Centre for Internet and Society

Re: The Human DNA Profiling Bill, 2012

bhairav — 2013-10-29T10:00:47Z

This short note speaks to legal issues arising from the proposed Human DNA Profiling Bill, 2012 ("DBT Bill") that was circulated drafted under the aegis of the Department of Biotechnology of the Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India, which seeks to collect human DNA samples, profile them and store them. These comments are made clause-by-clause against the DBT Bill.

Note: Clause-by-clause comments on the Working Draft version of April 29, 2012 from the Centre for Internet and Society

This short note speaks to legal issues arising from the proposed Human DNA Profiling Bill, 2012 ("DBT Bill") that was circulated within the Experts Committee constituted under the aegis of the Department of Biotechnology of the Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India.
This note must be read against the relevant provisions of the DBT Bill and, where indicated, together with the proposed Forensic DNA Profiling (Regulation) Bill, 2013 that was drafted by the Centre for Internet & Society, Bangalore ("CIS Bill"). These comments must also be read alongside the two-page submission titled “A Brief Note on the Forensic DNA Profiling (Regulation) Bill, 2013” ("CIS Note"). Whereas the aforesaid CIS Note raised issues that informed the drafting of the CIS Bill, this present note seeks to provide legal comments on the DBT Bill.
Preamble
The DBT Bill, in its current working form, lacks a preamble. No doubt, a preamble will be added later once the text of the DBT Bill is finalised. Instead, the DBT Bill contains an introduction. It must be borne in mind that the purpose of the legislation should be spelt out in the preamble since preambular clauses have interpretative value. [See, A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar AIR 1956 SC 246; Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. AIR 1961 SC 954; and Arnit Das (2000) 5 SCC 488]. Hence, a preamble that states the intent of Parliament to create permissible conditions for DNA source material collection, profiling, retention and forensic use in criminal trials is necessary.
Objects Clause
An ‘objects clause,’ detailing the intention of the legislature and containing principles to inform the application of a statute, in the main body of the statute is an enforceable mechanism to give directions to a statute and can be a formidable primary aid in statutory interpretation. [See, for example, section 83 of the Patents Act, 1970 that directly informed the Order of the Controller of Patents, Mumbai, in the matter of NATCO Pharma and Bayer Corporation in Compulsory Licence Application No. 1 of 2011.] Therefore, the DBT Bill should incorporate an objects clause that makes clear that (i) the principles of notice, confidentiality, collection limitation, personal autonomy, purpose limitation and data minimisation must be adhered to at all times; (ii) DNA profiles merely estimate the identity of persons, they do not conclusively establish unique identity; (iii) all individuals have a right to privacy that must be continuously weighed against efforts to collect and retain DNA; (iv) centralised databases are inherently dangerous because of the volume of information that is at risk; (v) forensic DNA profiling is intended to have probative value; therefore, if there is any doubt regarding a DNA profile, it should not be received in evidence by a court; (vi) once adduced, the evidence created by a DNA profile is only corroborative and must be treated on par with other biometric evidence such as fingerprint measurements.
Definitions
The definition of “analytical procedure” in clause 2(1)(a) of the DBT Bill is practically redundant and should be removed. It is used only twice – in clauses 24 and 66(2)(p) which give the DNA Profiling Board the power to frame procedural regulations. In the absence of specifying the content of any analytical procedure, the definition serves no purpose.
The definition of “audit” in clause 2(1)(b) is relevant for measuring the training programmes and laboratory conditions specified in clauses 12(f) and 27. However, the term “audit” is subsequently used in an entirely different manner in Chapter IX which relates to financial information and transparency. This is a conflicting definition. The term “audit” has a well-established use for financial information that does not require a definition. Hence, this definition should be removed.
The definition of “calibration” in clause 2(1)(d) is redundant and should be removed since the term is not meaningfully used in the DBT Bill.
The definition of “DNA Data Bank” in clause 2(1)(h) is unnecessary. The DBT Bill seeks to establish a National DNA Data Bank, State DNA Data Banks and Regional DNA Data Banks vide clause 32. These national, state and regional databases must be defined individually with reference to their establishment clauses. Defining a “DNA Data Bank”, exclusive of the national, state and regional databases, creates the assumption that any private individual can start and maintain a database. This is a drafting error.
The definition of “DNA Data Bank Manager” in clause 2(1)(i) is misleading since, in the text of the DBT Bill, it is only used in relation to the proposed National DNA Data Bank and never in relation to the State and Regional Data Banks. If it is the intention of DBT Bill that only the national database should have a manager, the definition should be renamed to ‘National DNA Data Bank Manager’ and the clause should specifically identify the National DNA Data Bank. This is a drafting error.
The definition of “DNA laboratory” in clause 2(1)(j) should refer to the specific clauses that empower the Central Government and State Governments to license and recognise DNA laboratories. This is a drafting error.
The definition of “DNA profile” in clause 2(1)(l) is too vague. Merely the results of an analysis of a DNA sample may not be sufficient to create an actual DNA profile. Further, the results of the analysis may yield DNA information that, because of incompleteness or lack of information, is inconclusive. These incomplete bits of information should not be recognised as DNA profiles. This definition should be amended to clearly specify the contents of a complete and valid DNA profile that contains, at least, numerical representations of 17 or more loci of short tandem repeats that are sufficient to estimate biometric individuality of a person.
The definition of “forensic material” in clause 2(1)(o) needs to be amended to remove the references to intimate and non-intimate body samples. If the references are retained, then evidence collected from a crime scene, where an intimate or non-intimate collection procedure was obviously not followed, will not fall within the scope of “forensic material”.
The terms “intimate body sample” and “non-intimate body sample” that are defined in clauses 2(1)(q) and 2(1)(v) respectively are not used anywhere outside the definitions clause except for an inconsequential reference to non-intimate body samples only in the rule-making provision of clause 66(2)(zg). “Intimate body sample” is not used anywhere outside the definitions clause. Both these definitions are redundant and should be removed.
The terms “intimate forensic procedure” and “non-intimate forensic procedure”, that are defined in clauses 2(1)(r) and 2(1)(w) respectively, are not used anywhere except for an inconsequential reference of non-intimate forensic procedure in the rule-making provision of clause 66(2)(zg). “Intimate forensic procedure” is not used anywhere outside the definitions clause. Both these definitions are redundant and should be removed.
The term “known samples” that is defined in clause 2(1)(s) is not used anywhere outside the definitions clause and should be removed for redundancy.
The definition of “offender” in clause 2(1)(y) if vague because it does not specify the offences for which an “offender” need be convicted. It is also linked to an unclear definition of the term “undertrial”, which does not specify the nature of pending criminal proceedings and, therefore, could be used to describe simple offences such as, for example, failure to pay an electricity bill, which also attracts criminal penalties.
The term “proficiency testing” that is defined in clause 2(1)(zb) is not used anywhere in the text of the DBT Bill and should be removed.
The definitions of “quality assurance”, “quality manual” and “quality system” serve no enforceable purpose since they are used only in relation to the DNA Profiling Board’s rule-making powers under clauses 18 and 66. Their inclusion in the definitions clause is redundant. Accordingly, these definitions should be removed.
The term “suspect” defined in clause 2(1)(zi) is vague and imprecise. The standard by which suspicion is to be measured, and by whom suspicion may be entertained – whether police or others, has not been specified. The term “suspect” is not defined in either the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("CrPC") or the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC").
The DNA Profiling Board
Clause 3 of the DBT Bill, which provides for the establishment of the DNA Profiling Board, contains a sub-clause (2) which vests the Board with corporate identity. This vesting of legal personality in the DNA Profiling Board – when other boards and authorities, even ministries and independent departments, and even the armed forces do not enjoy this function – is ill-advised and made without sufficient thought. Bodies corporate may be corporations sole – such the President of India, or corporations aggregate – such as companies. The intent of corporate identity is to create a fictional legal personality where none previously existed in order for the fictional legal personality to exist apart from its members, enjoy perpetual succession and to sue in its own legal name. Article 300 of the Constitution of India vests the Central Government with legal personality in the legal name of the Union of India and the State Governments with legal personality in the legal names of their respective states. Apart from this constitutional dispensation, some regulatory authorities, such as the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India ("TRAI") and the Securities and Exchange Board of India ("SEBI") have been individually vested with legal personalities as bodies corporate to enable their autonomous governance and independent functioning to secure their ability to free, fairly and impartially regulate the market free from governmental or private collusion. Similarly, some overarching national commissions, such as the Election Commission of India and the National Human Rights Commission ("NHRC") have been vested with the power to sue and be sued in their own names. In comparison, the DNA Profiling Board is neither an independent market regulator nor an overarching national commission with judicial powers. There is no legal reason for it to be vested with a legal personality on par with the Central Government or a company. Therefore, clause 3(2) should be removed.
The size and composition of the Board that is staffed under clause 4 is extremely large. Creating unwieldy and top-heavy bureaucratic authorities and investing them with regulatory powers, including the powers of licensing, is avoidable. The DBT Bill proposes to create a Board of 16 members, most of them from a scientific background and including a few policemen and one legal administrator. In its present form, the Board is larger than many High Courts but does not have a single legal member able to conduct licensing. Drawing from the experiences of other administrative and regulatory bodies in India, the size of the Board should be drastically reduced to no more than five members, at least half of whom should be lawyers or ex-judges. The change in the legal composition of the Board is necessary because the DBT Bill contemplates that it will perform the legal function of licensing that must obey basic tenets of administrative law. The current membership may be viable only if the Board is divested of its administrative and regulatory powers and left with only scientific advice functions. Moreover, stacking the Board with scientists and policemen appears to ignore the perils that DNA collection and retention pose to the privacy of ordinary citizens and their criminal law rights. The Board should have adequate representation from the human rights community – both institutional (e.g NHRC and the State Human Rights Commissions) and non-institutional (well-regarded and experienced human rights activists). The Board should also have privacy advocates.
Clauses 5(2) and 5(3) establish an unequal hierarchy within the Board by privileging some members with longer terms than others. There is no good reason for why the Vice-Chancellor of a National Law University, the Director General of Police of a State, the Director of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory and the Director of a State Forensic Science Laboratory should serve membership terms on the Board that are longer than those of molecular biologists, population geneticists and other scientists. Such artificial hierarchies should be removed at the outset. The Board should have one pre-eminent chairperson and other equal members with equal terms.
The Chairperson of the Board, who is first mentioned in clause 5(1), has not been duly and properly appointed. Clause 4 should be modified to mention the appointment of the Chairperson and other Members.
Clause 7 deals with the issue of conflict of interest in narrow cases. The clause requires members to react on a case-by-case basis to the business of the Board by recusing themselves from deliberations and voting where necessary. Instead, it may be more appropriate to require members to make a full and public disclosures of their real and potential conflicts of interest, and then granting the Chairperson the power to prevent such members from voting on interested matters. Failure to follow these anti-collusion and anti-corruption safeguards should attract criminal penalties.
Clause 10 anticipates the appointment of a Chief Executive Officer of the Board who shall be a serving Joint Secretary to the Central Government. Clause 10(3) further requires this officer to be scientist. This may not be possible because the administrative hierarchy of the Central Government may not contain a genetic scientist.
The functions of the Board specified in clause 12 are overbroad. Advising ministries, facilitating governments, recommending the size of funds and so on – these are administrative and governance functions best left to the executive. Once the Board is modified to have sufficient legal and human rights representation, then the functions of the Board can non-controversially include licensing, developing standards and norms, safeguarding privacy and other rights, ensuring public transparency, promoting information and debate and a few other limited functions necessary for a regulatory authority.
DNA Laboratories
The provisions of Chapters V and VI may be simplified and merged.
DNA Data Banks
The creation of multiple indices in clause 32(4) cannot be justified and must be removed. The collection of biological source material is an invasion of privacy that must be conducted only in strict conditions when the potential harm to individuals is outweighed by the public good. This balance may only be struck when dealing with the collection and profiling of samples from certain categories of offenders. The implications of collecting and profiling DNA samples from corpses, suspects, missing persons and others are vast and have either not been properly understood or deliberately ignored. At this moment, the forcible collection of biological source material should be restricted to the categories of offenders mentioned in the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 ("Prisoners Act") with a suitable addition for persons arrested in connection with certain specified terrorism-related offences. Therefore, databases should contain only an offenders’ index and a crime scene index.
Clause 32(6), which requires the names of individuals to be connected to their profiles, and hence accessible to persons connected with the database, should be removed. DNA profiles, once developed, should be anonymised and retained separate from the names of their owners.
Clause 36, which allows international disclosures of DNA profiles of Indians, should be removed immediately. Whereas an Indian may have legal remedies against the National DNA Data Bank, he/she certainly will not be able to enforce any rights against a foreign government or entity. This provision will be misused to rendition DNA profiles abroad for activities not permitted in India. Similarly, as in data protection regimes around the world, DNA profiles should remain within jurisdictions with high privacy and other legal standards.
Use
The only legitimate purpose for which DNA profiles may be used is for establishing the identity of individuals in criminal trials and confirming their presence or absence from a certain location. Accordingly, clauses 39 and 40 should be re-drafted to specify this sole forensic purpose and also specify the manner in which DNA profiles may be received in evidence. For more information on this point, see the relevant provisions of the CIS Note and the CIS Bill.
The disclosure of DNA profiles should only take place to a law enforcement agency conducting a valid investigation into certain offences and to courts currently trying the individuals to whom the DNA profiles pertains. All other disclosures of DNA profiles should be made illegal. Non-consensual disclosure of DNA profiles for the study of population genetics is specifically illegal. The DBT Bill does not prescribe stringent criminal penalties and other mechanisms to affix individual liability on individual scientists and research institutions for improper use of DNA profiles; it is therefore open to the criticism that it seeks to sacrifice individual rights of persons, including the fundamental right to privacy, without parallel remedies and penalties. Clause 40 should be removed in entirety.
Clause 43 should be removed in entirety. This note does not contemplate the retention of DNA profiles of suspects and victims, except as derived from a crime scene.
Clause 45 sets out a post-conviction right related to criminal procedure and evidence. This would fundamentally alter the nature of India’s criminal justice system, which currently does not contain specific provisions for post-conviction testing rights. However, courts may re-try cases in certain narrow cases when fresh evidence is brought forth that has a nexus to the evidence upon which the person was convicted and if it can be proved that the fresh evidence was not earlier adduced due to bias. Any other fresh evidence that may be uncovered cannot prompt a new trial. Clause 45 is implicated by Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and by section 300 of the CrPC. The principle of autrefois acquit that informs section 300 of the CrPC specifically deals with exceptions to the rule against double jeopardy that permit re-trials. [See, for instance, Sangeeta Mahendrabhai Patel (2012) 7 SCC 721].

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/re-the-human-dna-profiling-bill-2012

Concerns Regarding DNA Law

bhairav — 2013-10-29T10:09:26Z

Recently, a long government process to draft a law to permit the collection, processing, profiling, use and storage of human DNA is nearing conclusion. There are several concerns with this government effort. Below, we present broad-level issues to be kept in mind while dealing with DNA law.

Background

The Department of Biotechnology released, in 29 April 2012, a working draft of a proposed Human DNA Profiling Bill, 2012 ("DBT Bill") for public comments. The draft reveals an effort to (i) permit the collection of human blood, tissue and other samples for the purpose of creating DNA profiles, (ii) license private laboratories that create and store the profiles, (iii) store the DNA samples and profiles in various large databanks in a number of indices, and (iv) permit the use of the completed DNA profiles in scientific research and law enforcement. The regulation of human DNA profiling is of significant importance to the efficacy of law enforcement and the criminal justice system and correspondingly has a deep impact on the freedoms of ordinary citizens from profiling and monitoring. Below, we highlight five important concerns to bear in mind before drafting and implementing DNA legislation.

Primary Issues

Purpose of DNA Profiling

DNA profiling serves two broad purposes – (i) forensic – to establish unique identity of a person in the criminal justice system; and, (ii) research – to understand human genetics and its contribution to anthropology, biology and other sciences. These two purposes have very different approaches to DNA profiling and the issues and concerns attendant on them vary accordingly. Forensic DNA profiling is undertaken to afford either party in a criminal trial a better possibility of adducing corroborative evidence to prosecute, or to defend, an alleged offence. DNA, like fingerprints, is a biometric estimation of the individuality of a person. By itself, in the same manner that fingerprint evidence is only proof of the presence of a person at a particular place and not proof of the commission of a crime, DNA is merely corroborative evidence and cannot, on its own strength, result in a conviction or acquittal of an offence. Therefore, DNA and fingerprints, and the process by which they are collected and used as evidence, should be broadly similar.

