Centre for Internet and Society

Comments to the ID4D Practitioners’ Guide

Yesha Tshering Paul, Prakriti Singh, and Amber Sinha — 2019-08-08T10:25:13Z

This post presents our comments to the ID4D Practitioners’ Guide: Draft For Consultation released by ID4D in June, 2019. CIS has conducted research on issues related to digital identity since 2012. This submission is divided into three main parts. The first part (General Comments) contains the high-level comments on the Practitioners’ Guide, while the second part (Specific Comments) addresses individual sections in the Guide. The third and final part (Additional Comments) does not relate to particulars in the Practitioners' Guide but other documents that it relies upon. We submitted these comments to ID4D on August 5, 2019. Read our comments here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-the-id4d-practitioners2019-guide

Comments to the draft Motor Vehicle Aggregators Scheme, 2021

Chiara Furtado, Aayush Rathi and Abhishek Sekharan — 2022-04-01T15:25:06Z

This submission presents a response by researchers at the Centre for Internet and Society, India (CIS) to the draft Motor Vehicle Aggregators Scheme, 2021 published by the Transport Department, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, (hereafter “draft Scheme”).

CIS, established in Bengaluru in 2008 as a non-profit organisation, undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from public policy andacademic perspectives. Through its diverse initiatives, CIS explores, intervenes in, and advances contemporary discourse and regulatory practices around internet, technology,and society in India, and elsewhere.

CIS is grateful for the opportunity to submit its comments to the draft Scheme. Please find below our thematically organised comments.

Click here to read more.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-to-the-draft-motor-vehicle-aggregators-scheme-2021

Comments on the RBI's Consultation Paper on Peer to Peer Lending

sumandro — 2016-06-01T20:21:13Z

The Reserve Bank of India published a Consultation Paper on Peer to Peer Lending on April 28, 2016, and invited comments from the public. CIS submitted the following response, authored by Elonnai Hickok, Pavishka Mittal, Sumandro Chattapadhyay, Vidushi Marda, and Vipul Kharbanda.

1. Preliminary

1.1. This submission presents comments and recommendations by the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) on the Consultation Paper on Peer to Peer Lending (“the consultation paper”) by the Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) [1].

2. The Centre for Internet and Society

2.1. The Centre for Internet and Society, CIS [2], is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with diverse abilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, open access, open educational resources, and open video), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security. The academic research at CIS seeks to understand the reconfiguration of social processes and structures through the internet and digital media technologies, and vice versa.

2.2. This submission is consistent with CIS’ commitment to safeguarding general public interest, and the interests and rights of various stakeholders involved. The comments in this submission aim to further the concerns of citizens’ and users’ rights in the context of products, services, and transactions facilitated by digital media technologies, the , the principle that regulation should be defined around functions of the acts concerned, and not the technologies of delivery. Our comments are limited to the clauses that most directly have an impact on these concerns.

3. Response

3.1. Whether there is a felt need for regulating peer to peer lending platforms?

3.1.1. Peer to peer (“P2P”) lenders are platforms serving as marketplaces for the lenders and the borrowers of funds to connect. Their very business model does not render them as a provider of finance, as they aspire to function as pure intermediaries to enable lending and borrowing.

3.1.2. The Section 45I.(f)(iii) of the RBI Act, 1935 [3], provides RBI the authority to classify any financial institution as a non-banking financial company (“NBFC”) “with the previous approval of the Central Government and by notification in the Official Gazette.” Since the P2P lending platforms do not provide any finance themselves, undertake acquisition of financial instruments, deliver financial and/or insurance services, or collect financial resources directly, the only ground for classifying such companies as “financial institutions” [4] appears to be their involvement in “managing, conducting or supervising, as foreman, agent or in any other capacity, of chits or kuries as defined in any law which is for the time being in force in any State, or any business, which is similar thereto” [5]. P2P lending platforms can be considered to be brokers and thus there are other aspects that merit scrutiny such as antitrust issues, obligations of either party, company activities and the transactional system involved, as we will discuss in this document.

3.1.3. The consultation paper itself states that the balance sheet of the platform cannot indicate any borrowing / lending activity, which entails that the platform cannot itself provide finance or receive any funds for the provision of loans to others. Platforms are not allowed to determine the interest rates as they are not a party to the transaction. Neither would they be liable in cases of default by the borrower. These rules, standard for P2P platforms in other jurisdictions as well, confirm the assumption that the platform itself is not providing finance and thus, cannot be entrusted with any liability, obligation from the transaction.

3.1.4. Further, with RBI raising the threshold asset size for an NBFC to be considered systemically important (NBFC-ND-SI) from Rs. 100 Crores to Rs. 500 Crores [6], and Economic Times reporting that one of the biggest Indian P2P lending platform’s enterprise valuation (which can be taken as indicative of its net assets) is Rs 50 Crores [7], we may assume that most P2P lending platforms will have net assets worth less than 500 crore, at least in the near future; although there is a possibility for exponential growth with some companies.

3.1.5. Given the limited sphere of operation, restricted ability (by design) of these platforms to shape interest rates and other features of financial instruments, and their generally non-systemically-important nature, we would submit that the regulation of such P2P lending platforms are kept to an absolute minimum, so that their economic viability is not undermined, and at the same time the key risks associated with their operations are addressed by RBI.

3.2. Is the assessment of P2P lending and risks associated with it adequate?

3.2.1. CIS observes that the following are the key risks involved with the operations of the P2P lending platforms, and these are being respectively addressed by, or can be addressed by RBI in the following manners.

Insufficient information about the conditions of lending, leading to defrauding of the borrower: The borrower may not receive appropriate information about the terms of the loan, and/or the P2P lending platform may not act in a “fair” manner (say, in case of collusion between the P2P lending platform and the lender, or the lending platform and the borrower), which may lead to defrauding and/or economic loss of either party. By classifying P2P lending platforms as NBFCs, RBI will ensure that these companies follow the Guidelines on Fair Practices Code for NBFCs [8], which extensively addresses concerns related to this type of risks.
Insufficient information about the borrower, or her/his ability to repay the loan, may lead to non-repayment and economic loss of the lender: If the P2P lending platform allows the lender to offer loans to borrowers without acquiring and/or providing sufficient information to the lender about the borrower’s credit history and/or ability to repay the loan, modes of formulating security for loans, this may heighten the risks of non-repayment of loans. By classifying P2P lending platforms as NBFCs, RBI will ensure that these companies follow the Master Circular – 'Know Your Customer' (KYC) Guidelines – Anti Money Laundering Standards (AML) - Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - Obligations of NBFCs [9], which extensively addresses concerns related to this type of risks.
Credit-related information of the lenders and the borrowers collected by P2P lending platforms may not be made available to other financial institutions and that will lead asymmetry in credit information available across various actors in the sector: Credit information, related to both lending and borrowing practices of entities using the platform concerned, is a key asset of the P2P lending platforms. Lack of sharing of such information with Credit Information Companies, for economic reasons or otherwise, may however, lead to information asymmetry within the financial sector, which will structurally weaken the entire sector (with pieces of credit information being distributed across actors and not being shared internally). By classifying P2P lending platforms as NBFCs, RBI will ensure that these companies follow the Credit Information Companies (Regulation) Act, 2005 [10], which extensively addresses concerns related to this type of risks.
P2P lending platforms diversifying their financial operations without informing RBI and hence without appropriate regulatory control: It is possible that P2P lending platforms may decide to diversify their activities. There have been similar examples in other related sectors, say e-commerce marketplaces, that have started their own product re/selling companies that use the same online marketplace concerned. By classifying P2P lending platforms as NBFCs, RBI will ensure that these companies provide RBI with detailed and regular reports of their economic activities and investments, which is expected to address concerns related to this type of risks.

3.3. Are there any other risks which ought to be addressed?

3.3.1. CIS observes that as part of the usual transaction related activities of the P2P lending platforms, the companies will come into possession of what has been defined as “sensitive personal data or information” by the Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011 [11]. The concerns related to this type of risk is directly addressed by the Rules concerned, and may not require additional attention from the RBI.

3.3.2. CIS observes that as borrowers and lenders start using specific P2P lending platforms, the data regarding their credit histories and/or “financial reputation” will be owned by these companies. While such information might be shared internally within the financial sector through the Credit Information Companies, the borrowers and lenders themselves may not get direct access to such data. Hence, the borrowers and lenders will not be able to move easily and smoothly to a new P2P lending platform and make use of their existing credit information and/or “financial reputation” when accessing services offered via the new P2P lending platform. In other words, the borrowers and lenders may face a service provider lock-in, and inability to move between P2P lending platforms easily, without explicit access to their own credit history/reputation, and will not have the ability to migrate such information from one P2P lending platform to another (or to any other agency, for that matter). CIS submits that RBI must provide a mechanism to allow users to migrate between platforms as it has not been discussed in the consultation paper.

3.4. Is the proposed approach to regulating these platforms adequate?

3.4.1. CIS observes that while classification of P2P lending platforms will appropriately address key risks associated with their operations (as listed in 3.2.1. A-D), it will not address a major risk emerging out of their operations that is unique to the technological basis of the business concerned (as mentioned in 3.3.2.), and further, it will impose substantial financial and management obligations that have a very high probability of undermining the economic viability of this emerging and niche sector of intermediated direct lending and borrowing.

3.4.2. CIS observes that these financial and management obligations may involve the following topics among others discussed: 1) minimum net worth requirement for registration, 2) minimum investments required to be made government securities, 3) transferring of minimum percentage of net profits to RBI, 4) guidelines regarding corporate governance [12], etc.

3.4.3. Given this, CIS submits that instead of classifying P2P lending platforms as “Misc NBFCs,” a new sub-classification is created under the category of NBFC for such platforms, that directly addresses the key risks associated with businesses of P2P lending platforms, and protects lenders as well as borrowers while enhancing transparency in operations. This new sub-classification of P2P lending companies should also be divided into systemically-important and non-systemically-important like other NBFCs, and requirements regarding financial operations and corporate management should only be enforced for the former category of P2P lending companies.

3.5. Any other relevant issues pertaining to P2P lending

Beyond the issues already discussed above, CIS seek clarity from the RBI around the following aspects:

Transactional system pertaining to P2P lending:
1. What are the requirements and prerequisites for mandating the collection of user identity?
2. Establishing a maximum sum that can be transferred per transaction.
Company activities:
1. Fees that can be charged by platforms.
2. How data security can be best addressed.
3. How the financial transactions are brokered.
4. Modes of redressal.
5. Restitution to users if something goes amiss in the transaction.
6. Insurance that the company has to buy or capital on hand to support.

Endnotes

[1] See: https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/bs_viewcontent.aspx?Id=3164.

[2] See: http://cis-india.org/.

[3] See: https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/RBIA1934170510.pdf.

[4] See Section 45I.(c) of RBI Act, 1923, last amended on January 07, 2013.

[5] See Section 45I.(c)(v) of RBI Act, 1923, last amended on January 07, 2013.

[6] See: https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/pdfs/PNNBFC200315.pdf.

[7] See: http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/small-biz/startups/faircent-com-raises-pre-series-a-funding-of-250k/articleshow/47630279.cms.

[8] See: https://rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Id=7866.

[9] See: https://rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewMasCirculardetails.aspx?id=8168.

[10] See: http://www.incometaxindia.gov.in/Pages/acts/credit-information-companies-act.aspx.

[11] See: http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR313E_10511%281%29.pdf.

[12] See: https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_NBFCNotificationView.aspx?Id=3706.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/raw/comments-on-the-rbi-consultation-paper-on-peer-to-peer-lending

Comments on the National Digital Health Blueprint

Samyukta Prabhu, Ambika Tandon, Torsha Sarkar and Aayush Rathi — 2019-08-07T13:24:55Z

The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare had released the National Digital Health Blueprint on 15 July 2019 for comments. The Centre for Internet & Society submitted its comments.

This submission presents comments by the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), on the National Digital Health Blueprint (NDHB) Report, released on 15th July 2019 for publicconsulations. It must be noted at the outset that the time given for comments was less than three weeks, and such a short window of time is inadequate for all stakeholdersinvolved to comprehensively address the various aspects of the Report. Accordingly, on behalf of all other interested parties, we request more time for consultations.

We also note that the nature of data which would be subject to processing in the proposed digital framework pre-supposes a robust data protection regime in India, onewhich is currently absent. Accordingly, we also urge ceasing the implementation of the framework until the Personal Data Protection Bill is passed by the parliament. We wouldbe explaining our reasonings on this particular point below.

Click to download the full submission here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/samyukta-prabhu-ambika-tandon-torsha-sarkar-and-aayush-rathi-august-4-2019-comments-on-national-digital-health-blueprint

Comments on the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011

bhairav — 2013-07-12T12:13:53Z

Bhairav Acharya on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society prepared the following comments on the Sensitive Personal Data Rules. These were submitted to the Committee on Subordinate Legislation of the 15th Lok Sabha.

This research was undertaken as part of the 'SAFEGUARDS' project that CIS is undertaking with Privacy International and IDRC.

I Preliminary

1.1 The Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) is pleased to present this submission on the Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011 that were notified by the Central Government in the Gazette of India vide Notification GSR 313(E) on 11 April 2011 (“Sensitive Personal Data Rules” or “Rules”) to the Committee on Subordinate Legislation of the Fifteenth Lok Sabha.

1.2 The protection of personal information lies at the heart of the right to privacy; and, for this reason, it is an imperative legislative and policy concern in liberal democracies around the world. In India, although remedies for invasions of privacy exist in tort law and despite the Supreme Court of India according limited constitutional recognition to the right to privacy[1], there have never been codified provisions protecting the privacy of individuals and their personal information.

The Sensitive Personal Data Rules represent India’s first legislative attempt to recognise that all persons have a right to protect the privacy of their personal information. However, the Rules suffer from numerous conceptual, substantive and procedural weaknesses, including drafting defects, which demand scrutiny and rectification. The interpretation and applicability of the Rules was further confused when, on 24 August 2011, the Department of Information Technology of the Ministry of Communications attempted to reinterpret the Rules through a press release oblivious to the universally accepted basic proposition that law cannot be made or reinterpreted via press releases.[2] Therefore, the attention of the Committee on Subordinate Legislation of the Fifteenth Lok Sabha is called to the following submissions:

II Principles to Facilitate Appraisal
2.1 The Sensitive Personal Data Rules are an important step towards building a legal regime that protects the privacy of individuals whilst enabling the secure collection, use and storage of personal information by state and private entities. The Rules are to be welcomed in principle. However, at present, the Rules construct an incomplete regime that does not adequately protect privacy and, for this reason, falls short of internationally accepted data protection standards.[3]

This not only harms the personal liberties of Indian citizens, it also affects the ability of Indian companies to conduct commerce in foreign countries. More importantly, the Rules offer no protection against the state.

