Centre for Internet and Society

The Right to Information, The Right to Knowledge (Talk by Sam Pitroda & Carl Malamud)

pranesh — 2018-02-14T12:19:16Z

On October 15, 2017, Sam Pitroda and Carl Malamud will speak on open data and knowledge in India.

HasGeek and NUMA Bangalore are co-organizing a talk by two eminent internet pioneers — Sam Pitroda and Carl Malamud — on open data and knowledge in India. Pranesh Prakash of CIS will introduce the speakers and their work.

The Right to Information, The Right to Knowledge

Sam Pitroda and Carl Malamud will talk about their efforts in India, the U.S., and many other countries to help promote universal access to knowledge. They'll discuss the constitutional underpinnings of this right in India and some of the information they've been making available, including 3 lakh books from the Digital Library of India, 19,000 official standards from the Bureau of Indian Standards, and a raft of other resources such as the entire Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi.

They will discuss how key laws such as the Right to Information make this possible but will focus more on how the world of open source and the Internet can turn that promise into a reality. Universal access to knowledge is the great unmet promise of our times, and they will talk about what we can all do to make this dream possible.

About the speakers

Dr. Sam Pitroda was a senior advisor to Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Manmohan Singh and is widely credited for having led India’s telecommunications and technology revolutions in the 1980s. Dr. Pitroda holds 20 honorary PhDs, close to 100 worldwide patents, and helped create the first digital PBXs in the 1960s.

Carl Malamud started the first radio station on the Internet and is considered one of the pioneers of the U.S. open government movement. Carl runs Public.Resource.Org, an NGO which has placed hundreds of millions of pages of government information online, including all 19,000 Indian Standards.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/events/the-right-to-information-the-right-to-knowledge

Statement of Solidarity on Freedom of Expression and Safety of Internet Users in Bangladesh

pranesh — 2013-01-15T11:51:44Z

This is a statement on the violent attack on blogger Asif Mohiuddin by the participants to the Third South Asian Meeting on the Internet and Freedom of Expression that took place in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on January 14–15, 2013.

Bangladeshi blogger Asif Mohiuddin was brutally attacked in a stabbing last evening. His condition is currently said to be critical. Violent attacks on mediapersons have led to at least four deaths in the past year. This trend is now extending to those writing online.

It is the duty of societies at large to ensure that principles we universally consider sacrosanct, such as the right to life and liberty and of freedom of expression are in fact ideas, and of the government to actively protect the rights guaranteed under the Constitution of Bangladesh and to ensure they are not just words on paper.

Article 39 of the Constitution of Bangladesh—and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—guarantee both the freedom of thought and conscience, as well as the right of every citizen of freedom of speech and expression, and freedom of the press.

Article 32 of the Constitution of Bangladesh—and Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except by law.

The attack on Asif Mohiuddin constitutes a violation these fundamental principle by criminals, and we request the government to act decisively to show it will not tolerate such violations.

Reporters Without Borders note that "the ability of those in the media to work freely has deteriorated alarmingly in Bangladesh, which is now ranked 129th of 179 countries in the 2011-2012 World Press Freedom Index".

In general, the situation of those working as non-professional 'citizen journalists' is even worse. In a 2010 report, the UN Special Rapporteur wrote:

"Citizen journalists are by nature more isolated, they are more vulnerable to attack than professional journalists. However, citizen journalists enjoy less protection than their counterparts in traditional media, as they do not have the support of media organizations and networks, in particular the organizational resources, including lawyers and financial resources, which can help shield them from harassment."

This reality of greater vulnerability is equally applicable to those who do not self-identify as 'citizen journalists', but use social media to express unpopular opinions.

Keeping this in mind, we call upon the government on Bangladesh to carry out swift investigations into this particular incident and bring the perpetrators to justice, and to grant greater legal support to citizen journalists and ensure better protections for all those who use the Internet as a means of expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/statement-of-solidarity-asif-mohiuddin

Resources

pranesh — 2009-10-20T03:29:16Z

A collection of resources that will help one navigate through the arguments and evidence for and against the Indian "Bayh-Dole" bill.

PUPFIP

Bayh-Dole

Technology Transfer

Innovation's Golden Goose (The Economist)

Improving Innovation(The Economist)

Scientific Culture

Patents and America's Universities(The Economist)

When Academia Puts Profits Ahead of Wonder(The New York Times)

Bayhing for blood or Doling out cash?(The Economist)

Evaluative Pieces

University Licensing under Bayh-Dole: What are the Issues and Evidence?(Thursby and Thursby)

Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons from the US Experience(So et al.)

The Law of Unintended Consequences(Fortune Magazine)

The Growth of patenting and licensing by U.S. universities and the Bayh-Dole Act (Mowery et al.)

Overall Assessment of the Bayh-Dole Act (Nelson, Mowery, et al.)

General Resources

Joint Ventures and Intellectual Property(Andreas Panagopoulos)

Patents vs. Other Knowledge Transfer(Agrawal and Henderson)

Incentives Structure and Licensing Success(Dan Elfenbein)

University Licensing and Research Behavior(Lach and Schankerman)

Open Science and Private Property(Paul David)

IP Alternatives

New Approaches to Filling the Gap in TB Drug Discovery (Casenghi, Cole and Nathan)

The Role of Prizes in Developing Low-Cost Point-of-Care Rapid Diagnostic Tests and Better Drugs for TB(James Love)

How to boost R&D for essential drugs and diagnostics

Scrooge and intellectual property rights (BMJ January 2006)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/publications/pupfip/resources

Arguments Against the PUPFIP Bill

pranesh — 2011-09-12T11:03:09Z

The Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill (PUPFIP Bill) is a new legislation being considered by Parliament, which was introduced in the 2008 winter session of the Rajya Sabha. It is modelled on the American Bayh-Dole Act (University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act) of 1980. On this page, we explore some of the reasons that the bill is unnecessary, and how it will be harmful if passed.

Summary

How is the legislation unnecessary?

The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.
Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

How is the legislation harmful?

Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retards innovation.
The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.
Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of “public funded IP”.
It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.
It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.
Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.
Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

Arguments

How is the legislation unnecessary?

1) The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.

The idea behind the Bayh-Dole Act was that the research funded by the government (and owned, in the US, by the government) was being underutilized. In 1980, over 28,000 unlicensed patents lay with the U.S. government.[1] The Act shifted the title of such works from the government to the University or small business that conducted the research, thus allowing them to take out patents on the research outputs. In India, under present laws, the researcher(s) own the rights over their research whether they be government-funded or not. Usually, due to employment contracts, the research institutes already have the right to patent their inventions. Thus, currently, there is no need for an enabling legislation in this regard, as there was in the U.S.

In fact, currently, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has over 5173 patents (counting both those in force and those under dispute), while only 222 patents are licensed (with 68 of them being under dispute). Thus, even with the IP being in the institute's hands, there is a "problem" situation similar to that which necessitated Bayh-Dole in the U.S. Thus, quite contrary to the aims of the Act, further patenting will only lead to a situation of even more underutilized patents.

2) Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

At a recent seminar held at NUJS Kolkata on the PUPFIP Bill, it was revealed that while IIT-Kharagpur’s TTO-equivalent (called the Sponsored Research & Industrial Consultancy division - SRIC) currently handles over Rs.300 crores through 850 projects, only around Rs. 5-15 crores (exact figures weren't available) are currently made through its patent portfolio.[2] Thus patents don't seem, on the face of things, to be the best way of ensuring technology transfer. Indeed, the oft-cited 28,0000 unlicensed patents held by the U.S. government were composed primarily of patents for which industry had refused to take exclusive licences.[3]

Many contend that one of the most important functions of a patent is to get inventors to disclose their inventions rather than keep them as secrets. This reason for awarding a patent is invalidated if stronger protection is granted to trade secrets (no term limit, for instance) than for patents. Secondly, this reason for granting patents is not valid in case of government-funded research in academia and research institutes. The culture of publication and the economy of reputation are sufficient to ensure disclosure. Even without these intrinsic factors, there grant requirements can necessitate publication. If mere publication is believed to be insufficient, then the government would do well to ask for technology dissemination plans before grants are made. At any rate, monopoly rights in the form of patents are thoroughly unnecessary.

How is the legislation harmful?

1) Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retard innovation.

It sees protection of IPR as the sole means of encouraging innovation and driving research to the doorstep of consumers. The trend around the world is that of exploring alternative forms of spurring innovation. Even in India, CSIR has gone for an innovative "Open Source Drug Discovery" project, which has proven very successful so far. Furthermore, recent literature shows that excessive patenting is harming research and innovation by creating gridlocks.[4] If platform technologies and basic research (such as SNP) gets mired in patents, then the transaction costs increase (not only in terms of money, but more importantly in administrative terms). This ends up in research clearances getting blocked, and thus retards innovation. It must be remembered that intellectual property is not only an output, but also an input. The more aggressively the outputs are guarded and prevented from being shared, the more the inputs will be affected. The study of patent thickets and gridlocks has reached such a stage that the U.S. law has been changed to reflect this. Firstly, the Bayh-Dole Act was amended in 2000 to state that the objectives of the Bayh-Dole Act were to be carried out "without unduly encumbering future research and discovery". Now, the courts (in the Bilski case) have increased the standard of obviousness in patent law (which means that less patents will be granted). Furthermore, the U.S.P.T.O. and the U.S. Senate are currently considering means of overhauling the U.S. patent system, which many fear is close to breaking down due to over-patenting. All these are signs that the footsteps we are seeking to follow are themselves turning back.

2) The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.

While the CSIR labs pursue patents aggressively, they also run the OSSD project. The latter might not be permissible if the Act is passed as it stands. Furthermore, this would increase the number of underutilized patents, which is a problem faced currently by CSIR, which has had an aggressive patent policy since the 1990s. Unlicensed patents constitute around 93% of CSIR's total patent portfolio. (In contrast, MIT averages around 50% licensing of patents.) If aggressive patenting is made mandatory, it adds substantially to administrative costs of all institutes which receive any grants from the government. These institutes might not be large enough to merit a dedicated team of professionals to handle

3) Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of "public funded IP".

This leads to a ridiculous need to attempt to commercialise all government-funded research literature (and the government funds science research, social sciences, arts, etc.). Furthermore, while the definition of "public funded IP" includes copyrights, trademarks, etc., yet the substantive provisions seem to only include those forms of IP which have to be registered compulsorily (copyright and trademark don't -- copyright comes into existence when an original work is expressed in a medium, and trademark can come into existence by use). Importantly, seeking to commercialise all copyrighted works of research would hamper the movement for open access to scholarly literature. The inititative towards open access to scholarly literature is something that National Knowledge Commission has recommended, and is a move that would result in increased dissemination of public-funded research, which seems to be an aim of the PUPFIP Bill as well.

4) It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.

This bill would increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research, because of the additional burden of patent royalties.

Public funds research -> Institute patents research -> Pharma MNC gets exclusive license over research -> Drug reaches market.

Assuming an exclusive licence: Cost of the drug = cost of manufacturing, storage, etc. + mark-up (monopolistic) cost + cost of licence.

Thus, in effect, the public has to pay twice for the research: it pays once to enable the scientist to conduct the research, and once again in the form of royalties to have that research brought to the marketplace.

5) It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.

The former could happen since institutions and individual scientists have a financial incentive to shift their focus away from fundamental research; the latter, conversely, because the filings and bureaucracy involved could drive scientists away from reporting or even engaging in industrial research [pdf]. Faculty and researcher involvement in the business of licensing is a sub-optimal usage of their talents, and there are scientists who would rather stay away from business (as is shown by the intake of former industry-researchers into government-funded labs such as those of CSIR).

6) Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.

This will bring about a shift in science and research which is always done upon others' work. This is why in the U.S., the National Institute of Health (N.I.H.) has sought to ensure (without any legal authority) that it only finances that research that on single nucleotide polymorphism (S.N.P.) which is not patented, and is shared freely amongst scholars. Since this requirement of the N.I.H.'s does not have any legal backing (since it is contradictory to the Bayh-Dole Act), institutions are free to get the grant from N.I.H. and then go ahead and patent their inventions.

7) Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

The bill allows for both assignment of licences as well as exclusive licences. Both of these enable monopolistic pricing to be undertaken by the licensee/assignee. There are not even any mechanisms in the Act to ensure, for instance, that a public call is made to ascertain that no parties are willing to consider a non-exclusive licence. Patents are generally said to grant a monopoly right because of the opportunity to recover costs of research and development. When the research is being done by public-funded money, there is no justification for monopoly rights on that research, since there are no excessive costs to recover.

Footnotes:

[1] See So et al. and Thursby and Thursby, quoted in the National Knowledge Commission's letter to the Prime Minister.

