Centre for Internet and Society

WSIS +10 High Level Event: Open Consultation Process Multistakeholder Preparatory Platform: Phase Six: Fifth Physical Meeting

jyoti — 2014-10-12T05:31:48Z

The fifth physical meeting of the Multistakeholder Preparatory Platform (MPP-WSIS+10), was held from 28-31 May 2014 in Geneva as part as part of the sixth phase of the WSIS +10 High Level Event Open Consultation process. The meeting was aimed at developing draft agreed texts for the WSIS+10 Statement on Implementation on WSIS Outcomes and the Vision Beyond 2015.

Stakeholders including governments, private sector, civil society and international organizations participated in the meeting, which was chaired by Prof. Dr. V.Minkin (Russian Federation), Chairman of the Council Working Group on WSIS and the Vice Chairs of the meeting were Egypt, Switzerland and Saudi Arabia.

ITU Deputy Secretary General, Mr Houlin Zhao highlighted that WSIS+10 High Level Event as a joint effort of the UN family and re-emphasized on the commitment and hard work from all UN Agencies and the Secretariat that has processed up to 500 contributions till date. He further reiterated that this preparatory process builds upon several inputs including deliberations at WSIS Forums (2012 and 2013), WSIS+10 Visioning Challenge Initiative, 2013 WSIS+10 Multistakeholder Meeting in Paris, as well as outcomes of ITU Regional Development Forums held in six regions and led by BDT. Almost 500 multistakeholder contributions were processed by secretariat up to now.

Mr. C.Wachholz representing UNESCO and Ms. M. Kultamaa representing the CSTD Secretariat underlined the importance of the process being an important effort leading towards the Overall Review of the implementation of the WSIS outcomes by 2015. Ms. Kultamaa informed the meeting on the status of the discussions taking place at the UN General Assembly regarding the modalities of the Overall Review. She underlined that for the time being there is no consensus and discussions on this subject will continue.It is important to note that all UN organizations serve as secretariat to the preparatory process which is being coordinated by the ITU. All the Action Line Facilitators including, ITU, UNESCO, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNDESA, WMO, UNEP, WHO, UPU, ITC, ILO, FAO, and UN Regional Commissions,as well as WIPO, UN Women contributed towards the development of the Action line documents in the Vision, within their respective mandates. The meeting concluded with final agreed drafts for the WSIS+10 Statement and final agreed draft for WSIS+10 Vision Chapter A and B, with some pending issues in C.

Jyoti Panday representing CIS, participated in the meeting and intervened in the negotiations over the final agreed text. CIS made interventions on text related to increasing women's participation, freedom of expression, media rights, data privacy, network security and human rights. CIS also endorsed text on action line 'Media' which reaffirmed commitment to freedom of expression, data privacy and media rights offline and online including protection of sources, publishers and journalists.

WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes

Ø Preamble, Chapter A (Agreed)

Ø Overview of the implementation of Action Lines, Chapter B (Agreed)

Ø Challenges-during implementation of Action Lines and new challenges that have emerged, Chapter C (Agreed)

WSIS+10 Vision for WSIS beyond 2015

Ø Preamble, Chapter A (Agreed)

Ø Priority areas to be addressed in the implementation of WSIS Beyond 2015, Chapter B (Agreed)

Ø Action Lines, Chapter C

С1. The role of public governance authorities and all stakeholders in the promotion of ICTs for development (Agreed)

С2. Information and communication infrastructure (Agreed)

C3. Access to information and knowledge (Agreed)

C4. Capacity building (Agreed)

C5. Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs (pending para g)

g) Continue to promote greater cooperation [among the governments and all other stakeholders,] at the United Nations and~~with all stakeholders at~~ all other appropriate ~~fora~~fora, respectively at ~~the~~ national, regional and international levels to enhance user confidence, build trust,and protect both data and network integrity as well as consider existing and potential threats to ICTs ; and address other information security and network security issues.]

Alt 1 : [ Continue to promote cooperation [among the governments [at the United Nations ]and with all other stakeholders at the United Nations and other appropriate ~~fora~~for a] to enhance user confidence, build trust, ~~and~~ protect ~~both~~ data, ~~and~~ network integrity and critical infrastructures; consider existing and potential threats to ICTs; security in the use of ICTs and address other information security and network security issues, while stressing the need to address [cybercrime and]cybersecurity issues. ~~at appropriate forums, together with all stakeholdersncluding cybersecurity, [and cybercrime]~~]

Alt 2 : [Continue to promote cooperation among the governments at the United Nations and other international organizations and with all other stakeholders at all appropriate fora to enhance user confidence, build trust, protect data, network integrity and critical infrastructures; consider existing and potential threats to ICTs; security in the use of ICTs [and address other information security ]and network security issues, while stressing the need to address cybersecurity issues. ]

Alt 3: [Continue to promote cooperation among the[ governments ~~[at the United Nations]]~~ and ~~with~~ all other stakeholders at ~~other~~ the United Nations and other appropriate fora to enhance user confidence, build trust, and protect both data and network integrity and critical infrastructure; consider existing and potential threats to ICTs; security in the use of ICTs and address other [information security] and network security issues, while stressing the need to address ~~cybercrime and~~ cybersecurity issues. ~~[at appropriate forums, together with all stakeholders], including cybersecurity, [and cybercrime]~~]

[including cybercrime] [including cybercrime and cybersecurity .][ including ICT aspects of cybercrime and cybersecurity]

[Cybercrime [and cybersecurity] should continue to be dealt with,[at the United Nations and other appropriate fora] [in appropriate forums , ]

C6. Enabling environment (Agreed)

C7. ICT Applications: (Agreed)

E-government

E-business

E-learning

E-health

E-employment

E-environment

E-agriculture

E-science

C8. Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic diversity and local content (agreed but pending para f)

f) [Reinforce [and [enhance] implement at the national level] the recommendations concerning the promotion and use of multilingualism [and universal access to cyberspace]].

C9. Media (meeting has developed three proposals that were requested to be reflected in the documents in a table format)

Discussion at the MPP Plenary meeting:	UK proposal, discussed with and supported by: Sweden, Australia, Spain, Germany, UNESCO, European Broadcasting Union, Switzerland, APIG, Centre for Internet and Society (India), Austria, Tunisia, IDEA, Cisco Systems, Mexico, United States, Japan, Canada, ICC BASIS, Intel, Internet Society, Health and Environment Program (HEP), Netherlands, and Microsoft. It was later supported by The Center for Democracy & Technology, Hungary, Czech Republic. International Federation of Library Associations, Portugal, Association for Progressive Communications, auDA (the ccTLD manager for Australia), Finland, Internet Democracy Project (India)	Proposal: Rwanda and Russia
Media will benefit from the broader and expanded role of ICTs that can enhance media’s contribution to the development goals of the post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda. [The principles of freedom of expression and the free flow of information, ideas and knowledge are essential for the information and knowledge societies and beneficial to development with recognizing that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online, including the right to privacy.]	Media will benefit from the broader and expanded role of ICTs that can enhance media's contribution to the development goals of the post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda. The right to freedom of expression and the free flow of information, ideas and knowledge, and the protection of privacy, are essential for the information and knowledge societies and beneficial to development. The same rights that people have offline must also be protected online.	We reaffirm the continued relevance of all issues highlighted under action line C9 on Media (Geneva 2003) and the need for continued implementation of this action line.
1. 1. [Develop and update national ICT-Media legislation that guarantees the independence, objectivity, social responsibility, neutrality and plurality of the media according to international standards as well as the domestic needs.]	1. Develop and update national ICT-Media legislation that guarantees the independence, diversity and plurality of the media according to international standards.
2. [Continue to take appropriate measures — consistent with [international law][freedom of expression]— to combat illegal [content and to protect vulnerable groups , in particular children, from harmful content in media content] and harmful media content.]	2. Continue to take appropriate measures, consistent with international human rights law, to combat illegal media content.
3. Ensure that women and men equally access, participate and contribute to the media sector, including to decision-making processes. Alt: Work towards ensuring that women and men equally access, participate and contribute to the media sector, including to decision-making processes. Alt: Encourage that women and men access, participate and contribute on equal basis to the media sector, including to decision-making processes. [Alt: [Encourage][Ensure] [Strive] [ to leverage the potential of ICTs] to provide full and effective [equal ]opportunities to women and men to access, participate and contribute to the media sector, [including to decision-making processes]]	3. Encourage equal opportunities and the active participation of women in the media sector.
4. [Continue to encourage [independent] tradition [neutral, objective, responsible] nal media to bridge the knowledge divide and to facilitate [the freedom of expression] the flow of cultural content, particularly in rural and remote areas.]	4. Continue to encourage traditional media to bridge the knowledge divide and to facilitate the flow of cultural content, particularly in rural areas.
	5. Encourage online and offline mass media to play a more substantial role in capacity building for the information society.
5. Ensure the [safety[ and responsibility] of all journalists and media workers [and their accountability], [taking into account the provisions of article 19 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)]. ,[ including [bloggers] social media producers, and their sources and facilitate the implementation of the UN Plan of action on the safety of journalists and the issue of impunity.] [To ensure the safety of journalists and address the issue of impunity in accordance to UNGA Resolution (A/RES/68/163)]	6. Ensure the safety of all journalists and media workers, including social media producers and bloggers, and their sources and facilitate the implementation of the UN Plan of Action on the safety of journalists and address the issue of impunity
6. We reaffirm our commitment to the principles of freedom of the press and freedom of information, as well as those of the independence, pluralism and diversity of media, which are essential to the Information Society. Freedom to seek, receive, impart and use information for the creation, accumulation and dissemination of knowledge is important to the Information Society. We call for the responsible use and treatment of information by the media in accordance with the highest ethical and professional standards. Traditional media in all their forms have an important role in the Information Society and ICTs should play a supportive role in this regard. Diversity of media ownership should be encouraged, in conformity with national law, and taking into account relevant international conventions. We reaffirm the necessity of reducing international imbalances affecting the media, particularly as regards infrastructure, technical resources and the development of human skills.

