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DIDP Request #5: The Ombudsman and ICANN's Misleading Response to Our Request
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1
<b>CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of the complaints received and resolved, parties involved and the nature of complaints under the Ombudsman process. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below. ICANN's response is misleading in its insistence on confidentiality of all Ombudsman complaints and resolutions.</b>
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<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">CIS Request</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>26 December 2014</span></p>
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<p><span>To:<br /> Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board </span></p>
<p><span>Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President </span></p>
<p><span>Mr. Chris LaHatte, Ombudsman, ICANN </span></p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><span><strong>Sub: Details regarding complaints submitted to the ICANN Ombudsman </strong></span></p>
<p><span>We are very pleased to note that ICANN’s transparency and accountability mechanisms include maintaining a free, fair and impartial ombudsman. It is our understanding that any person with a complaint against the ICANN Board, staff or organization, may do so to the designated ombudsman.[1]</span><span> </span><span>We also understand that there are cases that the ICANN ombudsman does not have the authority to address. </span></p>
<p><span>In order to properly assess and study the efficiency and effectiveness of the ombudsman system, we request you to provide us with the following information: </span></p>
<p><span>(i) A compilation of all the cases that have been decided by ICANN ombudsmen in the history of the organization. </span></p>
<p><span>(ii) The details of the parties that are involved in the cases that have been decided by the ombudsmen. </span></p>
<p><span>(iii)A description of the proceedings of the case, along with the party that won in each instance. </span></p>
<p><span>Further, we hope you could provide us with an answer as to why there have been no ombudsman reports since the year 2010, on the ICANN website.[2]</span><span> </span><span>Additionally, we would like to bring to your notice that the link that provides the ombudsman report for the year 2010 does not work.</span></p>
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<p><span>In order to properly assess the mechanism that ICANN uses for grievance redressal, it would be necessary to examine the details of all the cases that ICANN ombudsmen have presided over in the past. In this regard, kindly provide us with the above information.</span></p>
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<p><span>We do hope that you will be able to furnish this information to us within the stipulated time period of 30 days. Do not hesitate to contact us if you have any doubts regarding our queries. Thank you so much. </span></p>
<p><span>Yours sincerely,<br /> Lakshmi Venkataraman<br /> NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad, </span><span>for </span><span>Centre for Internet & Society<br /> W: http://cis-india.org</span></p>
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<h2>ICANN Response</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In its response, ICANN declines our request on grounds of confidentiality. It refers to the ICANN Bylaws on the office of the Ombudsman to argue that all matters brought before the Ombudsman "shall be treated as confidential" and the Ombudsman shall "<span>take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve the privacy of, and to avoid harm to, those parties not involved in the complaint being investigated by the Ombudsman". ICANN states that the Ombudsman publishes Annual Reports, in which he/she provides a "consolidated analysis of the year's complaints and resolutions", including "</span><span>a description of any trends or common elements of complaints received". </span><span>In sum, ICANN states that m</span><span>aking Ombudsman Requests public would violate ICANN Bylaws, and topple the independence and integrity of the Ombudsman.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">These are, perhaps, valid reasons to decline our DIDP request. But it is important to investigate ICANN's reasons. The <span>ICANN Board appoints the Ombudsman for 2 year terms, under </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en#V">Article V of ICANN’s Bylaws</a><span>. As we note </span><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/where-does-icann2019s-money-come-from-we-asked-they-don2019t-know">in an earlier post</a><span>, the Ombudsman’s principal function is to receive and dispose of <span style="text-align: justify; ">complaints about unfair treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituency.</span></span><span> He/she reports to the ICANN Board alone. He/she also </span><span>reports on the categories of complaints he receives, and statistics regarding decisions in his </span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reports-96-2012-02-25-en">Annual Reports</a><span>; no details are forthcoming for stated reasons of confidentiality and privacy. </span><span>It is clear, therefore, that the Ombudsman receives and disposes of complaints under a procedure that is inadequately transparent. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN argues, however, that for reasons of confidentiality and integrity of the Ombudsman office, ICANN is unable to disclose details regarding Ombudsman complaints, the complainants/respondents and a description of the proceedings (including the decision/resolution). Indeed, ICANN states its</span><span> "Bylaws and <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ombudsman-framework-26mar09-en.pdf">the Ombudsman Framework</a> obligates the Ombudsman to treat all matters brought before him as confidential and 'to take reasonable steps necessary to preserve the privacy of, and to avoid harm to, those parties not involved in the complaint being investigated by the Ombudsman'.” For this reason, ICANN considers that "D</span><span>isclosing details about the parties involved and the nature of the cases that have been decided by the Ombudsmen would not only compromise the confidentiality of the Ombudsman process but would also violate the ICANN Bylaws and the Ombudsman Framework." </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>While the privacy of parties both involved and "not involved in the complaint" can be preserved (by redacting names, email addresses and other personal identification), h</span><span>ow valid is ICANN's dogged insistence on confidentiality and non-disclosure? Let's look at Article V of ICANN's Bylaws and the Ombudsman Framework both.</span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Do ICANN Bylaws bind the Ombudsman to Confidentiality?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Under Article V, Section 1(2) of ICANN's Bylaws, the Ombudsman is appointed by the ICANN Board for a 2 year term (renewable). As noted earlier, the Ombudsman's principal function is to<span> </span><span>“provide an independent internal evaluation of complaints by members of the ICANN community who believe that the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body has treated them unfairly” or inappropriately (Art. V, Section 2). The Ombudsman is not a judge; his conflict resolution tools are "</span><span>negotiation, facilitation, and 'shuttle diplomacy'. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>According to Art. V, Section 3(3), the Ombudsman has access to "all necessary information and records from staff and constituent bodies" to evaluate complaints in an informed manner. While the Ombudsman can <i>access</i> these records, he may not "publish if otherwise confidential". When are these records confidential, then? Section 3(3) supplies the answer. The confidentiality obligations are as "imposed by the complainant or <span style="text-align: justify; ">any generally applicable confidentiality policies adopted by ICANN". For instance, the complainant can waive its confidentiality by publishing the text of its complaint <span style="text-align: justify; ">and the Ombudsman's response to the same </span>(such as the <a href="http://www.internetcommerce.org/ica-tells-icann-ombudsman-office-its-irt-report-tardy-nonresponsive-and-non-persuasive/">Internet Commerce Association's complaint</a> regarding the Implementation Review Team under the new gTLD program), or a complaint may be publicly <a href="http://lists.ncuc.org/pipermail/ncuc-discuss/2012-November/010974.html">available on a listserv</a>. In any event, there is no blanket confidentiality obligation placed on the Ombudsman under ICANN's Bylaws.</span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: justify; ">Moreover, the Ombudsman also publishes Annual Reports,</span><span style="text-align: justify; "> in which he/she provides a "consolidated analysis of the year's complaints and resolutions", including "</span><span style="text-align: justify; ">a description of any trends or common elements of complaints received". That is, the Ombudsman's Annual Report showcases a graph comparing the increase in the number of complaints, categories of complaints (i.e., whether the complaints fall within or outside of the Ombudsman's jurisdiction), and a brief description of the Ombudsman's scope of resolution and response. The Annual Reports indicate that the mandate of the Ombudsman's office is extremely narrow. In 2014, for instance, 75 out of 467 complaints were <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/annual-report-2014-27jan15-en.pdf">within Mr. LaHatte's jurisdiction</a> (page 5), but he notes that his ability to intervene is limited to "failures in procedure". <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-recommendations-31dec13-en.pdf">As an input to the ATRT2 Report noted</a>, the Office of the Ombudsman “appears so restrained and contained” (page 53). As the ATRT2 noted, "</span></span></span><span>ICANN needs to reconsider the Ombudsman’s charter and the Office’s role as a symbol of good governance to be further incorporated in transparency processes"; the Office's transparency leaves much to be desired.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: justify; ">But I digress.</span></span></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span><span style="text-align: justify; ">The Ombudsman is authorised to make reports on any complaint and its resolution (or lack thereof) to the ICANN Board, and unless the Ombudsman says so <i>in his sole discretion</i>, his reports are to be posted on the website (Art. V, Section 4(4)). <span style="text-align: justify; ">The Ombudsman can also report on individual requests, such as </span><a href="https://omblog.icann.org/index.html%3Fp=1015.html" style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. LaHatte's response to a complaint regarding a DIDP denial</a><span style="text-align: justify; "> (cached). </span>Some reports are actually available on the Ombudsman page; the last published report dates back to 2012, though in 2013 and 2014, the Ombudsman dealt with more complaints within his jurisdiction than in 2012 or prior. </span></span><span>So ICANN's argument that disclosing the information we ask for in our DIDP Request would violate ICANN Bylaws and the confidentiality of the Ombudsman is misleading. </span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Does the Ombudsman Framework Prohibit Public Reporting?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">So if ICANN Bylaws do not <i>ipso facto</i> bind the Ombudsman's complaint and conflict resolution process to confidentiality, does the Ombudsman Framework do so?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The Ombudsman does indeed have confidentiality obligations under <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ombudsman-framework-26mar09-en.pdf" style="text-align: justify; ">the Ombudsman Framework</a> (page 4). All matters brought before the Ombudsman shall be treated as confidential, and the identities of parties not involved in the complaint are required to be protected. The Ombudsman may reveal the identity of the complainant to the ICANN Board or Staff only to further the resolution of a complaint (which seems fairly obvious); this obligation is extended to ICANN Board and Staff as well.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As the Framework makes crystal clear, the <i>identity of complainants</i> are to be kept confidential. Nothing whatsoever binds the Ombudsman from revealing the stakeholder group or affiliation of the complainants - and these are possibly of more importance. What stakeholders most often receive unfair or inappropriate treatment from ICANN Board, Staff or constituent bodies? Does business suffer more, or do non-commercial users, or indeed, governments? It is good to know <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/annual-report-2014-27jan15-en.pdf">what countries the complaints come from (page 4-5)</a>, but given ICANN's insistence on its multi-stakeholder model as a gold standard, it is important to know what stakeholders suffer the most in the ICANN system.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In fact, in the first page, the Ombudsman Framework says this: "<span><strong>The Ombudsman may post complaints and resolutions to a dedicated portion of the ICANN website</strong> (http://www.icann.org/ombudsman/): (i) <strong>in order to promote an understanding of the issues in the ICANN community</strong>; (ii) to raise awareness of administrative fairness; and (iii) <strong>to allow the community to see the results of similar previous cases</strong>. These postings will be done in a <strong>generic manner</strong> to protect the confidentiality and privilege of communicating with the Office of Ombudsman." But the ICANN website does not, in fact, host records of any Ombudsman complaints or resolutions; it links you only to the Annual Reports and Publications. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>As I've written before, the Annual Reports provide no details regarding the nature of each complaint, their origins or resolution, and are useful if the only information we need is bare statistics of the <i>number of complaints received</i>. That is useful, but it's not enough. Given that the Ombudsman Framework <i>does</i> allow complaint/resolution reporting, it is baffling that ICANN's response to our DIDP request chooses to emphasise only the confidentiality obligations, while conveniently leaving out the parts enabling and encouring reporting. </span></p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">Should ICANN Report the Ombudsman Complaints?</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Of course it should. The Ombudsman is aimed at filling an integral gap in the ICANN system - he/she listens to complaints about treatment by the ICANN Board, Staff or constituent bodies. As the discussions surrounding the appeal procedures in the CWG-Names show, and as the ATRT2 recommendations on Reconsideration and Independent Review show, conflict resolution mechanisms are crucial in any environment, not least a multi-stakeholder one. And in an organisation that leaves much desired by way of accountability and transparency, not reporting on complaints against the Board, staff or constituencies seems a tad irresponsible.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">If there are privacy concerns regarding the identities of complainants, their personal identifying information can be redacted. Actually, <a href="https://omb.icann.org/portal/complaint.php">in the complaint form</a>, adding a waiver-of-confidentiality tick-box would solve the problem, allowing the complainant to choose whether to keep his/her complaint unreportable. But the details of the respondents ought to be reported; as the entity responsible and accountable, ICANN should disclose whom complaints have been made against.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-ombudsman-response-27jan15-en.pdf"><b>found here</b></a>. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"><strong>in this table (Request S. no. 5)</strong></a>.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>[1] </span><span><i>See</i> </span><span>What the Ombudsman can do for you</span><span>, </span><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/contact- 2012-02-25-en</span><span>.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>[2] <i>See</i> Annual Reports & Publications, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/reports-96-2012- 02-25-en.</span></p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-5-the-ombudsman-and-icanns-misleading-response-to-our-request-1</a>
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No publishergeethaICANNDIDPTransparencyAccountability2015-03-06T11:11:31ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #7: Globalisation Advisory Groups
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-7-globalisation-advisory-groups
<b>CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking information regarding the creation and dissolution of the President's Globalisation Advisory Groups. The GAGs were created to advise the ICANN Board on its globalisation efforts, and to address questions on Affirmation of Commitments (AOC), policy structures, legal structure, root server system, the IANA multistakeholder accountability, and Internet governance. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.</b>
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<h2>CIS Request</h2>
<p><span>12 January 2015</span></p>
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<p><span>To:<br /> Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President</span></p>
<p><span> Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board</span></p>
<p><span> Ms. Theresa Swineheart, Senior Advisor to the President on Strategy </span></p>
<p><span>Mr. Samiran Gupta, ICANN India </span></p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><span><strong>Sub: Creation and dissolution of the President’s Globalisation Advisory Groups </strong></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>On 17 February 2014, at a Special Meeting of the ICANN Board, the Board passed a resolution creating the President’s Globalisation Advisory Groups.</span><span>1 </span><span>Six Globalisation Advisory Groups were created, including on IANA globalization, legal structures, Internet governance, the Affirmation of Commitments, policy structures and the root server system.</span><span>2 </span><span>According to the minutes of the meeting, the Advisory Groups were to meet with the community at ICANN49 (Singapore, March 2014), make recommendations to the Board, and the Board would present their reports at ICANN50 (London, June 2014).</span><span>3 </span><span>Mr. Chehade was vested with the authority to change the Advisory Groups and their composition without the need for a further resolution, but the manner of dissolution was not laid out. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN lists the Advisory Groups on its “Past Groups” page, with no further information.</span><span>4 </span><span>Presumably, the Groups remained in existence for at most one month. No explanation is provided for the reasons regarding the dissolution of all the Advisory Groups. There are no reports or transcripts of meetings with the community at ICANN49 or recommendations to Mr. Chehade or the Board.</span></p>
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<p><span>The Globalisation Advisory Groups covered issues crucial for ICANN and the global Internet governance community, including its seat (“Legal Structures”), the Affirmation of Commitments (considered critical for ICANN’s accountability), the IANA stewardship transition, and ICANN’s (increasing) involvement in Internet governance. Given this, we request the following information: </span></p>
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<li><span>Of the six Globalisation Advisory Groups created, is any Group active as of today (12 January 2015)? </span></li>
<li><span>When and how many times did any of the Groups meet?</span></li>
<li><span>On what date were the Groups dissolved? Were all Groups dissolved on the </span><span>same date?</span></li>
<li><span>By what mechanism did the dissolution take place (oral statement, email)? If the dissolution occurred by way of email or statement, please provide a copy of the same.</span></li>
<li><span>Did any of the six Globalisation Advisory Groups present any report, advice, or recommendations to Mr. Chehade or any member(s) of the Board, prior to their dissolution? If yes, please provide the report/recommendations (if available) and/or information regarding the same.</span></li>
<li><span>Why were the Advisory Groups dissolved? Has any reason been recorded, and if not, please provide an explanation.</span></li>