[2] See Prof. Vivekanandans' presentation "Patenting and Technology Transfer-the IIT Khargpur Experience"

[3] See Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol e262 (2008)

[4] See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998)

Additional Resources

On the PUPFIP Bill

February 5, 2004: NIPER holds parallel session of Indian Science Congress (Express Pharma)
October 27, 2006: Susan Finston, India to Propose New Technology Transfer Legislation (Bayh-Dole 25)
January 16, 2007: National Knowledge Commision's Letter to Indian Prime Minister (National Knowledge Commission)
April 15, 2007: Archita Bhatta, Proposed IPR law raises concern (Down to Earth)
May 31, 2007: Science & Technology needs to be core of the economic development says Kapil Sibal (PIB Press Release)
November 13, 2007: Government Accords Approval to National Biotechnology Development Strategy (PIB Press Release)
February 1, 2008: Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Indian Government Hopes Bill Will Stimulate Innovation (Science)
February 19, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Exporting Bayh Dole to India: Whither Transparency? (Part 1) (Part 2) (SpicyIP)
March 17, 2008: Kalpana Pathak, Varsities may soon own patent rights (Business Standard)
March 17, 2008: P.T. Jyothi Datta, Public-funded research may pay dividends for scientists (Business Line)
March 17, 2008: Joff Wild, India considers Bayh-Dole style legislation (IAM Magazine)
April 30, 2008: M.K. Unnikrishnan and Pradeepti Nayak, Lessons from Bayh Dole Act and its relevance to India (PharmaBiz)
July 2008: Sean M. O'Connor, Historical Context of U.S. Bayh-Dole Act: Implications for Indian Government Funded Research Patent Policy (STEM Newsletter)
July 7, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Mysterious Indian "Bayh Dole" Bill: SpicyIP Procures a Copy (SpicyIP)
July 09, 2008: Latha Jishnu, Does India need a Bayh-Dole Act? (Business Standard)
September 2008: V.C. Vivekanandan, Transplanting Bayh-Dole Act- Issues at Stake Authors (13 Journal of Intell. Prop. 480)
September 18, 2008: Shamnad Basheer, Indian Patent Bill: Let's not be too hasty (SciDev.net)
October 28, 2008: Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol e262 (2008)
October 31, 2008: Cabinet gives approval for Protection and Utilization of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008 (PIB Press Release)
November 2008: Annette Lin et al., The Bayh-Dole Act and Promoting the Transfer of Technology of Publicly Funded-Research (UAEM White Paper on the Proposed Indian Bayh-Dole Analogue)
November 1, 2008: Editorial: Not in Public Interest (Mint)
November 12, 2008: Ben Butkus, As India Mulls Bill Modeled on Bayh-Dole, Critics Claim It May Stifle Innovation (Biotech Transfer Weekly)
December 16, 2008: Pranesh Prakash, Indian "Bayh Dole" Bill before Parliament (Commons Law)
January 23, 2009: Editorial: Time to Rethink Intellectual Property Laws (SciDev.net)
March 12, 2009: Feroz Ali Khader, Does Patenting Research Change the Culture of Science? (The Hindu)
April 24, 2009: Sunil Abraham & Pranesh Prakash, Does India Need Its Own Bayh-Dole? (Indian Express)
September 21, 2009: C.H. Unnikrishnan, Proposed Patent Bill Is Flawed, Say Experts (Mint)
September 23, 2009: Editorial: An Idea That's A Patent Misfit (Mint)
October 2009: Bhaven N. Sampat, The Bayh-Dole Model in Developing Countries: Reflections on the Indian Bill on Publicly Funded Intellectual Property (UNCTAD - ICTSD Policy Brief No. 5)
January 2010: Amit Shovon Ray & Sabyasachi Saha, Patenting Public-Funded Research for Technology Transfer: A Conceptual-Empirical Synthesis of US Evidence and Lessons for India (ICRIER Working Paper No. 244)
January 2010: Mrinalini Kochupillai, The Protection and Utilization of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill, 2008: A Critique in the Light of India's Innovation Environment, 15 J. Intell. Prop. Rights 19 (2010)
January 16, 2010: Amit Shovon Ray & Sabyasachi Saha, Intellectual Bottlenecks (Financial Express)
January 21, 2010: Latha Jishnu, Perils of the US Model (Business Standard)
January 22, 2010: Rema Nagarajan, Scientists Fume Over New Patent Bill (Times of India)
January 26, 2010: Shamnad Basheer, The Problem with Patents (Mint)
February 5, 2010: Shalini Butani, Public Research May Become More Private (Business Line)
February 8, 2010: Anika Gupta, Scientists Want Changes in Innovation Bill (Mint)
February 9, 2010: C.H. Unnikrishnan, Parliament Panel Wants Govt Review on Innovation Bill (Mint)
February 15, 2010: Leena Menghaney, A Bad Example from the U.S. (Down to Earth)
February 19, 2010: Pranesh Prakash, A Patent Conundrum (Indian Express)
SpicyIP coverage by tag 'Bayh Dole'
Presentations from NUJS, Kolkata conference on the PUPFIP Bill

On Bayh-Dole

Newspapers and Magazines

Academic Journals

Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovation, 20 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1031 (2005)
Anthony So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries, 6 PLoS Biol. e262 (2008)
Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 289 (2003)
David C. Mowery & Arvids A. Aiedonis, Numbers, Quality, and Entry: How Has the Bayh-Dole Act Affected U.S. University Patenting and Licensing?, 1 Innovation Pol'y Econ. 187 (2000)
David C. Mowery, et al., Learning to Patent: Institutional Experience, Learning, and the Characteristics of U.S. University Patents After the Bayh-Dole Act, 1981-1992, 48 Mgmt. Sci. 73 (2002)
Donald Kennedy, Editorial: Enclosing the Research Commons, 294 Science 2249 (2001)
F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 Colorado J. Telecomm. High Tech. L. 167 (2009)
Henry Steck, Corporatization of the University: Seeking Conceptual Clarity, 585 Annals of Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 66 (2003)
Jason Owen-Smith, Trends and Transitions in the Institutional Environment for Public and Private Science, 49 Higher Educ. 91 (2005)
Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, University Licensing and the Bayh-Dole Act, 301 Science 1052 (2003)
Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Who is Selling the Ivory Tower? Sources of Growth in University Licensing, 48 Mgmt. Sci. 90 (2002)
Josh Lerner, Review of 'Ivory Tower', 43 J. Econ. Litt. 510 (2005)
Joshua B. Powers, R&D Funding Source and University Technology Transfer: What is Stimulating Universities to Be More Entrepreneurial?, 45 Research in Higher Educ. 1 (2004)
Lita Nelsen, The Rise of Intellectual Property Protection in the American University, 279 Science 1460 (1998)
Marcia Angell & Arnold S. Relman, Patents, Profits & American Medicine: Conflicts of Interest in the Testing & Marketing of New Drugs, 131 Daedalus 102 (2002)
Maria Jelenik, Review: Two Books on Technology Transfer, 50 Admin. Sci. Q. 131 (2005) (Review of 'Ivory Tower')
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998)
Rebecca Henderson, et al., Universities as a Source of Commercia Technology: A Detailed Analsis of University Patenting, 1965-1988, 80 Rev. Econ. Statistics 119 (1998)
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsorded Research, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1663 (1996)
Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Richard R. Nelson, Public vs. Proprietary Science: A Fruitful Tension?, 131 Daedalus 89 (2002)
Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University Inventions, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 240 (2001)
Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories about the Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. Econ. Issues 1031 (1998)
Thomas A. Massaro, Innovation, Technology Transfer, and Patent Policy: The University Contribution, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1729 (1996)
Walter W. Powell & Jason Owen-Smith, Universities and the Market for Intellectual Property in the Life Sciences, 17 J. Pol'y Analysis Mgmt. 253 (1998)
William M. Sage, Funding Fairness: Public Investment, Proprietary Rights and Access to Health Care Technology, 82 Virginia L. Rev. 1737 (1996)
Zach W. Hall & Christopher Scott, University-Industry Partnership, 291 Science 553 (2001)

Resources

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/publications/pupfip/why-no-pupfip

PUPFIP Bill

pranesh — 2011-08-20T15:15:08Z

A new bill which tries to promote innovation through privatization of public-funded research and is unnecessary, misguided, and will prove harmful to Indian research, innovation, and will harm the interests of taxpayers and consumers.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/publications/pupfip

Indian Copyright Act, 1957 (as amended by Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010)

pranesh — 2010-04-27T13:33:48Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/publications/copyright-act-amendediframes

No Civil Society Members in the Cyber Regulations Advisory Committee

pranesh — 2013-01-09T17:56:57Z

The Government of India has taken our advice and reconstituted the Cyber Regulations Advisory Commitee. But there is no representation of Internet users, citizens, and consumers — only government and industry interests.

In multiple op-eds (Indian Express and Mint), I have pointed out the need for the government to reconstitute the "Cyber Regulations Advisory Committee" (CRAC) under section 88 of the Information Technology Act. That it be reconstituted along the model of the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee was also part of the suggestions that CIS sent to the government after a meeting FICCI had convened along with the government on September 4, 2012.

Section 88 requires that people "representing the interests principally affected" by Internet policy or "having special knowledge of the subject matter" be present in this advisory body. The main function of the CRAC is to advise the the Central Government "either generally as regards any rules or for any other purpose connected with this Act".

Despite this important function, the CRAC had — till November 2012 — only ever met twice, both times in 2001. The response to an RTI informed us that the body had never provided any advice to the government.

Government Not Serious

The increasing pressure on the government for botching up Internet regulations has led it to reconstitute the CRAC. However, the list of members of the committee shows that the government is not serious about this committee representing "the interests primarily affected" by Internet policy.

Importantly, this goes against the express wish of the Shri Kapil Sibal, the Union Minister for Communications and IT, who has repeatedly stated that he believes that Internet-related policymaking should be an inclusive process. Most recently, at the 2012 Internet Governance Forum he stated that we need systems that are:

"collaborative, consultative, inclusive and consensual, for dealing with all public policies involving the Internet"

Interestingly, despite the Hon'ble Minster verbally inviting civil society organizations (on November 23, 2012) for a meeting of the CRAC that happened on November 25, 2012, the Department of Electronics and Information Technology refused to send us invitations for the meeting. This hints at a disconnect between the political and bureaucratic wings of the government, at least at some levels.

Interestingly, this isn't the first time this has been pointed out. Na. Vijayashankar was levelling similar criticisms against the CRAC way back in August 2000 when the original CRAC was constituted.

Breakdown by Stakeholder Groupings

While there is no one universal division of stakeholders in Internet governance, but four goups are widely recognized: governments (national and intergovernmental), industry, technical community, and civil society. Using that division, we get:

Government - 15 out of 22 members
Industry bodies - 6 out of 22 members
Technical community / Academia - 1 out of 22 members
Civil society - 0 out of 22 members.

List of Members of Cyber Regulatory Advisory Committee

The official notification (G.S.R. 827(E)) is available on the DEIT website and came into force on November 16, 2012.

(Note: Names with ~~strikethroughs~~ have been removed from the CRAC since 2000, and those with emphasis have been added.)

Minister, Ministry of Communication and Information Technology - Chairman
Minister of State, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology - Member
Secretary, Ministry of Communication and Information Technology, Department of Electronics and Information Technology - Member
Secretary, Department of Telecommunications - Member
~~Finance Secretary - Member~~
Secretary, Legislative Department - Member
Secretary, Department of Legal Affairs - Member
~~Shri T.K. Vishwanathan, Presently Member Secretary, Law Commission - Member~~
Secretary, Ministry of Commerce - Member
Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs - Member
Secretary, Ministry of Defence - Member
Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India - Member
Information Technology Secretary from the states by rotation - Member
Director, IIT by rotation from the IITs - Member
Director General of Police from the States by rotation - Member
President, NASSCOM - Member
President, Internet Service Provider Association - Member
Director, Central Bureau of Investigation - Member
Controller of Certifying Authority - Member
Representative of CII - Member
Representative of FICCI - Member
Representative of ASSOCHAM - Member
President, Computer Society of India - Member
Group Coordinator, Department of Electronic and Information Technology - Member Secretary

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cyber-regulations-advisory-committee-no-civil-society

Digital India: PM Modi to launch BJP's flagship programme likely in July

pranesh — 2015-08-22T16:45:33Z

The article by Jochelle Mendonca and Neha Alawadhi was published in the Economic Times on May 29, 2015.

The Modi government, which completed one year at the Centre, is preparing for a big-ticket launch of Digital India, taking technology to the villages and block levels, through merchandise, hackathons and games spread over a week-long initiative across the country.

The National e-Governance Division (NeGD), under the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY), has empanelled agencies for a messaging campaign, gamification, printing and merchandise, advertising and creatives, including advertising for rural outreach and social media.

Working directly with the Prime Minister's Office, NeGD has been tasked with preparing for the launch since February. Though no formal dates have been fixed yet, the Digital India Week (DIW) is likely to take off in July, and will involve stakeholders across state governments and ministries, and is expected to be the flagship programme for the second year of the BJP government, EThas learnt.

"They really want to make this the biggest programme of the second year. The idea is that many things have been done in the digital space that need to get highlighted," an individual with knowledge of the plans told ET.

The event is certainly being planned on a grand scale, according to the tender documents issued by the government. The government has asked for merchandise such as t-shirts, caps, trophies, pen drives and leather cloth and plastic bags. A gamification agency will work on the portals, mobile applications and social media handles to boost participation.

The messaging agency must be able to carry out, track, record and analyse 50 lakh to one crore messages a day. The event will be launched by the Prime Minister through a radio address on "Mann ki Baat", which will be followed by events at gram panchayats, block and sub divisional headquarters, district and state levels, eventually culminating in a national event, according to a presentation seen by ET.

As part of the run-up to the DIW, events such as hackathons, training programmes and webinars would be held in schools and colleges, followed by crowdsourcing ideas through the government's portal MyGov, as well as a new Digital India portal that is being designed. "It is a typical BJP-style campaign.

The Prime Minister does not want to hold the final day event in Delhi and the location is being finalised. All state and line ministries have been involved, and are being asked to showcase e-services and best practices, along with the launch of some programmes like digital locker," said another person familiar with the plans being rolled out for the DIW. The watch words of the campaign will be "inform, educate and engage", which will include taking the message of Digital India to the masses through educational institutions, industry and government agencies.

