplace of the common law of defamation – with the passage of the 2013 Defamation Act. Under English law, the plaintiff must now show that there is likely to be “serious harm” to his reputation, and there is also public interest exception.

While South Africa and the UK try to tackle the problem at the level of standards for defamation, the ECHR has taken another, equally interesting tack: by limiting the quantum of damages. In Tolstoy Milolasky v. United Kingdom, it found a 1.5 million pound damage award “disproportionately large”, and held that there was a violation of the ECHR’s free speech guarantee that could not be justified as necessary in a democratic society.

Thus, constitutional courts the world over have noticed the adverse impact traditional defamation law has on free speech and a free press. They have devised a multiplicity of ways to deal with this, some more speech-protective than others: from America’s absolutist standards, to South Africa’s “reasonableness” and the UK’s “public interest” exceptions, to the ECHR’s limitation of damages. It is about time that the Indian Courts took this issue seriously: there is no dearth of international guidance.

Gautam Bhatia — @gautambhatia88 on Twitter — is a graduate of the National Law School of India University (2011), and has just received an LLM from the Yale Law School. He blogs about the Indian Constitution at http://indconlawphil.wordpress.com. Here at CIS, he blogs on issues of online freedom of speech and expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/free-speech-and-civil-defamation

So Much to Lose

nishant — 2012-12-07T16:39:09Z

Unless you have been hiding under a rock, you have been a witness to the maelstrom of events that accompanied the death of the political leader Bal Thackeray.

Nishant Shah's column was published in the Indian Express on December 2, 2012.

Unless you have been hiding under a rock, you have been a witness to the maelstrom of events that accompanied the death of the political leader Bal Thackeray. For me, the brouhaha was elbowed out by the case of the police arresting two women for critiquing the events on Facebook. The person who wondered about the nature of the enforced mourning and the state of our public life, and her friend who “liked” the comment on Facebook, were booked and arrested under charges that can only be considered preposterous.

I will not repeat these arguments because it is needless to say that I am on the side of the women and think of this as yet another manifestation of the stringent measures which are being evolved as an older broadcast way of thinking meets the decentralised realities of digital technologies.

In the midst of this the idea of internet freedom needs to be revisited. The global Press Freedom Index 2011-12 report compiled by Reporters Without Borders, ranks India at 131, or as a “partly free” country, marking us as a country where the notion of internet freedom is not to be taken for granted, and possibly also one where the concept is not properly understood.

Citing various instances from the central government’s plans to censor the social web to the authoritarian crackdown on activists and cultural producers involved in online civic protests, from the traditional media industry’s stronghold over intellectual property regimes to the arrest of individuals for voicing their independent critiques online, the report shows that we not only have an infrastructure deficit (with only 10 per cent of the people in the country connected), but also a huge social and political deficit, which is being exposed by our actions and reactions to the Web.

Take the case of professor Ambikesh Mahapatra dean of the chemistry department of Jadavpur University, who was picked up by the police and lodged in the lock up for almost 40 hours for forwarding an e-mail that contained a cartoon of Trinamool Congress leaders Mamata Banerjee, Mukul Roy and Dinesh Trivedi. He and his housing society co-resident Subrata Sengupta were charged with defamation and outraging the modesty of a woman. While the proceedings are underway with the next date of hearing slated in February, 2013, the Jadavpur university professor says, “Section, 66A of the IT Act is being used for suppression of the freedom of speech. In my opinion, it is being misused by the state government, repeatedly. The section does not empower anyone to arrest those who voice their opinion and never meant to harm anybody’s image. Prompt action is needed to check the misuse of law.”

Likewise, Ravi Srinivasan, a 46-year-old a businessman from Pondicherry, was arrested for tweeting against Karti Chidambaram, son of Union Finance Minister P Chidambaram. His arrest and consequent release has not blunted his spirit. He says, “At the time (of the arrest) I had not heard of Section 66(A). I still cannot fathom why and how a tweet sent out to just 12 people — half of them family and friends — caught the eye of the police. By evening, when I had come home from the police station, my Twitter following had gone up to 1,700. About 15,000 people re-tweeted the statement that got me arrested.”

Given the series of incidents that have marked the last year and the whimsical nature of regulatory injunctions on internet freedom in the country, it might be a good idea for us to reflect on democracy and freedom.