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<div class="column"><span>We await your favorable response and the requested information within the prescribed time limit. Please do not hesitate to contact us should you require any clarifications.</span></div>
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<div class="column"><span>Thank you very much.</span></div>
<p>Warm regards,<br /> Geetha Hariharan<br /> Centre for Internet & Society</p>
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<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Response</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's response to this request is positive. ICANN states that the Board did indeed set up the six Globalisation Advisory Groups (GAGs) on 17 February 2014 to tackle issues surrounding ICANN's globalisation efforts. The Affirmation of Commitments (AOC), policy structures, legal structure, root server system, the IANA multistakeholder accountability, and Internet governance were issues taken up by the GAGs. However, after the NTIA made its announcement regarding the IANA transition in March 2014, the GAGs were disbanded so as to avoid duplication of work on issues that "<span>had a home in the global multistakeholder discussions". As a result, by a Board resolution dated 27 March 2014, the GAGs were dissolved. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>This is an example of a good response to an information request. Some documentation regarding the creation and dissolution of the GAGs existed, such as the Board resolutions. The response points us to these documents, and summarises the reasons for the GAGs' creation and dissolution. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is possible that this response is clear/comprehensive because the GAGs no longer exist, and in any event, did not perform any work worth writing about. Queries about ICANN's involvement in Internet governance (NETmundial, the NETmundial Initiative, etc.) garner responses that are, to say it informally, cage-y and surrounded by legalese.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-09feb15-en.pdf"><strong>found here</strong></a>. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"><strong>in this table (Request S. no. 7)</strong></a>.</p>
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<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>[1] </span><span><i>See</i> </span><span>Approved Board Resolutions | Special Meeting of the Board</span><span>, </span><span><a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/resolutions-2014-02-17-en">https://www.icann.org/resources/board-material/resolutions-2014-02-17-en</a></span><span>.</span></p>
<p>[2] <i>See</i> President’s Globalisation Advisory Groups, <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/globalization-19feb14-en.pdf">https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/globalization-19feb14-en.pdf</a>.</p>
<p>[3] <i>See</i> Minutes | Special Meeting of the Board, <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/board- material/minutes-2014-02-17-en">https://www.icann.org/resources/board- material/minutes-2014-02-17-en</a>.</p>
<p>[4] <i>See</i> Past Committees, Task Forces, and Other Groups, <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/past-2012-02-25-en">https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/past-2012-02-25-en</a>.</p>
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For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-7-globalisation-advisory-groups'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-7-globalisation-advisory-groups</a>
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No publishergeethaICANNDIDPTransparencyAccountability2015-03-17T10:07:26ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #8: ICANN Organogram
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-8-organogram
<b>CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of its oragnisational structure and headcount of all staff. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below. </b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">CIS Request</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>13 January 2015</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>To:</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Fadi Chehade, President and CEO</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Samiran Gupta, ICANN India</p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><strong>Sub: ICANN organogram</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><strong> </strong><span>In order to understand ICANN’s organizational structure, decision-making and day-to-day functioning, may we request an organogram of ICANN. We request that the organogram include ICANN’s reporting hierarchy, mentioning positions held in all departments. Wherever possible (such as middle and senior management), we request names of the ICANN staff holding the positions as well. Along with this, could you also provide a count per department of the number of ICANN staff employed in all departments as of this date?</span><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We await your favorable response and the requested information within the prescribed time limit. Please do not hesitate to contact us should you require any clarifications.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thank you very much.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Warm regards,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Geetha Hariharan</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Centre for Internet & Society</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">W: <a href="http://cis-india.org">http://cis-india.org</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Response</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN does not provide all the information we requested, but it responded with the following:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">First, ICANN has responded that its current staff headcount is approx. 310. ICANN states that it already makes publicly available an <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/management-org-01feb15-en.pdf">organisational chart</a>. This is immensely useful, for it sets out the reporting hierarchies at senior and mid-managerial levels. However, it doesn't tell us the organisational structure categorised by all departments and staff in the said departments. The webpages of some of ICANN's departments list out some of its staff; for instance, <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/about-2014-10-10-en">Contractual Compliance</a>, <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/gse-2012-02-25-en">Global Stakeholder Engagement</a> and <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/policy">Policy Development</a> (scroll down).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">What you will notice is that ICANN provides us a list of staff, but we cannot be sure whether the team includes more persons than those mentioned. Second, a quick glance at the Policy Development staff makes clear that ICANN selects from outside this pool to coordinate the policy development. For instance, the IANA Stewardship Transition (the CWG-IANA) is supported by <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/profiles/grace-abuhamad">Ms. Grace Abuhamad</a>, who is not a member of the <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/policy">policy support staff</a>, but coordinates the IANA mailing list and F2F meetings anyway. What this means is that we're no longer certain who within ICANN is involved in policy development and support, whom they report to, and where the Chinese walls lie. This is why an organogram is necessary: the policy-making and implementation functions in ICANN may be closely linked because of staff interaction, and effective Chinese walls would benefit from public scrutiny.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Now, ICANN says that one may explore staff profiles on the <a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/community/explore?profile_search%5Bbadge_filters%5D%5B%5D=staff_badge&profile_search%5Bbadge_filters%5D%5B%5D=&profile_search%5Bcountry_filters%5D%5B%5D=&profile_search%5Bicann_experience_filter%5D=&profile_search%5Big_experience_filter%5D=&profile_search%5Binterest_filters%5D%5B%5D=&profile_search%5Blanguage_filters%5D%5B%5D=&profile_search%5Bmembership_filters%5D%5B%5D=&profile_search%5Bprofile_filter%5D=&profile_search%5Bsearch_text%5D=&utf8=%E2%9C%93">Staff page</a>. While short biographies/profiles are available for most staff on the Staff page, it's unclear what departments they work in, how many staff members work each in department, whom they report to, and what the broad range of their responsibilities include.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Privacy concerns do not preclude the disclosure of such information for two reasons. First, staff profiles imply a consent to making staff information public (at least their place in the organisational structure, if not their salaries, addresses, phone extension numbers, etc.). Second, such information is necessary and helpful to scrutinise the effectiveness of ICANN's functioning. Like the example of the policy-making process mentioned above, greater transparency in internal functioning will itself serve as a check against hazards like partisanism, public comment aggregation, drafting of charters for policy-making and determining scope, etc. While the functioning itself may or need not change, scrutiny can ensure responsibility from ICANN and its staff.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be </span><a class="external-link" href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-organogram-response-11feb15-en.pdf" style="text-align: justify; "><strong>found here</strong></a><span style="text-align: justify; ">. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found </span><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file" style="text-align: justify; "><strong>in this table (Request S. no. 8)</strong></a><span style="text-align: justify; ">.</span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-8-organogram'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-8-organogram</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaICANNDIDPTransparencyAccountability2015-03-17T11:39:16ZBlog EntryCIS RTI REQUEST TO DIPP - NUMBER 1 - FEBRUARY, 2015
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-rti-request-to-dipp-number-1-february-2015
<b></b>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-rti-request-to-dipp-number-1-february-2015'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-rti-request-to-dipp-number-1-february-2015</a>
</p>
No publishernehaaAccess to KnowledgeCopyrightIntellectual Property RightsAccountabilityPatents2015-04-14T17:17:53ZFileCIS RTI REQUEST TO DIPP - NUMBER 3 - FEBRUARY, 2015
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-rti-request-to-dipp-number-3-february-2015
<b></b>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-rti-request-to-dipp-number-3-february-2015'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/cis-rti-request-to-dipp-number-3-february-2015</a>
</p>
No publishernehaaGovernment InformationAccess to KnowledgeDIPPIntellectual Property RightsAccountabilityNATIONAL IPR POLICYIPR THINK TANK2015-04-14T17:28:53ZFileDIPP RESPONSE TO CIS (SECOND) RTI - FEBRUARY, 2015
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/dipp-response-to-cis-second-rti-february-2015
<b></b>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/dipp-response-to-cis-second-rti-february-2015'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/dipp-response-to-cis-second-rti-february-2015</a>
</p>
No publishernehaaGovernment InformationAccess to KnowledgeDIPPIntellectual Property RightsAccountabilityNATIONAL IPR POLICYIPR THINK TANK2015-04-14T18:14:18ZFileCIS Comments: Enhancing ICANN Accountability
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability
<b>On May 6, 2014, ICANN published a call for public comments on "Enhancing ICANN Accountability". This comes in the wake of the IANA stewardship transition spearheaded by ICANN and related concerns of ICANN's external and internal accountability mechanisms. Centre for Internet and Society contributed to the call for comments.</b>
<h3><strong>Introduction:</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">On March 14, 2014, the US National Telecommunications and Information Administration <a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-functions">announced its intent</a> to transition key Internet domain name functions to the global multi-stakeholder Internet governance community. ICANN was tasked with the development of a proposal for transition of IANA stewardship, for which ICANN subsequently <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/draft-proposal-2014-04-08-en">called for public comments</a>. At NETmundial, ICANN President and CEO Fadi Chehadé acknowledged that the IANA stewardship transition and improved ICANN accountability were <a href="http://www.internetcommerce.org/issuance-of-netmundial-multistakeholder-statement-concludes-act-one-of-2014-internet-governance-trifecta/">inter-related issues</a>, and <a href="http://blog.icann.org/2014/05/icanns-accountability-in-the-wake-of-the-iana-functions-stewardship-transition/">announced</a> the impending launch of a process to strengthen and enhance ICANN accountability in the absence of US government oversight. The subsequent call for public comments on “Enhancing ICANN Accountability” may be found <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/enhancing-accountability-2014-05-06-en">here</a>.</p>
<h3><strong>Suggestions for improved accountability:</strong></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the event, Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) wishes to limit its suggestions for improved ICANN accountability to matters of reactive or responsive transparency on the part of ICANN to the global multi-stakeholder community. We propose the creation and implementation of a robust “freedom or right to information” process from ICANN, accompanied by an independent review mechanism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Article III of ICANN Bye-laws note that “<i>ICANN and its constituent bodies shall operate to the maximum extent feasible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness</i>”. As part of this, Article III(2) note that ICANN shall make publicly available information on, <i>inter alia</i>, ICANN’s budget, annual audit, financial contributors and the amount of their contributions, as well as information on accountability mechanisms and the outcome of specific requests and complaints regarding the same. Such accountability mechanisms include reconsideration (Article IV(2)), independent review of Board actions (Article IV(3)), periodic reviews (Article IV(4)) and the Ombudsman (Article V).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Further, ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (“DIDP”) sets forth a process by which members of the public may request information “<i>not already publicly available</i>”. ICANN <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en">may respond</a> (either affirmatively or in denial) to such requests within 30 days. Appeals to denials under the DIDP are available under the reconsideration or independent review procedures, to the extent applicable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While ICANN has historically been prompt in its response to DIDP Requests, CIS is of the view that absent the commitments in the AoC following IANA stewardship transition, it would be desirable to amend and strengthen Response and Appeal procedures for DIDP and other, broader disclosures. Our concerns stem from the fact that, <i>first</i>, the substantive scope of appeal under the DIDP, on the basis of documents requested, is unclear (say, contracts or financial documents regarding payments to Registries or Registrars, or a detailed, granular break-up of ICANN’s revenue and expenditures); and <i>second</i>, that grievances with decisions of the Board Governance Committee or the Independent Review Panel cannot be appealed.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Therefore, CIS proposes a mechanism based on “right to information” best practices, which results in transparent and accountable governance at governmental levels.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>First</i>, we propose that designated members of ICANN staff shoulder responsibility to respond to information requests. The identity of such members (information officers, say) ought to be made public, including in the response document.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Second</i>, an independent, third party body should be constituted to sit in appeal over information officers’ decisions to provide or decline to provide information. Such body may be composed of nominated members from the global multi-stakeholder community, with adequate stakeholder-, regional- and gender-representation. However, such members should not have held prior positions in ICANN or its related organizations. During the appointed term of the body, the terms and conditions of service ought to remain beyond the purview of ICANN, similar to globally accepted principles of an independent judiciary. For instance, the Constitution of India forbids any disadvantageous alteration of privileges and allowances of judges of the <a href="http://www.constitution.org/cons/india/p05125.html">Supreme Court</a> and <a href="http://www.constitution.org/cons/india/p06221.html">High Courts</a> during tenure.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Third</i>, and importantly, punitive measures ought to follow unreasonable, unexplained or illegitimate denials of requests by ICANN information officers. In order to ensure compliance, penalties should be made continuing (a certain prescribed fine for each day of information-denial) on concerned officers. Such punitive measures are accepted, for instance, in Section 20 of India’s Right to Information Act, 2005, where the review body may impose continuing penalties on any defaulting officer.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>Finally</i>, exceptions to disclosure should be finite and time-bound. Any and all information exempted from disclosure should be clearly set out (and not merely as categories of exempted information). Further, all exempted information should be made public after a prescribed period of time (say, 1 year), after which any member of the public may request for the same if it continues to be unavailable.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">CIS hopes that ICANN shall deliver on its promise to ensure and enhance its accountability and transparency to the global multi-stakeholder community. To that end, we hope our suggestions may be positively considered.</p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; "><strong>Comment repository</strong>:</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All comments received by ICANN during the comment period (May 6, 2014 to June 6, 2014) may be found <a href="http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06may14/">at this link</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaIANAInternet GovernanceNETmundialICANNAccountability2014-06-10T13:03:57ZBlog EntryICANN’s Problems with Accountability and the .WEB Controversy
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy
<b>The Post-Transition IANA promised enhanced transparency and accountability to the global multistakeholder community. The series of events surrounding the .WEB auction earlier this year has stirred up issues relating to the lack of transparency and accountability of ICANN. This post examines the .WEB auction as a case study to better understand exact gaps in accountability.</b>