2.2 To enact a comprehensive personal information protection regime, CIS believes that the Rules should proceed on the basis of the following broad principles:

(a) Principle of Notice / Prior Knowledge

All persons from whom personal information is collected have a right to know, before the personal information is collected and, where applicable, at any point thereafter: (i) of an impending collection of personal information; (ii) the content and nature of the personal information being collected; (iii) the purpose for which the personal information is being collected; (iv) the broad identities of all natural and juristic persons who will have access to the collected personal information; (v) the manner in which the collected personal information will be used; (vi) the duration for which the collected personal information will be stored; (vii) whether the collected personal information will be disclosed to third parties including the police and other law enforcement agencies; (viii) of the manner in which they may access, check, modify or withdraw their collected personal information; (ix) the security practices and safeguards that will govern the sanctity of the collected personal information; (x) of all privacy policies and other policies in relation to the collected personal information; (xi) of any breaches in the security, safety, privacy and sanctity of the collected personal information; and, (xii) the procedure for recourse, including identities and contact details of ombudsmen and grievance redress officers, in relation to any misuse of the collected personal information.

(b) Principle of Consent

Personal information must only be collected once the person to whom it pertains has consented to its collection. Such consent must be informed, explicit and freely given. Informed consent is conditional upon the fulfilment of the principle of notice/prior knowledge set out in the preceding paragraph. Consent must be expressly given: the person to whom the personal information to be collected pertains must grant explicit and affirmative permission to collect personal information; and, he must know, or be made aware, of any action of his that will constitute such consent. Consent that is obtained using threats or coercion, such as a threat of refusal to provide services, does not constitute valid consent. Any person whose personal information has been consensually collected may, at any time, withdraw such consent for any or no reason and, consequently, his personal information, including his identity, must be destroyed. When consent is withdrawn in this manner, the person who withdrew consent may be denied any service that requires the use of the personal information for which consent was withdrawn.

Personal information must only be collected when, where and to the extent necessary. Necessity cannot be established in general; there must be a specific nexus connecting the content of the personal information to the purpose of its collection. Only the minimal amount of personal information necessary to achieve the purpose should be collected. If a purpose exists that warrants a temporally specific, or an event-dependent, collection of personal information, such a collection must only take place when that specific time is reached or that event occurs. If the purpose of personal information is dependent upon, or specific to, a geographical area or location, that personal information must only be collected from that geographical area or location.

(d) Right to be Forgotten / Principle of Purpose Limitation

Once collected, personal information must be processed, used, stored or otherwise only for the purpose for which it was collected. If the purpose for which personal information was collected is achieved, the collected personal information must be destroyed and the person to whom that personal information pertained must be ‘forgotten.’ Similarly, collected personal information must be destroyed and the person to whom it pertained ‘forgotten’ if the purpose for which it was collected expires or ceases to exist. Personal information collected for a certain purpose cannot be used or stored for another purpose nor even used or stored for a similar purpose to arise in the future without the express and informed consent of the person from whom it was collected in accordance with the principles of notice/prior knowledge and consent.

(e) Right of Access

All persons from whom personal information is collected have a right to access that personal information at any point following its collection to check its accuracy, make corrections or modifications and have destroyed that which is inaccurate. Where personal information of more than one person is held in an aggregated form such that affording one person access to it may endanger the right to privacy of another person, the entity holding the aggregated personal information must, to the best of its ability, identify the portion of the personal information that pertains to the person seeking access and make it available to him. All persons from whom personal information is collected must be given copies of their personal information upon request.

(f) Principle regarding Disclosure

Personal information, once collected, must never be disclosed. However, if the person to whom certain personal information pertains consents to its disclosure in accordance with the principle of consent after he has been made aware of the proposed disclosee and other details related to the personal information in accordance with the principle of notice/prior knowledge, the personal information may be disclosed. Consent to a disclosure of this nature may be obtained even during collection of the personal information if the person to whom it pertains expressly consents to its future disclosure. Notwithstanding the rule against disclosure and the consent exception to the rule, personal information may be disclosed to the police or other law enforcement agencies on certain absolute conditions. Since the protection of personal information is a policy imperative, the conditions permitting its disclosure must be founded on a clear and serious law enforcement need that overrides the right to privacy; and, in addition, the disclosure conditions must be strict, construed narrowly and, in the event of ambiguity, interpreted to favour the individual right to privacy. Therefore, (i) there must be a demonstrable need to access personal information in connection with a criminal offence; (ii) only that amount of personal information that is sufficient to satisfy the need must be disclosed; and, (iii), since such a disclosure is non-consensual, it must follow a minimal due process regime that at least immediately notifies the person concerned and affords him the right to protest the disclosure.

(g) Principle of Security

All personal information must be protected to absolutely maintain its sanctity, confidentiality and privacy by implementing safeguards against loss, unauthorised access, destruction, use, processing, storage, modification, de-anonymisation, unauthorised disclosure and other risks. Such a level of protection must include physical, administrative and technical safeguards that are constantly and consistently audited. Protection measures must be revised to incorporate stronger measures and mechanisms as and when they arise.

(h) Principle of Transparency / ‘Open-ness’

All practices, procedures and policies governing personal information must be made available to the person to whom that personal information pertains in a simple and easy-to-understand manner. This includes policies relating to the privacy, security and disclosure of that personal information. If an entity that seeks to collect personal information does not have these policies, it must immediately draft, publish and display such policies in addition to making them available to the person from whom it seeks to collect personal information before the collection can begin.

(i) Principle of Accountability

Liability attaches to the possession of personal information of another person. Since rights and duties, such as those in relation to privacy of personal information, are predicated on accountability, this principle binds all entities that seek to possess personal information of another person. As a result, an entity seeking to collect, use, process, store or disclose personal information of another person is accountable to that person for complying with all these principles as well as the provisions of any law. The misuse of personal information causes harm to the person to whom it pertains to attract and civil and criminal penalties.

2.3 These principles are reflective of internationally accepted best practices to form the basis upon which Indian legislation to protect personal information should be drafted. The Sensitive Personal Data Rules, in their current form, fall far short of the achieving the substantive intent of these principles. CIS submits that either (i) the Sensitive Personal Data Rules should be replaced with new and comprehensive legislation that speaks to the objectives and purpose of these principles, or (ii) the Sensitive Personal Data Rules are radically modified by amendment to bring Indian law to par with world standards. Nevertheless, without prejudice to the preceding submission, CIS offers the following clause-by-clause comments on the Sensitive Personal Data Rules:

III Clause-by-Clause Analysis and Comments

Rule 2 - Definitions

3.1.1 Rule 2(1)(b) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules defines “biometrics” as follows:

"Biometrics" means the technologies that measure and analyse human body characteristics, such as 'fingerprints', 'eye retinas and irises', 'voice patterns', "facial patterns', 'hand measurements' and 'DNA' for authentication purposes.

3.1.2 Firstly, the Sensitive Personal Data Rules do not use the term “biometrics.” Instead, rule 3(vi), which defines sensitive personal data, uses the term “biometric information.” It is unclear why rule 2(1)(b) provides a definition of the technologies by which information is obtained instead of clearly identify the information that constitutes sensitive personal data. This is one of several examples of poor drafting of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules. Secondly, biometric information is not used only for authentication; there are many other reasons for collecting and using biometric information. For instance, DNA is widely collected and used for medical research. Restricting the application of the definition to only that biometric information that is used for authentication is illogical to deprive the Rules of meaning.

3.1.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 2(1)(b) be re-drafted to read as follows:

““Biometric information” means any information relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of an individual which enable their unique identification including, but not limited to, fingerprints, retinas, irises, voice patterns, facial patterns, Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and genetic information.”

3.2.1 Rule 2(1)(c) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules defines “body corporate” in accordance with the definition provided in clause (i) of the Explanation to section 43A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”) as follows:

“body corporate” means any company and includes a firm, sole proprietorship or other association of individuals engaged in commercial or professional activities.

3.2.2 Firstly, this definition of a body corporate is poorly drafted to extend beyond incorporated entities to bring within its ambit even unincorporated professional organisations such as societies and associations which, by their very nature, are not bodies corporate.[4]

This is an arbitrary reinterpretation of the fundamental principles of company law. As it presently stands, this peculiar definition will extend to public and private limited companies, including incorporated public sector undertakings, ordinary and limited liability partnerships, firms, sole proprietorships, societies and associations; but, will exclude public and private trusts[5] and unincorporated public authorities. Hence, whereas non-governmental organisations that are organised as societies will fall within the definition of “body corporate,” those that are organised as trusts will not. Similarly, incorporated public authorities such as Delhi Transport Corporation and even municipal corporations such as the Municipal Corporation of Delhi will fall within the definition of “body corporate” but unincorporated public authorities such as the New Delhi Municipal Council and the Delhi Development Authority will not. This is a prima facie violation of the fundamental right of all persons to be treated equally under the law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

3.2.3 Secondly, whereas state entities and public authorities often collect and use sensitive personal data, with the exception of state corporations the Sensitive Personal Data Rules do not apply to the state. This means that the procedural safeguards offered by the Rules do not bind the police and other law enforcement agencies allowing them a virtually unfettered right to collect and use, even misuse, sensitive personal data without consequence. Further, state entities such as the Unique Identification Authority of India or the various State Housing Boards which collect, handle, process, use and store sensitive personal data are not covered by the Rules and remain unregulated. It is not possible to include these unincorporated entities within the definition of a body corporate; but, in pursuance of the principles set out in paragraph 2.2 of this submission, the Rules should be expanded to all state entities, whether incorporated or not.

3.2.4 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 2(1)(c) be re-drafted to read as follows:

““body corporate” means the body corporate defined in sub-section (7) of section 2 read with section 3 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) and includes those entities which the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf but shall not include societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860), trusts created under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882) or any other association of individuals that is not a legal entity apart from the members constituting it and which does not enjoy perpetual succession.”

Further, it is proposed that the Sensitive Personal Data Rules be re-drafted to apply to societies registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and trusts created under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 in a manner reflective of their distinctiveness from bodies corporate.

Furthermore, it is proposed that the Sensitive Personal Data Rules be re-drafted to apply to public authorities and the state as defined in Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

3.3.1 Rule 2(1)(d) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules defines “cyber incidents” as follows:

"Cyber incidents" means any real or suspected adverse event in relation to cyber security that violates an explicitly or implicitly applicable security policy resulting in unauthorised access, denial of service or disruption, unauthorised use of a computer resource for processing or storage of information or changes to data, information without authorisation.

3.3.2 Before examining the provisions of this clause, CIS questions the need for this definition. The term “cyber incidents” is used only once in these rules: the proviso to rule 6(1) which specifies the conditions upon which personal information or sensitive personal data may be disclosed to the police or other law enforcement authorities without the prior consent of the person to whom the information pertains. An analysis of rule 6(1) is contained at paragraphs 3.11.1 – 3.11.4 of this submission. Firstly, personal information and sensitive personal data should only be disclosed in connection with the prevention, investigation and prosecution of an existing offence. Offences cannot be created in the definitions clause of sub-statutory rules, they can only be created by a parent statute or another statute. Secondly, the scope and content of “cyber incidents” are already covered by section 43 of the IT Act. When read with section 66 of IT Act, an offence is created that is larger than the scope of the term “cyber incidents” to render this definition redundant.

3.3.3 Therefore, it is proposed that the definition of “cyber incidents” in rule 2(1)(d) be deleted and the remaining clauses in sub-rule (1) of rule 2 be accordingly renumbered.

3.4.1 Rule 2(1)(g) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules defines “intermediary” in accordance with the definition provided in section 2(1)(w) of the IT Act. However, the term “intermediary” is not used anywhere in the Sensitive Personal Data Rules and so its definition is redundant. This is another instance of careless drafting of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules.

3.4.2 Therefore, it is proposed that the definition of “intermediary” in rule 2(1)(g) be deleted and the remaining clauses in sub-rule (1) of rule 2 be accordingly renumbered.

Rule 3 - Sensitive Personal Data

3.5.1 Rule 3 of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules provides an aggregated definition of sensitive personal data as follows:

Sensitive personal data or information of a person means such personal information which consists of information relating to –

(i) password;

(ii) financial information such as Bank account or credit card or debit card or other payment instrument details ;

(iii) physical, physiological and mental health condition;

(iv) sexual orientation;

(v) medical records and history;

(vi) Biometric information;

(vii) any detail relating to the above clauses as provided to body corporate for providing service; and

(viii) any of the information received under above clauses by body corporate for processing, stored or processed under lawful contract or otherwise:

provided that, any information that is freely available or accessible in public domain or furnished under the Right to Information Act, 2005 or any other law for the time being in force shall not be regarded as sensitive personal data or information for the purposes of these rules.

3.5.2 In accordance with the principle that certain kinds of personal information are particularly sensitive, due to the intimate nature of their content in relation to the right to privacy, to invite privileged protective measures regarding the collection, handling, processing, use and storage of such sensitive personal data, it is surprising that rule 3 does not protect electronic communication records of individuals. Emails and chat logs as well as records of internet activity such as online search histories are particularly vulnerable to abuse and misuse and should be accorded privileged protection.

3.5.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 3 be re-drafted to read as follows:

“Sensitive personal data or information of a person means personal information as to that person’s –

(i) passwords and encryption keys;

(ii) financial information including, but not limited to, information relating to his bank accounts, credit cards, debit cards, negotiable instruments, debt and other payment details;

(iii) physical, physiological and mental condition;

(iv) sexual activity and sexual orientation;

(v) medical records and history;

(vi) biometric information; and

(vii) electronic communication records including, but not limited to, emails, chat logs and other communications made using a computer;

and shall include any data or information related to the sensitive personal data or information set out in this rule that is provided to, or received by, a body corporate.

Provided that, any information that is freely available or accessible in the public domain or furnished under the Right to Information Act, 2005 or any other law for the time being in force shall not be regarded as sensitive personal data or information for the purposes of these rules.”

Rule 4 - Privacy and Disclosure Policy

3.6.1 Rule 4 of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules, which obligates certain bodies corporate to publish privacy and disclosure policies for personal information, states:

Body corporate to provide policy for privacy and disclosure of information. – (1) The body corporate or any person who on behalf of body corporate collects, receives, possess, stores, deals or handle information of provider of information, shall provide a privacy policy for handling of or dealing in personal information including sensitive personal data or information and ensure that the same are available for view by such providers of information who has provided such information under lawful contract. Such policy shall be published on website of body corporate or any person on its behalf and shall provide for –

(i) Clear and easily accessible statements of its practices and policies;

(ii) type of personal or sensitive personal data or information collected under rule 3;

(iii) purpose of collection and usage of such information;

(iv) disclosure of information including sensitive personal data or information as provided in rule 6;

(v) reasonable security practices and procedures as provided under rule 8.