"It will educate people on various important services such as digital literacy, cyber hygiene and e-waste management, and also look at engaging a large number of people, especially youth on a continuous basis," said a person familiar with the ongoing preparation.

NeGD is looking at using the principles of gamification to gather feedback. Experts on e-governance say this is a good move as most e-governance projects, across the world, fail because there's not enough buy-in from stakeholders or the goals aren't communicated widely to the public.

"E-governance needs evangelising. That is what this campaign looks like it will do. Some parts are dated — such as posters and the print elements. But this is a good idea. Whether it works or not depends on the participation they see at the end," Sunil Abraham, director at the Centre for Internet and Society, said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-may-29-2015-jochelle-mendonca-and-neha-alawadhi-digital-india

Regulatory Perspectives on Net Neutrality

pranesh — 2015-07-18T02:46:30Z

In this paper Pranesh Prakash gives an overview on why India needs to put in place net neutrality regulations, and the form that those regulations must take to avoid being over-regulation.

With assistance by Vidushi Marda (Programme Officer, Centre for Internet and Society) and Tarun Krishnakumar (Research Volunteer, Centre for Internet and Society). I would like to specially thank Vishal Misra, Steve Song, Rudolf van der Berg, Helani Galpaya, A.B. Beliappa, Amba Kak, and Sunil Abraham for extended discussions, helpful suggestions and criticisms. However, this paper is not representative of their views, which are varied.

Today, we no longer live in a world of "roti, kapda, makaan", but in the world of "roti, kapda, makaan aur broadband". ^{^[1]} This is recognized by the National Telecom Policy IV.1.2, which states the need to "recognise telecom, including broadband connectivity as a basic necessity like education and health and work towards 'Right to Broadband'."^{^[2]} According to the IAMAI, as of October 2014, India had 278 million internet users. ^{^[3]} Of these, the majority access Internet through their mobile phones, and the WEF estimates only 3 in 100 have broadband on their mobiles.^{^[4]} Thus, the bulk of our population is without broadband. Telecom regulation and net neutrality has a very important role in enabling this vision of Internet as a basic human need that we should aim to fulfil.

1. Why should we regulate the telecom sector?

All ICT regulation should be aimed at achieving five goals: achieving universal, affordable access; ^{^[5]} ensuring and sustaining effective competition in an efficient market and avoiding market failures; protecting against consumer harms; ensuring maximum utility of the network by ensuring interconnection; and addressing state needs (taxation, security, etc.). Generally, all these goals go hand in hand, however some tensions may arise. For instance, universal access may not be provided by the market because the costs of doing so in certain rural or remote areas may outweigh the immediate monetary benefits private corporations could receive in terms of profits from those customers. In such cases, to further the goal of universal access, schemes such as universal service obligation funds are put in place, while ensuring that such schemes either do not impact competition or very minimally impact it.

It is clear that to maximise societal benefit, effective regulation of the ICT sector is a requirement, which otherwise, due to the ability of dominant players to abuse network effect to their advantage, is inherently prone towards monopolies. For instance, in the absence of regulation, a dominant player would charge far less for intra-network calls than inter-network calls, making customers shift to the dominant network. This kind of harm to competition should be regulated by the ICT regulator. However, it is equally true that over-regulation is as undesirable as under-regulation, since over-regulation harms innovation - whether in the form of innovative technologies or innovative business models. The huge spurt of growth globally of the telecom sector since the 1980s has resulted not merely from advancements in technology, but in large part from the de-monopolisation and deregulation of the telecom sector.^{^[6]} Similarly, the Internet has largely flourished under very limited technology-specific regulation. For instance, while interconnection between different telecom networks is heavily regulated in the domestic telecom sector, interconnection between the different autonomous systems (ASes) that make up the Internet is completely unregulated, thereby allowing for non-transparent pricing and opaque transactions. Given this context, we must ensure we do not over-regulate, lest we kill innovation.

2. Why should we regulate Net Neutrality? And whom should we regulate?

We wouldn't need to regulate Net Neutrality if ISPs were not "gatekeepers" for last-mile access. "Gatekeeping" occurs when a single company establishes itself as an exclusive route to reach a large number of people and businesses or, in network terms, nodes. It is not possible for Internet services to reach the customers of the telecom network without passing through the telecom network. The situation is very different in the middle-mile and for backhaul. Even though anti-competitive terms may exist in the middle-mile, especially given the opacity of terms in "transit agreements", a packet is usually able to travel through multiple routes if one route is too expensive (even if that is not the shortest network path, and is thus inefficient in a way). However, this multiplicity of routes is not possible in the last mile.

This leaves last mile telecom operators (ISPs) in a position to unfairly discriminate between different Internet services or destinations or applications, while harming consumer choice. This is why we believe that promoting the five goals mentioned above would require regulation of last-mile telecom operators to prevent unjust discrimination against end-users and content providers.

Thus, net neutrality is the principle that we should regulate gatekeepers to ensure they do not use their power to unjustly discriminate between similarly situated persons, content or traffic.

3. How should we regulate Net Neutrality?

3.1. What concerns does Net Neutrality raise? What harms does it entail?

Discriminatory practices at the level of access to the Internet raises the following set of concerns:

1. Freedom of speech and expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and privacy.

2. Harm to effective competition

a. This includes competition amongst ISPs as well as competition amongst content providers.

b. Under-regulation here may cause harm to innovation at the content provider level, including through erecting barriers to entry.

c. Over-regulation here may cause harm to innovation in terms of ISP business models.

3. Harm to consumers

a. Under-regulation here may harm consumer choice and the right to freedom of speech, expression, and communication.

b. Over-regulation on this ground may cause harm to innovation at the level of networking technologies and be detrimental to consumers in the long run.

4. Harm to "openness" and interconnectedness of the Internet, including diversity (of access, of content, etc.)

a. Exceptions for specialized services should be limited to preserve the open and interconnectedness of the Internet and of the World Wide Web.

It might help to think about Net Neutrality as primarily being about two overlapping sets of regulatory issues: preferential treatment of particular Internet-based services (in essence: content- or source-/destination-based discrimination, i.e., discrimination on basis of 'whose traffic it is'), or discriminatory treatment of applications or protocols (which would include examples like throttling of BitTorrent traffic, high overage fees upon breaching Internet data caps on mobile phones, etc., i.e., discrimination on the basis of 'what kind of traffic it is').

Situations where the negative or positive discrimination happens on the basis of particular content or address should be regulated through the use of competition principles, while negative or positive discrimination at the level of specific class of content, protocols, associated ports, and other such sender-/receiver-agnostic features, should be regulated through regulation of network management techniques . The former deals with instances where the question of "in whose favour is there discrimination" may be asked, while the latter deals with the question "in favour of what is there discrimination".

In order to do this, a regulator like TRAI can use both hard regulation - price ceilings, data cap floors, transparency mandates, preventing specific anti-competitive practices, etc. - as well as soft regulation - incentives and disincentives.

3.1.1 Net Neutrality and human rights

Any discussion on the need for net neutrality impugns the human rights of a number of different stakeholders. Users, subscribers, telecom operators and ISPs all possess distinct and overlapping rights that are to be weighed against each other before the scope, nature and form of regulatory intervention are finalised. The freedom of speech, right to privacy and right to carry on trade raise some of the most pertinent questions in this regard.

For example, to properly consider issues surrounding the practice of paid content-specific zero-rating from a human rights point of view, one must seek to balance the rights of content providers to widely disseminate their 'speech' to the largest audiences against the rights of consumers to have access to a diverse variety of different, conflicting and contrasting ideas.

This commitment to a veritable marketplace or free-market of ideas has formed the touchstone of freedom of speech law in jurisdictions across the world as well as finding mention in pronouncements of the Indian Supreme Court. Particular reference is to be made to the dissent of Mathew, J. inBennett Coleman v. Union of India^{^[7]} and of the majority Sakal Papers v. Union of India^{^[8]} which rejected the approach.

Further, the practice of deep-packet inspection, which is sometimes used in the process of network management, raises privacy concerns as it seeks to go beyond what is "public" information in the header of an IP packet, necessary for routing, to analysing non-public information. ^{^[9]}

3.2 What conditions and factors may change these concerns and the regulatory model we should adopt?

While the principles relating to Net Neutrality remain the same in all countries (i.e., trying to prevent gatekeepers from unjustly exploiting their position), the severity of the problem varies depending on competition in the market, on the technologies, and on many other factors. One way to measure fair or stable allocation of the surplus created by a network - or a network-of-networks like the Internet - is by treating it as a convex cooperation game and thereupon calculating that game's Shapley value:^{^[10]} in the case of the Internet, this would be a game involving content ISPs, transit ISPs, and eyeball (i.e., last-mile) ISPs. The Shapley value changes depending on the number of competitors there are in the market: thus, the fair/stable allocation when there's vibrant competition in the market is different from the fair/stable allocation in a market without such competition. That goes to show that a desirable approach when an ISP tries to unjustly enrich itself by charging other network-participants may well be to increase competition, rather than directly regulating the last-mile ISP. Further, it shows that in a market with vibrant last-mile competition, the capacity of the last-mile ISP to unjustly are far diminished.

In countries which are remote and have little international bandwidth, the need to conserve that bandwidth is high. ISPs can regulate that by either increasing prices of Internet connections for all, or by imposing usage restrictions (such as throttling) on either heavy users or bandwidth-hogging protocols. If the amount of international bandwidth is higher, the need and desire on part of ISPs to indulge in such usage restrictions decreases. Thus, the need to regulate is far higher in the latter case, than in the former case.

The above paragraphs show that both the need for regulation and also the form that the regulation should take depend on a variety of conditions that aren't immediately apparent.

Thus, the framework that the regulator sets out to tackle issues relating to Net Neutrality are most important, whereas the specific rules may need to change depending on changes in conditions. These conditions include:

● last-mile market

○ switching costs between equivalent service providers

○ availability of an open-access last-mile

○ availability of a "public option" neutral ISP

○ increase or decrease in the competition, both in wired and mobile ISPs.

● interconnection market

○ availability of well-functioning peering exchanges

○ availability of low-cost transit

● technology and available bandwidth

○ spectrum efficiency

○ total amount of international bandwidth and local network bandwidth

● conflicting interests of ISPs

○ do the ISPs have other business interests other than providing Internet connectivity? (telephony, entertainment, etc.)

3.3 How should we deal with anti-competitive practices?

Anti-competitive practices in the telecom sector can take many forms: Abuse of dominance, exclusion of access to specific services, customer lock-in, predatory pricing, tying of services, cross-subsidization, etc., are a few of them. In some cases the anti-competitive practice targets other telecom providers, while in others it targets content providers. In the both cases, it is important to ensure that ensure that telecom subscribers have a competitive choice between effectively substitutable telecom providers and an ability to seamlessly switch between providers.

3.3.1 Lowering Switching Costs

TRAI has tackled many of these issues head on, especially in the mobile telephony space, while competitive market pressures have helped too:

● Contractual or transactional lock-in. The easiest way to prevent shifting from one network to another is by contractually mandating a lock-in period, or by requiring special equipment (interoperability) to connect to one's network. In India, this is not practised in the telecom sector, with the exception of competing technologies like CDMA and GSM. Non-contractual lock-ins, for instance by offering discounts for purchasing longer-term packages, are not inherently anti-competitive unless that results in predatory pricing or constitutes an abuse of market dominance. In India, switching from one mobile provider to another, though initiated 15 years into the telecom revolution, is in most cases now almost as easy as buying a new SIM card.^{^[11]} TRAI may consider proactive regulation against contractual lock-in.

● Number of competitors. Even if switching from one network to another is easy, it is not useful unless there are other equivalent options to switch to. In the telecom market, coverage is a very important factor in judging equivalence. Given that last mile connectivity is extremely expensive to provide, the coverage of different networks are very different, and this is even more true when one considers wired connectivity, which is difficult to lay in densely-populated urban and semi-urban areas and unprofitable in sparsely-populated areas. The best way to increase the number of competitors is to make it easier for competitors to exist. Some ways of doing this would be through enabling spectrum-sharing, lowering right-of-way rents, allowing post-auction spectrum trading, and promoting open-access last-mile fibre carriers and to thereby encourage competition on the basis of price and service and not exclusive access to infrastructure.

● Interconnection and mandatory carriage. The biggest advantage a dominant telecom player has is exclusive access to its customer base. Since in the telecom market, no telco wants to not connect to customers of another telco, they do not outright ban other networks. However, dominant players can charge high prices from other networks, thereby discriminating against smaller networks. In the early 2000s, Airtel-to-Airtel calls were much cheaper than Airtel-to-Spice calls. However, things have significantly changed since then. TRAI has, since the 2000s, heavily regulated interconnection and imposed price controls on interconnection ("termination") charges.^{^[12]} Thus, now, generally, inter-network calls are priced similarly to intra-network calls. And if you want cheaper Airtel-to-Airtel calls, you can buy a special (unbundled) pack that enables an Airtel customer to take advantage of the fact that her friends are also on the same network, and benefits Airtel since they do not in such cases have to pay termination charges. Recently, TRAI has even made the interconnection rates zero in three cases: landline-to-landline, landline-to-cellular, and cellular-to-landline, in a bid to decrease landline call rates, and incentivise them, allowing a very low per call interconnection charges of 14 paise for cellular-to-cellular connections. ^{^[13]}

○ With regard to Net Neutrality, we must have a rule that no termination charges or carriage charges may be levied by any ISP upon any Internet service. No Internet service may be discriminated against with regard to carriage conditions or speeds or any other quality of service metric. In essence all negative discrimination should be prohibited. This means that Airtel cannot forcibly charge WhatsApp or any other OTT (which essentially form a different "layer") money for the "privilege" of being able to reach Airtel customers, nor may Airtel slow down WhatsApp traffic and thus try to force WhatsApp to pay. There is a duty on telecom providers to carry any legitimate traffic ("common carriage"), not a privilege. It is important to note that consumer-facing TSPs get paid by other interconnecting Internet networks in the form of transit charges (or the TSP's costs are defrayed through peering). There shouldn't be any separate charge on the basis of content (different layer from the carriage) rather than network (same layer as the carriage). This principle is especially important for startups, and which are often at the receiving end of such discriminatory practices.