<h2>Chronological Background of the .WEB Auction</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In June 2012, ICANN launched a new phase for the creation and operation of Generic Top-Level Domains (gTLDs). After confirming the eligibility of seven applicants for the rights of the .WEB domain name, ICANN placed them in a string contention set (a group of applications with similar or identical applied for gTLDs).<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>[<i>Quick Note</i>: ICANN procedure encourages the resolving of this contention set by voluntary settlement amongst the contending applicants (also referred to as a private auction), wherein individual participation fees of US $185,000 go to ICANN and the auction proceeds are distributed among the bidders. If a private auction fails, the provision for a last resort auction conducted by ICANN is invoked - here the total auction proceeds go to ICANN along with the participation fees.<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><sup><span>[2]</span></sup></a>]</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>In June 2016, NuDotCo LLC, a bidder that had previously participated in nine private auctions without any objection, withdrew its consent to the voluntary settlement. Ruby Glen LLC, another bidder, contacted NDC to ask if it would reconsider its withdrawal, and was made aware of changes in NDC’s Board membership, financial position, management and a potential change in ownership, by NDC’s Chief Financial Officer.<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3"><sup><span>[3]</span></sup></a> Concerned about the transparency of the auction process, Ruby Glen requested ICANN to postpone the auction on June 22, in order to investigate the discrepancies between NDC’s official application and its representation to Ruby Glen.<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4"><sup><span>[4]</span></sup></a> The Vice President of ICANN’s gTLD Operations and the independent ICANN Ombudsman led separate investigations, both of which were limited to few e-mails seeking NDC’s confirmation of status quo. On the basis of NDC’s denial of any material changes, ICANN announced that the auction would proceed as planned, as no grounds had been found for its postponement.<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup><span>[5]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>On July 27, NDC’s winning bid – USD 135 million – beat the previous record by $90 million, <i>doubling ICANN’s total net proceeds</i> from the past fifteen auctions it had conducted.<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup><span>[6]</span></sup></a> Soon after NDC’s win, Verisign, Inc., the market giant that owns the .com and .net domain names, issued a public statement that it had used NDC as a front for the auction, and that it had been involved in its funding from the very beginning. Verisign agreed to transfer USD 130 million to NDC, allowing the latter to retain a $5 million stake in .WEB.<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup><span>[7]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Ruby Glen LLC filed for an injunction against the transfer of .WEB rights to NDC, and sought expedited discovery<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup><span>[8]</span></sup></a> against ICANN and NDC in order to gather evidentiary support for the temporary restraining order.<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9"><sup><span>[9]</span></sup></a> Donuts Inc., the parent company of Ruby Glen, simultaneously filed for recovery of economic loss due to negligence, fraud and breach of bylaws among other grounds, and Affilias, the second highest bidder, demanded that the .WEB rights be handed over by ICANN.<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10"><sup><span>[10]</span></sup></a> Furthermore, at ICANN57, Affilias publicly brought up the issue in front of ICANN’s Board, and Verisign followed with a rebuttal. However, ICANN’s Board refused to comment on the issue at that point as the matter was still engaged in ongoing litigation.<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11"><sup><span>[11]</span></sup></a></span></p>
<h2>Issues Regarding ICANN’s Assurance of Accountability</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Post-Transition IANA promised enhanced transparency and accountability to the global multistakeholder community. The series of events surrounding the .WEB auction has stirred up issues relating to the lack of transparency and accountability of ICANN. ICANN’s arbitrary enforcement of policies that should have been mandatory, with regard to internal accountability mechanisms, fiduciary responsibilities and the promotion of competition, has violated Bylaws that obligate it to operate ‘consistently, neutrally, objectively, and fairly, without singling out any particular party for discriminatory treatment’.<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12"><sup><span>[12]</span></sup></a> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Though the US court ruled in favour of ICANN, the discrepancies that were made visible with regard to ICANN’s differing emphasis on procedural and substantive compliance with its rules and regulations, have forced the community to acknowledge that corporate strategies, latent interests and financial advantages undermine ICANN’s commitment to accountability. The approval of NDC’s ridiculously high bid with minimal investigation or hesitation, even after Verisign’s takeover, signifies pressing concerns that stand in the way of a convincing commitment to accountability, such as:</span></p>
<ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Lack of Substantive Fairness and Accountability at ICANN (A Superficial Investigation)</span></li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN’s Sketchy Tryst with Legal Conformity</span></li>
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span>The Financial Accountability of ICANN’s Auction Proceeds</span></li>
</ol> <ol style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><span><span>The Lack of Substantive Fairness and Accountability in its Screening Processes: </span></span></li>
</ol>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Ruby Glen’s claim that ICANN conducted a cursory investigation of NDC’s misleading and unethical behaviour brought to light the ease and arbitrariness with which applications are deemed valid and eligible. </span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Disclosure of Significant Details Unique to Applicant Profiles:</span></span></i> <span>In the initial stage, applications for the gTLD auctions require disclosure of background information such as proof of legal establishment, financial statements, primary and secondary contacts to represent the company, officers, directors, partners, major shareholders, etc. At this stage, TAS User Registration IDs, which require VAT/tax/business IDs, principal business address, phone, fax, etc. of the applicants, are created to build unique profiles for different parties in an auction.<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13"><sup><span>[13]</span></sup></a> Any important change in an applicant’s details would thus significantly alter the unique profile, leading to uncertainty regarding the parties involved and the validity of transactions undertaken. NDC’s application clearly didn’t meet the requirements here, as its financial statements, secondary contact, board members and ownership all changed at some point before the auction took place (either prior to or post submission of the application).<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14"><sup><span>[14]</span></sup></a></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Mandatory Declaration of Third Party Funding:</span></span></i><span> Applications presupposing a future joint venture or any organisational unpredictability are not deemed eligible by ICANN, and if any third party is involved in the funding of the applicant, the latter is to provide evidence of such commitment to funding at the time of submission of its financial documents.<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15"><sup><span>[15]</span></sup></a> Verisign’s public announcement that it was involved in NDC’s funding from the very beginning (well before the auction) and its management later, proves that NDC’s failure to notify ICANN made its application ineligible, or irregular at the very least.<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16"><sup><span>[16]</span></sup></a></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Vague Consequences of Failure to Notify ICANN of Changes:</span></span></i><span> If in any situation, certain material changes occur in the composition of the management, ownership or financial position of the applicant, ICANN is liable to be notified of the changes by the submission of updated documents. Here, however, the applicant may be subjected to re-evaluation if a <i>material change</i> is concerned, <i>at ICANN’s will</i> (there is no mention of what a material change might be). In the event of failure to notify ICANN of changes that would lead the previous information submitted to be false or misleading, ICANN <i>may</i> reject or deny the application concerned.<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17"><sup><span>[17]</span></sup></a> NDC’s absolute and repeated denial of any changes, during the extremely brief e-mail ‘investigation’ conducted by ICANN and the Ombudsman, show that at no point was NDC planning on revealing its intimacy with Verisign. No extended evaluation was conducted by ICANN at any point.<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18"><sup><span>[18]</span></sup></a> Note: The arbitrary power allowed here and the vague use of the term ‘material’ obstruct any real accountability on ICANN’s part to ensure that checks are carried out to discourage dishonest behaviour, at all stages.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Arbitrary Enforcement of Background Checks:</span></span></i><span> In order to confirm the eligibility of all applicants, ICANN conducts background screening during its initial evaluation process to verify the information disclosed, at the individual and entity levels.<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19"><sup><span>[19]</span></sup></a> The applicants may be asked to produce any and all documents/evidence to help ICANN complete this successfully, and any relevant information received from ‘any source’ may be taken into account here. However, this screening is conducted only with regard to two criteria: general business diligence and criminal history, and any record of cybersquatting behaviour.<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20"><sup><span>[20]</span></sup></a> In this case, ICANN’s background screening was clearly not thorough, in light of Verisign’s confirmed involvement since the beginning, and at no point was NDC asked to submit any extra documents (apart from the exchange of e-mails between NDC and ICANN and its Ombudsman) to enable ICANN’s inquiry into its business diligence.<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21"><sup><span>[21]</span></sup></a> Further, ICANN also said that it was not <i>required</i> to conduct background checks or a screening process, as the provisions only mention that ICANN is <i>allowed</i> to do so, when it feels the need.<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22"><sup><span>[22]</span></sup></a> This ludicrous loophole hinders transparency efforts by giving ICANN the authority to ignore any questionable details in applications it desires to deem eligible, based on its own strategic leanings, advantageous circumstances or any other beneficial interests.</span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN’s deliberate avoidance of discussing or investigating the ‘allegations’ against NDC (that were eventually proved true), as well as a visible compromise in fairness and equity of the application process point to the conclusion it desired. </span></p>
<h3><span><span>ICANN’s Sketchy Tryst with Legal Conformity:</span></span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN’s lack of <i>substantive compliance</i>, with California’s laws and its own rules and regulations, leave us with the realisation that efforts towards transparency, enforcement and compliance (even with emphasis on the IANA Stewardship and Accountability Process) barely meet the procedural minimum. </span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Rejection of Request for Postponement of Auction:</span></span></i><span> ICANN’s intent to ‘initiate the Auction process once the composition of the set is stabilised’ implies that there must be no pending accountability mechanisms with regard to any applicant.<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23"><sup><span>[23]</span></sup></a> When ICANN itself determines the opening and closing of investigations or reviews concerning applicants, arbitrariness on ICANN’s part in deciding <i>on which date</i> the mechanisms are to be deemed as <i>pending</i>, may affect an applicant’s claim about procedural irregularity. In this case, ICANN had already scheduled the auction for July 27, 2016, before Ruby Glen sent in a request for postponement of the auction and inquiry into NDC’s eligibility on June 22, 2016.<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24"><sup><span>[24]</span></sup></a> Even though the ongoing accountability mechanisms had begun after initiation of the auction process, ICANN confirmed the continuance of the process without assurance about the stability of the contention set as required by procedure. Ruby Glen’s claim about this violation in auction rules was dismissed by ICANN on the basis that there must be no pending accountability mechanisms at the <i>time of scheduling</i> of the auction.<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25"><sup><span>[25]</span></sup></a> This means that if any objection is raised or any dispute resolution or accountability mechanism is initiated with regard to an applicant, at any point after fixing the date of the auction, the auction process continues even though the contention set may not be stabilised. This line of defence made by ICANN is not in conformity with the purpose behind the wording of its auction procedure as discussed above.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Lack of Adequate Participation in the Discovery Planning Process:</span></span></i><span> In order to gather evidentiary support and start the discovery process for the passing of the injunction, ICANN was required to engage with Ruby Glen in a conference, under Federal law. However, due to a disagreement as to the <i>extent</i> of participation required from both parties involved in the process, ICANN recorded only a single appearance at court, after which it refused to engage with Ruby Glen.<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26"><sup><span>[26]</span></sup></a> ICANN should have conducted a thorough investigation, based on both NDC’s and Verisign’s public statements, and engaged more cooperatively in the conference, to comply substantively with its internal procedure as well jurisdictional obligations. Under ICANN’s Bylaws, it is to ensure that an applicant <i>does not assign</i> its rights or obligations in connection with the application to another party, as NDC did, in order to promote a competitive market and ensure certainty in transactions.<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27"><sup><span>[27]</span></sup></a> However, due to its lack of substantive compliance with due procedure, such bylaws have been rendered weak.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Demand to Dismiss Ruby Glen’s Complaint:</span></span></i><span> ICANN demanded the dismissal of Ruby Glen’s complaint on the basis that the complaint was vague and unsubstantiated.<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28"><sup><span>[28]</span></sup></a> After the auction, Ruby Glen’s allegations and suspicions about NDC’s dishonest behaviour were confirmed publicly by Verisign, making the above demand for dismissal of the complaint ridiculous.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Inapplicability of ICANN’s Bylaws to its Contractual Relationships:</span></span></i><span> ICANN maintained that its bylaws are not part of application documents or contracts with applicants (as it is a not-for-profit public benefit corporation), and that ICANN’s liability, with respect to a breach of ICANN’s foundational documents, extends only to officers, directors, members, etc.<a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29"><sup><span>[29]</span></sup></a> In addition, it said that Ruby Glen had not included any facts that suggested a duty of care arose from the contractual relationship with Ruby Glen and Donuts Inc.<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30"><sup><span>[30]</span></sup></a> Its dismissal of and considerable disregard for fiduciary obligations like duty of care and duty of inquiry in contractual relationships, prove the contravention of promised commitments and core values (integral to its entire accountability process), which are to ‘apply in the broadest possible range of circumstances’.<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31"><sup><span>[31]</span></sup></a></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>ICANN’s Legal Waiver and Public Policy:</span></span></i><span> Ruby Glen had submitted that, under the California Civil Code 1668, a covenant not to sue was against policy, and that the legal waiver all applicants were made to sign in the application was unenforceable.<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32"><sup><span>[32]</span></sup></a> This waiver releases ICANN from ‘any claims arising out of, or related to, any action or failure to act’, and the complaint claimed that such an agreement ‘not to challenge ICANN in court, irrevocably waiving the right to sue on basis of any legal claim’ was unconscionable.<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33"><sup><span>[33]</span></sup></a> However, ICANN defended the enforceability of the legal waiver, saying that only a covenant not to sue that is <i>specifically designed</i> to avoid responsibility for own fraud or willful injury is invalidated under the provisions of the California Civil Code.<a href="#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34"><sup><span>[34]</span></sup></a> A waiver, incorporating the availability of accountability mechanisms ‘<i>within ICANN’s bylaws</i> to challenge any final decision of ICANN’s with respect to an application’, was argued as completely valid under California’s laws. It must be kept in mind that challenges to ICANN’s final decisions can make headway <i>only</i> through its own accountability mechanisms (including the Reconsideration Requests Process, the Independent Review Panel and the Ombudsman), which are mostly conducted by, accountable to and applicable at the discretion of the Board.<a href="#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35"><sup><span>[35]</span></sup></a> This means that the only recourse for dissatisfied applicants is through processes managed by ICANN, leaving no scope for independence and impartiality in the review or inquiry concerned, as the .WEB case has shown.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Note</span></span></i><span>: ICANN has also previously argued that its waivers are not restricted by S. 1668 because the parties involved are sophisticated - without an element of oppression, and that these transactions don’t involve public interest as ICANN doesn’t provide necessary services such as health, transportation, etc.<a href="#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36"><sup><span>[36]</span></sup></a> Such line of argument shows its continuous refusal to acknowledge responsibility for ensuring access to an essential good, in a diverse community, justifying concerns about ICANN’s commitment to accessibility and human rights.</span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Required to remain accountable to the stakeholders of the community through <i>mechanisms listed in its Bylaws</i>, ICANN’s repeated difficulty in ensuring these mechanisms adhere to the purpose behind jurisdictional regulations confirm hindrances to impartiality, independence and effectiveness.</span></p>