3.6.2 This rule is very badly drafted, contains several discrepancies and is legally imprecise. Firstly, this rule is overbroad to bind all bodies corporate that receive and use information, as opposed to “personal information” or “sensitive personal data.” All bodies corporate receive and use information, even a vegetable seller uses information relating to vegetables and prices; but, not all bodies corporate receive and use personal information and even fewer bodies corporate receive and use sensitive personal data. The application of this provision should turn on the reception and use of personal information, which includes sensitive personal data, and not simply information. Secondly, although this rule only applies when a provider of information provides information, the term “provider of information” is undefined. It may mean any single individual who gives his personal information to a body corporate, or it may even mean another entity that outsources or subcontracts work that involves the handling of personal information. This lack of clarity compromises the enforceability of this rule. The government’s press release of 24 August 2011 acknowledged this error but since it is impossible, not to mention unconstitutional, for a statutory instrument like these Rules to be amended, modified, interpreted or clarified by a press release, CIS is inclined to ignore the press release altogether. It is illogical that privacy policies not be required when personal information is directly given by a single individual. This rule should bind all bodies corporate that receive and use personal information irrespective of the source of the personal information. Thirdly, it is unclear whether separate privacy policies are required for personal information and for sensitive personal data. There is a distinction between personal information and sensitive personal data and since these Sensitive Personal Data Rules deal with the protection of sensitive personal data, this rule 4 should unambiguously mandate the publishing of privacy policies in relation to sensitive personal data. Any additional requirement for personal information must be set out to clearly mark its difference from sensitive personal data. Fourthly, because of sloppy drafting, the publishing duties of the body corporate in respect of any sensitive personal data are unclear. For example, the phrase “personal or sensitive personal data or information” used in clause (ii) is meaningless since “personal information” and “sensitive personal data or information” are defined terms.

3.6.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 3 be re-drafted to read as follows:

“Duty to publish certain policies. – (1) Any body corporate that collects, receives, possesses, stores, deals with or handles personal information or sensitive personal data from any source whatsoever shall, prior to collecting, receiving, possessing, storing, dealing with or handling such personal information or sensitive personal data, publish and prominently display the policies listed in sub-rule (2) in relation to such personal information and sensitive personal data.

(2) In accordance with sub-rule (1) of this rule, all bodies corporate shall publish separate policies for personal information and sensitive personal data that clearly state –

(i) the meanings of personal information and sensitive personal data in accordance with these rules;

(ii) the practices and policies of that body corporate in relation to personal information and sensitive personal data;

(iii) descriptive details of the nature and type of personal information and sensitive personal data collected, received, possessed, stored or handled by that body corporate;

(iv) the purpose for which such personal information and sensitive personal data is collected, received, possessed, stored or handled by that body corporate;

(v) the manner and conditions upon which such personal information and sensitive personal data may be disclosed in accordance with rule 6 of these rules; and

(vi) the reasonable security practices and procedures governing such personal information and sensitive personal data in accordance with rule 8 of these rules.”

Rule 5 - Collection of Information

3.7.1 Rule 5(1) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules lays down the requirement of consent before personal information can be collected as follows:

Body corporate or any person on its behalf shall obtain consent in writing through letter or Fax or email from the provider of the sensitive personal data or information regarding purpose of usage before collection of such information.

3.7.2 Firstly, the principle and requirement of consent is of overriding importance when collecting personal information, which includes sensitive personal data. Pursuant to the principles laid down in paragraph 2.2 of this submission, consent must be informed, explicit and freely given. Since sub-rule (3) of rule 5 attempts to secure the informed consent of persons giving personal information, this sub-rule must establish that all personal information can only be collected upon explicit consent that is freely given, irrespective of the medium and manner in which it is given. Secondly, it may be noted that sub-rule (1) only applies to sensitive personal data and not to other personal information that is not sensitive personal data. This is ill advised. Thirdly, this sub-rule relating to actual collection of personal information should follow a provision establishing the principle of necessity before collection can begin. The principle of necessity is currently laid down in sub-rule (2) of rule 5 which should be re-numbered to precede this sub-rule relating to collection.

3.7.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 5(1) be re-numbered to sub-rule (2) of rule 5 and re-drafted to read as follows:

“A body corporate seeking to collect personal information or sensitive personal data of a person shall, prior to collecting that personal information or sensitive personal data, obtain the express and informed consent of that person in any manner, and through any medium, that may be convenient but shall not obtain such consent through threat, duress or coercion.”

3.8.1 Rule 5(2) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules sets out the principle of necessity governing the collection of personal information as follows:

Body corporate or any person on its behalf shall not collect sensitive personal data or information unless —

(a) the information is collected for a lawful purpose connected with a function or activity of the body corporate or any person on its behalf; and

(b) the collection of the sensitive personal data or information is considered necessary for that purpose.

3.8.2 Firstly, before allowing a body corporate to collect personal information, which includes sensitive personal data, the law should strictly ensure that the collection of such personal information is necessary. Necessity cannot be established in general, there must be a nexus connecting the personal information to the purpose for which the personal information is sought to be collected. This important sub-rule sets out the principles upon which personal information can be collected; and, should therefore be the first sub-rule of rule 5. Secondly, this sub-rule only applies to sensitive personal data instead of all personal information. It is in the public interest that the principle of necessity applies to all personal information, including sensitive personal data.

3.8.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 5(2) be re-numbered to sub-rule (1) of rule 5 and re-drafted to read as follows:

“No body corporate shall collect any personal information or sensitive personal data of a person unless it clearly establishes that –

(a) the personal information or sensitive personal data is collected for a lawful purpose that is directly connected to a function or activity of the body corporate; and

(b) the collection of the personal information or sensitive personal data is necessary to achieve that lawful purpose.”

3.9.1 Rule 5(3) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules attempts to create an informed consent regime for the collection of personal information as follows:

While collecting information directly from the person concerned, the body corporate or any person on its behalf snail take such steps as are, in the circumstances, reasonable to ensure that the person concerned is having the knowledge of —

(a) the fact that the information is being collected;

(b) the purpose for which the information is being collected;

(c) the intended recipients of the information; and

(d) the name and address of —

(i) the agency that is collecting the information; and

(ii) the agency that will retain the information.

3.9.2 Firstly, this sub-rule (3) betrays the carelessness of its drafters by bringing within its application any and all information collected by a body corporate from a person instead of only personal information or sensitive personal data. Secondly, this provision is crucial to establishing a regime of informed consent before personal information is given by a person to a body corporate. For consent to be informed, the person giving consent must be made aware of not only the collection of that personal information or sensitive personal data, but also the purpose for which it is being collected, the manner in which it will be used, the intended recipients to whom it will be sent or made accessible, the duration for which it will be stored, the conditions upon which it may be disclosed, the conditions upon which it may be destroyed as well as the identities of all persons who will collect, receive, possess, store, deal with or handle that personal information or sensitive personal data. Thirdly, the use of the phrase “take such steps as are, in the circumstances, reasonable” dilutes the purpose of this provision and compromises the establishment of an informed consent regime. Instead, the use of the term “reasonable efforts”, which has an understood meaning in law, will suffice to protect individuals while giving bodies corporate sufficient latitude to conduct their business.

3.9.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 5(3) be re-drafted to read as follows:

“A body corporate seeking to collect personal information or sensitive personal data of a person shall, prior to such collection, make reasonable efforts to inform that person of the following details in respect of his personal information or sensitive personal data –

(a) the fact that it is being collected;

(b) the purpose for which it is being collected;

(d) the intended recipients to whom it will be sent or made available;

(e) the duration for which it will be stored;

(f) the conditions upon which it may be disclosed;

(g) the conditions upon which it may be destroyed; and

(h) the identities of all persons and bodies corporate who will collect, receive, possess, store, deal with or handle it.”

3.10.1 Rule 5(4) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules lays down temporal restrictions to the retention of personal information:

Body corporate or any person on its behalf holding sensitive personal data or information shall not retain that information for longer than is required for the purposes for which the information may lawfully be used or is otherwise required under any other law for the time being in force.

3.10.2 Since this sub-rule (4) only applies to sensitive personal data instead of all personal information, bodies corporate are permitted to hold personal information of persons that is not sensitive personal data for as long as they like even after the necessity that informed the collection of that personal information expires and the purpose for which it was collected ends. This is a dangerous provision that deprives the owners of personal information of the ability to control its possession to jeopardise their right to privacy. The Sensitive Personal Data Rules should prescribe a temporal limit to the storage of all personal information by bodies corporate.

3.10.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 5(4) be re-drafted to read as follows:

“No body corporate shall store, retain or hold personal information or sensitive personal data for a period longer than is required to achieve the purpose for which that personal information or sensitive personal data was collected.”

Rule 6 - Disclosure of Information

3.11.1 Rule 6(1) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules, which deals with the crucial issue of disclosure of personal information, states:

Disclosure of sensitive personal data or information by body corporate to any third party shall require prior permission from the provider of such information, who has provided such information under lawful contract or otherwise, unless such disclosure has been agreed to in the contract between the body corporate and provider of information, or where the disclosure is necessary for compliance of a legal obligation:

Provided that the information shall be shared, without obtaining prior consent from provider of information, with Government agencies mandated under the law to obtain information including sensitive personal data or information for the purpose of verification of identity, or for prevention, detection, investigation including cyber incidents, prosecution, and punishment of offences. The Government agency shall send a request in writing to the body corporate possessing the sensitive personal data or information stating clearly the purpose of seeking such information. The Government agency shall also state that the information so obtained shall not be published or shared with any other person.

3.11.2 In addition to errors and discrepancies in drafting, this sub-rule contains wide and vague conditions of disclosure of sensitive personal data to gravely impair the privacy rights and personal liberties of persons to whom such sensitive personal data pertains. A summary of drafting errors and discrepancies follows: Firstly, this sub-rule only applies to sensitive personal data instead of all personal information. The protection of personal information that is not sensitive personal data is an essential element of the right to privacy; hence, prohibiting bodies corporate from disclosing personal information at will is an important public interest prerogative. Secondly, the use of the phrase “any third party” lends vagueness to this provision since the term “third party” has not been defined. Thirdly, the repeated use of the undefined phrase “provider of information” throughout these Rules and in this sub-rule is confusing since, as pointed out in paragraph 3.6.2 of this submission, it could mean either or both of the single individual who consents to the collection of his personal information or another entity that transfers personal information to the body corporate.

3.11.3 Further, the conditions upon which bodies corporate may disclose personal information and sensitive personal data without the consent of the person to whom it pertains are dangerously wide. Firstly, the disclosure of personal information and sensitive personal data when it is “necessary for compliance of a legal obligation” is an extremely low protection standard. The law must intelligently specify the exact conditions upon which disclosure sans consent is possible; since the protection of personal information is a public interest priority, the conditions upon which it may be disclosed must outweigh this priority to be significant and serious enough to imperil the nation or endanger public interest. The disclosure of personal information and sensitive personal data for mere compliance of a legal obligation, such as failure to pay an electricity bill, is farcical. Secondly, the proviso sets out the conditions upon which the state, through its law enforcement agencies, may access personal information and sensitive personal data without the consent of the person to whom it pertains. Empowering the police with access to personal information can serve a public good if, and only if, it results in the prevention or resolution of crime; if not, this provision will give the police carte blanche to misuse and abuse this privilege. Hence, personal information should only be disclosed for the prevention, investigation and prosecution of an existing criminal offence. Thirdly, the definition and use of the term “cyber incidents” is unnecessary because section 43 of the IT Act already lists all such incidents. In addition, when read with section 66 of the IT Act, there emerges a clear list of offences to empower the police to seek non-consensual disclosure of personal information to obviate the need for any further new terminology. In sum, with regard to the non-consensual disclosure of personal information for the purposes of law enforcement: a demonstrable need to access personal information to prevent, investigate or prosecute crime must exist; only that amount of personal information sufficient to satisfy the need must be disclosed; and, finally, no disclosure may be permitted without clearly laid down procedural safeguards that fulfil the requirements of a minimal due process regime.

3.11.4 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 6(1) be re-drafted to read as follows:

“No body corporate shall disclose any personal information or sensitive personal data to anyone whosoever without the prior express consent of the person to whom the personal information or sensitive personal data to be disclosed pertains.

Provided that if the personal information or sensitive personal data was collected pursuant to an agreement that expressly authorises the body corporate to disclose such personal information or sensitive personal data, and if the person to whom the personal information or sensitive personal data pertains was aware of this authorisation prior to such collection, the body corporate may disclose the personal information or sensitive personal data without obtaining the consent of the person to whom it pertains in the form and manner specified in such agreement.

Provided further that if a reasonable threat to national security, defence or public order exists, or if the disclosure of personal information or sensitive personal data is necessary to prevent, investigate or prosecute a criminal offence, the body corporate shall, upon receiving a written request from the police or other law enforcement authority containing the particulars and details of the personal information or sensitive personal data to be disclosed, disclose such personal information or sensitive personal data to such police or other law enforcement authority without the prior consent of the person to whom it pertains.”

3.12.1 Rule 6(2) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules creates an additional disclosure mechanism:

Notwithstanding anything contain in sub-rule (1), any sensitive personal data on Information shall be disclosed to any third party by an order under the law for the time being in force.

3.12.2 This sub-rule is overbroad to enable anyone’s sensitive personal data to be disclosed to any other person without the application of any standards of necessity, proportionality or due process and without the person to whom the sensitive personal data pertains having any recourse or remedy. Such provisions are the hallmarks of authoritarian and police states and have no place in a liberal democracy. For instance, the invocation of this sub-rule will enable a police constable in Delhi to exercise unfettered power to access the biometric information or credit card details of a politician in Kerala since an order of a policeman constitutes “an order under the law”. Pursuant to our submission in paragraph 3.11.4, adequate measures exist to secure the disclosure of personal information or sensitive public data in the public interest. The balance of convenience between privacy and public order has already been struck. This sub-rule should be removed.

3.12.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 6(2) be deleted and the remaining sub-rules in rule 6 be accordingly renumbered.

3.13.1 Rule 6(4) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules states:

The third party receiving the sensitive personal data or information from body corporate or any person on its behalf under sub-rule (1) shall not disclose it further.

3.13.2 Firstly, as mentioned elsewhere in this submission, the phrase “third party” has not been defined. This is a drafting discrepancy that must be rectified. Secondly, this sub-rule only encompasses sensitive personal data and not other personal information that is not sensitive personal data. Thirdly, it may be necessary, in the interests of business or otherwise, for personal information or sensitive personal data that has been lawfully disclosed to a third person to be disclosed further if the person to whom that personal information consents to it.