C10. Ethical dimensions of the Information Society (Agreed)

C11. International and regional cooperation (Agreed)

The Chapter C, Part III: The paras highlighted in yellow below did not receive consensus.

III [Action Lines beyond 2015: Looking to the Future

[We reaffirm that effective cooperation among governments, private sector, civil society and the United Nations and other international organizations, according to their different roles and responsibilities and leveraging on their expertise, is essential, taking into account the multifaceted nature of building the Information Society.]

[We emphasize great importance of continuation of the multistakeholder implementation at the international level, following the themes and action lines in the Geneva Plan of Action, and moderated/facilitated by UN agencies. The coordination of multistakeholder implementation activities would help to avoid duplication of activities. This should include, inter alia, information exchange, creation of knowledge, sharing of best practices, and assistance in developing multi-stakeholder and public-private partnerships.]

[We reaffirm importance of the United Nations Group on the Information Society (UNGIS) created by the UN-Chief Executives Board (CEB) upon guidance by Tunis Agenda (Para 103), as an efficient and effective inter-agency mechanism with the main objective to coordinate substantive and policy issues facing the United Nations’ implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS).](HEP – delete)

We welcome holding of the annual WSIS Forum, which has become a key forum for multi-stakeholder debate on pertinent issues related to the Geneva Plan of Action and note that the Forum’s inclusiveness, openness, and thematic focus have strengthened responsiveness to stakeholders and contributed to increased physical and remote participation. [agreed]

We encourage all stakeholders to contribute to and closely collaborate with the Partnership on Measuring ICT for Development as an international, multi-stakeholder initiative to improve the availability and quality of ICT data and indicators, particularly in developing countries. [agreed]

[We emphasize/ recognize that the commitments to advance gender equality perspectives and undertake the necessary actions throughout the WSIS outcomes, as called for in Para 3 of Preamble under this document, should also be implemented, reviewed and monitored, consistent with other Action Lines, by UN Women in cooperation with other Action Line Facilitators.](HEP – delete)

We encourage all WSIS stakeholders to continue to contribute information on their activities to the public WSIS stocktaking database maintained by ITU. In this regard, we invite all countries to gather information at the national level with the involvement of all stakeholders, to contribute to the stocktaking. [agreed]

We also welcome continuation of the WSIS Project Prizes initiative that has been launched by ITU with involvement of all Action line facilitators as a competition that recognizes excellence in the implementation of projects and initiatives which further the WSIS goals of improving connectivity to ICTs), particularly within underserved communities, and provide a high-profile, international platform for recognizing and showcasing success stories and models that could be easily replicated. In this regard, the WSIS Stocktaking Database is of utmost importance in sharing best practices amongst WSIS Stakeholders. [agreed]

We emphasize on the importance of 17 May as World Information Society Day to help to raise awareness, on an annual basis, of the importance of this global facility, on the issues dealt with in the WSIS especially the possibilities that the use of ICTs can bring for societies and economies, as well as of ways to bridge the digital divide. [agreed]]

Vision Beyond 2015 Document

1. During the meeting, the participants agreed to replace Chapter E with the following three paragraphs and include them in Chapter B of the Vision:

34. Developing agreed goals and time-based measurable targets data and indicators along with enhanced monitoring and reporting. [agreed]

35. Encourage the ongoing assessment of progress towards the information society, as envisaged in the WSIS Outcomes, including through efforts such as the Partnership on Measuring ICT for Development which has been essential for evaluating the implementation of WSIS Action Lines. [agreed]

36. In this respect, it is necessary to continue to develop appropriate ways and means to make such measurements. [agreed]

2. A long discussion was held on the way forward. Some of the delegates expressed views that if text on WSIS Action Line C9 is not agreed, all Chapter C should not be considered as agreed, and refused to consider other items without reaching agreement on WSIS Action Line C9, while others were open to discuss further with the understanding that Chapter C is essential for the outcomes of the WSIS+10 High Level Event.

3. Some of the delegates requested for reflecting their statements in the Chairman’s Report (See Annex).

4. In conclusion the Chairman informed the meeting that the full text with all brackets will be reflected on the website and possibly forwarded to the consideration of the WSIS+10 High Level Event. He offered his availability on 9^th June 2014 for the meeting, if needed, with the aim of finalization of the text. He encouraged all stakeholders to conduct consultations to reach consensus for pending items prior to the Event.

Link to Documentation:

· Results of the pre-agreed Chapters during the Fifth Physical meeting: http://www.itu.int/wsis/review/mpp/pages/consolidated-texts.html

Background Documents: http://www.itu.int/wsis/review/mpp/#background

Annex

Statement by the Association for Proper Internet Governance
Regarding the 28-31 May Multistakeholder Preparatory Platform meeting
3 June 2014

The Association for Proper Internet Governance (APIG)[1] requests that this statement be annexed to the Chairman’s report of the Multistakeholder Preparatory Platform (MPP).

Introduction

APIG has attended all of the preparatory meetings and made numerous written and verbal submissions. Its representative has actively made constructive suggestions in order to help achieve consensus and APIG has withdrawn various proposals that it considered important when they were challenged by other participants, and this in order to find consensus. Some examples of such compromises made by APIG are presented below.

APIG is pleased that full consensus was reached regarding the Statement and parts A and B of the Vision, and that consensus was reached regarding most of part C of the Vision. However, APIG is disappointed that the rigid positions taken by some participants prevented full consensus from being reached regarding Action Lines C5 (Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs) and C9 (Media) in part C.

It must be recalled that the purpose of the discussions regarding part C was to identify action line items that would supplement the agreed action line items of the 2003 Geneva Plan of Action. The world has changed since 2003 and indeed the action lines need to be revisited and supplemented.

Agreement was reached on many supplements to the action lines. Action line C9 is related to the media, which has undergone dramatic changes since 2003. Many supplements to this action line are surely needed, but, given the complexity of the discussions, in particular regarding freedom of speech, it was not possible to reach consensus. Some participants took the view that, absent consensus on C9, none of the other supplements to the action lines could be considered to have been approved by consensus.

This is correct from a procedural point of view: nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. However, APIG is of the view that the supplements to all action lines except C9 and one item in C5 are acceptable as agreed and can be considered independently of C9 and the unresolved item in C5, while recognizing that important issues regarding C5 and C9 remain open and must continue to be discussed.

We present here the following:

1. Considerations on the multi-stakeholder process used during these preparatory meeting

2. Compromises made by APIG

3. Proposals for C5 and C9

3. Considerations on the multi-stakeholder process used during MPP meetings

The Multistakeholder Preparatory Platform (MPP) meetings were conducted on the basis of equal rights for all stakeholder and no restrictions on participation (except for registration). This allowed a wide variety of views to be heard and resulted in many valuable and diverse proposals being presented for consideration.

The leadership team (chairman and vice-chairmen) was very experienced and skilled, as was the secretariat.

Given the volume and diversity of the submitted inputs, it was APIG’s view that the leadership team should have been requested, already after the first MPP meeting, to propose compromise text. APIG regrets that many participants objected to this, and that the leadership team was tasked with proposing compromise text only at a very late state. This is particularly to be regretted because all participants agreed that the compromise text that was presented by the leadership at the end was excellent and formed an appropriate basis for further discussion and refinement. It is likely that progress would have been more rapid, and that full consensus might have been achieved, if the compromise proposals prepared by the leaderhsip had been presented at the earlier meetings of the MPP.

The meeting was conducted on the basis of unanimity. That is, no text was considered to have achieved consensus unless no participant objected to it. While this appears appealing at first sight, it can result in a small minority blocking progress towards a compromise text. And indeed this happened for some portions of the text of part C of the Vision.

If meetings are fully open, and all stakeholders have equal decision-making rights, then any stakeholder can block any proposal that, in its view, threatens its interests. Thus it will be difficult or impossible to reach consensus on delicate issues at such meetings, and this is indeed what happened at the MPP. Allowing private companies (which are stakeholders) to have the same power as other stakeholders with respect to public policy issues is problematic, see the Preamble of our submission[2] to the open consultation conducted by the ITU Council Working Group on International Internet-related Public Policy Issues (CWG-Internet). It is also problematic to allow a small number of participants, even if they are governments, to block progress.

Thus, it should be recognized that multi-stakeholder meetings in which public policy decisions are made by unanimity are not appropriate if the goal is to reach consensus on difficult issues.

An alternative would be to apply “rough consensus” rather than unanimity. But this gives a great deal of power to the leadership team, and thus makes the selection of the leadership team a very delicate matter. Such “rough consensus” cannot be held to be democratic.

APIG is of the view that multi-stakeholder process must be democratic, again, see the Preamble of our cited submission to CWG-Internet.