We need to examine the fundamental nature of freedom, and how these attempts at regulating the internet are only a symptom of the systemic failures of enshrining freedom of speech, information, identity and dignity in India. However, internet freedom is often a difficult concept to engage with, because it is one of those phrases that seem to be self-explanatory but without a straightforward explanation. There are three axes which might be useful to unpack the baggage that comes with internet freedom, both for our everyday practices, and our imagined future:

Freedom of: The freedom of the internet is something that is new and needs more attention. We have to stop thinking of the internet as merely a medium or a conduit of information. As the Web becomes inextricably linked with our everyday lives, the internet is no longer just an appendage or an externality. It becomes a reference point through which our social, political and economic practices are shaped. It becomes a defining point through which we draw our meanings of what it is to be a part of the society, to have rights, to be politically aware, to be culturally engaged — to be a human. The freedom of the Net is important because the crackdowns on the Net are an attack on our rights and freedoms. The silencing of a voice on Facebook, might soon gag the voices of people on the streets, creating conditions of silence in the face of violence perpetuated by the powerful.

Freedom to: Freedom to the internet is often confused with access to the internet. While, of course, access is important in our imagination of a just society where everybody is equally connected, freedom is also about creating open and fair societies. If the power of the internet is in creating alternative spaces of expression, deliberation and opinion-making, then the freedom to the internet is about being safe and responsible in these spaces. A society that controls these spaces of public discussion, under the guise of security and public safety, is a society that has given up its faith in freedom.

Freedom for: It is often not clear that when popular technologies of information and communication are regulated and censored, it is not merely the technology that is being controlled. What is being shaped and contained is the way people use them. The freedom for the internet is about the freedom for people. The possibility that Internet Service Providers are being coerced into revealing personal information of users to police states, that intermediaries are being equipped to remove content that they find offensive from the web, and that views expressed on the social media can lead to legal battles by those who have the power but not the acumen to exercise it, all have alarming consequences. There is a need to fight for freedom, not only for the defence of technology but also for the defence of the rights that we cherish that risk being eroded.

The case of these Facebook arrests is not new. It has happened before and it will continue happening as immature governments are unable to cope with the real voices of representational democracy. These cases sometimes get naturalised because they get repeated, and even without our knowledge, can start creating a life of fear, where we internalise the regulatory system, not voicing our opinions and ideas for fear of persecution. And so, whether you agree with their politics or not, whether you endorse the viewpoints of the people who are under arrest, whether you feel implicated or not in this case, we have to realise that even if we might not agree with somebody’s viewpoint, we must defend their right to have that particular viewpoint. Anything else, and tomorrow, when you want to say something against powers of oppression, you might find yourself alone, as your voice gets heard only by those who will find creative ways of silencing you.

— With inputs from Gopu Mohan, Madhuparna Das and V Shoba

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/indian-express-dec-2-2012-nishant-shah-so-much-to-lose

Girl's arrest draws flak on social media

praskrishna — 2012-11-20T11:04:27Z

The arrest of a 21-year-old girl by Mumbai police for criticizing the shutting down of the city following the death of Bal Thackeray come under fire from netizens.

Arun Dev's article was published in the Times of India on November 20, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

Many tweets and Facebook posts popped up soon after the news of her arrest played on TV and social media networks, some even reposting what she first posted on her page.

Pranesh Prakash, programme manager, Centre for Internet and Society, told TOI this case was a clear case of misapplication of Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code. "This provision has been frivolously used numerous times in Maharashtra. Even the banning of James Laine's book, 'Shivaji: Hindu King in Islamic India', happened this section. The ban was subsequently deemed unlawful by both the Bombay high court and the Supreme Court. Indeed, Section 295A has not been applied in cases where it's more apparent," he said.

On the CIS blog, he commented, "Interestingly, the question arises of the law under which the friend who 'liked' the Facebook status update was arrested. It would take a highly clever lawyer and a highly credulous judge to make 'liking' of a Facebook status update an act capable of being charged with electronically sending ... any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character".

"It is absolutely ridiculous. Regardless of the fact she was given bail, she was sent to 14 days of judicial custody for a mere comment. We have allowed our social media to be free and open but we have laws which are ancient," said Lawrence Liang, a lawyer working on media laws with the Alternative Law Forum in Bangalore. "Such cases don't stand a chance in a court of law. We need procedural safeguards which will ensure cases which are not relevant are not be allowed to be filed," he added.

