Centre for Internet and Society

India’s Supreme Court strikes down law that led to Facebook arrests

praskrishna — 2015-03-27T00:29:08Z

India’s Supreme Court on Tuesday struck down a provision of a law that made it illegal to spread “offensive messages” on electronic devices and resulted in arrests over posts on Facebook and other social media.

The article by Annie Gowen was published in Washington Post on March 24, 2015. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

In a decision hailed as a victory for free speech, Judge Rohinton Fali Nariman ruled that Section 66A of the Information Technology Act was unconstitutional, writing that the vaguely worded legislation had wrongly swept up innocent people and had a “chilling” effect on free speech in the world’s most populous democracy.

“Section 66A is cast so widely that virtually any opinion on any subject would be covered by it,” the judge wrote. “If it is to withstand the test of constitutionality, the chilling effect on free speech would be total.”

India passed the Information Technology Act in 2000, and an amendment that went into effect in 2009 gave authorities broad powers to arrest those who post content deemed “grossly offensive” or false. The offense was punishable by up to three years in jail and a fine.

Sunil Abraham, the executive director of the Centre for Internet and Society in Bangalore, said that the provision was originally intended to protect citizens from electronic spam but that it was used much more broadly.

“Politicians who didn’t like what people were saying about them used it to crack down on online criticism,” he said.

The section has resulted in more than 20 high-profile arrests, including that of a professor who posted an unflattering cartoon of a state political leader and an artist who drew cartoons lampooning the government and Parliament.

The most well-known was the case of two young women arrested in the western town of Palghar after one of them posted a comment on Facebook that said Mumbai should not have been shut down for the funeral of a famous conservative leader. A friend who merely “liked” the post also was arrested. After much outcry, the two were released on bail and the charges eventually dropped.

The case of the “Palghar Girls” inspired a young law student, Shreya Singhal, to take on the law. Singhal became the chief petitioner for the case, joined by other free speech advocates and an Indian information technology firm.

[When — and where — posting the wrong thing to Facebook can get you arrested]

“It’s a big victory,” Singhal said after the ruling. “The Internet is so far-reaching and so many people use it now, it’s very important for us to protect this right.”

In addition, Singhal and other petitioners had argued that a section of the Information Technology Act that allowed the government to block Web sites containing questionable material also was unconstitutional. The court disagreed, however, saying there was a sufficient review process in place to avoid misuse.

Free speech is enshrined in the Indian constitution but has its limits. Books and movies are often banned or censored out of consideration for the sentiments of religious and minority groups.

Last year, a conservative Hindu group persuaded Penguin India to withdraw a book on Hinduism by Wendy Doniger, a professor of religion at the University of Chicago, from the Indian market. And, more recently, the government halted the planned television debut of a documentary on a 2012 gang rape called “India’s Daughter.”

[India blocks film about 2012 New Delhi rape case]

The government, whose attorney had argued in court that the legislature was in the best position to understand the needs of the people, also welcomed the decision.

“The government is committed to free speech. India is a democratic country, and free flow of ideas should be respected. We do not seek to curtail any rights,” said Ravi Shankar Prasad, the minister of communications and information technology. He cautioned, however, that social media users and platforms should show self-restraint.

In recent years, other nations also have sharply increased monitoring of and crackdowns on Web posts perceived as insulting.

Across the Persian Gulf Arab states, dozens of activists have been arrested for social media posts considered insulting to the countries’ rulers or damaging to the national image. In January 2014, an American national was allowed to leave the United Arab Emirates after serving more than eight months in prison for posting a YouTube video spoofing the UAE’s youth culture.

Brian Murphy in Washington contributed to this report. Picture: (Indranil Mukherjee/AFP/Getty Images)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/washington-post-annie-gowen-march-24-2015-indias-sc-strikes-down-law-that-led-to-fb-arrests

Noose tightens on freedom of speech on the Internet

praskrishna — 2015-03-27T01:01:18Z

A worrying trend has emerged in the last few years, where intermediaries around the world are being used as chokepoints to restrict freedom of expression online, and to hold users accountable for content.

The blog post by Gabey Goh was originally published by Digital News Asia and mirrored in Malaymail Online on March 26, 2015. Jyoti Panday gave her inputs.

“These services are all routinely asked to take down content, and their policies for responding are often muddled, heavy-handed, or inconsistent.

“That results in censorship and the limiting of people’s rights,” he told Digital News Asia (DNA) on the sidelines of RightsCon, an Internet and human rights conference hosted in Manila from March 24-25.

This year, the government of France is moving to implement regulation that makes Internet operators “accomplices” of hate-speech offences if they host extremist messages.

In February, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) urged ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) to ensure that domain name registries and registrars “investigate copyright abuse complaints and respond appropriately.”

Closer to home, the Malaysian Government passed a controversial amendment to the Evidence Act 1950 – Section 114A – back in 2012.

Under Section 114A, an Internet user is deemed the publisher of any online content unless proven otherwise. The new legislation also makes individuals and those who administer, operate or provide spaces for online community forums, blogging and hosting services, liable for content published through their services.

Due to the potential negative impact on freedom of expression, a roadmap called the Manila Principles on Internet Liability was launched during RightsCon.

The EFF, Centre for Internet Society India, Article 19, and other global partners unveiled the principles, whose framework outlines clear, fair requirements for content removal requests and details how to minimise the damage a takedown can do.

For example, if content is restricted because it’s unlawful in one country or region, then the scope of the restriction should be geographically limited as well.

The principles also urge adoption of laws shielding intermediaries from liability for third-party content, which encourages the creation of platforms that allow for online discussion and debate about controversial issues.

“Our goal is to protect everyone’s freedom of expression with a framework of safeguards and best practices for responding to requests for content removal,” said Malcolm.

Jyoti Panday from the Centre for Internet and Society India noted that people ask for expression to be removed from the Internet for various reasons, good and bad, claiming the authority of myriad local and national laws.

“It’s easy for important, lawful content to get caught in the crossfire. We hope these principles empower everyone – from governments and intermediaries, to the public – to fight back when online expression is censored,” she said.

The Manila Principles can be summarised in six key points:

Intermediaries should be shielded by law from liability for third-party content
Content must not be required to be restricted without an order by a judicial authority
Requests for restrictions of content must be clear, be unambiguous, and follow due process
Laws and content restriction orders and practices must comply with the tests of necessity and proportionality
Laws and content restriction policies and practices must respect due process
Transparency and accountability must be built in to laws and content restriction policies and practices

“In addition, there is no logic in distinguishing between intellectual property (IP) and other forms of content as in the case in the United States for example, where under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, intermediaries are not liable for third party content but that doesn’t apply to IP,” he added.

The Manila Principles have two main targets: Governments and intermediaries themselves. The coalition, led by EFF, will be approaching governments to present the document and discuss the recommendations on how best to establish an intermediary liability regime.

This includes immunising intermediaries from liability and requiring a court order before any content can be taken down.

With intermediaries, the list includes companies such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, to discuss establishing transparency, responsibility and accountability in any actions taken.

The overall aim with the Manila Principles is to influence policy changes for the better.

Malcolm pointed out that by coincidence, some encouraging developments have taken place in India. On the same day the principles were released, the Indian Supreme Court struck down the notorious Section 66A of the country’s Information Technology Act.

Since 2009, the law had allowed both criminal charges against users and the removal of content by intermediaries based on vague allegations that the content was “grossly offensive or has menacing character,” or that false information was posted “for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will.”

Calling it a “landmark decision,” Malcolm noted that the case shows why the establishment and promotion of the Manila Principles are important.

“Not only is the potential overreach of this provision obvious on its face, but it was, in practice, misused to quell legitimate discussion online, including in the case of the plaintiffs in that case – two young women, one of whom made an innocuous Facebook post mildly critical of government officials, and the other who ‘liked’ it,” he said.

The court however, upheld section 69A of the Act, which allows the Government to block online content; and Section 79(3), which makes intermediaries such as YouTube or Facebook liable for not complying with government orders for censorship of content. — Digital News Asia

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/malaymail-online-gabey-goh-march-26-2015-noose-tightens-on-freedom-of-speech-on-the-internet

The noose tightens on freedom of speech on the Internet

praskrishna — 2015-03-27T01:06:52Z

A WORRYING trend has emerged in the last few years, where intermediaries around the world are being used as chokepoints to restrict freedom of expression online, and to hold users accountable for content.

The blog post by Gabey Goh was published by Digital News Asia on March 26, 2015. Jyoti Panday gave her inputs.

“All communication across the Internet is facilitated by intermediaries: Service providers, social networks, search engines, and more,” said Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) senior global policy analyst Jeremy Malcolm.

“These services are all routinely asked to take down content, and their policies for responding are often muddled, heavy-handed, or inconsistent.

“That results in censorship and the limiting of people’s rights,” he told Digital News Asia (DNA) on the sidelines of RightsCon, an Internet and human rights conference hosted in Manila from March 24-25.

This year, the government of France is moving to implement regulation that makes Internet operators ‘accomplices’ of hate-speech offences if they host extremist messages.

In February, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) urged ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) to ensure that domain name registries and registrars “investigate copyright abuse complaints and respond appropriately.”

Closer to home, the Malaysian Government passed a controversial amendment to the Evidence Act 1950 – Section 114A – back in 2012.

Under Section 114A, an Internet user is deemed the publisher of any online content unless proven otherwise. The new legislation also makes individuals and those who administer, operate or provide spaces for online community forums, blogging and hosting services, liable for content published through their services.

Due to the potential negative impact on freedom of expression, a roadmap called the Manila Principles on Internet Liability was launched during RightsCon.

The EFF, Centre for Internet Society India, Article 19, and other global partners unveiled the principles, whose framework outlines clear, fair requirements for content removal requests and details how to minimise the damage a takedown can do.

For example, if content is restricted because it’s unlawful in one country or region, then the scope of the restriction should be geographically limited as well.

The principles also urge adoption of laws shielding intermediaries from liability for third-party content, which encourages the creation of platforms that allow for online discussion and debate about controversial issues.

“Our goal is to protect everyone’s freedom of expression with a framework of safeguards and best practices for responding to requests for content removal,” said Malcolm.

Jyoti Panday from the Centre for Internet and Society India noted that people ask for expression to be removed from the Internet for various reasons, good and bad, claiming the authority of myriad local and national laws.

“It’s easy for important, lawful content to get caught in the crossfire. We hope these principles empower everyone – from governments and intermediaries, to the public – to fight back when online expression is censored,” she said.

The Manila Principles can be summarised in six key points:

Intermediaries should be shielded by law from liability for third-party content.

Content must not be required to be restricted without an order by a judicial authority.

Requests for restrictions of content must be clear, be unambiguous, and follow due process.

Laws and content restriction orders and practices must comply with the tests of necessity and proportionality.

Laws and content restriction policies and practices must respect due process.

Transparency and accountability must be built in to laws and content restriction policies and practices.

“Right now, different countries have differing levels of protection when it comes to intermediary liability, and we’re saying that there should be expansive protection across all content,” said Malcolm (pic).

“In addition, there is no logic in distinguishing between intellectual property (IP) and other forms of content as in the case in the United States for example, where under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, intermediaries are not liable for third party content but that doesn’t apply to IP,” he added.

