Centre for Internet and Society

India’s Digital ID Rollout Collides With Rickety Reality

praskrishna — 2017-01-17T15:35:04Z

India’s new digital identification system, years in the making and now being put into widespread use, has yet to deliver the new era of modern efficiency it promised for shop owner Om Prakash and customer Daya Chand.

The article by Gabriele Parussini was published in the Wall Street Journal on January 13, 2017. Hans Varghese Mathews was quoted.

At first, it drove both men up a tree.

The system, which relies on fingerprints and eye scans to eventually provide IDs to all 1.25 billion Indians, is also expected to improve the distribution of state food and fuel rations and eventually facilitate daily needs such as banking and buying train tickets.

But Mr. Prakash couldn’t confirm his customers’ identities until he dragged them to a Java plum tree in a corner of his village near New Delhi’s international airport. That was the only place to get the phone signal needed to tap into the government database.

“I hopped on a chair and put my finger in the machine,” said Mr. Chand, a 60-year-old taxi driver. Getting his state food ration “used to be much easier,” he said.

In a system so vast, even small glitches can leave millions of people empty-handed.

The government began building the system, called Aadhaar, or “foundation,” with great fanfare in 2009, led by a team of pioneering technology entrepreneurs. Since then, almost 90% of India’s population has been enrolled in what is now the world’s largest biometric data set.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who set aside early skepticism about the Aadhaar project after taking power in 2014, is betting that it can help India address critical problems such as poverty and corruption, while also saving money for the government.

But the technology is colliding with the rickety reality of India, where many people live off the grid or have fingerprints compromised by manual labor or age.

Panna Singh, a 55-year-old day laborer in the northwestern state of Rajasthan who breaks stones used to build walls, says the machine recognized his scuffed-up fingerprints only a couple of times.

“I’ve come twice today,” he said at a ration shop in the village of Devdungri. “That’s a full day of work, gone.”

Iris scans are meant to resolve situations where fingerprints don’t work, but shops don’t yet have iris scanners.

Ajay Bhushan Pandey, chief executive of the government agency that oversees Aadhaar, said kinks will be ironed out as the system is used, as is the case with software rollouts. It works 92% of the time, and that will rise to 95%, he said.

“On the scale of what [Aadhaar] has achieved, the rollout has been remarkably smooth,” said Nandan Nilekani, the Infosys co-founder who spearheaded the project. “I don’t see any issues that are disproportionate to the size of project.”

An Aadhaar ID is intended to be a great convenience, replacing the multitude of paperwork required by banks, merchants and government agencies. The benefits are only just beginning, backers say, as the biometric IDs are linked to programs and services.

But in rural areas, home to hundreds of millions of impoverished Indians dependent on subsidies, the impact of technical disruptions has already been evident.

After walking for two hours across rough underbrush in Rajasthan to get kerosene for the month, Hanja Devi left empty-handed because the machine couldn’t match her fingerprint with her Aadhaar number.

“It’s always so difficult” using the system, said Ms. Devi, who lives with her husband and a nephew on 1,500 rupees ($22) a month.

Ranjit Singh, who operates the shop, said five of the 37 customers before Ms. Devi also left the shop empty-handed, a failure rate of over 15%.

A shop manager in a neighboring village said identification had failed for a similar portion of his 500 customers.

Any biometric recognition system of Aadhaar’s size is bound to show duplicates, meaning some people’s biometric identifiers will match someone else’s when they try to enroll.The new system hasn’t eliminated attempts at fraud. In August, police in Rajasthan accused two shop managers of linking their fingerprints to a multitude of cards and stealing for months the rations of dozens of clients.

Hans Varghese Mathews, a mathematician at the Bangalore-based Center for Internet and Society, used the results of a test run by Aadhaar officials on a sample of 84 million people to extrapolate the figure for India’s total population. The error level is less than 1%, but in the world’s second-most populous country, the snag would still affect about 11 million people, he said.

Government officials disputed the calculation, saying the number of duplicates would be much smaller—and that it would take only seven analysts to manage the error caseload.

As for trouble connecting to the registry, better infrastructure, including steadier internet connections, will eventually also help, Mr. Pandey said.

For now, Mr. Prakash has found a way to cope without climbing trees. After scouring the village, he set up a shack in a spot with enough bandwidth for his fingerprint scanner to work. It is hardly efficient. He issues receipts in the morning at the shack, then goes back to his shop to hand out the grains. Customers have to line up twice, sometimes for hours.

Mr. Prakash has applied to the government to operate without biometric identification, but his request was turned down, he said. “They said: ‘You have to keep trying.’ ”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/wall-street-journal-gabriele-parussini-january-13-2017-indias-digital-id-rollout-collides-with-rickety-reality

India’s Data Protection Regime Must Be Built Through an Inclusive and Truly Co-Regulatory Approach

amber — 2018-01-01T16:18:54Z

We must move India past its existing consultative processes for rule-making, which often prompts stakeholders to take adversarial and extremely one-sided positions.

The article was published in the Wire on December 1, 2017.

Earlier this week, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology released a white paper by a “committee of experts” appointed a few months back led by former Supreme Court judge, Justice B.N. Srikrishna, on a data protection framework for India. The other members of the committee are Aruna Sundararajan, Ajay Bhushan Pandey, Ajay Kumar, Rajat Moona, Gulshan Rai, Rishikesha Krishnan, Arghya Sengupta and Rama Vedashree.

With the exception of Justice Srikrishna and Krishnan, the rest of the committee members are either part of the government or part of organisations that have worked closely with the government on separate issues relating to technology, with some of them also having taken positions against the fundamental right to privacy.

Refreshingly, the committee and the ministry has opted for a consultative process outlining the issues they felt relevant to a data protection law, and espousing provisional views on each of the issues and seeking public responses on them. The paper states that on the basis of the response received, the committee will conduct public consultations with citizens and stakeholders. Legitimate concerns were raised earlier about the constitution of the committee and the lack of inclusion of different voices on it. However, if the committee follows an inclusive, transparent and consultative process in the drafting of the data protection legislation, it would go a long way in addressing these concerns.

The paper seeks response to as many as 231 questions covering a broad spectrum of issues relating to data protection – including definitions of terms such as personal data, sensitive personal data, processing, data controller and processor – the purposes for which exemptions should be available, cross border flow of data, data localisation and the right to be forgotten.

While a thorough analysis of all the issues up for discussion would require a more detailed evaluation, at this point, the process of rule-making and the kind of governance model envisaged in this paper are extremely important issues to consider.

In part IV of the paper on ‘Regulation and Enforcement’, there is a discussion on a co-regulatory approach for the governance of data protection in India. The paper goes so far as to provisionally take a view that it may be appropriate to pursue a co-regulatory approach which involves “a spectrum of frameworks involving varying levels of government involvement and industry participation”.

However, the discussion on co-regulation in the white paper is limited to the section on regulation and enforcement. A truly inclusive and co-regulatory approach ought to involve active participation from non-governmental stakeholders in the rule-making process itself. In India, unfortunately, we lack a strong tradition of lawmakers engaging in public consultations and participation of other stakeholders in the process of drafting laws and regulation. One notable exception has been the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), which periodically seeks public responses on consultation papers it releases and also holds open houses occasionally. It is heartening to see the committee of experts and the ministry follow a similar process in this case.

However, these are essentially examples of ‘notice and comment’ rulemaking where the government actors stand as neutral arbiters who must decide on written briefs submitted to it in response to consultation papers or draft regulations that it notifies to the public.

This process is, by its very nature, adversarial, and often means that different stakeholders do not reveal their true priorities but must take extreme one-sided positions, as parties tend to at the beginning of a negotiation.This also prevents the stakeholders from sharing an honest assessment of the actual regulatory challenge they may face, lest it undermine their position.

This often pits industry and public interest proponents against each other, sometimes also leading to different kinds of industry actors in adversarial positions. An excellent example of this kind of posturing, also relevant to this paper, is visible in the responses submitted to the TRAI on the its recent consultation paper on ‘Privacy, Security and Ownership of data in Telecom Sector’. One of the more contentious issue raised by the TRAI was about the adequacy of the existing data protection framework under the license agreement with telecom companies, and if there was a need to bring about greater parity in regulation between telecom companies and over-the-top (OTT) service providers. Rather than facilitating an actual discussion on what is a complex regulatory issues, and the real practical challenges it poses for the stakeholders, this form of consultation simply led to the telecom companies and OTT services providers submitting contrasting extreme positions without much scope for engagement between two polar arguments.

A truly co-regulatory approach which also extends to rulemaking would involve collaborative processes which are far less adversarial in their design and facilitate joint problem solving through multiple face to face meetings. Such processes are also more likely to lead to better rule making by using the more specialised knowledge of the different stakeholders about technology, domain-specific issues, industry realities and low cost solutions. Further, by bringing the regulated parties into the rulemaking process, the ownership of the policy is shared, often leading to better compliance.

Within the domain of data protection law itself, we have a few existing models of robust co-regulation which entail the involvement of stakeholders not just at the level of enforcement but also at the level of drafting. The oldest and most developed form of this kind of privacy governance can be seen in the study of the Dutch privacy statute. It involved a central privacy legislations with broad principles, sectoral industry-drafted “codes of conduct”, government evaluations and certifications of these codes; and a legal safe harbour for those companies that follow the approved code for their sector. Over a period of 20 years, the Dutch experience saw the approval of 20 sectoral codes across a variety of sectors such as banking, insurance, pharmaceuticals, recruitment and medical research.

Other examples of policies espousing this approach include two documents from the US – first, a draft bill titled ‘Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011’ introduced before the Congress by John McCain and John Kerry, and second, a White House Paper titled ‘Consumer Data Privacy In A Networked World: A Framework For Protecting Privacy And Promoting Innovation In The Global Digital Economy’ released by the Obama administration. Neither of these documents have so far led to a concrete policy. Both of these policies envisioned broadly worded privacy requirements to be passed by the Congress, followed by the detailed rules to be drafted. The Obama administration white paper is more inclusive in mandating that ‘multi-stakeholder groups’ draft the codes that include not only industry representatives but also privacy advocates, consumer groups, crime victims, academics, international partners, federal and state civil and criminal law enforcement representatives and other relevant groups.

The principles that emerge out this consultative process are likely to guide the data protection law in India for a long time to come. Among democratic regimes with a significant data-driven market, India is extremely late in arriving at a data protection law. The least that it can do at this point is to learn from the international experience and scholarship which has shown that merits of a co-regulatory approach which entails active participation of the government, industry, civil society and academia in the drafting and enforcement of a robust data protection law.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-wire-amber-sinha-december-1-2017-inclusive-co-regulatory-approach-possible-building-indias-data-protection-regime

India’s Central Monitoring System: Security can’t come at cost of privacy

praskrishna — 2013-07-15T06:43:21Z

During a Google hangout session in June this year, Milind Deora, minister of state for communications and information technology, addressed concerns related to the central monitoring system (CMS).

Danish Raza's article was published in FirstPost on July 10, 2013. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

The surveillance project, described as the Indian version of PRISM, will allow the government to monitor online and telephone data of citizens. prism-milind-deora-cms-central-monitoring-system/” target=”_blank”>

The minister tried to justify the project arguing that the union government will become the sole custodian of citizen’s data which is now accessible to other parties such as telecom operators. But his justification failed to persuade experts who argue that the data is hardly safe because it is held by the government. And the limited information available about the project has raised serious concerns about its need and the consequences of government snooping on such a mass scale.

A release by the Press Information Bureau, dated November 26, 2009, is perhaps the only government document related to CMS available in public domain. It merely states that the project will strengthen the security environment in the country. “In the existing system secrecy can be easily compromised due to manual intervention at many stages while in CMS these functions will be performed on secured electronic link and there will be minimum manual intervention. Interception through CMS will be instant as compared to the existing system which takes a very long time.”

One of the primary concerns raised by experts is the sheer lack of public information on the project. So far, there is no official word from the government about which government bodies or agencies will be able to access the data; how will they use this information; what percentage of population will be under surveillance; or how long the data of a citizen will be kept in the record.

“This makes it impossible for India’s citizens to assess whether surveillance is the only, or the best, way in which the stated goal can be achieved. Also, citizens cannot gauge whether these measures are proportionate i.e. they are the most effective means to achieve this aim. The possibility of having such a debate is crucial in any democratic country,” said Dr Anja Kovacs, project director at Internet Democracy Project, Delhi based NGO working for online freedom of speech and related issues.