The open letter to the chief minister of the Maharashtra by Justice Katju, Chairman, Press Council of India, and former Judge, Supreme Court of India too was widely circulated on social media. Some posted this excerpt: "We are living in a democracy, not a fascist dictatorship. In fact this arrest itself appears to be a criminal act since under sections 341 and 342 it is a crime to wrongfully arrest or wrongfully confine someone who has committed no crime."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/times-of-india-arun-dev-nov-20-2012-girl-arrest-draws-flak-on-social-media

Internet users flay Mumbai girls' arrest over Facebook post

praskrishna — 2012-11-20T11:35:04Z

The arrest of two girls over their Facebook post on shutdown in Mumbai for Bal Thackeray's funeral on Monday again opened a can of worms with netizens calling the move a "social media hijack by the powerful and the fundamentalists". Social media was abuzz with tweets and posts about the arrest, with most referring to the arrest as yet another move to curb freedom of speech on the Internet.

This post was published by IBN Live on November 20, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

Noted journalist Gautam Chikermane tweeted "First Pondicherry businessman, now 21 year old Palghar girl. Next: all of us. Social media hijack by the powerful and the fundamentalists". Minister of State (Communications and IT) Milind Deora tweeted: "To learn who rules over you, simply find out who you are not allowed to criticize ~ Voltaire".

Communication specialist Alyque Padamsee expressed shock at the arrest and the vandalism at the clinic of one of the girl's uncle. "I want to know how these girls have broken the law when all they said is that why should Mumbai come to a standstill. There is nothing derogatory against Thackeray. I do not see anything illegal in that," he said. Padamsee further said the Constitution provides everyone free speech and that "no one should be arrested on such flimsy grounds".

Pavan Duggal, Cyber law Expert and an advocate with Supreme Court also voiced similar views. "This is high time for the government for the review of the law. The government should amend the IT Act so as to narrow down its provisions as some of the these violate our constitutional right of free speech."

He added that it would be a bigger challenge for the prosecution to prove that the statement could incite communal disharmony and violence. "This should not be seen merely as "social media regulation", but as a restriction on freedom of speech and expression by both the law and the police," Centre for Internet and Society Policy Director Pranesh Prakash said.

The two girls--Shaheen Dhada and Renu--were sent to 14-day judicial custody by a court before which they were produced today but were granted bail within hours after they furnished personal bonds. There was also an attack on the clinic of an uncle of one of them by Sena activists.

The arrests also sparked an outrage with Press Council of India chief Markandey Katju today demanding "immediate" action against police personnel involved. While Dhada was arrested for the post, Dhada's friend Renu was arrested for 'liking' the post. "Police arrested both of them under section 505(2) (statements creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes). Today, they were granted bail," their advocate Sudhir Gupta said.

The duo was arrested following a police complaint lodged by a local Sena leader. After the comment was posted, a mob of nearly 40 Shiv Sainiks allegedly barged into Dhada's uncles's orthopaedic hospital at Palghar and vandalised the place on Sunday. However, no arrests were made in connection with the attack.

Some other tweets in support of the girls read: "Hatred of minorities, liberals is an epidemic on Twitter. Law shd be harsh on hatespeak not on democratic rights of 21 year olds!Cheerio" (@sagarikaghose) and "So the girl n frnd got arrested for posting stuff on FB did Shiv sainiks get arrested for destroying the doc's hospital?? #Mumbai #Balasaheb" (@SocoMumbai).

Last month, a businessman from Puducherry was arrested on the charge of posting "offensive" messages on social media targeting Union Finance Minister P Chidambaram's son Karti Chidambaram.

The following image was also being circulated over the Internet and is said to be the Facebook post that led to the girls' arrest:

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/ibnlive-news-nov-20-2012-netizens-flay-mumbai-girls-arrest-over-facebook-post

Arrests over Facebook posts: Why we’re on a dangerous slide

praskrishna — 2012-11-20T11:47:43Z

The most bizarre thing about the arrest of Shaheen Dhada and Renu Srinivasan on Monday over a Facebook post that questioned the wisdom of a bandh to mark Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray‘s death is that no laws were actually violated by the post.

Venky Vembu's article was published in FirstPost on November 20, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

In tone and in content, the post is remarkably restrained, particularly when compared to the rather more incendiary messages that are commonplace on social media platforms. Nor was it even halfways defamatory in the way that many rants on Twitter and Facebook have unfortunately come to be.

Yet, the Mumbai police appear to have cravenly capitulated in the face of some arm-twisting by a local Sena strongman and gone ahead to arrest the two young women on charges that seem laughable even given the extraordinarily sweeping, catch-all clauses of the Information Technology Act.

It is hard to see how Shaheen Dhada violated the two sections of the law under which she has been charged – Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code (“outraging religous feelings of any class”) or even the draconian Section 66A of the IT Act (“sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.”) – with her contemplative post, or what crimes Renu Srinivasan committed in merely ‘liking’ the post.