The Manila Principles have two main targets: Governments and intermediaries themselves. The coalition, led by EFF, will be approaching governments to present the document and discuss the recommendations on how best to establish an intermediary liability regime.

This includes immunising intermediaries from liability and requiring a court order before any content can be taken down.

With intermediaries, the list includes companies such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, to discuss establishing transparency, responsibility and accountability in any actions taken.

“We recognise that a lot of the time, intermediaries are not waiting for a court order before taking down content, and we’re telling them to avoid removing content unless there is a sufficiently good reason and users have been notified and presented that reason,” said Malcolm.

The overall aim with the Manila Principles is to influence policy changes for the better.

Malcolm pointed out that by coincidence, some encouraging developments have taken place in India. On the same day the principles were released, the Indian Supreme Court struck down the notorious Section 66A of the country’s Information Technology Act.

Since 2009, the law had allowed both criminal charges against users and the removal of content by intermediaries based on vague allegations that the content was “grossly offensive or has menacing character,” or that false information was posted “for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will.”

Calling it a “landmark decision”, Malcolm noted that the case shows why the establishment and promotion of the Manila Principles are important.

“Not only is the potential overreach of this provision obvious on its face, but it was, in practice, misused to quell legitimate discussion online, including in the case of the plaintiffs in that case – two young women, one of whom made an innocuous Facebook post mildly critical of government officials, and the other who ‘liked’ it,” he said.

The court however, upheld section 69A of the Act, which allows the Government to block online content; and Section 79(3), which makes intermediaries such as YouTube or Facebook liable for not complying with government orders for censorship of content.

Gabey Goh reports from RightsCon in Manila at the kind invitation of the South-East Asian Press Alliance or Seapa.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/digital-news-asia-gabey-goh-march-26-2015-noose-tightens-on-freedom-of-speech-on-internet

India's landmark online speech ruling is step toward greater press freedom

praskrishna — 2015-03-29T00:55:35Z

In an historic decision, India's Supreme Court on Tuesday struck down part of a law used to silence criticism and free expression. While this marks a pivotal victory that has been welcomed in many quarters, many challenges remain for press freedom in the country.

The blog post by Sumit Galhotra was published by CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists) on March 28, 2015. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

Section 66A of the Information Technology Act--the vaguely worded provision struck down by the court--criminalized online speech deemed "grossly offensive" or "menacing," along with information for the purpose of causing "annoyance" or "inconvenience." Individuals convicted under the provision could face up to three years in prison. This law, along with others that remain on the books, has allowed India to become a paradise for the offended.

The law was challenged by a public interest litigation mounted by Shreya Singhal, in 2012. Singhal, who had just returned to Delhi from her studies in the U.K., was infuriated at how the law was being used to stifle debate and criticism in her home country, according to reports.

The September 2012 arrest of cartoonist Aseem Trivedi, on a range of charges including one under Section 66A, over his cartoons on politics and corruption, caught Singhal's attention. A few weeks later, she learned of the arrest of 21-year-old Shaheen Dhada, who questioned on Facebook the shutdown of Mumbai following the death of a politician, Singhal said. Dhada's friend, Renu Srinivasan, who had merely "liked" the comment, was arrested under the law. According to news reports, both were charged. These cases sparked a national debate on the space for free expression in the world's largest democracy, and led Singhal to challenge the law, she told reporters.

"It's a big victory," Singhal, who is currently studying law in Delhi, told the media following Tuesday's decision. "The Internet is so far-reaching and so many people use it now, it's very important for us to protect this right."

India is expected to overtake the U.S. as the second largest population of Internet users in the world, behind only China, according to the Internet and Mobile Association of India, a nonprofit group representing the Web and mobile industry. As Internet usage accelerates in India, thanks in large part to the widespread use of mobile devices, there has been an ongoing debate on how best to policeit in a country that has to contend with frequent episodes of violence, civil unrest, and terrorist attacks.


Karuna Nundy, an advocate at the Supreme Court of India who helped the legal challenge, says the country has several laws that are a threat to press freedom. (Geoffrey King)

Lawrence Liang, a lawyer and researcher at the Bangalore-based Alternative Law Forum, an Indian legal research organization, shared in Singhal's welcoming of the decision. "It is important to note that this is the first judgment in decades in which the Supreme Court has struck down a legal provision for violating freedom of speech, and in doing so, it simultaneously builds upon a rich body of free speech cases in India and paves the way for a jurisprudence of free speech in the 21st century, the era of the Internet and social media," he told CPJ.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, an organization that focuses on issues of digital pluralism, called the judgment "a moral victory." He said the decision "furthers free speech jurisprudence in India, but also in all those other countries where an Indian precedent would be important," including many countries in Asia, and places such as South Africa.

As part of the judgment, the court narrowed its reading of Section 79 of the IT Act, under which private parties could submit notice-and-takedown orders directly to Internet intermediaries. The court held that intermediary liability can be pursued only through a court order or other government order, reports said.

Liang told CPJ the judgment falls short in some areas. The Supreme Court's 123-page judgment kept in place Section 69A of the IT Act and Information Technology Rules 2009 that allows the government to block websites if the content in question has the potential to create communal discord, social disorder, or impact India's relations with other countries, according to news reports.

"I would say that if there is missed opportunity in the judgment, it is the clarification of the process of blocking websites. If Section 66A was found to be arbitrary in that its scope covered protected and unprotected speech, then the procedure for blocking websites as laid out in Section 69A is also beset with similar problems," Liang said.

According to Chinmayi Arun, research director at the Centre for Communications Governance at the National Law University in Delhi, the 2009 rules require blocking requests and implementation to be kept confidential. "This means that speakers will have no way of finding out that the government has ordered intermediaries to block their content. Speakers will therefore not be able to question unconstitutional blocking orders before the judiciary--this is a clear interference with their constitutional rights," she told CPJ via email, referring to online users who could fall foul of the law.

Academic in me: As a matter of legal & constitutional analysis, the SC judgment is at its best on #66A, but weaker on 69A & weakest on 79.
-- Pranesh Prakash (@pranesh_prakash) March 24, 2015

For some journalists, the decision highlights how virtually no national party in India, including the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), is a champion of these rights. In a piece for independent news website Scroll, journalist Shivam Vij criticizes the current Narendra Modi-led government for missing an opportunity by not acting decisively to address the problematic law. "It has become routine for India's politicians to avoid taking tough political decisions if they can be left to the courts," he said. "When in power, the BJP is as happy as the Congress to have at its disposal laws that can muzzle voices of dissent."

Trivedi told CPJ he agreed that the previous and current government did little to address abuses of the law. Trivedi, who up until the court decision, faced charges under Section 66A, and had joined Singhal as a petitioner in the case, added: "This decision marks a strong first step." The cartoonist's lawyer, Vijay Hiremath, told CPJ that the Section 66A charge has now been removed, but Trivedi still faces charges under the National Emblem Act.

While the striking down of Section 66A is a step in the right direction, many challenges remain for press freedom in India. Karuna Nundy, an advocate at the Supreme Court of India, who was at the forefront of the legal challenge, told CPJ numerous colonial-era laws, particularly in India's penal code, continue to pose threats to free speech and press freedom in India. CPJ has long documented cases of Indian journalists being threatened with sedition, defamation, and laws that criminalize "outraging religious sentiment."

Actually, next step(s): a review of the constitutionality of sedition, challenge criminal defamation, constitutionalise civil defamation.
-- Gautam Bhatia (@gautambhatia88) March 24, 2015

But Nundy expressed optimism for the challenges ahead for press freedom in India and elsewhere. She said the judgment shows, "If you do the work, you take the trouble, you make the challenge, you can achieve the kinds of values that you stand for. That is the work that is the duty of all us as national citizens and citizens of the world."

[Geoffrey King, CPJ Internet Advocacy Coordinator, contributed to this report from Manila]

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/cpj-march-28-2015-sumit-galhotra-indias-landmark-online-speech-ruling-is-step-toward-greater-press-freedom

Three reasons why 66A verdict is momentous

pranesh — 2015-03-29T16:22:51Z

Earlier this week, the fundamental right to freedom of expression posted a momentous victory. The nation's top court struck down the much-reviled Section 66A of the IT Act — which criminalized communications that are "grossly offensive", cause "annoyance", etc — as "unconstitutionally vague", "arbitrarily, excessively, and disproportionately" encumbering freedom of speech, and likely to have a "chilling effect" on legitimate speech.

The article was published in the Times of India on March 29, 2015.

It also struck down Sec 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act on similar grounds. This is a landmark judgment, as it's possibly the first time since 1973's Bennett Coleman case that statutory law was struck down by the Supreme Court for violating our right to free expression.

The SC also significantly 'read down' the draconian 'Intermediary Guidelines Rules' which specify when intermediaries — website hosts and search engines — may be held liable for what is said online by their users. The SC held that intermediaries should not be forced to decide whether the online speech of their users is lawful or not. While the judgment leaves unresolved many questions — phrases like "grossly offensive", which the SC ruled were vague in 66A, occur in the Rules as well — the court's insistence on requiring either a court or a government order to be able to compel an intermediary to remove speech reduces the 'invisible censorship' that results from privatized speech regulation.

The SC upheld the constitutional validity of Sec 69A and the Website Blocking Rules, noting they had several safeguards: providing a hearing to the website owner, providing written reasons for the blocking, etc. However, these safeguards are not practised by courts. Na Vijayashankar, a legal academic in Bengaluru, found a blogpost of his — ironically, on the topic of website blocking — had been blocked by a Delhi court without even informing him. He only got to find out when I published the government response to my RTI on blocked websites. Last December, Github, Vimeo and some other websites were blocked without being given a chance to contest it. As long as lower courts don't follow "principles of natural justice" and due process, we'll continue to see such absurd website blocking, especially in cases of copyright complaints, without any way of opposing or correcting them.

There are three main outcomes of this judgment. First is the legal victory: SC's analysis while striking down 66A is a masterclass of legal clarity and a significant contribution to free speech jurisprudence. This benefits not only future cases in India, but all jurisdictions whose laws are similar to ours, such as Bangladesh, Malaysia and the UK.

Second is the moral victory for free speech. Sec 66A was not merely a badly written law, it became a totem of governmental excess and hubris. Even when political parties realized they had passed 66A without a debate, they did not apologize to the public and revise it; instead, they defended it. Only a few MPs, such as P Rajeev and Baijayant Panda, challenged it. Even the NDA, which condemned the law in the UPA era, supported it in court. By striking down this totem, the SC has restored the primacy of the Constitution. For instance, while this ruling doesn't directly affect the censor board's arbitrary rules, it does morally undermine them.