There is also no legal recourse for a citizen whose personal details are being misused or leaked from the central or regional database. Unlike America’s PRISM project under which surveillance orders are approved by courts, CMS does not have any judicial oversight. “This means that the larger ecosystem of checks and balances in which any surveillance should be embedded in a democratic country is lacking. There is an urgent requirement for a strong legal protection of the right to privacy; for judicial oversight of any surveillance; and for parliamentary or judicial oversight of the agencies which will do surveillance. At the moment, all three are missing.” said Kovacs.

Given the use of technology by criminals and terrorists, government surveillance per se, seems inevitable. Almost in every nation, certain chunk of population is always under the scanner of intelligence agencies. However, mass-scale tracking the data of all citizens — not just those who are deemed persons of interest — enabled by the CMS has sparked a public furor. Sunil Abraham, executive director, Centre for Internet & Society, Bangalore, compared surveillance with salt in cooking. “A tiny amount is essential but any excess is counterproductive,” he said. “Unlike target surveillance, blanket surveillance increases the probability of false positives. Wrong data analysis will put more number of innocent civilians under suspicion as, by default, their number in the central server is more than those are actually criminals.”

Such blanket surveillance techniques also pose a threat to online business. With all the data going in one central pool, a competitor or a cyber criminal rival can easily tap into private and sensitive information by hacking into the server. “As vulnerabilities will be introduced into Internet infrastructure in order to enable surveillance, it will undermine the security of online transactions,” said Abraham. He notes that the project also can undermine the confidentiality of intellectual property especially pre-grant patents and trade secrets. “Rights-holders will never be sure if their IPR is being stolen by some government in order to prop up national players.”

Every time a surveillance system is exposed or its misuse sparks a debate, governments argue that such programs are required for internal security purposes and to help abort terror attacks. Obama made the same argument after PRISM was revealed to the public. Civil rights groups, on the other hand, argue that security cannot be prioritised by large-scale invasions of privacy especially in a country like India where there is little accountability or transparency. So is there a middle ground that will satisfy both sides?

“Yes, security and privacy can coexist,” said Commander (rtd) Mukesh Saini, former national information security coordinator, government of India, “We can design a system which takes care of national security aspect and yet gains the confidence of the citizens. Secrecy period must not be more than three to four years in such projects. Thereafter who all were snooped and when and why and under whose direction/circumstances must be made public through a website after this time gap.”

Kovacs agrees and says the right kind of surveillance program would focus on the needs of the citizen and not the government. “If a contradiction seems to exist between cyber security and privacy online, this is only because we have lost sight of who is supposed to benefit from any security measures. Only if a measure contributes to citizen’s sense of security, can it really be considered a legitimate security measure.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/firstpost-danish-raza-july-10-2013-indias-central-monitoring-system-security-cant-come-at-cost-of-privacy

India’s biometric ID scans make sci-fi a reality

praskrishna — 2017-03-28T02:45:28Z

I have been thinking about my fingerprints and the secrets that may lie within my eyes — and whether I want to share them with the Indian government. I may not however have a choice.

The article by Amy Kazmin was published in the Financial Times on March 27, 2017. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

India has the world’s largest domestic biometric identification system, known as Aadhaar. Since 2010, the government has collected fingerprints and iris scans from more than 1bn residents, and each has been assigned a 12-digit identification number.

The scheme is championed by Nandan Nilekani, the billionaire co-founder of IT company Infosys. It was initially conceived to ensure poor Indians received subsidised food entitlements and other welfare benefits that were previously siphoned off by unscrupulous intermediaries. It was also seen as offering poor Indians, many of whom lack birth certificates, with a portable ID that can be used anywhere in the country.

Until now, obtaining an Aadhaar number was voluntary, though most Indians enrolled without hesitation as they see its potential benefits. But New Delhi is now enlisting Aadhaar, which means “foundation” or “base” in Hindi, in more than just welfare schemes. This would mean sharing one’s biometric details isn’t really optional any more despite a Supreme Court ruling that it should be “purely voluntary”.

Last week, the government issued a rule requiring an Aadhaar number for filing tax returns, ostensibly to improve tax compliance. It has also decided that all cell phone numbers must be linked to an Aadhaar number by 2018. Even Indian Railways has plans to demand Aadhaar from those booking train tickets online.

What was once touted as an initiative to improve delivery of welfare suddenly now seems like the foundation of a surveillance state — and I admit the prospect of putting my own biometrics in the database leaves me uneasy.

As a US citizen, I’ve never had to give my biometric data to my government. Domestically, fingerprints are only taken from criminal suspects, or applicants for government jobs, though I know foreign citizens are fingerprinted on arrival.

To me, the idea of sharing eye scans evokes the dystopian Hollywood film, Minority Report, which depicts a near future in which optical-recognition cameras allow the authorities to identify anyone in any public place. The hero on the run, played by Tom Cruise, has an illegal eye transplant to avoid detection.

In recent days, many Indian academics and activists have raised concerns about Aadhaar data security, the lack of privacy rules and the absence of any accountability structure if data are misused.

"Biometrics is being weaponised," says Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society. "What you need to be worried about is that someone will clean out your bank account or frame you in a crime," he says.

Pratap Bhanu Mehta, director of the Centre for Policy Research, has written of the “conversion of Aadhaar from a tool of citizen empowerment to a tool of state surveillance and citizen vulnerability”.

I call Mr Nilekani, of whose honourable intentions I have no doubt. After leaving Infosys in 2009, he spent five years in government, working to get Aadhaar off the ground. He says he is “extremely offended” when his project is accused of being part of a surveillance society, a narrative he says is “completely misrepresenting” the project. “I can steal your fingerprint off your glass. I don’t need this fancy technology,” he says. “Surveillance is far better done by following my phone, or when I use a map to order a taxi: the map knows where I am. Our internet companies know where you are.”

But in a society known for ingenious means of bypassing rules, such as having multiple taxpayer ID cards to aid evasion, Mr Nilekani says biometric authentication of individuals can bring discipline and reduce cheating. “It’s like you are creating a rule-based society,” he says, “it’s the transition that is going on right now.” I hang up, hardly reassured. To me, it seems clear that in India, as in so many places these days, Big Brother is increasingly watching.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/financial-times-march-27-2017-amy-kazmin-indias-biometric-id-scans-make-sci-fi-a-reality

India’s Big Bet on Identity

praskrishna — 2012-03-07T05:44:12Z

The world’s largest biometric authentication system reaches its first major milestone, but lots of challenges remain, writes Joshua J. Romero in ieeespectrum. Sunil Abraham was quoted in this story which was featured in March 2012 edition.

Driving around Bangalore, it’s immediately clear that the infrastructure hasn’t kept up with the IT boom in this once-sleepy South Indian city. Auto rickshaws, scooters, and motorcycles squeeze into a tight phalanx at each red light and choke the air with exhaust. Construction, such as the concrete supports of the new metro rail line that looms overhead, causes detours everywhere, and in spots the entire road abruptly disintegrates into gravel.

But something miraculous happens as you make your way south, past the outer ring road. A ramp lifts a select few vehicles out of the weaving traffic and onto an elevated tollway, where you suddenly have a bird’s-eye view of the urban landscape. This is the road to Electronic City, an oasis of glass and steel high-rises overlooking pristine black asphalt paths that snake through the perfectly manicured lawns of tech companies like Wipro, IBM, and Infosys Technologies.

“If you can have such good roads in the Infosys campus, why are the roads outside so terrible?” That’s the common question foreign visitors would ask Nandan Nilekani, one of the company’s cofounders. “Politics” was his usual reply, according to Nilekani’s 2008 book, Imagining India. Now the man who has been called the Bill Gates of India has jumped into politics to try to use what he learned at the IT giant to transform the dysfunctional country that lies beyond the borders of Electronic City.

Since July 2009, Nilekani has been a cabinet minister, leading hundreds of engineers and entrepreneurs as chairman of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). By the most conservative estimates, at least a third of the country’s 1.2 billion citizens live below the poverty line and outside the formal economy. The UIDAI is expected to connect those hundreds of millions of people to government programs, save public money, reduce fraud and corruption, and foster new business opportunities—all by creating an unprecedented biometric system and outside the formal economy. The UIDAI is expected to connect those hundreds of millions of people to government programs, save public money, reduce fraud and corruption, and foster new business opportunities—all by creating an unprecedented biometric system.

“On the one hand, within India and across the world, people of Indian descent have done some remarkable work,” says Nilekani. “And on the other hand, here is a country that needs to solve some very basic problems. This project marries these two worlds.” UIDAI plans to use fingerprints and iris scans to assign every person in the country a unique 12-digit ID number that can be verified online. It’s one of the biggest IT projects in the world, and getting bigger: By early February, the UIDAI had issued 130 million ID numbers, and it can issue up to a million more IDs every day. The agency has set up 36 000 enrollment stations staffed by 87 000 certified enrollment operators. In India the project is called Aadhaar, which means “foundation” or “support,” because it’s meant to be a fundamental technology platform that will enable dozens of new public and private services to be created.

That’s if it all works. It’s easy to list major challenges: How exactly do you collect biometrics from every single person in the world’s second most populous country, especially those living at the margins? How do you keep bad data from getting into the database in a country rife with corruption? And how can you build the entire system around online authentication in a country where fewer than one in 20 people have access to the Internet?

The answers to these questions are getting more than the usual amount of scrutiny, because a lot of political fortunes are riding on the UIDAI.

The program has been heavily supported by the ruling Indian National Congress party; Nilekani was appointed by the prime minister himself, Manmohan Singh. But Singh and his Congress party have had a difficult time enacting many of their biggest policy goals, and the UIDAI has increasingly become the target of criticism.

Earlier this year, the whole scheme seemed in imminent danger of collapse, when a parliamentary committee killed the bill that would have given the program statutory authority, and a political turf war erupted between the UIDAI and the National Population Register, another government project collecting biometrics for the national census. But by late January the two sides had reached an agreement to share biometric data collection, and Aadhaar is once again moving full steam ahead with a new mandate and an estimated budget this year of 15 billion rupees [PDF] (about US $300 million).

Photo: Joshua J. Romero

EXISTING DOCUMENTS: A poster lists the variety of IDs a  person can use to register for an Aadhaar number.

To understand why the government has invested so heavily, it helps to know the current state of affairs in India. Aadhaar is meant to provide a form of identification that’s free, national, impossible to counterfeit—and available to everyone. “There’s an ID divide,” Nilekani explains, between people who have multiple official IDs and the hundreds of millions who have none. Only about 60 million people in India have passports, he says, and only about 100 million have photo ID bank cards. The most prevalent document is a voter ID card, which has been issued to about 700 million people, covering just over half of the country. But these and the rest of the official IDs created by the country’s vast bureaucracy all have shortcomings.

The primary reason for creating a biometric ID system is to give India’s poorest citizens better access to an array of welfare programs. India spends about 2 percent of its gross domestic product on social programs like the Public Distribution System, which provides subsidized rice, wheat, and other staples, and a rural employment scheme that guarantees 100 days of work. But all such programs suffer from severe “leakage”: According to the World Bank, corrupt officials and middlemen siphon away 59 percent of the money before it reaches the intended recipients. Eventually, the government hopes to provide funds directly to each person who needs them.

Most states issue ration cards, but they usually aren’t valid in other states. An official ID that can be used throughout the country is increasingly important as more and more people move away from their hometowns to follow employment, Nilekani says.

Complicating the problem further, existing ID cards are easy to duplicate. Some states have more names on their food ration lists than there are people living in the state. To fight counterfeiting, the Aadhaar team decided to use biometrics instead of issuing just another ID card. From the beginning, they consulted biometric experts, used existing standards when they could, and studied similar systems like the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program, run by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

One thing the team realized early on is that a single biometric measurement wasn’t enough to guarantee uniqueness. In proof-of-concept studies, researchers determined that only by using all 10 fingerprints and a scan of both irises could error rates be kept manageable. Adding iris scans also makes the program more inclusive for people whose fingerprints have been worn down by manual labor.