2. Compromises made by APIG

3. APIG would have preferred that paragaph 2 of the Preambles of both the Statement and the Vision read as follows in order to recognize recent UN Resolutions that highlight the relevance of specific human rights in the context of the evolution of ICTs since 2005, recognizing the well-known legal principle that offline rights apply equally online (our additions are shown as revision marks):

We reaffirm the human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and relevant international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and we also reaffirm paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 18 of the Geneva Declaration ; and we reaffirm the human rights mentioned in relevant UN Resolutions, including, but not limited to:

A/RES/68/147 . Rights of the child
A/RES/68/163. The safety of journalists and the issue of impunity
A/RES/68/167. The right to privacy in the digital age
A/RES/68/227 . Women in development
A/HRC/20/8. The promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet
A/HRC/RES/21/24. Human rights and indigenous People
A/HRC/RES/22/6 . Protecting human rights defenders
A/HRC/RES/ 23/2 . The role of freedom of opinion and expression in women’s empowerment
A/HRC/RES/23/3. Enhancement of international cooperation in the field of human rights
A/HRC/RES /23/10. Cultural rights and cultural diversity
A/HRC/RES/24/5 . The rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association
A/HRC/RES/25/11. Question of the realization in all countries of economic, social and cultural rights

APIG is disappointed that one participant (representing business) objected to inclusion in Action Line C2 (Information and Communication Infrastructure) of the following item, which is based on text agreed at the G20 St. Petersburg meeting[3]:

e) There is a need to identify the main difficulties that the digital economy poses for the application of existing international tax rules and develop detailed options to address these difficulties.

APIG would have preferred that the WSIS+10 recognize the dysfunctional nature of the current copyright regime for what concerns online issues and that an explicit call be included to reform that unworkable regime[4]. In particular, APIG would have preferred that item (f) of action line C6 (Enabling Environment) read as follows (changes with respect to the agreed version are shown as revision marks):

f) Foster an intellectual property rights framework that balances the interests of creators, implementers and users , by drastically reducing the length of copyright, by legalizing non-commercial downloads of copyright material, and by restricting what can be patented .

APIG would have preferred that the WSIS+10 explicitly call for the globalization of the IANA fundtion, by adding the following:

In section B (Priority areas) of the Vision, adding 37:

37) Accelerating the globalization of ICANN and IANA functions.

In action line C1 of the Vision, adding (f):

(f) Agree a formal framework that provides for all governments to participate, on an equal footing, in the governance and supervision of the ICANN and IANA functions, and that provides for effective supervision and accountability of these functions in accordance with paragraphs 29, 35, 36, 61 and 69 of the Tunis Agenda.

APIG would have preferred that (b) and (d) of C10 (Ethical Dimensions of the Information Society) read as follows (changes with respect to the agreed version are shown as revision marks):

(b) Promote respect of the fundamental ethical values in the use of ICTs and prevent their abusive usage , and in particular prevent mass surveillance.

(d) Continue to enhance the protection of privacy and personal data. Recognize that, i n the absence of the right to privacy, there can be no true freedom of expression and opinion, and therefore no effective democracy. Any violations of privacy and any restrictions on the protection of personal data must be held to be necessary and proportionate by an independent and impartial judge.

See 11 of our submission[5] to the open consultation conducted by the ITU Council Working Group on International Internet-related Public Policy Issues (CWG-Internet) and recall that, as stated by the President of Brazil, DilmaRousseff, in her speech at the UN General Assembly on 24 September 2013:

“In the absence of the right to privacy, there can be no true freedom of expression and opinion, and therefore no effective democracy.”

3. Proposals for C5 and C9

APIG would prefer the following texts for (a) of C5 and for C9.

С5. Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs

a) Continue to promote cooperation among governments at the United Nations and other appropriate intergovernmental forums, and with all stakeholders at other appropriate forums, to enhance user confidence, build trust, and protect both data and network integrity; consider existing and potential threats to ICTs, in particular threats created by weakening or compromising encryption standards; and address other information security (this being understood as defending information from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, perusal, inspection, recording or destruction) and network security issues, in particular mass surveillance.

a^bis) Address cybersecurity and cybercrime in appropriate forums.

In the interests of compromise, APIG could accept deletion of the parts highlighted in yellow above. It should be noted that the text in parenthesis after “information security” was not present in the 2003 version of this text, found in 12(a) of the Geneva Plan of Action. It has been added in order to make it clear that the term “information security” is used in its ordinary sense[6], and not in other senses.

C9. Media

Media will benefit from the broader and expanded role of ICTs that can enhance media’s contribution to the development goals of the post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda.

The principles of freedom of expression and the free flow of information, ideas and knowledge, and the protection of privacy, are essential for the information and knowledge societies and beneficial to development, recognizing that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online.

1. Develop and update national ICT-Media legislation that guarantees the independence, and plurality of the media according to international standards as well as the domestic needs.

2. Continue to take appropriate measures — consistent with freedom of expression— to combat media content that is both illegal and harmful. Any such measures must be held to be necessary and proportionate by an independent and impartial judge.

3. Continue to encourage traditional media to bridge the knowledge divide and to facilitate the flow of cultural content, particularly in rural areas.

4. Ensure the safety of all journalists and media workers, including social media producers and bloggers, and their sources (in particular whistle-blowers) and facilitate the implementation of the UN Plan of action on the safety of journalists and the issue of impunity.

5. Ensure the privacy of all media and the secrecy all communications, including E-Mail. Any violations of privacy or secrecy shall take place only if they are held to be necessary and proportionate by an independent and impartial judge. The privacy of all media and the secrecy of all communications shall be respected in accordance with the national laws of all concerned parties.

In the interests of compromise, APIG could accept deletion of the parts highlighted in yellow above. The first part, “recognizing that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online”, is not necessary, since it affirms a well-known legal principle and since human rights are individible.

It should be noted that the text proposed for 2 clarifies the text of 24 (c)) of the Geneva Plan of Action. That text could be misunderstood to imply that one could combat content that is harmful but not illegal. But such is not the case, since content can only be restricted if it is illegal, pursuant to article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. That is, the Geneva Plan of Action already enshrined the principle that there should be fewer restrictions on online freedom of speech than on offline freedom of speech, because the online content can be restricted only if it is “illegal and harmful”. In this respect, see 7.1 of our submission [7] to the open consultation conducted by the ITU Council Working Group on International Internet-related Public Policy Issues (CWG-Internet).

Regarding 4 above, whistle-blowers are sources for journalists, so they are already included and their explicit mention can be omitted.

Regarding 5 above, see 11 of our cited submission to CWG-Internet.

We have omitted an action line regarding gender equality in media because we believe that a strong statement regarding gender equality should apply to all action lines and thus should appear as a chapeau before action line C1. We propose the following for this chapeau (the language is that proposed by UN Women for a potential new action line, slightly modified since it is not proposed here as an action line):

We commit to promote progress in implementing gender commitments enshrined in the WSIS outcome documents and forward-looking recommendations by pursuing practical and joint measures to advance women’s empowerment within the Information Society. The goal is to realize women’s meaningful access to ICTs and full integration of women’s needs and perspectives, and their equal participation as active agents, innovators and decision-makers. Also critical are connecting and heightening understanding of online and offline realities and addressing underlying factors that hinder women’s engagement in the Information society. Finally, we seek to develop more coherent approaches, as well as increase investments, attention and accountability measures.

1. Gender Analysis: Promote the use of “gender analysis” and associated tools and methodologies in the development of national, regional and related global frameworks, strategies and policies and their implementation, as well as better connect with women’s empowerment communities and frameworks.

2. Holistic Approaches and Structural Issues: Address underlying women’s empowerment issues in the information society, such as gender stereotypes, specific or pronounced threats to women, such as online violence, as well as provide analysis and actionable recommendations on gender issues that cut across action lines.

3. Support to Action Lines and Stakeholders: Work with and across Action Lines and specific stakeholder groups (e.g. private sector) to accelerate integration of gender equality within their remits through identification of overarching issues, programmatic opportunities, requisite investments, policy interventions, case studies and learning, and promote participation of women and gender equality stakeholders.

4. Data and Monitoring Progress: Prepare scorecards on Action Line and National level reporting on women’s empowerment. Support and promote the work of the Partnership on the Measurement of the Information Society Working Group on Gender.

[1] http://www.apig.ch

[2] http://www.itu.int/en/Lists/CWGContributionmar2014/Attachments/25//CWG-March.pdf

[3] G20 Leaders, “Tax Annex to the St. Petersburg Declaration”, G20 (6 September 2013), Annex, Action 1 http://www.g20.org/news/20130906/782776427.html

[4] In this context, see 7.3 of http://www.itu.int/en/Lists/CWGContributionmar2014/Attachments/25//CWG-March.pdf and its references.

[5] http://www.itu.int/en/Lists/CWGContributionmar2014/Attachments/25//CWG-March.pdf

[6] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_security

[7] http://www.itu.int/en/Lists/CWGContributionmar2014/Attachments/25//CWG-March.pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/wsis-10-high-level-event-open-consultation-process-multistakeholder-preparatory-platform-phase-six

Report on ICANN 50

jyoti — 2014-10-12T05:42:04Z

Jyoti Panday attended ICANN 50 in London from 22-26 June. Below are some of the highlights from the meeting.