3.13.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 6(4) be re-drafted to read as follows:

“Personal information and sensitive personal data that has been lawfully disclosed by a body corporate to a person who is not the person to whom such personal information or sensitive personal data pertains in accordance with the provisions of these rules may be disclosed further upon obtaining the prior and express consent of the person to whom it pertains.”

Rule 7 - Transfer of Information

3.14.1 Rule 7 of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules sets out the conditions upon which bodies corporate may transfer personal information or sensitive personal data to other bodies corporate in pursuance of a business arrangement:

A body corporate or any person on its behalf may transfer sensitive personal data or information including any information, to any other body corporate or a person in India, or located in any other country, that ensures the same level of data protection that is adhered to by the body corporate as provided for under these Rules. The transfer may be allowed only if it is necessary for the performance of the lawful contract between the body corporate or any person on its behalf and provider of information or where such person has consented to data transfer.

3.14.2 This provision allows personal information and sensitive personal data to be transferred across international borders to other bodies corporate in pursuance of a business agreement. The transfer of such information is a common feature of international commerce in which Indian information technology companies participate with significant success. Within India too, personal information and sensitive personal data is routinely transferred between companies in furtherance of an outsourced business model. Besides affecting ease of business, the sub-rule also affects the ability of persons to control their personal information and sensitive personal data. However, the sub-rule has been poorly drafted: firstly, the simultaneous use of the phrases “provider of information” and “such person” is imprecise and misleading; secondly, the person to whom any personal information or sensitive personal data pertains must pre-consent to the transfer of such information.

3.14.3 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 7 be re-drafted to read as follows:

“A body corporate may transfer any personal information or sensitive personal data in its possession to another body corporate, whether located in India or otherwise, if the transfer is pursuant to an agreement that binds the other body corporate to same, similar or stronger measures of privacy, protection, storage, use and disclosure of personal information and sensitive personal data as are contained in these rules, and if the express and informed consent of the person to whom the personal information or sensitive personal data pertains is obtained prior to the transfer.”

Rule 8 - Reasonable Security Practices

3.15.1 Following rule 8(1) of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules that prescribes reasonable security practices and procedures necessary for protecting personal information and sensitive personal data, rule 8(2) asserts that the international standard ISO/IEC 27001 fulfils the protection standards required by rule 8(1):

The international Standard IS/ISO/IEC 27001 on "Information Technology - Security Techniques - Information Security Management System - Requirements" is one such standard referred to in sub-rule (1).

3.15.2 ISO/IEC 27001 is an information security management system standard that is prescribed by the International Organisation for Standardisation and the International Electrotechnical Commission. CIS raises no objection to the content or quality of the ISO/IEC 27001 standard. However, to achieve ISO/IEC 27001 compliance and certification, one must first purchase a copy of the standard. A copy of the ISO/IEC 27001 standard costs approximately Rs. _____/-. The cost of putting in place the protective measures required by the ISO/IEC 27001 standard are higher: these include the cost of literature and training, the cost of external assistance, the cost of technology, the cost of employees’ time and the cost of certification.

3.15.3 Therefore, to bring these standards within the reach of small and medium-sized Indian bodies corporate, an appropriate Indian authority, such as the Bureau of Indian Standards, should re-issue affordable standards that are equivalent to ISO/IEC 27001.

IV The Press Release of 24 August 2011

4.1 The shoddy drafting of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules resulted in national and international confusion about its interpretation. However, instead of promptly correcting the embarrassingly numerous errors in the Rules, the Department of Information Technology of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology chose to issue a press release on 24 August 2011 that was published on the website of the Press Information Bureau. The content of that press release is brought to the attention of the Committee of Subordinate Legislation as follows:

Clarification on Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules, 2011 Under Section 43A of the Information Technology ACT, 2000.

Press Note

The Department of Information Technology had notified Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information) Rules, 2011 under section 43A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 on 11.4.2011 vide notification no. G.S.R. 313(E).

These rules are regarding sensitive personal data or information and are applicable to the body corporate or any person located within India. Any such body corporate providing services relating to collection, storage, dealing or handling of sensitive personal data or information under contractual obligation with any legal entity located within or outside India is not subject to the requirement of Rules 5 & 6. Body corporate, providing services to the provider of information under a contractual obligation directly with them, as the case may be, however, is subject to Rules 5 & 6. Providers of information, as referred to in these Rules, are those natural persons who provide sensitive personal data or information to a body corporate. It is also clarified that privacy policy, as prescribed in Rule 4, relates to the body corporate and is not with respect to any particular obligation under any contract. Further, in Rule 5(1) consent includes consent given by any mode of electronic communication.

Ministry of Communications & Information Technology (Dept. of Information Technology)

Press Information Bureau, Government of India, Bhadra 2, 1933, August 24, 2011

SP/ska
(Release ID :74990)

4.2 It is apparent from a plain reading of the text that this press release seeks to re-interpret the application of rules 5 and 6 of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules insofar as they apply to Indian bodies corporate receiving personal information collected by another company outside India. Also, it seeks to define the term “providers of information” to address the confusion created by the repeated use this term in the Rules. Further, it re-interprets the scope and application of rule 4 relating to duty of bodies corporate to publish certain policies. Furthermore, it seeks to amend the provisions of rule 5(1) relating to manner and medium of obtaining consent prior to collecting personal information.

4.3 At the outset, it must be understood that a press release is not valid law. According to Article 13(3) of the Constitution of India,

...law includes any Ordinance, order, bye law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usages having in the territory of India the force of law.

Law includes orders made in exercise of a statutory power as also orders and notifications made in exercise of a power conferred by statutory rules.

[See, Edward Mills AIR 1955 SC 25 at pr. 12, Babaji Kondaji Garad 1984 (1) SCR 767 at pp. 779-780 and Indramani Pyarelal Gupta 1963 (1) SCR 721 at pp. 73-744]

Sub-delegated orders, made in exercise of a power conferred by statutory rules, cannot modify the rules.

[See, Raj Narain Singh AIR 1954 SC 569 and Re Delhi Laws Act AIR 1951 SC 332]

Therefore, press releases, which are not made or issued in exercise of a delegated or sub-delegated power are not “law” and cannot modify statutory rules.

V Summary

5.1 CIS submits that the following provisions of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules be amended or annulled

Rule 2(1)(b);
Rule 2(1)(c);
Rule 2(1)(d);
Rule 2(1)(g);
Rule 3;
Rule 4(1);
Rule 5(1);
Rule 5(2);
Rule 5(3);
Rule 5(4);
Rule 6(1);
Rule 6(1) Proviso;
Rule 6(2);
Rule 6(4);
Rule 7; and
Rule 8.

5.2 CIS submits that the Committee on Subordinate Legislation should take a serious view of the press release issued by the Department of Information Technology of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology on 24 August 2011.

5.3 CIS submits that in exercise of the powers granted to the Committee on Subordinate Legislation under Rules 317 and 320 of the Lok Sabha Rules of Procedure, the provisions of the Sensitive Personal Data Rules listed in the preceding paragraph 5.1 should be annulled; and, the Committee may be pleased to consider and recommend as an alternative the amendments proposed by CIS in this submission.

5.4 CIS thanks the Committee on Subordinate Legislation for the opportunity to present this submission and reiterates its commitment to supporting the Committee with any clarification, question or other requirement it may have.

[1]. See generally, Kharak Singh AIR 1963 SC 1295, Gobind (1975) 2 SCC 148, R. Rajagopal (1994) 6 SCC 632, People’s Union for Civil Liberties (1997) 1 SCC 301 and Canara Bank (2005) 1 SCC 496.

[2]. See infra pr. 4.3.

[3]. See, for comparison, Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 of the European Parliament and Council, the Data Protection Act, 1998 of the United Kingdom and the Proposed EU Regulation on on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation).

[4].See generally, Board of Trustees of Ayurvedic College AIR 1962 SC 458 and S. P. Mittal AIR 1983 SC 1.

[5]. See generally, W. O. Holdsworth AIR 1957 SC 887 and Duli Chand AIR 1984 Del 145.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-it-reasonable-security-practices-and-procedures-and-sensitive-personal-data-or-information-rules-2011

Comments on the Information Technology (Electronic Service Delivery) Rules, 2011

bhairav — 2013-07-12T12:12:16Z

Bhairav Acharya on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society prepared the following comments on the Information Technology (Electronic Services Delivery) Rules, 2011. These were submitted to the Committee on Subordinate Legislation of the 15th Lok Sabha. These were submitted to the Committee on Subordinate Legislation of the 15th Lok Sabha.

This research was undertaken as part of the 'SAFEGUARDS' project that CIS is undertaking with Privacy International and IDRC.

I Preliminary

1.1 This submission presents comments from the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) on the Information Technology (Electronic Service Delivery) Rules, 2011 that were notified by the Central Government in the Gazette of India vide Notification GSR 316(E) on 11 April 2011 (“ESD Rules” or “Rules”).

1.2 The ESD Rules were notified only eight months before the Electronic Delivery of Services Bill, 2011 was tabled in the Lok Sabha on 27 December 2011 (Bill 137 of 2011) (“EDS Bill” or “Bill”). Both the ESD Rules and the EDS Bill are concerned with enabling computer-based electronic delivery of government services to Indian citizens (“electronic service delivery”). Both the Rules and the Bill originate from the same government department: the Department of Electronics and Information Technology of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. Since the EDS Bill seeks to enact a comprehensive legislative framework for mandating and enforcing electronic service delivery, the purpose of the ESD Rules are called into question.

II Basic Issues Regarding Electronic Service Delivery

2.1 CIS believes that there are significant conceptual issues regarding electronic service delivery that demand attention. The Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Information Technology of the Fifteenth Lok Sabha (“Standing Committee”) raised a few concerns when it submitted its 37th Report on the EDS Bill on 29 August 2012. There is a clear need for a national debate on the manner of effecting exclusive electronic service delivery to the exclusion of manual service delivery. Some of these issues are briefly summarised as follows:

(a) Mandatory exclusive electronic service delivery pre-supposes the ability of all Indian citizens to easily access such mechanisms. While there are no authoritative national statistics on familiarity with computer-related technologies, it is apparent that a large majority of Indians, most of whom are likely to be already marginalised and vulnerable, are totally unfamiliar with such technologies to endanger their ability to receive basic government services;

(b) Consequent upon mandatory exclusive electronic service delivery for basic government services, a large group of ‘middlemen’ will arise to facilitate access for that majority of Indians who cannot otherwise access these services. This group will control the interface between citizens and their government. As a result, citizens’ access to governance will deteriorate. This problem may be mitigated to a certain extent by creating a new class of public servants to solely facilitate access to electronic service delivery mechanisms;

(c) The issue of governmental incapacity at the citizen-government interface might be addressed by contracting private service providers to operate mandatory exclusive electronic service delivery mechanisms. However, it is difficult to see how commercialising access to essential government services serves the public interest, especially when public funds will be expended to meet the costs of private service providers. Permitting private service providers to charge a fee from the general public to allow access to essential government services is also ill advised;

(d) All electronic service delivery, whether mandatory to the exclusion of other service delivery mechanisms or offered simultaneously with manual service delivery, must be accompanied by strong data protection measures to ensure the sanctity of sensitive personal information shared online with the state. At present, there are no specific laws that bind the state, or its agents, to the stringent requirements of privacy necessary to protect personal liberties. In the same vein, strong data security measures are necessary to prevent sensitive personal information from being compromised or lost;

(e) All electronic service delivery, whether mandatory to the exclusion of other service delivery mechanisms or offered simultaneously with manual service delivery, must ensure ease and equality of accessibility. For this reason, electronic service delivery mechanisms should conform to the National Policy on Open Standards, 2010 (or the proposed National Electronic Access Policy which is currently awaiting adoption), the Interoperability Framework for E-Governance in India and the Website Guidelines of the National Informatics Centre;

(f) Electronic service delivery requires infrastructure which India does not currently have but can develop. Only 1.44 per cent of India’s population has access to a broadband internet connection[1] and current daily energy demand far exceeds supply. On the other hand, the number of broadband subscribers is increasing,[2] the annual installed capacity for electricity generation is growing[3] and the literacy rate is increasing.[4]

2.2 The ESD Rules do not address any of the issues raised in the preceding paragraph. As a result, they cannot be seen to represent the result of a national consensus on the crucial question of mandating exclusive electronic service delivery and the means of enforcing such a scheme. Further, very few of the provisions of the Rules are binding; instead, the Rules appear to be drafted to serve as a minimal model for electronic service delivery. In this background, CIS believes that the Rules should be treated as an incomplete arrangement that prescribe the minimal standards necessary to bind private service providers before comprehensive and statutory electronic service delivery legislation is enacted, perhaps in the form of the EDS Bill or otherwise. Therefore, without prejudice to the issues raised in the preceding paragraph, CIS offers the following comments on the provisions of the Rules while reserving the opportunity to make substantive submissions on electronic service delivery in general to an appropriate forum at a later date.

III Improper Exercise of Subordinate Legislative Power

3.1 Rule 317 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Lok Sabha (Fourteenth Edition, July 2010) (“Rules of Procedure”), which empowers the Committee on Subordinate Legislation to scrutinise exercises of statutory delegation of legislative powers for impropriety, states:

There shall be a Committee on Subordinate Legislation to scrutinize and report to the House whether the powers to make regulations, rules, subrules, bye-laws etc., conferred by the Constitution or delegated by Parliament are being properly exercised within such delegation.

Further, the Committee on Subordinate Legislation is specifically empowered by rule 320(vii) of the Rules of Procedure to examine any provision of the ESD Rules to consider “whether it appears to make some unusual or unexpected use of the powers conferred by the Constitution or the Act pursuant to which it is made.”

3.2 Accordingly, the attention of the Committee on Subordinate Legislation is called to an improper exercise of delegated power under rule 3(1) of the ESD Rules, which states:

The appropriate Government may on its own or through an agency authorised by it, deliver public services through electronically- enabled kiosks or any other electronic service delivery mechanism.

This sub-rule (1) empowers both the Central Government and State Governments to provide electronic service delivery on their own.

3.3 The ESD Rules are made in exercise of delegated powers conferred under section 87(2)(ca) read with section 6-A(2) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT Act”). Section 87(2)(ca) of the IT Act empowers the Central Government to make rules to provide for:

the manner in which the authorised service provider may collect, retain and appropriate service charges under sub-section (2) of section 6-A.