Photos, clockwise from left: Ruth Fremson/The New York Times/Redux; Joshua J. Romero (2)
NECESSARY GEAR: Each enrollment station has the same basic set of equipment, including an iris scanner [top], a fingerprint scanner [bottom right], a webcam and light [bottom left], a laptop, a second monitor for the resident to view, and a scanner and printer to handle documents.

Getting an Aadhaar number is not a quick process. One Friday after midnight, I watch dozens of families wait patiently in a municipal building where only half the lights are on and there’s always a baby crying. While Anurodh Kanchan waits, he explains that he came at this hour because he’d heard the lines were even longer during the day. He’d already been once before to schedule this appointment. Now his 7-year-old daughter dozes on his wife’s shoulder as the whole family waits another half an hour for the enrollment agent to return from a break.

Hiring and training people to work as agents has been one of the project’s biggest logistical challenges. The UIDAI outsources enrollment to “registrars”—often state governments or banks—which in turn hire accredited agencies to actually set up and staff the centers. The agencies get paid a flat rate for each successful enrollment, as do the agents they hire. A coordinator for one of the largest agencies told me that his organization had significantly overestimated how many enrollments an agent could complete in a day. UIDAI says that an average station (see photos, “Necessary Gear”) can process each enrollment in under 10 minutes, but in the days I spent observing, it wasn’t uncommon for the process to take twice as long. And if you’re an agent looking at a line of people stretching out the door, it’s easy to see how you might begin to rush through your tasks.

That’s why enforcing quality is left to a piece of software known as the enrollment client, installed on each agent’s laptop. The program manages every step of the process and was developed jointly by engineers at UIDAI and MindTree, an Indian IT company. Because enrollment often takes place in remote locations with no Internet access, the client must be fully independent and be able to run off a single laptop. The developers also had to make sure that the enrollment client could work seamlessly with any of the 11 biometric devices from various manufacturers that had been certified for use. And the initial version had to be built fast: MindTree won the contract at the end of April 2010, and the UIDAI wanted to enroll the first resident by that August.

MindTree met the deadline, and the client it designed now manages to prevent and correct most errors an enrollment agent might make. In addition to a simple quality check, the software looks for self-consistency—for instance, verifying that each fingerprint isn’t coming from the operator or another recently enrolled resident and that all 10 fingerprints and two irises are distinct from each other. If something goes wrong in a biometric capture, the software tells the operator how to correct it—for instance, it can distinguish between a facial photo that’s too dark and one in which the person was photographed at the wrong angle.

Still, over the last 21 months, the software engineers have had to continually improve the program to address new challenges encountered in the field. For example, when the UIDAI began enrolling people in the Punjab region of North India, where many men wear long beards and large turbans, enrollment agents had a hard time taking a photo that the software considered acceptable: The turban would be interpreted as an unacceptable background, or the automatic cropping feature would crop around the turban instead of the face. The software team was able to quickly tweak the parameters and release a new version of the client so that enrollment could continue.

It isn’t just the biometric collection that’s tricky. A resident must also supply basic demographic data—name, age, gender, and address. Residents can fill out paper forms in any of the 16 official Indian languages, which agents must first transfer to the computer and then translate into an English version of the form. This is by far the most time-consuming part of the process, and MindTree has tried to speed it up by building transliteration into the client software. But Indic languages have many variations—some are written right to left, and many use unique character sets. Still, the agent is expected to check the results and clean up minor mistakes.

There are obviously both privacy and security concerns when you’re collecting personal data from more than a billion people. “You can’t change your biometrics,” points out Sunil Abraham, the executive director at the Center for Internet and Society, in Bangalore, so if they become compromised, it’s a difficult problem to fix.

Among the precautions the UIDAI takes is to encrypt all data as soon as they’re collected. The data can be decrypted only by UIDAI servers, so the records aren’t even accessible to the operator or enrollment agency that collected them. At the end of each day, all the encrypted enrollment data are stored on USB flash drives, and the drives are transported to a place with Internet access so the data can be uploaded to UIDAI’s servers. It’s in the best interests of the enrollment agencies to safeguard the data, because otherwise they won’t get paid.

From the enrollment centers the action moves to the racks of servers at the UIDAI Central Information Data Repository, which is also in Bangalore. Here is where deduplication—checking each new enrollment against every other record in the database—will arguably make this identity scheme rise above the rest. Ensuring that no person can get two numbers is key to making biometrics a worthwhile investment. A few years ago, one Indian state collected biometrics for everyone below the poverty line, but it didn’t have the technology or a plan to prevent duplicates. It ended up capturing 1.2 times the population, which resulted in a significant leakage of benefits.

Many critics, including members of Parliament, have doubted that it’s even possible to deduplicate records from the entire Indian populace. It’s certainly a big task. In order to issue 1 million Aadhaar numbers in a single day, the current maximum rate, the data center must conduct 100 trillion person matches. To improve this process, the UIDAI came up with an unusual arrangement. Rather than hiring a single firm for the job, it awarded the project to three contractors, each responsible for processing a portion of the enrollments, with the overlapping records used to compare performance between the systems. This arrangement lets the UIDAI know if a system isn’t working correctly and also gives the companies a financial incentive to improve their software—they’ll get to process more records, and get paid more, if their products perform better. The vendors were even required to use the same kind of hardware to build their systems, so the agency isn’t tied to any one company.

In late January, the UIDAI released a report [PDF] that for the first time detailed the results of this deduplication effort. There are two primary factors that determine the accuracy of a biometric system: the false-positive rate, which in this case is how often a newly registered person is incorrectly judged to be already enrolled, and the false-negative rate, which is how often true duplicates are not recognized as such. To measure the false-positive rate, the UIDAI tested 4 million unique records against a subset of the enrollment database containing 84 million records: Of the unique records, 2309 were falsely rejected, for a false-positive rate of 0.057 percent. The agency also tested 31 399 known duplicates. The system caught all but 11, for a false-negative rate of 0.035 percent.

The false-positive rate applies to the total number of records in the database. As that number grows, the rate should increase in a linear fashion, because there are more opportunities for false matches. The false-negative rate, on the other hand, applies only to the small minority of enrollments that really are true duplicates (the UIDAI estimates that these make up only 0.5 percent of all incoming enrollments). Because the false-negative rate doesn’t depend on the total number of records, it should remain steady unless more people try to enroll multiple times.

R.S. Sharma, the director general of UIDAI, says that preventing all duplicates with technology alone is impossible. There are some people who just can’t be uniquely identified through biometrics, because the data for them aren’t good enough—children under age 5, for instance, and people with multiple disabilities. That’s why the responsibility for accuracy and uniqueness isn’t all left up to the software. Several full-time employees manually review the roughly 0.2 percent of cases that the software can’t handle, resolving errors and looking for evidence of fraud.

Even if the system isn’t perfect, it’s likely to be much better than any existing alternative, simply because it will eliminate “ghost identities,” says M.R. Madhavan, who works at the Centre for Policy Research, in New Delhi. “At least people who died in 1995 or 2005 will not get into the system,” he says.

Photo: Joshua J. Romero

AUTHENTICATION TERMINAL: Widespread use of Aadhaar will  rely on biometric terminals, like this prototype at MindTree.

Now that the UIDAI has shown it can collect biometric and demographic data and eliminate duplicate enrollments, much of the attention will shift to the authentication system, where people can prove their identity with just the swipe of a finger. Such systems are still under development, so most residents I met weren’t clear about the benefits of the program. When I asked people why they were enrolling, they often had vague reasons: “It might make it easier to get my benefits,” said one middle-aged woman in Bangalore. “I heard you’ll need it to buy heating gas,” said another woman. “I think it’s mandatory,” an elderly man told me. Nilekani thinks that getting authentication services up and running will be the best way to demonstrate the power of the entire project.

Here’s how such a futuristic system might work: Walking up to a wirelessly connected terminal at a local shop, a person will type in his name and Aadhaar number, and then he’ll scan his fingerprints. The data will be sent to a central database, where the Aadhaar number will be used to locate his record. The submitted name and biometric data will be compared to those on file, and the software will determine whether they match.

The UIDAI imagines that such biometric terminals will eventually be ubiquitous. The first devices deployed will likely be micro-ATMs in rural shops. These machines process transactions electronically, just like a full-size ATM, except they don’t store and dispense cash—that gets handled from the shopkeeper’s till. The hope is that such systems will deliver financial services to the 40 percent of the Indian population who have never had bank accounts. When people enroll for Aadhaar, they simply need to check a box and an Aadhaar-enabled bank account will be created for them.

In January, the UIDAI began a pilot project in the state of Jharkhand, where workers in the rural employment program could collect cash payments by scanning their fingerprints at a micro-ATM. Another pilot program in Maharashtra transferred small amounts of money to individual Aadhaar numbers, showing that bank servers could be easily linked with the UIDAI system.

The authentication system is already available as an application programming interface (API), which means it won’t be limited to just government programs and banks. Private service providers could use it to verify new customers as well. Take India’s vaunted mobile-phone culture: Phone companies are currently required to collect and retain significant documentation for every person they sell a SIM card to, as I found out in the two days I spent collecting the photos and local references I needed to get one myself. “If you look at any service provider, they’re not going to offer the mobile-phone service unless they verify who you are,” says Bala Parthasarathy, an entrepreneur who worked in Silicon Valley but came back to India to volunteer on the project for a year. Parthasarathy says that using Aadhaar for identity verification could provide the telephone companies with major savings.

Still, setting up a nationwide network of biometric terminals has plenty of its own challenges. First, India will need better connectivity. Wireless voice networks now cover most of the country, but wireless data networks have trailed behind. Current penetration of 3G is mostly just in the cities, says Debabrata Das, an IEEE member and a professor of electrical engineering at the International Institute of Information Technology, Bangalore, who has been studying the network challenges of authentication as a technical advisor for the state of Karnataka.

The API will also need to be flexible enough to handle variations in the demographic data that are submitted. The system can’t enforce strict matches: Many Indians use initials in their names, and there is no guarantee that they will always spell their names the same way in English. Further, sometimes a married woman will use her father’s family name instead of her husband’s. Because of the ambiguity in names and addresses, the database must be able to perform partial and fuzzy matches. Eventually, Sharma says, the UIDAI hopes to be able to do database matching for all the Indian languages as well, so the API will continue to undergo revisions.

Now the UIDAI must wait for its partners to begin taking advantage of the system, and Nilekani admits that starting up such services is largely beyond his control. Cooperation with other agencies and industries is all part of Nilekani’s approach to how government initiatives should work. “The big thing to my mind has been, How do you create a model of change, and how do you carry a lot of people with it? How do you think this through in a way that everyone comes on board?” he says. In building the project to this point, he’s managed to bring, if not everyone, then certainly a pretty diverse crowd: technical experts; national, state, and local officials; banks and businesses; and all those millions who willingly wait in line for hours.

“Everyone puts their own aspirations on it…like Obama,” he jokes. But the downside of being so inclusive is that as the project matures, it may be difficult to keep all the interested parties happy, and there’s bound to be disappointment if the project fails to achieve all its lofty ambitions.

The project has made it this far by adapting quickly as problems arise. “Think of it as multigeneration, continuous improvement,” Nilekani says. “You launch and get feedback and you get criticism. You need to build a rapid feedback loop, which is what we’ve built.”

Read the original here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/big-bet-on-identity

India's struggle for online freedom

praskrishna — 2012-06-18T06:39:32Z

"65 years since your independence," a new battle for freedom is under way in India — according to a YouTube video uploaded by an Indian member of Anonymous, the global "hacktivist" movement.

Rebecca MacKinnon's article was published in the Sydney Morning Herald on June 9, 2012

With popular websites like Vimeo.com blocked across India by court order, the video calls for action: "Fight for your rights. Fight for India." Over the past several weeks, the group has launched distributed denial-of-service attacks against websites belonging to internet service providers, government departments, India's Supreme Court, and two political parties.

Street protests are being planned for today in as many as 18 cities to protest laws and other government actions that a growing number of Indian internet users believe have violated their right to free expression and privacy online.

A lively national internet freedom movement has grown rapidly across India since the beginning of this year.

The most colourful highlight so far was a seven-day Gandhian hunger strike, otherwise known as a "freedom fast," held in early May on a New Delhi pavement by political cartoonist Aseem Trivedi and activist-journalist Alok Dixit. Trivedi's website was shut down this year in response to a police complaint by a Mumbai-based advocate who alleged that some of Trivedi's works "ridicule the Indian Parliament, the national emblem, and the national flag."