Procedural Integrity

Forensic DNA profiling results from biological source material that is usually collected from crime scenes or forcibly from offenders and convicts. Biological source material found at a crime scene is very rarely non-contaminated and the procedure by which it is collected and its integrity ensured is of primary legislative importance. To avoid the danger of contaminated crime scene evidence being introduced in the criminal justice system to pervert the course of justice, it is crucial to ensure that DNA is collected only from intact human cells and not from compromised genetic material. Therefore, if the biological source material found at a crime scene does not contain at least one intact human cell, the whole of the biological source material should be destroyed to prevent the possibility of compromised genetic material being collected to yield inconclusive results. Adherence to this basic principle will obviate the possibility of partial matches of DNA profiles and the resulting controversy and confusion that ensues.

Conditions of Collection

In India, the taking of fingerprints is chiefly governed by the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 ("Prisoners Act") and section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ("Evidence Act"). The Prisoners Act permits the forcible taking of fingerprints from convicts and suspects in certain conditions. The Evidence Act, in addition, permits courts to require the taking of fingerprints for the forensic purpose of establishing unique identity in a criminal trial. No
provisions exist for consensual taking of fingerprints, presumably because of the danger of self-incrimination and general privacy concerns. Since, as discussed earlier, fingerprints and DNA are biometric measurements that should be treated equally to the extent possible, the conditions for the collection of DNA should be similar to those for the taking of fingerprints.Accordingly, there should be no legal provisions that enable other kinds of collection, including from volunteers and innocent people.

Retention of DNA

As a general rule applicable in India, the retention of biometric measurements must be supported by a clear purpose that is legitimate, judicially sanctioned and transparent. The Prisoners Act, which permits the forcible taking of fingerprints from convicts, also mandates the destruction of these fingerprints when the person is acquitted or discharged. The indefinite collection of biometric measurements of people is dangerous, susceptible to abuse and invasive of civil rights. Therefore, once lawfully collected from crime scenes and offenders, their DNA profiles must be retained in strictly controlled databases with highly restricted access for the forensic purpose of law enforcement only. DNA should not be held in databases that allow non-forensic use. Further, the indices within these databases should be watertight and exclusive of each other.

DNA Laboratories

The process by which DNA profiles are created from biological source material is of critical importance. Because of the evidentiary value of DNA profiles, the laboratories in which these profiles are created must be properly licensed, professionally managed and manned by competent and impartial personnel. Therefore, the process by which DNA laboratories are licensed and permitted to operate is significant.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/concerns-regarding-dna-law

The National Cyber Security Policy: Not a Real Policy

bhairav — 2013-09-25T09:49:11Z

Cyber security in India is still a nascent field without an organised law and policy framework. Several actors participate in and are affected by India's still inchoate cyber security regime. The National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP) presented the government and other stakeholders with an opportune moment to understand existing legal limitations before devising a future framework. Unfortunately, the NCSP's poor drafting and meaningless provisions do not advance the field.

This article was published in the Observer Research Foundation's Cyber Security Monitor Vol. I, Issue.1, August 2013.

For some time now, law and policy observers in India have been noticing a definite decline in the quality of national policies emanating from the Central Government. Unlike legislation, which is notionally subject to debate in the Parliament of India, policies face no public evaluation before they are brought in to force. Since, unlike legislation, policies are neither binding nor enforceable, there has been no principled ground for demanding public deliberation of significant national policies. While Parliament’s falling standard of competence has been almost unanimously condemned, there has been nearly no criticism of the corresponding failure of the Centre to invigilate the quality of the official policies of its ministries. Luckily for the drafters of the National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP), the rest of the country has also mostly failed to notice its poor content.

The NCSP was notified into effect on 2 July 2013 by the Department of Electronics and Information Technology – which calls itself DeitY – of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. As far as legislation and legal drafting go, DeitY has a dubious record. In March 2013, in a parliamentary appraisal of subordinate law framed by DeitY, a Lok Sabha committee found ambiguity, invasions of privacy and potentially illegal clauses. Apprehensions about statutory law administered by DeitY have also found their way to the Supreme Court of India, where a constitutional challenge to certain provisions of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) continues. On more than one occasion, owing to poor drafting, DeitY has been forced to issue advisories and press releases to clarify the meaning of its laws. Ironically, the legal validity of these clarifications is also questionable.

A national policy must set out, in real and quantifiable terms, the objectives of the government in a particular field within a specified time frame. To do that, the policy must provide the social, economic, political and legal context prevalent at the time of its issue as well as a normative statement of factual conditions it seeks to achieve at the time of its expiry. Between these two points in time, the policy must identify and explain all the particular social, economic, political and legal measures it intends to implement to secure its success. Albeit concerned solely with economic growth, the Five-Year Plans – the Second and Tenth Plans in particular, without prejudice to their success or failure, are samples of policies that are well-drafted. In this background, the NCSP should be judged on the basis of how it addresses, in no particular order, national security, democratic freedoms, economic growth and knowledge development. Let us restrict ourselves to the first two issues.

There are broadly two intersections between national security and information technology; these are: (i) the security of networked communications used by the armed forces and intelligence services, and (ii) the storage of civil information of national importance. While the NCSP makes no mention of it, the adoption of the doctrine of network-centric warfare by the three armed forces is underway. Understanding the doctrine is simple – an intensive use of information technology to create networks of information aids situational awareness and enables collaboration to bestow an advantage in combat. However, the doctrine is vulnerable to asymmetric attack using both primitive and highly sophisticated means. Pre-empting such attacks should be a primary policy concern; not so, apparently, for the NCSP which is completely silent on this issue. The NCSP is slightly more forthcoming on the protection of critical information infrastructure of a civil nature. Critical information infrastructure, such as the national power grid or the Aadhar database, is narrowly defined in section 70 of the IT Act where it used to describe a protected system. Other provisions of the IT Act also deal with the protection of critical information infrastructure. The NCSP does not explain how these statutory provisions have worked or failed, as the case may be, to necessitate further mention in a policy document. For instance, section 70A of the IT Act, inserted in 2008, enables the creation of a national nodal agency to undertake research and development and other activities in respect of critical information infrastructure. Despite this, five years later, the NCSP makes a similar recommendation to operate a National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre to undertake the same activities. In the absence of any meaningful explanation of intended policy measures, there is no reason to expect that the NCSP will succeed where an Act of Parliament has failed.

But, putting aside the shortcomings of its piece-meal provisions, the NCSP also fails to address high-level conceptual policy concerns. As information repositories and governance services through information technology become increasingly integrated and centralised, the security of the information that is stored or distributed decreases. Whether by intent or error, if these consolidated repositories of information are compromised, the quantity of information susceptible to damage is greater leading to higher insecurity. Simply put, if power transmission is centrally controlled instead of zonally, a single attack could black out the entire country instead of only a part of it. Or if personal data of citizens is centrally stored, a single leak could compromise the privacy of millions of people instead of only hundreds. Therefore, a credible policy must, before it advocates greater centralisation of information, examine the merits of diffused information storage to protect national security. The NCSP utterly fails in this regard.

Concerns short of national security, such as the maintenance of law and order, are also in issue because crime is often planned and perpetrated using information technology. The prevention of crime before it is committed and its prosecution afterwards is a key policy concern. While the specific context may vary depending on the nature of the crime – the facts of terrorism are different from those of insurance fraud – the principles of constitutional and criminal law continue to apply. However, the NCSP neither examines the present framework of cybersecurity-related offences nor suggests any changes in existing law. It merely calls for a “dynamic legal framework and its periodic review to address the cyber security challenges” (sic). This is self-evident, there was no need for a new national policy to make this discovery; and, ironically, it fails to conduct the very periodic review that it envisages. This is worrying because the NCSP presented DeitY with an opportunity to review existing laws and learn from past mistakes. There are concerns that cybersecurity laws, especially relevant provisions of the IT Act and its rules, betray a lack of understanding of India’s constitutional scheme. This is exemplified by the insertion, in 2008, of section 66A into the IT Act that criminalises the sending of annoying, offensive and inconvenient electronic messages without regard for the fact that free speech that is annoying is constitutionally protected.

In India, cybersecurity law and policy attempts to compensate for the state’s inability to regulate the internet by overreaching into and encroaching upon democratic freedoms. The Central Monitoring System (CMS) that is being assembled by the Centre is a case in point. Alarmed at its inability to be privy to private communications, the Centre proposes to build systems to intercept, in real time, all voice and data traffic in India. Whereas liberal democracies around the world require such interceptions to be judicially sanctioned, warranted and supported by probable cause, India does not even have statutory law to regulate such an enterprise. Given that, once completed, the CMS will represent the largest domestic interception effort in the world, the failure of the NCSP to examine the effect of such an exercise on daily cybersecurity is bewildering. This is made worse by the fact that the state does not possess the technological competence to build such a system by itself and is currently tendering private companies for equipment. The state’s incompetence is best portrayed by the activities of the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) that was constituted under section 70B of the IT Act to respond to “cyber incidents”. CERT-In has repeatedly engaged in extra-judicial censorship and has ham-handedly responded to allegedly objectionable blogs or websites by blocking access to entire domains. Unfortunately, the NCSP, while reiterating the operations of CERT-In, attempts no evaluation of its activities precluding the scope for any meaningful policy measures.

The NCSP’s poor drafting, meaningless provisions, deficiency of analysis and lack of stated measures renders it hollow. Its notification into force adds little to the public or intellectual debate about cybersecurity and does nothing to further the trajectory of either national security or democratic freedoms in India. In fairness, this problem afflicts many other national policies. There is a need to revisit the high intellectual and practical standards set by most national policies that were issued in the years following Independence.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/orfonline-bhairav-acharya-observer-research-foundation-cyber-security-monitor-august-2013-nsp-not-a-real-policy

Privacy (Protection) Bill, 2013: Updated Third Draft

bhairav — 2013-10-01T12:25:43Z

The Centre for Internet and Society has been researching privacy in India since 2010 with the objective of raising public awareness around privacy, completing in depth research, and driving a privacy legislation in India. As part of this work, we drafted the Privacy (Protection) Bill, 2013.

This research is being undertaken as part of the 'SAFEGUARDS' project that CIS is doing with Privacy International and IDRC. The following is the latest version with changes based on the Round Table held on August 24:

[Preamble]

CHAPTER I

Preliminary

1. Short title, extent and commencement. – (1) This Act may be called the Privacy (Protection) Act, 2013.

(2) It extends to the whole of India.

(3) It shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint.

2. Definitions. – In this Act and in any rules made thereunder, unless the context otherwise requires, –

(a) “anonymise” means, in relation to personal data, the removal of all data that may, whether directly or indirectly in conjunction with any other data, be used to identify the data subject;

(b) “appropriate government” means, in relation the Central Government or a Union Territory Administration, the Central Government; in relation a State Government, that State Government; and, in relation to a public authority which is established, constituted, owned, controlled or substantially financed by funds provided directly or indirectly –

(i) by the Central Government or a Union Territory Administration, the Central Government;

(ii) by a State Government, that State Government;

(c) “authorised officer” means an officer, not below the rank of a Gazetted Officer, of an All India Service or a Central Civil Service, as the case may be, who is empowered by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to intercept a communication of another person or carry out surveillance of another person under this Act;

(d) “biometric data” means any data relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a person which allow their unique identification including, but not restricted to, facial images, finger prints, hand prints, foot prints, iris recognition, hand writing, typing dynamics, gait analysis and speech recognition;

(e) “Chairperson” and “Member” mean the Chairperson and Member appointed under sub-section (1) of section 17;

(f) “collect”, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means, in relation to personal data, any action or activity that results in a data controller obtaining, or coming into the possession or control of, any personal data of a data subject;

(g) “communication” means a word or words, spoken, written or indicated, in any form, manner or language, encrypted or unencrypted, meaningful or otherwise, and includes visual representations of words, ideas, symbols and images, whether transmitted or not transmitted and, if transmitted, irrespective of the medium of transmission;

(h) “competent organisation” means an organisation or public authority listed in the Schedule;

(i) “data controller” means a person who, either alone or jointly or in concert with other persons, determines the purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data is processed;

(j) “data processor” means any person who processes any personal data on behalf of a data controller;

(k) “Data Protection Authority” means the Data Protection Authority constituted under sub-section (1) of section 17;

(l) “data subject” means a person who is the subject of personal data;

(m) “deoxyribonucleic acid data” means all data, of whatever type, concerning the characteristics of a person that are inherited or acquired during early prenatal development;

(n) “destroy”, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means, in relation to personal data, to cease the existence of, by deletion, erasure or otherwise, any personal data;

(o) “disclose”, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means, in relation to personal data, any action or activity that results in a person who is not the data subject coming into the possession or control of that personal data;

(p) “intelligence organisation” means an intelligence organisation under the Intelligence Organisations (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1985 (58 of 1985);

(q) “interception” or “intercept” means any activity intended to capture, read, listen to or understand the communication of a person;

(r) “personal data” means any data which relates to a natural person if that person can, whether directly or indirectly in conjunction with any other data, be identified from it and includes sensitive personal data;

(s) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under this Act;

(t) “process”, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means, in relation to personal data, any action or operation which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automated means including, but not restricted to, organisation, structuring, adaptation, modification, retrieval, consultation, use, alignment or destruction;

(u) “receive”, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means, in relation to personal data, to come into the possession or control of any personal data;

(v) “sensitive personal data” means personal data as to the data subject’s –

(i) biometric data;

(ii) deoxyribonucleic acid data;

(iii) sexual preferences and practices;

(iv) medical history and health;

(v) political affiliation;

(vi) commission, or alleged commission, of any offence;

(vii) ethnicity, religion, race or caste; and

(viii) financial and credit information.

(w) “store”, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means, in relation to personal data, to retain, in any form or manner and for any purpose or reason, any personal data;

(x) “surveillance” means any activity intended to watch, monitor, record or collect, or to enhance the ability to watch, record or collect, any images, signals, data, movement, behaviour or actions, of a person, a group of persons, a place or an object, for the purpose of obtaining information of a person;

and all other expressions used herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them under the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), as the case may be.

CHAPTER II

Regulation of Personal Data

3. Regulation of personal data. – Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for time being in force, no person shall collect, store, process, disclose or otherwise handle any personal data of another person except in accordance with the provisions of this Act and any rules made thereunder.

4. Exemption. – Nothing in this Act shall apply to the collection, storage, processing or disclosure of personal data for personal or domestic use.

CHAPTER III

Protection of Personal Data

5. Regulation of collection of personal data. – (1) No personal data of a data subject shall be collected except in conformity with section 6 and section 7.

(2) No personal data of a data subject may be collected under this Act unless it is necessary for the achievement of a purpose of the person seeking its collection.

(3) Subject to section 6 and section 7, no personal data may be collected under this Act prior to the data subject being given notice, in such and form and manner as may be prescribed, of the collection.

6. Collection of personal data with prior informed consent. – (1) Subject to sub-section (2), a person seeking to collect personal data under this section shall, prior to its collection, obtain the consent of the data subject.

(2) Prior to a collection of personal data under this section, the person seeking its collection shall inform the data subject of the following details in respect of his personal data, namely: –

(a) when it will be collected;

(b) its content and nature;

(d) the manner in which it may be accessed, checked and modified;

(e) the security practices, privacy policies and other policies, if any, to which it will be subject;

(f) the conditions and manner of its disclosure; and

(g) the procedure for recourse in case of any grievance in relation to it.

(3) Consent to the collection of personal data under this section may be obtained from the data subject in any manner or medium but shall not be obtained as a result of a threat, duress or coercion:

Provided that the data subject may, at any time after his consent to the collection of personal data has been obtained, withdraw the consent for any reason whatsoever and all personal data collected following the original grant of consent shall be destroyed forthwith:

Provided that the person who collected the personal data in respect of which consent is subsequently withdrawn may, if the personal data is necessary for the delivery of any good or the provision of any service, not deliver that good or deny that service to the data subject who withdrew his grant of consent.

7. Collection of personal data without prior consent. – Personal data may be collected without the prior consent of the data subject if it is –

(a) necessary for the provision of an emergency medical service to the data subject;

(b) required for the establishment of the identity of the data subject and the collection is authorised by a law in this regard;

(d) necessary to prevent, investigate or prosecute a cognisable offence.

8. Regulation of storage of personal data. – (1) No person shall store any personal data for a period longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose for which it was collected or received, or, if that purpose is achieved or ceases to exist for any reason, for any period following such achievement or cessation.

(2) Save as provided in sub-section (3), any personal data collected or received in relation to the achievement of a purpose shall, if that purpose is achieved or ceases to exist for any reason, be destroyed forthwith.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, any personal data may be stored for a period longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose for which it was collected or received, or, if that purpose has been achieved or ceases to exist for any reason, for any period following such achievement or cessation, if –

(a) the data subject grants his consent to such storage prior to the purpose for which it was collected or received being achieved or ceasing to exist;

(b) it is adduced for an evidentiary purpose in a legal proceeding; or

Provided that only that amount of personal data that is necessary to achieve the purpose of storage under this sub-section shall be stored and any personal data that is not required to be stored for such purpose shall be destroyed forthwith:

Provided further that any personal data stored under this sub-section shall, to the extent possible, be anonymised.