● Number Portability. One other factor that prevents users from shifting between one network and another is the fact that they have to change an important aspect of their identity: their phone number (this doesn't apply to Internet over DSL, cable, etc.). At least in the mobile space, TRAI has for several years tried to mandate seamless mobile number portability. The same is being tried by the European Commission in the EU. ^{^[14]} While intra-circle mobile number portability exists in India - and TRAI is pushing for inter-circle mobile number portability as well^{^[15]} - this is nowhere as seamless as it should be.

● Multi-SIM phones. The Indian market is filled with phones that can accommodate multiple SIM cards, enabling customers to shift seamlessly between multiple networks. This is true not just in India, but most developing countries with extremely price-sensitive customers. Theoretically, switching costs would approach zero if in a market with full coverage by n telecom players every subscriber had a phone with n SIM slots with low-cost SIM cards being available.

The situation in the telecom sector with respect to the above provides a stark contrast to the situation in the USA, and to the situation in the DTH market. In the USA, phones get sold at discounts with multi-month or multi-year contracts, and contractual lock-ins are a large problem. Keeping each of the above factors in mind, the Indian mobile telecom space is far more competitive than the US mobile telecom space.

Further, in the Indian DTH market, given that there is transactional lock-in (set-top boxes aren't interoperable in practice, though are mandated to be so by law^{^[16]}), there are fewer choices in the market; further, the equivalent of multi-SIM phones don't exist with respect to set-top boxes. Further, while there are must-carry rules with respect to carriage, they can be of three types: 1) must mandatorily provide access to particular channels^{^[17]} (positive obligation, usually for government channels); 2) prevented from not providing particular channels (negative obligation, to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and political censorship); and 3) must mandatorily offer access to at least a set number of channels (positive obligation for ensuring market diversity). ^{^[18]} Currently, only (1) is in force, since despite attempts by TRAI to ensure (3) as well.^{^[19]}

If the shifting costs are low and transparency in terms of network practice is reported in a standard manner and well-publicised, then that significantly weakens the "gatekeeper effect", which as we saw earlier, is the reason why we wish to introduce Net Neutrality regulation. This consequently means, as explained above in section 3.2, that despite the same Net Neutrality principles applying in all markets and countries, the precise form that the Net Neutrality regulations take in a telecom market with low switching costs would be different from the form that such regulations would take in a market with high switching costs.

3.3.2 Anti-competitive Practices

Some potential anti-competitive practices, which are closely linked, are cross-subsidization, tying (anti-competitive bundling) of multiple services, and vertical price squeeze. All three of these are especial concerns now, with the increased diversification of traditional telecom companies, and with the entry into telecom (like with DTH) of companies that create content. Hence, if Airtel cross-subsidizes the Hike chat application that it recently acquired, ^{^[20]} or if Reliance Infocomm requires customers to buy a subscription to an offering from Reliance Big Entertainment, or if Reliance Infocomm meters traffic from another Reliance Big Entertainment differently from that from Saavn, all those would be violative of the principle of non-discrimination by gatekeepers. This same analysis can be applied to all unpaid deals and non-commercial deals, including schemes such as Internet.org and Wikipedia Zero, which will be covered later in the section on zero-rating.

While we have general rules such as sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, we do not currently have specific rules prohibiting these or other anti-competitive practices, and we need Net Neutrality regulation that clearly prohibit such anti-competitive practices so that the telecom regulator can take action for non-compliance . We cannot leave these specific policy prescriptions unstated, even if they are provided for in section 3 of the Competition Act. These concerns are especial concerns in the telecom sector, and the telecom regulator or arbitrator should have the power to directly deal with these, instead of each case going to the Competition Commission of India. This should not affect the jurisdiction of the CCI to investigate and adjudicate such matters, but should ensure that TRAI both has suo motu powers, and that the mechanism to complain is made simple (unlike the current scenario, where some individual complainants may fall in the cracks between TRAI and TDSAT).

3.3.3 Zero-rating

Since a large part of the net neutrality debate in India involves zero-rating practices, we deal with that in some length. Zero-rating is the practice of not counting (aka "zero-rating") certain traffic towards a subscriber's regular Internet usage. The zero-rated traffic could be zero-priced or fixed-price; capped or uncapped; subscriber-paid, Internet service-paid, paid for by both, or unpaid; content- or source/destination-based, or agnostic to content or source/destination; automatically provided by the ISP or chosen by the customer . The motivations for zero-rating may also be varied, as we shall see below. Further, depending on the circumstances, zero-rating could be competitive or anti-competitive. All forms of zero-rating result in some form of discrimination, but not all zero-rating is harmful, nor does all zero-rating need to be prohibited.

While, as explained in the section on interconnection and carriage above, negative discrimination at the network level should be prohibited, that leaves open the question of positive discrimination. It follows from section 3.1 that the right frame of analysis of this question is harm to competition, since the main harm zero-rating is, as we shall see below, about discriminating between different content providers, and not discrimination at the level of protocols, etc.

Whether one should allow for any form of positive discrimination at the network level or not depends on whether positive discrimination of (X) has an automatic and unfair negative impact on all (~X). That, in turn, depends on whether (~X) is being subject to unfair competition. As Wikipedia notes, "unfair competition means that the gains of some participants are conditional on the losses of others, when the gains are made in ways which are illegitimate or unjust." Thus, positive discrimination that has a negative impact on effective competition shall not be permitted, since in such cases it is equivalent to negative discrimination ("zero-sum game") . Positive discrimination that does not have a negative impact on effective competition may be permitted, especially since it results in increased access and increases consumer benefit, as long as the harm to openness and diversity is minimized .

While considering this, one should keep in mind the fact that startups were, 10-15 years ago, at a huge disadvantage with regard to wholesale data purchase. The marketplaces for data centres and for content delivery networks (which speed up delivery of content by being located closer, in network terms, to multiple last-mile ISPs) were nowhere near as mature as they are today, and the prices were high. There was a much higher barrier to startup entry than there is today, due to the prices and due to larger companies being able to rely on economies of scale to get cheaper rates. Was that unfair? No. There is no evidence of anti-competitive practices, nor of startups complaining about such practices. Therefore, that was fair competition, despite specific input costs that were arguably needed (though not essential) for startups to compete being priced far beyond their capacity to pay.

Today the marketplace is very different, with a variety of offerings. CDNs such as Cloudflare, which were once the preserve of rich companies, even have free offerings, thus substantially lowering barriers for startups that want faster access to customers across the globe.

Is a CDN an essential cost for a startup? No. But in an environment where speed matters and customers use or don't use a service depending on speed; and where the startup's larger competitors are all using CDNs, a startup more or less has to. Thankfully, given the cheap access to CDNs these days, that cost is not too high for a startup to bear. If the CDN market was not competitive enough, would a hypothetical global regulator have been justified in outright banning the use of CDNs to 'level' the playing field? No, because the hypothetical global regulator instead had the option to (and would have been justified in) regulating the market to ensure greater competition.

A regulator should not prohibit an act that does not negatively impact access, competition, consumer benefit, nor openness (including diversity), since that would be over-regulation and would harm innovation.

3.3.3.1 Motivations for Zero-Rating

3.3.3.1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility / Incentivizing Customers to Move Up Value Chain

There exist multiple instances where there is no commercial transaction between the OTT involved and the telecom carrier, in which zero-priced zero-rating of specific Internet content happens. We know that there is no commercial transaction either through written policy (Wikipedia Zero) or through public statements (Internet.org, a bouquet of sites). In such cases, the telecom provider would either be providing such services out of a sense of public interest, given the social value of those services, or would be providing such services out of self-interest, to showcase the value of particular Internet set the same time.

The apprehended risk is that of such a scheme creating a "walled garden", where users would be exposed only to those services which are free since the search and discovery costs of non-free Internet (i.e., any site outside the "walled garden") would be rather high. This risk, while real, is rather slim given the fact that the economic incentives for those customers who have the ability to pay for "Internet packs" but currently do not find a compelling reason to do so, or out of both a sense of public interest and self-interest of the telecom providers works against this.

In such non-commercial zero-priced zero-rating, a telecom provider would only make money if and only if subscribers start paying for sites outside of the walled garden. If subscribers are happy in the walled garden, the telecom provider starts losing money, and hence has a strong motivation to stop that scheme. If on the other hand, enough subscribers start becoming paying customers to offset the cost of providing the zero-priced zero-rated service(s) and make it profitable, that shows that despite the availability of zero-priced options a number of customers will opt for paid access to the open Internet and the open Web, and the overall harms of such zero-priced zero-rating would be minimal. Hence, the telecom providers have an incentive to keep the costs of Internet data packs low, thus encouraging customers who otherwise wouldn't pay for the Internet to become paying customers.

There is the potential of consumer harm when users seek to access a site outside of the walled garden, and find to their dismay that they have been charged for the Internet at a hefty rate, and their prepaid balance has greatly decreased. This is an issue that TRAI is currently appraised of, and a suitable solution would need to be found to protect consumers against such harm.

All in all, given that the commercial interests of the telecom providers align with the healthy practice of non-discrimination, this form of limited positive discrimination is not harmful in the long run, particularly because it is not indefinitely sustainable for a large number of sites. Hence, it may not be useful to ban this form of zero-priced zero-rating of services as long as they aren't exclusive, or otherwise anti-competitive (a vertical price-squeeze, for instance), and the harm to consumers is prohibited and the harm to openness/diversity is minimized.

3.3.3.1.2 Passing on ISP Savings / Incentivizing Customers to Lower ISP's Cost

Suppose, for instance, an OTT uses a CDN located, in network distance terms, near an eyeball ISP. In this case, the ISP has to probably pay less than it would have to had the same data been located in a data centre located further away, given that it would have fewer interconnection-related charges.

Hence the monetary costs of providing access to different Web destinations are not equal for the ISP. This cost can be varied either by the OTT (by it locating the data closer to the ISP - through a CDN, by co-locating where the ISP is also present, or by connecting to an Internet Exchange Point which the ISP is also connected to - or by it directly "peering" with the ISP) or by the ISP (by engaging in "transparent proxying" in which case the ISP creates caches at the ISP level of specific content (usually by caching non-encrypted data the ISP's customers request) and serves the cached content when a user requests a site, rather than serving the actual site). None of the practices so far mentioned are discriminatory from the customer's perspective with regard either to price or to prioritization, though all of them enable faster speeds to specific content. Hence none of the above-mentioned practices are considered even by the most ardent Net Neutrality advocates to be violations of that principle. ^{^[21]} However, if an ISP zero-rates the content to either pass on its savings to the customer^{^[22]} or to incentivize the customer to access services that cost the ISP less in terms of interconnection costs, that creates a form of price discrimination for the customer, despite it benefiting the consumer.

The essential economic problem is that the cost to the ISP is variable, but the cost to the customer is fixed. Importantly, this problem is exacerbated in India where web hosting prices are high, transit prices are high, peering levels are low, and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) are not functioning well. ^{^[23]} These conditions create network inefficiencies in terms of hosting of content further away from Indian networks in terms of network distance, and thus harms consumers as well as local ISPs. In order to set this right, zero-rating of this sort may be permitted as it acts as an incentive towards fixing the market fundamentals. However, once the market fundamentals are fixed, such zero-rating may be prohibited.

This example shows that the desirability or otherwise of discriminatory practices depends fully on the conditions present in the market, including in terms of interconnection costs.

3.3.3.1.3 Unbundling Internet into Services ("Special Packs")

Since at least early 2014, mobile operators have been marketing special zero-rating "packs". These packs, if purchased by the customer, allow capped or in some instances uncapped, zero-rating of a service such as WhatsApp or Facebook, meaning traffic to/from that service will not be counted against their regular Internet usage.

For a rational customer, purchasing such a pack only makes sense in one of two circumstances:

● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, but has not purchased an "Internet data pack" since she doesn't find the Internet valuable. Instead, she has heard about "WhatsApp", has friends who are on it, and wishes to use that to reduce her SMS costs (and thereby eat into the carriage provider's ability to charge separately for SMSes). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for around ₹25 a month instead of paying ₹95 for an all-inclusive Internet data pack.

● The person has Internet connectivity on her Internet-capable phone, and has purchased an "Internet data pack". However, that data pack is capped and she has to decide between using WhatsApp and surfing web sites. She is on multiple WhatsApp groups and her WhatsApp traffic eats up 65% of her data cap. She thus has to choose between the two, since she doesn't want to buy two Internet data packs (each costing around ₹95 for a month). She chooses to buy a WhatsApp pack for ₹25 a month, paying a cumulative total of ₹120 instead of ₹190 which she would have had to had she bought two Internet data packs. In this situation, "unbundling" is happening, and this benefits the consumer. Such unbundling harms the openness and integrity of the Internet.