From 22- 26 June, ICANN hosted its 50^th meeting in London, the largest congregation of participants, so far. In the wake of the IANA transition announcement, Internet governance was the flavor of the week. ICANN’s transparency and accountability measures emerged as much contested notions as did references to NETmundial. This ICANN meeting clearly demonstrated that questions as to the role of ICANN in internet governance need to be settled.

ATLAS II

Coinciding with ICANN meeting was the 2^nd At-Large Summit, or ATLAS II, bringing together a network of regionally self organized and self supporting At-Large structures, representing individual Internet users throughout the world. The goal of the meeting was to discuss, reach consensus and draft reports around five issues organized around five issues organized around thematic groups of issues of concerns to the At-Large Community.

The subjects for the thematic groups were selected by the representatives of ALSes, each summit participant was allocated to thematic groups according to his/her preferences. The groups included were:

Future of Multistakeholder models
The Globalization of ICANN
Global Internet: The User perspective
ICANN Transparency and Accountability
At-Large Community Engagement in ICANN

Fahad Chehade Five Point Agenda

ICANN President, Mr Chehade in his address to the ICANN community covered five points which he felt were important for ICANN in planning its future role. The first topic was the IANA Stewardship and transition, and he stated that ICANN is committed to being a transparent organization and seeks to be more accountable to the community as the contract with the US government ends. Regarding the IANA transition, he remarked that ICANN had received thousands of comments and proposals regarding the transition of IANA stewardship and understood there would be much more discussion on this subject, and that a coordination group has been proposed of 27 members representing all different stakeholders in order to plot the course forward for IANA transition.

His second topic was about ICANN globalization and hardening of operations. He said that ICANN has about 2-3 years to go before he is comfortable that ICANN operations are where they need to be. He applauded the new service channels which allows customer support in many different languages and time zones, and mentioned local language support that would add to the languages in which ICANN content is currently available. Chehade spent a few minutes discussing the future of WHOIS "Directory" technology and highlighted the initial report that a working group had put together, led by Jean-Francois Poussard.

Next he covered the GDD, the Global Domains Division of ICANN and an update from that division on the New gTLD program. He mentioned the ICANN Auction, the contracts that had been signed, and the number of New gTLDs that had already been delegated to the Root. Internet Governance was Chehade's 4th topic of discussion, he applauded the NETmundial efforts, though he stressed that internet governance is one of the things that ICANN does and it will not be a high priority. He ended his speech with his last point, calling for more harmony within the ICANN community.

High Level Government Meeting

During ICANN London, UK government hosted a high-level meeting, bringing together representatives from governments of the world to discuss Internet Governance and specifically the NTIA transition of the IANA contract. Government representatives recognized that the stewardship of IANA should be a shared responsibility between governments and private sector groups, while other representatives stressed giving governments a stronger voice than other stakeholders. The consensus at the meeting held that the transition should not leave specific governments or interest groups with more control over the Internet, but that governments should have a voice in political issues in Internet Governance.

GAC Communiqué

GAC Communique, is a report drafted by the Governmental Advisory Committee, advising the ICANN board on decisions involving policy and implementation. Highlights from the communiqué include:

The GAC advises the Board regarding the .africa string, saying it would like to see an expedited process, especially once the Independent Review Panel comes to a decision regarding the two applicants for the string. They reaffirm their decision that DotConnectAfrica's application should not proceed.
The GAC mentioned the controversy surrounding .wine and .vin, where some European GAC representatives strongly felt that the applications for these strings should not proceed without proper safeguards for geographic names at the second level. However, the GAC was unable to reach consensus advice regarding this issue and thus did not relay any formal advice to the Board.
The GAC requested safeguards in the New gTLDs for IGO (Inter-Governmental Organization) names at the second level, and specifically related such advice for names relating to Red Cross and Red Crescent.

Civil Society in ICANN and Internet Governance

NCUC, or the Noncommercial Users Constituency www.ncuc.org, voice of civil society in ICANN’s policy processes on generic top level domain names and related matters, as well as other civil society actors from the ICANN community organized a workshop to provide an opportunity for open and vigorous dialogue between public interest advocates who are active both within and outside the ICANN community.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/report-on-icann-50

IANA Transition Stewardship & ICANN Accountability (II)

jyoti — 2015-07-31T15:47:20Z

This paper is the second in a multi-part series, in which we provide an overview of submitted proposals and highlight areas of concern that will need attention moving forward. The series is a work in progress and will be updated as the processes move forward. It is up for public comments and we welcome your feedback.

The discussions and the processes established for transition plan have moved rapidly, though not fast enough—given the complicated legal and technical undertaking it is. ICG will be considering the submitted proposals and moving forward on consultations and recommendations for pending proposals. ICANN53 saw a lot of discussion on the implementation of the proposals from the numbers and protocols community, while the CWG addressed the questions related to the 2^nd draft of the names community proposal. The Protocol Parameters (IANA PLAN Working Group) submitted to ICG on 6 January 2015, while the Numbering Resources (CRISP Team) submitted on 15 January 2015. The Domain Names (CWG-Stewardship) submitted its second draft to ICG on 25 June 2015. The ICG had a face-to-face meeting in Buenos Aires and their proposal to transition the stewardship of the IANA functions is expected to be out for public comment July 31 to September 8, 2015. Parallelly, the CCWG on Enhancing ICANN Accountability offered its first set of proposals for public comment in June 2015 and organised two working sessions at ICANN'53. More recently, the CCWG met in Paris focusing on the proposed community empowerment mechanisms, emerging concerns and progress on issues so far.

Number and Protocols Proposals

The numbering and the protocol communities have developed and approved their plans for the transition. Both communities are proposing a direct contractual relationship with ICANN, in which they have the ability to end the contract on their terms. The termination clause has seen push back from ICANN and teams involved in the negotiations have revealed that ICANN has verbally represented that they will reject any proposed agreement in which ICANN is not deemed the sole source prime contractor for IANA functions in perpetuity.[1] The emerging contentious negotiations on the issue of separability i.e., the ability to change to a different IANA functions operator, is an important issue.[2] As Milton Mueller points out, ICANN seems to be using these contract negotiations to undo the HYPERLINK "http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-monopoly-and-its-willing-to-wreck-the-transition-process-to-get-it/#comment-40045"community process and that ICANN’s staff members are viewing themselves, rather than the formal IANA transition process shepherded by the ICG, as the final authority on the transition.[3] The attempts of ICANN Staff to influence or veto ideas regarding what solutions will be acceptable to NTIA and the Congress goes beyond its mandate to facilitate the transition dialogue. The ARIN meeting[4] and the process of updating MoU with IETF which mandates supplementary SLAs[5] are examples of ICANN leveraging its status as the incumbent IANA functions operator, with which all three operational communities must negotiate, to ensure that the outcome of the IANA transition process does not threaten its control.

Names Proposal

Recently, the CWG working on recommendations for the names related functions provided an improved 2nd draft of their earlier complex proposal which attempts to resolve the internal-external debate with a middle ground, with the creation of Post-Transition IANA (PTI). PTI a subsidiary/affiliate of the current contract-holder, ICANN, will be created and handed the IANA contract and its related technology and staff. Therefore, ICANN takes on the role of the contracting authority and PTI as the contracted party will perform the names-related IANA functions. Importantly, under the new proposal CWG has done away altogether with the requirement of “authorisation” to root zone changes and the reasons for this decision have not been provided. The proposal also calls for creation of a Customer Standing Committee (CSC) to continuously monitor the performance of IANA and creation a periodic review process, rooted in the community, with the ability to recommend ICANN relinquishing its role in names-related IANA functions, if necessary. A key concern area is the external oversight mechanism Multistakeholder Review Team– has been done away with. This is a significant departure from the version placed for public comment in December 2014. It is expected that clarification will be sought from the CWG on how it has factored in inputs from the first round of public comments.

Consensus around the CWG 2nd Draft

There is a growing consensus around the model proposed—the numbers community has commented on the proposal that it does "not foresee any incompatibility between the CWG's proposal”.[6] On the IANA PLAN list, members of the protocols community have also expressed willingness to accept the new arrangement to keep all the IANA functions together in PTI during the transition and view this as merely a reorganization.[7] However, acceptance of the proposal is pending till clarification related to how the PTI will be set up and its legal standing and scope are provided.

Structure of PTI

Presently, two corporate forms are being considered for the PTI, a nonprofit public benefit corporation (PBC) or a limited liability corporation (LLC), with a single member, ICANN, at its outset. Milton Mueller has advocated for the incorporation of PTI as a PBC rather than as a LLC, with its board composed of a mix of insiders and outsiders.[8] He is of the view that LLC form makes the implementation of PTI much more complex and risky as the CWG would need to debate mechanisms of control for the PTI as part of the transition process. The choice of structure is important as it will define the limitations and responsibilities that will be placed on the PTI Board—an important and necessary accountability mechanism.

Broadly, the division of views is around selection of the Board Members that is if they should be chosen either by IANA's customers or representative groups within ICANN or solely by the Board. The degree of autonomy which the PTI has given the existing ICANN structure is also a key developing question. Debate on autonomy of PTI are broadly centered around two distinct views of PTI being incorporated in a different country, to prevent ICANN from slowly subsuming the organization. The other view endorsed by ICANN states that a high degree of autonomy risks creates additional bureaucracy and process for no discernible improvement in actual services.