<h3><span><span>The Financial Accountability of ICANN’s Auction Proceeds:</span></span></h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The use and distribution of significant auction proceeds accruing to ICANN have been identified by the internet community as issues central to financial transparency, especially in a future of increasing instances of contention sets. </span></p>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Private Inurement Prohibition and Legal Requirements of Tax-Exempted Organisations:</span></span></i> <span>Subject to California’s state laws as well as federal laws, tax exemptions and tax-deductible charitable donations (available to not-for-profit public benefit corporations) are dependent on the fulfillment of jurisdictional obligations by ICANN, including avoiding contracts that may result in excessive economic benefit to a party involved, or lead to any deviation from purely charitable and scientific purposes.<a href="#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37"><sup><span>[37]</span></sup></a> ICANN’s Articles require that it ‘<i>shall</i> pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet’.<a href="#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38"><sup><span>[38]</span></sup></a> Due to this, ICANN’s accumulation of around USD 60 million (the total net proceeds from over 14 contention sets) since 2014 has been treated with unease, making it impossible to ignore the exponential increase in the same after the .WEB controversy.<a href="#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39"><sup><span>[39]</span></sup></a> With its dedication to a bottom-up, multi-stakeholder policy development process, the use of a single and ambiguous footnote, in ICANN’s Guidebook, to tackle the complications involving significant funds that accrue from last resort auctions (without even mentioning the arbiters of their ‘appropriate’ use) is grossly insufficient.<a href="#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40"><sup><span>[40]</span></sup></a> </span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>Need for Careful and Inclusive Deliberation Over the Use of Auction Proceeds:</span></span></i><span> At the end of the fiscal year 2016, ICANN’s balance sheet showed a total of USD 399.6 million. However, the .WEB sale amount was not included in this figure, as the auction happened after the last date (June 30, 2016).<a href="#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41"><sup><span>[41]</span></sup></a> Around seven times the average winning bid, a USD 135 million hike in ICANN’s accounts shows the need for greater scrutiny on ICANN’s process of allocation and distribution of these auction proceeds.<a href="#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42"><sup><span>[42]</span></sup></a> While finding an ‘appropriate purpose’ for these funds, it is important that ICANN’s legal nature under US jurisdiction as well as its vision, mission and commitments be adhered to, in order to help increase public confidence and financial transparency.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>The CCWG Charter on New gTLD Auction Proceeds:</span></span></i><span> ICANN has always maintained that it recognised the concern of ‘significant funds accruing as a result of several auctions’ at the outset.<a href="#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43"><sup><span>[43]</span></sup></a> In March 2015, the GNSO brought up issues relating to the distribution of auction proceeds at ICANN52, to address growing concerns of the community.<a href="#_ftn44" name="_ftnref44"><sup><span>[44]</span></sup></a> A Charter was then drafted, proposing the formation of a Cross-Community Working Group on New gTLD Auction Proceeds, to help ICANN’s Board in allocating these funds.<a href="#_ftn45" name="_ftnref45"><sup><span>[45]</span></sup></a> After being discussed in detail at ICANN56, the draft charter was forwarded to the various supporting organisations for comments.<a href="#_ftn46" name="_ftnref46"><sup><span>[46]</span></sup></a> The Charter received no objections from 2 organisations and was adopted by the ALAC, ASO, ccNSO and GNSO, following which members and co-chairs were identified from the organisations to constitute the CCWG.<a href="#_ftn47" name="_ftnref47"><sup><span>[47]</span></sup></a> It was decided that while ICANN’s Board will have final responsibility in disbursement of the proceeds, the CCWG will be responsible for the submission of proposals regarding the mechanism for the allocation of funds, keeping ICANN’s fiduciary and legal obligations in mind.<a href="#_ftn48" name="_ftnref48"><sup><span>[48]</span></sup></a> While creating proposals, the CCWG must recommend how to avoid possible conflicts of interest, maintain ICANN’s tax-exempt status, and ensure diversity and inclusivity in the entire process.<a href="#_ftn49" name="_ftnref49"><sup><span>[49]</span></sup></a> It is important to note that the CCWG cannot make recommendations ‘regarding which organisations are to be funded or not’, but is to merely submit a <i>proposal</i> for the <i>process</i> by which allocation is undertaken.<a href="#_ftn50" name="_ftnref50"><sup><span>[50]</span></sup></a> ICANN’s Guidebook mentions possible uses for proceeds, such as ‘<i><span>grants to support new gTLD applications or registry operators from communities’</span></i><span>, the creation of a fund for ‘<i>specific projects for the benefit of the Internet community’, </i>the ‘<i>establishment of a security fund to expand use of secure protocols’</i>, among others, to be decided by the Board.<a href="#_ftn51" name="_ftnref51"><sup><span>[51]</span></sup></a></span></span></li>
</ul>
<ul style="text-align: justify; ">
<li style="text-align: justify; "><i><span><span>A Slow Process and the Need for More Official Updates:</span></span></i><span> The lack of sufficient communication/updates about any allocation or the process behind such, in light of ICANN’s current total net auction proceeds of USD 233,455,563, speaks of an urgent need for a decision by the Board (based on a recommendation by CCWG), regarding a <i>timeframe</i> for the allocation of such proceeds.<a href="#_ftn52" name="_ftnref52"><sup><span>[52]</span></sup></a> However, the entire process has been very slow, with the <i>first</i> CCWG meeting on auction proceeds scheduled for 26 January 2016, and the lists of members and observers being made public only recently.<a href="#_ftn53" name="_ftnref53"><sup><span>[53]</span></sup></a> Here, even parties interested in applying for the same funds at a later stage are allowed to participate in meetings, as long as they include such information in a Statement of Interest and Declaration of Intention, to satisfy CCWG’s efforts towards transparency and accountability.<a href="#_ftn54" name="_ftnref54"><sup><span>[54]</span></sup></a> </span></li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>The worrying consequences of ICANN’s lack of financial as well as legal accountability (especially in light of its controversies), reminds us of the need for constant reassessment of its commitment to substantive transparency, enforcement and compliance with its rules and regulations. Its current obsessive courtship with only <i>procedural</i> regularity must not be mistaken for a greater commitment to accountability, as assured by the post-transition IANA.</span></p>
<hr style="text-align: justify; " />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"><sup><span>[1]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 2. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.p</span></a><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>df</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2"><sup><span>[2]</span></sup></a> <span>4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3"><sup><span>[3]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4"><sup><span>[4]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5"><sup><span>[5]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 4-7. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6"><sup><span>[6]</span></sup></a><span> PLAINTIFF RUBY GLEN, LLC’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO TAKE THIRD PARTY DISCOVERY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR THE COURT TO ISSUE A SCHEDULING ORDER, 3.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-motion-court-issue-scheduling-order-26oct16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-motion-court-issue-scheduling-order-26oct16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7"><sup><span>[7]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz"><span>https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8"><sup><span>[8]</span></sup></a> <span>An expedited discovery request can provide the required evidentiary support needed to meet the Plaintiff’s burden to obtain a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. (</span><a href="http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/winter2014-0227-using-expedited-discovery-with-preliminary-injunction-motions.html"><span>http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/businesstorts/articles/winter2014-0227-using-expedited-discovery-with-preliminary-injunction-motions.html</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9"><sup><span>[9]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 2. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10"><sup><span>[10]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="http://domainincite.com/20789-donuts-files-10-million-lawsuit-to-stop-web-auction"><span>http://domainincite.com/20789-donuts-files-10-million-lawsuit-to-stop-web-auction</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.thedomains.com/2016/08/15/afilias-asks-icann-to-disqualify-nu-dot-cos-135-million-winning-bid-for-web/"><span>https://www.thedomains.com/2016/08/15/afilias-asks-icann-to-disqualify-nu-dot-cos-135-million-winning-bid-for-web/</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11"><sup><span>[11]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="http://www.domainmondo.com/2016/11/news-review-icann57-hyderabad-india.html"><span>http://www.domainmondo.com/2016/11/news-review-icann57-hyderabad-india.html</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12"><sup><span>[12]</span></sup></a> <span>Art III, Bylaws of Public Technical Identifiers, ICANN. (</span><a href="https://pti.icann.org/bylaws"><span>https://pti.icann.org/bylaws</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13"><sup><span>[13]</span></sup></a> <span>1.4.1.1, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-39.(</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14"><sup><span>[14]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15"><sup><span>[15]</span></sup></a> <span>1.2.1; 1.2.2, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-21. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16"><sup><span>[16]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz"><span>https://www.verisign.com/en_US/internet-technology-news/verisign-press-releases/articles/index.xhtml?artLink=aHR0cDovL3ZlcmlzaWduLm5ld3NocS5idXNpbmVzc3dpcmUuY29tL3ByZXNzLXJlbGVhc2UvdmVyaXNpZ24tc3RhdGVtZW50LXJlZ2FyZGluZy13ZWItYXVjdGlvbi1yZXN1bHRz</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17"><sup><span>[17]</span></sup></a> <span>1.2.7, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-30. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18"><sup><span>[18]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 4. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19"><sup><span>[19]</span></sup></a> <span>1.1.2.5, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-8. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20"><sup><span>[20]</span></sup></a> <span>1.2.1, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 1-21. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21"><sup><span>[21]</span></sup></a> <span>DECLARATION OF CHRISTINE WILLETT IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S <i>EX PARTE </i>APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, 7. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-declaration-willett-25jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22"><sup><span>[22]</span></sup></a> <span>6.8; 6.11, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-5 (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>);</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 10. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23"><sup><span>[23]</span></sup></a> <span>1.1.2.10, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24"><sup><span>[24]</span></sup></a> <span>NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 15. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25"><sup><span>[25]</span></sup></a><span> DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 8. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26"><sup><span>[26]</span></sup></a> <span>26(f); 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (</span><a href="https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-viii-provisional-and-final-remedies/rule-65-injunctions-and-restraining-orders/"><span>https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-viii-provisional-and-final-remedies/rule-65-injunctions-and-restraining-orders/</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-v-disclosures-and-discovery/rule-26-duty-to-disclose-general-provisions-governing-discovery/"><span>https://www.federalrulesofcivilprocedure.org/frcp/title-v-disclosures-and-discovery/rule-26-duty-to-disclose-general-provisions-governing-discovery/</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27"><sup><span>[27]</span></sup></a> <span>6.10, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-6. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/reviews/specific-reviews/cct"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/reviews/specific-reviews/cct</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28"><sup><span>[28]</span></sup></a><span> 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 6. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>) </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29"><sup><span>[29]</span></sup></a> <span>DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 8. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30"><sup><span>[30]</span></sup></a> <span>PLAINTIFF RUBY GLEN, LLC’S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES, 12.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-opposition-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-07nov16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-opposition-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-07nov16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31"><sup><span>[31]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://archive.icann.org/en/accountability/frameworks-principles/legal-corporate.htm"><span>https://archive.icann.org/en/accountability/frameworks-principles/legal-corporate.htm</span></a><span>); Art. 1(c), Bylaws for ICANN. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylaws-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32"><sup><span>[32]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&sectionNum=1668"><span>http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=CIV&sectionNum=1668</span></a><span>); NOTICE OF AND EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER: MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF, 24. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-ruby-glen-ex-parte-application-tro-memo-points-authorities-22jul16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33"><sup><span>[33]</span></sup></a><span> 6.6, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 6-4. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34"><sup><span>[34]</span></sup></a> <span>DEFENDANT INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS’ MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 18. (</span><a href="http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf"><span>http://domainnamewire.com/wp-content/icann-donuts-motion.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35"><sup><span>[35]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/mechanisms-2014-03-20-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/mechanisms-2014-03-20-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36"><sup><span>[36]</span></sup></a> <span>AMENDED REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ICANN’S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, 4. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-dca-reply-memo-support-icann-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-14apr16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/litigation-dca-reply-memo-support-icann-motion-dismiss-first-amended-complaint-14apr16-en.pdf</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37"><sup><span>[37]</span></sup></a><span> 501(c)(3), Internal Revenue Code, USA. (</span><a href="https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-section-501-c-3-organizations"><span>https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-section-501-c-3-organizations</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38"><sup><span>[38]</span></sup></a> <span>Art. II, Public Technical Identifiers, Articles of Incorporation, ICANN. (</span><a href="https://pti.icann.org/articles-of-incorporation"><span>https://pti.icann.org/articles-of-incorporation</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39"><sup><span>[39]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/alacpolicydev/At-Large+New+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Discussion+Paper+Workspace"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/alacpolicydev/At-Large+New+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Discussion+Paper+Workspace</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40"><sup><span>[40]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/policy"><span>https://www.icann.org/policy</span></a><span>); 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41"><sup><span>[41]</span></sup></a><span>5, Internet Corporation for ASsigned Names and Numbers, Fiscal Statements As of and for the Years Ended June 30, 2016 and 2015. (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun16-en.pdf"><span>https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun16-en.pdf</span></a><span>);</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="http://domainincite.com/21204-icann-has-400m-in-the-bank?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+DomainIncite+%28DomainIncite.com%29"><span>http://domainincite.com/21204-icann-has-400m-in-the-bank?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+DomainIncite+%28DomainIncite.com%29</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42"><sup><span>[42]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/28/someone_paid_135m_for_dot_web"><span>http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/07/28/someone_paid_135m_for_dot_web</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43"><sup><span>[43]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref44" name="_ftn44"><sup><span>[44]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref45" name="_ftn45"><sup><span>[45]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref46" name="_ftn46"><sup><span>[46]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref47" name="_ftn47"><sup><span>[47]</span></sup></a><span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>); </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/Cross-Community+Working+Group+on+new+gTLD+Auction+Proceeds+Home</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref48" name="_ftn48"><sup><span>[48]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ccwg-charter-07nov16-en.pdf"><span>https://ccnso.icann.org/workinggroups/ccwg-charter-07nov16-en.pdf</span></a><span>); (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref49" name="_ftn49"><sup><span>[49]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/public-comments/new-gtld-auction-proceeds-2015-09-08-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref50" name="_ftn50"><sup><span>[50]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/CCWG+Charter"><span>https://community.icann.org/display/CWGONGAP/CCWG+Charter</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref51" name="_ftn51"><sup><span>[51]</span></sup></a><span> 4.3, gTLD Applicant Guidebook ICANN, 4-19. (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/agb</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref52" name="_ftn52"><sup><span>[52]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions/proceeds"><span>https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions/proceeds</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref53" name="_ftn53"><sup><span>[53]</span></sup></a><span> (</span><a href="https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=63150102"><span>https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=63150102</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref54" name="_ftn54"><sup><span>[54]</span></sup></a> <span>(</span><a href="https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en"><span>https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2-2016-12-13-en</span></a><span>)</span></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/icann2019s-problems-with-accountability-and-the-web-controversy</a>
</p>
No publisherPadma VenkataramanICANNTransparencyInternet GovernanceAccountability2017-10-28T15:49:38ZBlog EntryReading the Fine Script: Service Providers, Terms and Conditions and Consumer Rights
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/reading-between-the-lines-service-providers-terms-and-conditions-and-consumer-rights