Third, this verdict shows that given proper judicial reading, the Indian constitutional system of allowing for a specific list of purposes for which reasonable restrictions are permissible, might in fact be as good or even better in some cases, than the American First Amendment. The US law baldly states that Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or of the press. However, the US Supreme Court has never held the opinion that freedom of speech is absolute. The limits of Congress's powers are entirely judicially constructed, and till the 1930s, the US court never struck down a law for violating freedom of speech, and has upheld laws banning obscenity, public indecency, offensive speech in public, etc. However, in India, the Constitution itself places hard limits on Parliament's powers, and also, since the first amendment to our Constitution, allows the judiciary to determine if the restrictions placed by Parliament are "reasonable". In the judgment Justice Nariman quotes Mark Antony from Julius Caesar. He could also have quoted Cassius: "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves." Judges like Justice Nariman show the constitutional limits to free speech can be read both narrowly and judiciously: we can no longer complain about the Constitution as the primary reason we have so many restrictions on freedom of expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/times-of-india-march-29-2015-pranesh-prakash-three-reasons-why-66a-is-momentous

SECTION 66A: DELETE

praskrishna — 2015-03-30T01:32:18Z

The Supreme Court has killed a law that allowed the Government to control social media. What’s the Net worth of freedom hereafter?

The article by Kumar Anshuman was published in the Open Magazine on March 27, 2015. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

It was in 2009 that Section 66A was added as an amendment to India’s IT Act by the then UPA Government, but it took three years before it came to the notice of Shreya Singhal, a student of Law at Delhi University. By then, the Section had already earned itself a fair amount of notoriety for how much leeway it provided for the police and politicians to abuse the law.

The first time was in September 2011 when Musafir Baitha, a famous poet and government employee in Bihar, was suspended from his job because he criticised the state government on Facebook. An uproar followed, as people realised that freedom of speech in social media could now be construed as a criminal activity. Ambikesh Mahapatra, a professor at Jadavpur Unversity, became a target of the Mamata Banerjee government in April 2012 when he made cartoons of her. In September 2012, cartoonist Aseem Trivedi was arrested in Mumbai for a caricature of corruption under the UPA. But the case that caught Shreya Singhal’s attention was perhaps the most shocking of all. In November 2012, after Shiv Sena founder Bal Thackeray’s death, Shaheen Dhada, a Thane resident, posted a comment on her Facebook page criticising the near-total shutdown of Mumbai for the funeral. She wrote that Mumbai was shut not in respect, but fear, and that a leader should earn respect instead of forcing it out of people. Her friend Renu Srinivasan ‘liked’ this post. Hours later, both were arrested and booked under Section 66A. "I was shocked when I heard of this news," Singhal says, "I went and checked the post and there was nothing which could have provoked such an outrage." Her mother, Manali Singhal, a lawyer at the Supreme Court, advised her to file a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) against the Section.

The case continued for two years in the Supreme Court, while arbitrary arrests continued to be made. The UPA Government first defended 66A in court, taking the position that the current NDA Government took as well. It argued that the law would be used only in extreme cases where a person overreaches his or her online freedom to curtail the rights of others. Unconvinced, on 24 March, the apex court struck 66A down, saying that it could not allow such a law to exist on mere government assurances. The Court found several terms in the Act, such as ‘grossly offensive’ and ‘insult’, that were not clearly defined and could be interpreted arbitrarily to suit one’s convenience. ‘It is clear that Section 66A is unconstitutionally vague and it takes away a guaranteed freedom,’ observed the bench of Justice J Chelameswar and Justice Rohinton Nariman.

"We can celebrate the scrapping of Section 66A, but with caution," says Sunil Abraham, executive director at The Centre for Internet & Society in Bangalore. "[As for] those who are booked under Section 66A, the police also imposes different sections of the Indian Penal Code to justify their arrest." There are examples to support his statement, a recent one being the arrest of a Bareilly-based student, Gulrez Khan, who had posted a picture on Facebook of UP minister Azam Khan along with some derogatory comments about Hindus that he allegedly made. Gulrez Khan denied the comments, saying that his image was being maligned. The boy was arrested and booked. "People are making it out as a moment of triumph against the UP government. The fact is this boy had been arrested under Section 153A and 504 of the IPC along with Section 66A of the IT Act. We have said this even in the Supreme Court," says Gaurav Bhatia, a spokesperson of the Samajwadi Party and also a senior advocate.

But the import of scrapping Section 66A is that there is now one less law that can be misused, one that specifically stifles online freedom. "It’s an excellent judgment," says Lawrence Liang of Alternative Law Forum, Bangalore. “It couldn’t have been better than this. The fact that the apex court termed it ‘vague and overreaching’ signifies how important it was to scrap this."

Once the 122-page judgment arrived, there was a rush to welcome it—even by those who were responsible for Section 66A to begin with. Former Congress minister Kapil Sibal was one of them. "The Supreme Court has scrapped Section 66A to allow freedom of speech in cyberspace and we should welcome it,” he said. His former cabinet colleague P Chidambaram went to the extent of saying that it was poorly drafted. But the Congress as a party also warned of the possible misuse of this freedom, saying that it had woven various safeguards into Section 66A, including the condition that an arrest could only be made after an officer of the level of Inspector General or Superintendent of Police had okayed it. "The Supreme Court, it appears, has not found the safeguards sufficient," says Congress spokesperson and senior lawyer Abhishek Manu Singhvi. “It is now up to the current Government [to decide] how to strike the right balance between freedom of speech on one hand and [prevention of] abuse and hounding of groups or individuals through obscene or incorrigibly false information [on the other] to deter unbridled defamation in cyberspace." The Left parties, which were supporting the UPA Government back when Section 66A was imposed, have expressed happiness over the verdict. “The draconian provision of 66A was used to arrest people who express dissenting views against the Government and the State and to suppress criticism of those in power,” says senior CPM leader Sitaram Yechury.

The NDA Government has also welcomed the verdict. "The Government absolutely respects the right to freedom of speech and expression on social media and has no intention of curbing it," says Ravi Shankar Prasad, Union Minister for Information Technology.

But the scrapping of the Section leaves the Government with very little power to act against real abuse of online freedoms. Like Congress leader Milind Deora says, "An unregulated internet can be more dangerous than a regulated one." This argument is easily countered: there are enough provisions in existing laws that prevent a person from misusing freedom of speech. Says Apar Gupta, a senior lawyer, “Section 66A was a bailable section and arrests were made only with further imposition of IPC acts." While Article 19 (1) of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, at the same time Article 19 (2) provides a list of reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech. This is enough, experts believe, to curtail misuse of the internet. The court judgment also grants the Centre the freedom to enact any other law specific to the internet, provided it does not violate the provisions of freedom of speech as laid down by the Constitution of India.

This does, however, put a question mark on the necessity of Section 66A to begin with, if existing laws were quite enough to address freedom-of- speech abuses. "Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000, was enacted to prevent online abuse and hounding of groups and individuals, check the propagation of obscene or incorrigibly false information with the intent to create social divides and unrest, and deter unbridled defamation in cyberspace. This Act came into effect in 2008 when social media was yet evolving," says Singhvi. But experts disagree with this argument. "It is a perfect case of confusion and mixing up of facts,” says Sunil Abraham. “The purpose of this law was to curb unsolicited messages, spamming and harassing someone through fake identities in the internet space." He says that the Government claimed to borrow law provisions from the US, Canada and other countries, but the legislation was so poorly drafted that it didn’t have any teeth for action against spammers. "Even words like ‘unsolicited commercial mails’ were not included in the Act and that is the reason not a single person has been arrested in India for spam mails even after this Act came into being."

A section of the Indian legal fraternity believes that the country’s apex court should also have made a statement about the problem of spamming and harassment on the internet.

But there is bad news too. The same judgment that struck down Section 66A has upheld Section 69A of the IT Act as constitutionally valid. This allows the Government to block any website which it deems a direct threat to public order and security that might spread propaganda.

"In this case, the Government [can decide] to block a website without notifying [it with any] reason for it. If I am an internet user who wants to visit this site, I am also not notified why that website has been taken down. It is just the whims and fancies of a few officials in the Government, what to block and what not," says Apar Gupta. Using the section, the Union Government had blocked 32 websites just this January, saying that anti- national groups were using these websites for ‘jihadi propaganda’.

All major democracies have some form of legal net regulation. "Laws in foreign jurisdictions vary widely as per the guarantees of civil rights afforded to citizens in any legal system," adds Gupta. "The legislations of the United States, which borrowed certain phrases in Section 66A, have already been declared unconstitutional. In the United Kingdom, similar phrases have come under fierce critique and have been limited by guidelines issued by the office of prosecutions. In these jurisdictions, as in India, existing criminal law applies equally to online speech as much as to offline."

Also, while social media enthusiasts rejoice over their first big victory against restrictions on online freedom of speech, the internet is still a matter of great concern for any government, thanks to its reach and influence. The Union Government walks a thin line while dealing with instances of abuse on social media, and many believe India needs an IT Act drafted in proper consultation with all stakeholders.

For now, a young law student has found a place in the legal history of India. "It will always be remembered as Shreya Singhal vs Union of India," says Singhal.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT

‘66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc. Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device:

Any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
Any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device;
Any electronic mail or message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages...

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine’

SUPREME COURT ORDER

‘In conclusion, we may summarise what has been held by us: Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is struck down in its entirety being violative of Article 19(1)(a) and not saved under Article 19(2)’

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/open-magazine-march-27-2015-kumar-anshuman-section-66a-delete

You can still get into trouble for online posts: Digital law experts

praskrishna — 2015-04-02T01:44:32Z

The internet in India is freer now, but individuals could still to get into trouble for online posts, say digital media and law experts. Hailing the Supreme Court judgment on Tuesday as a landmark verdict for free speech in India, experts who have closely read the judgment say there is much to be careful about too.

The article by Kim Arora was published in the Times of India on March 30, 2015. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

The scrapping of the contentious section doesn't mean that one has a free run, cautions Sunil Abraham, executive director, Centre for Internet and Society. An online comment can still land you in jail, he says.

"The judgement in no way means that speech on online platforms will be unregulated now. You can still be charged for pornography or voyeurism under the IT Act. There are many provisions in the Constitution and Indian Penal Code that the government can use to target people it wants to go after. You can be still charged for hate speech or defamation - which is a criminal offence in India - for an online comment," says Abraham.

While lawyer Apar Gupta found the judgment to be forward-looking, he pointed to Para 98 of the 120 page judgment, which addresses Article 14 of the Constitution regarding "discrimination" and talks of the distinction between online and other media.

"We make it clear that there is an intelligible differentia between speech on the internet and other mediums of communication for which separate offences can certainly be created by legislation," says the judgment. "The court has indicated that special offences can be created for the internet. Constant vigilance is the price of liberty. We need to constantly engage with these issues to keep the internet free," says Gupta.

The judgment has been praised for making a distinction between online posts and messages that pertain to advocacy, discussion and incitement. "This is an excellent decision. The SC is saying that no matter what the medium, we stand for constitutional rights. The judges were ready to listen, and ready to share their experience of using the internet also," says Mishi Choudhary, legal director at Software Freedom Law Center, adding, "It was a lost opportunity for the Modi government. They should have gotten rid of section 66 A themselves."

Section 69A of the Act, which stands as is, allows non-transparent blocking of online content in the interest of "sovereignty and integrity of India, defense of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign states or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above." However, Choudhary says that since it is a narrowly-drawn provision, it ensures more safeguards.

"It will be noticed that Section 69A unlike Section 66A is a narrowly drawn provision with several safeguards. First and foremost, blocking can only be resorted to where the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do. Secondly, such necessity is relatable only to some of the subjects set out in Article 19(2). Thirdly, reasons have to be recorded in writing in such blocking order so that they may be assailed in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution," she says.