If users did not find value in the "special" data packs, and there is no market demand for such products, they will cease to be offered. Thus, assuming a telco's decision to offer such packs is purely customer-demand driven - and not due to deals it has struck with service providers - if Orkut is popular, telcos would be interested in offering Orkut packs and if Facebook is popular, they would be interested in offering a Facebook pack. Thus, clearly, there is nothing anti-competitive about such customer-paid zero-rating packs, whereas they clearly enhance consumer benefit. Would this increase the popularity of Orkut or Facebook? Potentially yes. But to prohibit this would be like prohibiting a supermarket from selectively (and non-collusively) offering discounts on popular products. Would that make already popular products even more popular? Potentially, yes. But that would not be seen as a harm to competition but would be seen as fair competition. This contravenes the "openness" of the Internet (i.e., the integral interconnected diversity that an open network like the Internet embodies) as an independent regulatory goal. The Internet, being a single gateway to a mind-boggling variety of services, allows for a diverse "long tail", which would lose out if the Internet was seen solely as a gateway to popular apps, sites, and content. However, given that this is a choice exercised freely by the consumer, such packs should not be prohibited, as that would be a case of over-regulation.

The one exception to the above analysis of competition, needless to say, is if that these special packs aren't purely customer-demand driven and are the product of special deals between an OTT and the telco. In that case, we need to ensure it isn't anti-competitive by following the prescriptions of the next section.

3.3.3.1.4 Earning Additional Revenues from Content Providers

With offerings like Airtel Zero, we have a situation where OTT companies are offering to pay for wholesale data access used by their customers, and make accessing their specific site or app free for the customer. From the customer's perspective, this is similar to a toll-free number or a pre-paid envelope or free-to-air TV channel being offered on a particular network.

However, from the network perspective, these are very different. Even if a customer-company pays Airtel for the toll-free number, that number is accessible and toll-free across all networks since the call terminates on Airtel networks and Airtel pays the connecting network back the termination charge from the fee they are paid by the customer-company. This cannot happen in case of the Internet, since the "call" terminates outside of the reach of the ISP being paid for zero-rating by the OTT company; hence unless specific measures are taken, zero-rating has to be network-specific.

The comparison to free-to-air channels is also instructive, since in 2010 TRAI made recommendations that consumers should have the choice of accessing free-to-air channels à-la-carte, without being tied up to a bouquet.^{^[24]} This would, in essence, allow a subscriber to purchase a set-top box, and without paying a regular subscription fee watch free-to-air channels. ^{^[25]} However, similar to toll-free numbers, these free-to-air channels are free-to-air on all MSO's set-top boxes, unlike the proposed Airtel Zero scheme under which access to a site like Flipkart would be free for customers on Airtel's network alone.

Hence, these comparisons, while useful in helping think through the regulatory and competition issues, should not be used as instructive exact analogies, since they aren't fully comparable situations.

3.3.3.1.5 Market Options for OTT-Paid Zero-Rating

As noted above, a competitive marketplace already exists for wholesale data purchase at the level of "content ISPs" (including CDNs), which sell wholesale data to content providers (OTTs). This market is at present completely unregulated. The deals that exist are treated as commercial secrets. It is almost certain that large OTTs get better rates than small startups due to economies of scale.

However, at the eyeball ISP level, it is a single-sided market with ISPs competing to gain customers in the form of end-users. With a scheme like "Airtel Zero", this would get converted into a double-sided market, with a gatekeeper without whom neither side can reach the other being in the middle creating a two-sided toll. This situation is ripe for market abuse: this situation allows the gatekeeper to hinder access to those OTTs that don't pay the requisite toll or to provide preferential access to those who pay, apart from providing an ISP the opportunity to "double-dip".

One way to fix this is to prevent ISPs from establishing a double-sided market. The other way would be to create a highly-regulated market where the gatekeeping powers of the ISP are diminished, and the ISP's ability to leverage its exclusive access over its customers are curtailed. A comparison may be drawn here to the rules that are often set by standard-setting bodies where patents are involved: given that these patents are essential inputs, access to them must be allowed through fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory licences. Access to the Internet and common carriers like telecom networks, being even more important (since alternatives exist to particular standards, but not to the Internet itself), must be placed at an even higher pedestal and thus even stricter regulation to ensure fair competition.

A marketplace of this sort would impose some regulatory burdens on TRAI and place burdens on innovations by the ISPs, but a regulated marketplace harms ISP innovation less than not allowing a market at all.

At a minimum, such a marketplace must ensure non-exclusivity, non-discrimination, and transparency. Thus, at a minimum, a telecom provider cannot discriminate between any OTTs who want similar access to zero-rating. Further, a telecom provider cannot prevent any OTT from zero-rating with any other telecom provider. To ensure that telecom providers are actually following this stipulation, transparency is needed, as a minimum.

Transparency can take one of two forms: transparency to the regulator alone and transparency to the public. Transparency to the regulator alone would enable OTTs and ISPs to keep the terms of their commercial transactions secret from their competitors, but enable the regulator, upon request, to ensure that this doesn't lead to anti-competitive practices. This model would increase the burden on the regulator, but would be more palatable to OTTs and ISPs, and more comparable to the wholesale data market where the terms of such agreements are strictly-guarded commercial secrets. On the other hand, requiring transparency to the public would reduce the burden on the regulator, despite coming at a cost of secrecy of commercial terms, and is far more preferable.

Beyond transparency, a regulation could take the form of insisting on standard rates and terms for all OTT players, with differential usage tiers if need be, to ensure that access is truly non-discriminatory. This is how the market is structured on the retail side.

Since there are transaction costs in individually approaching each telecom provider for such zero-rating, the market would greatly benefit from a single marketplace where OTTs can come and enter into agreements with multiple telecom providers.

Even in this model, telecom networks will be charging based not only on the fact of the number of customers they have, but on the basis of them having exclusive routing to those customers. Further, even under the standard-rates based single-market model, a particular zero-rated site may be accessible for free from one network, but not across all networks: unlike the situation with a toll-free number in which no such distinction exists.

To resolve this, the regulator may propose that if an OTT wishes to engage in paid zero-rating, it will need to do so across all networks, since if it doesn't there is risk of providing an unfair advantage to one network over another and increasing the gatekeeper effect rather than decreasing it.

However, all forms of competitive Internet service-paid zero-priced zero-rating, even when they don't harm competition, innovation amongst content providers, or consumers, will necessarily harm openness and diversity of the Internet. For instance, while richer companies with a strong presence in India may pay to zero-rate traffic for their Indian customers, decentralized technologies such as XMPP and WebRTC, having no central company behind them, would not, leading to customers preferring proprietary networks and solutions to such open technologies, which in turn, thanks to the network effect, leads to a vicious cycle. These harms to openness and diversity have to be weighed against the benefit in terms of increase in access when deciding whether to allow for competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating, as such competition doesn't exist in a truly level playing field . Further, it must be kept in mind that there are forms of zero-priced zero-rating that decrease the harm to openness / diversity, or completely remove that harm altogether: that there are other options available must be acknowledged by the regulator when considering the benefit to access from competitive OTT-paid zero-priced zero-rating.

3.3.3.1.6 Other options for zero-rating

There are other models of zero-priced zero-rating that either minimize the harm is that of ensuring free Internet access for every person. This can take the form of:^{^[26]}

● A mandatorily "leaky" 'walled garden':

○ The first-degree of all hyperlinks from the zero-rated OTT service are also free.

○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers during specified hours.

○ The zero-rated OTT service provider has to mandatorily provide free access to the whole of the World Wide Web to all its customers based on amount on usage of the OTT service.^{^[27]}

● Zero-rating of all Web traffic

○ In exchange for viewing of advertisements

○ In exchange for using a particular Web browser

○ At low speeds on 3G, or on 2G.

3.3.3.2. What kinds of zero-rating are good

The majority of the forms of zero-rating covered in this section are content or source/destination-based zero-rating. Only some of the options covered in the "other options for zero-rating" section cover content-agnostic zero-rating models. Content-agnostic zero-rating models are not harmful, while content-based zero-rating models always harm, though to varying degrees, the openness of the Internet / diversity of OTTs, and to varying degrees increase access to Internet-based services. Accordingly, here is an hierarchy of desirability of zero-priced zero-rating, from most desirable to most harmful:

1. Content- & source/destination-agnostic zero-priced zero-rating.^{^[28]}

2. Content- & source/destination-based non-zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, chosen freely & paid for by users. ^{^[29]}

3. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any commercial deals, with full transparency. ^{^[30]}

4. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of commercial deal with partial zero-priced access to all content, with non-discriminatory access to the same deal by all with full transparency.^{^[31]}

5. Content- & source/destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, on the basis of a non-commercial deal, without any benefits monetary or otherwise, flowing directly or indirectly from the provider of the zero-rated content to the ISP, with full transparency. ^{^[32]}

6. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, across all telecom networks, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

7. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with standard pricing, non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

8. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and full transparency.

9. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, with non-discriminatory access, and transparency to the regulator.

10. Content- & source-destination-based zero-priced zero-rating, without any regulatory framework in place.

3.3.4 Cartels and Oligopoly

While cartels and oligopolies may have an impact on Net Neutrality, they are not problems that any set of anti-discrimination rules imposed on gatekeepers can fix. Further, cartels and oligopolies don't directly enhance the ability of gatekeepers to unjustly discriminate if there are firm rules against negative discrimination and price ceilings and floors on data caps are present for data plans. Given this, TRAI should recommend that this issue be investigated and the Competition Commission of India should take this issue up.

3.4 Reasonable Network Management Principles

Reasonable network management has to be allowed to enable the ISPs to manage performance and costs on their network. However, ISPs may not indulge in acts that are harmful to consumers in the name of reasonable network management. Below are a set of guidelines for when discrimination against classes of traffic in the name of network management are justified.

● Discrimination between classes of traffic for the sake of network management should only be permissible if:

○ there is an intelligible differentia between the classes which are to be treated differently, and

○ there is a rational nexus between the differential treatment and the aim of such differentiation, and

○ the aim sought to be furthered is legitimate, and is related to the security, stability, or efficient functioning of the network, or is a technical limitation outside the control of the ISP^{^[33]}, and

○ the network management practice is the least harmful manner in which to achieve the aim.

● Provision of specialized services (i.e., "fast lanes") is permitted if and only if it is shown that

○ The service is available to the user only upon request, and not without their active choice, and

○ The service cannot be reasonably provided with "best efforts" delivery guarantee that is available over the Internet, and hence requires discriminatory treatment, or

○ The discriminatory treatment does not unduly harm the provision of the rest of the Internet to other customers.

These principles are only applicable at the level of ISPs, and not on access gateways for institutions that may in some cases be run by ISPs (such as a university network, free municipal WiFi, at a work place, etc.), which are not to be regulated as common carriers.

These principles may be applied on a case-by-case basis by a regulator, either suo motu or upon complaint by customers.

^{^[1]} Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, (19 May 2011), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf.

^{^[2]} Available at http://www.trai.gov.in/WriteReadData/userfiles/file/NTP%202012.pdf.

^{^[3]} IAMAI, India to Cross 300 million internet users by Dec 14, (19 November, 2014), http://www.iamai.in/PRelease_detail.aspx?nid=3498&NMonth=11&NYear=2014.

^{^[4]} World Economic Forum, The Global Information Technology Report 2015, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_IT_Report_2015.pdf.

^{^[5]} http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/4.1#s4.1.1

^{^[6]} See R.U.S. Prasad, The Impact of Policy and Regulatory Decisions on Telecom Growth in India (July 2008), http://web.stanford.edu/group/siepr/cgi-bin/siepr/?q=system/files/shared/pubs/papers/pdf/SCID361.pdf.

^{^[7]} 1973 AIR 106

^{^[8]} 1962 AIR 305

^{^[9]} "When ISPs go beyond their traditional use of IP headers to route packets, privacy risks begin to emerge." Alissa Cooper, How deep must DPI be to incur privacy risk? http://www.alissacooper.com/2010/01/25/how-deep-must-dpi-be-to-incur-privacy-risk/

^{^[10]} Richard T.B. Ma & Vishal Misra, The Public Option: A Non-Regulatory Alternative to Network Neutrality, http://dna-pubs.cs.columbia.edu/citation/paperfile/200/netneutrality.pdf

^{^[11]} Mobile number portability was launched in India on January 20, 2011 in the Haryana circle. See http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/pm-launches-nationwide-mobile-number-portability/1/127176.html . Accessed on April 24, 2015.

^{^[12]} For a comprehensive list of all TRAI interconnection regulations & subsequent amendments, see http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[13]} See Telecommunication Interconnection Usage Charges (Eleventh Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (1 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[14]} Article 30 of the Universal Service Directive, Directive 2002/22/EC.

^{^[15]} See Telecommunication Mobile Number Portability (Sixth Amendment) Regulations, 2015 (3 of 2015), available at http://www.trai.gov.in/Content/Regulation/0_1_REGULATIONS.aspx.

^{^[16]} The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Seventh) (The Direct to Home Services) Tariff Order, 2015 (2 of 2015).

^{^[17]} Section 8, Cable Television Networks Act, 1995.

^{^[18]} TRAI writes new rules for Cable TV, Channels, Consumers, REAL TIME NEWS, (August 11, 2014), http://rtn.asia/rtn/233/1220_trai-writes-new-rules-cable-tv-channels-consumers.