<b>This year, an increasing number of incidents, related to consumer rights and service providers, have come to light. This blog illustrates the facts of the cases, and discusses the main issues at stake, namely, the role and responsibilities of providers of platforms for user-created content with regard to consumer rights.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>On 1st July, 2014 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against T-Mobile USA,</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn1">[1]</a><span> accusing the service provider of 'cramming' customers bills, with millions of dollars of unauthorized charges. Recently, another service provider, received flak from regulators and users worldwide, after it published a paper, 'Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks'.</span><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn2">[2]</a><span> The paper described Facebook's experiment on more than 600,000 users, to determine whether manipulating user-generated content, would affect the emotions of its users.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In both incidents the terms that should ensure the protection of their user's legal rights, were used to gain consent for actions on behalf of the service providers, that were not anticipated at the time of agreeing to the terms and conditions (T&Cs) by the consumer. More precisely, both cases point to the underlying issue of how users are bound by T&Cs, and in a mediated online landscape—highlight, the need to pay attention to the regulations that govern the online engagement of users.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>I have read and agree to the terms</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In his statement, Chief Executive Officer, John Legere might have referred to T-Mobile as "the most pro-consumer company in the industry",<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn3">[3]</a> however the FTC investigation revelations, that many customers never authorized the charges, suggest otherwise. The FTC investigation also found that, T-Mobile received 35-40 per cent of the amount charged for subscriptions, that were made largely through innocuous services, that customers had been signed up to, without their knowledge or consent. Last month news broke, that just under 700,000 users 'unknowingly' participated in the Facebook study, and while the legality and ethics of the experiment are being debated, what is clear is that Facebook violated consumer rights by not providing the choice to opt in or out, or even the knowledge of such social or psychological experiments to its users.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Both incidents boil down to the sensitive question of consent. While binding agreements around the world work on the condition of consent, how do we define it and what are the implications of agreeing to the terms?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Terms of Service: Conditions are subject to change </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A legal necessity, the existing terms of service (TOS)—as they are also known—as an acceptance mechanism are deeply broken. The policies of online service providers are often, too long, and with no shorter or multilingual versions, require substantial effort on part of the user to go through in detail. A 2008 Carnegie Mellon study estimated it would take an average user 244 hours every year to go through the policies they agree to online.<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn4">[4]</a> Based on the study, Atlantic's Alexis C. Madrigal derived that reading all of the privacy policies an average Internet user encounters in a year, would take 76 working days.<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn5">[5]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The costs of time are multiplied by the fact that terms of services change with technology, making it very hard for a user to keep track of all of the changes over time. Moreover, many services providers do not even commit to the obligation of notifying the users of any changes in the TOS. Microsoft, Skype, Amazon, YouTube are examples of some of the service providers that have not committed to any obligations of notification of changes and often, there are no mechanisms in place to ensure that service providers are keeping users updated.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Facebook has said that the recent social experiment is perfectly legal under its TOS,<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn6">[6]</a> the question of fairness of the conditions of users consent remain debatable. Facebook has a broad copyright license that goes beyond its operating requirements, such as the right to 'sublicense'. The copyright also does not end when users stop using the service, unless the content has been deleted by everyone else.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">More importantly, since 2007, Facebook has brought major changes to their lengthy TOS about every year.<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn7">[7]</a> And while many point that Facebook is transparent, as it solicits feedback preceding changes to their terms, the accountability remains questionable, as the results are not binding unless 30% of the actual users vote. Facebook can and does, track users and shares their data across websites, and has no obligation or mechanism to inform users of the takedown requests.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Courts in different jurisdictions under different laws may come to different conclusions regarding these practices, especially about whether changing terms without notifying users is acceptable or not. Living in a society more protective of consumer rights is however, no safeguard, as TOS often include a clause of choice of law which allow companies to select jurisdictions whose laws govern the terms.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The recent experiment bypassed the need for informed user consent due to Facebook's Data Use Policy<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn8">[8]</a>, which states that once an account has been created, user data can be used for 'internal operations, including troubleshooting, data analysis, testing, research and service improvement.' While the users worldwide may be outraged, legally, Facebook acted within its rights as the decision fell within the scope of T&Cs that users consented to. The incident's most positive impact might be in taking the questions of Facebook responsibilities towards protecting users, including informing them of the usage of their data and changes in data privacy terms, to a worldwide audience.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>My right is bigger than yours</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Most TOS agreements, written by lawyers to protect the interests of the companies add to the complexities of privacy, in an increasingly user-generated digital world. Often, intentionally complicated agreements, conflict with existing data and user rights across jurisdictions and chip away at rights like ownership, privacy and even the ability to sue. With conditions that that allow for change in terms at anytime, existing users do not have ownership or control over their data.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In April New York Times, reported of updates to the legal policy of General Mills (GM), the multibillion-dollar food company.<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn9">[9]</a> The update broadly asserted that consumers interacting with the company in a variety of ways and venues no longer can sue GM, but must instead, submit any complaint to “informal negotiation” or arbitration. Since then, GM has backtracked and clarified that “online communities” mentioned in the policy referred only to those online communities hosted by the company on its own websites.<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn10">[10]</a> Clarification aside, as Julia Duncan, Director of Federal programs at American Association for Justice points out, the update in the terms were so broad, that they were open to wide interpretation and anything that consumers purchase from the company could have been held to this clause. <a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn11">[11]</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Data and whose rights?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Following Snowden revelations, data privacy has become a contentious issue in the EU, and TOS, that allow the service providers to unilaterally alter terms of the contract, will face many challenges in the future. In March Edward Snowden sent his testimony to the European Parliament calling for greater accountability and highlighted that in "a global, interconnected world where, when national laws fail like this, our international laws provide for another level of accountability."<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn12">[12]</a> Following the testimony came the European Parliament's vote in favor of new safeguards on the personal data of EU citizens, when it’s transferred to non-EU.<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn13">[13]</a> The new regulations seek to give users more control over their personal data including the right to ask for data from companies that control it and seek to place the burden of proof on the service providers.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The regulation places responsibility on companies, including third-parties involved in data collection, transfer and storing and greater transparency on concerned requests for information. The amendment reinforces data subject right to seek erasure of data and obliges concerned parties to communicate data rectification. Also, earlier this year, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in favor of the 'right to be forgotten'<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn14">[14]</a>. The ECJ ruling recognised data subject's rights override the interest of internet users, however, with exceptions pertaining to nature of information, its sensitivity for the data subject's private life and the role of the data subject in public life.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In May, the Norwegian Consumer Council filed a complaint with the Norwegian Consumer Ombudsman, “… based on the discrepancies between Norwegian Law and the standard terms and conditions applicable to the Apple iCloud service...”, and, “...in breach of the law regarding control of marketing and standard agreements.”<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn15">[15]</a> The council based its complaint on the results of a study, published earlier this year, that found terms were hazy and varied across services including iCloud, Drop Box, Google Drive, Jotta Cloud, and Microsoft OneDrive. The Norwegian Council study found that Google TOS, allow for users content to be used for other purposes than storage, including by partners and that it has rights of usage even after the service is cancelled. None of the providers provide a guarantee that data is safe from loss, while many, have the ability to terminate an account without notice. All of the service providers can change the terms of service but only Google and Microsoft give an advance notice.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The study also found service providers lacking with respect to European privacy standards, with many allowing for browsing of user content. Tellingly, Google had received a fine in January by the French Data Protection Authority, that stated regarding Google's TOS, "permits itself to combine all the data it collects about its users across all of its services without any legal basis."</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>To blame or not to blame</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Facebook is facing a probe by the UK Information Commissioner's Office, to assess if the experiment conducted in 2012 was a violation of data privacy laws.<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn16">[16]</a> The FTC asked the court to order T-Mobile USA, to stop mobile cramming, provide refunds and give up any revenues from the practice. The existing mechanisms of online consent, do not simplify the task of agreeing to multiple documents and services at once, a complexity which manifolds, with the involvement of third parties.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Unsurprisingly, T-Mobile's Legere termed the FTC lawsuit misdirected and blamed the companies providing the text services for the cramming.<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftn17">[17]</a> He felt those providers should be held accountable, despite allegations that T-Mobile's billing practices made it difficult for consumers to detect that they were being charged for unauthorized services and having shared revenues with third-party providers. Interestingly, this is the first action against a wireless carrier for cramming and the FTC has a precedent of going after smaller companies that provide the services.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The FTC charged T-Mobile USA with deceptive billing practices in putting the crammed charges under a total for 'use charges' and 'premium services' and failure to highlight that portion of the charge was towards third-party charges. Further, the company urged customers to take complaints to vendors and was not forthcoming with refunds. For now, T-Mobile may be able to share the blame, the incident brings to question its accountability, especially as going forward it has entered a pact along with other carriers in USA including Verizon and AT&T, agreeing to stop billing customers for third-party services. Even when practices such as cramming are deemed illegal, it does not necessarily mean that harm has been prevented. Often users bear the burden of claiming refunds and litigation comes at a cost while even after being fined companies could have succeeded in profiting from their actions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Conclusion </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Unfair terms and conditions may arise when service providers include terms that are difficult to understand or vague in their scope. TOS that prevent users from taking legal action, negate liability for service providers actions despite the companies actions that may have a direct bearing on users, are also considered unfair. More importantly, any term that is hidden till after signing the contract, or a term giving the provider the right to change the contract to their benefit including wider rights for service provider wide in comparison to users such as a term that that makes it very difficult for users to end a contract create an imbalance. These issues get further complicated when the companies control and profiting from data are doing so with user generated data provided free to the platform.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the knowledge economy, web companies play a decisive role as even though they work for profit, the profit is derived out of the knowledge held by individuals and groups. In their function of aggregating human knowledge, they collect and provide opportunities for feedback of the outcomes of individual choices. The significance of consent becomes a critical part of the equation when harnessing individual information. In France, consent is part of the four conditions necessary to be forming a valid contract (article 1108 of the Code Civil).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The cases highlight the complexities that are inherent in the existing mechanisms of online consent. The question of consent has many underlying layers such as reasonable notice and contractual obligations related to consent such as those explored in the case in Canada, which looked at whether clauses of TOS were communicated reasonably to the user, a topic for another blog. For now, we must remember that by creating and organising social knowledge that further human activity, service providers, serve a powerful function. And as the saying goes, with great power comes great responsibility.</p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref1">[1]</a> 'FTC Alleges T-Mobile Crammed Bogus Charges onto Customers’ Phone Bills', published 1 July, 2014. See: http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/07/ftc-alleges-t-mobile-crammed-bogus-charges-customers-phone-bills</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref2">[2]</a> 'Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks', Adam D. I. Kramera,1, Jamie E. Guilloryb, and Jeffrey T. Hancock, published March 25, 2014. See:http://www.pnas.org/content/111/24/8788.full.pdf+html?sid=2610b655-db67-453d-bcb6-da4efeebf534</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref3">[3]</a> 'U.S. sues T-Mobile USA, alleges bogus charges on phone bills, Reuters published 1st July, 2014 See: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/01/us-tmobile-ftc-idUSKBN0F656E20140701</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref4">[4]</a> 'The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies', Aleecia M. McDonald and Lorrie Faith Cranor, published I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 2008 Privacy Year in Review issue. See: http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/readingPolicyCost-authorDraft.pdf</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref5">[5]</a> 'Reading the Privacy Policies You Encounter in a Year Would Take 76 Work Days', Alexis C. Madrigal, published The Atlantic, March 2012 See: http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/reading-the-privacy-policies-you-encounter-in-a-year-would-take-76-work-days/253851/</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Facebook Legal Terms. See: https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref7">[7]</a> 'Facebook's Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline', Kurt Opsahl, Published Electronic Frontier Foundation , April 28, 2010 See:https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref8">[8]</a> Facebook Data Use Policy. See: https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref9">[9]</a> 'When ‘Liking’ a Brand Online Voids the Right to Sue', Stephanie Strom, published in New York Times on April 16, 2014 See: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/business/when-liking-a-brand-online-voids-the-right-to-sue.html?ref=business</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Explaining our website privacy policy and legal terms, published April 17, 2014 See:http://www.blog.generalmills.com/2014/04/explaining-our-website-privacy-policy-and-legal-terms/#sthash.B5URM3et.dpufhttp://www.blog.generalmills.com/2014/04/explaining-our-website-privacy-policy-and-legal-terms/</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref11">[11]</a> General Mills Amends New Legal Policies, Stephanie Strom, published in New York Times on 1http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/business/general-mills-amends-new-legal-policies.html?_r=0</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref12">[12]</a> Edward Snowden Statement to European Parliament published March 7, 2014. See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201403/20140307ATT80674/20140307ATT80674EN.pdf</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref13">[13]</a> Progress on EU data protection reform now irreversible following European Parliament vote, published 12 March 201 See: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-186_en.htm</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref14">[14]</a> European Court of Justice rules Internet Search Engine Operator responsible for Processing Personal Data Published by Third Parties, Jyoti Panday, published on CIS blog on May 14, 2014. See: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ecj-rules-internet-search-engine-operator-responsible-for-processing-personal-data-published-by-third-parties</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref15">[15]</a> Complaint regarding Apple iCloud’s terms and conditions , published on 13 May 2014 See:http://www.forbrukerradet.no/_attachment/1175090/binary/29927</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref16">[16]</a> 'Facebook faces UK probe over emotion study' See: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-28102550</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Reading%20the%20fine%20script%20When%20terms%20and%20conditions%20apply.docx#_ftnref17">[17]</a> Our Reaction to the FTC Lawsuit See: http://newsroom.t-mobile.com/news/our-reaction-to-the-ftc-lawsuit.htm</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/reading-between-the-lines-service-providers-terms-and-conditions-and-consumer-rights'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/reading-between-the-lines-service-providers-terms-and-conditions-and-consumer-rights</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiSocial MediaConsumer RightsGoogleinternet and societyPrivacyTransparency and AccountabilityIntermediary LiabilityAccountabilityFacebookData ProtectionPoliciesSafety2014-07-04T06:31:37ZBlog EntrySummary Report Internet Governance Forum 2015
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/summary-report-internet-governance-forum-2015
<b>Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), India participated in the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) held at Poeta Ronaldo Cunha Lima Conference Center, Joao Pessoa in Brazil from 10 November 2015 to 13 November 2015. The theme of IGF 2015 was ‘Evolution of Internet Governance: Empowering Sustainable Development’. Sunil Abraham, Pranesh Prakash & Jyoti Panday from CIS actively engaged and made substantive contributions to several key issues affecting internet governance at the IGF 2015. The issue-wise detail of their engagement is set out below. </b>
<p align="center" style="text-align: left;"><strong>INTERNET
GOVERNANCE</strong></p>
<p align="justify">
I. The
Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group to the IGF organised a discussion on
<em><strong>Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) and Internet Economy</strong></em><em>
</em>at
the Main Meeting Hall from 9:00 am to 12:30 pm on 11 November, 2015.