Going forward, the government plan of action should focus on balancing safety and freedom on the internet, says Rajya Sabha MP Rajeev Chandrasekhar, who himself was one of the petitioners. "The final endgame has to be one where we have a new law or even a new IT Act which meets the twin objectives of a safe and free internet. The two need not be mutually exclusive," he says.

(With inputs from Anand J in Bengaluru)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/times-of-india-march-30-2015-kim-arora-you-can-still-get-into-trouble-for-online-posts

India High Court: No Takedown Requests On Social Sites Without Court, Gov't Order

praskrishna — 2015-04-03T06:18:52Z

Indian police will no longer be able to threaten Internet users and online intermediaries with jail merely on the basis of a complaint that they have posted “offensive” posts online.

The blog post by Madhur Singh was published in Bloomberg BNA on March 25, 2015. Geetha Hariharan gave her inputs.

Following a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India March 24, law enforcement agencies will be able to take action in such cases only after an order has been obtained from a court or the government (Singhal v.Union of India, India Sup. Ct., 3/24/15).

The court struck down in its entirety Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which authorized criminal penalties for sending “offensive” messages through electronic communication services. Opponents of the measure said the section defined “offensive” very vaguely and broadly, and that cases of arrest under the section frequently made headlines.

Freedom of speech activists and Internet-based businesses welcomed the judgment as a boost for civil liberties, freedom of speech and a conducive business environment for an entire gamut of online businesses.

The judgment is good news for intermediaries such as Facebook Inc. and the India-based review site MouthShut.com, both of which have been repeatedly inundated with takedown notices based on complaints against “offensive” posts.

Offensive Posts Were Actionable Under Section 66A

Section 66A, added to the Information Technology Act of 2000 through an amendment in February 2009, prescribed imprisonment of up to three years and a fine for anyone who sends via a computer resource or communication device:

(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character;
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device; or
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages.

A supporting Section 79(3)(b) stated that “upon receiving actual knowledge, or on being notified by the appropriate government or its agency that any information, data or communication link residing in or connected to a computer resource controlled by the intermediary is being used to commit the unlawful act,” the intermediary would have to “expeditiously remove or disable access to that material or that resource.”

Together, these sections put ordinary Internet users at risk for arrest for simply posting online and obligated intermediaries such as Twitter Inc., Facebook, MouthShut.com and others to take down content simply pursuant to a complaint.

Earlier this month, Facebook revealed statistics indicating that India is second on its global list of governments demanding takedowns.

Court Removes Intermediaries' Discretion

Shwetasree Majumder, partner at Fidus Law Chambers, told Bloomberg BNA March 25 that after this decision, any blocking of content can now only take place via a reasoned order after complying with several procedural safeguards, including a hearing to the originator and intermediary either by the designated
officer or pursuant to an order passed by a competent court.

“So intermediaries like Google, Facebook etc. are no longer required to judge as to whether the take down notices received by them contain legitimate requests or not,” she wrote in an e-mail. “As an acknowledgement that a true intermediary should not concern itself with the merits of the content posted by third parties, the court takes away the intermediary's discretion as to what content must remain and what must go.”

Geetha Hariharan, program officer at the Centre for Internet and Society, told Bloomberg BNA that after “reading down” Section 79, the Supreme Court “has relieved the intermediary of its responsibility to judge the lawfulness of content. Now, the intermediary will lose immunity under Section 79(3)(b) (and be liable
to prosecution or penalty) only if it does not take content down after receiving ‘actual knowledge of a court order or government notification' requiring takedown of content.”

Prior to the judgment, an intermediary was required to judge whether a takedown notice concerned unlawful content on its website, which would constitute “actual knowledge” under the section. If the intermediary made an affirmative determination, it was required to take the content down or lose immunity under Section 79(3)(b).

Supreme Court Strikes Down 66A

Momentum against Section 66A built up over the last three years, particularly after law student Shreya Singhal filed a challenge in the Supreme Court after two Mumbai women were arrested and put in jail for 10 days in 2012 for Facebook posts against a shutdown of Mumbai city following a politician's death.

A Supreme Court bench comprising Justices Jasti Chelameswar and Rohinton F. Nariman heard ten such cases together, and ruled March 24 that Section 66A was unconstitutional as it directly affected the right of the public to know. Holding that Section 66A was “open ended, undefined, and vague” so that “virtually any opinion on any subject would be covered by it, as any serious opinion dissenting with the mores of the day would be caught within its net,” the court struck it down in its entirety.

The court said that Rule 3(4) of the Intermediaries (Guidelines) Rules, 2011, which pertains to an intermediary disabling access to material that is “known” to be violative of Rule 3(2), needed to be read down in the same manner as Section 79(3)(b).

The court, however, upheld Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, which gives the government the power to block web content if doing so is in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity or security of India.

Impact on Intermediary Liability

Overall, Majumder said that intermediary liability now stands significantly watered down. One particular case this might impact is the currently pending Super Cassettes India Ltd. v MySpace Inc. case before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, which is considering the validity of the high threshold of intermediary liability prescribed by a single judge in copyright infringement cases.

Hariharan wrote in an e-mail that while intermediaries such as Internet service providers (ISPs) or content hosts may “choose” to take down content when they receive a private takedown notice, they don't “need” to do so to remain immune under Section 79(3)(b) or Rule 3(4) of the Intermediaries Guidelines.

“This reduces uncertainty in intermediary liability in India. It will also hopefully keep intermediaries from taking down content in an overbroad manner to escape liability,” Hariharan said, adding that the government nevertheless continues to have the ability to criminalize online acts. For instance, Sections 66B
to 67B of the IT Act define and criminalize different online conduct. Additionally, sections of the Indian Penal Code that criminalize speech acts (e.g., Sections 295A and 153A for incitement; Section 292 for obscenity) have also been applied to online acts in the past.

The Internet & Mobile Association of India said in a statement on its website March 24 that the judgment will mark a new phase for the growth and evolution of the Internet in India. While Internet users will no longer fear illegal censorship or harassment, it said that “online businesses, ranging from established international companies to small Indian startups, will be able to take advantage of a more conducive business environment.”

The IAMAI added that the judgment will be especially helpful to smaller companies such as Mouthshut.com that will “now not be harassed by the frivolous and mal-intentioned notices of take down.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bloomberg-bna-march-25-2015-madhur-singh-india-high-court-no-takedown-requests-on-social-sites-without-court-govt-order

India tops list of content restrictions requests, says Facebook

praskrishna — 2015-04-03T17:01:53Z

India has again topped the list of content restriction requests in the second half of 2014 with over 5,800 requests recorded in Facebook's Government Requests Report released on Sunday.

The article by Neha Alawadhi was published in the Economic Times on March 17, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

"Overall, we continue to see an increase in government requests for data and content restrictions. The amount of content restricted for violating local law increased by 11% over the previous half, to 9,707 pieces of content restricted, up from 8,774," said Monika Bickert, Facebook's head of global policy management, and Chris Sonderby, deputy general counsel, in a statement on the social networking website.

Facebook saw a rise in content restriction requests from countries like Turkey and Russia, while requests from countries like Pakistan came down. The number of content restriction requests from Pakistan came down to 54 in the second half of 2014 from 1,773 in the first half. The number of content restriction requests from India rose to 5,832 from 4,960 in the first half.

India has been the top requestor for content restrictions in the past one and a half years, and the number of these requests and for user account data from the country have consistently been on the rise.

Facebook said that while the number of government requests for user account data remained relatively flat in the six-month period, there was an increase in data requests from "governments such as India, and decline in requests from countries such as the United States and Germany".

India made 5,473 requests for user account data in the six months ending December 2014, second only to the United States, which made 14,274 requests in the same period. About 45% of the requests made by India led to Facebook producing some data, according to the report, while 79% of the requests made by the US were complied with.

"Of course, the figures are alarming... But it would have been better if Facebook had also given us more information on the kind of data that was being asked for. Now we only have consolidated figures. So what kind of data was asked for, that would have been more useful," said counsel for the Software Freedom Law Centre.

India is the second largest market for Facebook, with 112 million users until last year, second only to the United States. According to Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society, "the number of content restriction requests are not only high on an absolute number, but even on a per-user basis".

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/economic-times-march-17-2015-neha-alawadhi-india-tops-list-of-content-restrictions-requests-says-facebook

Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt

sunil — 2015-04-17T01:44:39Z

Much confusion has resulted from the Section 66A verdict. Some people are convinced that online speech is now without any reasonable restrictions under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution. This is completely false.

There are many other provisions within the IT Act that still regulate speech online, for example the section on obscenity (Sec. 67) and also the data protection provision (Sec. 43A). Additionally there are provisions within the Indian Penal Code and other Acts that regulate speech both online and offline. For example, defamation remains a criminal offence under the IPC (Sec. 499), and disclosing information about children in a manner that lowers their reputation or infringes their privacy is also prohibited under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (Sec. 23).

Others are afraid that the striking down of Section 66A results in a regulatory vacuum where it will be possible for bad actors to wreak havoc online because the following has been left unaddressed by the IT Act.

Criminal Intimidation: The phrase "criminal intimidation" was included in Sec. 66A(b), but the requirement was that intimidation should be carried out using "information which he knows to be false". Sec. 506 of the IPC which punishes criminal intimidation does not have this requirement and is therefore a better legal route for affected individuals, even though the maximum punishment is a year shorter than the three years possible under the IT Act.
Cyber-stalking: A new section for stalking - Sec. 345 D - was added into the IPC in 2013 which also recognised cyber stalking. The definition within Sec.345D is more precise compared to the nebulous phrasing in Sec. 66A, which read - "monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication, commits the offence of stalking".
Phishing: Sec. 66A (c) dealt with punishment to people who "deceive or mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages". Sec.66D, which will be the operative section after this verdict, deals with "cheating by impersonation" and forms a more effective safeguard against phishing.

Cyber-bulling of children is arguably left unaddressed. Most importantly, spam, the original intention behind 66A, now cannot be tackled using any existing provision of the law. However, the poorly drafted section made it impossible for law enforcement to crack down on spammers. A 2005 attempt by the ITU to produce model law for spam based on a comparative analysis of national laws resulted in several important best practices that were ignored during the 2008 Amendment of the Act. For example, the definition of spam must cover the following characteristics - mass, unsolicited and commercial. All of which was missing in 66A.

Good quality law must be drafted by an open, participatory process where all relevant stakeholders are consulted and responded to before bills are introduced in parliament.

A scanned copy of the article was published in the Deccan Chronicle on March 26, 2015.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/deccan-chronicle-march-26-2015-sunil-abraham-fear-uncertainty-doubt

Shreya Singhal and 66A

sunil — 2015-04-19T08:09:42Z

Most software code has dependencies. Simple and reproducible methods exist for mapping and understanding the impact of these dependencies. Legal code also has dependencies --across court orders and within a single court order. And since court orders are not produced using a structured mark-up language, experts are required to understand the precedential value of a court order.

The article was published in the Economic and Political Weekly Vol-L No.15. Vidushi Marda, programme officer at the Centre for Internet and Society, was responsible for all the research that went into this article. PDF version here.