Section 6-A(2) of the IT Act states:

The appropriate Government may also authorise any service provider authorised under sub-section (1) to collect, retain and appropriate such service charges, as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government for the purpose of providing such services, from the person availing such service.

Prima facie, the delegated powers under section 87(2)(ca) read with section 6-A(2) of the IT Act, in exercise of which the ESD Rules are made, only permit delegated legislation to regulate private service providers, they do not permit the executive to exercise these powers to empower itself to conduct electronic service delivery on its own. Therefore, to the extent that the ESD Rules authorise the Central Government and State Governments to provide electronic service delivery on their own, such authorisation constitutes an improper exercise of delegated power and is ultra vires the IT Act. This may be resolved by deriving the delegated legislative competence of the ESD Rules from section 87(1) of the IT Act, instead of section 87(2)(ca) read with section 6-A(2).

IV Clause-by-Clause Comments

Rule 2 - Definitions

4.1.1 Rule 2(c) of the ESD Rules states:

"authorised agent" means an agent of the appropriate Government or service provider and includes an operator of an electronically enabled kiosk who is permitted under these rules to deliver public services to the users with the help of a computer resource or any communication device, by following the procedure specified in the rules

In accordance with the argument regarding improper exercise of delegated power contained in paragraphs 3.1 – 3.3 of this submission, the appropriate Government cannot undertake electronic service delivery under these Rules. Consequently, the appropriate Government cannot appoint an agent to provide electronic service delivery on behalf, and under the control, of the appropriate Government since, as the principal, the appropriate Government would be responsible for the acts of its agents. Instead, private service providers may provide electronic service delivery as contractees of the appropriate Government who might enter into such contracts as a sovereign contractor. Therefore, only a private service provider may appoint an authorised agent under these Rules.

4.1.2 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 2(c) is amended to read as follows:

““authorised agent” means an agent of a service provider, and includes an operator of an electronically enabled kiosk, who is permitted under these rules to deliver public services with the help of a computer resource or any communication device, by following the procedure specified in these rules”

Rule 3 - System of Electronic Service Delivery

4.2.1 Rule 3(3) of the ESD Rules states:

The appropriate Government may determine the manner of encrypting sensitive electronic records requiring confidentiality, white they are electronically signed.

This sub-rule is supposed to prescribe stringent standards to maintain the security, confidentiality and privacy of all personal information used during electronic service delivery transactions. In the absence of transactional security, electronic service delivery will invite fraud, theft and other misuse to impugn its viability as a means of delivering public services. However, the use of the term “may” leaves the prescription of security standards up to the discretion of the appropriate Government. Further, the language of the sub-rule is unclear and imprecise.

4.2.2 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 3(3) is amended to read as follows:

“The appropriate Government shall, prior to any electronic service delivery, determine the manner of encrypting electronic records and shall prescribe standards for maintaining the safety, security, confidentiality and privacy of all information collected or used in the course of electronic service delivery.”

4.3.1 Rule 3(5) of the ESD Rules states:

The appropriate Government may allow receipt of payments made by adopting the Electronic Service Delivery System to be a deemed receipt of payment effected in compliance with the financial code and treasury code of such Government.

Firstly, if these Rules enable payments to be made electronically, they must also validate the receipt of these payments. Inviting citizens to make electronic payments for government services without recognising the receipt of those payments is farcical to attract abusive and corrupt practices. Therefore, it is imperative that these Rules compulsorily recognise receipt of payments, either by deeming their receipt to be valid receipts under existing law or by specially recognising their receipt by other means including the law of evidence. Either way, electronic receipts of electronic payments must be accorded the validity in law that manual/paper receipts have; and, copies of such electronic receipts must be capable of being adduced in evidence. Secondly, the use of the phrase “financial code and treasury code” is avoidable since these terms are undefined.

4.3.2 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 3(5) be amended to read as follows:

“Any receipt of payment made by electronic service delivery shall be deemed to be a valid receipt of such payment under applicable law and shall be capable of being adduced as evidence of such payment.”

4.4.1 Rule 3(6) of the ESD Rules states:

The appropriate Government may authorise service providers or their authorised agents to collect, retain and appropriate such service charges as may be specified by the appropriate Government for the purpose of providing such services from the person availing such services:

Provided that the apportioned service charges shall be clearly indicated on the receipt to be given to the person availing the services.

This sub-rule is an almost verbatim reproduction of the provisions of section 6-A(2) of the IT Act which reads as follows:

Since the IT Act specifically delegates to the appropriate Governments the power to authorise service providers to levy charges, rule 3(6) of the ESD Rules that merely copies the provisions of the parent statute is meaningless. The purpose of delegated legislation is to give effect to the provisions of a statute by specifying the manner in which statutory provisions shall be implemented. Copying and pasting statutory provisions is a absurd misuse of delegated legislative powers.

4.4.2 Therefore, it is proposed that sub-rule (6) is deleted and the remaining sub-rules of rule 3 are renumbered.

4.5.1 Rule 3(7) of the ESD Rules states:

The appropriate Government shall by notification specify the scale of service charges which may be charged and collected by the service providers and their authorised agents for various kinds of services.

This is an almost verbatim reproduction of the provisions of section 6-A(4) of the IT Act which reads as follows:

The appropriate Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the scale of service charges which may be charged and collected by the service providers under this section.

As noted in paragraph 4.3.1 of this submission, the purpose of delegated legislation is not to copy the provisions of the parent statute, but to amplify the scope of the delegated power and the manner of effecting its implementation.

4.5.2 Therefore, it is proposed that sub-rule (7) is deleted and the remaining sub-rules of rule 3 are renumbered.

4.6.1 Rule 3(8) of the ESD Rules states:

The appropriate Government may also determine the norms on service levels to be complied with by the Service Provider and the authorised agents.

There is no quarrel with the power of the government to determine norms for, or directly prescribe, service levels to regulate service providers. However, without a scheme of statutory or sub-statutory penalties for contravention of the prescribed service levels, a sub-delegated service level cannot enforce any penalties. Simply put, the state cannot enforce penalties unless authorised by law. Unfortunately, rule 3(8) contains no such authorisation. Service levels for service providers without a regime of penalties for non-compliance is meaningless, especially since service providers will be engaged in providing access to essential government services.

4.6.2 Therefore, it is proposed that rule 3(8) be amended to read as follows:

“The appropriate Government shall prescribe service levels to be complied with by all service providers and their authorised agents which shall include penalties for failure to comply with such service levels.”

[1]. Thirty-Seventh Report of the Standing Committee on Information Technology (2011-12) on the Electronic Delivery of Services Bill, 2011 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 29 August 2012) at pp. 13, 17 and 34. See also, Telecom Sector in India: A Decadal Profile (New Delhi: Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, 8 June 2012).

[2]. Annual Report (2011-12) of the Department of Telecommunications, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Government of India (New Delhi: Department of Telecommunications, 2012) at pp. 5 and 1-3.

[3]. Report of the Working Group on Power of the Twelfth Plan (New Delhi: Planning Commission, Government of India, January 2012).

[4]. Provisional Report of the Census of India 2011 (New Delhi: Registrar General and Census Commissioner, 2011) from p. 124.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-it-electronic-service-delivery-rules-2011

Comments on the Draft National Policy on Official Statistics

Gurshabad Grover and Sandeep Kumar — 2018-06-07T02:54:18Z

This submission presents comments by the Centre for Internet & Society, India (“CIS”) on the Draft National Policy on Official Statistics which was released to the public by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation on 17th May 2018 for comments and views.

Edited by Swaraj Barooah. Download a PDF of the submission here

Preliminary

CIS appreciates the Government’s efforts in realising the importance of the need for high quality statistical information enshrined in the Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics as adopted by the UN General Assembly in January 2014. CIS is grateful for the opportunity to put forth its views on the draft policy. This submission was made on 31st May, 2018.

First, this submission highlights some general defects in the draft policy: there is lack of principles guiding data dissemination policies; there are virtually no positive mandates set for Government bodies for secure storage and transmission of data; and while privacy is mentioned as a concern, it has been overlooked in designing the principles of the implementation of surveys. Then, this submission puts forward specific comments suggesting improvements to various sections in the draft policy.

CIS would also like to point out the short timeline between the publication of the draft policy (18th May, 2018), and the deadline set for the stakeholders to submit their comments (31st May, 2018). Considering that the policy has widespread implications for all Ministries, citizens, and State legislation rights (proposed changes include a Constitutional Amendment), it is necessary that such call-for-comments are publicised widely, and enough time is given to the public so that the Government can receive well-researched comments.

General Comments

Data dissemination

For data dissemination, the draft policy does not stress upon a general principle or set of principles, and often disregards principles specified in the Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics, which are the very principles the Government intends to draw its policies on official statistics from. Rather it relies on context-specific provisions that fail to summarise and articulate a general philosophy for the dissemination of official statistics, and fails to practically embody some stated goals. The first principle on Official Statistics, as realised by the United Nations General Assembly, clearly states that: “[...] official statistics that meet the test of practical utility are to be compiled and made available on an impartial basis by official statistical agencies to honour citizens’ entitlement to public information.”

Let us compare this with Section 5.1.7 (9) of the draft policy, which refers to policies regarding core statistics: it mentions a data “warehouse” to be maintained by the NSO which should be accessible to private and public bodies. While this does point towards an open data policy, such a vision has not been articulated in any part thereof.

The draft policy, at the outset, should have general guiding principles of publishing data openly and freely (once it meets the utility test, and it has been ensured that individual privacy will not be violated by the publishing of such statistics). This should serve well to inform further regulations and related policies governing the use and publishing of statistics, like the Statistical Disclosure Control Report.

A general commitment to a well-articulated policy on data dissemination will ensure easy-to-follow principles for the various Ministries that will refer to the document. The additional principles that come with open data principles should also be described by the policy document: a commitment to publishing data in a machine-readable format, making it available in multiple data formats (.txt, .csv, etc.), and including its metadata.

Data storage and usage

In the absence of a regime for data protection, it is absolutely necessary that a national policy on statistics provide positive mandates for the encryption of all digitally-stored personal and sensitive information collected through surveys. Even though the current draft of the policy mentions the need to protect confidential information, it sets no mandatory requirements on the Government to ensure the security of such information, especially on digital platforms.

Additionally, all transmission of potentially sensitive information should be done with the digital signatures of the employee/Department/Ministry authorising said transmission. This will ensure the integrity and authenticity of the information, and provide with an auditable trail of the information flowing between entities in the various bodies.

Data privacy

It is appreciable that Section 5.7.9 of the draft policy notes, “[a]ll statistical surveys represent a degree of privacy invasion, which is justified by the need for an alternative public good, namely information.” However, all statistical surveys may not be proportionate in their invasiveness, even if they might serve a legitimate public goal in the future.

The draft policy does not address how privacy concerns can be taken into account while designing the survey itself. A necessary outcome of the realisation of the possible privacy violations that may arise due to surveys is that all data collection be “minimally intrusive”, the data be securely stored (see previous comment section, ‘Data storage and usage’), and the surveyed users have control over the data even after they have parted with their information.

Since the policy deals extensively with the implementation of surveys, the following should details should be clearly laid out in the policy:

The extent to which an individual has control over the data they have provided to the surveying agency.
The means of redressal available to an individual who feels that his/her privacy has been violated through the publication of certain statistical information

Specific Comments

Section 5.1: Dichotomising official statistics as core statistics and other official statistics

Comments

The reasons for dichotomising official statistics has not been appropriately substantiated with evidence, considering the wide implications of policy proposals that arise from the definition of “core statistics.”

Firstly, the descriptions of what constitutes “core statistics” casts too wide a net by only having a single vague qualitative criterion, i.e. “national importance.” All the other characteristics of the “core statistics” are either recommendations or requirements as to how the data will be handled and thus, pose no filter to what can constitute “core statistics.” The wide net is apparent in the fact that even the initially-proposed list of “core statistics”, given in Annex-II of the policy, has 120 categories of statistics.

Secondly, the policy does not provide reasons for why the characteristics of “core statistics”, highlighted in Section 5.1.5, should not apply to all official statistics at the various levels of Government. Therefore, the utility of the proposed dichotomy has also not been appropriately substantiated with illustrative examples of how “core statistics” should be considered qualitatively different from all official statistics.

This definition may lead to widespread disagreement between the States and the Centre, because Section 5.2 proposes that “core statistics” be added to the Union List of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. How the proposal may affect Centre-State responsibilities and relations pertaining to the collection and dissemination of statistics is elaborated in the next section.

Recommendations

The policy should not make a forced dichotomy between “core” and (ipso facto) non-core statistics. If a distinction is to be made for any reason(s) (such as for the purposes of delineating administrative roles) then such reason must be clearly defined, along with a clear explanation for why such a dichotomy would alleviate the described problem. The definitions should have tangible and unambiguous qualitative criteria.

Section 5.2: Constitutional amendment in respect of core statistics

Comments

The main proposal in the section is that the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution be amended to include “core statistics” in the Union List. This would give the Parliament the legislative competence to regulate the collection, storage, publication and sharing of such statistics, and the Central Government the power to enforce such legislation. Annex-II provides a tentative list of what would constitute “core statistics”; as is apparent, this list is wide-ranging and consists over 120 items which span the gamut of administrative responsibilities.

The list includes items such as “Landholdings Number, area, tenancy, land utilisation [...]” (S. No. 21), and “Statistics on land records” (S. No. 111) while most responsibilities of land regulation currently lie with the States. Similarly, items in Annex-II venture into statistics related to petroleum, water, agriculture, electricity, and industry; some of which are in the Concurrent or State List.

Statistics are metadata. There is no reason for why the administration of a particular subject lie with the State, and the regulation of data about such subject should lie with solely with the Central Government. It is important to recognise that adding the vaguely defined “core statistics” to the Union List, while enabling the Central Government to execute and plan such statistical exercises, will also prevent the States from enacting any legislation that regulates the management of statistics regarding its own administrative responsibilities.

The regulation of State Government records in general has been a contentious issue, and its place in our federal structure has been debated several times in the Parliament: the enactment of Public Records Act, 1993; the Right to Information Act, 2005; and the Collection of Statistics Act, 2008 are predicated on an assumption of such competence lying with the Parliament. However, it is equally important to recognise the role States have played in advancing transparency of Government records. For example, State-level Acts analogous to the Right to Information Act existed in Tamil Nadu and Karnataka before the Central Government enactment.

Recommendations

We strongly recommend that “statistics” be included in the Concurrent List, so that States are free to enact progressive legislation which advances transparency and accountability, and is not in derogation of Parliamentary legislation.

The Ministry should view this statistical policy document as a venue to set the minimum standards for the collection, handling and publication of statistics regarding its various functions. If the item is added to the Concurrent List, the States, through local legislation, will only have the power to improve on the Central standards since in a case of conflict, State-levels laws will be superseded by Parliamentary ones.