The
discussions at this session focused on the importance of Internet
Economy enabling policies and eco-system for the fulfilment of
different SDGs. Several concerns relating to internet
entrepreneurship, effective ICT capacity building, protection of
intellectual property within and across borders were availability of
local applications and content were addressed. The panel also
discussed the need to identify SDGs where internet based technologies
could make the most effective contribution. Sunil
Abraham contributed to the panel discussions by addressing the issue
of development and promotion of local content and applications. List
of speakers included:</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Lenni
Montiel, Assistant-Secretary-General for Development, United Nations</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Helani
Galpaya, CEO LIRNEasia</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Sergio
Quiroga da Cunha, Head of Latin America, Ericsson</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Raúl
L. Katz, Adjunct Professor, Division of Finance and Economics,
Columbia Institute of Tele-information</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Jimson
Olufuye, Chairman, Africa ICT Alliance (AfICTA)</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Lydia
Brito, Director of the Office in Montevideo, UNESCO</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
H.E.
Rudiantara, Minister of Communication & Information Technology,
Indonesia</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Daniel
Sepulveda, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Coordinator for
International and Communications Policy at the U.S. Department of
State </p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Deputy
Minister Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services for
the republic of South Africa</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Sunil
Abraham, Executive Director, Centre for Internet and Society, India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
H.E.
Junaid Ahmed Palak, Information and Communication Technology
Minister of Bangladesh</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Jari
Arkko, Chairman, IETF</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Silvia
Rabello, President, Rio Film Trade Association</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Gary
Fowlie, Head of Member State Relations & Intergovernmental
Organizations, ITU</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">http</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">://</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">www</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">.</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">intgovforum</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">.</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">org</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">cms</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">igf</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">2015-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">main</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">sessions</a><u>
</u></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<u><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2327-2015-11-11-internet-economy-and-sustainable-development-main-meeting-room">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2327-2015-11-11-internet-economy-and-sustainable-development-main-meeting-room</a></u></p>
<p align="justify">
Video
link Internet
economy and Sustainable Development here
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D6obkLehVE8">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D6obkLehVE8</a></p>
<p align="justify"> II.
Public
Knowledge organised a workshop on <em><strong>The
Benefits and Challenges of the Free Flow of Data </strong></em>at
Workshop Room
5 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm on 12 November, 2015. The discussions in
the workshop focused on the benefits and challenges of the free flow
of data and also the concerns relating to data flow restrictions
including ways to address
them. Sunil
Abraham contributed to the panel discussions by addressing the issue
of jurisdiction of data on the internet. The
panel for the workshop included the following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Vint
Cerf, Google</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Lawrence
Strickling, U.S. Department of Commerce, NTIA</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Richard
Leaning, European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3), Europol</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Marietje
Schaake, European Parliament</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Nasser
Kettani, Microsoft</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Sunil
Abraham, CIS
India</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">http</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">://</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">www</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">.</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">intgovforum</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">.</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">org</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">cms</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">workshops</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">list</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">of</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">published</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">workshop</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">proposals</a><u>
</u></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2467-2015-11-12-ws65-the-benefits-and-challenges-of-the-free-flow-of-data-workshop-room-5">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2467-2015-11-12-ws65-the-benefits-and-challenges-of-the-free-flow-of-data-workshop-room-5</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Video link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KtjnHkOn7EQ</p>
<p align="justify"> III.
Article
19 and
Privacy International organised a workshop on <em><strong>Encryption
and Anonymity: Rights and Risks</strong></em>
at Workshop Room 1 from 11:00 am to 12:30 pm on 12 November, 2015.
The
workshop fostered a discussion about the latest challenges to
protection of anonymity and encryption and ways in which law
enforcement demands could be met while ensuring that individuals
still enjoyed strong encryption and unfettered access to anonymity
tools. Pranesh
Prakash contributed to the panel discussions by addressing concerns
about existing south Asian regulatory framework on encryption and
anonymity and emphasizing the need for pervasive encryption. The
panel for this workshop included the following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
David
Kaye, UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Juan
Diego Castañeda, Fundación Karisma, Colombia</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Edison
Lanza, Organisation of American States Special Rapporteur</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Pranesh
Prakash, CIS India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Ted
Hardie, Google</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Elvana
Thaci, Council of Europe</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Professor
Chris Marsden, Oxford Internet Institute</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Alexandrine
Pirlot de Corbion, Privacy International</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify"><a name="_Hlt435412531"></a>
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">http</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">://</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">www</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">.</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">intgovforum</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">.</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">org</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">cms</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">worksh</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">o</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">ps</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">/</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">list</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">of</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">published</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">workshop</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">-</a><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">proposals</a><u>
</u></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2407-2015-11-12-ws-155-encryption-and-anonymity-rights-and-risks-workshop-room-1">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2407-2015-11-12-ws-155-encryption-and-anonymity-rights-and-risks-workshop-room-1</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Video link available here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUrBP4PsfJo</p>
<p align="justify"> IV.
Chalmers
& Associates organised a session on <em><strong>A
Dialogue on Zero Rating and Network Neutrality</strong></em>
at the Main Meeting Hall from 2:00 pm to 4:00 pm on 12 November,
2015. The Dialogue provided access to expert insight on zero-rating
and a full spectrum of diverse
views on this issue. The Dialogue also explored alternative
approaches to zero rating such as use of community networks. Pranesh
Prakash provided
a
detailed explanation of harms and benefits related to different
approaches to zero-rating. The
panellists for this session were the following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Jochai
Ben-Avie, Senior Global Policy Manager, Mozilla, USA</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Igor
Vilas Boas de Freitas, Commissioner, ANATEL, Brazil</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Dušan
Caf, Chairman, Electronic Communications Council, Republic of
Slovenia</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Silvia
Elaluf-Calderwood, Research Fellow, London School of Economics,
UK/Peru</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Belinda
Exelby, Director, Institutional Relations, GSMA, UK</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Helani
Galpaya, CEO, LIRNEasia, Sri Lanka</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Anka
Kovacs, Director, Internet Democracy Project, India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Kevin
Martin, VP, Mobile and Global Access Policy, Facebook, USA</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Pranesh
Prakash, Policy Director, CIS India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Steve
Song, Founder, Village Telco, South Africa/Canada</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Dhanaraj
Thakur, Research Manager, Alliance for Affordable Internet, USA/West
Indies</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Christopher
Yoo, Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information
Science, University of Pennsylvania, USA</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions" target="_top">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/igf2015-main-sessions</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2457-2015-11-12-a-dialogue-on-zero-rating-and-network-neutrality-main-meeting-hall-2">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2457-2015-11-12-a-dialogue-on-zero-rating-and-network-neutrality-main-meeting-hall-2</a></p>
<p align="justify"> V.
The
Internet & Jurisdiction Project organised a workshop on
<em><strong>Transnational
Due Process: A Case Study in MS Cooperation</strong></em>
at Workshop Room
4 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm on 13 November, 2015. The
workshop discussion focused on the challenges in developing an
enforcement framework for the internet that guarantees transnational
due process and legal interoperability. The discussion also focused
on innovative approaches to multi-stakeholder cooperation such as
issue-based networks, inter-sessional work methods and transnational
policy standards. The panellists for this discussion were the
following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Anne
Carblanc Head of Division, Directorate for Science, Technology and
Industry, OECD</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Eileen
Donahoe Director Global Affairs, Human Rights Watch</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Byron
Holland President and CEO, CIRA (Canadian ccTLD)</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Christopher
Painter Coordinator for Cyber Issues, US Department of State</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Sunil
Abraham Executive Director, CIS India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Alice
Munyua Lead dotAfrica Initiative and GAC representative, African
Union Commission</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Will
Hudsen Senior Advisor for International Policy, Google</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Dunja
Mijatovic Representative on Freedom of the Media, OSCE</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Thomas
Fitschen Director for the United Nations, for International
Cooperation against Terrorism and for Cyber Foreign Policy, German
Federal Foreign Office</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Hartmut
Glaser Executive Secretary, Brazilian Internet Steering Committee</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Matt
Perault, Head of Policy Development Facebook</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2475-2015-11-13-ws-132-transnational-due-process-a-case-study-in-ms-cooperation-workshop-room-4">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2475-2015-11-13-ws-132-transnational-due-process-a-case-study-in-ms-cooperation-workshop-room-4</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Video
link Transnational
Due Process: A Case Study in MS Cooperation available here <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M9jVovhQhd0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M9jVovhQhd0</a></p>
<p align="justify"> VI.
The Internet Governance Project organised a meeting of the
<em><strong>Dynamic
Coalition on Accountability of Internet Governance Venues</strong></em>
at Workshop Room 2 from 14:00
– 15:30 on
12 November, 2015. The coalition
brought together panelists to highlight the
challenges in developing an accountability
framework
for internet governance
venues that include setting up standards and developing a set of
concrete criteria. Jyoti Panday provided the perspective of civil
society on why acountability is necessary in internet governance
processes and organizations. The panelists for this workshop included
the following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>
Robin
Gross, IP Justice</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Jeanette
Hofmann, Director
<a href="http://www.internetundgesellschaft.de/">Alexander
von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society</a></p>
</li><li>
<p>
Farzaneh
Badiei,
Internet Governance Project</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Erika
Mann,
Managing
Director Public PolicyPolicy Facebook and Board of Directors
ICANN</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Paul
Wilson, APNIC</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Izumi
Okutani, Japan
Network Information Center (JPNIC)</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Keith
Drazek , Verisign</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Jyoti
Panday,
CIS</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Jorge
Cancio,
GAC representative</p>
</li></ol>
<p>
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://igf2015.sched.org/event/4c23/dynamic-coalition-on-accountability-of-internet-governance-venues?iframe=no&w=&sidebar=yes&bg=no">http://igf2015.sched.org/event/4c23/dynamic-coalition-on-accountability-of-internet-governance-venues?iframe=no&w=&sidebar=yes&bg=no</a></p>
<p>
Video
link https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UIxyGhnch7w</p>
<p> VII.
Digital
Infrastructure
Netherlands Foundation organized an open forum at
Workshop Room 3
from 11:00
– 12:00
on
10
November, 2015. The open
forum discussed the increase
in government engagement with “the internet” to protect their
citizens against crime and abuse and to protect economic interests
and critical infrastructures. It
brought
together panelists topresent
ideas about an agenda for the international protection of ‘the
public core of the internet’ and to collect and discuss ideas for
the formulation of norms and principles and for the identification of
practical steps towards that goal.
Pranesh Prakash participated in the e open forum. Other speakers
included</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p>
Bastiaan
Goslings AMS-IX, NL</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Pranesh
Prakash CIS, India</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Marilia
Maciel (FGV, Brasil</p>
</li><li>
<p>
Dennis
Broeders (NL Scientific Council for Government Policy)</p>
</li></ol>
<p>
Detailed
description of the open
forum is available here
<a href="http://schd.ws/hosted_files/igf2015/3d/DINL_IGF_Open%20Forum_The_public_core_of_the_internet.pdf">http://schd.ws/hosted_files/igf2015/3d/DINL_IGF_Open%20Forum_The_public_core_of_the_internet.pdf</a></p>
<p>
Video
link available here <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joPQaMQasDQ">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joPQaMQasDQ</a></p>
<p>
VIII.
UNESCO, Council of Europe, Oxford University, Office of the High
Commissioner on Human Rights, Google, Internet Society organised a
workshop on hate speech and youth radicalisation at Room 9 on
Thursday, November 12. UNESCO shared the initial outcome from its
commissioned research on online hate speech including practical
recommendations on combating against online hate speech through
understanding the challenges, mobilizing civil society, lobbying
private sectors and intermediaries and educating individuals with
media and information literacy. The workshop also discussed how to
help empower youth to address online radicalization and extremism,
and realize their aspirations to contribute to a more peaceful and
sustainable world. Sunil Abraham provided his inputs. Other speakers
include</p>
<p>
1.
Chaired by Ms Lidia Brito, Director for UNESCO Office in Montevideo</p>
<p>
2.Frank
La Rue, Former Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression</p>
<p>
3.
Lillian Nalwoga, President ISOC Uganda and rep CIPESA, Technical
community</p>
<p>
4.
Bridget O’Loughlin, CoE, IGO</p>
<p>
5.
Gabrielle Guillemin, Article 19</p>
<p>
6.
Iyad Kallas, Radio Souriali</p>
<p>
7.
Sunil Abraham executive director of Center for Internet and Society,
Bangalore, India</p>
<p>
8.
Eve Salomon, global Chairman of the Regulatory Board of RICS</p>
<p>
9.
Javier Lesaca Esquiroz, University of Navarra</p>
<p>
10.
Representative GNI</p>
<p>
11.
Remote Moderator: Xianhong Hu, UNESCO</p>
<p>
12.
Rapporteur: Guilherme Canela De Souza Godoi, UNESCO</p>
<p>
Detailed
description of the workshop
is available here
<a href="http://igf2015.sched.org/event/4c1X/ws-128-mitigate-online-hate-speech-and-youth-radicalisation?iframe=no&w=&sidebar=yes&bg=no">http://igf2015.sched.org/event/4c1X/ws-128-mitigate-online-hate-speech-and-youth-radicalisation?iframe=no&w=&sidebar=yes&bg=no</a></p>
<p>
Video
link to the panel is available here
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eIO1z4EjRG0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eIO1z4EjRG0</a></p>
<p> <strong>INTERMEDIARY
LIABILITY</strong></p>
<p align="justify">
IX.
Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Centre for Internet Society India, Open Net
Korea and Article 19 collaborated to organize
a workshop on the <em><strong>Manila
Principles on Intermediary Liability</strong></em>
at Workshop Room 9 from 11:00 am to 12:00 pm on 13 November 2015. The
workshop elaborated on the Manila
Principles, a high level principle framework of best practices and
safeguards for content restriction practices and addressing liability
for intermediaries for third party content. The
workshop
saw particpants engaged in over lapping projects considering
restriction practices coming togetehr to give feedback and highlight
recent developments across liability regimes. Jyoti
Panday laid down the key details of the Manila Principles framework
in this session. The panelists for this workshop included the
following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Kelly
Kim Open Net Korea,</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Jyoti
Panday, CIS India,</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Gabrielle
Guillemin, Article 19,</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Rebecca
McKinnon on behalf of UNESCO</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Giancarlo
Frosio, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Nicolo
Zingales, Tilburg University</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Will
Hudson, Google</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2423-2015-11-13-ws-242-the-manila-principles-on-intermediary-liability-workshop-room-9">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2423-2015-11-13-ws-242-the-manila-principles-on-intermediary-liability-workshop-room-9</a></p>
<p align="justify">
Video link available here <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFLmzxXodjs">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kFLmzxXodjs</a></p>
<p align="justify"> <strong>ACCESSIBILITY</strong></p>
<p align="justify">
X.