As a non–lawyer and engineer, I cannot authoritatively comment on the Supreme Court’s order in Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015) on sections of the Information Technology Act of 2000, so I have tried to summarise a variety of views of experts in this article. The Shreya Singhal order is said to be unprecedented at least for the last four decades and also precedent setting as its lucidity, some believe, will cause a ripple effect in opposition to a restrictive understanding of freedom of speech and expression, and an expansiveness around reasonable restrictions. Let us examine each of the three sections that the bench dealt with.

The Section in Question

Section 66A of the IT Act was introduced in a hastily-passed amendment. Unfortunately, the language used in this section was a pastiche of outdated foreign laws such as the UK Communications Act of 2003, Malicious Communications Act of 1988 and the US Telecommunications Act, 1996.¹ Since the amendment, this section has been misused to make public examples out of innocent, yet uncomfortable speech, in order to socially engineer all Indian netizens into self-censorship.²

Summary: The Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act in its entirety holding that it was not saved by Article 19(2) of the Constitution on account of the expressions used in the section, such as "annoying," "grossly offensive," "menacing,", "causing annoyance." The Court justified this by going through the reasonable restrictions that it considered relevant to the arguments and testing them against S66A. Apart from not falling within any of the categories for which speech may be restricted, S66A was struck down on the grounds of vagueness, over-breadth and chilling effect. The Court considered whether some parts of the section could be saved, and then concluded that no part of S66A was severable and declared the entire section unconstitutional. When it comes to regulating speech in the interest of public order, the Court distinguished between discussion, advocacy and incitement. It considered the first two to fall under the freedom of speech and expression granted under Article 19(1)(a), and held that it was only incitement that attracted Article 19(2).

Between Speech and Harm

Gautam Bhatia, a constitutional law expert, has an optimistic reading of the judgment that will have value for precipitating the ripple effect. According to him, there were two incompatible strands of jurisprudence which have been harmonised by collapsing tendency into imminence.³ The first strand, exemplified by Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP⁴ and Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar,⁵ imported an older and weaker American standard, that is, the tendency test, between the speech and public order consequences. The second strand exemplified byRam Manohar Lohia vs State of UP,⁶ S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram,⁷ andArup Bhuyan vs Union of India,⁸ all require greater proximity between the speech and the disorder anticipated. In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court held that at the stage of incitement, the reasonable restrictions will step in to curb speech that has a tendency to cause disorder. Other experts are of the opinion that Justice Nariman was doing no such thing, and was only sequentially applying all the tests for free speech that have been developed within both these strands of precedent. In legal activist Lawrence Liang's analysis, "Ramjilal Modi was decided by a seven judge bench and Kedarnath by a constitutional bench. As is often the case in India, when subsequent benches of a lower strength want to distinguish themselves from older precedent but are unable to overrule them, they overcome this constraint through a doctrinal development by stealth. This is achieved by creative interpretations that chip away at archaic doctrinal standards without explicitly discarding them."⁹

Compatibility with US Jurisprudence

United States (US) jurisprudence has been imported by the Indian Supreme Court in an inconsistent manner. Some judgments hold that the American first amendment harbours no exception and hence is incompatible with Indian jurisprudence, while other judgments have used American precedent when convenient. Indian courts have on occasion imported an additional restriction beyond the eight available in 19(2)-the ground of public interest, best exemplified by the cases of K A Abbas¹⁰ and Ranjit Udeshi.¹¹ The bench in its judgment-which has been characterised by Pranesh Prakash as a masterclass in free speech jurisprudence¹²-clarifies that while the American first amendment jurisprudence is applicable in India, the only area where a difference is made is in the "sub serving of general public interest" made under the US law. This eloquent judgment will hopefully instruct judges in the future on how they should import precedent from American free speech jurisprudence.

Article 14 Challenge

The Article 14 challenge brought forward by the petitioners contended that Section 66A violated their fundamental right to equality because it differentiated between offline and online speech in terms of the length of maximum sentence, and was hence unconstitutional. The Court held that an intelligible differentia, indeed, did exist. It found so on two grounds. First, the internet offered people a medium through which they can express views at negligible or no cost. Second, the Court likened the rate of dissemination of information on the internet to the speed of lightning and could potentially reach millions of people all over the world. Before Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court had already accepted medium-specific regulation. For example in K A Abbas, the Court made a distinction between films and other media, stating that the impact of films on an average illiterate Indian viewer was more profound than other forms of communication. The pessimistic reading of Shreya Singhal is that Parliament can enact medium-specific law as long as there is an intelligible differentia which could even be a technical difference-speed of transmission. However, the optimistic interpretation is that medium-specific law can only be enacted if there are medium-specific harms, e g, phishing, which has no offline equivalent. If the executive adopts the pessimistic reading, then draconian sections like 66A will find their way back into the IT Act. Instead, if they choose the optimistic reading, they will introduce bills that fill the regulatory vacuum that has been created by the striking down of S66A, that is, spam and cyberbullying.

Section 79

Section 79 was partially read down. This section, again introduced during the 2008 amendment, was supposed to give legal immunity to intermediaries for third party content by giving a quick redressal for those affected by providing a mechanism for takedown notices in the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules notified in April 2011. But the section and rules had enabled unchecked invisible censorship¹³ in India and has had a demonstrated chilling effect on speech¹⁴ because of the following reasons:

One, there are additional unconstitutional restrictions on speech and expression. Rule 3(2) required a standard "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" that would have to be incorporated by all intermediaries. Under these rules, users are prohibited from hosting, displaying, uploading, modifying, publishing, transmitting, updating or sharing any information that falls into different content categories, a majority of which are restrictions on speech which are completely out of the scope of Article 19(2). For example, there is an overly broad category which contains information that harms minors in any way. Information that "belongs to another person and to which the user does not have any right to" could be personal information or could be intellectual property. A much better intermediary liability provision was introduced into the Copyright Act with the 2013 amendment. Under the Copyright Act, content could be reinstated if the takedown notice was not followed up with a court order within 21 days.¹⁵ A counter-proposal drafted by the Centre for Internet and Society for "Intermediary Due Diligence and Information Removal," has a further requirement for reinstatement that is not seen in the Copyright Act.¹⁶

Two, a state-mandated private censorship regime is created. You could ban speech online without approaching the court or the government. Risk-aversive private intermediaries who do not have the legal resources to subjectively determine the legitimacy of a legal claim err on the side of caution and takedown content.

Three, the principles of natural justice are not observed by the rules of the new censorship regime. The creator of information is not required to be notified nor given a chance to be heard by the intermediary. There is no requirement for the intermediary to give a reasoned decision.

Four, different classes of intermediaries are all treated alike. Since the internet is not an uniform assemblage of homogeneous components, but rather a complex ecosystem of diverse entities, the different classes of intermediaries perform different functions and therefore contribute differently to the causal chain of harm to the affected person. If upstream intermediaries like registrars for domain names are treated exactly like a web-hosting service or social media service then there will be over-blocking of content.

Five, there are no safeguards to prevent abuse of takedown notices. Frivolous complaints could be used to suppress legitimate expressions without any fear of repercussions and given that it is not possible to expedite reinstatement of content, the harm to the creator of information may be irreversible if the information is perishable. Transparency requirements with sufficient amounts of detail are also necessary given that a human right was being circumscribed. There is no procedure to have the removed information reinstated by filing a counter notice or by appealing to a higher authority.

The judgment has solved half the problem by only making intermediaries lose immunity if they ignore government orders or court orders. Private takedown notices sent directly to the intermediary without accompanying government orders or courts order no longer have basis in law. The bench made note of the Additional Solicitor General's argument that user agreement requirements as in Rule 3(2) were common practice across the globe and then went ahead to read down Rule 3(4) from the perspective of private takedown notices. One way of reading this would be to say that the requirement for standardised "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" remains. The other more consistent way of reading this part of the order in conjunction with the striking down of 66A would be to say those parts of the user agreement that are in violation of Article 19(2) have also been read down.

This would have also been an excellent opportunity to raise the transparency requirements both for the State and for intermediaries: for (i) the person whose speech is being censored, (ii) the persons interested in consuming that speech, and (iii) the general public. It is completely unclear whether transparency in the case of India has reduced the state appetite for censorship. Transparency reports from Facebook, Google and Twitter claim that takedown notices from the Indian government are on the rise.¹⁷ However, on the other hand, the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEITY) claims that government statistics for takedowns do not match the numbers in these transparency reports.¹⁸ The best way to address this uncertainty would be to require each takedown notice and court order to be made available by the State, intermediary and also third-party monitors of free speech like the Chilling Effects Project.

Section 69A

The Court upheld S69A which deals with website blocking, and found that it was a narrowly-drawn provision with adequate safeguards, and, hence, not constitutionally infirm. In reality, unfortunately, website blocking usually by internet service providers (ISPs) is an opaque process in India. Blocking under S69A has been growing steadily over the years. In its latest response to an RTI (right to information)¹⁹ query from the Software Freedom Law Centre, DEITY said that 708 URLs were blocked in 2012, 1,349 URLs in 2013, and 2,341 URLs in 2014. On 30 December 2014 alone, the centre blocked 32 websites to curb Islamic State of Iraq and Syria propaganda, among which were "pastebin" websites, code repository (Github) and generic video hosting sites (Vimeo and Daily Motion).²⁰ Analysis of leaked block lists and lists received as responses to RTI requests have revealed that the block orders are full of errors (some items do not exist, some items are not technically valid web addresses), in some cases counter speech which hopes to reverse the harm of illegal speech has also been included, web pages from mainstream media houses have also been blocked and some URLs are base URLs which would result in thousands of pages getting blocked when only a few pages might contain allegedly illegal content.²¹

Pre-decisional Hearing

The central problem with the law as it stands today is that it allows for the originator of information to be isolated from the process of censorship. The Website Blocking Rules provide that all "reasonable efforts" must be made to identify the originator or the intermediary who hosted the content. However, Gautam Bhatia offers an optimistic reading of the judgment, he claims that the Court has read into this "or" and made it an "and"-thus requiring that the originator must also be notified of blocks when he or she can be identified.²²

Transparency

Usually, the reasons for blocking a website are unknown both to the originator of material as well as those trying to access the blocked URL. The general public also get no information about the nature and scale of censorship unlike offline censorship where the court orders banning books and movies are usually part of public discourse. In spite of the Court choosing to leave Section 69A intact, it stressed the importance of a written order for blocking, so that a writ may be filed before a high court under Article 226 of the Constitution. While citing this as an existing safeguard, the Court seems to have been under the impression that either the intermediary or the originator is normally informed, but according to Apar Gupta, a lawyer for the People's Union for Civil Liberties, "While the rules indicate that a hearing is given to the originator of the content, this safeguard is not evidenced in practice. Not even a single instance exists on record for such a hearing."²³ Even worse, block orders have been unevenly implemented by ISPs with variations across telecom circles, connectivity technologies, making it impossible for anyone to independently monitor and reach a conclusion whether an internet resource is inaccessible as a result of a S69A block order or due to a network anomaly.