Functional Separability

Under the CWG-Stewardship draft proposal, ICANN would assume the role currently fulfilled by NTIA (overseeing the IANA function), while PTI would assume the role currently played by ICANN (the IANA functions operator). A divisive area here is that the goal of “functional separation” is defeated with PTI being structured as an “affiliate” wholly owned subsidiary, as it will be subject to management and policies of ICANN. From this view, while ICANN as the contracting party has the right of selecting future IANA functions operators, the legal and policy justification for this has not been provided. It is expected that ICANN'53 will see discussions around the PTI will focus on its composition, legal standing and applicability of the California law.

Richard Hill is of the view that the details of how PTI would be set up is critical for understanding whether or not there is "real" separation between ICANN and PTI leading to the conclusion of a meaningful contract in the sense of an agreement between two separate entities.[9] This functional separation and autonomy is granted by the combination of a legally binding contract, CSC oversight, periodic review and the possibility of non-renewal of the contract.[10]

Technical and policy roles - ICANN and PTI

The creation of PTI splits the technical and policy functions between ICANN and PTI. The ICANN Board comments on CWG HYPERLINK "http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfrIUO5F9nY4.pdf"PrHYPERLINK "http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfrIUO5F9nY4.pdf"oHYPERLINK "http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfrIUO5F9nY4.pdf"posal also confirm PTI having no policy role, nor it being intended to in the future, and that while it will have control of the budget amounts ceded to it by ICANN the funding of the PTI will be provided by ICANN as part of the ICANN budgeting process.[11] The comments from the Indian government on the proposal states this as an issue of concern, as it negates ICANN's present role as a merely technical coordination body. The concerns stem from placing ICANN in the role of the perpetual contracting authority for the IANA function makes ICANN the sole venue for decisions relating to naming policy as well as the entity with sole control over the PTI under the present wholly subsidiary entity.[12]

Key areas of work related to the distinction between the PTI and ICANN policy and technical functions include addressing how the new PFI Board would be structured, what its role would be, and what the legal construction between it and ICANN. The ICANN Board too has sought some important clarifications on its relationship as a parent body including areas where the PTI is separate from ICANN and areas where CWG sees shared services as being allowable (shared office space, HR, accounting, legal, payroll). It also sought clarification on the line of reporting, duties of the PTI Directors and alignment of PTI corporate governance with that of ICANN.

The Swedish government has commented that the next steps in this process would be clarification of the process for designing the PTI-IANA contract, a process to establish community consent before entering the contract, explicit mention of whom the contracting parties are and what their legal responsibilities would be in relation to it.[13]

Internal vs External Accountability

The ICANN Board, pushing for an internal model of full control of IANA Functions is of the view that a more independent PTI could somehow be "captured" and used to thwart the policies developed by ICANN. However, others have pointed out that under proposed structure PTI has strong ties to ICANN community that implements the policies developed by ICANN.[14] With no funding and no authority other than as a contractor of ICANN, if PTI is acting in a manner contrary to its contract it would be held in breach and could be replaced under the proposal.

Even so, as the Indian government has pointHYPERLINK "http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfJGK6yVohdU.pdf"edHYPERLINK "http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfJGK6yVohdU.pdf" out from the point of view of institutional architecture and accountability, this model is materially worse off than the status quo.[15]

The proposed PTI and ICANN relationship places complete reliance on internal accountability mechanisms within ICANN, which is not a prudent institutional design. The Indian government anticipates a situation where, in the event there is customer/ stakeholder dissatisfaction with ICANN’s role in naming policy development, there would be no mechanism to change the entity which fulfils this role. They feel that the earlier proposal for the creation of a Contract Co, a lightweight entity with the sole purpose of being the repository of contracting authority, and award contracts including the IANA Functions Contract provided a much more effective mechanism for external accountability. While the numbers and protocol communities have proposed a severable contractual relationship with ICANN for the performance of its SLAs no such mechanism exists with respect to ICANN's role in policy development for names.

Checks and Balances

Under the current proposal the Customer Standing Committee (CSC) has the role, of constantly reviewing the technical aspects of the naming function as performed by PTI. This, combined with the proposed periodic IANA Function Review (IFR), would act as a check on the PTI. The current draft proposal does not specify what will be the consequence of an unfavourable IANA Functions Review.

Some other areas of focus going forward relate to the IFR team inclusion in ICANN bylaws along the lines of the AOC established in 2009.[16] Also, ensuring the IFR team clarifies the scope of separability. The circumstances and procedures in place for pulling the IANA contract away if it has been established that ICANN is not fulfilling it contractual agreements. This will be a key accountability mechanism and deterrent for ICANN controlling the exercise of its influence.

CCWG Accountability

Work Stream (WS1): Responsible for drafting a mechanism for enhancing ICANN accountability, which must be in place before the IANA stewardship transition.

Work Stream (WS2): Addressing long term accountability topics which may extend beyond the IANA Stewardship Transition.

The IANA transition was recognized to be dependent on ICANN’s wider accountability, and this has exposed the trust issues between community and leadership and the proposal must be viewed in this context. The CCWG Draft Proposal attempts 4 significant new undertakings:

A. Restating ICANN’s Mission, Commitments, and Core Values, and placing those into the ICANN Bylaws. The CCWG has recommended that some segments of the Affirmation of Commitments (AOC)– a contract on operating principles agreed upon between ICANN and the United States government – be absorbed into the Corporation’s bylaws.

B. Establishing certain bylaws as “Fundamental Bylaws” that cannot be altered by the ICANN Board acting unilaterally, but over which stakeholders have prior approval rights;

C. Creating a formal “membership” structure for ICANN, along with “community empowerment mechanisms”. Some of the community empowerment mechanisms including (a) remove individual Board members, (b) recall the entire Board, (c) veto or approve changes to the ICANN Bylaws, Mission Statement, Commitments, and Core Values; and (d) to veto Board decisions on ICANN’s Strategic Plan and its budget;

D. Enhancing and strengthening ICANN's Independent Review Process (IRP) by creating a standing IRP Panel empowered to review actions taken by the corporation for compliance both with stated procedures and with the Bylaws, and to issue decisions that are binding upon the ICANN Board.

The key questions likely to be raised at ICANN 53 on several of these proposals will likely concern how these empowerment mechanisms affect the “legal nature” of the community.

Membership and Accountability

At the heart of the distrust between the ICANN Board and the community is the question of membership. ICANN as a corporation is a private sector body that is largely unregulated, with no natural competitors, cash-rich and directly or indirectly supports many of its participants and other Internet governance processes. Without effective accountability and transparency mechanisms, the opportunities for distortion, even corruption, are manifold. In such an environment, placing limitations on the Board’s power is critical to invoke trust. Three keys areas of accountability related to the Board include: no mechanisms for recall of individual board directors; the board’s ability to amend the company’s constitution (its bylaws), and the track record of board reconsideration requests.[17]

With no membership, ICANN’s directors represent the end of the line in terms of accountability. While there is a formal mechanism to review board decisions, the review is conducted by a subset of the same people. The CCWG’s proposal to create SOs/ACs as unincorporated “members” with Articles of Association has met with a lot of discussion, especially in the Governmental Advisory Council (GAC).[18] The GAC has posed several critical questions on this set up, some of which are listed here:

Can a legal person created and acting on behalf of the GAC become a member of ICANN, even though the GAC does not appoint Board members?
If GAC does not wish to become a member, how could it still be associated to the exercise of the 6 (community empowerment mechanisms) powers?
It is still unclear what the liability of members of future “community empowered structures” would be.
What are the legal implications on rights, obligations and liabilities of an informal group like the GAC creating an unincorporated association (UA) and taking decisions as such UA, from substantial (like exercising the community powers) to clerical (appointing its board, deciding on its financing) and whether there are implications when the members of such an UA are Governments?

Any proposal to strengthen accountability of ICANN needs to provide for membership so that there is ability to remove directors, creates financial accountability by receiving financial accounts and appointing editors and can check the ICANN’s board power to change bylaws without recourse to a higher authority.

Constitutional Undertaking

David Post and Danielle Kehl have pointed out that the CCWG correctly identifies the task it is undertaking – to ensure that ICANN’s power is adequately and appropriately constrained – as a “constitutional” one.[19] Their interpretation is based on the view that even if ICANN is not a true “sovereign,” it can usefully be viewed as one for the purpose of evaluating the sufficiency of checks on its power. Subsequently, the CCWG Draft Proposal, and ICANN’s accountability post-transition, can be understood and analyzed as a constitutional exercise, and that the transition proposal should meet constitutional criteria. Further, from this view the CCWG draft reflects the reformulation of ICANN around the broadly agreed upon constitutional criteria that should be addressed. These include:

A clear enumeration of the powers that the corporation can exercise, and a clear demarcation of those that it cannot exercise.
A division of the institution’s powers, to avoid concentrating all powers in one set of hands, and as a means of providing internal checks on its exercise.
Mechanism(s) to enforce the constraints of (1) and (2) in the form of meaningful remedies for violations.