Dynamic
Coalition
on Accessibility and Disability and Global Initiative for Inclusive
ICTs organised a workshop on <em><strong>Empowering
the Next Billion by Improving Accessibility</strong></em><em>
</em>at
Workshop Room 6 from 9:00 am to 10:30 am on 13 November, 2015. The
discussion focused on
the need and ways to remove accessibility barriers which prevent over
one billion potential users to benefit from the Internet, including
for essential services. Sunil
Abraham specifically spoke about the lack of compliance of existing
ICT infrastructure with well established accessibility standards
specifically relating to accessibility barriers in the disaster
management process. He discussed the barriers faced by persons with
physical or psychosocial disabilities. The
panelists for this discussion were the following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Francesca
Cesa Bianchi, G3ICT</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Cid
Torquato, Government of Brazil</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Carlos
Lauria, Microsoft Brazil</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Sunil
Abraham, CIS India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Derrick
L. Cogburn, Institute on Disability and Public Policy (IDPP) for the
ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Region</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Fernando
H. F. Botelho, F123 Consulting</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Gunela
Astbrink, GSA InfoComm</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<u><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals</a></u></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<u><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2438-2015-11-13-ws-253-empowering-the-next-billion-by-improving-accessibility-workshop-room-3">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2438-2015-11-13-ws-253-empowering-the-next-billion-by-improving-accessibility-workshop-room-3</a></u></p>
<p align="justify">
Video
Link Empowering
the next billion by improving accessibility <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7RZlWvJAXxs">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7RZlWvJAXxs</a></p>
<p align="justify"> <strong>OPENNESS</strong></p>
<p align="justify">
XI.
A
workshop on <em><strong>FOSS
& a Free, Open Internet: Synergies for Development</strong></em>
was organized at Workshop Room 7 from 2:00 pm to 3:30 pm on 13
November, 2015. The discussion was focused on the increasing risk to
openness of the internet and the ability of present & future
generations to use technology to improve their lives. The panel shred
different perspectives about the future co-development
of FOSS and a free, open Internet; the threats that are emerging; and
ways for communities to surmount these. Sunil
Abraham emphasised the importance of free software, open standards,
open access and access to knowledge and the lack of this mandate in
the draft outcome document for upcoming WSIS+10 review and called for
inclusion of the same. Pranesh Prakash further contributed to the
discussion by emphasizing the need for free open source software with
end‑to‑end encryption and traffic level encryption based
on open standards which are decentralized and work through federated
networks. The
panellists for this discussion were the following.</p>
<ol>
<li>
<p align="justify">
Satish
Babu, Technical Community, Chair, ISOC-TRV, Kerala, India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Judy
Okite, Civil Society, FOSS Foundation for Africa</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Mishi
Choudhary, Private Sector, Software Freedom Law Centre, New York</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Fernando
Botelho, Private Sector, heads F123 Systems, Brazil</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Sunil
Abraham, CIS
India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Pranesh
Prakash, CIS
India</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Nnenna
Nwakanma- WWW.Foundation</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Yves
MIEZAN EZO, Open Source strategy consultant</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Corinto
Meffe, Advisor to the President and Directors, SERPRO, Brazil</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Frank
Coelho de Alcantara, Professor, Universidade Positivo, Brazil</p>
</li><li>
<p align="justify">
Caroline
Burle, Institutional and International Relations, W3C Brazil Office
and Center of Studies on Web Technologies</p>
</li></ol>
<p align="justify">
Detailed
description of the workshop is available here
<u><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals" target="_top">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/workshops/list-of-published-workshop-proposals</a></u></p>
<p align="justify">
Transcript
of the workshop is available here
<u><a href="http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2468-2015-11-13-ws10-foss-and-a-free-open-internet-synergies-for-development-workshop-room-7" target="_top">http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/187-igf-2015/transcripts-igf-2015/2468-2015-11-13-ws10-foss-and-a-free-open-internet-synergies-for-development-workshop-room-7</a></u></p>
<p align="justify">
Video
link available here <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwUq0LTLnDs">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwUq0LTLnDs</a></p>
<p align="justify">
<br /><br /></p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/summary-report-internet-governance-forum-2015'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/summary-report-internet-governance-forum-2015</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiAccess to KnowledgeBig DataFreedom of Speech and ExpressionEncryptionInternet Governance ForumIntermediary LiabilityAccountabilityInternet GovernanceCensorshipCyber SecurityDigital GovernanceAnonymityCivil SocietyBlocking2015-11-30T10:47:13ZBlog EntryComments to ICANN Supporting the DNS Industry in Underserved Regions
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-supporting-the-dns-industry-in-underserved-regions
<b>Towards exploring ideas and strategies to help promote the domain name industry in regions that have typically been underserved, ICANN published a call for public comments on May 14, 2014. In particular, ICANN sought comments related to existing barriers to Registrar Accreditation and operation and suggestions on how these challenges might be mitigated. CIS contributed to the comments on this report, which will be used to determine next steps to support the domain name industry in underserved regions.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b> </b><b> </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Domain names and the DNS are used in virtually every aspect of the Internet, and without the DNS, the Internet as we know it, would not exist. The DNS root zone has economic value and ICANN's contract with Verisign delineates the selling of domain names via only ICANN accredited registrars. By the indirect virtue of its control of the root, ICANN has the power and capacity to influence the decisions of entities involved in the management and operations of the DNS, including registrars.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Too far, too many?</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We acknowledge some of the efforts for improvements, in particular with reference to barriers to participation in DNS-related business in regions such as Africa and the Middle East, including the creation of a fellowship program, and increased availability of translated materials. However, despite these efforts, the gaps in the distribution of the DNS registrars and registries across the world has become an issue of heightened concern.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">This is particularly true, in light of the distribution of registrars and given that, of the 1124 ICANN-accredited registrars, North America has a total of 765 registrars. US and Canada together, have more than double the number of registrars than the rest of the world taken collectively. To put things further into perspective, of the total number of registrars 725 are from the United States alone, and 7 from the 54 countries of Africa.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">A barrier to ICANN's capacity building initiatives has been the lack of trust, given the general view that, ICANN focuses on policies that favour entrenched incumbents from richer countries. Without adequate representation from poorer countries, and adequate representation from the rest of the world's Internet population, there is no hope of changing these policies or establishing trust. The entire region of Latin America and the Caribbean, comprising of a population of 542.4 million internet users<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftn1">[1]</a> in 2012, has only 22 registrars spread across a total of 10 countries. In Europe, covering a population of 518.5 million internet users<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftn2">[2]</a>, are 158 registrars and 94 of those are spread across Germany, UK, France, Spain and Netherlands. The figures paint the most dismal picture with respect to South Asia, in particular India, where just 16 registrars cater to the population of internet users that is expected to reach 243 million by June 2014<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftn3">[3]</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">While we welcome ICANN's research and outreach initiatives with regard to the DNS ecosystem in underserved regions, without the crucial first step of clarifying the metrics that constitute an underserved region, these efforts might not bear their intended impact. ICANN cannot hope to identify strategies towards bridging the gaps that exist in the DNS ecosystem, without going beyond the current ICANN community, which, while nominally being 'multistakeholder' and open to all, grossly under-represents those parts of the world that aren't North America and Western Europe.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The lack of registries in the developing world is another significant issue that needs to be highlighted and addressed. The top 5 gTLD registries are in the USA and it is important that users and the community feels that the fees being collected are equivalent compensation for the services they provide. As registries operate in captive markets that is allocated by ICANN, we invite ICANN to improve its financial accountability, by enabling its stakeholders to assess the finances collected on these registrations.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Multistakeholderism—community and consensus </b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">As an organization that holds itself a champion of the bottom-up policy development process, and, as a private corporation fulfilling a public interest function, ICANN, is in a unique position to establish new norms of managing common resources. In theory and under ICANN’s extensive governance rules, the board is a legislative body that is only supposed to approve the consensus decisions of the community and the staff wield executive control. However in reality, both board and the staff have been criticised for decisions that are not backed by the community.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The formal negotiations between ICANN and Registrar Stakeholder Group Negotiating Team (Registrar NT) over the new Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA), is an example of processes that have a multistakeholder approach but fail on values of deliberation and pluralistic decision making.<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftn4">[4]</a> ICANN staff insisted on including a "proposed Revocation (or "blow up") Clause that would have given them the ability to unilaterally terminate all registrar accreditations" and another proposal seeking to provide ICANN Board ability to unilaterally amend the RAA (identical to proposal inserted in the gTLD registry agreement - a clause met with strong opposition not only from the Registry Stakeholder Group but from the broader ICANN community).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Both proposals undermine the multistakeholder approach of the ICANN governance framework, as they seek more authority for the Board, rather than the community or protections for registrars and more importantly, registrants. The proposed amendments to the RAA were not issues raised by Law Enforcement, GAC or the GNSO but by the ICANN staff and received considerable pushback from the Registrar Stakeholder Group Negotiating Team (Registrar NT). The bottom-up policy making process at ICANN has also been questioned with reference to the ruling on vertical integration between registries and registrars, where the community could not even approach consensus.<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftn5">[5]</a> Concerns have also been raised about the extent of the power granted to special advisory bodies handpicked by the ICANN president, the inadequacy of existing accountability mechanisms for providing a meaningful and external check on Board decisions and the lack of representation of underserved regions on these special bodies. ICANN must evolve its accountability mechanisms, to go beyond the opportunity to provide comments on proposed policy, and extend to a role for stakeholders in decision making, which is presently a privilege reserved for staff rather than bottom-up consensus.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN was created as a consensus based organisation that would enable the Internet, its stakeholders and beneficiaries to move forward in the most streamlined, cohesive manner.<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftn6">[6]</a> Through its management of the DNS, ICANN is undertaking public governance duties, and it is crucial that it upholds the democratic values entrenched in the multistakeholder framework. Bottom up policy making extends beyond passive participation and has an impact on the direction of the policy. Presently, while anyone can comment on policy issues, only a few have a say in which comments are integrated towards outcomes and action. We would like to stress not just improving and introducing checks and balances within the ICANN ecosystem, but also, integrating accountability and transparency practices at all levels of decision making.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><b>Bridging the gap</b></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We welcome the Africa Strategy working group and the public community process that was initiated by ICANN towards building domain name business industry in Africa, and, we are sure there will be lessons that will applicable to many other underserved regions. In the context of this report CIS, wants to examine the existing criteria of the accreditation process. As ICANN's role evolves and its revenues grow across the DNS and the larger Internet landscape, it is important in our view, that ICANN review and evolve it's processes for accreditation and see if they are as relevant today, as they were when launched.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The relationship between ICANN and every accredited registrar is governed by the individual RAA, which set out the obligations of both parties, and, we recommend simplifying and improving them. The RAA language is complex, technical and not relevant to all regions and presently, there are no online forms for the accreditation process. While ICANN's language will be English, the present framing has an American bias—we recommend—creating an online application process and simplifying the language keeping it contextual to the region. It would also be helpful, if ICANN invested in introducing some amount of standardization across forms, this would reduce the barrier of time and effort it takes to go through complex legal documents and contribute to the growth of DNS business.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">The existing accreditation process for registrars requires applicants to procure US$70,000 or more for the ICANN accreditation to become effective. The applicants are also required to obtain and maintain for the length of accreditation process, a commercial general liability insurance with a policy limit of US$500,000 or more. The working capital and the insurance are quite high and create a barrier to entrance of underserved regions in the DNS ecosystem.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">With lack of appropriate mechanisms registrars resort to using US companies for insurance, creating more foreign currency pressures on themselves. The commercial general liability insurance requirement for the registrars is not limited to their functioning as a registrar perhaps not the most appropriate option. <span>ICANN should, and must, increase efforts towards helping registrars find suitable insurance providers and scaling down the working capital. Solutions may lie in exploring variable fee structures adjusted against profits, and derived after considering factors such as cost of managing domain names and sub-domain names, expansion needs, ICANN obligations and services, financial capacities of LDCs and financial help pledged to disadvantaged groups or countries.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Presently, the start-up capital required is too high for developing countries, and this is reflected in the number of registries in these areas. Any efforts to improve the DNS ecosystem in underserved regions, must tackle this by scaling down the capital in proportion to the requirements of the region.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Another potential issue that ICANN should consider, is that users getting sub-domain names from local registrars located in their own country, are usually taxed on the transaction, however, online registration through US registrars spares users from paying taxes in their country.<a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftn7">[7]</a> This could create a reverse incentive for registering domain sub-names online from US registrars. ICANN should push forward on efforts to ensure that registrars are sustainable by providing incentives for registering in underserved regions and help towards maintain critical mass of the registrants. The Business Constituency (BC)—the voice of commercial Internet users within ICANN, could play a role in this and ICANN should endeavour to either, expand the BC function or create a separate constituency for the representation of underserved regions.</p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Internet Users and Population stats 2012. http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Internet Users and Population stats 2012. http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Times of India IAMAI Report. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/India-to-have-243-million-internet-users-by-June-2014-IAMAI/articleshow/29563698.cms</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Mar/07/2013 - Registrar Stakeholder Group Negotiating Team (Registrar NT) Statement Regarding ICANN RAA Negotiations.http://www.icannregistrars.org/calendar/announcements.php</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Kevin Murphy, Who runs the internet? An ICANN 49 primer. http://domainincite.com/16177-who-runs-the-internet-an-icann-49-primer</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Stephen Ryan, Governing Cyberspace: ICANN, a Controversial Internet Standards Body http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/governing-cyberspace-icann-a-controversial-internet-standards-body</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="file:///C:/Users/jyoti/Desktop/Comments%20on%20Supporting%20the%20DNS%20Industry%20in%20Underserved%20Regions.doc#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Open Root-Financing LDCs in the WSIS process. See: http://www.open-root.eu/about-open-root/news/financing-ldcs-in-the-wsis-process</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-supporting-the-dns-industry-in-underserved-regions'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-supporting-the-dns-industry-in-underserved-regions</a>
</p>
No publisherjyotiIG4allICANNInternet GovernanceAccountability2014-07-04T06:48:36ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #1: ICANN's Expenditures on "Travel & Meetings"
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-1-icanns-expenditures-on-travel-meetings