Rule 16 under S69A requires confidentiality with respect to blocking requests and complaints, and actions taken in that regard. The Court notes that this was argued to be unconstitutional, but does not state their opinion on this question. Gautam Bhatia holds the opinion that this, by implication, requires that requests cannot be confidential. Chinmayi Arun, from the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi, one of the academics supporting the petitioners, holds the opinion that it is optimism carried too far to claim that the Court noted the challenge to Rule 16 but just forgot about it in a lack of attention to detail that is belied by the rest of the judgment.

Free speech researchers and advocates have thus far used the RTI Act to understand the censorship under S69A. The Centre for Internet and Society has filed a number of RTI queries about websites blocked under S69A and has never been denied information on grounds of Rule 16.²⁴ However, there has been an uneven treatment of RTI queries by DEITY in this respect, with the Software Freedom Law Centre²⁵ being denied blocking orders on the basis of Rule 16. The Court could have protected free speech and expression by reading down Rule 16 except for a really narrow set of exceptions wherein only aggregate information would be made available to affected parties and members of the public.

Conclusions

In Shreya Singhal, the Court gave us great news: S66A has been struck down; good news: S79(3) and its rules have been read down; and bad news: S69A has been upheld. When it comes to each section, the impact of this judgment can either be read optimistically or pessimistically, and therefore we must wait for constitutional experts to weigh in on the ripple effect that this order will produce in other areas of free speech jurisprudence in India. But even as free speech activists celebrate Shreya Singhal, some are bemoaning the judgment as throwing the baby away with the bathwater, and wish to reintroduce another variant of S66A. Thus, we must remain vigilant.

Notes

1 G S Mudur (2012): "66A 'Cut and Paste Job,'" The Telegraph, 3 December, visited on 3 April, 2015, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1121 203/jsp/frontpage/story_16268138.jsp

2 Sunil Abraham (2012): "The Five Monkeys and Ice Cold Water," Centre for Internet and Society, 26 September, visited on 3 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/www-deccan-chronicle-sep-16-201...

3 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Striking Down of 66A: How Free Speech Jurisprudence in India Found Its Soul Again," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 26 March, visited on 4 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/26/the-striking-down-of-sect...

4 Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP, 1957, SCR 860.

5 Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar, 1962, AIR 955.

6 Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of UP, AIR, 1968 All 100.

7 S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram, 1989, SCC(2), 574.

8 Arup Bhuyan vs Union of India, (2011), 3 SCC 377.

9 Lawrence Liang, Alternative Law Forum, personal communication to author, 6 April 2015.

10 K A Abbas vs Union of India, 1971 SCR (2), 446.

11 Ranjit Udeshi vs State of Maharashtra,1965 SCR (1) 65.

12 Pranesh Prakash (2015): "Three Reasons Why 66A Verdict Is Momentous"/ Times of India/(29 March). Visited on 6 April 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-times/all-that-matters/Th...

13 Pranesh Prakash (2011): "Invisble Censorship: How the Government Censors Without Being Seen," The Centre for Internet and Society, 14 December, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/invisible-censorship

14 Rishabh Dara (2012): "Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet," The Centre for Internet and Society, 27 April, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/chilling-effects-on-free-expres... .

15 Rule 75, Copyright Rules, 2013.

16 The Draft Counter Proposal is available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/counter-proposal-by-cis-draft-i...

17 According to Facebook's transparency report, there were 4,599 requests in the first half of 2014, followed by 5,473 requests in the latter half. Available at https://govtrequests.facebook. com/country/India/2014-H2/ also see Google's transparency report available at http: //www.google. com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/?hl=en and Twitter's report, available at https:// transparency.twitter.com/country/in

18 Surabhi Agarwal (2015): "Transparency Reports of Internet Companies are Skewed: Gulashan Rai," Business Standard, 31 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/transparency-re... .

19 http://sflc.in/deity-says-2341-urls-were-blocked-in-2014-refuses-to-reve...

20 "32 Websites Go Blank," The Hindu, 1 January 2015, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/now-modi-govt-blocks-32-websites/a...

21 Pranesh Prakash (2012): "Analysing Latest List of Blocked Sites (Communalism and Rioting Edition)," 22 August, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysing-blocked-sites-ri... . Also, see Part II of the same series at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/analyzing-the-latest-list-of-bl... and analysis of blocking in February 2013, at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analyzing-latest-list-of-b...

22 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Supreme Court's IT Act Judgment, and Secret Blocking," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 25 March, viewed on 6 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/25/the-supreme-courts-it-act...

23 Apar Gupta (2015): "But What about Section 69A?," Indian Express, 27 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://indianexpress. com/article/opinion/ columns/but-what-about-section-69a/

24 Pranesh Prakash (2011): DIT's Response to RTI on Website Blocking, The Centre for Internet and Society, 7 April, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rti-response-dit-blocking ). Also see http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-dit-response-2nd-... and http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/reply-to-rti-applicat...

25 http://sflc.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/RTI-blocking-final-reply-from-...

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-and-political-weekly-sunil-abraham-april-11-2015-shreya-singhal-and-66a

FOEX Live

geetha — 2014-07-07T12:36:49Z

Selections of news on online freedom of expression and digital technology from across India (and some parts of the world)

For feedback, comments and any incidents of online free speech violation you are troubled or intrigued by, please email Geetha at geetha[at]cis-india.org or on Twitter at @covertlight.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/foex-live

Free Speech and Civil Defamation

gautam — 2014-07-08T08:31:18Z

Does defamation become a tool in powerful hands to suppress criticism? Gautam Bhatia examines the strict and unrealistic demands of defamation law, and concludes that defamation suits are a weapon to silence dissent and bad press.

Previously on this blog, we have discussed one of the under-analysed aspects of Article 19(2) – contempt of court. In the last post, we discussed the checking – or “watchdog” – function of the press. There is yet another under-analysed part of 19(2) that we now turn to – one which directly implicates the press, in its role as public watchdog. This is the issue of defamation.

Unlike contempt of court – which was a last-minute insertion by Ambedkar, before the second reading of the draft Constitution in the Assembly – defamation was present in the restrictions clause since the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee’s first draft, in 1947. Originally, it accompanied libel and slander, before the other two were dropped for the simpler “reasonable restrictions… in the interests of… defamation.” Unlike the other restrictions, which provoked substantial controversy, defamation did not provoke extended scrutiny by the Constituent Assembly.

In hindsight, that was a lapse. In recent years, defamation lawsuits have emerged as a powerful weapon against the press, used primarily by individuals and corporations in positions of power and authority, and invariably as a means of silencing criticism. For example, Hamish MacDonald’s The Polyester Prince, a book about the Ambanis, was unavailable in Indian bookshops, because of threats of defamation lawsuits. In January, Bloomsbury withdrew The Descent of Air India, which was highly critical of ex-Aviation Minister Praful Patel, after the latter filed a defamation lawsuit. Around the same time, Sahara initiated a 200 crore lawsuit against Tamal Bandyopadhayay, a journalist with The Mint, for his forthcoming book, Sahara: The Untold Story. Sahara even managed to get a stay order from a Calcutta High Court judge, who cited one paragraph from the book, and ruled that “Prima facie, the materials do seem to show the plaintiffs in poor light.” The issue has since been settled out of Court. Yet there is no guarantee that Bandyopadhyay would have won on merits, even with the absurd amount claimed as damages, given that a Pune Court awarded damages of Rs. 100 crores to former Justice P.B. Sawant against the Times Group, for a fifteen-second clip by a TV channel that accidentally showed his photograph next to the name of a judge who was an accused in a scam. What utterly takes the cake, though, is Infosys serving legal notices to three journalistic outlets recently, asking for damages worth Rs. 200 crore for “loss of reputation and goodwill due to circulation of defamatory articles.”

Something is very wrong here. The plaintiffs are invariably politicians or massive corporate houses, and the defendants are invariably journalists or newspapers. The subject is always critical reporting. The damages claimed (and occasionally, awarded) are astronomical – enough to cripple or destroy any business – and the actual harm is speculative. A combination of these factors, combined with a broken judicial system in which trials take an eternity to progress, leading to the prospect of a lawsuit hanging perpetually over one’s head, and financial ruin just around the corner, clearly has the potential to create a highly effective chilling effect upon newspapers, when it come to critical speech on matters of public interest.

One of the reasons that this happens, of course, is that extant defamation law allows it to happen. Under defamation law, as long as a statement is published, is defamatory (that is, tending to lower the reputation of the plaintiff in the minds of reasonable people) and refers to the plaintiff, a prima facie case of defamation is made out. The burden then shifts to the defendant to argue a justification, such as truth, or fair comment, or privileged communication. Notice that defamation, in this form, is a strict liability offence: that is, the publisher cannot save himself even if he has taken due care in researching and writing his story. Even an inadvertent factual error can result in liability. Furthermore, there are many things that straddle a very uncomfortable barrier between “fact” and “opinion” (“opinions” are generally not punishable for defamation): for example, if I call you “corrupt”, have I made a statement of fact, or one of opinion? Much of reporting – especially political reporting – falls within this slipstream.

The legal standard of defamation, therefore, puts almost all the burden upon the publisher, a burden that will often be impossible to discharge – as well as potentially penalising the smallest error. Given the difficulty in fact-checking just about everything, as well as the time pressures under which journalists operate, this is an unrealistic standard. What makes things even worse, however, is that there is no cap on damages, and that the plaintiff need not even demonstrate actual harm in making his claims. Judges have the discretion to award punitive damages, which are meant to serve both as an example and as a deterrent. When Infosys claims 2000 crores, therefore, it need not show that there has been a tangible drop in its sales, or that it has lost an important and lucrative contract – let alone showing that the loss was caused by the defamatory statement. All it needs to do is make abstract claims about loss of goodwill and reputation, which are inherently difficult to verify either way, and it stands a fair chance of winning.

A combination of onerous legal standards and crippling amounts in damages makes the defamation regime a very difficult one for journalists to operate freely in. We have discussed before the crucial role that journalists play in a system of free speech whose underlying foundation is the maintenance of democracy: a free press is essential to maintaining a check upon the actions of government and other powerful players, by subjecting them to scrutiny and critique, and ensuring that the public is aware of important facts that government might be keen to conceal. In chilling journalistic speech, therefore, defamation laws strike at the heart of Article 19(1)(a). When considering what the appropriate standards ought to be, a Court therefore must consider the simple fact that if defamation – as it stands today – is compromising the core of 19(1)(a) itself, then it is certainly not a “reasonable restriction” under 19(2) (some degree of proportionality is an important requirement for 19(2) reasonableness, as the Court has held many times).

This is not, however, a situation unique to India. In Singapore, for instance, “[political] leaders have won hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages in defamation cases against critics and foreign publications, which they have said are necessary to protect their reputations from unfounded attacks” – the defamation lawsuit, indeed, was reportedly a legal strategy used by Lee Kuan Yew against political opponents.

Particularly in the United States, the European Union and South Africa, however, this problem has been recognised, and acted upon. In the next post, we shall examine some of the legal techniques used in those jurisdictions, to counter the chilling effect that strict defamation laws can have on the press.