Their comments reflect that they support CCWG in their approach and progress made in designing a durable accountability structure for a post-transition ICANN. However, they have stressed that a number of important omissions and/or clarifications need to be addressed before they can be confident that these mechanisms will, in practice, accomplish their mission. One such suggestion relates to ICANN’s policy role and PTI technical role separability. Given ICANN’s position in the DNS hierarchy gives it the power to impose its policies, via the web of contracts with and among registries, registrars, and registrants, on all users of the DNS, a constitutional balance for the DNS must preserve and strengthen the separation between DNS policy-making and policy-implementation. Importantly, they have clarified that even if ICANN has the power to choose what policies are in the best interest of the community it is not free to impose them on the community. ICANN's role is a critical though narrow one: to organize and coordinate the activities of that stakeholder community – which it does through its various Supporting Organizations, Advisory Committees, and Constituencies – and to implement the consensus policies that emerge from that process. Their comments on the CCWG draft call for stating this clarification explicitly and institutionalizing separability to be guided by this critical safeguard against ICANN’s abuse of its power over the DNS.

An effective implementation of this limitation will help clarify the role mechanisms being proposed such as the PTI and is critical for creating sustainable mechanisms, post-transition. More importantly, clarifying ICANN’s mission would ensure that in the post-transition communities could challenge its decisions on the basis that it is not pertaining to the role outlined or based on strengthening the stability and security of the DNS. Presently, it is very unclear where ICANN can interfere in terms of policymaking and implementation.

Other Issues

Other issues expected to be raised in the context of ICANN's overall accountabiltiy will likey concern the following:

Strengthening financial transparency and oversight

Given the rapid growth of the global domain name industry, one would imagine that ICANN is held up to the same standard of accountability as laid down in the right to information mechanisms countries such as India. CIS has been raising this issue for a while and has managed to received the list of ICANN’s current domain name revenues.[20]

By sharing this information, ICANN has shown itself responsive to repeated requests for transparency however, the shared revenue data is only for the fiscal year ending June 2014, and historical revenue data is still not publicly available. Neither is a detailed list (current and historical) of ICANN’s expenditures publicly available. Accountability mechanisms and discussions must seek that ICANN provide the necessary information during its regular Quarterly Stakeholder Reports, as well as on its website.

Strengthening transparency

A key area of concern is ICANN's unchecked influence and growing role as an institution in the IG space. Seen in the light of the impending transition, the transparency concerns gain significance and given ICANN's vocal interests in maintaining the status quo of its role in DNS Management. While financial statements (current and historic) are public and community discussions are generally open, the complexity of the contractual arrangements in place tracking the financial reserves available to ICANN through these processes are not sufficient.

Further, ICANN as a monopoly is presently constrained only by the NTIA review and few internal mechanisms like the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP)[21], Ombudsman[22], Reconsideration and Independent Review[23] and the Accountability and Transparency Review (ATRT)[24]. These mechanisms are facing teething issues and some do not conform to the principles of natural justice. For example, a Reconsideration Request can be filed if one is aggrieved by an action of ICANN’s Board or staff. Under ICANN’s By-laws, it is the Board Governance Committee, comprising ICANN Board members, that adjudicates Reconsideration Requests.[25]

Responses to the DIDP requests filed by CIS reveal that the mechanism in its current form, is not sufficient to provide the transparency necessary for ICANN’s functioning. For instance, in the response to DIDP pertaining to the Ombudsman Requests[26], ICANN cites confidentiality as a reason to decline providing information as making Ombudsman Requests public would violate ICANN Bylaws, toppling the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman. Over December ’14 and January ’15, CIS sent 10 DIDP requests to ICANN with an aim was to test and encourage discussions on transparency from ICANN. We have received responses for 9 of our requests, and in 7 of those responses ICANN provides very little new information and moving forward we would stress the improvements of existing mechanisms along with introduction of new oversight and reporting parameters towards facilitating the transition process.[27]

[1]John Sweeting and others, 'CRISP Process Overview' (ARIN 35, 2015) https://regmedia.co.uk/2015/04/30/crisp_panel.pdf

[2]Andrew Sullivan, [Ianaplan] Update On IANA Transition & Negotiations With ICANN (2015), Email http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01680.html

[3]Milton Mueller, ‘ICANN WANTS AN IANA FUNCTIONS MONOPOLY – WILL IT WRECK THE TRANSITION PROCESS TO GET IT?’ (Internet Governance Project, 28 April 2015) http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/04/28/icann-wants-an-iana-functions-monopoly-and-its-willing-to-wreck-the-transition-process-to-get-it/#comment-40045

[4]Tony Smith, 'Event Wrap: ICANN 52' (APNIC Blog, 20 February 2015) http://blog.apnic.net/2015/02/20/event-wrap-icann-52/

[5]Internet Engineering Task Force, 'IPROC – IETF Protocol Registries Oversight Committee' (2015) https://www.ietf.org/iana/iproc.html

[6]Axel Pawlik, Numbers Community Proposal Contact Points With CWG’S Draft IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal (2015), Email http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/msg00003.html

[7]Jari Arkko, Re: [Ianaplan] CWG Draft And Its Impact On The IETF (2015), Email http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ianaplan/current/msg01843.html

[8]Milton Mueller, Comments Of The Internet Governance Project (2015), Email http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/msg00021.html

[9]Richard Hill, Initial Comments On CWG-Stewardship Draft Proposal (2015), Email http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/msg00000.html

[10]Brenden Kuerbis, 'Why The Post-Transition IANA Should Be A Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation' (Internet Governance Project, 18 May 2015) http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/05/18/why-the-post-transition-iana-should-be-a-nonp

[11]ICANN Board Comments On 2Nd Draft Proposal Of The Cross Community Working Group To Develop An IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal On Naming Related Functions (20 May 2015) http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfrIUO5F9nY4.pdf

[12]Comments Of Government Of India On The ‘2nd Draft Proposal Of The Cross Community Working Group To Develop An IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal On Naming Related Functions’ (2015) http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfJGK6yVohdU.pdf

[13]Anders Hektor, Sweden Comments To CWG-Stewardship (2015), Email http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/msg00016.html

[14]Brenden Kuerbis, 'Why The Post-Transition IANA Should Be A Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation |' (Internet Governance Project, 18 May 2015) http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/05/18/why-the-post-transition-iana-should-be-a-nonprofit-public-benefit-corporation/

[15]Comments Of Government Of India On The ‘2nd Draft Proposal Of The Cross Community Working Group To Develop An IANA Stewardship Transition Proposal On Naming Related Functions’ (2015) http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-cwg-stewardship-draft-proposal-22apr15/pdfJGK6yVohdU.pdf

[16]Kieren McCarthy, 'Internet Kingmakers Drop Ego, Devise Future Of DNS, IP Addys Etc' (The Register, 24 April 2015) http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/24/internet_kingmakers_drop_ego_devise_future_of_the_internet/

[17]Emily Taylor, ICANN: Bridging The Trust Gap (Paper Series No. 9, Global Commission on Internet Governance March 2015) https://regmedia.co.uk/2015/04/02/gcig_paper_no9-iana.pdf

[18]Milton Mueller, 'Power Shift: The CCWG’S ICANN Membership Proposal' (Internet Governance Project, 4 June 2015) http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/06/04/power-shift-the-ccwgs-icann-membership-proposal/

[19]David Post, Submission Of Comments On CCWG Draft Initial Proposal (2015), Email http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00050.html

[20] Hariharan, 'ICANN reveals hitherto undisclosed details of domain names revenues', 8 December, 2014 See: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014

[21] ICANN, Documentary Information Disclosure Policy See: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en

[22] ICANN Accountability, Role of the Ombudsman https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/accountability/ombudsman-en

[23] ICANN Reconsideration and independent review, ICANN Bylaws, Article IV, Accountability and Review https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reconsideration-and-independent-review-icann-bylaws-article-iv-accountability-and-review

[24] ICANN Accountability and Transparency Review Final Recommendations https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-recommendations-31dec13-en.pdf

[25] ICANN Bylaws Article iv, Section 2 https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#IV

[26] ICANN Response to DIDP Ombudsman https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/20141228-1-ombudsman-2015-01-28-en

[27] Table of CIS DIDP Requests See: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/iana-transition-stewardship-and-icann-accountability-2

Role of Intermediaries in Countering Online Abuse

jyoti — 2015-08-02T16:38:36Z

The Internet can be a hostile space and protecting users from abuse without curtailing freedom of expression requires a balancing act on the part of online intermediaries.

This got published as two blog entries in the NALSAR Law Tech Blog. Part 1 can be accessed here and Part 2 here.

As platforms and services coalesce around user-generated content (UGC) and entrench themselves in the digital publishing universe, they are increasingly taking on the duties and responsibilities of protecting rights including taking reasonable measures to restrict unlawful speech. Arguments around the role of intermediaries tackling unlawful content usually center around the issue of regulation—when is it feasible to regulate speech and how best should this regulation be enforced?

Recently, Twitter found itself at the periphery of such questions when an anonymous user of the platform, @LutyensInsider, began posting slanderous and sexually explicit comments about Swati Chaturvedi, a Delhi-based journalist. The online spat which began in February last year, culminated into Swati filing an FIR against the anonymous user, last week. Within hours of the FIR, the anonymous user deleted the tweets and went silent. Predictably, Twitter users hailed this as a much needed deterrence to online harassment. Swati’s personal victory is worth celebrating, it is an encouragement for the many women bullied daily on the Internet, where harassment is rampant. However, while Swati might be well within her legal rights to counter slander, the rights and liabilities of private companies in such circumstances are often not as clear cut.

Should platforms like Twitter take on the mantle of deciding what speech is permissible or not? When and how should the limits on speech be drawn? Does this amount to private censorship?The answers are not easy and as the recent Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgment in the case of Delfi AS v. Estonia confirms, the role of UGC platforms in balancing the user rights, is an issue far from being settled. In its ruling, the ECtHR reasoned that because of their role in facilitating expression, online platforms have a requirement “to take effective measures to limit the dissemination of hate speech and speech inciting violence was not ‘private censorship”.