9. Regulation of processing of personal data. – (1) No person shall process any personal data that is not necessary for the achievement of the purpose for which it was collected or received.

(2) Save as provided in sub-section (3), no personal data shall be processed for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was collected or received.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, any personal data may be processed for a purpose other than the purpose for which it was collected or received if –

(a) the data subject grants his consent to the processing and only that amount of personal data that is necessary to achieve the other purpose is processed;

(b) it is necessary to perform a contractual duty to the data subject;

(d) it necessary to prevent, investigate or prosecute a cognisable offence.

10. Transfer of personal data for processing. – (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, personal data that has been collected in conformity with this Act may be transferred by a data controller to a data processor, whether located in India or otherwise, if the transfer is pursuant to an agreement that explicitly binds the data processor to same or stronger measures in respect of the storage, processing, destruction, disclosure and other handling of the personal data as are contained in this Act.

(2) No data processor shall process any personal data transferred under this section except to achieve the purpose for which it was collected.

(3) A data controller that transfers personal data under this section shall remain liable to the data subject for the actions of the data processor.

11. Security of personal data and duty of confidentiality. – (1) No person shall collect, receive, store, process or otherwise handle any personal data without implementing measures, including, but not restricted to, technological, physical and administrative measures, adequate to secure its confidentiality, secrecy, integrity and safety, including from theft, loss, damage or destruction.

(2) Data controllers and data processors shall be subject to a duty of confidentiality and secrecy in respect of personal data in their possession or control.

(3) Without prejudice to the provisions of this section, a data controller or data processor shall, if the confidentiality, secrecy, integrity or safety of personal data in its possession or control is violated by theft, loss, damage or destruction, or as a result of any disclosure contrary to the provisions of this Act, or for any other reason whatsoever, notify the data subject, in such form and manner as may be prescribed, forthwith.

12. Regulation of disclosure of personal data. – Subject to section 10, section 13 and section 14, no person shall disclose, or otherwise cause any other person to receive, the content or nature of any personal data that has been collected in conformity with this Act.

13. Disclosure of personal data with prior informed consent. – (1) Subject to sub-section (2), a data controller or data processor seeking to disclose personal data under this section shall, prior to its disclosure, obtain the consent of the data subject.

(2) Prior to a disclosure of personal data under this section, the data controller or data processor, as the case may be, seeking to disclose the personal data, shall inform the data subject of the following details in respect of his personal data, namely: –

(a) when it will be disclosed;

(b) the purpose of its disclosure;

(d) the procedure for recourse in case of any grievance in relation to it.

14. Disclosure of personal data without prior consent. – (1) Subject to sub-section (2), personal data may be disclosed without the prior consent of the data subject if it is necessary –

(a) to prevent a reasonable threat to national security, defence or public order; or

(b) to prevent, investigate or prosecute a cognisable offence.

(2) No data controller or data processor shall disclose any personal data unless it has received an order in writing from a police officer not below the rank of [___] in such form and manner as may be prescribed:

Provided that an order for the disclosure of personal data made under this sub-section shall not require the disclosure of any personal data that is not necessary to achieve the purpose for which the disclosure is sought:

Provided further that the data subject shall be notified, in such form and manner as may be prescribed, of the disclosure of his personal data, including details of its content and nature, and the identity of the police officer who ordered its disclosure, forthwith.

15. Quality and accuracy of personal data. – (1) Each data controller and data processor shall, to the extent possible, ensure that the personal data in its possession or control, is accurate and, where necessary, is kept up to date.

(2) No data controller or data processor shall deny a data subject whose personal data is in its possession or control the opportunity to review his personal data and, where necessary, rectify anything that is inaccurate or not up to date.

(3) A data subject may, if he finds personal data in the possession or control of a data controller or data processor that is not necessary to achieve the purpose for which it was collected, received or stored, demand its destruction, and the data controller shall destroy, or cause the destruction of, the personal data forthwith.

16. Special provisions for sensitive personal data. – Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act and the provisions of any other law for the time being in force –

(a) no person shall store sensitive personal data for a period longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose for which it was collected or received, or, if that purpose has been achieved or ceases to exist for any reason, for any period following such achievement or cessation;

(b) no person shall process sensitive personal data for a purpose other than the purpose for which it was collected or received;

(c) no person shall disclose sensitive personal data to another person, or otherwise cause any other person to come into the possession or control of, the content or nature of any sensitive personal data, including any other details in respect thereof.

CHAPTER IV

The Data Protection Authority

17. Constitution of the Data Protection Authority. – (1) The Central Government shall, by notification, constitute, with effect from such date as may be specified therein, a body to be called the Data Protection Authority consisting of a Chairperson and not more than four other Members, to exercise the jurisdiction and powers and discharge the functions and duties conferred or imposed upon it by or under this Act.

(2) The Chairperson shall be a person who has been a Judge of the Supreme Court:

Provided that the appointment of the Chairperson shall be made only after consultation with the Chief Justice of India.

(3) Each Member shall be a person of ability, integrity and standing who has a special knowledge of, and professional experience of not less than ten years in privacy law and policy.

18. Term of office, conditions of service, etc. of Chairperson and Members. – (1) Before appointing any person as the Chairperson or Member, the Central Government shall satisfy itself that the person does not, and will not, have any such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially his functions as such Chairperson or Member.

(2) The Chairperson and every Member shall hold office for such period, not exceeding five years, as may be specified in the order of his appointment, but shall be eligible for reappointment:

Provided that no person shall hold office as the Chairperson or Member after he has attained the age of sixty-seven years.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Chairperson or any Member may –

(a) by writing under his hand resign his office at any time;

(b) be removed from office in accordance with the provisions of section 19 of this Act.

(4) A vacancy caused by the resignation or removal of the Chairperson or Member under sub-section (3) shall be filled by fresh appointment.

(5) In the event of the occurrence of a vacancy in the office of the Chairperson, such one of the Members as the Central Government may, by notification, authorise in this behalf, shall act as the Chairperson till the date on which a new Chairperson, appointed in accordance with the provisions of this Act, to fill such vacancy, enters upon his office.

(6) When the Chairperson is unable to discharge his functions owing to absence, illness or any other cause, such one of the Members as the Chairperson may authorise in writing in this behalf shall discharge the functions of the Chairperson, till the date on which the Chairperson resumes his duties.

(7) The salaries and allowances payable to and the other terms and conditions of service of the Chairperson and Members shall be such as may be prescribed:

Provided that neither the salary and allowances nor the other terms and conditions of service of the Chairperson and any member shall be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment.

19. Removal of Chairperson and Members from office in certain circumstances. – The Central Government may remove from office the Chairperson or any Member, who –

(a) is adjudged an insolvent; or

(b) engages during his term of office in any paid employment outside the duties of his office; or

(d) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; or

(e) is convicted for an offence which in the opinion of the President involves moral turpitude; or

(f) has acquired such financial or other interest as is likely to affect prejudicially his functions as a Chairperson or Member, or

(g) has so abused his position as to render his continuance in offence prejudicial to the public interest.

20. Functions of the Data Protection Authority. – (1) The Chairperson may inquire, suo moto or on a petition presented to it by any person or by someone acting on his behalf, in respect of any matter connected with the collection, storage, processing, disclosure or other handling of any personal data and give such directions or pass such orders as are necessary for reasons to be recorded in writing.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the Data Protection Authority shall perform all or any of the following functions, namely –

(a) review the safeguards provided by or under this Act and other law for the time being in force for the protection of personal data and recommend measures for their effective implementation;

(b) review any measures taken by any entity for the protection of personal data and take such further action is it deems fit;

(c) review any action, policy or procedure of any entity to ensure compliance with this Act and any rules made hereunder;

(d) formulate, in consultation with experts, norms for the effective protection of personal data;

(e) promote awareness and knowledge of personal data protection through any means necessary;

(f) undertake and promote research in the field of protection of personal data;

(g) encourage the efforts of non-governmental organisations and institutions working in the field of personal data protection;

(h) publish periodic reports concerning the incidence of collection, processing, storage, disclosure and other handling of personal data;

(i) such other functions as it may consider necessary for the protection of personal data.

(3) Subject to the provisions of any rules prescribed in this behalf by the Central Government, the Data Protection Authority shall have the power to review any decision, judgement, decree or order made by it.

(4) In the exercise of its functions under this Act, the Data Protection Authority shall give such directions or pass such orders as are necessary for reasons to be recorded in writing.

(5) The Data Protection Authority may, in its own name, sue or be sued.

21. Secretary, officers and other employees of the Data Protection Authority. – (1) The Central Government shall appoint a Secretary to the Data Protection Authority to exercise and perform, under the control of the Chairperson such powers and duties as may be prescribed or as may be specified by the Chairperson.

(2) The Central Government may provide the Data Protection Authority with such other officers and employees as may be necessary for the efficient performance of the functions of the Data Protection Authority.

(3) The salaries and allowances payable to and the conditions of service of the Secretary and other officers and employees of the Data Protection Authority shall be such as may be prescribed.

22. Salaries, etc. be defrayed out of the Consolidated Fund of India. – The salaries and allowances payable to the Chairperson and Members and the administrative expenses, including salaries, allowances and pension, payable to or in respect of the officers and other employees of the of the Data Protection Authority shall be defrayed out of the Consolidated Fund of India.

23. Vacancies, etc. not to invalidate proceedings of the Data Protection Authority. – No act or proceeding of the Data Protection Authority shall be questioned on the ground merely of the existence of any vacancy or defect in the constitution of the Data Protection Authority or any defect in the appointment of a person acting as the Chairperson or Member.

24. Chairperson, Members and employees of the Data Protection Authority to be public servants. – The Chairperson and Members and other employees of the Data Protection Authority shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).

25. Location of the office of the Data Protection Authority. – The offices of the Data Protection Authority shall be in [___] or any other location as directed by the Chairperson in consultation with the Central Government.

26. Procedure to be followed by the Data Protection Authority. – (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Data Protection Authority shall have powers to regulate –

(a) the procedure and conduct of its business;

(b) the delegation to one or more Members of such powers or functions as the Chairperson may specify.

(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provisions, the powers of the Data Protection Authority shall include the power to determine the extent to which persons interested or claiming to be interested in the subject-matter of any proceeding before it may be allowed to be present or to be heard, either by themselves or by their representatives or to cross-examine witnesses or otherwise take part in the proceedings:

Provided that any such procedure as may be prescribed or followed shall be guided by the principles of natural justice.

27. Power relating to inquiries. – (1) The Data Protection Authority shall, for the purposes of any inquiry or for any other purpose under this Act, have the same powers as vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying suits in respect of the following matters, namely –

(a) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person from any part of India and examining him on oath;

(b) the discovery and production of any document or other material object producible as evidence;

(d) the requisitioning of any public record from any court or office;

(e) the issuing of any commission for the examination of witnesses; and,

(f) any other matter which may be prescribed.

(2) The Data Protection Authority shall have power to require any person, subject to any privilege which may be claimed by that person under any law for the time being in force, to furnish information on such points or matters as, in the opinion of the Data Protection Authority, may be useful for, or relevant to, the subject matter of an inquiry and any person so required shall be deemed to be legally bound to furnish such information within the meaning of section 176 and section 177 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).

(3) The Data Protection Authority or any other officer, not below the rank of a Gazetted Officer, specially authorised in this behalf by the Data Protection Authority may enter any building or place where the Data Protection Authority has reason to believe that any document relating to the subject matter of the inquiry may be found, and may seize any such document or take extracts or copies therefrom subject to the provisions of section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in so far as it may be applicable.

(4) The Data Protection Authority shall be deemed to be a civil court and when any offence as is described in section 175, section 178, section 179, section 180 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860) is committed in the view or presence of the Data Protection Authority, the Data Protection Authority may, after recording the facts constituting the offence and the statement of the accused as provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), forward the case to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same and the Magistrate to whom any such case is forwarded shall proceed to hear the complaint against the accused as if the case had been forwarded to him under section 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).

28. Decisions of the Data Protection Authority. – (1) The decisions of the Data Protection Authority shall be binding.

(2) In its decisions, the Data Protection Authority has the power to –

(a) require an entity to take such steps as may be necessary to secure compliance with the provisions of this Act;

(b) require an entity to compensate any person for any loss or detriment suffered;

29. Proceedings before the Data Protection Authority to be judicial proceedings. – The Data Protection Authority shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and every proceeding before the Data Protection Authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and section 228 and for the purposes of section 196 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).

CHAPTER V

Regulation by Data Controllers and Data Processors

30. Co-regulation by Data Controllers and the Data Protection Authority. – (1) The Data Protection Authority may, in consultation with data controllers, formulate codes of conduct for the collection, storage, processing, disclosure or other handling of any personal data.

(2) No code of conduct formulated under sub-section (1) shall be binding on a data controller unless –

(a) it has received the written approval of the Data Protection Authority; and

(b) it has received the approval, by signature of a director or authorised signatory, of the data controller.

31. Co-regulation without prejudice to other remedies. – Any code of conduct formulated under this chapter shall be without prejudice to the jurisdiction, powers and functions of the Data Protection Authority.

32. Self-regulation by data controllers. – (1) The Data Protection Authority may encourage data controllers and data processors to formulate professional codes of conduct to establish rules for the collection, storage, processing, disclosure or other handling of any personal data.

(2) No code of conduct formulated under sub-section (1) shall be effective unless it is registered, in such form and manner as may be prescribed, by the Data Protection Authority.

(3) The Data Protection Authority shall, for reasons to be recorded in writing, not register any code of conduct formulated under sub-section (1) that is not adequate to protect personal data.

CHAPTER IV

Surveillance and Interception of Communications

33. Surveillance and interception of communication to be warranted. – Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no –

(i) surveillance shall be carried out, and no person shall order any surveillance of another person;

(ii) communication shall be intercepted, and no person shall order the interception of any communication of another person; save in execution of a warrant issued under section 36, or an order made under section 38, of this Act.

34. Application for issuance of warrant. – (1) Any authorised officer seeking to carry out any surveillance or intercept any communication of another person shall prefer an application for issuance of a warrant to the Magistrate.

(2) The application for issuance of the warrant shall be in the form and manner prescribed in the Schedule and shall state the purpose for which the warrant is sought.

(3) The application for issuance of the warrant shall be accompanied by –

(i) a report by the authorised officer of the suspicious conduct of the person in respect of whom the warrant is sought, and all supporting material thereof;

(ii) an affidavit of the authorised officer, or a declaration under his hand and seal, that the contents of the report and application are true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, and that the warrant shall be executed only for the purpose stated in the application and shall not be misused or abused in any manner including to interfere in the privacy of any person;

(iii) details of all warrants previously issued in respect of the person in respect of whom the warrant is sought, if any.

35. Considerations prior to the issuance of warrant. – (1) No warrant shall issue unless the requirements of section 34 and this section have been met.

(2) The Magistrate shall consider the application made under section 34 and shall satisfy himself that the information contained therein sets out –

(i) a reasonable threat to national security, defence or public order; or

(ii) a cognisable offence, the prevention, investigation or prosecution of which is necessary in the public interest.

(3) The Magistrate shall satisfy himself that all other lawful means to acquire the information that is sought by the execution of the warrant have been exhausted.

(4) The Magistrate shall verify the identity of the authorised officer and shall satisfy himself that the application for issuance of the warrant is authentic.

36. Issue of warrant. – (1) Subject to section 34 and section 35, the Magistrate may issue a warrant for surveillance or interception of communication, or both of them.

(2) The Magistrate may issue the warrant in Chambers.

37. Magistrate may reject application for issuance of warrant. – If the Magistrate is not satisfied that the requirements of section 34 and section 35 have been met, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, –

(i) refuse to issue the warrant and dispose of the application;

(ii) return the application to the authorised officer without disposing of it;

(iii) pass any order that he thinks fit.

38. Order by Home Secretary in emergent circumstances. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 35, if the Home Secretary of the appropriate government is satisfied that a grave threat to national security, defence or public order exists, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, order any surveillance or interception of communication.

(2) An authorised officer seeking an order for surveillance or interception of communication under this section shall prefer an application to the Home Secretary in the form and manner prescribed in the Schedule and accompanied by the documents required under sub-section (3) of section 34.

(3) No order for surveillance or interception of communication made by the Home Secretary under this section shall be valid upon the expiry of a period of seven days from the date of the order.

(4) Before the expiry of a period of seven days from the date of an order for surveillance or interception of communication made under this section, the authorised officer who applied for the order shall place the application before the Magistrate for confirmation.

39. Duration of warrant or order. – (1) The warrant or order for surveillance or interception of communication shall specify the period of its validity and, upon its expiry, all surveillance and interception of communication, as the case may be, carried out in relation to that warrant or order shall cease forthwith:

Provided that no warrant or order shall be valid upon the expiry of a period of sixty days from the date of its issue.