^{^[19]} An initial requirement for all multi system operators to have a minimum capacity of 500 channels was revoked by the TDSAT in 2012. For more details, see http://www.televisionpost.com/cable/msos-not-required-to-have-500-channel-headends-tdsat/.

^{^[20]} Aparna Ghosh, Bharti SoftBank Invests $14 million in Hike, LIVE MINT, (April 2, 2014), http://www.livemint.com/Companies/nI38YwQL2eBgE6j93lRChM/Bharti-SoftBank-invests-14-million-in-mobile-messaging-app.html.

^{^[21]} Mike Masnick, Can We Kill This Ridiculous Shill-Spread Myth That CDNs Violate Net Neutrality? They Don't, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140812/04314528184/can-we-kill-this-ridiculous-shill-spread-myth-that-cdns-violate-net-neutrality-they-dont.shtml.

^{^[22]} Mathew Carley, What is Hayai's stance on "Net Neutrality"?, https://www.hayai.in/faq/hayais-stance-net-neutrality?c=mgc20150419

^{^[23]} Helani Galpaya & Shazna Zuhyle, South Asian Broadband Service Quality: Diagnosing the Bottlenecks, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1979928

^{^[24]} DTH players told to offer pay channels on la carte basis, HINDU BUSINESS LINE (July 22, 2010), http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/todays-paper/dth-players-told-to-offer-pay-channels-on-la-carte-basis/article999298.ece.

^{^[25]} The Telecommunication (Broadcasting and Cable) Services (Fourth) (Addressable Systems) Tariff Order, 2010.

^{^[26]} These suggestions were provided by Helani Galpaya and Sunil Abraham, based in some cases on existing practices.

^{^[27]} This is what is being followed by the Jana Loyalty Program: http://www.betaboston.com/news/2015/05/06/with-a-new-loyalty-program-mobile-app-marketplace-jana-pushes-deeper-into-the-developing-world/

^{^[28]} Example: free Internet access at low speeds, with data caps.

^{^[29]} Example: special "packs" for specific services like WhatsApp.

^{^[30]} Example: zero-rating of all locally-peered settlement-free traffic.

^{^[31]} Example: "leaky" walled gardens, such as the Jana Loyalty Program that provide limited access to all of the Web alongside access to the zero-rated content.

^{^[32]} Example: Wikipedia Zero.

^{^[33]} A CGNAT would be an instance of such a technology that poses network limitations.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/regulatory-perspectives-on-net-neutrality

DOT Order Blocking 857 Websites on Grounds of Decency and Morality

pranesh — 2015-08-03T07:42:53Z

Copy of leaked DOT order blocking 857 websites on grounds of morality and decency, claiming powers under section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/dot-morality-block-order-2015-07-31

India blocks access to 857 porn sites

pranesh — 2015-08-05T01:31:32Z

India has blocked free access to 857 porn sites in what it says is a move to prevent children from accessing them.

The story was published by BBC on August 3, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

Adults will still be able to access the sites using virtual private networks (VPNs) or proxy servers. In July, the Supreme Court expressed its unhappiness over the government's inability to block sites, especially those featuring child pornography.

Telecom companies have said they will not be able to enforce the "ban" immediately.

"We have to block each site one by one and it will take a few days for all service providers to block all the sites," an unnamed telecom company executive told The Times of India newspaper.

A senior official, who preferred to remained unnamed, told the BBC Hindi that India's department of telecommunications had "advised" telecom operators and Internet service providers to "control free and open access" to 857 porn sites.

"There is no total ban. This was done in the backdrop of Supreme Court's observation on children having free access to porn sites. The idea is also to protect India's cultural fabric. This will not prevent adults from visiting porn sites," the official said.

In July, the top court had observed that it was not for the court to order a ban on porn sites.

"It is an issue for the government to deal with. Can we pass an interim order directing blocking of all adult websites? And let us keep in mind the possible contention of a person who could ask what crime have I committed by browsing adult websites in private within the four walls of my house. Could he not argue about his right to freedom to do something within the four walls of his house without violating any law?," the court said.

According to statistics released by adult site Pornhub, India was its fourth largest source of traffic in 2014, behind the US, UK and Canada. Pranesh Prakash of the Bangalore based Centre for Internet and Society said the directive to block the 857 sites was "the largest single order of its kind" in India.

"The government's reasoning that it is not a ban because adults can still access the porn sites is ridiculous," he told the BBC. The move has caused a great deal of comment on Indian social media networks, with many prominent personalities coming forward to condemn it.

Popular author Chetan Bhagat, writer and commentator Nilanjana Roy, politician Milind Deora and director Ram Gopal Varma have all added their voices to the debate.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-news-august-3-2015-india-blocks-access-to-857-porn-sites

Porn ban: People will soon learn to circumvent ISPs and govt orders, expert says

pranesh — 2015-08-05T01:47:52Z

The article by Karthikeyan Hemalatha was published in the Times of India on August 2. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.

The government used other sections of the Act to circumvent this provision. Sources in the Department of Telecommunication, which comes under the ministry of communications and information technology, said a notification had been issued under Section 79 (b) of IT Act under which internet service providers could be penalized for not following government orders. "Though the section protects an internet service provider (ISP) from legal action for the content it may allow, it can be penalized for not following government orders to ban them," said Prakash.

Last month, the Supreme Court declined to pass an interim order to block websites which have pornographic content. "Such interim orders cannot be passed by this court. Somebody may come to the court and say 'look I am above 18 and how can you stop me from watching it within the four walls of my room?' It is a violation of Article 21 [right to personal liberty]," said Chief Justice H L Dattu.

The judge was reacting to a public interest litigation filed by advocate Kamlesh Vashwani who was seeking to block porn websites in the country. "The issue is definitely serious and some steps need to be taken. The Centre is expected to take a stand. Let us see what stand the Centre will take," the Chief Justice said and directed the Centre to reply within four weeks. Over the weekend, the stance became clear.

Sources also say that Section 19 (2) of the Constitution was used for the ban. The section allows the government to impose "reasonable restrictions in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court."

For netizens, the government could actually be providing crash courses on proxy sites. "This is the best way to teach people on how to circumvent ISPs and government orders," said Prakash, adding that real abusive porn sites might still be available.

"There is no dynamic mechanism to block all sites with pornographic content. The government has to individually pick URLs (uniform resource locator) to ban websites. Right now, only popular websites have been banned and the little known abusive sites like those that propagate revenge porn or child porn," said Prakash. "No ban can be comprehensive," he added.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-2-2015-karthikeyan-hemalatha-porn-ban

Porn block in India sparks outrage

pranesh — 2015-08-05T02:10:46Z

India’s government has triggered a storm of protest after blocking 857 alleged pornography websites, with privacy and internet freedom campaigners, as well as consumers, condemning the move as arbitrary and unlawful.

The article by Amanda Hodge was published in the Australian on August 5, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

The order, enforced since Sunday by the country’s main internet service providers, comes amid debate about the influence of pornography on sex crime in India, and as the Supreme Court considers a petition by lawyer Kamlesh Vaswani to ban pornographic websites that harm children.

The government has been forced to defend the move, saying it was taken in response to Supreme Court criticism at inaction against child pornography websites, although the Supreme Court itself has refused to impose any interim ban while it considers the petition. The websites — a fraction of the world’s millions of internet pornography sites — will remain blocked until the government figures out how to restrict access, a spokesman said.

Critics have slammed the measure as unconstitutional and pointed out the list includes adult humour sites that contain no pornographic content. Others have suggested it is another intrusion into the private lives of ordinary Indians by an administration intent on pushing a puritanical Hindu agenda, citing the recent ban on beef in several states and an alleged “Hindu-isation” of school textbooks.

That prompted outrage from Telecom Minister Ravi Shankar Prasad. “I reject with contempt the charge that it is a Talibani government. Our government supports free media, respects communication on social media and has respected freedom of communication always,” he said.

While India has no law preventing citizens accessing internet pornography, regulations do restrict the publishing of “obscene information in electronic form”. Centre for Internet and Society policy director Pranesh Prakash told The Australian yesterday that some elements of that act were welcome — such as prohibition of child pornography and the uploading of a person’s private parts without consent — but “the provisions relating to ‘sexually explicit materials’ are far too broad, with no exceptions made for art, architecture, education or literature”.

Mr Prakash said the pornography ban amounted to an “abdication of the government’s duty”, given the list of sites blocked was provided on request to the government by one of the Vaswani petitioners. “The additional solicitor-general essentially asked one of the petitioners to provide a list of websites, which she passed on to the Department of Information Technology, which in turn passed to Department of Telecommunications asking for them to be blocked or disabled.

“That is not acceptable in a democracy where it is not the government which has actually found any of these websites to be unlawful.” Mr Prakash also criticised the secrecy surrounding the order, which he said contravened Indian law requiring a public declaration of any intended ban so that it might be challenged. The bans were made under “Rule 12” of India’s IT Act, which empowers the government to force ISPs to block sites when it is “necessary or expedient”.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-australian-news-august-5-2015-amanda-hodge-porn-block-in-india-sparks-outrage

CIS's Comments on the Draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016

pranesh — 2016-06-05T15:06:09Z

The Centre for Internet and Society is alarmed by the Draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016, and has recommended that the proposed law be withdrawn in its entirety. It offered the following detailed comments as its submission.

Comments on the Draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016

by the Centre for Internet and Society

1. Preliminary

1.1. This submission presents comments and recommendations by the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) on the draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016 (“the draft bill” / “the proposed bill” / “the bill”).

2. Centre for Internet and Society

2.1. The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from the perspectives of policy and academic research. The areas of focus include accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security. The academic research at CIS seeks to understand the reconfiguration of social processes and structures through the internet and digital media technologies, and vice versa.

2.2. This submission is consistent with CIS’ commitment to safeguarding the public interest, and particularly the representing the interests of ordinary citizens and consumers. The comments in this submission aim to further the principles of people’s right to information regarding their own country, openness-by-default in governmental activities, freedom of speech and expression, and the various forms of public good that can emerge from greater availability of open (geospatial) data created by both public and private agencies, and the innovations made possible as a result.

3. Comments

3.1. General Remarks

3.1.1. While CIS welcomes the intentions of the government to prevent use of geospatial information to undermine national security, the proposed bill completely fails to do so, infringes upon Constitutional rights, harms innovation, undermines the national initiatives of Digital India and Startup India, is completely impractical and unworkable, and it will lead to a range of substantial harms if the government actually seeks to enforce it.

3.1.2. There are already laws in place that prevent the use of geospatial information to undermine national security. For instance, the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (“OSA”) already contains provisions — sections 3(2)(a), (b), and (c) — all of which would prevent a person from creating maps that undermine national security and would penalise their doing so. Section 5 of the OSA contains multiple provisions that penalise the possession and communication of maps that undermine “national security.” The penalties under the OSA range from imprisonment of up to 3 years all the way to imprisonment up to 14 years. Given this, there is absolutely no need to create yet another law to deal with maps that undermine “national security.” Indeed, it is the government’s stated policy to reduce the number of laws in India, whereas the proposed bill introduces a redundant new law that adds multiple layers of bureaucracy.

3.1.3. The National Mapping Policy, 2005, already puts in place restrictions on wrongful depictions of India’s international boundaries, and as we explain below in section 3.4 of this document, even the National Mapping Policy is over-broad. Even if the government wishes to provide statutory backing to the policy, it should be a very different law that is far more limited in scope, and restricts itself to criminalising those who misrepresent India’s international boundary with an intention to mislead people into thinking that that is the official boundary of India as recognised by the Survey of India. CIS would support a law of such limited scope and mandate, provided it has an appropriate penalty.

3.1.4. There would be much utility in a law that creates a duty on the Survey of India to make available, in the form of an open standard, an official electronic version of the maps that it creates, and expressly allows and encourages citizens and startups to reuse such official maps, however the Ministry of Home Affairs would not be the nodal ministry for such a law.

3.1.5. We recommend that the proposed law be scrapped in its entirety.

3.1.6. We additionally provide an alternative manner of reducing the harms caused by this bill, in our comments below. By no means should these further comments be seen as a repudiation of our above position, since we do not feel the proposed bill, even with the inclusion of all of our recommendations, would truly further its stated aims. All our below recommendations would do is to reduce the bill’s harmful, and often unintended, consequences.

3.2. Definition of “Geospatial Information” is over-broad, all- encompassing

3.2.1. The second part of the definition of “geospatial information” refers to all “graphic or digital data depicting natural or man-made physical features, phenomenon or boundaries of the earth or any information related thereto” that are “referenced to a co-ordinate system and having attributes.” (Section 2(1)(e)) As per the definition, this will include all geo-referenced information, and data, that is produced by everyday users as an integral part of various everyday uses of digital technologies. This will also include geo-referenced tweets and messages, location of public and private vehicles shared in the real-time with agencies tracking their location (from public transport authorities, to insurance agencies, etc.), location data of mobile phones collected and used by telecommunication service providers, location of mobile phones shared by the user with various kinds of service providers (from taxi companies to delivery agencies), etc.

3.2.2. We recommend that instead of regulating all kinds of geospatial information, and giving rise to a range of possible harms, the draft bill be revised to specifically address “sensitive geospatial information,” defined as geospatial information related to the “Prohibited Places” as defined in the Official Secrets Act 1923 (section 2(8)) which will allow the bill to effectively respond to its key stated concerns of ensuring “security, sovereignty and integrity of India.” Since the National Map Policy defines “Vulnerable Points” and “Vulnerable Areas” (para 3(b)) as the two main types of geospatial units associated with “Prohibited Places”, these terms should also be referred to in the revised version of the draft bill.