We discussed the use of civil defamation laws as weapons to stifle a free and critical press. One of the most notorious of such instances also birthed one of the most famous free speech cases in history: New York Times v. Sullivan. This was at the peak of the civil rights movement in the American South, which was accompanied by widespread violence and repression of protesters and civil rights activists. A full-page advertisement was taken out in the New York Times, titled Heed Their Rising Voices, which detailed some particularly reprehensible acts by the police in Montgomery, Alabama. It also contained some factual errors. For example, the advertisement mentioned that Martin Luther King Jr. had been arrested seven times, whereas he had only been arrested four times. It also stated that the Montgomery police had padlocked students into the university dining hall, in order to starve them into submission. That had not actually happened. On this basis, Sullivan, the Montgomery police commissioner, sued for libel. The Alabama courts awarded 500,000 dollars in damages. Because five other people in a situation similar to Sullivan were also suing, the total amount at stake was three million dollars – enough to potentially boycott the New York Times, and certainly enough to stop it from publishing about the civil rights movement.

In his book about the Sullivan case, Make No Law, Anthony Lewis notes that the stakes in the case were frighteningly high. The civil rights movement depended, for its success, upon stirring public opinion in the North. The press was just the vehicle to do it, reporting as it did on excessive police brutality against students and peaceful protesters, practices of racism and apartheid, and so on. Sullivan was a legal strategy to silence the press, and its weapon of choice was defamation law.

In a 9 – 0 decision, the Supreme Court found for the New York Times, and changed the face of free speech law (and, according to Lewis, saved the civil rights movement). Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan made the crucial point that in order to survive, free speech needed “breathing space” – that is, the space to make errors. Under defamation law, as it stood, “the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public criticism [is] an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive.” And under the burden of proving truth, “would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is, in fact, true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." For these reasons, Justice Brennan laid down an “actual malice” test for defamation – that is, insofar as the statement in question concerned the conduct of a public official, it was actionable for defamation only if the publisher either knew it was false, or published it with “reckless disregard” for its veracity. After New York Times, this standard has expanded, and the press has never lost a defamation case.

There are some who argue that in its zeal to protect the press against defamation lawsuits by the powerful, the Sullivan court swung the opposite way. In granting the press a near-unqualified immunity to say whatever it wanted, it subordinated the legitimate interests of people to their reputation and their dignity to an intolerable degree, and ushered in a regime of media unaccountability. This is evidently what the South African courts felt. In Khulamo v. Holomisa, Justice O’Regan accepted that the common law of defamation would have to be altered so as to reflect the new South African Constitution’s guarantees of the freedom of speech. Much like Justice Brennan, she noted that “the media are important agents in ensuring that government is open, responsive and accountable to the people as the founding values of our Constitution require”, as well as the chilling effect in requiring journalists to prove the truth of everything they said. Nonetheless, she was not willing to go as far as the American Supreme Court did. Instead, she cited a previous decision by the Supreme Court of Appeals, and incorporated a “resonableness standard” into defamation law. That is, “if a publisher cannot establish the truth, or finds it disproportionately expensive or difficult to do so, the publisher may show that in all the circumstances the publication was reasonable. In determining whether publication was reasonable, a court will have regard to the individual’s interest in protecting his or her reputation in the context of the constitutional commitment to human dignity. It will also have regard to the individual’s interest in privacy. In that regard, there can be no doubt that persons in public office have a diminished right to privacy, though of course their right to dignity persists. It will also have regard to the crucial role played by the press in fostering a transparent and open democracy. The defence of reasonable publication avoids therefore a winner-takes-all result and establishes a proper balance between freedom of expression and the value of human dignity. Moreover, the defence of reasonable publication will encourage editors and journalists to act with due care and respect for the individual interest in human dignity prior to publishing defamatory material, without precluding them from publishing such material when it is reasonable to do so.”

The South African Constitutional Court thus adopts a middle path between the two opposite zero-sum games that are traditional defamation law, and American first amendment law. A similar effort was made in the United Kingdom – the birthplace of the common law of defamation – with the passage of the 2013 Defamation Act. Under English law, the plaintiff must now show that there is likely to be “serious harm” to his reputation, and there is also public interest exception.

While South Africa and the UK try to tackle the problem at the level of standards for defamation, the ECHR has taken another, equally interesting tack: by limiting the quantum of damages. In Tolstoy Milolasky v. United Kingdom, it found a 1.5 million pound damage award “disproportionately large”, and held that there was a violation of the ECHR’s free speech guarantee that could not be justified as necessary in a democratic society.

Thus, constitutional courts the world over have noticed the adverse impact traditional defamation law has on free speech and a free press. They have devised a multiplicity of ways to deal with this, some more speech-protective than others: from America’s absolutist standards, to South Africa’s “reasonableness” and the UK’s “public interest” exceptions, to the ECHR’s limitation of damages. It is about time that the Indian Courts took this issue seriously: there is no dearth of international guidance.

Gautam Bhatia — @gautambhatia88 on Twitter — is a graduate of the National Law School of India University (2011), and has just received an LLM from the Yale Law School. He blogs about the Indian Constitution at http://indconlawphil.wordpress.com. Here at CIS, he blogs on issues of online freedom of speech and expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/free-speech-and-civil-defamation

Free Speech Policy in India: Community, Custom, Censorship, and the Future of Internet Regulation

bhairav — 2015-08-23T10:12:16Z

This note summarises my panel contribution to the conference on Freedom of Expression in a Digital Age at New Delhi on 21 April 2015, which was organised by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) in collaboration with the Internet Policy Observatory of the Center for Global Communication Studies (CGCS) at the Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania

Download the Note here (PDF, 103 Kb)

Preliminary

There has been legitimate happiness among many in India at the Supreme Court’s recent decision in the Shreya Singhal case to strike down section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 ("IT Act") for unconstitutionally fettering the right to free speech on the Internet. The judgment is indeed welcome, and reaffirms the Supreme Court’s proud record of defending the freedom of speech, although it declined to interfere with the government’s stringent powers of website blocking. As the dust settles there are reports the government is re-grouping to introduce fresh law, allegedly stronger to secure easier convictions, to compensate the government’s defeat.

Case Law and Government Policy

India’s constitutional courts have a varied history of negotiating the freedom of speech that justifiably demands study. But, in my opinion, inadequate attention is directed to the government’s history of free speech policy. It is possible to discern from the government’s actions over the last two centuries a relatively consistent narrative of governance that seeks to bend the individual’s right to speech to its will. The defining characteristics of this narrative – the government’s free speech policy – emerge from a study of executive and legislative decisions chiefly in relation to the press, that continue to shape policy regarding the freedom of expression on the Internet.

India’s corpus of free speech case law is not uniform nor can it be since, for instance, the foundational issues that attend hate speech are quite different from those that inform contempt of court. So too, Indian free speech policy has been varied, captive to political compulsions and disparate views regarding the interests of the community, governance and nation-building. There has been consistent tension between the individual and the community, as well as the role of the government in enforcing the expectations of the community when thwarted by law.

Dichotomy between Modern and Native Law

To understand free speech policy, it is useful to go back to the early colonial period in India, when Governor-General Warren Hastings established a system of courts in Bengal’s hinterland to begin the long process of displacing traditional law to create a modern legal system. By most accounts, pre-modern Indian law was not prescriptive, Austinian, and uniform. Instead, there were several legal systems and a variety of competing and complementary legal sources that supported different interpretations of law within most legal systems. J. Duncan M. Derrett notes that the colonial expropriation of Indian law was marked by a significant tension caused by the repeatedly-stated objective of preserving some fields of native law to create a dichotomous legal structure. These efforts were assisted by orientalist jurists such as Henry Thomas Colebrook whose interpretation of the dharmasastras heralded a new stage in the evolution of Hindu law.

In this background, it is not surprising that Elijah Impey, a close associate of Hastings, simultaneously served as the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court at Fort William while overseeing the Sadr Diwani Adalat, a civil court applying Anglo-Hindu law for Hindus, and the Sadr Faujdari Adalat, a criminal court applying Anglo-Islamic law to all natives. By the mid-nineteenth century, this dual system came under strain in the face of increasing colonial pressure to rationalise the legal system to ensure more effective governance, and native protest at the perceived insensitivity of the colonial government to local customs.

Criminal Law and Free Speech in the Colony

In 1837, Thomas Macaulay wrote the first draft of a new comprehensive criminal law to replace indigenous law and custom with statutory modern law. When it was enacted as the Indian Penal Code in 1860 ("IPC"), it represented the apogee of the new colonial effort to recreate the common law in India. The IPC’s enactment coincided with the growth and spread of both the press and popular protest in India. The statute contained the entire gamut of public-order and community-interest crimes to punish unlawful assembly, rioting, affray, wanton provocation, public nuisance, obscenity, defiling a place of worship, disturbing a religious assembly, wounding religious feelings, and so on. It also criminalised private offences such as causing insult, annoyance, and intimidation. These crimes continue to be invoked in India today to silence individual opinion and free speech, including on the Internet. Section 66A of the IT Act utilised a very similar vocabulary of censorship.

Interestingly, Macaulay’s IPC did not feature the common law offences of sedition and blasphemy or the peculiar Indian crime of promoting inter-community enmity; these were added later. Sedition was criminalised by section 124A at the insistence of Barnes Peacock and applied successfully against Indian nationalist leaders including Bal Gangadhar Tilak in 1897 and 1909, and Mohandas Gandhi in 1922. In 1898, the IPC was amended again to incorporate section 153A to criminalise the promotion of enmity between different communities by words or deeds. And, in 1927, a more controversial amendment inserted section 295A into the IPC to criminalise blasphemy. All three offences have been recently used in India against writers, bloggers, professors, and ordinary citizens.

Loss of the Right to Offend

The two amendments of 1898 and 1927, which together proscribed the promotion of inter-community enmity and blasphemy, represent the dismantling of the right to offend in India. But, oddly, they were defended by the colonial government in the interests of native sensibilities. The proceedings of the Imperial Legislative Council reveal several members, including Indians, were enthusiastic about the amendments. For some, the amendments were a necessary corrective action to protect community honour from subversive speech. The 1920s were a period of foment in India as the freedom movement intensified and communal tension mounted. In this environment, it was easy to fuse the colonial interest in strong administration with a nationalist narrative that demanded the retrieval of Indian custom to protect native sensibilities from being offended by individual free speech, a right derived from modern European law. No authoritative jurist could be summoned to prove or refute the claim that native custom privileged community honour.

Sadly the specific incident which galvanised the amendment of 1927, which established the crime of blasphemy in India, would not appear unfamiliar to a contemporary observer. Mahashay Rajpal, an Arya Samaj activist, published an offensive pamphlet of the Prophet Muhammad titled Rangeela Rasool, for which he was arrested and tried but acquitted in the absence of specific blasphemy provisions. With his speech being found legal, Rajpal was released and given police protection but Ilam Din, a Muslim youth, stabbed him to death. Instead of supporting its criminal law and strengthening its police forces to implement the decisions of its courts, the colonial administration surrendered to the threat of public disorder and enacted section 295A of the IPC.

Protest and Community Honour

The amendment of 1927 marks an important point of rupture in the history of Indian free speech. It demonstrated the government’s policy intention of overturning the courts to restrict the individual’s right to speech when faced with public protest. In this way, the combination of public disorder and the newly-created crimes of promoting inter-community enmity and blasphemy opened the way for the criminal justice system to be used as a tool by natives to settle their socio-cultural disputes. Both these crimes address group offence; they do not redress individual grievances. In so far as they are designed to endorse group honour, these crimes signify the community’s attempt to suborn modern law and individual rights.