(2) A warrant issued under section 36, or an order issued under section 38, for surveillance or interception of communication, or both of them, may be renewed by a Magistrate if he is satisfied that the requirements of sub-section (2) of section 35 continue to exist.

40. Duty to inform the person concerned. – Subject to sub-section (2), before the expiry of a period of sixty days from the conclusion of any surveillance or interception of communication carried out under this Act, the authorised officer who carried out the surveillance or interception of communication shall, in writing in such form and manner as may be prescribed, notify, with reference to the warrant of the Magistrate, and, if applicable, the order of the Home Secretary, each person in respect of whom the warrant or order was issued, of the fact of such surveillance or interception and duration thereof.

(2) The Magistrate may, on an application made by an authorised officer in such form and manner as may be prescribed, if he is satisfied that the notification under sub-section (1) would –

(a) present a reasonable threat to national security, defence or public order, or

(b) adversely affect the prevention, investigation or prosecution of a cognisable offence,

for reasons to be recorded in writing addressed to the authorised officer, order that the person in respect of whom the warrant or order of surveillance or interception of communication was issued, not be notified of the fact of such interception or the duration thereof:

41. Security and duty of confidentiality and secrecy. – (1) No person shall carry out any surveillance or intercept any communication of another person without implementing measures, including, but not restricted to, technological, physical and administrative measures, to secure the confidentiality and secrecy of all information obtained as a result of the surveillance or interception of communication, as the case may be, including from theft, loss or unauthorised disclosure.

(2) Any person who carries out any surveillance or interception of any communication, or who obtains any information, including personal data, as a result of surveillance or interception of communication, shall be subject to a duty of confidentiality and secrecy in respect of it.

(3) Every competent organisation shall, before the expiry of a period of one hundred days from the enactment of this Act, designate as many officers as it deems fit as Privacy Officers who shall be administratively responsible for all interceptions of communications carried out by that competent organisation.

42. Disclosure of information. – (1) Save as provided in this section, no person shall disclose to any other person, or otherwise cause any other person to come into the knowledge or possession of, the content or nature of any information, including personal data, obtained as a result of any surveillance or interception carried out under this Act.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, if the disclosure of any information, including personal data, obtained as a result of any surveillance or interception of any communication is necessary to –

(a) prevent a reasonable threat to national security, defence or public order, or

(b) prevent, investigate or prosecute a cognisable offence,

an authorised officer may disclose the information, including personal data, to any authorised officer of any other competent organisation.

CHAPTER VI

Offences and penalties

43. Punishment for offences related to personal data. – (1) Whoever, except in conformity with the provisions of this Act, collects, receives, stores, processes or otherwise handles any personal data shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to [___] years and may also be liable to fine which may extend to [___] rupees.

(2) Whoever attempts to commit any offence under sub section (1) shall be punishable with the punishment provided for such offence under that sub-section.

(3) Whoever, except in conformity with the provisions of this Act, collects, receives, stores, processes or otherwise handles any sensitive personal data shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to [increased for sensitive personal data] years and and may also be liable to fine which may extend to [___] rupees.

(4) Whoever attempts to commit any offence under sub section (3) shall be punishable with the punishment provided for such offence under that sub-section.

44. Abetment and repeat offenders. – (1) Whoever abets any offence punishable under this Act shall, if the act abetted is committed in consequence of the abetment, be punishable with the punishment provided for that offence.

(2) Whoever, having been convicted of an offence under any provision of this Act is again convicted of an offence under the same provision, shall be punishable, for the second and for each subsequent offence, with double the penalty provided for that offence.

45. Offences by companies. – (1) Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who, at the time of the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment, if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence, and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.

46. Cognisance. – Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the offences under section 43, section 44 and section 45 shall be cognisable and non-bailable.

47. General penalty. – Whoever, in any case in which a penalty is not expressly provided by this Act, fails to comply with any notice or order issued under any provisions thereof, or otherwise contravenes any of the provisions of this Act, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to [___] rupees, and, in the case of a continuing failure or contravention, with an additional fine which may extend to [___] rupees for every day after the first during which he has persisted in such failure or contravention.

48. Punishment to be without prejudice to any other action. – The award of punishment for an offence under this Act shall be without prejudice to any other action which has been or which may be taken under this Act with respect to such contravention.

CHAPTER VII

Miscellaneous

49. Power to make rules. – (1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules to carry out the provisions of this Act.

(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may provide for –

[__]

(3) Every rule made under this section shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament while it is in session for a period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two successive sessions and if before the expiry of the session in which it is so laid or the session immediately following, both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule, or both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be, so however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule.

50. Bar of jurisdiction. – (1) On and from the appointed day, no court or authority shall have, or be entitled to exercise, any jurisdiction, powers or authority (except the Supreme Court and a High Court exercising powers under Article 32, Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution) in relation to matters specified in this Act.

(2) No order passed under this Act shall be appealable except as provided therein and no civil court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Data Protection Authority is empowered by, or under, this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.

51. Protection of action taken in good faith. – No suit or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Central Government, State Government, Data Protection Authority, Chairperson, Member or any person acting under the direction either of the Central Government, State Government, Data Protection Authority, Chairperson or Member in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act or of any rules or any order made thereunder.

52. Power to remove difficulties. – (1) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act, the Central Government may, by order, published in the Official Gazette, make such provisions, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, as appears to it to be necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty:

Provided that no such order shall be made under this section after the expiry of a period of three years from the commencement of this Act.

(2) Every order made under this section shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament.

53. Act to have overriding effect. – The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy-protection-bill-2013-updated-third-draft

Comments on the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011

bhairav — 2013-07-12T12:13:53Z

Bhairav Acharya on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society prepared the following comments on the Sensitive Personal Data Rules. These were submitted to the Committee on Subordinate Legislation of the 15th Lok Sabha.

This research was undertaken as part of the 'SAFEGUARDS' project that CIS is undertaking with Privacy International and IDRC.

I Preliminary

1.1 The Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) is pleased to present this submission on the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011 that were notified by the Central Government in the Gazette of India vide Notification GSR 313(E) on 11 April 2011 (“Sensitive Personal Data Rules” or “Rules”) to the Committee on Subordinate Legislation of the Fifteenth Lok Sabha.

1.2 The protection of personal information lies at the heart of the right to privacy; and, for this reason, it is an imperative legislative and policy concern in liberal democracies around the world. In India, although remedies for invasions of privacy exist in tort law and despite the Supreme Court of India according limited constitutional recognition to the right to privacy[1], there have never been codified provisions protecting the privacy of individuals and their personal information.

The Sensitive Personal Data Rules represent India’s first legislative attempt to recognise that all persons have a right to protect the privacy of their personal information. However, the Rules suffer from numerous conceptual, substantive and procedural weaknesses, including drafting defects, which demand scrutiny and rectification. The interpretation and applicability of the Rules was further confused when, on 24 August 2011, the Department of Information Technology of the Ministry of Communications attempted to reinterpret the Rules through a press release oblivious to the universally accepted basic proposition that law cannot be made or reinterpreted via press releases.[2] Therefore, the attention of the Committee on Subordinate Legislation of the Fifteenth Lok Sabha is called to the following submissions:

II Principles to Facilitate Appraisal
2.1 The Sensitive Personal Data Rules are an important step towards building a legal regime that protects the privacy of individuals whilst enabling the secure collection, use and storage of personal information by state and private entities. The Rules are to be welcomed in principle. However, at present, the Rules construct an incomplete regime that does not adequately protect privacy and, for this reason, falls short of internationally accepted data protection standards.[3]

This not only harms the personal liberties of Indian citizens, it also affects the ability of Indian companies to conduct commerce in foreign countries. More importantly, the Rules offer no protection against the state.

2.2 To enact a comprehensive personal information protection regime, CIS believes that the Rules should proceed on the basis of the following broad principles:

(a) Principle of Notice / Prior Knowledge

All persons from whom personal information is collected have a right to know, before the personal information is collected and, where applicable, at any point thereafter: (i) of an impending collection of personal information; (ii) the content and nature of the personal information being collected; (iii) the purpose for which the personal information is being collected; (iv) the broad identities of all natural and juristic persons who will have access to the collected personal information; (v) the manner in which the collected personal information will be used; (vi) the duration for which the collected personal information will be stored; (vii) whether the collected personal information will be disclosed to third parties including the police and other law enforcement agencies; (viii) of the manner in which they may access, check, modify or withdraw their collected personal information; (ix) the security practices and safeguards that will govern the sanctity of the collected personal information; (x) of all privacy policies and other policies in relation to the collected personal information; (xi) of any breaches in the security, safety, privacy and sanctity of the collected personal information; and, (xii) the procedure for recourse, including identities and contact details of ombudsmen and grievance redress officers, in relation to any misuse of the collected personal information.

(b) Principle of Consent

Personal information must only be collected once the person to whom it pertains has consented to its collection. Such consent must be informed, explicit and freely given. Informed consent is conditional upon the fulfilment of the principle of notice/prior knowledge set out in the preceding paragraph. Consent must be expressly given: the person to whom the personal information to be collected pertains must grant explicit and affirmative permission to collect personal information; and, he must know, or be made aware, of any action of his that will constitute such consent. Consent that is obtained using threats or coercion, such as a threat of refusal to provide services, does not constitute valid consent. Any person whose personal information has been consensually collected may, at any time, withdraw such consent for any or no reason and, consequently, his personal information, including his identity, must be destroyed. When consent is withdrawn in this manner, the person who withdrew consent may be denied any service that requires the use of the personal information for which consent was withdrawn.

Personal information must only be collected when, where and to the extent necessary. Necessity cannot be established in general; there must be a specific nexus connecting the content of the personal information to the purpose of its collection. Only the minimal amount of personal information necessary to achieve the purpose should be collected. If a purpose exists that warrants a temporally specific, or an event-dependent, collection of personal information, such a collection must only take place when that specific time is reached or that event occurs. If the purpose of personal information is dependent upon, or specific to, a geographical area or location, that personal information must only be collected from that geographical area or location.

(d) Right to be Forgotten / Principle of Purpose Limitation

Once collected, personal information must be processed, used, stored or otherwise only for the purpose for which it was collected. If the purpose for which personal information was collected is achieved, the collected personal information must be destroyed and the person to whom that personal information pertained must be ‘forgotten.’ Similarly, collected personal information must be destroyed and the person to whom it pertained ‘forgotten’ if the purpose for which it was collected expires or ceases to exist. Personal information collected for a certain purpose cannot be used or stored for another purpose nor even used or stored for a similar purpose to arise in the future without the express and informed consent of the person from whom it was collected in accordance with the principles of notice/prior knowledge and consent.

(e) Right of Access

All persons from whom personal information is collected have a right to access that personal information at any point following its collection to check its accuracy, make corrections or modifications and have destroyed that which is inaccurate. Where personal information of more than one person is held in an aggregated form such that affording one person access to it may endanger the right to privacy of another person, the entity holding the aggregated personal information must, to the best of its ability, identify the portion of the personal information that pertains to the person seeking access and make it available to him. All persons from whom personal information is collected must be given copies of their personal information upon request.

(f) Principle regarding Disclosure

Personal information, once collected, must never be disclosed. However, if the person to whom certain personal information pertains consents to its disclosure in accordance with the principle of consent after he has been made aware of the proposed disclosee and other details related to the personal information in accordance with the principle of notice/prior knowledge, the personal information may be disclosed. Consent to a disclosure of this nature may be obtained even during collection of the personal information if the person to whom it pertains expressly consents to its future disclosure. Notwithstanding the rule against disclosure and the consent exception to the rule, personal information may be disclosed to the police or other law enforcement agencies on certain absolute conditions. Since the protection of personal information is a policy imperative, the conditions permitting its disclosure must be founded on a clear and serious law enforcement need that overrides the right to privacy; and, in addition, the disclosure conditions must be strict, construed narrowly and, in the event of ambiguity, interpreted to favour the individual right to privacy. Therefore, (i) there must be a demonstrable need to access personal information in connection with a criminal offence; (ii) only that amount of personal information that is sufficient to satisfy the need must be disclosed; and, (iii), since such a disclosure is non-consensual, it must follow a minimal due process regime that at least immediately notifies the person concerned and affords him the right to protest the disclosure.

(g) Principle of Security

All personal information must be protected to absolutely maintain its sanctity, confidentiality and privacy by implementing safeguards against loss, unauthorised access, destruction, use, processing, storage, modification, de-anonymisation, unauthorised disclosure and other risks. Such a level of protection must include physical, administrative and technical safeguards that are constantly and consistently audited. Protection measures must be revised to incorporate stronger measures and mechanisms as and when they arise.

(h) Principle of Transparency / ‘Open-ness’

All practices, procedures and policies governing personal information must be made available to the person to whom that personal information pertains in a simple and easy-to-understand manner. This includes policies relating to the privacy, security and disclosure of that personal information. If an entity that seeks to collect personal information does not have these policies, it must immediately draft, publish and display such policies in addition to making them available to the person from whom it seeks to collect personal information before the collection can begin.

(i) Principle of Accountability

Liability attaches to the possession of personal information of another person. Since rights and duties, such as those in relation to privacy of personal information, are predicated on accountability, this principle binds all entities that seek to possess personal information of another person. As a result, an entity seeking to collect, use, process, store or disclose personal information of another person is accountable to that person for complying with all these principles as well as the provisions of any law. The misuse of personal information causes harm to the person to whom it pertains to attract and civil and criminal penalties.

2.3 These principles are reflective of internationally accepted best practices to form the basis upon which Indian legislation to protect personal information should be drafted. The Sensitive Personal Data Rules, in their current form, fall far short of the achieving the substantive intent of these principles. CIS submits that either (i) the Sensitive Personal Data Rules should be replaced with new and comprehensive legislation that speaks to the objectives and purpose of these principles, or (ii) the Sensitive Personal Data Rules are radically modified by amendment to bring Indian law to par with world standards. Nevertheless, without prejudice to the preceding submission, CIS offers the following clause-by-clause comments on the Sensitive Personal Data Rules:

III Clause-by-Clause Analysis and Comments

Rule 2 - Definitions

3.1.1 Rule 2(1)(b) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules defines “biometrics” as follows:

"Biometrics" means the technologies that measure and analyse human body characteristics, such as 'fingerprints', 'eye retinas and irises', 'voice patterns', "facial patterns', 'hand measurements' and 'DNA' for authentication purposes.

3.1.2 Firstly, the Sensitive Personal Data Rules do not use the term “biometrics.” Instead, rule 3(vi), which defines sensitive personal data, uses the term “biometric information.” It is unclear why rule 2(1)(b) provides a definition of the technologies by which information is obtained instead of clearly identify the information that constitutes sensitive personal data. This is one of several examples of poor drafting of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules. Secondly, biometric information is not used only for authentication; there are many other reasons for collecting and using biometric information. For instance, DNA is widely collected and used for medical research. Restricting the application of the definition to only that biometric information that is used for authentication is illogical to deprive the Rules of meaning.

3.1.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 2(1)(b) be re-drafted to read as follows:

““Biometric information” means any information relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of an individual which enable their unique identification including, but not limited to, fingerprints, retinas, irises, voice patterns, facial patterns, Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and genetic information.”

3.2.1 Rule 2(1)(c) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules defines “body corporate” in accordance with the definition provided in clause (i) of the Explanation to section 43A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”) as follows:

“body corporate” means any company and includes a firm, sole proprietorship or other association of individuals engaged in commercial or professional activities.

3.2.2 Firstly, this definition of a body corporate is poorly drafted to extend beyond incorporated entities to bring within its ambit even unincorporated professional organisations such as societies and associations which, by their very nature, are not bodies corporate.[4]

This is an arbitrary reinterpretation of the fundamental principles of company law. As it presently stands, this peculiar definition will extend to public and private limited companies, including incorporated public sector undertakings, ordinary and limited liability partnerships, firms, sole proprietorships, societies and associations; but, will exclude public and private trusts[5] and unincorporated public authorities. Hence, whereas non-governmental organisations that are organised as societies will fall within the definition of “body corporate,” those that are organised as trusts will not. Similarly, incorporated public authorities such as Delhi Transport Corporation and even municipal corporations such as the Municipal Corporation of Delhi will fall within the definition of “body corporate” but unincorporated public authorities such as the New Delhi Municipal Council and the Delhi Development Authority will not. This is a prima facie violation of the fundamental right of all persons to be treated equally under the law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

3.2.3 Secondly, whereas state entities and public authorities often collect and use sensitive personal data, with the exception of state corporations the Sensitive Personal Data Rules do not apply to the state. This means that the procedural safeguards offered by the Rules do not bind the police and other law enforcement agencies allowing them a virtually unfettered right to collect and use, even misuse, sensitive personal data without consequence. Further, state entities such as the Unique Identification Authority of India or the various State Housing Boards which collect, handle, process, use and store sensitive personal data are not covered by the Rules and remain unregulated. It is not possible to include these unincorporated entities within the definition of a body corporate; but, in pursuance of the principles set out in paragraph 2.2 of this submission, the Rules should be expanded to all state entities, whether incorporated or not.