Escalating political and legal battles over internet regulation in India are the latest front in a global struggle for online freedom — not only in countries like China and Iran where the internet is heavily censored and monitored by autocratic regimes, but also in democracies where the political motivations for control are much more complicated.

Democratically elected governments all over the world are failing to find the right balance between demands from constituents to fight crime, control hate speech, keep children safe, and protect intellectual property, and their duty to ensure and respect all citizens' rights to free expression and privacy. Popular online movements — many of them globally interconnected — are arising in response to these failures.

Only about 10 per cent of India's population uses the web, making it unlikely that internet freedom will be a decisive ballot-box issue anytime soon. Yet activists are determined to punish New Delhi's "humourless babus," as one columnist recently called India's censorious politicians and bureaucrats, in the country's media. Grassroots organisers are bringing a new generation of white-collar protesters to the streets to defend the right to use a technology that remains alien to the majority of India's people.

The trouble started with the 2008 passage of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, whose Section 69 empowers the government to direct any internet service to block, intercept, monitor, or decrypt any information through any computer resource.

Company officials who fail to comply with government requests can face fines and up to seven years in jail. Then, in April 2011, the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology issued new rules under which internet companies are expected to remove within 36 hours any content that regulators designate as "grossly harmful," "harassing," or "ethnically objectionable" — designations that are open to a wide variety of interpretations and that free speech advocates argue have opened the door to abuse.

It is thanks to these rules that the website of the hunger-striking cartoonist, Trivedi, was taken offline. Also thanks to the 2011 rules, Facebook and Google are facing trial for having failed to remove objectionable content. If found guilty, the companies could face fines, and executives could be sentenced to jail time.

Saturday's protesters are calling for annulment of the 2011 rules and the repeal of part of the 2008 act. They are also calling for internet service companies to reverse the wholesale blocking of hundreds of websites, including the file-sharing services isoHunt and The Pirate Bay, as well as the video-sharing site Vimeo and Pastebin, which is primarily used for the sharing of text and links.

Internet service providers were responding to a court order from the Madras High Court demanding the blockage, which is aimed at preventing the online distribution of pirated versions of one particular film. The internet companies, fearing that they would not be able to catch every individual instance on every possible site they host, instead chose to block entire services along with all of their content — which had nothing to do with the film in question.

Such "John Doe" orders, named because they are directed against unknown potential offenders in the present and future, are characterised "by their overly broad and sweeping nature," argue lawyer Lawrence Liang and researcher Achal Prabhala, which extends "to a range of non-infringing activities as well, thus catching a whole range of legal acts in their net."

More broadly, as Delhi-based journalist Shivam Vij wrote in a recent essay: "The current mechanisms of internet censorship in India — blocking, direct removal requests to websites, intermediary rules — are draconian and unconstitutional. They need to be replaced with a new set of rules that are fair, transparent and accessible for public scrutiny. They should not be amenable to misuse by the powers-that-be for their own private interests."

Not only are the rules abused, but researchers find that they are causing extralegal censorship by companies that overcompensate in order to err on the side of caution. Last year, the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society performed an experiment in which it sent "legally flawed" takedown demands to seven companies that provide a range of online services, including search, online shopping, and news with user-generated comments.

The legal flaws in the notices were such that the companies could have rejected them without being in breach of the law. Yet "of the 7 intermediaries to which takedown notices were sent, 6 intermediaries over-complied with the notices, despite the apparent flaws in them," reads the Centre for Internet and Society report.

Despite the growing public opposition, a motion to annul the 2011 rules was defeated by voice vote in the upper house of Parliament last month. Yet the criticism was sufficiently sharp that Communications Minister Kapil Sibal announced that he will hold consultations with all members of Parliament, representatives of industry, and other "stakeholders" to discuss the law's problems and how it might be revised.

Many of the law's critics, however, are skeptical that this will eliminate the law's deep flaws and loopholes for abuse, especially given the government's failure to listen so far. Comments on the 2011 rules submitted last year by the Centre for Internet and Society were not even acknowledged as having been received by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. "Sibal uses the excuse of national security and hate speech," says the center's director, Sunil Abraham, "but that is not what is happening."

Abraham worries that what is really happening is a government effort at Internet "behavior modification" through a process akin to an experiment involving caged monkeys, bananas, and ice water. Put four monkeys in a cage and hang a bunch of bananas on the ceiling. Every time one of them climbs up to reach the bananas, you drench all of them with ice water.

Soon enough, the monkeys will start policing themselves — attacking anybody who tries to reach the bananas, making it unnecessary for their masters to deploy the ice water. "This is why the government is being so aggressive so early on, with only 10 percent of India's population online," says Abraham. "If you start the drenching early on, by the time you get to 50 per cent [internet penetration], every one will be well-behaved monkeys."

Companies will act as private internet police for fear of legal punishment before the government is called upon to step in and enforce the law. If it works, Indian politicians could have fewer reasons to worry about online critiques or mockery, because companies fearing prosecution will proactively delete speech that could potentially be designated "harassing" or "grossly harmful."

India is not China or Iran, however. Its politicians may be corrupt, and most of its voters may not understand why Internet freedom matters because they've never used the Internet. But it still has an independent press and boisterous civil society that are not going to give up their critiques and protests anytime soon. India also has a strong, independent judiciary, with a record of ruling against censorship and surveillance measures when a strong case can be made that they conflict with constitutional protections of individual rights. "On free speech I have high faith in the Indian judiciary," says Abraham. "There is a good chance to launch a constitutional challenge."

If Google and Facebook lose at their impending trial — now scheduled for July — they will most certainly appeal, which activists hope could provide just such an opportunity to prevent the sort of "behaviour modification" process that Abraham warns against.

Now India's burgeoning internet freedom movement needs its own reverse "behaviour modification" strategy — imposing consistent and regular doses of political and legal ice water upon India's bureaucrats, politicians, and companies whenever they do things that threaten to corrode the rights of India's internet users. Saturday's protest is just the beginning.

Sunil Abraham is quoted in the article. The report on Intermediary Guidelines co-produced by CIS and Google is also mentioned.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/indias-struggle-for-online-freedom

India's Rs 400-crore Central Monitoring System to snoop on all communication

praskrishna — 2013-06-05T10:39:19Z

Latest reports confirm that the government's longstanding aim of initiating the Central Monitoring System in the country is materialising now.

This was published in Tech 2 on May 9, 2013. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

The Times of India reports that the government began rolling out the project last month, and it lets them access all communication in the country – comprising online activities, phone calls, SMSes, social media conversations and even the geographical location of individuals. Using the Central Monitoring System, officials with the National Investigation Agency or tax officials will have access to "every byte of communication".

Pavan Duggal, an advocate with the Supreme Court, believes that the new system "is capable of tremendous abuse". He went on to say that the government hasn't revealed much on what it intends to monitor with this new system, and under what criteria.

The Centre for Development of Telematics has been given the task of putting this system in place to give government officials this crucial access to communication in the country. In his statement to the Parliament in December last year, IT minister Milind Deora had said that the Central Monitoring System will "lawfully intercept Internet and telephone services".

This system was initiated in the wake of the horrying bomb blast in Mumbai in November 2008. Post that incident, the government reportedly took on the task of making itself technologically adept to "eavesdrop on digital communications".

It would be important to quote here that the IT law – enacted in 2000, amended in 2008 and in 2011 – confers upon government officials the authority to intercept phone calls, SMSes, emails and even monitor websites. That, however, can only be done for "reasonable security practices and procedures".

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/tech-2-may-9-2013-indias-rs-400-crore-central-monitoring-system-to-snoop-on-all-communication

India's plan to offer citizens digital lockers poses a privacy threat, say experts

praskrishna — 2015-04-03T06:32:20Z

The Indian government launched a test version of a service called the digital locker last month that allows citizens to store scanned versions of important documents online, something that experts say poses a serious threat to people’s privacy.

The blog post was published in Scroll.in on March 19, 2015. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

Based on a similar project being tried out in Maharashtra, the service allows people with Aadhar cards to store scanned copies of their passports, birth certificates, ration cards and other important documents on remote servers. This way, people can digitally back-up important documents and also send them over the internet to others, such as potential employers or banks, for availing themselves of other services.

The service, whose test version was launched on February 12, will be optional. But it could find takers from among the about 90% of India’s households who do not own a laptop or computer and the 95% that do not have an internet connection, according to the 2011 census. Experts are concerned that sensitive data stored in a central place could be stolen or misused.

Serious threat

“Any large linked database with personal information is a serious threat to citizen's data,” said G Nagarjuna, a researcher at the Homi Bhabha Centre for Science Education in Mumbai and a member of the Free Software Movement. “There exists no agency that could secure their data till date without any possibilities of data theft.”

Digitisation is not inherently a problem, experts say. It is the kind of information stored that is. There are two kinds of information people need to be concerned about, said Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, in an email to Scroll.in. Public domain information such as land records, pan cards and ration cards should be available to the public anyway. However, private information such as biometrics and passports are of concern.

“Unless the cryptography and architecture is organised in such a manner that only the citizen will have access there can be very serious consequences for the individual’s right to privacy,” he said.

The scheme raises the same concerns about privacy that came up during the creation of Aadhar cards, for which the government has collected biometric and identification data for 773 million citizens.

Information is power

Experts pointed to the dangers of the state having access to crucial data about citizens. The dangers are perhaps greater when the data passes into the hands of private corporations, they said.

The Indian government has not said who will run the central servers on which all the data is to be stored, but Maharashtra said in January that it would upload the data it was collecting to a private cloud service run by Microsoft.

“This is a terrible idea because it is centralising storage of personal information across silos controlled by different data controllers and also giving the citizen no control over who has access to his or her data," said Abraham.

“A blunder of the highest order is to pass this information to a cloud, and that too to a foreign company,” said Nagarjuna. “India is a sovereign republic, and hence we should assert this in the country’s digital assets as well. How secure can India be if our security is passed on to another agency that owes its allegiance to another country?”

Surykant Jadhav, joint secretary of the Directorate of Information Technology in Maharashtra, defended the scheme, comparing it to other optional services that the state provides such as online ticketing and filing of income tax returns. “The lockers are there only if people want to use it,” he said.

Cart before the horse

But the government ought to be trying to improve the basics, such as increasing computer and internet penetration, before launching value-added digital services, said Nagarjuna.

“What is the basic social or economic problem that the government is trying to solve by creating the digital lockers?” “Just as each citizen learns how to protect their assets, the digital natives of a digital society will eventually learn how to protect their digital assets. Digital India cannot be created without providing digital literacy to all the citizens. Did we do that? Once we do that, citizens will learn what is good for them, particularly for their own assets over which the government has no ownership.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/scroll-mridula-chari-march-19-2015-indias-plan-to-offer-citizens-digital-lockers-poses-a-privacy-threat-say-experts

India's National ID Project Brings Pain to Those it Aims to Help

Admin — 2018-05-12T00:53:39Z

Poor management, corruption and fraud are threatening to derail the world’s largest national identity project.

The blog post by Aayush Soni was published in Ozy.com on May 11, 2018.

For Phoolmati, a resident of the Kusumpur Pahari slum in south Delhi, standing every month in a queue at the neighborhood fair-price shop was a trusted routine. When her turn came up, she would place her thumb on a scanning machine that confirmed her identity. But on a biting-cold morning this past January, she had to return home empty-handed because, the shopkeeper told her, the “server was down.”

The next day, it happened again. On her third try, Phoolmati thought she had gotten lucky when the machine scanned her thumb successfully. But she was in for a shock. “The shopkeeper told me that, according to the computer records, I’ve already taken my quota of wheat flour for the month,” she says. When she protested and showed her ration card, another form of identification, the shopkeeper wouldn’t accept it.

Left with no choice, Phoolmati had to buy wheat flour from the open market at 25 rupees per kilogram — more than 12 times the amount she usually paid at fair-price shops. She wasn’t alone. At a weekly meeting of slum residents in a temple courtyard in April, many women complained about the difficulty of buying subsidized food grains to the Satark Nagrik Sangathan (Alert Citizens Organization), a nonprofit that seeks accountability from government agencies. Nanno Devi, a 67-year-old homemaker whose fingers are wrinkled with age, said that she didn’t receive her quota of wheat flour for January because a fingerprint-scanning machine couldn’t detect her thumb impression.