This is problematic because the decision moves the regime away from a framework that grants immunity from liability, as long as platforms meet certain criteria and procedures. In other words the ruling establishes strict liability for intermediaries in relation to manifestly illegal content, even if they may have no knowledge. The 'obligation' placed on the intermediary does not grant them safe harbour and is not proportionate to the monitoring and blocking capacity thus necessitated. Consequently, platforms might be incentivized to err on the side of caution and restrict comments or confine speech resulting in censorship. The ruling is especially worrying, as the standard of care placed on the intermediary does not recognize the different role played by intermediaries in detection and removal of unlawful content. Further, intermediary liability is its own legal regime and is at the same time, a subset of various legal issues that need an understanding of variation in scenarios, mediums and technology both globally and in India.

Law and Short of IT

Earlier this year, in a leaked memo, the Twitter CEO Dick Costolo took personal responsibility for his platform's chronic problem and failure to deal with harassment and abuse. In Swati's case, Twitter did not intervene or take steps to address harrassment. If it had to, Twitter (India), as all online intermediaries would be bound by the provisions established under Section 79 and accompanying Rules of the Information Technology Act. These legislations outline the obligations and conditions that intermediaries must fulfill to claim immunity from liability for third party content. Under the regime, upon receiving actual knowledge of unlawful information on their platform, the intermediary must comply with the notice and takedown (NTD) procedure for blocking and removal of content.

Private complainants could invoke the NTD procedure forcing intermediaries to act as adjudicators of an unlawful act—a role they are clearly ill-equipped to perform, especially when the content relates to political speech or alleged defamation or obscenity. The SC judgment in Shreya Singhal addressing this issue, read down the provision (Section 79 by holding that a takedown notice can only be effected if the complainant secures a court order to support her allegation. Further, it was held that the scope of restrictions under the mechanism is restricted to the specific categories identified under Article 19(2). Effectively, this means Twitter need not take down content in the absence of a court order.

Content Policy as Due Diligence

Another provision, Rule 3(2) prescribes a content policy which, prior to the Shreya Singhal judgment was a criteria for administering takedown. This content policy includes an exhaustive list of types of restricted expressions, though worryingly, the terms included in it are not clearly defined and go beyond the reasonable restrictions envisioned under Article 19(2). Terms such as “grossly harmful”, “objectionable”, “harassing”, “disparaging” and “hateful” are not defined anywhere in the Rules, are subjective and contestable as alternate interpretation and standard could be offered for the same term. Further, this content policy is not applicable to content created by the intermediary.

Prior to the SC verdict in Shreya Singhal, actual knowledge could have been interpreted to mean the intermediary is called upon its own judgement under sub-rule (4) to restrict impugned content in order to seek exemption from liability. While liability accrued from not complying with takedown requests under the content policy was clear, this is not the case anymore. By reading down of S. 79 (3) (b) the court has addressed the issue of intermediaries complying with places limits on the private censorship of intermediaries and the invisible censorship of opaque government takedown requests as they must and should adhere, to the boundaries set by Article 19(2). Following the SC judgment intermediaries do not have to administer takedowns without a court order thereby rendering this content policy redundant. As it stands, the content policy is an obligation that intermediaries must fulfill in order to be exempted from liability for UGC and this due diligence is limited to publishing rules and regulations, terms and conditions or user agreement informing users of the restrictions on content. The penalties for not publishing this content policy should be clarified.

Further, having been informed of what is permissible users are agreeing to comply with the policy outlined, by signing up to and using these platforms and services. The requirement of publishing content policy as due diligence is unnecessary given that mandating such ‘standard’ terms of use negates the difference between different types of intermediaries which accrue different kinds of liability. This also places an extraordinary power of censorship in the hands of the intermediary, which could easily stifle freedom of speech online. Such heavy handed regulation could make it impossible to publish critical views about anything without the risk of being summarily censored.

Twitter may have complied with its duties by publishing the content policy, though the obligation does not seem to be an effective deterrence. Strong safe harbour provisions for intermediaries are a crucial element in the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression online. By absolving platforms of responsibility for UGC as long as they publish a content policy that is vague and subjective is the very reason why India’s IT Rules are in fact, in urgent need of improvement.

Size Matters

The standards for blocking, reporting and responding to abuse vary across different categories of platforms. For example, it may be easier to counter trolls and abuse on blogs or forums where the owner or an administrator is monitoring comments and UGC. Usually platforms outline monitoring and reporting policies and procedures including recourse available to victims and action to be taken against violators. However, these measures are not always effective in curbing abuse as it is possible for users to create new accounts under different usernames. For example, in Swati’s case the anonymous user behind @LutyensInsider account changed their handle to @gregoryzackim and @gzackim before deleting all tweets. In this case, perhaps the fear of criminal charges ahead was enough to silence the anonymous user, which may not always be the case.

Tackling the Trolls

Most large intermediaries have privacy settings which restrict the audience for user posts as well as prevent strangers from contacting them as a general measure against online harassment. Platforms also publish monitoring policy outlining the procedure and mechanisms for users to register their complaint or report abuse. Often reporting and blocking mechanisms rely on community standards and users reporting unlawful content. Last week Twitter announced a new feature allowing lists of blocked users to be shared between users. An improvement on existing mechanism for blocking, the feature is aimed at making the service safer for people facing similar issues and while an improvement on standard policies defining permissible limits on content, such efforts may have their limitations.

The mechanisms follow a one-size-fits-all policy. First, such community driven efforts do not address concerns of differences in opinion and subjectivity. Swati in defending her actions stressed the “coarse discourse” prevalent on social media, though as this article points out she might be assumed guilty of using offensive and abusive language. Subjectivity and many interpretations of the same opinion can pave the way for many taking offense online. Earlier this month, Nikhil Wagle’s tweets criticising Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a “pervert” was interpreted as “abusive”, “offensive” and “spreading religious disharmony”. While platforms are within their rights to establish policies for dealing with issues faced by users, there is a real danger of them doing so for “political reasons” and based on “popularity” measures which may chill free speech. When many get behind a particular interpretation of an opinion, lawful speech may also be stifled as Sreemoyee Kundu found out. A victim of online abuse her account was blocked by Facebook owing to multiple reports from a “faceless fanatical mob”. Allowing the users to set standards of permissible speech is an improvement, though it runs the risk of mob justice and platforms need to be vigilant in applying such standards.

While it may be in the interest of platforms to keep a hands off approach to community policies, certain kind of content may necessiate intervention by the intermediary. There has been an increase in private companies modifying their content policy to place reasonable restriction on certain hateful behaviour in order to protect vulnerable or marginalised voices. Twitter and Reddit's policy change in addressing revenge porn are reflective of a growing understanding amongst stakeholders that in order to promote free expression of ideas, recognition and protection of certain rights on the Internet may be necessary. However, any approach to regulate user content must assess the effect of policy decisions on user rights. Google's stand on tackling revenge porn may be laudable, though the decision to push down 'piracy' sites in its search results could be seen to adversely impact the choice that users have. Terms of service implemented with subjectivity and lack of transparency can and does lead to private censorship.

The Way Forward

Harassment is damaging, because of the feeling of powerlessness that it invokes in the victims and online intermediaries represent new forms of power through which users' negotiate and manage their online identity. Content restriction policies and practices must address this power imbalance by adopting baseline safeguards and best practices. It is only fair that based on principles of equality and justice, intermediaries be held responsible for the damage caused to users due to wrongdoings of other users or when they fail to carry out their operations and services as prescribed by the law. However, in its present state, the intermediary liability regime in India is not sufficient to deal with online harassment and needs to evolve into a more nuanced form of governance.

Any liability framework must evolve bearing in mind the slippery slope of overbroad regulation and differing standards of community responsibility. Therefore, a balanced framework would need to include elements of both targeted regulation and soft forms of governance as liability regimes need to balance fundamental human rights and the interests of private companies. Often, achieving this balance is problematic given that these companies are expected to be adjudicators and may also be the target of the breach of rights, as is the case in Delfi v Estonia. Global frameworks such as the Manila Principles can be a way forward in developing effective mechanisms. The determination of content restriction practices should always adopt the least restrictive means of doing so, distinguishing between the classes of intermediary. They must evolve considering the proportionality of the harm, the nature of the content and the impact on affected users including the proximity of affected party to content uploader.

Further, intermediaries and governments should communicate a clear mechanism for review and appeal of restriction decisions. Content restriction policies should incorporate an effective right to be heard. In exceptional circumstances when this is not possible, a post facto review of the restricton order and its implementation must take place as soon as practicable. Further, unlawful content restricted for a limited duration or within a specific geography, must not extend beyond these limits and a periodic review should take place to ensure the validity of the restriction. Regular, systematic review of rules and guidelines guiding intermediary liability will go a long way in ensuring that such frameworks are not overly burdensome and remain effective.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/role-of-intermediaries-in-counting-online-abuse

CIS submission to the UNGA WSIS+10 Review

jyoti — 2015-08-09T16:24:04Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) submitted its comments to the non-paper on the UNGA Overall Review of the Implementation of the WSIS outcomes, evaluating the progress made and challenges ahead.