3.2.4 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 2(1)(c) be re-drafted to read as follows:

““body corporate” means the body corporate defined in sub-section (7) of section 2 read with section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) and includes those entities which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf but shall not include societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), trusts created under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882) or any other association of individuals that is not a legal entity apart from the members constituting it and which does not enjoy perpetual succession.”

Further, it is proposed that the Sensitive Personal Data Rules be re-drafted to apply to societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and trusts created under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 in a manner reflective of their distinctiveness from bodies corporate.

Furthermore, it is proposed that the Sensitive Personal Data Rules be re-drafted to apply to public authorities and the state as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

3.3.1 Rule 2(1)(d) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules defines “cyber incidents” as follows:

"Cyber incidents" means any real or suspected adverse event in relation to cyber security that violates an explicitly or implicitly applicable security policy resulting in unauthorised access, denial of service or disruption, unauthorised use of a computer resource for processing or storage of information or changes to data, information without authorisation.

3.3.2 Before examining the provisions of this clause, CIS questions the need for this definition. The term “cyber incidents” is used only once in these rules: the proviso to rule 6(1) which specifies the conditions upon which personal information or sensitive personal data may be disclosed to the police or other law enforcement authorities without the prior consent of the person to whom the information pertains. An analysis of rule 6(1) is contained at paragraphs 3.11.1 – 3.11.4 of this submission. Firstly, personal information and sensitive personal data should only be disclosed in connection with the prevention, investigation and prosecution of an existing offence. Offences cannot be created in the definitions clause of sub-statutory rules, they can only be created by a parent statute or another statute. Secondly, the scope and content of “cyber incidents” are already covered by section 43 of the IT Act. When read with section 66 of IT Act, an offence is created that is larger than the scope of the term “cyber incidents” to render this definition redundant.

3.3.3 Therefore, it is proposed that the definition of “cyber incidents” in rule 2(1)(d) be deleted and the remaining clauses in sub-rule (1) of rule 2 be accordingly renumbered.

3.4.1 Rule 2(1)(g) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules defines “intermediary” in accordance with the definition provided in section 2(1)(w) of the IT Act. However, the term “intermediary” is not used anywhere in the Sensitive Personal Data Rules and so its definition is redundant. This is another instance of careless drafting of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules.

3.4.2 Therefore, it is proposed that the definition of “intermediary” in rule 2(1)(g) be deleted and the remaining clauses in sub-rule (1) of rule 2 be accordingly renumbered.

Rule 3 - Sensitive Personal Data

3.5.1 Rule 3 of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules provides an aggregated definition of sensitive personal data as follows:

Sensitive personal data or information of a person means such personal information which consists of information relating to –

(i) password;

(ii) financial information such as Bank account or credit card or debit card or other payment instrument details ;

(iii) physical, physiological and mental health condition;

(iv) sexual orientation;

(v) medical records and history;

(vi) Biometric information;

(vii) any detail relating to the above clauses as provided to body corporate for providing service; and

(viii) any of the information received under above clauses by body corporate for processing, stored or processed under lawful contract or otherwise:

provided that, any information that is freely available or accessible in public domain or furnished under the Right to Information Act, 2005 or any other law for the time being in force shall not be regarded as sensitive personal data or information for the purposes of these rules.

3.5.2 In accordance with the principle that certain kinds of personal information are particularly sensitive, due to the intimate nature of their content in relation to the right to privacy, to invite privileged protective measures regarding the collection, handling, processing, use and storage of such sensitive personal data, it is surprising that rule 3 does not protect electronic communication records of individuals. Emails and chat logs as well as records of internet activity such as online search histories are particularly vulnerable to abuse and misuse and should be accorded privileged protection.

3.5.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 3 be re-drafted to read as follows:

“Sensitive personal data or information of a person means personal information as to that person’s –

(i) passwords and encryption keys;

(ii) financial information including, but not limited to, information relating to his bank accounts, credit cards, debit cards, negotiable instruments, debt and other payment details;

(iii) physical, physiological and mental condition;

(iv) sexual activity and sexual orientation;

(v) medical records and history;

(vi) biometric information; and

(vii) electronic communication records including, but not limited to, emails, chat logs and other communications made using a computer;

and shall include any data or information related to the sensitive personal data or information set out in this rule that is provided to, or received by, a body corporate.

Provided that, any information that is freely available or accessible in the public domain or furnished under the Right to Information Act, 2005 or any other law for the time being in force shall not be regarded as sensitive personal data or information for the purposes of these rules.”

Rule 4 - Privacy and Disclosure Policy

3.6.1 Rule 4 of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules, which obligates certain bodies corporate to publish privacy and disclosure policies for personal information, states:

Body corporate to provide policy for privacy and disclosure of information. – (1) The body corporate or any person who on behalf of body corporate collects, receives, possess, stores, deals or handle information of provider of information, shall provide a privacy policy for handling of or dealing in personal information including sensitive personal data or information and ensure that the same are available for view by such providers of information who has provided such information under lawful contract. Such policy shall be published on website of body corporate or any person on its behalf and shall provide for –

(i) Clear and easily accessible statements of its practices and policies;

(ii) type of personal or sensitive personal data or information collected under rule 3;

(iii) purpose of collection and usage of such information;

(iv) disclosure of information including sensitive personal data or information as provided in rule 6;

(v) reasonable security practices and procedures as provided under rule 8.

3.6.2 This rule is very badly drafted, contains several discrepancies and is legally imprecise. Firstly, this rule is overbroad to bind all bodies corporate that receive and use information, as opposed to “personal information” or “sensitive personal data.” All bodies corporate receive and use information, even a vegetable seller uses information relating to vegetables and prices; but, not all bodies corporate receive and use personal information and even fewer bodies corporate receive and use sensitive personal data. The application of this provision should turn on the reception and use of personal information, which includes sensitive personal data, and not simply information. Secondly, although this rule only applies when a provider of information provides information, the term “provider of information” is undefined. It may mean any single individual who gives his personal information to a body corporate, or it may even mean another entity that outsources or subcontracts work that involves the handling of personal information. This lack of clarity compromises the enforceability of this rule. The government’s press release of 24 August 2011 acknowledged this error but since it is impossible, not to mention unconstitutional, for a statutory instrument like these Rules to be amended, modified, interpreted or clarified by a press release, CIS is inclined to ignore the press release altogether. It is illogical that privacy policies not be required when personal information is directly given by a single individual. This rule should bind all bodies corporate that receive and use personal information irrespective of the source of the personal information. Thirdly, it is unclear whether separate privacy policies are required for personal information and for sensitive personal data. There is a distinction between personal information and sensitive personal data and since these Sensitive Personal Data Rules deal with the protection of sensitive personal data, this rule 4 should unambiguously mandate the publishing of privacy policies in relation to sensitive personal data. Any additional requirement for personal information must be set out to clearly mark its difference from sensitive personal data. Fourthly, because of sloppy drafting, the publishing duties of the body corporate in respect of any sensitive personal data are unclear. For example, the phrase “personal or sensitive personal data or information” used in clause (ii) is meaningless since “personal information” and “sensitive personal data or information” are defined terms.

3.6.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 3 be re-drafted to read as follows:

“Duty to publish certain policies. – (1) Any body corporate that collects, receives, possesses, stores, deals with or handles personal information or sensitive personal data from any source whatsoever shall, prior to collecting, receiving, possessing, storing, dealing with or handling such personal information or sensitive personal data, publish and prominently display the policies listed in sub-rule (2) in relation to such personal information and sensitive personal data.

(2) In accordance with sub-rule (1) of this rule, all bodies corporate shall publish separate policies for personal information and sensitive personal data that clearly state –

(i) the meanings of personal information and sensitive personal data in accordance with these rules;

(ii) the practices and policies of that body corporate in relation to personal information and sensitive personal data;

(iii) descriptive details of the nature and type of personal information and sensitive personal data collected, received, possessed, stored or handled by that body corporate;

(iv) the purpose for which such personal information and sensitive personal data is collected, received, possessed, stored or handled by that body corporate;

(v) the manner and conditions upon which such personal information and sensitive personal data may be disclosed in accordance with rule 6 of these rules; and

(vi) the reasonable security practices and procedures governing such personal information and sensitive personal data in accordance with rule 8 of these rules.”

Rule 5 - Collection of Information

3.7.1 Rule 5(1) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules lays down the requirement of consent before personal information can be collected as follows:

Body corporate or any person on its behalf shall obtain consent in writing through letter or Fax or email from the provider of the sensitive personal data or information regarding purpose of usage before collection of such information.

3.7.2 Firstly, the principle and requirement of consent is of overriding importance when collecting personal information, which includes sensitive personal data. Pursuant to the principles laid down in paragraph 2.2 of this submission, consent must be informed, explicit and freely given. Since sub-rule (3) of rule 5 attempts to secure the informed consent of persons giving personal information, this sub-rule must establish that all personal information can only be collected upon explicit consent that is freely given, irrespective of the medium and manner in which it is given. Secondly, it may be noted that sub-rule (1) only applies to sensitive personal data and not to other personal information that is not sensitive personal data. This is ill advised. Thirdly, this sub-rule relating to actual collection of personal information should follow a provision establishing the principle of necessity before collection can begin. The principle of necessity is currently laid down in sub-rule (2) of rule 5 which should be re-numbered to precede this sub-rule relating to collection.

3.7.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 5(1) be re-numbered to sub-rule (2) of rule 5 and re-drafted to read as follows:

“A body corporate seeking to collect personal information or sensitive personal data of a person shall, prior to collecting that personal information or sensitive personal data, obtain the express and informed consent of that person in any manner, and through any medium, that may be convenient but shall not obtain such consent through threat, duress or coercion.”

3.8.1 Rule 5(2) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules sets out the principle of necessity governing the collection of personal information as follows:

Body corporate or any person on its behalf shall not collect sensitive personal data or information unless —

(a) the information is collected for a lawful purpose connected with a function or activity of the body corporate or any person on its behalf; and

(b) the collection of the sensitive personal data or information is considered necessary for that purpose.

3.8.2 Firstly, before allowing a body corporate to collect personal information, which includes sensitive personal data, the law should strictly ensure that the collection of such personal information is necessary. Necessity cannot be established in general, there must be a nexus connecting the personal information to the purpose for which the personal information is sought to be collected. This important sub-rule sets out the principles upon which personal information can be collected; and, should therefore be the first sub-rule of rule 5. Secondly, this sub-rule only applies to sensitive personal data instead of all personal information. It is in the public interest that the principle of necessity applies to all personal information, including sensitive personal data.

3.8.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 5(2) be re-numbered to sub-rule (1) of rule 5 and re-drafted to read as follows:

“No body corporate shall collect any personal information or sensitive personal data of a person unless it clearly establishes that –

(a) the personal information or sensitive personal data is collected for a lawful purpose that is directly connected to a function or activity of the body corporate; and

(b) the collection of the personal information or sensitive personal data is necessary to achieve that lawful purpose.”

3.9.1 Rule 5(3) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules attempts to create an informed consent regime for the collection of personal information as follows:

While collecting information directly from the person concerned, the body corporate or any person on its behalf snail take such steps as are, in the circumstances, reasonable to ensure that the person concerned is having the knowledge of —

(a) the fact that the information is being collected;

(b) the purpose for which the information is being collected;

(c) the intended recipients of the information; and

(d) the name and address of —

(i) the agency that is collecting the information; and

(ii) the agency that will retain the information.

3.9.2 Firstly, this sub-rule (3) betrays the carelessness of its drafters by bringing within its application any and all information collected by a body corporate from a person instead of only personal information or sensitive personal data. Secondly, this provision is crucial to establishing a regime of informed consent before personal information is given by a person to a body corporate. For consent to be informed, the person giving consent must be made aware of not only the collection of that personal information or sensitive personal data, but also the purpose for which it is being collected, the manner in which it will be used, the intended recipients to whom it will be sent or made accessible, the duration for which it will be stored, the conditions upon which it may be disclosed, the conditions upon which it may be destroyed as well as the identities of all persons who will collect, receive, possess, store, deal with or handle that personal information or sensitive personal data. Thirdly, the use of the phrase “take such steps as are, in the circumstances, reasonable” dilutes the purpose of this provision and compromises the establishment of an informed consent regime. Instead, the use of the term “reasonable efforts”, which has an understood meaning in law, will suffice to protect individuals while giving bodies corporate sufficient latitude to conduct their business.

3.9.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 5(3) be re-drafted to read as follows:

“A body corporate seeking to collect personal information or sensitive personal data of a person shall, prior to such collection, make reasonable efforts to inform that person of the following details in respect of his personal information or sensitive personal data –

(a) the fact that it is being collected;

(b) the purpose for which it is being collected;

(d) the intended recipients to whom it will be sent or made available;

(e) the duration for which it will be stored;

(f) the conditions upon which it may be disclosed;

(g) the conditions upon which it may be destroyed; and

(h) the identities of all persons and bodies corporate who will collect, receive, possess, store, deal with or handle it.”

3.10.1 Rule 5(4) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules lays down temporal restrictions to the retention of personal information:

Body corporate or any person on its behalf holding sensitive personal data or information shall not retain that information for longer than is required for the purposes for which the information may lawfully be used or is otherwise required under any other law for the time being in force.

3.10.2 Since this sub-rule (4) only applies to sensitive personal data instead of all personal information, bodies corporate are permitted to hold personal information of persons that is not sensitive personal data for as long as they like even after the necessity that informed the collection of that personal information expires and the purpose for which it was collected ends. This is a dangerous provision that deprives the owners of personal information of the ability to control its possession to jeopardise their right to privacy. The Sensitive Personal Data Rules should prescribe a temporal limit to the storage of all personal information by bodies corporate.

3.10.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 5(4) be re-drafted to read as follows:

“No body corporate shall store, retain or hold personal information or sensitive personal data for a period longer than is required to achieve the purpose for which that personal information or sensitive personal data was collected.”

Rule 6 - Disclosure of Information

3.11.1 Rule 6(1) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules, which deals with the crucial issue of disclosure of personal information, states:

Disclosure of sensitive personal data or information by body corporate to any third party shall require prior permission from the provider of such information, who has provided such information under lawful contract or otherwise, unless such disclosure has been agreed to in the contract between the body corporate and provider of information, or where the disclosure is necessary for compliance of a legal obligation:

Provided that the information shall be shared, without obtaining prior consent from provider of information, with Government agencies mandated under the law to obtain information including sensitive personal data or information for the purpose of verification of identity, or for prevention, detection, investigation including cyber incidents, prosecution, and punishment of offences. The Government agency shall send a request in writing to the body corporate possessing the sensitive personal data or information stating clearly the purpose of seeking such information. The Government agency shall also state that the information so obtained shall not be published or shared with any other person.

3.11.2 In addition to errors and discrepancies in drafting, this sub-rule contains wide and vague conditions of disclosure of sensitive personal data to gravely impair the privacy rights and personal liberties of persons to whom such sensitive personal data pertains. A summary of drafting errors and discrepancies follows: Firstly, this sub-rule only applies to sensitive personal data instead of all personal information. The protection of personal information that is not sensitive personal data is an essential element of the right to privacy; hence, prohibiting bodies corporate from disclosing personal information at will is an important public interest prerogative. Secondly, the use of the phrase “any third party” lends vagueness to this provision since the term “third party” has not been defined. Thirdly, the repeated use of the undefined phrase “provider of information” throughout these Rules and in this sub-rule is confusing since, as pointed out in paragraph 3.6.2 of this submission, it could mean either or both of the single individual who consents to the collection of his personal information or another entity that transfers personal information to the body corporate.

3.11.3 Further, the conditions upon which bodies corporate may disclose personal information and sensitive personal data without the consent of the person to whom it pertains are dangerously wide. Firstly, the disclosure of personal information and sensitive personal data when it is “necessary for compliance of a legal obligation” is an extremely low protection standard. The law must intelligently specify the exact conditions upon which disclosure sans consent is possible; since the protection of personal information is a public interest priority, the conditions upon which it may be disclosed must outweigh this priority to be significant and serious enough to imperil the nation or endanger public interest. The disclosure of personal information and sensitive personal data for mere compliance of a legal obligation, such as failure to pay an electricity bill, is farcical. Secondly, the proviso sets out the conditions upon which the state, through its law enforcement agencies, may access personal information and sensitive personal data without the consent of the person to whom it pertains. Empowering the police with access to personal information can serve a public good if, and only if, it results in the prevention or resolution of crime; if not, this provision will give the police carte blanche to misuse and abuse this privilege. Hence, personal information should only be disclosed for the prevention, investigation and prosecution of an existing criminal offence. Thirdly, the definition and use of the term “cyber incidents” is unnecessary because section 43 of the IT Act already lists all such incidents. In addition, when read with section 66 of the IT Act, there emerges a clear list of offences to empower the police to seek non-consensual disclosure of personal information to obviate the need for any further new terminology. In sum, with regard to the non-consensual disclosure of personal information for the purposes of law enforcement: a demonstrable need to access personal information to prevent, investigate or prosecute crime must exist; only that amount of personal information sufficient to satisfy the need must be disclosed; and, finally, no disclosure may be permitted without clearly laid down procedural safeguards that fulfil the requirements of a minimal due process regime.