Nor are the urban poor, like Phoolmati, the only ones with such complaints. Students with government scholarships, senior citizens with pensions, farmers entitled to subsidies, religious minorities and backward castes eligible for benefits, patients at public hospitals, young couples trying to get married and professionals updating their bank details are all on the front line of an unparalleled experiment that was meant to help them but is hurting them instead.

Theirs is the lived experience of Aadhaar, a unique 12-digit identity system that includes an individual’s biometrics and demographic data — and that must verify an individual’s identity for the government, increasingly, to even recognize their existence. First rolled out in 2010, it is modeled on America’s Social Security number system, with the aim that government subsidies and welfare programs reach the intended beneficiaries and aren’t siphoned off by middlemen.

But over the past three years, India’s Narendra Modi government has cajoled, pressured and often effectively forced people into enrolling for this ID, even though it isn’t required by law. Today, a person’s bank account risks being frozen if it isn’t linked to her Aadhaar number. Her PAN (permanent account number) card, used to file income tax, could be declared invalid. Mobile phone companies can disconnect her number if it isn’t authenticated through biometrics. An Aadhaar number (or an enrollment number, in case someone has already applied for it) is mandatory to open a new bank account, get a new passport, invest in mutual funds or register a marriage. A joke making the rounds on Twitter is that very soon, Aadhaar will be mandatory for a person to swipe right on Tinder.

In the absence of any privacy law, much of the concern within sections of India’s educated middle class has focused on questions about personal freedom, data security and mass surveillance. But a parallel tide of complaints is rising from those the program was meant to help, rooted in complications it has instead imposed upon them. This growing frustration is threatening to derail the initiative in a manner privacy can’t, in a nation where millions live in cramped city apartments with strangers, and the distinction between personal and public is often blurred.

Cases of fraud, mismanagement and corruption hurting Aadhaar beneficiaries are tumbling out into the public domain almost every week. In late March, hackers used weaknesses in the Aadhaar database to steal data from a government organization that manages more than $120 billion in the pensions and savings of millions of Indians. In January, a 10-year-old girl from the Dalit community — historically at the bottom of India’s caste ladder — was denied a school scholarship because officials had misnamed her on her Aadhaar card. Last October, a farm loan waiver program in Maharashtra state ran into trouble after officials discovered that 100 farmers had the same Aadhaar identity number.

The Modi government maintains that it takes both the security of personal data and the concerns of Aadhaar beneficiaries seriously. But it is reluctant to answer any questions about identity theft, corruption, privacy or misappropriated benefits. Neither Ajay Bhushan Pandey, the current CEO of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), which runs Aadhaar, nor Vikas Shukla, its spokesperson, responded to multiple requests for comment.

At a public rally in early May, Modi — who had himself opposed the program before he came to power in 2014 — called critics of Aadhaar “opponents of technology” unwilling to evolve with the times. Increasingly, though, many are questioning whether it’s Aadhaar’s own identity that has changed the most from when the idea first came up. “From a project of inclusion, it has become a project of exclusion,” says Usha Ramanathan, a lawyer who focuses on issues of development and poverty. Just ask Phoolmati.

Aadhaar was the brainchild of Nandan Nilekani, a former CEO of tech giant Infosys, who in a 2009 book argued that multiple forms of identification made it “difficult” to establish a “definitive identity” for India’s citizens.

A single identity linked to passports, PAN cards and other national databases, Nilekani argued, would not only solve this problem but also help eliminate the exasperating processes that India’s bureaucracy is notorious for — mountains of paper, proof of identity in triplicate and a glacial pace of work. It would help citizens avail government benefits that are rightfully theirs. Such a system would reduce a citizen’s dependence on distribution mechanisms susceptible to leakages and make “the moral scruples of our bureaucrats redundant,” Nilekani wrote. “An IT-enabled, accessible national ID system would be nothing less than revolutionary in how we distribute state benefits and welfare handouts.”

That same year, the Congress Party–led United Progressive Alliance government offered Nilekani a chance to translate his idea into reality, appointing him UIDAI chairman. Under Nilekani the UIDAI hired people from within the Indian bureaucracy as well as those outside it. The initial team of 50 included software engineers, designers and entrepreneurs from Silicon Valley as well as lawyers and policy wonks who worked at the head office in New Delhi. Each of the eight regional offices had a staff of 20.

In its early-stage avatar, the team had thought out solutions to problems such as the ones the residents of Kusumpur Pahari faced, says a policy consultant who worked with the UIDAI in 2010 and spoke on condition of anonymity. “You can use old methods and physically verify a person’s name and address [by going to their house] if biometrics aren’t working,” the consultant says. “It’s built into the architecture [of Aadhaar].” In his view, the current government under Modi — whose Bharatiya Janata Party defeated the Congress Party and came to power in 2014 — and the UIDAI setup have made a “mess” of the program. He also believes that the goal has shifted from inclusion to mass enrollment. Nilekani did not respond to a request for comment.

For sure, Aadhaar has staunch supporters too, who argue that it has helped reduce the misuse of government subsidies. In July 2017, India’s junior minister for consumer affairs, food and public distribution, C.R. Chaudhary, told the country’s Parliament that Aadhaar had helped the government delete nearly 25 million fake ration cards that the poor use to access subsidized food ingredients.

“This unnecessary fearmongering around Aadhaar is uncalled for,” says Sanjay Anandaram of iSpirit, a software industry think tank. In his view, it’s “last-mile deployment challenges” like fingerprint authentication, one-time-password systems and server glitches that need to be fixed, not Aadhaar. He juxtaposes anecdotal examples of people struggling to gain benefits with the “larger purpose” he believes Aadhaar serves. “It is a revolutionary system to ensure governance improves — especially for centrally administered programs,” he says.

The UIDAI has made some efforts too, if not to improve security of personal data then at least to allow citizens to check whether their Aadhaar identity has been misused. They can go online and view any occasions when their Aadhaar identity was used to access benefits.

But for millions of Indians dependent on subsidies, pensions, scholarships and other benefits, the concerns go well beyond privacy. Getting an Aadhaar identity can be a struggle. Earlier this year, the Punjab government conceded that it can’t process nearly 200,000 farm loan waiver claims either because intended beneficiaries don’t have Aadhaar cards or because the UIDAI is still processing their applications. At the same time, not signing on to Aadhaar is increasingly not an option. In February 2017, Chaudhary’s ministry made it mandatory for individuals to have an Aadhaar card to access subsidized food grains. Then, in October, an 11-year-old girl died of starvation in the central state of Jharkhand because the local ration dealer refused to give her family food grains for six months, as they had not linked their ration cards to Aadhaar. Facing criticism, the government asked states not to deny the poor the food grains they are entitled to, but the incident underscored how the Aadhaar initiative is cutting the needy off from subsidy access, rather than helping them, suggests Ramanathan, the lawyer. “People are dying because of Aadhaar,” she says.

But the Modi government has shown no signs of rethinking either the ways in which Aadhaar appears to hurt the poorest in Indian society or its data security protocols. Instead, it has appeared keener to target whistle-blowers pointing out weaknesses in the initiative.

It cost Rachna Khaira, a reporter, only 500 rupees ($7.50) to access the entire Aadhaar database — the names, addresses, fingerprint scans, iris scans, mobile phone numbers, email addresses, postal index numbers (PINs) and Aadhaar numbers of 830 million Indians. She “purchased” the service offered by anonymous sellers on WhatsApp and transferred the money via Paytm, a popular digital wallet company, to an “agent,” who created a “gateway” for Khaira. He then gave her a log-in ID and a password to that gateway, which allowed Khaira unrestricted access to the Aadhaar database. Her report, published in January in The Tribune, one of India’s oldest English dailies, created a national stir. Instead of trying to plug the holes the report had revealed, the UIDAI filed criminal cases against Khaira and the newspaper, accusing them of breaching privacy.

Khaira’s wasn’t the first piece of evidence to expose the vulnerability of the Aadhaar database. In May 2017, a report by the Centre for Internet and Society, a nonprofit organization, claimed that 130 million to 135 million Aadhaar numbers were published on four websites: the National Social Assistance Programme, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme and two projects run by Andhra Pradesh state. “This is the largest exercise in the world of the conversion of public information into an asset and then its privatization,” says Nikhil Pahwa, editor of MediaNama and a critic of Aadhaar.

These breaches of security highlight corruption and mismanagement that belie claims the government continues to peddle. In April 2017, Ravi Shankar Prasad, India’s minister of information and technology, told Parliament that “Aadhaar is robust. Aadhaar is safe. Aadhaar is secure, and totally accountable.” The government hasn’t appeared too perturbed by privacy concerns. On July 22, 2015, Mukul Rohatgi, the then attorney general, argued before the country’s Supreme Court that “the right of privacy is not a guaranteed right under our constitution.” That set off a two-year-long hearing before a nine-judge bench of the court, which unanimously ruled in 2017 that the right to privacy was indeed a fundamental right.

The criticism from social groups Aadhaar was meant to benefit, though, has left the Modi administration on the defensive. Since the passage of the 2016 Aadhaar law, civil society activists have filed 12 petitions in the Supreme Court challenging its legality. In January, the All India Kisan Sabha, one of India’s largest farmer organizations with millions of members, petitioned the top court against government moves to link subsidies to Aadhaar identities. Some leaders from Modi’s party, the BJP, have also started questioning their own government in Parliament about cases of beneficiaries denied their due because of the Aadhaar program. The Supreme Court, which is holding regular hearings on the case, has extended indefinitely the date by which citizens must link all identity documents to their Aadhaar number, until it rules on the validity of the legislation. At stake is the trust the Indian people can place in their government.

Back in Kusumpur Pahari, much of that trust has already eroded. In his 2014 election campaign, Modi had promised to stand guard as a chaukidaar (watchman) over the country’s resources, to prevent corruption. But when someone illegally withdrew Phoolmati’s grains by using her Aadhaar identity, the watchman wasn’t able to stop the theft.

For Phoolmati and other residents of Kusumpur Pahari, their ration cards guaranteed them food, and were a rare pillar of certainty in an unstable life. The Aadhaar-linked fingerprint authentication system is a source of frustration, and they don’t want it, they make clear at their weekly meeting. They now get their ration some months, and other months they don’t. Life on the fringes of society was already tough. Aadhaar, they say, has made it harder still.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/ozy-aayush-soni-may-11-2018-indias-national-id-project-brings-pain-to-those-it-aims-to-help

India's National Cyber Security Policy in Review

jon — 2013-07-31T10:40:22Z

Earlier this month, the Department of Electronics and Information Technology released India’s first National Cyber Security Policy. Years in the making, the Policy sets high goals for cyber security in India and covers a wide range of topics, from institutional frameworks for emergency response to indigenous capacity building.

What the Policy achieves in breadth, however, it often lacks in depth. Vague, cursory language ultimately prevents the Policy from being anything more than an aspirational document. In order to translate the Policy’s goals into an effective strategy, a great deal more specificity and precision will be required.

The Scope of National Cyber Security

Where such precision is most required is in definitions. Having no legal force itself, the Policy arguably does not require the sort of legal precision one would expect of an act of Parliament, for example. Yet the Policy deals in terms plagued with ambiguity, cyber security not the least among them. In forgoing basic definitions, the Policy fails to define its own scope, and as a result it proves remarkably broad and arguably unfocused.

The Policy’s preamble comes close to defining cyber security in paragraph 5 when it refers to "cyber related incident[s] of national significance" involving "extensive damage to the information infrastructure or key assets…[threatening] lives, economy and national security." Here at least is a picture of cyber security on a national scale, a picture which would be quite familiar to Western policymakers: computer security practices "fundamental to both protecting government secrets and enabling national defence, in addition to protecting the critical infrastructures that permeate and drive the 21st century global economy."[*] The paragraph 5 definition of sorts becomes much broader, however, when individuals and businesses are introduced, and threats like identity theft are brought into the mix.