3.3. Unreasonable regulation of acquiring and end-use of geospatial information

3.3.1. Section 3 of the draft bill states that “[s]ave as otherwise provided in this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder, or with the general or special permission of the Security Vetting Authority, no person shall acquire geospatial imagery or data including value addition” and “[e]very person who has already acquired any geospatial imagery or data ... including value addition prior to coming of this Act into effect, shall within one year from the commencement of this Act, make an application alongwith requisite fees to the Security Vetting Authority.” This effectively makes it illegal to acquire and maintain ownership of geospatial information that has not been subjected to security vetting.

3.3.2. This draft bill doesn’t apply just to geospatial information that may undermine national security but covers all manners of geospatial information and modern geospatial technologies embedded in everyday digital devices and intimately connected to various electronic products and services, from cars to mobile phones, result in the creation and acquiring of various kinds of geo-referenced information, ranging from the geo-referenced photographs to locations shared with friends. Even ordinary users who are unknowingly looking at maps that contain sensitive geospatial information, which are illegal under the Official Secrets Act, are committing an illegal act under the draft bill, because the users temporarily acquires such sensitive geospatial information in her/his digital device, as part of the very act of browsing the map concerned. This clearly cannot be the intention of the bill. Thus we recommend deletion of the word “acquire.”

3.3.3. Further, the insertion of the phrase “including value addition” in both Section 3(1) and 3(2) appears to suggest that all users who have created derivative products using geospatial information that includes sensitive data (that is data related to Prohibited Places) may be held liable under this draft bill, even if these users have not themselves collected or created such sensitive geospatial information, which was part of the original geospatial information published by the source map agency. This too cannot be the intention of the bill. Thus, we recommend deletion of the phrase “including value addition.”

3.3.4. In the definition of the “Security Vetting of Geospatial Information” itself, it is mentioned that the process will include “screening of the credentials of the end-users and end-use applications, with the sole objective of protecting national security, sovereignty, safety and integrity.” (Section 2(1)(o)) This appears to indicate that all end-users of all electronic and analog services and products using geospatial information will have to be individually vetted before such services and products are used, which would cover a large proportion of the Indian population. This imposes an enormous and impractical burden on the Indian digital economy in particular, and the entire national economy in general, without improving national security. This too cannot be the intention of the draft bill. Thus, we recommend deletion of this phrase, and ensure that end users are not covered by the law.

3.3.5. Given these specific characteristics of how modern geospatial technologies work, and how they provide a basis for various kinds of everyday use of electronic products and services, we would like to submit that the regulatory focus should be on large-scale and/or commercial dissemination, publication, or distribution of geospatial information, and not on the acts of acquiring, possessing, sharing, and using geospatial information. Further, the regulation in general should be aimed at the party owning the geospatial information in question, and not at the parties involved in its dissemination (say, Internet Service Providers) or in its generation or use (say, end-users).

3.4. Removal of journalistic, political, artistic, creative, and speculative depictions of India from the scope of Section 6

3.4.1. Section 6 of the draft bill states that “[n]o person shall depict, disseminate, publish or distribute any wrong or false topographic information of India including international boundaries through internet platforms or online services or in any electronic or physical form.” Section 15 imposes a penalty for such wrong depiction of maps of India.

3.4.2. Depictions of India, which do not purport to accurately represent the international boundaries as recognised by the Indian government should not be penalised. For instance, a map published in a newspaper article about India’s border disputes that shows the incorrect claims that the Chinese government has made over Indian territory would also be penalised as “wrong or false topographic information of India”, since there is a clear intention to depict the boundary as claimed by China. Criminalising such journalism cannot be the legitimate intent of such a provision.

3.4.3. There are numerous instances which have been willfully depicting inaccurate and inauthentic maps of India with international borders for political ends. For instance, there are often depictions of India which show territories within present day Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and Sri Lanka as part of an “Akhand Bharat.” Depictions of this sort should not be penalised. In doing so, would contradict the freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) without being a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2).

3.4.4. Even depictions of India for purposes of speculative fiction would be penalised under this proposed bill unless they depict the official borders. This is clearly undesirable and would not be allowed as a reasonable restriction under Article 19(2).

*3.4.5.* Even geography students in schools and colleges who mis-draw the official map of India would be liable to penalties under the draft bill. This plainly, cannot be the intention of the drafters of this bill. The creator of a rough and inaccurate tourist map of an Indian city can also be identified as committing a criminal act under the proposed bill as she would be depicting “… wrong or false topographic information of India …”

3.4.6. In brief: Merely depicting, disseminating, publishing or distributing any “wrong or false topographic information of India” should not be penalised. unless a person publishes and widely circulates an incorrect map of India while claiming that that represents the official international boundaries of India, such should not be penalised.

3.4.7. CIS recommends that the bill should instead state: “No person shall depict, disseminate, publish, or distribute any topographic information purporting to accurately depict the international boundaries of India as recognised by the Survey of India unless he is authorised to do so by the Surveyor General of India; provided that usage by any person of the international boundaries as is electronically and in print made available by the Survey of India shall deemed to be usage that is authorised by the Surveyor General of India.”

3.5. Absence of Publicly Available and Openly Reusable Standardised National Boundary of India

3.5.1. Given the lack of an reusable versions of maps of India, including of India’s official boundary as recognised by the Survey of India, it becomes impossible for people to accurately depict the boundary of India. We recommend that the bill requires the Survey of India to publish all “Open Series Maps,”as defined in the National Mapping Policy, 2005, including maps depicting the official international and subnational political and administrative boundaries of India, using open geospatial standards and under an open licence allowing such geospatial data to be used by citizens and all companies.

3.6. Remove Requirement for Prior License for Acquire, Dissemination, Publication, or Distribution of Geospatial Information

3.6.1. Section 9 of the draft bill refers to “any person who wants to acquire, disseminate, publish, or distribute any geospatial information of India” (emphasis added), which can be interpreted as the need for a prior license before any person decides to acquire (including creation, collection, generation, and buying) geospatial information. This creates at least two problems:

modern digital geospatial technologies have enabled everyday digital devices (like smartphones) to instantaneously acquire, disseminate, publish, and distribute geospatial information all the time when the person holding that device is looking at online digital maps, say Google Maps, or sharing location with their friends, online platforms and services and service providers (both local and foreign); and
the requirement of prior license involves payment of a “requisite fees” to the Security Vetting Authority, which may act as an arbitrary (since the fee might be based upon the volume of geospatial information to be acquired that one may not know fully determine before acquiring) and effective barrier to acquiring, dissemination, publication, or distribution of geospatial information even if it does not violate the concerns of “security, sovereignty, and integrity” in any manner. This requirement also impedes competition in the market, because new entrants to the geospatial industry may not have enough upfront capital to procure licenses.

3.6.2. Further, the requirement of necessary prior license for acquiring geospatial information does not seem to be a crucial component of the security vetting process, since the geospatial information, once acquired by the agency concerned, is in any case directed to be shared with the Security Vetting Authority for undertaking necessary expunging of sensitive or incorrect information.

3.6.3. We recommend revision of this section so that no prior license and/or permission is required for collection, acquiring, distribution, and/or use of geospatial information; instead, a framework may be established for monitoring of published geospatial information for purposes of ensuring geospatial information pertaining to “Prohibited Places,” as defined under the Official Secrets Act, is not made available to the general public by any person or entity under Indian jurisdiction, including, for instance, Indian subsidiaries and branches of foreign corporations.. Such a framework must not address the end-user of such geospatial information, but its publishers.

3.7. Unenforceable jurisdictional scope

3.7.1. Section 5 of the draft bill states “[s]ave as otherwise provided in any international convention, treaty or agreement of which India is signatory or as provided in this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder, or with the general or special permission of the Security Vetting Authority, no person shall, in any manner, make use of, disseminate, publish or distribute any geospatial information of India, outside India, without prior permission from the Security Vetting Authority.”

3.7.2. In compliance with this section, domestic and foreign companies and platforms will be required to obtain permission from the Security Vetting Authority of India prior to publishing, distributing etc. geospatial information. Similarly in the preliminary, the draft bill holds in person who commits an offence beyond India under the scope of the bill. The bill is thus proposing extraterritorial applicability of its provisions, yet the extent and method of enforcement of the same on other jurisdictions are kept unclear.

3.8. Negative implications for rights of citizens

3.8.1. There are a number of sections in the draft bill which have negative implications for the rights of all users and potentially impinge on the constitutional rights of Indian citizens. These include:

a. Section 18(2) which empowers the Enforcement Authority to conduct a search without a judicial search order;

b. Section 17(3) which empowers the Enforcement Authority to conduct undefined surveillance and monitoring to enforce the Act;

c. Chapter (V) which penalises individuals with Rs. 1-100 Crores and/or seven years in prison for an offence under the act;

d. Section 22 which allows the government to take ownership of a person’s land if a financial penalty has not been paid;

e. Section 30(1) which holds, in the case of the offense being committed by a company, every person in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company, guilty and liable.

3.9. Overly broad powers and responsibilities of the Apex Committee and Enforcement Authority, and lack of adequate oversight

3.9.1. Section 7(2) states that “[t]he Apex Committee shall do all such acts and deeds that may be necessary or otherwise desirable to achieve the objectives of the Act, including the following functions:...” The wording in this section is broad and open ended, and allows for the responsibilities of the Apex Committee to be expanded without clear oversight of such expansion.

3.9.2. Similarly, section 17 established an “Enforcement Authority” for the purpose of carrying out surveillance and monitoring for enforcement of the draft bill. The Authority has been given a number of powers including the power of inquiry, the power to adjudicate, and the power to give directions. These powers have direct implications on the rights of individuals, yet the Authority is not subject to oversight or accountability requirements.

3.9.3. We recommend that the powers and responsibilities of the Apex Committee and Enforcement Authority are narrowly defined in the draft bill itself, limited by the principle of necessity, and subject to independent oversight and accountability requirements.

3.10. Remove the Security Vetting Authority’s power of delegation

3.10.1. Section 8(3) allows the Security Vetting Authority to delegate to any constituent member of the Authority, other subordinate committee, or officer powers and functions as it may deem necessary except the power to grant a licence. In practice, this will allow security vetting to be done by another institution and risks potential involvement of private agencies and/or quasi-governmental bodies.

3.10.2. We recommend that the power of delegation should not be granted to the Security Vetting Authority.

3.11. Negative implications for innovation and India’s digital economy

3.11.1. Section 3 of the draft bill states “[s]ave as otherwise provided in this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder, or with the general or special permission of the Security Vetting Authority, no person shall acquire geospatial imagery or data including value addition of any part of India either through any space or aerial platforms such as satellite, aircrafts, airships, balloons, unmanned aerial vehicles or terrestrial vehicles, or any other means whatsoever”. This effectively ensures that each and every user of geospatial data, products, services, and solutions — since all of these either include or are derivatives of geospatial information — would require prior permission from the Security Vetting Authority. This will substantially affect the existing and emerging digital economy in particular, and the entire economy in general.

3.11.2. Further, Section 9 of the draft bill mandates that any person submitting an application for geospatial information to be vetted must pay a fee. As the provisions of the bill mandate that users approach the Security Vetting Authority for license to use geospatial information, this will impose an immense burden on all users of digital devices in and outside of India. CIS submits that imposition of this fee for security vetting be removed.

3.12. Disproportionate penalty for acquisition of geospatial information

3.12.1. Section 12 states that “[p]enalty for illegal acquisition of geospatial information of India.- Whoever acquires any geospatial information of India in contravention of section 3, shall be punished with a fine ranging from Rupees one crore to Rupees one hundred crore and/or imprisonment for a period upto seven years.” Seven years in prison is disproportionate to the offense of acquiring geospatial information without vetting by the authority concerned. This is particularly true given the broad and all-encompassing definition of “geospatial information” in the draft bill, and the fact that the bill applies to individuals and companies both within and outside of India.

3.13. Improper and inconsistent usage of terms in the draft bill

3.13.1. Section 4 of the draft bill regulates the visualization, publication, dissemination and distribution of geospatial information of India, while section 5 regulates use, dissemination, publication, and distribution of geospatial information outside of India. The definition of “visualization” remains unclear, and the act is only regulated in section 4. The section 6 of the draft bill uses the term ‘depict’, which is undefined as well. We submit that in this context terms are interchangeable, and the draft bill should either define them expressly to avoid ambiguity in interpretations, or consistently use only one throughout the draft bill.

3.13.2. Section 11 (3) of the draft bill requires licensees to “[d]isplay the insignia of the clearance of the Security Vetting Authority on the security-vetted geospatial information by appropriate means such as water-marking or licence as relevant, while disseminating or distributing of such geospatial information.” We observe that geospatial information includes graphical representation, location coordinates, inter alia. While the former may be represented visually on an “as is” basis after the completion of the vetting, the latter may be used to perform other complex functions at the “back-end” (i.e., vendor-facing side) in various technologies. Water-marking and/or displaying of insignia would place undue burden on the licensee, depending on the kind of platform, service, or individual.

3.14. Lack of reference to technical implementation guidance

3.14.1. The regulation, harmonisation, and standardisation of the collection, generation, dissemination etc. of geospatial information is a complex process that goes beyond a process of security vetting and that will require extensive technical implementation guidance from the government. At a minimum this could include quality assurance considerations and standard operating procedures, yet the draft bill makes no reference to the need for technical standards or guidance.