3.11.4 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 6(1) be re-drafted to read as follows:

“No body corporate shall disclose any personal information or sensitive personal data to anyone whosoever without the prior express consent of the person to whom the personal information or sensitive personal data to be disclosed pertains.

Provided that if the personal information or sensitive personal data was collected pursuant to an agreement that expressly authorises the body corporate to disclose such personal information or sensitive personal data, and if the person to whom the personal information or sensitive personal data pertains was aware of this authorisation prior to such collection, the body corporate may disclose the personal information or sensitive personal data without obtaining the consent of the person to whom it pertains in the form and manner specified in such agreement.

Provided further that if a reasonable threat to national security, defence or public order exists, or if the disclosure of personal information or sensitive personal data is necessary to prevent, investigate or prosecute a criminal offence, the body corporate shall, upon receiving a written request from the police or other law enforcement authority containing the particulars and details of the personal information or sensitive personal data to be disclosed, disclose such personal information or sensitive personal data to such police or other law enforcement authority without the prior consent of the person to whom it pertains.”

3.12.1 Rule 6(2) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules creates an additional disclosure mechanism:

Notwithstanding anything contain in sub-rule (1), any sensitive personal data on Information shall be disclosed to any third party by an order under the law for the time being in force.

3.12.2 This sub-rule is overbroad to enable anyone’s sensitive personal data to be disclosed to any other person without the application of any standards of necessity, proportionality or due process and without the person to whom the sensitive personal data pertains having any recourse or remedy. Such provisions are the hallmarks of authoritarian and police states and have no place in a liberal democracy. For instance, the invocation of this sub-rule will enable a police constable in Delhi to exercise unfettered power to access the biometric information or credit card details of a politician in Kerala since an order of a policeman constitutes “an order under the law”. Pursuant to our submission in paragraph 3.11.4, adequate measures exist to secure the disclosure of personal information or sensitive public data in the public interest. The balance of convenience between privacy and public order has already been struck. This sub-rule should be removed.

3.12.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 6(2) be deleted and the remaining sub-rules in rule 6 be accordingly renumbered.

3.13.1 Rule 6(4) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules states:

The third party receiving the sensitive personal data or information from body corporate or any person on its behalf under sub-rule (1) shall not disclose it further.

3.13.2 Firstly, as mentioned elsewhere in this submission, the phrase “third party” has not been defined. This is a drafting discrepancy that must be rectified. Secondly, this sub-rule only encompasses sensitive personal data and not other personal information that is not sensitive personal data. Thirdly, it may be necessary, in the interests of business or otherwise, for personal information or sensitive personal data that has been lawfully disclosed to a third person to be disclosed further if the person to whom that personal information consents to it.

3.13.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 6(4) be re-drafted to read as follows:

“Personal information and sensitive personal data that has been lawfully disclosed by a body corporate to a person who is not the person to whom such personal information or sensitive personal data pertains in accordance with the provisions of these rules may be disclosed further upon obtaining the prior and express consent of the person to whom it pertains.”

Rule 7 - Transfer of Information

3.14.1 Rule 7 of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules sets out the conditions upon which bodies corporate may transfer personal information or sensitive personal data to other bodies corporate in pursuance of a business arrangement:

A body corporate or any person on its behalf may transfer sensitive personal data or information including any information, to any other body corporate or a person in India, or located in any other country, that ensures the same level of data protection that is adhered to by the body corporate as provided for under these Rules. The transfer may be allowed only if it is necessary for the performance of the lawful contract between the body corporate or any person on its behalf and provider of information or where such person has consented to data transfer.

3.14.2 This provision allows personal information and sensitive personal data to be transferred across international borders to other bodies corporate in pursuance of a business agreement. The transfer of such information is a common feature of international commerce in which Indian information technology companies participate with significant success. Within India too, personal information and sensitive personal data is routinely transferred between companies in furtherance of an outsourced business model. Besides affecting ease of business, the sub-rule also affects the ability of persons to control their personal information and sensitive personal data. However, the sub-rule has been poorly drafted: firstly, the simultaneous use of the phrases “provider of information” and “such person” is imprecise and misleading; secondly, the person to whom any personal information or sensitive personal data pertains must pre-consent to the transfer of such information.

3.14.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 7 be re-drafted to read as follows:

“A body corporate may transfer any personal information or sensitive personal data in its possession to another body corporate, whether located in India or otherwise, if the transfer is pursuant to an agreement that binds the other body corporate to same, similar or stronger measures of privacy, protection, storage, use and disclosure of personal information and sensitive personal data as are contained in these rules, and if the express and informed consent of the person to whom the personal information or sensitive personal data pertains is obtained prior to the transfer.”

Rule 8 - Reasonable Security Practices

3.15.1 Following rule 8(1) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules that prescribes reasonable security practices and procedures necessary for protecting personal information and sensitive personal data, rule 8(2) asserts that the international standard ISO/IEC 27001 fulfils the protection standards required by rule 8(1):

The international Standard IS/ISO/IEC 27001 on "Information Technology - Security Techniques - Information Security Management System - Requirements" is one such standard referred to in sub-rule (1).

3.15.2 ISO/IEC 27001 is an information security management system standard that is prescribed by the International Organisation for Standardisation and the International Electrotechnical Commission. CIS raises no objection to the content or quality of the ISO/IEC 27001 standard. However, to achieve ISO/IEC 27001 compliance and certification, one must first purchase a copy of the standard. A copy of the ISO/IEC 27001 standard costs approximately Rs. _____/-. The cost of putting in place the protective measures required by the ISO/IEC 27001 standard are higher: these include the cost of literature and training, the cost of external assistance, the cost of technology, the cost of employees’ time and the cost of certification.

3.15.3 Therefore, to bring these standards within the reach of small and medium-sized Indian bodies corporate, an appropriate Indian authority, such as the Bureau of Indian Standards, should re-issue affordable standards that are equivalent to ISO/IEC 27001.

IV The Press Release of 24 August 2011

4.1 The shoddy drafting of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules resulted in national and international confusion about its interpretation. However, instead of promptly correcting the embarrassingly numerous errors in the Rules, the Department of Information Technology of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology chose to issue a press release on 24 August 2011 that was published on the website of the Press Information Bureau. The content of that press release is brought to the attention of the Committee of Subordinate Legislation as follows:

Clarification on Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011 Under Section 43A of the Information Technology ACT, 2000.

Press Note

The Department of Information Technology had notified Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011 under section 43A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 on 11.4.2011 vide notification no. G.S.R. 313(E).

These rules are regarding sensitive personal data or information and are applicable to the body corporate or any person located within India. Any such body corporate providing services relating to collection, storage, dealing or handling of sensitive personal data or information under contractual obligation with any legal entity located within or outside India is not subject to the requirement of Rules 5 & 6. Body corporate, providing services to the provider of information under a contractual obligation directly with them, as the case may be, however, is subject to Rules 5 & 6. Providers of information, as referred to in these Rules, are those natural persons who provide sensitive personal data or information to a body corporate. It is also clarified that privacy policy, as prescribed in Rule 4, relates to the body corporate and is not with respect to any particular obligation under any contract. Further, in Rule 5(1) consent includes consent given by any mode of electronic communication.

Ministry of Communications & Information Technology (Dept. of Information Technology)

Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Bhadra 2, 1933, August 24, 2011

SP/ska
(Release ID :74990)

4.2 It is apparent from a plain reading of the text that this press release seeks to re-interpret the application of rules 5 and 6 of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules insofar as they apply to Indian bodies corporate receiving personal information collected by another company outside India. Also, it seeks to define the term “providers of information” to address the confusion created by the repeated use this term in the Rules. Further, it re-interprets the scope and application of rule 4 relating to duty of bodies corporate to publish certain policies. Furthermore, it seeks to amend the provisions of rule 5(1) relating to manner and medium of obtaining consent prior to collecting personal information.

4.3 At the outset, it must be understood that a press release is not valid law. According to Article 13(3) of the Constitution of India,

...law includes any Ordinance, order, bye law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usages having in the territory of India the force of law.

Law includes orders made in exercise of a statutory power as also orders and notifications made in exercise of a power conferred by statutory rules.

[See, Edward Mills AIR 1955 SC 25 at pr. 12, Babaji Kondaji Garad 1984 (1) SCR 767 at pp. 779-780 and Indramani Pyarelal Gupta 1963 (1) SCR 721 at pp. 73-744]

Sub-delegated orders, made in exercise of a power conferred by statutory rules, cannot modify the rules.

[See, Raj Narain Singh AIR 1954 SC 569 and Re Delhi Laws Act AIR 1951 SC 332]

Therefore, press releases, which are not made or issued in exercise of a delegated or sub-delegated power are not “law” and cannot modify statutory rules.

V Summary

5.1 CIS submits that the following provisions of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules be amended or annulled

Rule 2(1)(b);
Rule 2(1)(c);
Rule 2(1)(d);
Rule 2(1)(g);
Rule 3;
Rule 4(1);
Rule 5(1);
Rule 5(2);
Rule 5(3);
Rule 5(4);
Rule 6(1);
Rule 6(1) Proviso;
Rule 6(2);
Rule 6(4);
Rule 7; and
Rule 8.

5.2 CIS submits that the Committee on Subordinate Legislation should take a serious view of the press release issued by the Department of Information Technology of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology on 24 August 2011.

5.3 CIS submits that in exercise of the powers granted to the Committee on Subordinate Legislation under Rules 317 and 320 of the Lok Sabha Rules of Procedure, the provisions of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules listed in the preceding paragraph 5.1 should be annulled; and, the Committee may be pleased to consider and recommend as an alternative the amendments proposed by CIS in this submission.

5.4 CIS thanks the Committee on Subordinate Legislation for the opportunity to present this submission and reiterates its commitment to supporting the Committee with any clarification, question or other requirement it may have.

[1]. See generally, Kharak Singh AIR 1963 SC 1295, Gobind (1975) 2 SCC 148, R. Rajagopal (1994) 6 SCC 632, People’s Union for Civil Liberties (1997) 1 SCC 301 and Canara Bank (2005) 1 SCC 496.

[2]. See infra pr. 4.3.

[3]. See, for comparison, Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 of the European Parliament and Council, the Data Protection Act, 1998 of the United Kingdom and the Proposed EU Regulation on on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation).

[4].See generally, Board of Trustees of Ayurvedic College AIR 1962 SC 458 and S. P. Mittal AIR 1983 SC 1.

[5]. See generally, W. O. Holdsworth AIR 1957 SC 887 and Duli Chand AIR 1984 Del 145.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-it-reasonable-security-practices-and-procedures-and-sensitive-personal-data-or-information-rules-2011

Comments on the Information Technology (Electronic Service Delivery) Rules, 2011

bhairav — 2013-07-12T12:12:16Z

Bhairav Acharya on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society prepared the following comments on the Information Technology (Electronic Services Delivery) Rules, 2011. These were submitted to the Committee on Subordinate Legislation of the 15th Lok Sabha. These were submitted to the Committee on Subordinate Legislation of the 15th Lok Sabha.

This research was undertaken as part of the 'SAFEGUARDS' project that CIS is undertaking with Privacy International and IDRC.

I Preliminary

1.1 This submission presents comments from the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) on the Information Technology (Electronic Service Delivery) Rules, 2011 that were notified by the Central Government in the Gazette of India vide Notification GSR 316(E) on 11 April 2011 (“ESD Rules” or “Rules”).

1.2 The ESD Rules were notified only eight months before the Electronic Delivery of Services Bill, 2011 was tabled in the Lok Sabha on 27 December 2011 (Bill 137 of 2011) (“EDS Bill” or “Bill”). Both the ESD Rules and the EDS Bill are concerned with enabling computer-based electronic delivery of government services to Indian citizens (“electronic service delivery”). Both the Rules and the Bill originate from the same government department: the Department of Electronics and Information Technology of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. Since the EDS Bill seeks to enact a comprehensive legislative framework for mandating and enforcing electronic service delivery, the purpose of the ESD Rules are called into question.

II Basic Issues Regarding Electronic Service Delivery

2.1 CIS believes that there are significant conceptual issues regarding electronic service delivery that demand attention. The Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information Technology of the Fifteenth Lok Sabha (“Standing Committee”) raised a few concerns when it submitted its 37th Report on the EDS Bill on 29 August 2012. There is a clear need for a national debate on the manner of effecting exclusive electronic service delivery to the exclusion of manual service delivery. Some of these issues are briefly summarised as follows:

(a) Mandatory exclusive electronic service delivery pre-supposes the ability of all Indian citizens to easily access such mechanisms. While there are no authoritative national statistics on familiarity with computer-related technologies, it is apparent that a large majority of Indians, most of whom are likely to be already marginalised and vulnerable, are totally unfamiliar with such technologies to endanger their ability to receive basic government services;

(b) Consequent upon mandatory exclusive electronic service delivery for basic government services, a large group of ‘middlemen’ will arise to facilitate access for that majority of Indians who cannot otherwise access these services. This group will control the interface between citizens and their government. As a result, citizens’ access to governance will deteriorate. This problem may be mitigated to a certain extent by creating a new class of public servants to solely facilitate access to electronic service delivery mechanisms;

(c) The issue of governmental incapacity at the citizen-government interface might be addressed by contracting private service providers to operate mandatory exclusive electronic service delivery mechanisms. However, it is difficult to see how commercialising access to essential government services serves the public interest, especially when public funds will be expended to meet the costs of private service providers. Permitting private service providers to charge a fee from the general public to allow access to essential government services is also ill advised;

(d) All electronic service delivery, whether mandatory to the exclusion of other service delivery mechanisms or offered simultaneously with manual service delivery, must be accompanied by strong data protection measures to ensure the sanctity of sensitive personal information shared online with the state. At present, there are no specific laws that bind the state, or its agents, to the stringent requirements of privacy necessary to protect personal liberties. In the same vein, strong data security measures are necessary to prevent sensitive personal information from being compromised or lost;

(e) All electronic service delivery, whether mandatory to the exclusion of other service delivery mechanisms or offered simultaneously with manual service delivery, must ensure ease and equality of accessibility. For this reason, electronic service delivery mechanisms should conform to the National Policy on Open Standards, 2010 (or the proposed National Electronic Access Policy which is currently awaiting adoption), the Interoperability Framework for E-Governance in India and the Website Guidelines of the National Informatics Centre;

(f) Electronic service delivery requires infrastructure which India does not currently have but can develop. Only 1.44 per cent of India’s population has access to a broadband internet connection[1] and current daily energy demand far exceeds supply. On the other hand, the number of broadband subscribers is increasing,[2] the annual installed capacity for electricity generation is growing[3] and the literacy rate is increasing.[4]

2.2 The ESD Rules do not address any of the issues raised in the preceding paragraph. As a result, they cannot be seen to represent the result of a national consensus on the crucial question of mandating exclusive electronic service delivery and the means of enforcing such a scheme. Further, very few of the provisions of the Rules are binding; instead, the Rules appear to be drafted to serve as a minimal model for electronic service delivery. In this background, CIS believes that the Rules should be treated as an incomplete arrangement that prescribe the minimal standards necessary to bind private service providers before comprehensive and statutory electronic service delivery legislation is enacted, perhaps in the form of the EDS Bill or otherwise. Therefore, without prejudice to the issues raised in the preceding paragraph, CIS offers the following comments on the provisions of the Rules while reserving the opportunity to make substantive submissions on electronic service delivery in general to an appropriate forum at a later date.

III Improper Exercise of Subordinate Legislative Power

3.1 Rule 317 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Lok Sabha (Fourteenth Edition, July 2010) (“Rules of Procedure”), which empowers the Committee on Subordinate Legislation to scrutinise exercises of statutory delegation of legislative powers for impropriety, states:

There shall be a Committee on Subordinate Legislation to scrutinize and report to the House whether the powers to make regulations, rules, subrules, bye-laws etc., conferred by the Constitution or delegated by Parliament are being properly exercised within such delegation.

Further, the Committee on Subordinate Legislation is specifically empowered by rule 320(vii) of the Rules of Procedure to examine any provision of the ESD Rules to consider “whether it appears to make some unusual or unexpected use of the powers conferred by the Constitution or the Act pursuant to which it is made.”

3.2 Accordingly, the attention of the Committee on Subordinate Legislation is called to an improper exercise of delegated power under rule 3(1) of the ESD Rules, which states:

The appropriate Government may on its own or through an agency authorised by it, deliver public services through electronically- enabled kiosks or any other electronic service delivery mechanism.