Here the Policy runs afoul of a common pitfall: conflating threats to the state or society writ large (e.g. cyber warfare, cyber espionage, cyber terrorism) with threats to businesses and individuals (e.g. fraud, identity theft). Although both sets of threats may be fairly described as cyber security threats, only the former is worthy of the term national cyber security. The latter would be better characterized as cyber crime. The distinction is an important one, lest cyber crime be “securitized,” or elevated to an issue of national security. National cyber security has already provided the justification for the much decried Central Monitoring System (CMS). Expanding the range of threats subsumed under this rubric may provide a pretext for further surveillance efforts on a national scale.

Apart from mission creep, this vague and overly broad conception of national cyber security risks overwhelming an as yet underdeveloped system with more responsibilities than it may be able to handle. Where cyber crime might be left up to the police, its inclusion alongside true national-level cyber security threats in the Policy suggests it may be handled by the new "nodal agency" mentioned in section IV. Thus clearer definitions would not only provide the Policy with a more focused scope, but they would also make for a more efficient distribution of already scarce resources.

What It Get Right

Definitions aside, the Policy actually gets a lot of things right — at least as an aspirational document. It certainly covers plenty of ground, mentioning everything from information sharing to procedures for risk assessment / risk management to supply chain security to capacity building. It is a sketch of what could be a very comprehensive national cyber security strategy, but without more specifics, it is unlikely to reach its full potential. Overall, the Policy is much of what one might expect from a first draft, but certain elements stand out as worthy of special consideration.

First and foremost, the Policy should be commended for its commitment to “[safeguarding] privacy of citizen’s data” (sic). Privacy is an integral component of cyber security, and in fact other states’ cyber security strategies have entire segments devoted specifically to privacy. India’s Policy stands to be more specific as to the scope of these safeguards, however. Does the Policy aim primarily to safeguard data from criminals? Foreign agents? Could it go so far as to protect user data even from its own agents? Indeed this commitment to privacy would appear at odds with the recently unveiled CMS. Rather than merely paying lip service to the concept of online privacy, the government would be well advised to pass legislation protecting citizens’ privacy and to use such legislation as the foundation for a more robust cyber security strategy.

The Policy also does well to advocate “fiscal schemes and incentives to encourage entities to install, strengthen and upgrade information infrastructure with respect to cyber security.” Though some have argued that such regulation would impose inordinate costs on private businesses, anyone with a cursory understanding of computer networks and microeconomics could tell you that “externalities in cybersecurity are so great that even the freest free market would fail”—to quote expert Bruce Schneier. In less academic terms, a network is only as strong as its weakest link. While it is true that many larger enterprises take cyber security quite seriously, small and medium-sized businesses either lack immediate incentives to invest in security (e.g. no shareholders to answer to) or more often lack the basic resources to do so. Some form of government transfer for cyber security related investments could thus go a long way toward shoring up the country’s overall security.

The Policy also “[encourages] wider usage of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) within Government for trusted communication and transactions.” It is surprising, however, that the Policy does not mandate the usage of PKI. In general, the document provides relatively few details on what specific security practices operators of Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) can or should implement.

Where It Goes Wrong

One troubling aspect of the Policy is its ambiguous language with respect to acquisition policies and supply chain security in general. The Policy, for example, aims to “[mandate] security practices related to the design, acquisition, development, use and operation of information resources” (emphasis added). Indeed, section VI, subsection A, paragraph 8 makes reference to the “procurement of indigenously manufactured ICT products,” presumably to the exclusion of imported goods. Although supply chain security must inevitably factor into overall cyber security concerns, such restrictive acquisition policies could not only deprive critical systems of potentially higher-quality alternatives but—depending on the implementation of these policies—could also sharpen the vulnerabilities of these systems.

Not only do these preferential acquisition policies risk mandating lower quality products, but it is unlikely they will be able to keep pace with the rapid pace of innovation in information technology. The United States provides a cautionary tale. The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), tasked with producing cyber security standards for operators of critical infrastructure, made its first update to a 2005 set of standards earlier this year. Other regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) move at a marginally faster pace yet nevertheless are delayed by bureaucratic processes. FERC has already moved to implement Version 5 of its Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards, nearly a year before the deadline for Version 4 compliance. The need for new standards thus outpaces the ability of industry to effectively implement them.

Fortunately, U.S. cyber security regulation has so-far been technology-neutral. Operators of Critical Information Infrastructure are required only to ensure certain functionalities and not to procure their hardware and software from any particular supplier. This principle ensures competition and thus security, allowing CII operators to take advantage of the most cutting-edge technologies regardless of name, model, etc. Technology neutrality does of course raise risks, such as those emphasized by the Government of India regarding Huawei and ZTE in 2010. Risk assessment must, however, remain focused on the technology in question and avoid politicization. India’s cyber security policy can be technology neutral as long as it follows one additional principle: trust but verify.

Verification may be facilitated by the use of free and open-source software (FOSS). FOSS provides security through transparency as opposed to security through obscurity and thus enables more agile responses to security responses. Users can identify and patch bugs themselves, or otherwise take advantage of the broader user community for such fixes. Thus open-source software promotes security in much the same way that competitive markets do: by accepting a wide range of inputs.

Despite the virtues of FOSS, there are plenty of good reasons to run proprietary software, e.g. fitness for purpose, cost, and track record. Proprietary software makes verification somewhat more complicated but not impossible. Source code escrow agreements have recently gained some traction as a verification measure for proprietary software, even with companies like Huawei and ZTE. In 2010, the infamous Chinese telecommunications giants persuaded the Indian government to lift its earlier ban on their products by concluding just such an agreement. Clearly trust but verify is imminently practicable, and thus technology neutrality.

What’s Missing

Level of detail aside, what is most conspicuously absent from the new Policy is any framework for institutional cooperation beyond 1) the designation of CERT-In “as a Nodal Agency for coordination of all efforts for cyber security emergency response and crisis management” and 2) the designation of the “National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC) to function as the nodal agency for critical information infrastructure protection in the country.” The Policy mentions additionally “a National nodal agency to coordinate all matters related to cyber security in the country, with clearly defined roles & responsibilities.” Some clarity with regard to roles and responsibilities would certainly be in order. Even among these three agencies—assuming they are all distinct—it is unclear who is to be responsible for what.

More confusing still is the number of other pre-existing entities with cyber security responsibilities, in particular the National Technical Research Organization (NTRO), which in an earlier draft of the Policy was to have authority over the NCIIPC. The Ministry of Defense likewise has bolstered its cyber security and cyber warfare capabilities in recent years. Is it appropriate for these to play a role in securing civilian CII? Finally, the already infamous Central Monitoring System, justified predominantly on the very basis of cyber security, receives no mention at all. For a government that is only now releasing its first cyber security policy, India has developed a fairly robust set of institutions around this issue. It is disappointing that the Policy does not more fully address questions of roles and responsibilities among government entities.

Not only is there a lack of coordination among government cyber security entities, but there is no mention of how the public and private sectors are to cooperate on cyber security information—other than oblique references to “public-private partnerships.” Certainly there is a need for information sharing, which is currently facilitated in part by the sector-level CERTS. More interesting, however, is the question of liability for high-impact cyber attacks. To whom are private CII operators accountable in the event of disruptive cyber attacks on their systems? This legal ambiguity must necessarily be resolved in conjunction with the “fiscal schemes and incentives” also alluded to in the Policy in order to motivate strong cyber security practices among all CII operators and the public more broadly.

Next Steps

India’s inaugural National Cyber Security Policy is by and large a step in the right direction. It covers many of the most pressing issues in national cyber security and lays out a number of ambitious goals, ranging from capacity building to robust public-private partnerships. To realize these goals, the government will need a much more detailed roadmap.

Firstly, the extent of the government’s proposed privacy safeguards must be clarified and ideally backed by a separate piece of privacy legislation. As Benjamin Franklin once said, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.” When it comes to cyberspace, the Indian people must demand both liberty and safety.

Secondly, the government should avoid overly preferential acquisition policies and allow risk assessments to be technologically rather than politically driven. Procurement should moreover be technology-neutral. Open source software and source code escrow agreements can facilitate the verification measures that make technology neutrality work.

Finally, to translate this policy into a sound strategy will necessarily require that India’s various means be directed toward specific ends. The Policy hints at organizational mapping with references to CERT-In and the NCIIPC, but the roles and responsibilities of other government agencies as well as the private sector remain underdetermined. Greater clarity on these points would improve inter-agency and public-private cooperation—and thus, one hopes, security—significantly.

[*]. Melissa E. Hathaway and Alexander Klimburg, “Preliminary Considerations: On National Cyber Security” in National Cyber Security Framework Manual, ed. Alexander Klimburg, (Tallinn, Estonia: Nato Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2012), 13

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/indias-national-cyber-security-policy-in-review

India's Latest Data Leak: People's Aadhaar Number And Bank Account Are Just One Google Search Away

Admin — 2018-07-13T15:18:46Z

Even Truecaller doesn't reveal this much.

The article by Gopal Sathe was published in Huffington Post on July 12, 2018.

Imagine being able to hack someone's personal data simply by entering their mobile phone number into a Google search. There is a website of the Andhra Pradesh government that's leaking people's phone numbers, Aadhaar numbers, father's names, passbook and bank account numbers, and the district and mandal where they live - all the link to all this information is the first result you get when you search for the phone numbers of people in the database.

The Andhra government has been leaking the personal data of more than 23,000 farmers who have received subsidies from the Andhra Pradesh Medicinal and Aromatic Plants Board, and organisation that encourages the growth of Ayurvedic medicines in the state. The subsidies are offered to farmers and tribals in the state, and all their personal data is available on an open database on an Andhra Government website.

The information is not behind any access control, and you can see all the records, click on them to get the details of anyone, or download everything as an Excel sheet. But what's perhaps worse is that simply by searching for the phone numbers of many of these farmers, we were able to find the detailed information about them. HuffPost India randomly chose a dozen farmers, and in each case, this database was the first result for their phone number on Google.

That's the most concerning part - in most cases, even when the information has leaked, it isn't readily apparent to people. You have to know the website address, or at the very least spend some time poring through dashboards. In the case of this latest leak, all you need is the person's phone number, and all their information is made visible. HuffPost India has reported this issue to the AP government, much like earlier leaks, although at the time of writing the data is still available online.

Who's held responsible?

This is just the latest in a long line of leaks from AP - in just the last few months, we've reported on a website that let you geo-locate homes on the basis of caste and religion; while another tracked all the medicines people buy, such as generic viagra, along with their phone numbers; and one that tracked pregnant women in ambulances in real time.

A government official we spoke to in AP Secretariat said that while all the departments have been digitised, an understanding of security - and privacy - is yet to come. "Even if you tell them, 'this data is not something you can publish', they disagree and say that it is needed for the beneficiaries to be able to access their own information," he explained.

Karan Saini, a security analyst and consultant who writes on issues of web security and privacy, told HuffPost that the various government departments are generally unresponsive when breaches like this are brought up.

"Lack of outreach is an issue with all of these organisations," said Saini. "NCIIPC is the only one that can even be found by someone looking at the surface. [These organisations] are hard to get a response from."

One reason for this, said Srinivas Kodali, a security researcher who has revealed a tremendous amount of leaks in the AP system, is that there is no official system of accountability in the government when it comes to data leaks.

In May 2017, the AP government passed the Andhra Pradesh Core Digital Data Authority Act, under which in section 37 it states that no legal proceeding shall lie against any officer or employee for anything which is in good faith done. What this means is that leaks and breaches are not something any official in the government can be held responsible for.

This act came out less than a month after the Centre for Internet and Society in Bengaluru published a report stating that 13 crore Aadhaar numbers were leaked - of which 2 crore were from Andhra Pradesh.

A lack of (human) resources

AP officials do acknowledge the problem. "There is a major shortage of cybersecurity professionals, and hiring them is a challenge," said V Premchand, head of the Andhra Pradesh Technology Service, who is in charge of the ongoing security work in the state. AP has seen a major security audit in May this year, and a privacy audit was announced last month.

"The work is ongoing but it is not something that can happen overnight," Premchand explained. However, others argue that the government isn't doing enough to make use of existing manpower. Unlike other countries, the Indian government does not have any real bug bounty program, where security researchers are incentivised to report weaknesses to organisations for cash rewards and recognition.

Sai Krishna Kothapalli, a student at IIT Guwahati and a security researcher, told HuffPost that the government actively discourages security experts from providing their support, rather than encouraging them.