Section 5.3: Mechanism for regulating core statistics including auditing

Comments

The draft policy in Section 5.3.2 says, “[...] The Committee will be assisted by a Search Committee headed by the Vice-Chairperson of the NITI Aayog, in which a few technical experts could be included as Members.” The non-commital nature of the word ‘could’ in this statement detracts from the importance of having technical experts on this committee, by making their inclusion optional. The policy also does not specify who has the power to include technical experts as Members in the Search Committee. The statement should include either a minimum number of a specific number or members, and not use the non-committal word “could”

The National Statistical Development Council, as mentioned in 5.3.9, is supposed to “handle Centre-State relations in the areas of official statistics, the Council should be represented by Chief Ministers of six States to be nominated by the Centre” (Section 5.3.10). The draft does not elaborate on the rationale behind including just six states in the Council. It does not recommend any mechanism on the basis of which Centre will nominate states in the council.

Recommendations

The policy should recommend a minimum number of technical experts who must be included in the search committee, along with a clear process for how such members are to be appointed.

Additionally, the policy appropriately recognises the great diversity in India and the unique challenges faced by each State. Thus, each State has its unique requirements. Since in Section 5.3.11, the policy recommends that council meet at a low frequency of at least once in a year, all States should be represented in the Council.

Section 5.4: Official Machinery to implement directions on core statistics

Comments

The functions of Statistics Wing in the MOSPI, laid out in Section 5.4.7, include advisory functions which overlap with functions of National Statistical Commission (NSC) mentioned in Section 5.3.5. Some regulatory functions of Statistics Wing, like “conducting quality checks and auditing of statistical surveys/data sets”, overlap with the regulatory functions of NSC mentioned in Section 5.3.7.

In section 5.3.1, the draft policy explicitly mentions that “what is feasible and desirable is that production of official statistics should continue with the Government, whereas the related regulatory and advisory functions could be kept outside the Government”. But Statistics Wing is a part of the government and it also has regulatory and advisory functions. It will adversely affect the power of NSC as an autonomous body.

There are inconsistencies in the draft-policy regarding the importance and need of a decentralized statistical system. In section 3 [Objectives], it has been emphasized that the Indian Statistical System shall function within decentralized structure of the system. But, in section 5.4.15, the draft says that decentralized statistical system poses a variety of problems, and advocates for a unified statistical system. Again, in section 5.15, draft emphasizes the development of sub-national statistical systems. These views are inconsistent and create confusion regarding the nature of statistical system that policy wants to pursue.

Recommendations

The functions of the NSC should be kept in its exclusive domain. Any such overlapping functions should be allocated to one agency taking into consideration the Fundamental Principles on Official Statistics.

The inconsistencies regarding the decentralisation philosophy of the statistical system should be addressed.

Section 5.5: Identifying statistical products required through committees

Comments

While Section 5.5.2 recognises data confidentiality as a goal for statistical coordination, it does not take into account the violation of privacy that might occur due to the sharing of data. For example, a certain individual might agree to share personal information with a particular Ministry, but have apprehensions about it being shared with other Ministries or private parties.

Recommendations

We recommend that point 4 in Section 5.5.2 be read as, “enabling sharing of data without compromising the privacy of individuals and the confidentiality/security of data.”The value of of the individual privacy stems from both the recent Supreme Court judgment that affirmed privacy as a Fundamental Right, and also Principle 6 of the of the Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics. Realising privacy as a goal in this section will add a realm of individual control that is already articulated in Section 5.7.9.

Annex-VII: Guidelines on Outsourcing statistical activities

Comments

Section 6 defines “sensitive information” in an all-inclusive manner and does not leave space for further inclusion of any information that may be interpreted as sensitive. For example, biometric data has not been listed as “sensitive information”.

Section 9.1, draft says, “[t]he identity of the Government agency and the Contractor may be made available to informants at the time of collection of data”. It is imperative that informants have the right to verify the identity of the Government agency and the Contractor before parting with their personal information.

Recommendations

The definition of “sensitive information” should be broad-based with scope for further inclusion of any kind of data that may be deemed “sensitive.”

Section 9.1 must mandate that the identity of the Government agency and the Contractor be made available to informants at the time of collection of data.

Section 9.6 can be redrafted to state that each informant must be informed of the manner in which the informant could access the data collected from the informant in a statistical project, as also of the measures taken to deny access on that information to others, except in the cases specified by the policy.

Section 10.2 can be improved to state that if information exists in a physical form that makes the removal of the identity of informants impracticable (e.g. on paper), the information should be recorded in another medium and the original records must be destroyed.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-draft-national-policy-on-official-statistics

Comments on the Report of the Committee on Digital Payments (December 2016)

Sumandro Chattapadhyay and Amber Sinha — 2017-01-12T12:32:22Z

The Committee on Digital Payments constituted by the Ministry of Finance and chaired by Ratan P. Watal, Principal Advisor, NITI Aayog, submitted its report on the "Medium Term Recommendations to Strengthen Digital Payments Ecosystem" on December 09, 2016. The report was made public on December 27, and comments were sought from the general public. Here are the comments submitted by the Centre for Internet and Society.

1. Preliminary

1.1. This submission presents comments by the Centre for Internet and Society (“CIS”) [1] in response to the report of the Committee on Digital Payments, chaired by Mr. Ratan P. Watal, Principal Advisor, NITI Aayog, and constituted by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India (“the report”) [2].

2. The Centre for Internet and Society

2.1. The Centre for Internet and Society, CIS, is a non-profit organisation that undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives. The areas of focus include digital accessibility for persons with diverse abilities, access to knowledge, intellectual property rights, openness (including open data, free and open source software, open standards, and open access), internet governance, telecommunication reform, digital privacy, and cyber-security.

2.2. CIS is not an expert organisation in the domain of banking in general and payments in particular. Our expertise is in matters of internet and communication governance, data privacy and security, and technology regulation. We deeply appreciate and are most inspired by the Ministry of Finance’s decision to invite entities from both the sectors of finance and information technology. This submission is consistent with CIS’ commitment to safeguarding general public interest, and the interests and rights of various stakeholders involved, especially the citizens and the users. CIS is thankful to the Ministry of Finance for this opportunity to provide a general response on the report.

3. Comments

3.1. CIS observes that the decision by the Government of India to withdraw the legal tender character of the old high denomination banknotes (that is, Rs. 500 Rs. 1,000 notes), declared on November 08, 2016 [3], have generated unprecedented data about the user base and transaction patterns of digital payments systems in India, when pushed to its extreme use due to the circumstances. The majority of this data is available with the National Payments Corporation of India and the Reserve Bank of India. CIS requests the authorities concerned to consider opening up this data for analysis and discussion by public at large and experts in particular, before any specific policy and regulatory decisions are taken towards advancing digital payments proliferation in India. This is a crucial opportunity for the Ministry of Finance to embrace (open) data-driven regulation and policy-making.

3.2. While the report makes a reference to the European General Data Protection Directive, it does not make a reference to any substantive provisions in the Directive which may be relevant to digital payments. Aside from the recommendation that privacy protections around the purpose limitation principle be relaxed to ensure that payment service providers be allowed to process data to improve fraud monitoring and anti-money laundering services, the report is silent on significant privacy and data protection concerns posed by digital payments services. CIS strongly warns that the existing data protection and security regulations under Information Technology (Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data or information), Rules are woefully inadequate in their scope and application to effectively deal with potential privacy concerns posed by digital payments applications and services. Some key privacy issues that must be addressed either under a comprehensive data protection legislation or a sector specific financial regulation are listed below. The process of obtaining consent must be specific, informed and unambiguous and through a clear affirmative action by the data subject based upon a genuine choice provided along with an option to opt out at any stage. The data subjects should have clear and easily enforceable right to access and correct their data. Further, data subjects should have the right to restrict the usage of their data in circumstances such as inaccuracy of data, unlawful purpose and data no longer required in order to fulfill the original purpose.

3.3. The initial recommendation of the report is to “[m]ake regulation of payments independent from the function of central banking” (page 22). This involves a fundamental transformation of the payment and settlement system in India and its regulation. We submit that a decision regarding transformation of such scale and implications is taken after a more comprehensive policy discussion, especially involving a wider range of stakeholders. The report itself notes that “[d]igital payments also have the potential of becoming a gateway to other financial services such as credit facilities for small businesses and low-income households” (page 32). Thus, a clear functional, and hence regulatory, separation between the (digital) payments industry and the lending/borrowing industry may be either effective or desirable. Global experience tells us that digital transactions data, along with other alternative data, are fast becoming the basis of provision of financial and other services, by both banking and non-banking (payments) companies. We appeal to the Ministry of Finance to adopt a comprehensive and concerted approach to regulating, enabling competition, and upholding consumers’ rights in the banking sector at large.

3.4. The report recognises “banking as an activity is separate from payments, which is more of a technology business” (page 154). Contemporary banking and payment businesses are both are primarily technology businesses where information technology particularly is deployed intimately to extract, process, and drive asset management decisions using financial transaction data. Further, with payment businesses (such as, pre-paid instruments) offering return on deposited money via other means (such as, cashbacks), and potentially competing and/or collaborating with established banks to use financial transaction data to drive lending decisions, including but not limited to micro-loans, it appears unproductive to create a separation between banking as an activity and payments as an activity merely in terms of the respective technology intensity of these sectors. CIS firmly recommends that regulation of these financial services and activities be undertaken in a technology-agnostic manner, and similar regulatory regimes be deployed on those entities offering similar services irrespective of their technology intensity or choice.

3.5. The report highlights two major shortcomings of the current regulatory regime for payments. Firstly “the law does not impose any obligation on the regulator to promote competition and innovation in the payments market” (page 153). It appears to us that the regulator’s role should not be to promote market expansion and innovation but to ensure and oversee competition. We believe that the current regulator should focus on regulating the existing market, and the work of the expansion of the digital payments market in particular and the digital financial services market in general be carried out by another government agency, as it creates conflict of interest for the regulator otherwise. Secondly, the report mentions that Payment and Settlement Systems Act does not “focus the regulatory attention on the need for consumer protection in digital payments” and then it notes that a “provision was inserted to protect funds collected from customers” in 2015 (page 153). This indicates that the regulator already has the responsibility to ensure consumer protection in digital payments. The purview and modalities of how this function of course needs discussion and changes with the growth in digital payments.

3.6. The report identifies the high cost of cash as a key reason for the government’s policy push towards digital payments. Further, it mentions that a “sample survey conducted in 2014 across urban and rural neighbourhoods in Delhi and Meerut, shows that despite being keenly aware of the costs associated with transacting in cash, most consumers see three main benefits of cash, viz. freedom of negotiations, faster settlements, and ensuring exact payments” (page 30). It further notes that “[d]igital payments have significant dependencies upon power and telecommunications infrastructure. Therefore, the roll out of robust and user friendly digital payments solutions to unelectrified areas/areas without telecommunications network coverage, remains a challenge.” CIS much appreciates the discussion of the barriers to universal adoption and rollout of digital payments in the report, and appeals to the Ministry of Finance to undertake a more comprehensive study of the key investments required by the Government of India to ensure that digital payments become ubiquitously viable as well as satisfy the demands of a vast range of consumers that India has. The estimates about investment required to create a robust digital payment infrastructure, cited in the report, provide a great basis for undertaking studies such as these.

3.7. CIS is very encouraged to see the report highlighting that “[w]ith the rising number of users of digital payment services, it is absolutely necessary to develop consumer confidence on digital payments. Therefore, it is essential to have legislative safeguards to protect such consumers in-built into the primary law.” We second this recommendation and would like to add further that financial transaction data is governed under a common data protection and privacy regime, without making any differences between data collected by banking and non-banking entities.

3.8. We are, however, very discouraged to see the overtly incorrect use of the word “Open Access” in this report in the context of a payment system disallowing service when the client wants to transact money with a specific entity [4]. This is not an uncommon anti-competitive measure adopted by various platform players and services providers so as to disallow users from using competing products (such as, not allowing competing apps in the app store controlled by one software company). The term “Open Access” is not only the appropriate word to describe the negation of such anti-competitive behaviour, its usage in this context undermines its accepted meaning and creates confusion regarding the recommendation being proposed by the report. The closest analogy to the recommendation of the report would perhaps be with the principle of “network neutrality” that stands for the network provider not discriminating between data packets being processed by them, either in terms of price or speed.

3.9. A major recommendation by the report involves creation of “a fund from savings generated from cash-less transactions … by the Central Government,” which will use “the trinity of JAM (Jan Dhan, Adhaar, Mobile) [to] link financial inclusion with social protection, contributing to improved Social and Financial Security and Inclusion of vulnerable groups/ communities” (page 160-161). This amounts to making Aadhaar a mandatory ID for financial inclusion of citizens, especially the marginal and vulnerable ones, and is in direct contradiction to the government’s statements regarding the optional nature of the Aadhaar ID, as well as the orders by the Supreme Court on this topic.

3.10. The report recommends that “Aadhaar should be made the primary identification for KYC with the option of using other IDs for people who have not yet obtained Aadhaar” (page 163) and further that “Aadhaar eKYC and eSign should be a replacement for paper based, costly, and shared central KYC registries” (page 162). Not only these measures would imply making Aadhaar a mandatory ID for undertaking any legal activity in the country, they assume that the UIDAI has verified and audited the personal documents submitted by Aadhaar number holders during enrollment. A mandate for replacement of the paper-based central KYC agencies will only remove a much needed redundancy in the the identity verification infrastructure of the government.

3.11. The report suggests that “[t]ransactions which are permitted in cash without KYC should also be permitted on prepaid wallets without KYC” (page 164-165). This seems to negate the reality that physical verification of a person remains one of the most authoritative identity verification process for a natural person, apart from DNA testing perhaps. Thus, establishing full equivalency of procedure between a presence-less transaction and one involving a physically present person making the payment will only amount to removal of relatively greater security precautions for the former, and will lead to possibilities of fraud.

3.12. In continuation with the previous point, the report recommends promotion of “Aadhaar based KYC where PAN has not been obtained” and making of “quoting Aadhaar compulsory in income tax return for natural persons” (page 163). Both these measures imply a replacement of the PAN by Aadhaar in the long term, and a sharp reduction in growth of new PAN holders in the short term. We appeal for this recommendation to be reconsidered as integration of all functionally separate national critical information infrastructures (such as PAN and Aadhaar) into a single unified and centralised system (such as Aadhaar) engenders massive national and personal security threats.