This sub-rule (1) empowers both the Central Government and State Governments to provide electronic service delivery on their own.

3.3 The ESD Rules are made in exercise of delegated powers conferred under section 87(2)(ca) read with section 6-A(2) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”). Section 87(2)(ca) of the IT Act empowers the Central Government to make rules to provide for:

the manner in which the authorised service provider may collect, retain and appropriate service charges under sub-section (2) of section 6-A.

Section 6-A(2) of the IT Act states:

The appropriate Government may also authorise any service provider authorised under sub-section (1) to collect, retain and appropriate such service charges, as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government for the purpose of providing such services, from the person availing such service.

Prima facie, the delegated powers under section 87(2)(ca) read with section 6-A(2) of the IT Act, in exercise of which the ESD Rules are made, only permit delegated legislation to regulate private service providers, they do not permit the executive to exercise these powers to empower itself to conduct electronic service delivery on its own. Therefore, to the extent that the ESD Rules authorise the Central Government and State Governments to provide electronic service delivery on their own, such authorisation constitutes an improper exercise of delegated power and is ultra vires the IT Act. This may be resolved by deriving the delegated legislative competence of the ESD Rules from section 87(1) of the IT Act, instead of section 87(2)(ca) read with section 6-A(2).

IV Clause-by-Clause Comments

Rule 2 - Definitions

4.1.1 Rule 2(c) of the ESD Rules states:

"authorised agent" means an agent of the appropriate Government or service provider and includes an operator of an electronically enabled kiosk who is permitted under these rules to deliver public services to the users with the help of a computer resource or any communication device, by following the procedure specified in the rules

In accordance with the argument regarding improper exercise of delegated power contained in paragraphs 3.1 – 3.3 of this submission, the appropriate Government cannot undertake electronic service delivery under these Rules. Consequently, the appropriate Government cannot appoint an agent to provide electronic service delivery on behalf, and under the control, of the appropriate Government since, as the principal, the appropriate Government would be responsible for the acts of its agents. Instead, private service providers may provide electronic service delivery as contractees of the appropriate Government who might enter into such contracts as a sovereign contractor. Therefore, only a private service provider may appoint an authorised agent under these Rules.

4.1.2 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 2(c) is amended to read as follows:

““authorised agent” means an agent of a service provider, and includes an operator of an electronically enabled kiosk, who is permitted under these rules to deliver public services with the help of a computer resource or any communication device, by following the procedure specified in these rules”

Rule 3 - System of Electronic Service Delivery

4.2.1 Rule 3(3) of the ESD Rules states:

The appropriate Government may determine the manner of encrypting sensitive electronic records requiring confidentiality, white they are electronically signed.

This sub-rule is supposed to prescribe stringent standards to maintain the security, confidentiality and privacy of all personal information used during electronic service delivery transactions. In the absence of transactional security, electronic service delivery will invite fraud, theft and other misuse to impugn its viability as a means of delivering public services. However, the use of the term “may” leaves the prescription of security standards up to the discretion of the appropriate Government. Further, the language of the sub-rule is unclear and imprecise.

4.2.2 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 3(3) is amended to read as follows:

“The appropriate Government shall, prior to any electronic service delivery, determine the manner of encrypting electronic records and shall prescribe standards for maintaining the safety, security, confidentiality and privacy of all information collected or used in the course of electronic service delivery.”

4.3.1 Rule 3(5) of the ESD Rules states:

The appropriate Government may allow receipt of payments made by adopting the Electronic Service Delivery System to be a deemed receipt of payment effected in compliance with the financial code and treasury code of such Government.

Firstly, if these Rules enable payments to be made electronically, they must also validate the receipt of these payments. Inviting citizens to make electronic payments for government services without recognising the receipt of those payments is farcical to attract abusive and corrupt practices. Therefore, it is imperative that these Rules compulsorily recognise receipt of payments, either by deeming their receipt to be valid receipts under existing law or by specially recognising their receipt by other means including the law of evidence. Either way, electronic receipts of electronic payments must be accorded the validity in law that manual/paper receipts have; and, copies of such electronic receipts must be capable of being adduced in evidence. Secondly, the use of the phrase “financial code and treasury code” is avoidable since these terms are undefined.

4.3.2 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 3(5) be amended to read as follows:

“Any receipt of payment made by electronic service delivery shall be deemed to be a valid receipt of such payment under applicable law and shall be capable of being adduced as evidence of such payment.”

4.4.1 Rule 3(6) of the ESD Rules states:

The appropriate Government may authorise service providers or their authorised agents to collect, retain and appropriate such service charges as may be specified by the appropriate Government for the purpose of providing such services from the person availing such services:

Provided that the apportioned service charges shall be clearly indicated on the receipt to be given to the person availing the services.

This sub-rule is an almost verbatim reproduction of the provisions of section 6-A(2) of the IT Act which reads as follows:

Since the IT Act specifically delegates to the appropriate Governments the power to authorise service providers to levy charges, rule 3(6) of the ESD Rules that merely copies the provisions of the parent statute is meaningless. The purpose of delegated legislation is to give effect to the provisions of a statute by specifying the manner in which statutory provisions shall be implemented. Copying and pasting statutory provisions is a absurd misuse of delegated legislative powers.

4.4.2 Therefore, it is proposed that sub-rule (6) is deleted and the remaining sub-rules of rule 3 are renumbered.

4.5.1 Rule 3(7) of the ESD Rules states:

The appropriate Government shall by notification specify the scale of service charges which may be charged and collected by the service providers and their authorised agents for various kinds of services.

This is an almost verbatim reproduction of the provisions of section 6-A(4) of the IT Act which reads as follows:

The appropriate Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the scale of service charges which may be charged and collected by the service providers under this section.

As noted in paragraph 4.3.1 of this submission, the purpose of delegated legislation is not to copy the provisions of the parent statute, but to amplify the scope of the delegated power and the manner of effecting its implementation.

4.5.2 Therefore, it is proposed that sub-rule (7) is deleted and the remaining sub-rules of rule 3 are renumbered.

4.6.1 Rule 3(8) of the ESD Rules states:

The appropriate Government may also determine the norms on service levels to be complied with by the Service Provider and the authorised agents.

There is no quarrel with the power of the government to determine norms for, or directly prescribe, service levels to regulate service providers. However, without a scheme of statutory or sub-statutory penalties for contravention of the prescribed service levels, a sub-delegated service level cannot enforce any penalties. Simply put, the state cannot enforce penalties unless authorised by law. Unfortunately, rule 3(8) contains no such authorisation. Service levels for service providers without a regime of penalties for non-compliance is meaningless, especially since service providers will be engaged in providing access to essential government services.

4.6.2 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 3(8) be amended to read as follows:

“The appropriate Government shall prescribe service levels to be complied with by all service providers and their authorised agents which shall include penalties for failure to comply with such service levels.”

[1]. Thirty-Seventh Report of the Standing Committee on Information Technology (2011-12) on the Electronic Delivery of Services Bill, 2011 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 29 August 2012) at pp. 13, 17 and 34. See also, Telecom Sector in India: A Decadal Profile (New Delhi: Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, 8 June 2012).

[2]. Annual Report (2011-12) of the Department of Telecommunications, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Government of India (New Delhi: Department of Telecommunications, 2012) at pp. 5 and 1-3.

[3]. Report of the Working Group on Power of the Twelfth Plan (New Delhi: Planning Commission, Government of India, January 2012).

[4]. Provisional Report of the Census of India 2011 (New Delhi: Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 2011) from p. 124.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-it-electronic-service-delivery-rules-2011

Open Call for Comments: The Privacy Protection Bill 2013 drafted by the Centre for Internet and Society

bhairav — 2014-02-25T05:38:27Z

The Centre for Internet and Society is announcing an Open Call for Comments to the CIS Privacy Protection Bill 2013.

In early 2013 the Centre for Internet and Society drafted the Privacy (Protection) Bill 2013 as a citizen’s version of privacy legislation for India. The Privacy (Protection) Bill, 2013 seeks to protect privacy by regulating (i) the manner in which personal data is collected, processed, stored, transferred and destroyed — both by private persons for commercial gain and by the state for the purpose of governance; (ii) the conditions upon which, and procedure for, interceptions of communications — both voice and data communications, including both data-in-motion and data-at-rest — may be conducted and the authorities permitted to exercise those powers; and, (iii) the manner in which forms of surveillance not amounting to interceptions of communications — including the collection of intelligence from humans, signals, geospatial sources, measurements and signatures, and financial sources — may be conducted.

The Centre for Internet and Society has been collecting comments to the Privacy Protection Bill since April 2013 with the intention of submitting the Bill to the Department of Personnel and Training as a citizen’s version of a privacy legislation for India. If you would like to submit comments on the Privacy Protection Bill to be included as part of the Centre for Internet and Society’s submission to the Department of Personnel and Training, please email comments to bhairav@cis-india.org.

Download the latest version of the Privacy Protection Bill (February 2014)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy-protection-bill-2013-open-call-for-comments

Privacy Law in India: A Muddled Field - I

bhairav — 2014-05-05T06:17:06Z

The absence of a statute expressing the legislative will of a democracy to forge a common understanding of privacy is a matter of concern, says BHAIRAV ACHARYA in the first of a two part series.

The article was published in the Hoot on April 15, 2014.

Privacy evades definition and for this reason sits uneasily with law. The multiplicity of everyday privacy claims and transgressions by ordinary people, and the diversity of situations in which these occur, confuse any attempt to create a common meaning of privacy to inform law. Instead, privacy is negotiated contextually, and the circumstances that permit a privacy claim in one situation might form the basis for its transgression in another.

It is easy to understand privacy when it is claimed in relation to the body; it is beyond argument that every person has a right to privacy in relation to their bodies, especially intimate areas. It is also accepted that homes and private property secure to their owners a high degree of territorial privacy. But what of privacy from intrusive stares, or even from camera surveillance, when in a public place? Or of biometric privacy to protect against surreptitious fingerprint capturing or DNA collection from the things we touch and the places we visit every day? Or the privacy of a conversation in a restaurant from other patrons? Clearly, there are multiple meanings of privacy that are negotiated by individuals all the time.

Law has, where social custom has demanded, clothed some aspects of human activity with an expectation of privacy. In relation to bodily privacy, this is achieved by both ordinary common law without reference to privacy at all, such as the offences of battery and rape; and, by special criminal law that is premised on an expectation of privacy, such as the discredited offences regarding women’s modesty in sections 354 and 509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC), and the new offences of voyeurism and stalking contained in sections 354C and 354D of the IPC.

The law also privileges communications that are made through telephones, letters, and emails by regulating the manner of their interception in special circumstances. Conditional interception provisions with procedural safeguards – which, for several reasons, are flawed and ineffective – exist to protect the privacy of such communications in section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, section 26 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, and section 69 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

Territorial privacy, which is afforded by possession of private property, is ordinarily protected by the broad offence of trespass – in India, these are the offences of criminal trespass, house trespass, and lurking house-trespass contained in sections 441 to 443 of the IPC – and house-breaking, which is akin to the offence of breaking and entering in other jurisdictions, in section 445 of the IPC.

Some measure of protection is provided to biometric information, such as fingerprints and DNA, by limiting their lawful collection by the state: sections 53, 53A, and 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 permit collections of biometric information from arrestees in certain circumstances; this is in addition to a colonial-era collection regime created by the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920. However, nothing expressly prohibits the police or anybody else from non-consensually developing DNA profiles from human material that is routinely left behind by our bodies, for instance, saliva on restaurant cutlery or hair at the barbershop.

Physical surveillance, by which a person is visually monitored to invade locational privacy, is also inadequately regulated. Besides man-on-woman stalking, which was criminalised only one year ago, no effective measures exist to otherwise protect locational privacy. Indian courts regularly employ their injunctive power but have been loath to issue equitable remedies such as restraining orders to secure privacy. Police surveillance, which is usually covert, is an executive function that is practised with wide latitude under every state police statute and government-issued rules and regulations thereunder with little or no oversight. The risk of misuse of these powers is compounded by the increasingly widespread use of surveillance cameras sans regulation.

Other technologies too compromise privacy: GPS-enabled mobile phones offer precise locational information, presumably consensually; cell-tower tracking, almost always non-consensually, is ordered by Indian police without any procedurally built-in safeguards; radio frequency identification to locate vehicles is sought to be made mandatory; and, satellite-based surveillance is available to intelligence agencies, none of which are registered or regulated unlike in other liberal democracies.

No uniform privacy standard in law

None of these laws applies a uniform privacy standard nor are they measured against a commonly understood meaning of privacy. The lack of a statutory definition is not the issue; the lack of a statute that expresses the legislative will of a democracy to forge a common understanding of privacy to inform all kinds of human activity is the concern. Ironically, the impetus to draft a privacy law has come from abroad. Foreign senders of personal information – credit card data, home addresses, phone numbers, and the like – to India’s information technology and outsourcing industry demand institutionalised protection for their privacy.

Pressure from the European Union, which has the world’s strongest information privacy standards and with which India is currently negotiating a free trade agreement, to enact a data protection regime to address privacy has not gone unanswered. The Indian government – specifically, the Department of Personnel and Training, the same department that administers the Right to Information Act, 2005 – is currently drafting a privacy law to govern data protection and surveillance. At stake is the continued growth of India’s information technology and outsourcing sectors that receive significant amounts of European personal data for processing, which drives national exports and gross domestic product.

An inferred right

For its part, the Supreme Court has examined more than a few privacy claims to find, intermittently and unconvincingly, that there is a constitutional right to privacy, but the contours of this right remain vague. In 1962, the Supreme Court rejected the existence of a privacy right in Kharak Singh’s case which dealt with intrusive physical surveillance by the police.

The court was not unanimous; the majority of judges expressly rejected the notion of locational privacy while declaring that privacy was not a constituent of personal liberty, a lone dissenting judge found the opposite to be true and, furthermore, held that surveillance had a chilling effect on freedom. In 1975, in the Gobind case that presented substantially similar facts, the Supreme Court leaned towards, but held short of, recognising a right to privacy. It did find that privacy flowed from personal autonomy, which bears the influence of American jurisprudence, but subjected it to the interests of government; the latter prevailed.

However, in the PUCL case of 1997 that challenged inadequately regulated wiretaps, the Supreme Court declared that phone conversations were protected by a fundamental right to privacy that flowed from Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. To intrude upon this right, the court said, a law was necessary that is just, fair, and reasonable. If this principle were to be extended beyond communications privacy to, say, identity cards, the Aadhar project, which is being implemented without the sanction of an Act of Parliament, would be judicially stopped.

But what does “law” mean? Is it only the law of our Constitution and courts? What of the law that governed Indian societies before European colonisation brought the word ‘privacy’ to our legal system? Classical Hindu law – distinct from colonial and post-independence Hindu law – also recognises and enforces expectations of privacy in different contexts. It recognised the sanctity of the home and family, the autonomy of the community, and prescribed penalties for those who breached these norms. So, too, does Islamic law: all schools of Islamic jurisprudence – ‘fiqh’ – recognise privacy as an enforceable right.

Different words and concepts are used to secure this right, and these words have meanings and connotations of their own. But, the hermeneutics of privacy notwithstanding, this belies the common view that privacy is not an Indian value. Privacy may or may not be a cultural norm, but it has existed in India and South Asia in different forms for millennia.

Bhairav Acharya is a constitutional lawyer practising in the Supreme Court of India. He advises the Centre for Internet & Society, Bangalore, on privacy law and other constitutional issues.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-hoot-bhairav-acharya-april-15-2014-privacy-law-in-india-a-muddled-field-1

Legislating for Privacy - Part II

bhairav — 2014-05-28T09:59:56Z

Apart from the conflation of commercial data protection and privacy, the right to privacy bill has ill-informed and poorly drafted provisions to regulate surveillance.

The article was published in the Hoot on May 20, 2014.

In October 2010, the Department of Personnel and Training ("DOPT") of the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions released an ‘Approach Paper’ towards drafting a privacy law for India. The Approach Paper claims to be prepared by a leading Indian corporate law firm that, to the best of my knowledge, has almost no experience of criminal procedure or constitutional law. The Approach Paper resulted in the drafting of a Right to Privacy Bill, 2011 ("DOPT Bill") which, although it has suffered several leaks, has neither been published for public feedback nor sent to the Cabinet for political clearance prior to introduction in Parliament.

Approach Paper and DOPT Bill

The first article in this two-part series broadly examined the many legal facets of privacy. Notions of privacy have long informed law in common law countries and have been statutorily codified to protect bodily privacy, territorial or spatial privacy, locational privacy, and so on. These fields continue to evolve and advance; for instance, the legal imperative to protect intimate body privacy from violation has now expanded to include biometric information, and the protection given to the content of personal communications that developed over the course of the twentieth century is now expanding to encompass metadata and other ‘information about information’.