"The US Department of Defense and others have a responsible disclosure program and a lot of people from India take part in that," he said. "Our talent is being used by them instead because the government here does not reply at all."

"India's top hackers are being employed by people outside the country, even though we have the talent here, because will you spend the time and effort to be ignored here, or report issues to a US company and make thousands of dollars instead?"

However, security audits in India are only being carried out by agencies that have been empaneled, and most of the hackers active here don't have the certification, he added. "They're too busy actually doing the work, while these big companies do audits, and leave all kinds of security issues behind."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/huffington-post-gopal-sathe-july-12-2018-indias-latest-data-leak-is-so-basic-that-peoples-aadhaar-number-bank-account-and-fathers-name-are-just-one-google-search-away

India's Internet Privacy Woes

praskrishna — 2013-09-05T11:09:30Z

“For the sake of national security and to protect the privacy of its citizens, India should develop its own social media platforms,” says Dr Kamlesh Bajaj, CEO of Data Security Council of India (DSCI), a Nasscom-promoted ‘self-regulatory’ organisation on data protection and privacy in India, in a blog post dated August 13.

This article by Rohin Dharmakumar was published in Forbes India on August 26, 2013. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

Citing a litany of woes, including American control over internet infrastructure, Bajaj makes the case for India to take a leaf out of China’s playbook (“even though its reasons were different”) and encourages the creation of “Indian” social media sites and search engines.

“Unfortunately, Dr Bajaj provides a wrong solution to a correct diagnosis,” says Pranesh Prakash, a policy director with the Centre for Internet and Society. “First, I can’t think of any governmental intervention—short of a ban on existing foreign services—that can make a new Indian service successful. Second, India’s privacy laws are worse than those in the US. Nothing will stop the US and Indian governments from coming after this company too.”

The problem arises because services like Facebook and Google store all your data unencrypted on their servers, making it easy for them, or governments and hackers, to monitor everything you do. The correct solution, says Prakash, would be to encourage the creation and use of de-centralised and end-to-end encrypted services that do not store all your data in one place.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/forbesindia-august-26-2013-india-internet-privacy-woes

India's Identity Crisis

malavika — 2014-01-09T07:56:08Z

Malavika Jayaram's article was published in 2013 Internet Monitor Annual Report: Reflections on the Digital World, published by Harvard's Berkman Center for Internet and Society.

India’s Unique Identity (UID) project is already the world’s largest biometrics identity program, and it is still growing. Almost 530 million people have been registered in the project database, which collects all ten fingerprints, iris scans of both eyes, a photograph, and demographic information for each registrant. Supporters of the project tout the UID as a societal game changer. The extensive biometric information collected, they argue, will establish the uniqueness of each individual, eliminate fraud, and provide the identity infrastructure needed to develop solutions for a range of problems. Despite these potential benefits, however, critical concerns remain about the UID’s legal and physical architecture as well as about unforeseen risks associated with the linking and analysis of personal data.

The most basic concerns regarding the UID project stem from the fact that biometric technologies have never been tested on such a large population. As a result, well-founded concerns exist around scalability, false acceptance and rejection rates, and the project’s core premise that biometrics can uniquely and unambiguously identify people in a foolproof manner. Some of these concerns are based on technical issues—collecting fingerprints and iris scans “in the field,” for instance, can be complicated when a registrant’s fingerprints are eroded by manual labor or her irises are affected by malnutrition and cataracts. Other concerns relate to the project’s federated implementation architecture, which, by outsourcing collection to a massive group of private and public registrars and operators, increases the chance for data breaches, error, and fraud.

Perhaps even more vexing are concerns regarding how the UID, which promises financial inclusion (by reducing the identification barriers to opening bank accounts, for example), might in fact lead to new types of exclusion for already marginalized groups. Members of the LGBT community, for instance, question whether the inclusion of the transgender category within the UID scheme is a laudable attempt at inclusion, or a new means of listing and targeting members of their community for exclusion. More fundamentally, as more and more services and benefits are linked to the UID, the project threatens to exclude all those who cannot or will not participate in the scheme due to logistical failures or philosophical objections.

It is worth noting that the UID is not the only large data project in India. A slew of “Big Brother” projects exist: the Centralised Monitoring System (CMS), the Telephone Call Interception System (TCIS), the National Population Register (NPR), the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS), and the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), which is working to aggregate up to 21 different databases relating to tax, rail and air travel, credit card transactions, immigration, and other domains. The UID is intended to serve as a common identifier across these databases, creating a massive surveillance state. It also facilitates an ecosystem where access to goods and services, from government subsidies to drivers’ licenses to mobile phones to cooking gas, increasingly requires biometric authentication.

The UID project was originally vaunted as voluntary, but the inexorable slippery slope toward compulsory participation has triggered a series of lawsuits challenging the legality of forced enrollment and the constitutionality of the entire project. Most recently, in September 2013, India’s federal Supreme Court affirmed by way of an interim decision that the UID was not mandatory, that not possessing a UID should not disadvantage anybody, and that citizenship should be ascertained as a criteria for registering in order to ensure that UIDs are not issued to illegal immigrants. This last stipulation is particularly thorny given that the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI, the body in charge of the UID project) has consistently distanced the UID from questions of citizenship under the justification that it is a matter beyond their remit (i.e., the UID is open to residents, and is not linked to citizenship). The government moved quickly to urge a modification of the order, but the Supreme Court declined to do so and will instead release its final decision after it reviews a batch of petitions from activists and others. The UIDAI approached the court, arguing that not making the UID mandatory has serious consequences for welfare schemes, but the court recently ordered the federal government, the Reserve Bank of India, and the Election Commission to delink the LPG cooking gas scheme from the UID. This is a considerable setback for the project, given that this was one of the most hyped linkages for the UID. It remains to be seen whether the court will similarly halt other attempts to make the UID mandatory.

In the meantime, the UID project is effectively being implemented in a legal vacuum without support from the Supreme Court or Parliament. The Cabinet is seeking to rectify this and has cleared a bill that would finally provide legal backing for the UID program—its previous attempt was rejected by the Standing Committee on Finance in 2010. This bill is scheduled to come up for debate during the winter session of Parliament. The bill’s progress, along with the final decision of the Supreme Court, will have far reaching consequences for the UID project’s implementation and longevity, as well as for the relationship between India’s citizens and the state.

If fully implemented, the UID system will fundamentally alter the way in which citizens interact with the government by creating a centrally controlled, technology-based standard that mediates access to social services and benefits, financial systems, telecommunications, and governance. It will undoubtedly also have implications for how citizens relate to private sector entities, on which the UID rests and which have their own vested interests in the data. The success or failure of the UID represents a critical moment for India. Whatever course the country takes, its decision to travel further toward or turn away from becoming a “database nation” will have implications for democracy, free speech, and economic justice within its own borders and also in the many neighboring countries that look to it as a technological standard bearer.

The Indian government seems to envision “big data” as a panacea for fraud, corruption, and abuse, but it has given little attention to understanding and addressing the fraud, corruption, and abuse that massive databases can themselves engender. The government’s actions have yet to demonstrate an appreciation for the fact that the matrix of identity and surveillance schemes it has implemented can create a privacy-invading technology layer that is not only a barrier to online activity but also to social participation writ large.

The lack of identification documents for a large portion of the Indian population does need to be addressed. Whether the UID project is the best means to do this—whether it has the right architecture and design, whether it can succeed without an overhaul of several other failures of governmental institutions, and whether fixing the identity piece alone causes more harm than good—should be the subject of intense debate and scrutiny. Only through rigorous threat modeling and analysis of the risks arising out of this burgeoning “data industrial complex” can steps be taken to stem the potential repercussions of the project not just for identity management, fraud, corruption, distributive justice, and welfare generally, but also for autonomy, openness, and democracy.

Click to download the article published in the annual report of Berkman's Center for Internet and Society (PDF 7223 Kb)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/internet-monitor-2013-malavika-jayaram-indias-identity-crisis

India's Data Protection Framework Will Need to Treat Privacy as a Social and Not Just an Individual Good

amber — 2018-05-18T06:22:57Z

The idea that technological innovations may compete with privacy of individuals assumes that there is social and/or economic good in allowing unrestricted access to data. However, it must be remembered that data is potentially a toxic asset, if it is not collected, processed, secured and shared in the appropriate way.

Published in Economic & Political Weekly, Volume 53, Issue No. 18, 05 May, 2018. Article can be accessed online here.

In July 2017, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeITy) in India set up a committee headed by a former judge, B N Srikrishna, to address the growing clamour for privacy protections at a time when both private collection of data and public projects like Aadhaar are reported to pose major privacy risks (Maheshwari 2017). The Srikrishna Committee is in the process of providing its input, which will go on to inform India’s data-protection law.

While the committee released a white paper with provisional views, seeking feedback a few months ago, it may be discussing a data protection framework without due consideration to how data practices have evolved.

In early 2018, a series of stories based on investigative journalism by Guardianand Observer revealed that the data of 87 million Facebook users was used for the Trump campaign by a political consulting firm, Cambridge Analytica, without their permissions. Aleksandr Kogan, a psychology researcher at the University of Cambridge, created an application called “thisisyourdigitallife” and collected data from 270,000 participants through a personality test using Facebook’s application programming interface (API), which allows developers to integrate with various parts of the Facebook platform (Fruchter et al 2018). This data was collected purportedly for academic research purposes only. Kogan’s application also collected profile data from each of the participants’ friends, roughly 87 million people.

The kinds of practices concerning the sharing and processing of data exhibited in this case are not unique. These are, in fact, common to the data economy in India as well. It can be argued that the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica incident is representative of data practices in the data-driven digital economy. These new practices pose important questions for data protection laws globally, and how these may need to evolve to address data protection, particularly for India, which is in the process of drafting its own data protection law.

Privacy as Control

Most modern data protection laws focus on individual control. In this context, the definition by the late Alan Westin (2015) characterises privacy as:

The claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to other.

The idea of “privacy as control” is what finds articulation in data protection policies across jurisdictions, beginning with the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPP) from the United States (US) (Dixon 2006). These FIPPs are the building blocks of modern information privacy law (Schwartz 1999) and not only play a significant role in the development of privacy laws in the US, but also inform data protection laws in most privacy regimes internationally (Rotenberg 2001), including the nine “National Privacy Principles” articulated by the Justice A P Shah Committee in India. Much of this approach is also reflected in the white paper released by the committee, led by Justice Srikrishna, towards the creation of data protection laws in India (Srikrishna 2017)

This approach essentially involves the following steps (Cate 2006):

(i) Data controllers are required to tell individuals what data they wish to collect and use and give them a choice to share the data.
(ii) Upon sharing, the individuals have rights such as being granted access, and data controllers have obligations such as securing the data with appropriate technologies and procedures, and only using it for the purposes identified.

The objective in this approach is to make the individual empowered and allow them to weigh their own interests in exercising their consent. The allure of this paradigm is that, in one elegant stroke, it seeks to “ensure that consent is informed and free and thereby also (seeks) to implement an acceptable tradeoff between privacy and competing concerns.” (Sloan and Warner 2014). This approach is also easy to enforce for both regulators and businesses. Data collectors and processors only need to ensure that they comply with their privacy policies, and can thus reduce their liability while, theoretically, consumers have the information required to exercise choice. In recent years, however, the emergence of big data, the “Internet of Things,” and algorithmic decision-making has significantly compromised the notice and consent model (Solove 2013).

Limitations of Consent

Some cognitive problems, such as long and difficult to understand privacy notices, have always existed with regard to the issue of informed consent, but lately these problems have become aggravated. Privacy notices often come in the form of long legal documents, much to the detriment of the readers’ ability to understand them. These policies are “long, complicated, full of jargon and change frequently” (Cranor 2012).

Kent Walker (2001) lists five problems that privacy notices typically suffer from:

(i) Overkill: Long and repetitive text in small print.
(ii) Irrelevance: Describing situations of little concern to most consumers.
(iii) Opacity: Broad terms that reflect limited truth, and are unhelpful to track and control the information collected and stored.
(iv) Non-comparability: Simplification required to achieve comparability will lead to compromising of accuracy.
(v) Inflexibility: Failure to keep pace with new business models.