But it is a sign of the disquieting nature of the provision of the law, and the perverse manner in which it is being implemented, that there weren’t adequate checks and balances to inhibit the wilful deployment of the law on such frivolous grounds. Ironically, the goons who actually wrecked the clinic of Dhada’s uncle haven’t been called to account.

If that is bad enough, it is doubly perverse for Kapil Sibal to claim in all innocence that he is “deeply saddened” by the arrest of the two young women and to insinuate that the IT Act, which he was instrumental in passing, was being misused on grounds of improper implementation.

The fact of it is that the IT Act that he fathered, and particularly the notorious Section 66A, was deliberately worded to give maximum potential for mischief. There have been far too many egregious instances of its misuse by discredited governments and politicians for Sibal to claim that these are random incidents of misuse of the law. Just last month, Finance Minister P Chidambaram’s son Karti had a Puducherry businessmen and anti-corruption activist hauled up by the police for a Twitter post in which the businessman alleged that Karti had “amassed more wealth” than Sonia Gandhi‘s son-in-law.

It’s important to get a sense of why the latest arrests take us further on the slippery slope towards curtailing free speech. Justice Markandeya Katju has repeatedly pointed to the egregious encroachment on the freedom of speech by this provision of law, and has been vocal in calling both politicians and policemen to account whenever the law is abused in this manner.

“It is absurd to say that protesting against the bandh hurts religious sentiments,” Katju observed in a letter to the Maharashtra Chief Minister. “Under Article 19 of our Constitution, freedom of speech is guaranteed fundamental right. We are living in a democracy, not a fascist dictatorship.”

If anything, Katju argued, “this arrest itself appears to be a criminal act since under Sections 341 and 342, it is a crime to wrongfully arrest or wrongfully confine someone who has committed no crime.”

As Pranesh Prakash at the Centre for Internet and Society points out, in the context of Monday’s arrests, “This should not be seen merely as ‘social media regulation’, but as a restriction on freedom of speech and expression by both the law and the police.” Section 66A, he says, makes certain kinds of speech-activities (“causing annoyance”) illegal if communicated online, but legal if that same speech-activity is published in a newspaper.

This distinction is important, Prakash notes, since the mere fact that it was a Facebook status update “should not grant Shaheen Dhada any special immunity”. If anything, it is the fact that her update is not punishable under Section 295 of the IPC or of Section 66A of the IT Act that should give her the immunity, he adds.

With each instance in which Section 66A of the IT Act is being invoked, the potential for mischief embedded in the law is being exposed. Monday’s arrests – of two young women for crimes they did not even commit – are the most brazen instance of their abuse.

Of course, the perverse provision of law has been abused in the real world through selective and arbitrary invocation of the law. But the original sin lies in the law itself. It is the most potent threat to free speech online, and if the law isn’t amended to throw out these perverse provisions, India can kiss goodbye to any lingering pretensions to being a democracy of any sort.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/first-post-politics-venky-vembu-nov-20-2012-arrests-over-facebook-posts-why-were-on-a-dangerous-slide

The Last Word: Is there a need to review Information Technology Act?

praskrishna — 2012-11-21T12:10:15Z

Does the high-handed arrest of two young girls mean it's time to review and revise the IT Act?

Aryaman Sundaram, Pavan Duggal, Pranesh Prakash and Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad took part in a discussion with Karan Thapar on section 66A of the IT Act. This was aired on CNN-IBN on November 20, 2012.

Pranesh Prakash said that it was just not a history of misuse of section 66A of the IT Act because that presumes that the law is otherwise fine and it has just been applied wrongly. This law is fundamentally flawed. It is unconstitutional. It is like a law in which there is a provision on rape, murder, theft, nuisance, everything put together in a single section with the same punishment being given for all of them. This obviously is not good law making but that is exactly what has been done in this case by taking bits from laws in the UK and from elsewhere and mashing them all up into one omnibust gargantuan monster which is unconstitutional.

Pranesh Prakash also added that the fact is that if you have bad laws they will be used to harass people. Having good law is one part of that. Apart from that there has been also other laws which have been misapplied in this case. In all these recent cases, section 66A of the IT Act wasn't the only provision used. This particular section has been used in conjunction with some other laws. So section 66A of the IT Act independently is not required. There are other laws in the Indian Penal Code and elsewhere which are usually enough to cover all the things that section 66A of the IT Act is right now covering. It is just an add on provision that really can't justify its existence unless it is really reduced in scope.

Watch the full video that was aired on CNN-IBN

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/ibnlive-videos-november-20-2012-the-last-word-is-there-a-need-to-review-information-technology-act