3.13. The report suggest the establishment of “a ranking and reward framework” to recognise and encourage for the best performing state/district/agency in the proliferation of digital payments. It appears to us that creation of such a framework will only lead to making of an environment of competition among these entities concerned, which apart from its benefits may also have its costs. For example, the incentivisation of quick rollout of digital payment avenues by state government and various government agencies may lead to implementation without sufficient planning, coordination with stakeholders, and precautions regarding data security and privacy. The provision of central support for digital payments should be carried out in an environment of cooperation and not competition.

3.14. CIS welcomes the recommendation by the report to generate greater awareness about cost of cash, including by ensuring that “large merchants including government agencies should account and disclose the cost of cash collection and cash payments incurred by them periodically” (page 164). It, however, is not clear to whom such periodic disclosures should be made. We would like to add here that the awareness building must simultaneously focus on making public how different entities shoulder these costs. Further, for reasons of comparison and evidence-driven policy making, it is necessary that data for equivalent variables are also made open for digital payments - the total and disaggregate cost, and what proportion of these costs are shouldered by which entities.

3.15. The report acknowledges that “[t]oday, most merchants do not accept digital payments” and it goes on to recommend “that the Government should seize the initiative and require all government agencies and merchants where contracts are awarded by the government to provide at-least one suitable digital payment option to its consumers and vendors” (page 165). This requirement for offering digital payment option will only introduce an additional economic barrier for merchants bidding for government contracts. We appeal to the Ministry of Finance to reconsider this approach of raising the costs of non-digital payments to incentivise proliferation of digital payments, and instead lower the existing economic and other barriers to digital payments that keep the merchants away. The adoption of digital payments must not lead to increasing costs for merchants and end-users, but must decrease the same instead.

3.16. As the report was submitted on December 09, 2016, and was made public only on December 27, 2016, it would have been much appreciated if at least a month-long window was provided to study and comment on the report, instead of fifteen days. This is especially crucial as the recently implemented demonetisation and the subsequent banking and fiscal policy decisions taken by the government have rapidly transformed the state and dynamics of the payments system landscape in India in general, and digital payments in particular.

Endnotes

[1] See: http://cis-india.org/.

[2] See: http://finmin.nic.in/reports/Note-watal-report.pdf and http://finmin.nic.in/reports/watal_report271216.pdf.

[3] See: http://finmin.nic.in/cancellation_high_denomination_notes.pdf.

[4] Open Access refers to “free and unrestricted online availability” of scientific and non-scientific literature. See: http://www.budapestopenaccessinitiative.org/read.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-on-the-report-of-the-committee-on-digital-payments-dec-2016

Comments by the Centre for Internet and Society on the Report of the Committee on Medium Term Path on Financial Inclusion

vipul — 2016-03-01T13:53:38Z

Apart from item-specific suggestions, CIS would like to make one broad comment with regard to the suggestions dealing with linking of Aadhaar numbers with bank accounts. Aadhaar is increasingly being used by the government in various departments as a means to prevent fraud, however there is a serious dearth of evidence to suggest that Aadhaar linkage actually prevents leakages in government schemes. The same argument would be applicable when Aadhaar numbers are sought to be utilized to prevent leakages in the banking sector.

The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) is a non-governmental organization which undertakes interdisciplinary research on internet and digital technologies from policy and academic perspectives.

In the course of its work CIS has also extensively researched and witten about the Aadhaar Scheme of the Government of India, specially from a privacy and technical point of view. CIS was part of the Group of Experts on Privacy constituted by the Planning Commission under the chairmanship of Justice AP Shah Committee and was instrumental in drafting a major part of the report of the Group. In this background CIS would like to mention that it is neither an expert on banking policy in general nor wishes to comment upon the purely banking related recommendations of the Committee. We would like to limit our recommendations to the areas in which we have some expertise and would therefore be commenting only on certain Recommendations of the Committee.

Before giving our individual comments on the relevant recommendations, CIS would like to make one broad comment with regard to the suggestions dealing with linking of Aadhaar numbers with bank accounts. Aadhaar is increasingly being used by the government in various departments as a means to prevent fraud, however there is a serious dearth of evidence to suggest that Aadhaar linkage actually prevents leakages in government schemes. The same argument would be applicable when Aadhaar numbers are sought to be utilized to prevent leakages in the banking sector.

Another problem with linking bank accounts with Aadhaar numbers, even if it is not mandatory, is that when the RBI issues an advisory to (optionally) link Aadhaar numbers with bank accounts, a number of banks may implement the advisory too strictly and refuse service to customers (especially marginal customers) whose bank accounts are not linked to their Aadhaar numbers, perhaps due to technical problems in the registration procedure, thereby denying those individuals access to the banking sector, which is contrary to the aims and objectives of the Committee and the stated policy of the RBI to improve access to banking.

Individual Comments

Recommendation 1.4 - Given the predominance of individual account holdings, the Committee recommends that a unique biometric identifier such as Aadhaar should be linked to each individual credit account and the information shared with credit information companies. This will not only be useful in identifying multiple accounts, but will also help in mitigating the overall indebtedness of individuals who are often lured into multiple borrowings without being aware of its consequences.

CIS Comment: The discussion of the committee before making this recommendation revolves around the total incidence of indebtedness in rural areas and their Debt-to-Asset ratio representing payment capacity. However, the committee has not discussed any evidence which indicates that borrowing from multiple banks leads to greater indebtedness for individual account holders in the rural sector. Without identifying the problem through evidence the Committee has suggested linking bank accounts with Aadhaar numbers as a solution.

Recommendation 2.2 - On the basis of cross-country evidence and our own experience, the Committee is of the view that to translate financial access into enhanced convenience and usage, there is a need for better utilization of the mobile banking facility and the maximum possible G2P payments, which would necessitate greater engagement by the government in the financial inclusion drive.

CIS Comment: The drafting of the recommendation suggests that RBI is batting for the DBT rather than the subsidy model. However an examination of the discussion in the report suggests that all that the Committee has not discussed or examined the subsidy model vis-à-vis the direct benefit transfer (DBT) model here (though it does recommend DBT in the chapter on G-2-P payments), but only is trying to say is that where government to people money transfer has to take place, it should take place using mobile banking, payment wallets or other such technologies, which have been known to be successful in various countries across the world.

Recommendation 3.1 - The Committee recommends that in order to increase formal credit supply to all agrarian segments, the digitization of land records should be taken up by the states on a priority basis.

Recommendation 3.2 - In order to ensure actual credit supply to the agricultural sector, the Committee recommends the introduction of Aadhaar-linked mechanism for Credit Eligibility Certificates. For example, in Andhra Pradesh, the revenue authorities issue Credit Eligibility Certificates to Tenant Farmers (under ‘Andhra Pradesh Land Licensed Cultivators Act No 18 of 2011'). Such tenancy /lease certificates, while protecting the owner’s rights, would enable landless cultivators to obtain loans. The Reserve Bank may accordingly modify its regulatory guidelines to banks to directly lend to tenants / lessees against such credit eligibility certificates.

CIS Comment: The Committee in its discussion before the recommendation 3.2 has discussed the problems faced by landless farmers, however there is no discussion or evidence which suggests that an Aadhaar linked Credit Eligibility Certificate is the best solution, or even a solution to the problem. The concern being expressed here is not with the system of a Credit Eligibility Certificate, but with the insistence on linking it to an Aadhaar number, and whether the system can be put in place without linking the same to an Aadhaar number.

Recommendation 6.11 - Keeping in view the indebtedness and rising delinquency, the Committee is of the view that the credit history of all SHG members would need to be created, linking it to individual Aadhaar numbers. This will ensure credit discipline and will also provide comfort to banks.

CIS Comment: There is no discussion in the Report on the reasons for increase in indebtedness of SHGs. While the recommendation of creating credit histories for SHGs is laudable and very welcome, however there is no logical reason that has been brought out in the Report as to why the same needs to be linked to individual Aadhaar numbers and how such linkage will solve any problems.

Recommendation 6.13 - The Committee recommends that bank credit to MFIs should be encouraged. The MFIs must provide credit information on their borrowers to credit bureaus through Aadhaar-linked unique identification of individual borrowers.

CIS Comment: Since the discussion before this recommendation clearly indicates multiple lending practices as one of the problems in the Microfinance sector and also suggests better credit information of borrowers as a possible solution, therefore this recommendation per se, seems sound. However, we would still like to point out that the RBI may think of alternative means to get borrower credit history rather than relying upon just the Aadhaar numbers.

Recommendation 7.3 - Considering the widespread availability of mobile phones across the country, the Committee recommends the use of application-based mobiles as PoS for creating necessary infrastructure to support the large number of new accounts and cards issued under the PMJDY. Initially, the FIF can be used to subsidize the associated costs. This will also help to address the issue of low availability of PoS compared to the number of merchant outlets in the country. Banks should encourage merchants across geographies to adopt such applicationbased mobile as a PoS through some focused education and PoS deployment drives.

Recommendation 7.5 - The Committee recommends that the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) should ensure faster development of a multi-lingual mobile application for customers who use non-smart phones, especially for users of NUUP; this will address the issue of linguistic diversity and thereby promote its popularization and quick adoption.

Recommendation 7.8 - The Committee recommends that pre-paid payment instrument (PPI) interoperability may be allowed for non-banks to facilitate ease of access to customers and promote wider spread of PPIs across the country. It should however require non-bank PPI operators to enhance their customer grievance redressal mechanism to deal with any issues thereof.

Recommendation 7.9 - The Committee is of the view that for non-bank PPIs, a small-value cashout may be permitted to incentivize usage with the necessary safeguards including adequate KYC and velocity checks.

CIS Comments: While CIS supports the effort to use technology and mobile phones to increase banking penetration and improve access to the formal financial sector for rural and semi-rural areas, sufficient security mechanisms should be put in place while rolling out these services keeping in mind the low levels of education and technical sophistication that are prevalent in rural and semi-rural areas.

Recommendation 8.1 - The Committee recommends that the deposit accounts of beneficiaries of government social payments, preferably all deposits accounts across banks, including the ‘inprinciple’ licensed payments banks and small finance banks, be seeded with Aadhaar in a timebound manner so as to create the necessary eco-system for cash transfer. This could be complemented with the necessary changes in the business correspondent (BC) system (see Chapter 6 for details) and increased adoption of mobile wallets to bridge the ‘last mile’ of service delivery in a cost-efficient manner at the convenience of the common person. This would also result in significant cost reductions for the government besides promoting financial inclusion.

CIS Comment: While the report of the Committee has already given several examples of how cash transfer directly into the bank accounts (rather than requiring the beneficiaries to be at a particular place at a particular time) could be more efficient as well as economical, the Committee is making the same point again here under the chapter that deals specifically with government to person payments. However even before this recommendation, there has been no discussion as to the need for linking or “seeding” the deposit accounts of the beneficiaries with Aadhaar numbers, let alone a discussion of how it would solve any problems.

Recommendation 10.6 - Given the focus on technology and the increasing number of customer complaints relating to debit/credit cards, the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) may be invited to SLBC meetings. They may particularly take up issues of Aadhaar-linkage in bank and payment accounts.

CIS Comment: There is no discussion on why this recommendation has been made, more particularly; there is no discussion at all on why issues of Aadhaar linkage in bank and payment accounts need to be taken up at all.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/comments-by-the-centre-for-internet-and-society-on-the-report-of-the-committee-on-medium-term-path-on-financial-inclusion

Comment by CIS at ACE on Presentation on French Charter on the Fight against Cyber-Counterfeiting

pranesh — 2011-12-01T11:59:45Z

The seventh session of the World Intellectual Property Organization's Advisory Committee on Enforcement is being held in Geneva on November 30 and December 1, 2011. Pranesh Prakash responded to a presentation by Prof. Pierre Sirinelli of the École de droit de la Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 on 'The French Charter on the Fight against Cyber-Counterfeiting of December 16, 2009' with this comment.

Thank you, Chair. I speak on behalf of the Centre for Internet and Society. First, I would like to congratulate you on your re-election.

And I would like to congratulate Prof. Sirenelli on his excellent presentation.

I would like to flag a few points, though:

One of the benefits of normal laws, as opposed to the soft/plastic laws, which he champions, is that normal laws are bound by procedures established by law, due process requirements, and principles of natural justice. Unfortunately, the soft/plastic laws, which in essence are private agreements, are not.
The report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Expression and Opinion made it clear in his report to the UN Human Rights Council that the Internet is now an intergral part of citizens exercising their right of freedom of speech under national constitutions and under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That report highlights that many initiatives on copyright infringement, including that of the French government with HADOPI and the UK, actually contravene the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The right of privacy is also flagged by many as something that will have to be compromised if such private enforcement of copyright is encouraged.

I'd like to know Prof. Sirinelli's views on these three issues: due process, right of freedom of speech, and the right to privacy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/ace-7-french-charter-cis-comment

COAI, Centre for Internet & Society to hold pan-India meetings on privacy issues

praskrishna — 2014-07-07T07:37:34Z

In order to discuss possible legal frameworks to enable surveillance of voice and data communications in India, the Cellular Operators' Association of India (COAI) along with the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) will hold seven roundtable meetings across the country in the coming weeks on privacy and surveillance issues.

Originally published by IANS on July 4, 2014 the news was mirrored in the Times of India, NDTV, Business Standard, Economic Times, and World News on the same day. Bhairav Acharya gave his inputs.

The recommendations and dialogues from each of these roundtables will be compiled and submitted to the relevant ministries of the government, a statement issued by COAI said here on Friday.

The roundtable meetings will take place in Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Chennai and twice in New Delhi.

These roundtables are closed-door meetings involving multiple stakeholders such as the industry leaders, policy makers, and experts from the legal fraternity and civil society.

In the era of freedom, when data connectivity via the internet, has emerged as one of the most powerful tools for communications, infringement of customer privacy by government agencies through telecom networks have forced the industry to initiate discussions on the international best practices on communications privacy and surveillance, and the relevant Indian jurisprudence.

"COAI, with the Centre for Internet and Society has taken this initiative by bringing the relevant stakeholders on a common platform to discuss the matter to arrive at an acceptable conclusion," COAI Director General Rajan S Mathews said.

According to Bhairav Acharya, who advises the CIS: "Legal reform is necessary to identify the limits of permissible surveillance, the protection of privacy, the procedure of intercepting communications, the expectations of service providers, and freedom of all Indians. The law must keep up with technological advancements to create a balanced, proportionate and fair mechanism to enable and regulate surveillance. This will serve India’s national interest."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/ians-july-4-2014-coai-cis-to-hold-pan-india-meetings-on-privacy-issues

Clause 12 Of The Data Protection Bill And Digital Healthcare: A Case Study

amber — 2022-03-01T15:07:44Z

In light of the state’s emerging digital healthcare apparatus, how does Clause 12 alter the consent and purpose limitation model?