Today, data is collected continuously with every use of online services, making it humanly impossible to exercise meaningful consent.
The quantity of data being generated is expanding at an exponential rate. With connected devices, smartphones, appliances transmitting data about our usage, and even the smart cities themselves, data now streams constantly from almost every sector and function of daily life, “creating countless new digital puddles, lakes, tributaries and oceans of information” (Bollier 2010).

The infinitely complex nature of the data ecosystem renders consent of little value in cases where individuals may be able to read and comprehend privacy notices. As the uses of data are so diverse, and often not limited by a purpose identified at the beginning, individuals cannot conceptualise how their data will be aggregated and possibly used or reused.

Seemingly innocuous bits of data revealed at different stages could be combined to reveal sensitive information about the individual. While the regulatory framework is designed such that individuals are expected to engage in cost–benefit analysis of trading their data to avail services, this ecosystem makes such individual analysis impossible.

Conflicts Between Big Data and Individual Control

The thrust of big data technologies is that the value of data resides not in its primary purposes, but in its numerous secondary purposes, where data is reused many times over (Schoenberger and Cukier 2013).

On the other hand, the idea of privacy as control draws from the “data minimisation” principle, which requires organisations to limit the collection of personal data to the minimum extent necessary to obtain their legitimate purpose and to delete data no longer required. Control is excercised and privacy is enhanced by ensuring data minimisation. These two concepts are in direct conflict. Modern data-driven businesses want to retain as much data as possible for secondary uses. Since these secondary uses are, by their nature, unanticipated, their practices run counter to the very principle of purpose limitation (Tene and Polonetsky 2012).

It is evident from such data-sharing practices, as demonstrated by the Cambridge Analytica–Facebook story, that platform architectures are designed with a clear view to collect as much data as possible. This is amply demonstrated by the provision of a “friends permission” feature by Facebook on its platform to allow individuals to share information not just about themselves, but also about their friends. For the principle of informed consent to be meaningfully implemented, it is necessary for users to have access to information about intended data practices, purposes and usage, so they consciously share data about themselves.

In reality, however, privacy policies are more likely to serve as liability disclaimers for companies than any kind of guarantee of privacy for consumers. A case in point is Mark Zuckerberg’s facile claim that there was no “data-breach" in the Cambridge Analytica–Facebook incident. Instead of asking each of the 87 million users whether they wanted their data to be collected and shared further, Facebook designed a platform that required consent in any form only from 270,000 users. Not only were users denied the opportunity to give consent, their consent was assumed through a feature which was on by default. This is representative of how privacy trade-offs are conceived by current data-driven business models. Participation in a digital ecosystem is by itself deemed as users’ consent to relinquish control over how their data is collected, who may have access to it, and what purposes it may be used for.

Yet, Zuckerberg would have us believe that the primary privacy issue of concern is not about how his platform enabled the collection of users’ data without their explicit consent, but in the subsequent unauthorised sharing of the data by Kogan. Zuckerberg’s insistence that collection of data of people without their consent is not a data breach is reminiscent of the UIDAI’s recent claims in India that publication of Aadhaar numbers and related information by several government websites is not a data breach, so long as its central biometric database in secure (Sharma 2018). In such cases also, the intended architecture ensured the seeding of other databases with Aadhaar numbers, thus creating multiple potential points of failure through disclosure. Similarly, the design flaws in direct benefit transfers enabled Airtel to create payments bank accounts with the customers’ knowledge (Hindu Business Line 2017). Such claims clearly suggest the very limited responsibility data controllers (both public and private) are willing to take for personal data that they collect, while wilfully facilitating and encouraging data practices which may lead to greater risk to data.

On this note, it is also relevant to point out that the Srikrishna committee white paper begins with identifying informational privacy and data innovation as its two key objectives. It states that “a firm legal framework for data protection is the foundation on which data-driven innovation and entrepreneurship can flourish in India.”

Conversations around privacy and data have become inevitably linked to the idea of technological innovation as a competing interest. Before engaging in such conversations, it is important to acknowledge that the value of innovation as a competing interest itself is questionable. It is not a competing right, nor a legitimate public interest endeavour, nor a proven social good.

The idea that in policymaking, technological innovations may compete with privacy of individuals assumes that there is social and/or economic good in allowing unrestricted access to data. The social argument is premised on the promises of mathematical models and computational capacity being capable of identifying key insights from data. In turn, these insights may be useful in public and private decision-making. However, it must be remembered that data is potentially a toxic asset, if it is not collected, processed, secured and shared in the appropriate way. Sufficient research suggests that indiscriminate data collection is greatly increasing the ratio of noise to signal, and can lead to erroneous insights. Further, the greater the amount of data you collect, the greater is the attack surface that leads to cybersecurity risks. Further, incidents such as Facebook–Cambridge Analytica demonstrate that toxicity of data in various ways and underscores the need for data regulation at every stage of the data lifecycle (Scheiner 2016). These are important tempering factors that need to be kept in mind while evaluating data innovation as a key mover of policy or regulation.

Privacy as Social Good

As long as privacy is framed as arising primarily from individual control, data controllers will continue to engage in practices that compromise the ability to exercise choice. There is a need to view privacy as a social good, and policymaking should ensure its preservation and enhancement. Contractual protections and legal sanctions can themselves do little if platform architectures are designed to do the exact opposite.

More importantly, policymaking needs to recognise privacy not merely as an individual right, available for individuals to forego when engaging with data-driven business models, but also as a social good. The recognition of something as a social good deems it desirable by definition, and a legitimate goal of law and policy, rather than rely completely on market forces for its achievement.

The Puttaswamy judgment (K Puttaswamy v Union of India 2017) lends sufficient weight to privacy’s social value by identifying it as fundamental to any individual development through its dependence on solitude, anonymity, and temporary releases from social duties.

Sociological scholarship demonstrates that different types of social relationships, be it Gesellschaft (interest groups and acquaintances) or Gemeinschaft (friendship, love, and marriage), and the nature of these relationships depend on the ability to conceal certain things (Simmel 1906). Demonstrating this in the context of friendships, it has been stated that such relationships “present a very peculiar synthesis in regard to the question of discretion, of reciprocal revelation and concealment.” Friendships, much like most other social relationships, are very much dependent on our ability to selectively present ourselves to others. Contrast this with Zuckerberg’s stated aim of making the world more “open” where information about people flows freely and effectively without any individual control. Contrast this also with government projects such as the Aadhaar which intends to act as one universal identity which can provide a 360-degree view of citizens.

Other scholars such as Julie Cohen (2012) and Anita Allen (2011) have demonstrated that data that a person produces or has control over concerns both herself and others. Individuals can be exposed not only because of their own actions and choices, but also made vulnerable merely because others have been careless with their data. This point is amply demonstrated in the Facebook–Cambridge Analytica incident. What this means is that protection of privacy requires not just individual action, but in a sense, requires group co-ordination. It is my argument that this group interest of privacy as a social good must be the basis of policymaking and regulation of data in the future, in addition to the idea of privacy as an individual right. In the absence of attention to the social good aspect of privacy, individual consumers are left to their own devices to negotiate their privacy trade-offs with large companies and governments and are significantly compromised.

What this translates into is a regulatory framework and data protection frameworks should not be value-neutral in their conception of privacy as a facet of individual control. The complete reliance of data regulation on the data subject to make an informed choice is, in my opinion, an idea that has run its course. If privacy is viewed as a social good, then the data protection framework, including the laws and the architecture must be designed with a view to protect it, rather than leave it entirely to the market forces.

The Way Forward

Data protection laws need to be re-evaluated, and policymakers must recognise Lawrence Lessig’s dictum that “code is law.” Like laws, architecture and norms can play a fundamental role in regulation. Regulatory intervention for technology need not mean regulation of technology only, but also how technology itself may be leveraged for regulation (Lessig 2006; Reidenberg 1998). It is key that the latter is not left only in the hands of private players.
Zuckerberg, in his testimony (Washington Post 2018) before the United States Senate's Commerce and Judiciary committees, asserted that "AI tools" are central to any strategy for addressing hate speech, fake news, and manipulations that use data ecosystems for targeting.

What is most concerning in his testimony is the complete lack of mention of standards, public scrutiny and peer-review processes, which “AI tools” and regulatory technologies need to be subject to. Further, it cannot be expected that data-driven businesses will view privacy as a social good or be publicly accountable.

As policymakers in India gear up for writing the country’s data protection law, they must acknowledge that their responsibility extends to creating norms and principles that will inform future data-driven platforms and regulatory technologies.

Since issues of privacy and data protection will have to be increasingly addressed at the level of how architectures enable data collection, and more importantly how data is used after collection, policymakers must recognise that being neutral about these practices is no longer enough. They must take normative positions on data collection, processing and sharing practices. These positions cannot be implemented through laws only, but need to be translated into technological solutions and norms. Unless a multipronged approach comprising laws, architecture and norms is adopted, India’s new data protection regime may end up with limited efficacy.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/epw-amber-sinha-may-18-2018-for-indias-data-protection-regime-to-be-efficient-policymakers-should-treat-privacy-as-a-social-good

India's Contribution to Internet Governance Debates

Sunil Abraham, Mukta Batra, Geetha Hariharan, Swaraj Barooah and Akriti Bopanna — 2018-08-16T15:38:02Z

India's Contribution to Internet Governance Debates", an article by Sunil Abraham, Mukta Batra, Geetha Hariharan, Swaraj Barooah and Akriti Bopanna, was recently published in the NLUD Student Law Journal, an annual peer-reviewed journal published by the National Law University, Delhi.

Abstract

India is the leader that championed ‘access to knowledge’ and ‘access to medicine’. However, India holds seemingly conflicting views on the future of the Internet, and how it will be governed. India’s stance is evolving and is distinct from that of authoritarian states who do not care for equal footing and multi-stakeholderism.

Introduction

Despite John Perry Barlow’s defiant and idealistic Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace1 in 1996, debates about governing the Internet have been alive since the late 1990s. The tug-of-war over its governance continues to bubble among states, businesses, techies, civil society and users. These stakeholders have wondered who should govern the Internet or parts of it: Should it be the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)? The International Telecommunications Union (ITU)? The offspring of the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) - the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) or Enhanced Cooperation (EC) under the UN? Underlying this debate has been the role and power of each stakeholder at the decision-making table.States in both the global North and South have taken various positions on this issue.

Whether all stakeholders ought to have an equal say in governing the unique structure of the Internet or do states have sovereign public policy authority? India has, in the past, subscribed to the latter view. For instance, at WSIS in 2003, through Arun Shourie, then India’s Minister for Information Technology, India supported the move ‘requesting the Secretary General to set up a Working Group to think through issues concerning Internet Governance,’ offering him ‘considerable experience in this regard... [and] contribute in whatever way the Secretary General deems appropriate’. The United States (US), United Kingdom (UK) and New Zealand have expressed their support for ‘equal footing multi-stakeholderism’ and Australia subscribes to the status quo.

India’s position has been much followed, discussed and criticised. In this article, we trace and summarise India’s participation in the IGF, UN General Assembly (‘UNGA’), ITU and the NETmundial conference (April 2014) as a representative sample of Internet governance fora. In these fora, India has been represented by one of three arms of its government: the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY), the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The DeitY was converted to a full-fledged ministry in 2016 known as the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY). DeitY and DoT were part of the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) until 2016 when it was bifurcated into the Ministry of Communications and MeitY.

DeitY used to be and DoT still is, within the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT) in India. Though India has been acknowledged globally for championing ‘access to knowledge’ and ‘access to medicine’ at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and World Trade Organization (WTO), global civil society and other stakeholders have criticised India’s behaviour in Internet governance for reasons such as lack of continuity and coherence and for holding policy positions overlapping with those of authoritarian states.

We argue that even though confusion about the Indian position arises from a multiplicity of views held within the Indian government, India’s position, in totality, is distinct from those of authoritarian states. Since criticism of the Indian government became more strident in 2011, after India introduced a proposal at the UNGA for a UN Committee on Internet-related Policies (CIRP) comprising states as members, we will begin to trace India's position chronologically from that point onwards.

Download the paper published in NLUD Student Law Journal here
For a timeline of the events described in the article click here
Read the paper published by NLUD Student Law Journal on their website

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/nlud-student-law-journal-sunil-abraham-mukta-batra-geetha-hariharan-swaraj-barooah-and-akriti-bopanna-indias-contribution-to-internet-governance-debates