Almost a century later, the Rangeela Rasool affair has become the depressing template for illegal censorship in India: fringe groups take offence at permissible speech, crowds are marshalled to articulate an imagined grievance, and the government capitulates to the threat of violence. This formula has become so entrenched that governance has grown reflexively suppressive, quick to silence speech even before the perpetrators of lumpen violence can receive affront. This is especially true of online speech, where censorship is driven by the additional anxiety brought by the difficulty of Internet regulation. In this race to be offended the government plays the parochial referee, acting to protect indigenous sensibilities from subversive but legal speech.

The Censorious Post-colony

Independence marked an opportunity to remake Indian governance in a freer image. The Constituent Assembly had resolved not to curb the freedom of speech in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution on account of public order. In two cases from opposite ends of the country where right-wing and left-wing speech were punished by local governments on public order grounds, the Supreme Court acted on the Constituent Assembly’s vision and struck down the laws in question. Free speech, it appeared, would survive administrative concerns, thanks to the guarantee of a new constitution and an independent judiciary. Instead Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his cabinet responded with the First Amendment in 1951, merely a year after the Constitution was enacted, to create three new grounds of censorship, including public order. In 1963, a year before he demitted office, the Sixteenth Amendment added an additional restriction.

Nehru did not stop at amending the Constitution, he followed shortly after with a concerted attempt to stage-manage the press by de-legitimising certain kinds of permissible speech.

Under Justice G. S. Rajadhyaksha, the government constituted the First Press Commission which attacked yellow journalism, seemingly a sincere concern, but included permissible albeit condemnable speech that was directed at communities, indecent or vulgar, and biased. Significantly, the Commission expected the press to only publish speech that conformed to the developmental and social objectives of the government. In other words, Nehru wanted the press to support his vision of India and used the imperative of nation-building to achieve this goal. So, the individual right to offend communities was taken away by law and policy, and speech that dissented from the government’s socio-economic and political agenda was discouraged by policy. Coupled with the new constitutional ground of censorship on account of public order, the career of free speech in independent India began uncertainly.

How to regulate permissible speech?

Despite the many restrictions imposed by law on free speech, Indian free speech policy has long been engaged with the question of how to regulate the permissible speech that survives constitutional scrutiny. This was significantly easier in colonial India. In 1799, Governor-General Richard Wellesley, the brother of the famous Duke of Wellington who defeated Napoleon at Waterloo, instituted a pre-censorship system to create what Rajeev Dhavan calls a “press by permission” marked by licensed publications, prior restraint, subsequent censorship, and harsh penalties. A new colonial regime for strict control over the publication of free speech was enacted in the form of the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867, the preamble of which recognises that “the literature of a country is…an index of…the condition of [its] people”. The 1867 Act was diluted after independence but still remains alive in the form of the Registrar of Newspapers.

After surviving Indira Gandhi’s demand for a committed press and the depredations of her regime during the Emergency, India’s press underwent the examination of the Second Press Commission. This was appointed in 1978 under the chairmanship of Justice P. K. Goswami, a year after the Janata government released the famous White Paper on Misuse of Mass Media. When Gandhi returned to power, Justice Goswami resigned and the Commission was reconstituted under Justice K. K. Mathew. In 1982, the Commission’s report endorsed the earlier First Press Commission’s call for conformist speech, but went further by proposing the appointment of a press regulator invested with inspection powers; criminalising attacks on the government; re-interpreting defamation law to encompass democratic criticism of public servants; retaining stringent official secrecy law; and more. It was quickly acted upon by Rajiv Gandhi through his infamous Defamation Bill.

The contours of future Internet regulation

The juggernaut of Indian free speech policy has received temporary setbacks, mostly inflicted by the Supreme Court. Past experience shows us that governments with strong majorities – whether Jawaharlal Nehru’s following independence or Indira Gandhi’s in the 1970s – act on their administrative impulses to impede free speech by government policy. The Internet is a recent and uncontrollable medium of speech that attracts disproportionately heavy regulatory attention. Section 66A of the IT Act may be dead but several other provisions remain to harass and punish online free speech. Far from relaxing its grip on divergent opinions, the government appears poised for more incisive invasions of personal freedoms.

I do not believe the contours of future speech regulation on the Internet need to be guessed at, they can be derived from the last two centuries of India’s free speech policy. When section 66A is replaced – and it will be, whether overtly by fresh statutory provisions or stealthily by policy and non-justiciable committees and commissions – it will be through a regime that obeys the mandate of the First Press Commission to discourage dissenting and divergent speech while adopting the regulatory structures of the Second Press Commission to permit a limited inspector raj and forbid attacks on personalities. The interests of the community, howsoever improperly articulated, will seek precedence over individual freedoms and the accompanying threat of violence will give new meaning to Bhimrao Ambedkar’s warning of the “grammar of anarchy”.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/policy-in-india-community-custom-censorship-and-future-of-internet-regulation

Facebook and its Aversion to Anonymous and Pseudonymous Speech

Jessamine Mathew — 2014-07-04T07:53:07Z

Jessamine Mathew explores Facebook's "real name" policy and its implications for the right to free speech.

The power to be unidentifiable on the internet has been a major reason for its sheer number of users. Most of the internet can now be freely used by anybody under a pseudonym without the fear of being recognised by anybody else. These conditions allow for the furtherance of free expression and protection of privacy on the internet, which is particularly important for those who use the internet as a medium to communicate political dissent or engage in any other activity which would be deemed controversial in a society yet not illegal. For example, an internet forum for homosexuals in India, discussing various issues which surround homosexuality may prove far more fruitful if contributors are given the option of being undetectable, considering the stigma that surrounds homosexuality in India, and the recent setting-aside of the Delhi High Court decision reading down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. The possibility of being anonymous or pseudonymous exists on many internet fora but on Facebook, the world’s greatest internet space for building connections and free expression, there is no sanction given to pseudonymous accounts as Facebook follows a real name policy. And as the recent decision of a New York judge, disallowing Facebook from contesting warrants on private information of over 300 of its users, shows, there are clear threats to freedom of expression and privacy.

On the subject of using real names, Facebook’s Community Standards states, “Facebook is a community where people use their real identities. We require everyone to provide their real names, so you always know who you're connecting with. This helps keep our community safe.” Facebook’s Marketing Director, Randi Zuckerberg, bluntly dismissed the idea of online anonymity as one that “has to go away” and that people would “behave much better” if they are made to use their real names. Apart from being a narrow-minded statement, she fails to realise that there are many different kinds of expression on the internet, from stories of sexual abuse victims to the views of political commentators, or indeed, whistleblowers, many of whom may prefer to use the platform without being identified. It has been decided in many cases that humans have a right to anonymity as it provides for the furtherance of free speech without the fear of retaliation or humiliation (see Talley v. California).

While Facebook’s rationale behind wanting users to register for accounts with their own names is based on the goal of maintaining the security of other users, it is still a serious infraction on users’ freedom of expression, particularly when anonymous speech has been protected by various countries. Facebook has evolved from a private space for college students to connect with each other to a very public platform where not just social connections but also discussions take place, often with a heavily political theme. Facebook has been described as instrumental in the facilitation of communication during the Arab Spring, providing a space for citizens to effectively communicate with each other and organise movements. Connections on Facebook are no longer of a purely social nature but have extended to political and legal as well, with it being used to promote movements all through the country. Even in India, Facebook was the most widely adopted medium, along with Twitter and Facebook, for discourse on the political future of the country during, before and after the 2014 elections. Earlier in 2011, Facebook was used intensively during the India Against Corruption movement. There were pages created, pictures and videos uploaded, comments posted by an approximate of 1.5 million people in India. In 2012, Facebook was also used to protest against the Delhi gang rape with many coming forward with their own stories of sexual assault, providing support to the victim, organising rallies and marches and protesting about the poor level of safety of women in Delhi.

Much like its content policy, Facebook exhibits a number of discrepancies in the implementation of the anonymity ban. Salman Rushdie found that his Facebook account had been suspended and when it was reinstated after he sent them proof of identity, Facebook changed his name to the name on his passport, Ahmed Rushdie instead of the name he popularly goes by. Through a series of tweets, he criticised this move by Facebook, forcing him to display his birth name. Eventually Facebook changed his name back to Salman Rushdie but not before serious questions were raised regarding Facebook’s policies. The Moroccan activist Najat Kessler’s account was also suspended as it was suspected that she was using a fake name. Facebook has also not just stopped at suspending individual user accounts but has also removed pages and groups because the creators used pseudonyms to create and operate the pages in question. This was seen in the case of Wael Ghonim who created a group which helped in mobilizing citizens in Egypt in 2011. Ghonim was a Google executive who did not want his online activism to affect his professional life and hence operated under a pseudonym. Facebook temporarily removed the group due to his pseudonymity but later reinstated it.

While Facebook performs its due diligence when it comes to some accounts, it has still done nothing about the overwhelmingly large number of obviously fake accounts, ranging from Santa Claus to Jack the Ripper. On my own Facebook friend list, there are people who have entered names of fictional characters as their own, clearly violating the real name policy. I once reported a pseudonymous account that used the real name of another person. Facebook thanked me for reporting the account but also said that I will “probably not hear back” from them. The account still exists with the same name. The redundancy of the requirement lies in the fact that Facebook does not request users to upload some form identification when they register with the site but only when they suspect them to be using a pseudonym. Since Facebook also implements its policies largely only on the basis of complaints by other users or the government, the real name policy makes many political dissidents and social activists the target of abuse on the internet.

Further, Articles 21 and 22 of the ICCPR grant all humans the right to free and peaceful assembly. As governments increasingly crack down on physical assemblies of people fighting for democracy or against legislation or conditions in a country, the internet has proved to be an extremely useful tool for facilitating this assembly without forcing people to endure the wrath of governmental authorities. A large factor which has promoted the popularity of internet gatherings is the way in which powerful opinions can be voice without the fear of immediate detection. Facebook has become the coveted online space for this kind of assembly but their policies and more particularly, faulty implementation of the policies, lead to reduced flows of communication on the site.

Of course, Facebook’s fears of cyberbullying and harassment are likely to materialise if there is absolutely no check on the identity of users. A possible solution to the conflict between requiring real names to keep the community safe and still allowing individuals to be present on the network without the fear of identification by anybody would be to ask users to register with their own names but still allowing them to create a fictional name which would be the name that other Facebook users can see. Under this model, Facebook can also deal with the issue of safety through their system of reporting against other users. If a pseudonymous user has been reported by a substantial number of people for harassment or any other cause, then Facebook may either suspend the account or remove the content that is offensive. If the victim of harassment chooses to approach a judicial body, then Facebook may reveal the real name of the user so that due process may be followed. At the same time, users who utilise the website to present their views and participate in the online process of protest or contribute to free expression in any other way can do so without the fear of being detected or targeted. Safety on the site can be maintained even without forcing users to reveal their real names to the world. The system that Facebook follows currently does not help curb the presence of fake accounts and neither does it promote completely free expression on the site.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/facebook-and-its-aversion-to-anonymous-and-pseudonymous-speech