The blog post was published in Medianama on February 21, 2022. This is the second in a two-part series by Amber Sinha.

In the previous post, I looked at provisions on non-consensual data processing for state functions under the most recent version of recommendations by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on India’s Data Protection Bill (DPB). The true impact of these provisions can only be appreciated in light of ongoing policy developments and real-life implications.

To appreciate the significance of the dilutions in Clause 12, let us consider the Indian state’s range of schemes promoting digital healthcare. In July 2018, NITI Aayog, a central government policy think tank in India released a strategy and approach paper (Strategy Paper) on the formulation of the National Health Stack which envisions the creation of a federated application programming interface (API)-enabled health information ecosystem. While the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has focused on the creation of Electronic Health Records (EHR) Standards for India during the last few years and also identified a contractor for the creation of a centralised health information platform (IHIP), this Strategy Paper advocates a completely different approach, which is described as a Personal Health Records (PHR) framework. In 2021, the National Digital Health Mission (NDHM) was launched under which a citizen shall have the option to obtain a digital health ID. A digital health ID is a unique ID and will carry all health records of a person.

A Stack Model for Big Data Ecosystem in Healthcare

A stack model as envisaged in the Strategy Paper, consists of several layers of open APIs connected to each other, often tied together by a unique health identifier. The open nature of APIs has the advantage that it allows public and private actors to build solutions on top of it, which are interoperable with all parts of the stack. It is however worth considering both the ‘openness’ and the role that the state plays in it.

Even though the APIs are themselves open, they are a part of a pre-decided technological paradigm, built by private actors and blessed by the state. Even though innovators can build on it, the options available to them are limited by the information architecture created by the stack model. When such a technological paradigm is created for healthcare reform and health data, the stack model poses additional challenges. By tying the stack model to the unique identity, without appropriate processes in place for access control, siloed information, and encrypted communication, the stack model poses tremendous privacy and security concerns. The broad language under Clause 12 of the DPB needs to be looked at in this context.

Clause 12 allows non-consensual processing of personal data where it is necessary “for the performance of any function of the state authorised by law” in order to provide a service or benefit from the State. In the previous post, I had highlighted the import of the use of only ‘necessity’ to the exclusion of ‘proportionality’. Now, we need to consider its significance in light of the emerging digital healthcare apparatus being created by the state.

The National Health Stack and National Digital Health Mission together envision an intricate system of data collection and exchange which in a regulatory vacuum would ensure unfettered access to sensitive healthcare data for both the state and private actors registered with the platforms. The Stack framework relies on repositories where data may be accessed from multiple nodes within the system. Importantly, the Strategy Paper also envisions health data fiduciaries to facilitate consent-driven interaction between entities that generate the health data and entities that want to consume the health records for delivering services to the individual. The cast of characters involve the National Health Authority, health care providers and insurers who access the National Health Electronic Registries, unified data from different programmes such as National Health Resource Repository (NHRR), NIN database, NIC and the Registry of Hospitals in Network of Insurance (ROHINI), private actors such as Swasth, iSpirt who assist the Mission as volunteers. The currency that government and private actors are interested in is data.

The promised benefits of healthcare data in an anonymised and aggregate form range from Disease Surveillance to Pharmacovigilance as well as Health Schemes Management Systems and Nutrition Management, benefits which have only been more acutely emphasised during the pandemic. However, the pandemic has also normalised the sharing of sensitive healthcare data with a variety of actors, without much thinking on much-needed data minimisation practises.

The potential misuses of healthcare data include greater state surveillance and control, predatory and discriminatory practices by private actors which rely on Clause 12 to do away with even the pretense of informed consent so long as the processing of data is deemed necessary by the state and its private sector partners to provide any service or benefit.

Subclause (e) in Clause 12, which was added in the last version of the Bill drafted by MeitY and has been retained by the JPC, allows processing wherever it is necessary for ‘any measures’ to provide medical treatment or health services during an epidemic, outbreak or threat to public health. Yet again, the overly-broad language used here is designed to ensure that any annoyances of informed consent can be easily brushed aside wherever the state intends to take any measures under any scheme related to public health.

Effectively, how does the framework under Clause 12 alter the consent and purpose limitation model? Data protection laws introduce an element of control by tying purpose limitation to consent. Individuals provide consent to specified purposes, and data processors are required to respect that choice. Where there is no consent, the purposes of data processing are sought to be limited by the necessity principle in Clause 12. The state (or authorised parties) must be able to demonstrate necessity to the exercise of state function, and data must only be processed for those purposes which flow out of this necessity. However, unlike the consent model, this provides an opportunity to keep reinventing purposes for different state functions.

In the absence of a data protection law, data collected by one agency is shared indiscriminately with other agencies and used for multiple purposes beyond the purpose for which it was collected. The consent and purpose limitation model would have addressed this issue. But, by having a low threshold for non-consensual processing under Clause 12, this form of data processing is effectively being legitimised.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/medianama-february-21-2022-amber-sinha-data-protection-bill-digital-healthcare-case-study

Civil Society Pushes for Privacy Panel

praskrishna — 2014-05-27T11:39:20Z

The article was published in the Times of India on May 6, 2014. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

Civil society organizations are pushing for a 'privacy commission' to provide protection to individuals from illegal breach of their privacy, with guidelines imposing penal sanction against the violators. This assumes significance

This assumes significance at a time when the Centre has decided to set up a judicial panel to probe the snoopgate scandal wherein the BJP government in Gujarat was allegedly involved in illegal surveillance of a woman architect and especially when the Right to Privacy Bill is pending in Parliament.

However, industry consortia, including CII and FICCI, prefer lesser regulation, though calling for a cautious approach.

Among civil society organizations pressing for a stringent privacy bill is the International Centre for Free and Open Source Software (ICFOSS), the only representative from Kerala to attend the NETmundial conference held recently in Brazil. The meet focused on privacy issues to ensure basic human rights, including freedom of expression.

NETmundial is the first step towards pushing for a privacy law against the snooping and spying on individuals by those in power, including agencies within and outside the country Privacy guidelines should be clear as to what data can be collected without infringing on the dignity of an individual as 'data' represents the duration of a call, while 'metadata' reveals the content of the caH," said ICFOSS director SatishBabu.

Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), another NETmundial participant, also stands for a strong privacy law. "The two-day conference that concluded on April 24 was a baby step towards a privacy law with a road map for global internet governance. It is the first step towards a multi-stakeholder model offering an equal footing for all civil society organizations, academia, government, private sector and the UN fora," said CIS executive director Sunil Abraham

“We are pushing for a privacy law in the country aimed at national privacy regulation and constituting a privacy commission on the lines of the information commission," he added.

Click to read the full story

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/the-times-of-india-may-6-2014-laxmi-ajai-prasanna-civil-society-pushes-for-privacy-panel

Citizens’ Draft Privacy Bill Seeks To Revolutionise Data Collection, Storage In India

Admin — 2018-06-11T02:47:46Z

A draft privacy bill proposes sweeping reforms to the way personal data is collected, processed and stored in India.

The blog post by Arpan Chaturvedi was published in Bloomberg Quint on June 9, 2018. CIS research was quoted.

Titled Indian Privacy Code, 2018, the draft proposes that “all data collected, processed and stored by data controllers and data processors prior to the date on which this Act comes into force shall be destroyed within a period of two years from the date on which this Act comes into force”.

The draft has been put together by a group of lawyers and policy analysts and uploaded on the website of ‘Save our Privacy’ — a public initiative to put forth a model law on data protection. The initiative is backed by the India Privacy Foundation.

No person, including a data controller and data processor, shall collect any personal data without obtaining the consent of the data subject to whom it pertains, the draft bill says. Collection of personal data without consent can happen only when:

It’s necessary for the provision of an emergency medical service.
Prevent, investigate or prosecute a cognizable offence.
Exempted by a privacy commission that the draft seeks to institute

Also, the draft bill proposes that no person shall store any personal data for a period longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose for which it was collected or received. The same applies to the processing of personal data.

The draft bill has been submitted to the Justice Sri Krishna Committee — which will deliberate on a data-protection framework for the country. The committee’s first draft is likely to be submitted this month.

The bill prescribes punishment for offenses related to interception of communication, surveillance, abetment, repeat offenders and offenses by companies.

The bill, according to information on the website, is based on seven principles, foremost of which is the importance of individual rights. The others are:

A data protection law must be based on privacy principles and guidelines discussed in the report of Justice AP Shah Committee of Experts; the Supreme Court judgement on Right to Privacy and European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation.
A strong privacy commission must be created to enforce privacy principles. The commission should be granted wide powers of investigation, adjudication, rule-making and enforcement. The privacy commission must have jurisdiction over the government as well as private bodies.
The government must respect user privacy. The government cannot deny essential services to citizens if they choose not to share data with it. The draft says government withholding services on pretext of collection of information effectively amounts to “extortion of consent”.
A complete privacy code must come with surveillance reform. Even when individual interception and surveillance is carried out this should be severely limited in substance and practiced through procedural safeguards.
Strengthen the Right To Information Act and exempt information commissioners from interference or control by the privacy commissioner
International protection and harmonisation is a must to protect the open internet. The group suggests the law must have extraterritorial effect and apply to web services and platforms which are accessible in India and gather personal data of Indians.

The bill takes inspiration from the Privacy (Protection) Bill, 2013 which was drafted over a series of roundtable discussions and inputs conducted by the Centre for Internet and Society, Bengaluru.

The individuals who were involved in the drafting of the model law are Raman Jit Singh Cheema, Apar Gupta, Gautam Bhatia, Kritika Bhardwaj, Maansi Verma, Naman N Aggarwal, Praavita Kashyap, Prasanna S, Ujjwala Uppaluri, Vrinda Bhandari.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bloomberg-quint-june-9-2018-draft-bill-seeks-to-revolutionise-data-collection-storage-in-india

CIS Welcomes Standing Committee Report on IT Rules

pranesh — 2013-04-03T10:54:52Z

The Centre for Internet and Society welcomes the report by the Standing Committee on Subordinate Legislation, in which it has lambasted the government and has recommended that the government amend the Rules it passed in April 2011 under section 79 of the Information Technology Act.

Click to read the Parliamentary Standing Committee Report on the IT Rules. A modified version was published in CiOL on March 27, 2013.

These rules have been noted by many, including CIS, Software Freedom Law Centre, and Society for Knowledge Commons, and many eminent lawyers, as being unconstitutional. The Standing Committee, noting this, has asked the government to make changes to the Rules to ensure that the fundamental rights to freedom of speech and privacy are safeguarded, and that the principles of natural justice are respected when a person’s freedom of speech or privacy are curtailed.

Ambiguous and Over-reaching Language

The Standing Committee has noted the inherent ambiguity of words like "blasphemy", "disparaging", etc., which are used in the Intermediary Guidelines Rules, and has pointed out that unclear language can lead to harassment of people as has happened with Section 66A of the IT Act, and can lead to legitimate speech being removed. Importantly, the Standing Committee recognizes that many categories of speech prohibited by the Intermediary Guidelines Rules are not prohibited by any statute, and hence cannot be prohibited by the government through these Rules. Accordingly, the Standing Committee has asked the government to ensure "no new category of crimes or offences is created" by these Rules.

Government Confused Whether Rules Are Mandatory or Advisory

The Standing Committee further notes that there is a discrepancy in the government’s stand that the Intermediary Guidelines Rules are not mandatory, and are only "of advisory nature and self-regulation", and that "it is not mandatory for the Intermediary to disable the information, the rule does not lead to any kind of censorship". The Standing Committee points out the flaw in this, and notes that the language used in the rules is mandatory language (“shall act” within 36 hours). Thus, it rightly notes that there is a "need for clarity on the aforesaid contradiction". Further, it also notes that there is "there should be safeguards to protect against any abuse", since this is a form of private censorship by intermediaries."

Evidence Needed Against Foreign Websites

The government has told the Standing Committee that "foreign websites repeatedly refused to honour our laws", however, it has not provided any proof for this assertion. The government should make public all evidence that foreign web services are refusing to honour Indian laws, and should encourage a public debate on how we should tackle this problem in light of the global nature of the Internet.

Cyber Cafes Rules Violate Citizens’ Privacy

The Standing Committee also pointed out that the Cyber Cafe Rules violated citizens’ right to privacy in requiring that "screens of the computers installed other than in partitions and cubicles should face open space of the cyber café". Unfortunately, the Standing Committee did not consider the privacy argument against retention of extensive and intrusive logs. Under the Cyber Cafe Rules, cyber cafes are required to retain (for a minimum of one year) extensive logs, including that of "history of websites accessed using computer resource at cyber café" in such a manner that each website accessed can be linked to a person. The Committee only considered the argument that this would impose financial burdens on small cybercafes, and rejected that argument. CIS wishes the Committee had examined the provision on log maintenance on grounds of privacy as well."

Government’s Half-Truths

In one response, the government notes that "rules under Section 79 in particular have undergone scrutiny by High Courts in the country. Based on the Rules, the courts have given reliefs to a number of individuals and organizations in the country. No provision of the Rules notified under Sections 43A and 79 of the IT Act, 2000 have been held ultra vires."

What the government says is a half-truth. So far, courts have not struck down any of the IT Rules. But that is because none of the High Court cases in which the vires of the Rules have been challenged has concluded. So it is disingenuous of the government to claim that the Rule have "undergone scrutiny by High Courts". And in those cases where relief has been granted under the Intermediary Guidelines, the cases have been ex-parte or have been cases where the vires of the Rules have not been challenged. The government, if it wants to defend the Rules, should point out to any case in which the vires of the Rules have been upheld. Not a single court till date has declared the Rules to be constitutional when that question was before it.

Lack of Representation of Stakeholders in Policy Formulation

Lastly, the Standing Committee noted that it is not clear whether the Cyber Regulatory Advisory Committee (CRAC), which is responsible for policy guidance on the IT Act, has "members representing the interests of principally affected or having special knowledge of the subject matter as expressly stipulated in Section 88(2) of the IT Act". This is a problem that we at CIS also noted in November 2012, when the CRAC was reconstituted after having been defunct for more than a decade.

CIS hopes that the government finally takes note of the view of legal experts, the Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation, the Parliamentary motion against the Rules, and numerous articles and editorials in the press, and withdraws the Intermediary Guidelines Rules and the Cyber Cafe Rules, and instead replaces them with rules that do not infringe our constitutional rights.

The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit research organization that works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, and openness, and engages in academic research on digital natives and digital humanities. It was among the organizations that submitted evidence to the Standing Committee on Subordinate Legislation on the IT Rules.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cis-welcomes-standing-committee-report-on-it-rules