Comments prepared by Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Adya Garg, Pranesh Prakash, Anubha Sinha, and Elonnai Hickok. Submitted by the Centre for Internet and Society, on June 3, 2016.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-draft-geospatial-information-regulation-bill-2016

List of Blocked 'Escort Service' Websites

pranesh — 2016-06-15T08:33:31Z

Here is the full list of URLs that Indian ISPs were asked to block on Monday, June 13, 2016.

On April 20, 2016, DNA carried a report on a PIL seeking action against advertisements for prostitution in newspapers and on websites. That report noted that the Mumbai Police had obtained an order from a magistrates court to block 174 objectionable websites, and had sent a list to the "Group Coordinator (Cyber Laws)" within the Department of Electronics and IT. On June 13, 2016, some news agencies carried reports about the Ministry of Communications and IT having ordered ISPs to block 240 websites.

As far as we know, the Mumbai Police has not proceeded against any of the people who run these websites, whose phone numbers are available, and whose names and addresses are also available in many cases through WHOIS queries on the domain names.

Unfortunately, the government does not make available publicly the list of websites they have ordered ISPs to block. Given that knowledge of what is censored by the government is crucial in a democracy, we are publishing the entire list of blocked websites.

Those of these websites that use TLS (i.e., those with 'https'), still appear to be available on multiple Indian ISPs, and others can be accessed by using a proxy VPN from outside India or by using Tor.

Notes:

The list circulated to ISPs has two sub-lists, numbered from 1-174 (but containing 175 entries, with a numbering mistake), and 1-64, for a total of 239 URLs.
4 URLs are repeated in the list ("www.salini.in/navi-mumbai-independent-escort-service.php", "exmumbai.in", "www.mansimathur.in/pinkyagarwal", "www.mumbaifunclubs.com")
For one website, both the domain name and a specific web page within it are listed (""www.mumbaiwali.in" and "www.mumbaiwali.in/navi-mumbai-escort-service.php")
One URL is incomplete (No. 214: "www.independentescortservicemumbai.com/mumbai%20escort%20servi..")
There are thus 235 unique URLs, targetting 234 websites and web pages.

Full List of Blocked URLs

www.sterlingbioscience.com
rawpoint.biz
www.onemillionbabes.com
www.mumbaihotcollection.in
simranoberoi.in
rubinakapoor.biz
talita.biz
www.mumbaiescortsagency.net
www.mumbaifunclubs.com
www.alishajain.co.in
www.ankitatalwar.co.in
https://www.jennyarora.ind.in
www.riya-kapoor.com
shneha.in
missinimi.in
www.mumbaiglamour.in
kalyn.in
www.saumyagiri.co.in/city/mumbai/
bookerotic.com
www.divyamalik.in
www.suhanisharma.co.in
www.ruhi.biz
umbaiqueens.in
www.aliyaghosh.com
priyasen.in
www.highprofilemumbaiescorts.co.in
charmingmumbai.com
www.poojamehata.in
kiiran.in/
mansikher.in
www.newmumbaiescorts.in
www.mumbaifunclubs.com
www.punarbas.in
www.discreetbabes.in
www.alisharoy.in
www.arpitarai.in
www.nidhipatel.in
navimumbailescort.com
www.zoyaescorts.com
www.juhioberoi.in
shoniya.in
panchibora.in
rehu.in
www.nehaanand.com
www.aditiray.co.in
www.rakhibajaj.in
www.alianoidaescorts.in
www.sobiya.in
www.alishaparul.in
mumbai-escorts.leathercurrency.com
ankita-ahuja.in
www.yamika.in
mumbailescort.co
www.ranjika.in
www.aditiray.com
www.alinamumbailescort.in
www.sonikaa.com/services/
riyamodel.in
mumbai-escorts.info
soonam.in
www.sejalthakkar.com
www.yomika-tandon.in
www.asika.in
www.siyasharma.org/
www.rubikamathur.in
www.mumbaiescortslady.com
www.sexyshe.in
www.indepandentescorts.com
www.saanvichopra.co.in
www.goswamipatel.in
ojaloberoi.in
www.naincy.in
www.sonyamehra.com
www.pinkgrapes.in
anjalitomar.in/
www.nishakohli.com/
sagentia.co.in
mumbai.vivastreet.co.in/escort+mumbai
www.deseescortgirls.in
guides.wonobo.com/mumbai/mumbai-escorts-service/.4299
jasmineescorts.com
www.shalinisethi.com
www.highclassmumbailescort.com
www.vipescortsinmumbai.com
www.mumbaiescorts69.co.in
monikabas.co.in
www.riyasehgal.com
onlycelebrity.in
www.greatmumbaiescorts.com/escort-service-mumbai.html
www.aishamumbailescort.com
www.jennydsouzaescort.com
www.desifun.in
www.siyaescort.co.in
masti—escort.in
www.sofya.in
www.mumbaiwali.in/navi-mumbai-escort-service.php
www.mumbaiwali.in
www.calldaina.com
www.mumbaiescortsservice.co.in
www.escortsgirlsinmumbai.com
www.passionmumbai.escorts.com
www.nehakapoor.in
meerakapoor.com
www.dianamumbaiescorts.net .in
www.allmumbailescort.in
www.rakhiarora.in
www.ritikasingh.com
www.rekhapatil.com
www.mumbaidolls.com
www.piapandey.com
www.mumbaicuteescorts.in
www.mumbaiescortssevice.com
www.onlycelebrity.com
www.meetescortservice.com
onlyoneescorts.com
simirai.org
www.riyamumbaiescorts.in
www.neharana.in
www.tanyaroy.com
www.mumbaihiprofilegirls.in
www.sexyescortsmumbai.in
www.sexymumbai.escorts.com
www.four-seasons—escort.in
www.mumbaiescortsgirl.com
www.vdreamescorts.com
www.passionatemumbaiescorts.in
www.payalmalhotra.in
www.shrutisinha.com
www.juliemumbaiescorts.com
www.indiasexservices.com/mumbai.html
www.mumbai-escorts.co.in
www.aliyamumbaiescorts.net.in
shivaniarora.co.in/escort–service-mumbai.html
www.pinkisingh.com
soyam.in
www.arpitaray.com
www.localescorts.in
www.jennifermumbaiescorts.com
www.yanaroy.com
escorts18.in/mumbai—escorts.html
www.tinamumbaiescorts.com
www.mumbaijannatescorts.com
www.deepikaroy.com
www.nancy.co.in
www.pearlpatel.in
30minsmumbaiescorts.in
www.datinghopes.com
https://www.riyaroy.com/services.html
www.sonalikajain.com
www.zainakapoor.co.in
kavyajain.in
www.kinnu.co.in
exmumbai.in/
www.mansimathur.in/pinkyagarwal
exmumbai.in
www.mansimathur.in/pinkyagarwal
www.devikabatra.in
katlin.in
riyaverma.in
escortsinindia.co/
www.snehamumbaiescorts.in
shimi.in
www.mumbaiescortsforu.com/about
www.chetnagaur.co.in/chetna-gaur.html
www.escortspoint.in
www.rupalikakkar.in
www.hemangisinha.co.in
1escorts.in/location/mumbai.html
www.salini.in/navi-mumbai-independent—escort-service.php
www.salini.in/navi-mumbai-independent-escort-service.php
www.mumbaibella.in
mohitescortservicesmumbai.com
www.anchu.in
www.aliyaroy.co.in
jaanu.co.in/mumbai-escorts-service-call-girls.html
www.andyverma.com
dreams-come-true.biz
feel–better.biz
jellyroll.biz
dreamgirlmumbai.com
role-play.biz
mansi—mathur.com
www.zarinmumbaiescorts.com
mymumbai.escortss.com
www.goldentouchescorts.com
www.mumbaipassion.biz
ishitamalhotra.com
happy-ending.biz
juicylips.biz
www.escortsmumbai.name
www.kirstygbasai.net
www.hiremumbaiescorts.com
www.meeraescorts.com/mumbai-escorts.php
3–5–7star.biz
www.pranjaltiwari.com
www.richagupta.biz
way2heaven.biz
piya.co/
pinkflowers.info
www.beautifulmumbaiescorts.com
www.bestescortsinmumbai.com/charges-html
www.mumbaiescorts.me
www.tanikatondon.com
www.escortsinmumbai.biz
www.escortgirlmumbai.com
www.mumbaicallgrils.com
www.quickescort4u.com
www.mayamalhotra.com
www.legal-escort.com
escortsbaba.com/mumbai-escorts.html
rupa.biz
www.mumbaiescorts.agency/erotic-service-mumbai.html
www.escortscelebrity.com
www.independentescortservicemumbai.com/mumbai%20escort%20servi..
garimachopra.com
kajalgupta.biz
lipkiss.site
aanu.in
bombayescort.in
hotkiran.co.in
khushikapoor.in
joyapatel.in
rici.in
aaditi.in
andheriescorts.org.in
www.jiyapatel.in
spicymumbai.in
rimpyarora.in
lovemaking.co.in
riyadubey.co.in
escortservicesmumbai.in
mumbaiescorts.co.in
midnightprincess.in/
vashiescorts.co.in/
angee.in/
www.rozakhan.in/
www.mumbaiescortsvilla.in/
kylie.co.in/
escortservicemumbai.co.in

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/list-of-blocked-escort-service-websites

Centre for Internet and Society

The Right to Information, The Right to Knowledge (Talk by Sam Pitroda & Carl Malamud)

The Right to Information, The Right to Knowledge

About the speakers

Statement of Solidarity on Freedom of Expression and Safety of Internet Users in Bangladesh

Resources

PUPFIP

News-related/General Coverage

Scientific Culture

Analytical Pieces

Bayh-Dole

Technology Transfer

Scientific Culture

Evaluative Pieces

General Resources

IP Alternatives

Arguments Against the PUPFIP Bill

Summary

How is the legislation unnecessary?

How is the legislation harmful?

Additional resources

Arguments

How is the legislation unnecessary?

1) The Indian government does not have vast reserves of underutilized patents, as the U.S. did in 1980.

2) Technology transfer is very important, but pushing IPRs aggressively is not the best way of ensuring technology transfer.

How is the legislation harmful?

1) Excessive patenting lead to gridlocks and retard innovation.

2) The legislation makes mandatory that which is optional now, and is anyway being followed in many institutions.

3) Copyright, trademark, etc., seem to be covered under the definition of "public funded IP".

4) It will result in a form of double taxation for research, and will increase the consumer cost of all products based on publicly-funded research.

5) It could have unintended consequences of varied kinds, including discouraging fundamental research as well as discouraging industrial research.

6) Non-disclosure requirements in the Bill restricts the dissemination of research within the academic community, and curtails freedom of speech.

7) Exclusive licensing enables restriction on the dissemination of academic research in the marketplace, and increase in cost of products based on public-funded research.

Additional Resources

On the PUPFIP Bill

On Bayh-Dole

PUPFIP Bill

Indian Copyright Act, 1957 (as amended by Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010)

No Civil Society Members in the Cyber Regulations Advisory Committee

Government Not Serious

Breakdown by Stakeholder Groupings

List of Members of Cyber Regulatory Advisory Committee

Digital India: PM Modi to launch BJP's flagship programme likely in July

Regulatory Perspectives on Net Neutrality

1. Why should we regulate the telecom sector?

2. Why should we regulate Net Neutrality? And whom should we regulate?

3. How should we regulate Net Neutrality?

3.1. What concerns does Net Neutrality raise? What harms does it entail?

3.1.1 Net Neutrality and human rights

3.2 What conditions and factors may change these concerns and the regulatory model we should adopt?

3.3 How should we deal with anti-competitive practices?

3.3.1 Lowering Switching Costs

3.3.2 Anti-competitive Practices

3.3.3 Zero-rating

3.3.3.1 Motivations for Zero-Rating

3.3.3.1.1 Corporate Social Responsibility / Incentivizing Customers to Move Up Value Chain

3.3.3.1.2 Passing on ISP Savings / Incentivizing Customers to Lower ISP's Cost

3.3.3.1.3 Unbundling Internet into Services ("Special Packs")

3.3.3.1.4 Earning Additional Revenues from Content Providers

3.3.3.1.5 Market Options for OTT-Paid Zero-Rating

3.3.3.1.6 Other options for zero-rating

3.3.3.2. What kinds of zero-rating are good

3.3.4 Cartels and Oligopoly

3.4 Reasonable Network Management Principles

DOT Order Blocking 857 Websites on Grounds of Decency and Morality

India blocks access to 857 porn sites

Porn ban: People will soon learn to circumvent ISPs and govt orders, expert says

Porn block in India sparks outrage

CIS's Comments on the Draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016

Comments on the Draft Geospatial Information Regulation Bill, 2016

1. Preliminary

2. Centre for Internet and Society

3. Comments

3.1. General Remarks

3.2. Definition of “Geospatial Information” is over-broad, all- encompassing

3.3. Unreasonable regulation of acquiring and end-use of geospatial information

3.4. Removal of journalistic, political, artistic, creative, and speculative depictions of India from the scope of Section 6

3.5. Absence of Publicly Available and Openly Reusable Standardised National Boundary of India

3.6. Remove Requirement for Prior License for Acquire, Dissemination, Publication, or Distribution of Geospatial Information

3.7. Unenforceable jurisdictional scope