To what extent has progress been made on the vision of the peoplecentred, inclusive and development oriented Information Society in the ten years since the WSIS?
The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003 and 2005 played an important role in encapsulating the potential of knowledge and information and communication technologies (ICT) to contribute to economic and social development. Over the past ten years, most countries have sought to foster the use of information and knowledge by creating enabling environment for innovation and through efforts to increase access. There have been interventions to develop ICT for development both at an international and national level through private sector investment, bilateral treaties and national strategies.

However, much of the progress made in the past ten years in terms of getting people connected and reaping the benefits of ICT has not been sufficiently peoplecentred, nor have they been sufficiently inclusive.

These developments have not been sufficiently peoplecentred, since governments across the world have been using the Internet as a monumental surveillance tool, invading people’s privacy without legitimate justifications, in an arbitrary manner without due care for reasonableness, proportionality, or democratic accountability. These developments have not been sufficiently peoplecentred, since the largest and most profitable Internet businesses — businesses that have more users than most nationstates have citizens, yet have one-sided terms of service — have eschewed core principles like open standards and interoperability that helped create the Internet and the World Wide Web, and instead promote silos.

We still reside in a world where development has been very lopsided, and ICTs have contributed to reducing some of these gulfs, while exacerbating others. For instance, persons with visual impairment are largely yet to reap the benefits of the Information Society due to a lack of attention paid to universal, while sighted persons have benefited far more; the ability of persons who don’t speak a language like English to contribute to global Internet governance discussions is severely limited; the spread of academic knowledge largely remains behind prohibitive paywalls.

As ICTs have grown both in sophistication and reach, much work remains to achieve the peoplecentred, inclusive and developmentoriented information society envisaged in WSIS. While the diffusion of ICTs has created new opportunities for development, even today less than half the world has access to broadband (with only eleven per cent of the world’s population having access to fixed broadband). See International Telecommunication Union, ICT Facts and Figures: The World in 2015.

Ninety per cent of people connected come from the industrialized countries — North America (thirty per cent), Europe (thirty per cent) and the AsiaPacific (thirty per cent). Four billion people from developing countries remain offline, representing two-thirds of the population residing in developing countries. Of the nine hundred and forty million people residing in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), only eighty-nine million use the Internet and only seven per cent of households have Internet access, compared with the world average of forty-six per cent. See International Telecommunication Union, ICT Facts and Figures: The World in 2015. This digital divide is first and foremost a question of access to basic infrastructure (like electricity).

Furthermore, there is a problem of affordability, all the more acute since in the South in comparison with countries of the North due to the high costs related to access to the connection. Further, linguistic, educational, cultural and content related barriers are also contributing to this digital divide. Growth of restrictive regimes around intellectual property, vision of the equal and connected society. Security of critical infrastructure with in light of ever growing vulnerabilities, the loss of trust following revelations around mass surveillance and a lack of consensus on how to tackle these concerns are proving to be a challenge to the vision of a connected information society. The WSIS+10 overall review is timely and a much needed intervention in assessing the progress made and planning for the challenges ahead.

There were two bodies as major outcomes of the WSIS process: the Internet Governance Forum and the Digital Solidarity Fund, with both of these largely failing to achieve their intended goals. The Internet Governance Forum, which is meant to be a leading example of “multi-stakeholder governance” is also a leading example of what the Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) noted in 2010 as “‘black box’ approach”, with the entire process around the nomination and selection of the MAG being opaque. Indeed, when CIS requested the IGF Secretariat to share information on the nominators, we were told that this information will not be made private. Five years since the MAG lamented its own blackbox nature, things have scarcely improved. Further, analysis of MAG membership since 2006 shows that 26 persons have served for 6 years or more, with the majority of them being from government, industry, or the technical community. Unsurprisingly, 36 per cent of the MAG membership has come from the WEOG group, highlighting both deficiencies in the nomination/selection
process as well as the need for capacity building in this most important area. The Digital Solidarity Fund failed for a variety of reason, which we have analysed in a separate document annexed to this response.

What are the challenges to the implementation of WSIS outcomes?

Some of the key areas that need attention going forward and need to be addressed include:

Access to Infrastructure

Developing policies aimed at promoting innovation and increasing affordable access to hardware and software, and curbing the ill effects of the currentlyexcessive patent and copyright regimes.

Focussing global energies on solutions to lastmile access to the Internet in a manner that is not decoupled from developmental ground realities.
This would include policies on spectrum sharing, freeing up underutilized spectrum, and increasing unlicensed spectrum.
This would also include governmental policies on increasing competition among Internet providers at the last mile as well as at the backbone (both nationally and internationally), as well as commitments for investments in basic infrastructure such as an openaccess national fibreoptic backbone where the private sector investment is not sufficient.
Developing policies that encourage local Internet and communications infrastructure in the form of Internet exchange points, data centres, community broadcasting.

Access to Knowledges

As the Washington Declaration on IP and the Public Interest5 points out, the enclosure of the public domain and knowledge commons through expansive “intellectual property” laws and policies has only gotten worse with digital technologies, leading to an unjust allocation of information goods, and continuing royalty outflows from the global South to a handful of developing countries. This is not sustainable, and urgent action is needed to achieve more democratic IP laws, and prevent developments such as extra judicial enforcement mechanisms such as digital restrictions management systems from being incorporated within Web standards.
Aggressive development of policies and adoption of best practices to ensure that persons with disabilities are not treated as secondgrade citizens, but are able to fully and equally participate in and benefit from the Information Society.
Despite the rise of video content on the Internet, much of that has been in parts of the world with already high literacy, and language and illiteracy continue to pose barriers to full usage of the Internet.
While the Tunis Agenda highlighted the need to address communities marginalized in Information Society discourse, including youth, older persons, women, indigenous peoples, people with disabilities, and remote and rural communities, but not much progress has been seen on this front.

Rights, Trust, and Governance

Ensuring effective and sustainable participation especially from developing countries and marginalised communities. Developing governance mechanisms that are accountable, transparent and provide checks against both unaccountable commercial interests as well as governments.
Building citizen trust through legitimate, accountable and transparent governance mechanisms.
Ensuring cooperation between states as security is influenced by global foreign policy, and is of principal importance to citizens and consumers, and an enabler of other rights.
As the Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability show, uninformed intermediary liability policies, blunt and heavy handed regulatory measures, failing to meet the principles of necessity and proportionality, and a lack of consistency across these policies has resulted in censorship and other human rights abuses by governments and private parties, limiting individuals’ rights to free expression and creating an environment of uncertainty that also impedes innovation online. In developing, adopting, and reviewing legislation, policies and practices that govern the liability of intermediaries, interoperable and harmonized regimes that can promote innovation while respecting users’ rights in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights are needed and should be encouraged.
An important challenge before the Information Society is that of the rise of “quantified society”, where enormous amounts of data are generated constantly, leading to great possibilities and grave concerns regarding privacy and data protection.
Reducing tensions arising from the differences between cultural and digital nationalism including on issues such as data sovereignty, data localisation, unfair trade and the need to have open markets.
Currently, there is a lack of internationally recognized venues accessible to all stakeholders for not only discussing but also acting upon many of these issues.

What should be the priorities in seeking to achieve WSIS outcomes and progress towards the Information Society, taking into account emerging trends?
All the challenges mentioned above should be a priority in achieving WSIS outcomes and ensuring innovation to lead social and economic progress in society. Digital literacy, multilingualism and addressing privacy and user data related issues need urgent attention in the global agenda. Enabling increased citizen participation thus accounting for the diverse voices that make the Internet a unique medium should also be treated as priority. Renewing the IGF mandate and giving it teeth by adopting indicators for development and progress, periodic review and working towards tangible outcomes would be beneficial to achieving the goal of a connected information society.

What are general expectations from the WSIS + 10 High Level Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly?
We would expect the WSIS+10 High Level Meeting to endorse an outcome document that seeks to d evelop a comprehensive policy framework addressing the challenges highlighted above . It would also be beneficial, if the outcome document could identify further steps to assess development made so far, and actions for overcoming the identified challenges. Importantly, this should not only be aimed at governments, but at all stakeholders. This would be useful as a future road map for regulation and would also allow us to understand the impact of Internet on society.

What shape should the outcome document take?
The outcome document should be a resolution of the UN General Assembly, with high level policy statements and adopted agreements to work towards identified indicators. It should stress the urgency of reforms needed for ICT governance that is democratic, respectful of human rights and social justice and promotes participatory policymaking. The language should promote the use of technologies and institutional architectures of governance that ensure users’ rights over data and information and recognize the need to restrict abusive use of technologies including those used for mass surveillance. Further, the outcome document should underscore the relevance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights, in the Information Society.

The outcome document should also acknowledge that certain issues such as security, ensuring transnational rights, taxation, and other such cross jurisdictional issues may need greater international cooperation and should include concrete steps on how to proceed on these issues. The outcome document should acknowledge the limited progress made through outcome-less multi-stakeholder governance processes such as the Internet Governance Forum, which favour status quoism, and seek to enable the IGF to be more bold in achieving its original goals, which are still relevant. It should be frank in its acknowledgement of the lack of consensus on issues such as “enhanced cooperation” and the “respective roles” of stakeholders in multi-stakeholder processes, as brushing these difficulties under the carpet won’t help in magically building consensus. Further, the outcome document should recognize that there are varied approaches to multi-stakeholder governance.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-submission-to-unga-wsis-review