<b>CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of expenditure by ICANN at its Meetings. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below. </b>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "></h2>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; "></h2>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">CIS' Request</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>18 December 2014</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Cherine Chalaby, Chair, Finance Committee of the Board</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Xavier Calvez, Chief Financial Officer</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Samiran Gupta, ICANN India</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">All other members of Staff involved in accounting and financial tasks</p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><strong>Sub: Request for itemized details of expenditure by ICANN at its Meetings</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We would like to thank Mr. Calvez and Mr. Gupta for providing information regarding ICANN’s domain name revenues for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2014.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> We would like to request further information through the DIDP.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In the Audited Financial Statements for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2014, the “statements of activities” provides Total Expenses (for ICANN and New gTLD) as USD 124,400,000.<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> For the fiscal year ended June 30, 2013, the Total Expenses (ICANN and New gTLD) noted is USD 150,362,000.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">According to the statement, this covers expenses for Personnel, Travel and meetings, Professional services and Administration. Quarterly Reports note that the head “Travel and meetings” includes community support requests.<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> In addition to these heads, Quarterly Reports include “Bad debt expenses” and “Depreciation expenses”. The manner of accounting for these is explained in <span>Note 2</span> to the Notes to Financial Statements.<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> Note 2 explains that the expenses statement is prepared by “functional allocation of expenses” to identifiable programs or support services, or otherwise by methods determined by the management.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">For the purposes of our research into normative and practised transparency and accountability in Internet governance, we request, to begin with, <i>current and historical</i> information regarding itemized, detailed expenses under the head “Travel and meetings”. We request this information from 1999 till 2014. We request that such information be categorized and sub-categorised as follows:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Total and Individual Expenses for each meeting (categorised by meeting and year):</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>1. Total and individual expenses for ICANN staff (differentiated by department and name of each individual attending the event, including dates/duration of attendance);</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">- Also broken down into each individual expense (flights, accommodation, per diem or separate local transport, food and other expenses).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">- Each ICANN staff member who attended the event to be named.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">2. <span>Total and individual expenses for members of ICANN Board (listed by each Board member and dates/duration of attendance);</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">- Broken down into each individual expense (flights, accommodation, per diem or separate local transport, food and other expenses).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">- Each Board member to be named.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>3. Total and individual expenses for members of ICANN constituencies (ALAC, ATRT, ccNSO, GAC, GNSO, etc.)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">- Broken down into each individual expense (flights, accommodation, per diem or separate local transport, food and other expenses).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">- Each attendee for whom ICANN covered expenses to be named.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>4. Total and individual expenses for ICANN fellows</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">- Broken down into each individual expense (flights, accommodation, per diem or separate local transport, food and other expenses).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">- Each attendee for whom ICANN covered expenses to be named, including their region and stakeholder affiliation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">5. <span>Total and individual expenses incurred for any other ICANN affiliate or liaison (ISOC, IETF, IAB, etc.)</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">- Broken down into each individual expense (flights, accommodation, per diem or separate local transport, food and other expenses).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">- Each attendee for whom ICANN covered expenses to be named, including their affiliation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">6. <span>Total and individual expenses incurred for any other person, whether or not directly affiliated with ICANN</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">- Broken down into each individual expense (flights, accommodation, per diem or separate local transport, food and other expenses).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">- Each attendee for whom ICANN covered expenses to be named, including their affiliation.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Please note that we request the above-detailed information for ICANN meetings, and also other meetings for which ICANN may provide financial support (for instance, CWG-Stewardship or CWG-Accountability). We request, as a preliminary matter, a list of </span><i>all meetings</i><span> to which ICANN provides and has, in the past, provided financial support (1999-2014).</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We note that some information of this nature is available in the Travel Support Reports.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> However, the Travel Support Reports are available only from 2008 (Cairo meeting), and are not available for ICANN48 to ICANN51. Further, the Travel Support Reports do not exhibit the level of granularity necessary for research and scrutiny. As explained above, we request granular information for all meetings.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In our view, providing such information will not violate any individual or corporate rights of ICANN, its Staff, Board, Affiliates/Liaisons or any other individual. Public corporations and even private organisations performing public functions may be subjected to or accept an increased level of transparency and accountability. We believe this is of especial importance to ICANN, as it is involved in a process to enhance its accountability, intrinsically related to IANA Stewardship Transition. We expressed similar views in our initial comment to “Enhancing ICANN Accountability”.<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> Increased transparency from ICANN may also address accountability concerns present across stakeholder-groups both within and outside ICANN.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We await your favorable response and the requested information within the prescribed time limit. Please do not hesitate to contact us should you require any clarifications.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thank you very much.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Warm regards,</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Geetha Hariharan</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Centre for Internet & Society</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">W: <a href="http://cis-india.org">http://cis-india.org</a></p>
<p> </p>
<h2>ICANN's Response</h2>
<p>ICANN responded to the above request for information within the stipulated time of 30 days. <strong><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-17jan15-en.pdf">ICANN’s response is here</a></strong>. A short summary of CIS's request and ICANN's response can be found <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"><strong>in this table (Request S. no. 1)</strong></a>.</p>
<p> </p>
<hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" />
<p><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> See <i>ICANN reveals hitherto undisclosed details of domain names revenues</i>, <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014">http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014</a>.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> See <i>ICANN Financial Statements As of and For the years ended June 30, 2014 and 2013</i>, pages 7, 19-20, <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun14-en.pdf">https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/financial-report-fye-30jun14-en.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> For instance, see <i>ICANN FY14 Financial Package: For the nine months ending March 2014</i>, pages 2-5, <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/package-fy14-31mar14-en.pdf">https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/package-fy14-31mar14-en.pdf</a>.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> <i>Supra</i> note 1, page 14.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> See Community Travel Support, <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/travel-support-2012-02-25-en#reports">https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/travel-support-2012-02-25-en#reports</a>.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> See CIS Comments on Enhancing ICANN Accountability, <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability">http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-comments-enhancing-icann-accountability</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-1-icanns-expenditures-on-travel-meetings'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-1-icanns-expenditures-on-travel-meetings</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaICANNDIDPTransparencyAccountability2015-03-05T08:00:36ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #4: ICANN and the NETmundial Principles
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-4-icann-and-the-netmundial-principles
<b>CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking details of ICANN's implementation of the NETmundial Principles that it has endorsed widely and publicly. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">CIS Request</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>27 December 2014</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Cherine Chalaby, Chair, Finance Committee of the Board</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Xavier Calvez, Chief Financial Officer</p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><strong>Sub: Details of implementation by and within ICANN of the NETmundial Outcome Document (April ‘14)</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We express our appreciation at ICANN’s prompt acknowledgement of our previous DIDP request, and await the information. We would, in the meanwhile, request information regarding ICANN’s internal measures to implement the NETmundial Outcome Document.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In a post titled <i>Turning Talk Into Action After NETmundial,</i><a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> Mr. Chehade emphasized the imperative to carry forward the NETmundial principles to fruition. In nearly every public statement, Mr. Chehade and other ICANN representatives have spoken in praise and support of NETmundial and its Outcome Document.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">But in the absence of binding value to them, self-regulation and organizational initiatives pave the way to adopt them. There must be concrete action to implement the Principles. In this regard, we request information about mechanisms or any other changes afoot within ICANN, implemented internally in recognition of the NETmundial Principles.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">At the IGF in Istanbul, when CIS’ Sunil Abraham raised this query,<a href="#_ftn3">[3]</a> Mr. Chehade responded that mechanisms ought to and will be undertaken jointly and in collaboration with other organisations. However, institutional improvements are intra-organisational as well, and require changes <i>within </i>ICANN. An example would be the suggestions to strengthen the IGF, increase its term, and provide financial support (some of which are being achieved, though ICANN’s financial contribution to IGFSA is incongruous in comparison to its financial involvement in the NETmundial Initiative).<span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">From ICANN, we have seen consistent championing of the controversial NETmundial Initiative,<a href="#_ftn4">[4]</a> and contribution to the IGF Support Association.<a href="#_ftn5">[5]</a> There are also mechanisms instituted for IANA Stewardship Transition and Enhancing ICANN Accountability,<a href="#_ftn6">[6]</a> as responses to the NTIA’s announcement to not renew the IANA functions contract and related concerns of accountability.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In addition to the above, we would like to know what ICANN has done to implement the NETmundial Principles, internally and proactively.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We hope that our request will be processed within the stipulated time period of 30 days. Do let us know if you require any clarifications on our queries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Thank you very much.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Warm regards,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Geetha Hariharan</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Centre for Internet & Society</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">W: <a href="http://cis-india.org">http://cis-india.org</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h3 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Response</h3>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's response to the above request disappointingly linked to the very same blogpost we note in our request, <i>Turning Talk Into Action After NETmundial</i>. Following this, ICANN points us to their involvement in the NETmundial Initiative. On the question of internal implementation, ICANN's response is defensive, to say the least. "ICANN is not the home for the implementation of the NETmundial Principles", they say. In any event, ICANN defends that it already implements the NETmundial Principles in its functioning, a response that comes as a surprise to us. "<span>Many of the NETmundial Principles are high-level statements that permeate through the </span><span>work of any entity – particularly a multistakeholder entity like ICANN – that is interested </span><span>in the upholding of the inclusive, multistakeholder process within the Internet governance </span><span>framework", notes ICANN's response. Needless to say, ICANN's response falls short of responding to our queries. </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>Finally, ICANN notes that our request is beyond the scope of the DIDP, as it does not relate to ICANN's operational activities. Notwithstanding that our query does in fact seek ICANN's operationalisation of the NETmundial Principles, we are now confused as to where to go to seek this information from ICANN. If the DIDP is not the effective transparency tool it is aimed to be, who in ICANN can provide answers to these questions?</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>ICANN's response may be <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-netmundial-response-27jan15-en.pdf"><strong>found here</strong></a>. A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found <a href="https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file"><strong>in this table (Request S. no. 4)</strong></a>.</span></p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> See <i>NETmundial Multi-stakeholder Statement</i>, <a href="http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf">http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf</a>. <i> </i></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> See Chehade, <i>Turning Talk Into Action After NETmundial</i>, <a href="http://blog.icann.org/2014/05/turning-talk-into-action-after-netmundial/">http://blog.icann.org/2014/05/turning-talk-into-action-after-netmundial/</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> See <i>ICANN Open Forum</i>, 9<sup>th</sup> IGF 2014 (Istanbul, Turkey), <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cio31nsqK_A">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cio31nsqK_A</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> See McCarthy, <i>I’m Begging You To Join</i>, The Register (12 December 2014), <a href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/12/im_begging_you_to_join_netmundial_initiative_gets_desperate/">http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/12/12/im_begging_you_to_join_netmundial_initiative_gets_desperate/</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> See <i>ICANN Donates $50k to Internet Governance Forum Support Association</i>, <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/press-material/release-2014-12-18-en">https://www.icann.org/resources/press-material/release-2014-12-18-en</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> See <i>NTIA IANA Functions’ Stewardship Transition & Enhancing ICANN Accountability Processes</i>, <a href="https://www.icann.org/stewardship-accountability">https://www.icann.org/stewardship-accountability</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-4-icann-and-the-netmundial-principles'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-4-icann-and-the-netmundial-principles</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaICANNDIDPTransparencyAccountability2015-03-05T08:28:44ZBlog EntryDIDP Request #6: Revenues from gTLD auctions
https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-6-revenues-from-gtld-auctions
<b>CIS sent ICANN a request under its Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, seeking information regarding revenues received from gTLD auctions. CIS' request and ICANN's response are detailed below.</b>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">CIS Request</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>12 January 2015</span><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">To:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Fadi Chehade, CEO and President</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Mr. Steve Crocker, Chairman of the Board</p>
<p style="text-align: center; "><strong>Sub: Revenues from gTLD auctions</strong></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span> </span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">It is our understanding that an auction for a Generic Top Level Domain (gTLD) is used as a last-resort mechanism in order to resolve string contention, i.e., when there are groups of applications for same or confusingly similar new gTLDs. As of now, the ICANN website only furnishes information of the winning applicant and the winning price, as regards each new gTLD auction.<a href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> We have observed that information regarding the bids from all other applicants is not available. The revenue information provided to us<a href="#_ftn2">[2]</a> does not include revenues from new gTLDs.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">In this regard, we request you to provide us with the following information:</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(i) How many gTLDs have been sold <i>via</i> the auction process, since its inception?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(ii) What were the starting and winning bids in the ICANN auctions conducted?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(iii) What revenue has ICANN received from the gTLD auctions, since the first ICANN auction was conducted? Please also provide information about the winner (name, corporate information provided to/ available with ICANN).</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">(iv) How are proceeds from the gTLD auction process utilized?</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span>We believe that this information will give us a framework for understanding the gTLD auction process within ICANN. Furthermore, it will assist us in understanding the manner and purpose for which the proceeds from the auctioning process are utilized, in the broader structure of ICANN transparency and accountability.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">We hope that our request will be processed within the stipulated time period of 30 days. Do let us know if you require any clarifications on our queries.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Warm regards,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">Lakshmi Venkataraman,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">IV Year, NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad,</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><i>for </i>Centre for Internet & Society</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">W: <a href="http://cis-india.org">http://cis-india.org</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "> </p>
<h2 style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN Response</h2>
<p style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's response to the above query is positive. ICANN states that all information surrounding the auctions is available on the New gTLDs microsite, and on the Auctions page: <span>http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions. The current status of </span><span>auction proceeds and costs are available at </span><span>http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/auctions/proceeds,</span><span> and auction results are at </span><span>https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/auctionresults. The utilization of proceeds from the auctions is yet to be decided by the ICANN Board:</span><span> “[auction] proceeds will be reserved and earmarked until the Board determines a plan for the appropriate use of the funds through consultation with the community. Auction proceeds are net of any Auction costs. Auction costs may include initial set-up costs, auction management fees, and escrow fees.”</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><span style="text-align: justify; ">ICANN's response to our DIDP request may be <a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/cis-response-09feb15-en.pdf"><strong>found here</strong></a>.</span><span style="text-align: justify; "> A short summary of our request and ICANN's response may be found </span><a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/table-of-cis-didp-requests/at_download/file" style="text-align: justify; "><strong>in this table (Request S. no. 6)</strong></a><span style="text-align: justify; ">.</span></p>
<hr size="1" style="text-align: justify; " width="33%" />
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> See <i>Auction Results</i>, <a href="https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/auctionresults">https://gtldresult.icann.org/application-result/applicationstatus/auctionresults</a>.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify; "><a href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> See <i>ICANN reveals hitherto undisclosed details of domain names revenues</i>, <a href="http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014">http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-receives-information-on-icanns-revenues-from-domain-names-fy-2014</a>.</p>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-6-revenues-from-gtld-auctions'>https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/didp-request-6-revenues-from-gtld-auctions</a>
</p>
No publishergeethaICANNDIDPTransparencyAccountability2015-03-10T10:59:37ZBlog EntryDIPP RESPONSE TO CIS RTI - IMPROPER PAYMENT - FEBRUARY, 2015
https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/dipp-response-to-cis-rti-improper-payment-february-2015
<b></b>
<p>
For more details visit <a href='https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/dipp-response-to-cis-rti-improper-payment-february-2015'>https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/dipp-response-to-cis-rti-improper-payment-february-2015</a>
</p>
No publishernehaaGovernment InformationAccess to KnowledgeIntellectual Property RightsAccountabilityNATIONAL IPR POLICYIPR THINK TANK2015-04-14T17:35:58ZFile