The Approach Paper suffers from several serious flaws, the largest of which is its conflation of commercial data protection and privacy. It ignores the diversity of privacy law and jurisprudence in the common law, instead concerning itself wholly with commercial data protection. This creates a false equivalency, albeit not one that cannot be rectified by re-naming the endeavour to describe commercial data protection only.

However, there are other errors. The paper claims that no right of action exists for privacy breaches between citizens inter se. This is false, the civil wrongs of nuisance, interference with enjoyment, invasion of privacy, and other similar torts and actionable claims operate to redress privacy violations. In fact, in the case of Ratan Tata v. Union of India that is currently being heard by the Supreme Court of India, at least two parties are arguing that privacy is already adequately protected by civil law. Further, the criminal offences of nuisance and defamation, amongst others, and the recently introduced crimes of stalking and voyeurism, all create rights of action for privacy violations. These measures are incomplete, – this is not contested, the premise of these articles is the need for better privacy protection law – but denying their existence is not useful.

The shortcomings of the Approach Paper are reflected in the draft legislation it resulted in. A major concern with the DOPT Bill is its amateur treatment of surveillance and interception of communications. This is inevitable for the Approach Paper does not consider this area at all although there is sustained and critical global and national attention to the issues that attend surveillance and communications privacy. For an effort to propose privacy law, this lapse is quite astonishing. The Approach Paper does not even examine if Parliament is competent to regulate surveillance, although the DOPT Bill wades into this contested turf.

Constitutionality of Interceptions

In a federal country, laws are weighed by the competence of their legislatures and struck down for overstepping their bounds. In India, the powers to legislate arise from entries that are contained in three lists in Schedule VII of the Constitution. The power to legislate in respect of intercepting communications traditionally emanates from Entry 31 of the Union List, which vests the Union – that is, Parliament and the Central Government – with the power to regulate “Posts and telegraphs; telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other like forms of communication” to the exclusion of the States. Hence, the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, and the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, both Union laws, contain interception provisions. However, after holding the field for more than a century, the Supreme Court overturned this scheme in Bharat Shah’s case in 2008.

The case challenged the telephone interception provisions of the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 ("MCOCA"), a State law that appeared to transgress into legislative territory reserved for the Union. The Supreme Court held that Maharashtra’s interception provisions were valid and arose from powers granted to the States – that is, State Assemblies and State Governments – by Entries 1 and 2 of the State List, which deal with “public order” and “police” respectively. This cleared the way for several States to frame their own communications interception regimes in addition to Parliament’s existing laws. The question of what happens when the two regimes clash has not been answered yet. India’s federal scheme anticipates competing inconsistencies between Union and State laws, but only when these laws derive from the Concurrent List which shares legislative power. In such an event, the ‘doctrine of repugnancy’ privileges the Union law and strikes down the State law to the extent of the inconsistency.

In competitions between Union and State laws that do not arise from the Concurrent List but instead from the mutually exclusive Union and State Lists, the ‘doctrine of pith and substance’ tests the core substance of the law and traces it to one the two Lists. Hence, in a conflict, a Union law the substance of which was traceable to an entry in the State List would be struck down, and vice versa.

However, the doctrine permits incidental interferences that are not substantive. For example, as in a landmark 1946 case, a State law validly regulating moneylenders may incidentally deal with promissory notes, a Union field, since the interference is not substantive. Since surveillance is a police activity, and since “police” is a State subject, care must be taken by a Union surveillance law to remain on the pale of constitutionality by only incidentally affecting police procedure. Conversely, State surveillance laws were required to stay clear of the Union’s exclusive interception power until Bharat Shah’s case dissolved this distinction without answering the many questions it threw up.

Since the creation of the Republic, India’s federal scheme was premised on the notion that the Union and State Lists were exclusive of each other. Conceptually, the Union and the States could not have competing laws on the same subject. But Bharat Shah did just that; it located the interception power in both the Lists and did not enunciate a new doctrine to resolve their (inevitable) future conflict. This both disturbs Indian constitutional law and goes to the heart of surveillance and privacy law.

Three Principles of Interception

Apart from the important questions regarding legislative competence and constitutionality, the DOPT Bill proposed weak, ill-informed, and poorly drafted provisions to regulate surveillance and interceptions. It serves no purpose to further scrutinise the 2011 DOPT Bill. Instead, at this point, it may be constructive to set out the broad contours of a good interceptions regulation regime. Some clarity on the concepts: intercepting communications means capturing the content and metadata of oral and written communications, including letters, couriers, telephone calls, facsimiles, SMSs, internet telephony, wireless broadcasts, emails, and so on. It does not include activities such visual capturing of images, location tracking or physical surveillance; these are separate aspects of surveillance, of which interception of communications is a part.

Firstly, all interceptions of communications must be properly sanctioned. In India, under Rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951, the Home Secretary – an unelected career bureaucrat, or a junior officer deputised by the Home Secretary – with even lesser accountability, authorises interceptions. In certain circumstances, even senior police officers can authorise interceptions. Copies of the interception orders are supposed to be sent to a Review Committee, consisting of three more unelected bureaucrats, for bi-monthly review. No public information exists, despite exhaustive searching, regarding the authorisers and numbers of interception orders and the appropriateness of the interceptions.

The Indian system derives from outdated United Kingdom law that also enables executive authorities to order interceptions. But, the UK has constantly revisited and revised its interception regime; its present avatar is governed by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 ("RIPA") which creates a significant oversight mechanism headed by an independent commissioner, who monitors interceptions and whose reports are tabled in Parliament, and quasi-judicially scrutinised by a tribunal comprised of judges and senior independent lawyers, which hears public complaints, cancels interceptions, and awards monetary compensation. Put together, even though the current UK interceptions system is executively sanctioned, it is balanced by independent and transparent quasi-judicial authorities.

In the United States, all interceptions are judicially sanctioned because American constitutional philosophy – the separation of powers doctrine – requires state action to be checked and balanced. Hence, ordinary interceptions of criminals’ communications as also extraordinary interceptions of perceived national security threats are authorised only by judges, who are ex hypothesi independent, although, as the PRISM affairs teaches us, independence can be subverted. In comparison, India’s interception regime is incompatible with its democracy and must be overhauled to establish independent and transparent authorities to properly sanction interceptions.

Secondly, no interceptions should be sanctioned but upon ‘probable cause’. Simply described, probable cause is the standard that convinces a reasonable person of the existence of criminality necessary to warrant interception. Probable case is an American doctrine that flows from the US Constitution’s Fourth Amendment that protects the rights of people to be secure in places in which they have a reasonable expectation of privacy. There is no equivalent standard in UK law, except perhaps the common law test of reasonability that attaches to all government action that abridges individual freedoms. If a coherent ‘reasonable suspicion’ test could be coalesced from the common law, I think it would fall short of the strictness that the probable cause doctrine imposes on the executive. Therefore, the probable cause requirement is stronger than ordinary constraint of reasonability but weaker than the standard of reasonable doubt beyond which courts may convict. In this spectrum of acceptable standards, India’s current law in section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 is the weakest for it permits interceptions merely “on the occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest of public safety”, which determination is left to the “satisfaction” of a bureaucrat. And, under Rule 419A(2) of the Telegraph Rules, the only imposition on the bureaucrat when exercising this satisfaction is that the order “contain reasons” for the interception.

Thirdly, all interceptions should be warranted. This point refers not to the necessity or otherwise of the interception, but to the framework within which it should be conducted. Warrants should clearly specify the name and clear identity of the person whose communications are sought to be intercepted. The target person’s identity should be linked to the specific means of communication upon which the suspected criminal conversations take place. Therefore, if the warrant lists one person’s name but another person’s telephone number – which, because of the general ineptness of many police forces, is not uncommon – the warrant should be rejected and the interception cancelled. And, by extension, the specific telephone number, or email account, should be specified. A warrant against a person called Rahul Kumar, for instance, cannot be executed against all Rahul Kumars in the vicinity, nor also against all the telephones that the one specific Rahul Kumar uses, but only against the one specific telephone number that is used by the one specific Rahul Kumar. Warrants should also specify the duration of the interception, the officer responsible for its conduct and thereby liable for its abuse, and other safeguards. Some of these concerns were addressed in 2007 when the Telegraph Rules were amended, but not all.

A law that fails to substantially meet the standards of these principles is liable, perhaps in the not too distant future, to be read down or struck down by India’s higher judiciary. But, besides the threat of judicial review, a democratic polity must protect the freedoms and diversity of its citizens by holding itself to the highest standards of the rule of law, where the law is just.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-hoot-may-20-2014-bhairav-acharya-legislating-for-privacy

The Privacy (Protection) Bill 2013: A Citizen's Draft

bhairav — 2013-07-12T11:50:20Z

This research was undertaken as part of the 'SAFEGUARDS' project that CIS is undertaking with Privacy International and IDRC.

The Privacy (Protection) Bill 2013 contains provisions that speak to data protection, interception, and surveillance. The Bill also establishes the powers and functions of the Privacy Commissioner, and lays out offenses and penalties for contravention of the Bill. The Bill represents a citizen's version of a possible privacy legislation for India, and will be shared with key stakeholders including civil society, industry, and government.

Click to download a full draft of the Privacy (Protection) Bill, 2013.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy-protection-bill-2013-citizens-draft

Criminal Defamation and the Supreme Court’s Loss of Reputation

bhairav — 2016-06-03T03:05:14Z

The Supreme Court’s refusal, in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, to strike down the anachronistic colonial offence of criminal defamation is wrong. Criminalising defamation serves no legitimate public purpose; the vehicle of criminalisation – sections 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – is unconstitutional; and the court’s reasoning is woolly at best.

The article was published in the Wire on May 14, 2016.

Politics and censorship

Two kinds of defamation actions have emerged to capture popular attention. First, political interests have adopted defamation law to settle scores and engage in performative posturing for their constituents. And, second, powerful entities such as large corporations have exploited weaknesses in defamation law to threaten, harass, and intimidate journalists and critics.

The former phenomenon is not new. Colonial India saw an explosion of litigation as traditional legal structures were swept away and native disputes successfully migrated to the colonial courts. These included politically-motivated defamation actions that had little to do with protecting reputations. In fact, defamation litigation has long become an extension of politics, in many cases a new front for political manoeuvring.

The latter type of defamation action is far more sinister. Powerful elites, both individuals and corporations, have cynically misused the law of defamation to silence criticism and chill the free press. By filing excessive and often unfounded complaints that are dispersed across the country, which threaten journalists with imprisonment, powerful elites frighten journalists into submission and vindictively hound those who refuse to back down. Such actions are called Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs) which Rajeev Dhavan warns have created a new system of censorship.

Petitions and politicians

Defamation originates from the concept of scandalum magnatum – the slander of great men – which protected the reputations of aristocrats. The crime was linked to sedition, so insulting a lord was akin to treason. In today’s neo-feudal India, political leaders are contemporary aristocrats. Investigating them can invite devastating consequences, even death. Most of the time, they retaliate through defamation law. Since the criminal justice system is most compromised at its base, where the police and magistrates directly interact with people, the misuse of criminal defamation law hurts ordinary citizens.

This is different from politicians prosecuting each other since they rarely, if ever, suffer punishment. Of all the petitions before the Supreme Court concerning the decriminalisation of defamation, the three that received the most news coverage were those of Subramanian Swamy, Rahul Gandhi, and Arvind Kejriwal. They are all politicians, their petitions were made in response to defamation complaints filed by rival politicians. On the other hand, there are numerous cases which politicians have filed against private members of civil society to silence them. When presented with these concerns, the Supreme Court simply failed to seriously engage with them.

The architecture of defamation

Defamation has many species, a convoluted history, and complex defences. Defamation can be committed by the spoken word, which is slander, or the written word, which is libel. The historical distinction between these two modes of defamation is based on the permanence of written words. Before the invention of the printing press, the law was chiefly concerned with slander. But as written ideas proliferated through mass publication technologies, libel came to be viewed as more malevolent and the law visited serious punishments on writers and publishers.

Such a distinction presumes a literate readership. In largely illiterate societies, the spoken word was more potent. This is why films and radio have long attracted censorship and state control in India. Before mass publishing forked defamation into libel and slander, there existed only the historical crime of libel. Historical libel had four species: seditious libel, blasphemous libel, obscene libel, and defamatory libel.

Seditious libel, which has been repealed in Britain, prospers in India as the offence of sedition which is criminalised by section 124A of the IPC. Blasphemous libel, repealed in Britain, fares well in India as the offence of blasphemy under section 295A of the IPC. Obscene libel, as the offence of obscenity, is criminalised by section 294 of the IPC. And defamatory libel, repealed in Britain, which is the offence of criminal defamation that the Subramanian Swamy case upheld, continues to exist under section 499 of the IPC.

Confusing harms

Of the many errors that litter the Supreme Court’s May 13, 2016 judgment in the Subramanian Swamy case, perhaps the most egregious is the failure to recognise the harm that criminal defamation poses to a healthy civil society in a free democracy. At the crux of this mistake is the Supreme Court’s failure to distinguish between private injury and social harm. Two people may, in their private capacities, litigate a civil suit to recover damages if one feels the other has injured her reputation. This private action of defamation was not in issue before the court.

On the other hand, by criminalising defamation, why should the state protect the reputations of individuals while expending public resources to do so? This goes to the concept of crime. When an action is serious enough to harm society it is criminalised. Rape strikes at the root of public safety, human dignity, equality, and peace, so it is a crime. A breach of contract only injures the party who was expecting the performance of contractual duties; it does not harm society, so it is not a crime. Similarly, a loss of reputation, which is by itself difficult to quantify, does no harm to society and so it should not be a crime.

Truth and the public good

It may be argued, and the Supreme Court hints, that at its fundament, society is premised on the need for truth; so lies should be penalised. This is where defamation law wanders into moral policing. In Indian and European philosophies, truth is consecrated as a moral good. The Supreme Court quotes from the Bhagavad Gita on the virtue of truth. But while quotes like these are undoubtedly meaningful, they have no utility in a constitutional challenge. In reality, society is composed of truth, lies, untruths, half-truths, rumour, satire, and a lot more. In fact, the more shades of opinion there are, the livelier that society is. So lies should not invite criminal liability.

If we concede the moral debate and arrive at a consensus that the law must privilege truth over lies, then truth alone should be a complete defence to defamation. If the law criminalises untruth, then it must sanctify truth. That means when tried for the crime of defamation, a journalist must be acquitted if her writing is true. But the law and the Supreme Court require more. In addition to proving the truth, the journalist must prove that her writing serves the public good. So speaking truth is illegal if it does not serve the public good.

In fact, truth has only recently been recognised as a defence to defamation, albeit not a complete defence. This belies the social foundations of criminal defamation law. The purpose of the offence is not to uphold truth, it is to protect the reputations of the powerful. But what is reputation? The Supreme Court spends 25 pages trying to answer this question with no success. Instead, the court declares that reputation is protected by the right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution but it offers no sound reasoning to support this claim. The court also fails to explain why the private civil action of defamation is insufficient to protect reputation.

The constitution and constitutionalism

There are two core constitutional questions posed by the Subramanian Swamy case. They are:

Does the crime of defamation fall within one of the nine grounds listed in Article 19(2) of the constitution; and
Are sections 499 and 500 of the IPC which criminalise and punish defamation reasonable restrictions on the right to free speech?

Article 19(2) contains nine grounds in the interests of which a law may reasonably restrict the right to free speech. Defamation is one of the nine grounds, but the provision is silent as to which type of defamation, civil or criminal, it considers. However, B.R. Ambedkar’s comments in the Constituent Assembly arguably indicate that criminal defamation was intended to be a ground to restrict free speech.

The answer to the second question lies in measuring the reasonableness of the restriction criminal defamation places on free speech. If the restriction is proportionate to the social harm caused by defamation, then it is reasonable. However, restating an earlier point, criminalising defamation serves no legitimate public purpose because society is unconcerned with the reputations of a few individuals. Even if society is concerned with private reputations, the private civil action of defamation is more than sufficient to protect private interests. Further, the danger that current criminal defamation law poses to India’s free speech environment is considerable. Dhavan says: “Defamation cases [are] a weapon by which the rich and powerful silence their critics and censor a democracy.”

The Subramanian Swamy case highlights several worrying trends in India’s constitutional jurisprudence. The judgment is delivered by one judge speaking for a bench of two. Such critically significant constitutional challenges cannot be left to the whims of two unelected and unaccountable men. Moreover, from its position as the guarantor of individual freedoms, the Supreme Court appears to be in retreat. This will have far-reaching and negative consequences for India’s citizenry. If the court fails to enhance individual freedoms, what is its constitutional role? The judiciary would do well to stay away from policy mundanities and focus on promoting India’s democratic project, lest it injure its own reputation.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/criminal-defamation-and-the-supreme-court2019s-loss-of-reputation