Centre for Internet and Society

New Bill to decide on individual’s right to privacy

praskrishna — 2012-02-07T07:19:07Z

A group of experts would identify issues relating to privacy and prepare a report to facilitate authoring the Privacy Bill. Vishwajoy Mukherjee's article was published in Tehelka on 6 February 2012.

American jurist William J Brennan once famously remarked, “If the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion.” Now the Government of India is on the verge of formulating, for the first time, a Privacy Bill that will lay down a specific framework to adjudicate an individual’s right to privacy.

The Planning Commission has constituted a small group of experts under the chairmanship of Justice A P Shah, former Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, to identify issues relating to privacy and prepare a paper to facilitate authoring the Privacy Bill. The group will be studying the privacy laws and related bills promulgated by other countries and will also be analysing the impact of various programmes being implemented by the government, from the perspective of their impact on privacy. A detailed report with suggestions and remarks will then be handed to the Planning Commission by 31 March.

In the run-up to the formulation of a new Privacy Bill in India, an All India Privacy Symposium was held on 4 February to discuss aspects of privacy in the context of transparency, national security and internet banking. One of the most vociferous oppositions to the idea of privacy becoming an enshrined right for individuals, has come from those who believe that national security is of paramount importance. “The notion that one has to choose between privacy and national security is a false dichotomy of choice… When the judiciary adjudicates between privacy and surveillance, privacy in almost all cases loses. Especially when the word terrorism is invoked,” said Oxblood Ruffin, a member of the Cult of the Dead Cow, an information security and publishing collective. Speaking at the conference Ruffin stressed on the idea that the State shouldn’t act as a “peeping Tom” but instead respect the “sovereignty of its people.”

One of the more stark examples, in recent years, of the State clamping down on individual rights, such as the right to privacy, on the pretext of national security, is the Patriot Act in America. The Patriot Act was passed in the United States of America in the immediate aftermath of the September 2001 attacks on the twin towers, and allowed the government to scrutinise everything from “suspicious” bank accounts to wire-tapping lines of communication. Menaka Guruswamy, a lawyer at the Supreme Court of India, believes that unlike America, India does not yet have a codified view on privacy. “Privacy is a vast, fragile, and an open space in the Indian justice system,” she told Tehelka.

Though India doesn’t have clearly defined laws dealing with the issue of privacy, it does have certain directives under which surveillance methods such as wire-tapping can be done. Wire-tapping, which is regulated under the Telegraph Act of 1885, saw a major overhaul in a 1996 Supreme Court judgment, which ruled that wire-taps are a "serious invasion of an individual's privacy." The Supreme Court (SC) recognised the fact that the right to privacy is an integral part of the fundamental right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, and therefore laid down guidelines defining who can tap phones and under what circumstances. Only the Union Home Secretary, or his counterpart in the states, can issue an order for a tap, and the government is also required to show that the information sought cannot to be obtained through any other means. The SC mandated the development of a high-level committee to review the legality of each wire-tap.

“Interceptions and intrusions by the state have often gone on to help exonerate people who have been falsely accused, so I think it would be unfair to demonise wire-tapping in general. One does have to ensure though, that those who intercept exchanges do not exceed limits,” said a former chief of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).

Besides the dimension of privacy versus surveillance, another important aspect which comes under the scanner when privacy laws are discussed is Internet banking. Details of personal bank accounts and other highly sensitive information of individuals have been whizzing around the cyber space with the advent of E-banking. Everything from booking tickets for movies and flights, to transferring money between accounts is happening via computers, and is happening fast. This growing trend has sparked a major debate on how safe is our information on the web, and what can the government do to secure it? In May 2000, the government passed the Information Technology Act, which laid down a set of laws intended to provide a comprehensive regulatory environment for electronic commerce.

The Act also addressed computer crimes such as hacking, damage to computer source code, breach of confidentiality and viewing of pornography and created a Cyber Appellate Tribunal to oversee and adjudicate cyber crimes. However, at the same time, the legislation gave broad discretion to law enforcement authorities through several provisions, such as Section 69, allowing the interception of any information transmitted through a computer resource and mandates that users disclose encryption keys or face a jail sentence up to seven years. Section 80 of the Act allows deputy superintendents of police to conduct searches and seize suspects in public spaces without a warrant.

“Confidentiality between banker and customer is the golden rule of traditional banking, but with the coming of E-banking, banks are using confidentiality as an excuse for not putting out data that shows how vulnerable they are to cyber crimes like hacking,” said N Vijayashankar, an E-business consultant, and a front runner in raising awareness about cyber laws in India. He said, “When framing privacy laws one has to ensure that banks are mandated to disclose data on breach of Internet security. That is the only way to ensure that banks take the necessary steps to secure customer information.” Malavika Jairam, a lawyer who focuses on technology and intellectual property, believes that allowing private participation in what should essentially be a sovereign State function is a dangerous path to tread on. “Tesco, a major retail chain in England, is now into E-banking… There are numerous examples of such private banking entities sharing customer information with insurance policy firms. These details are often used as markers for the kind of premium that will be set for a person,” Jairam said.

With the current pace of technological advancements fast thinning the line between individual privacy and public content, it remains to be seen what kind of privacy laws India will frame to keep up.

The original was published by Tehelka, Malavika Jayaram, a Fellow at CIS is quoted in it.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/new-bill-to-decide-on-individual2019s-right-to-privacy

New Approaches to Information Privacy – Revisiting the Purpose Limitation Principle

amber — 2016-11-09T13:54:28Z

Article on Aadhaar throwing light on privacy and data protection.

This was published in Digital Policy Portal on July 13, 2016.

Introduction

Last year, Mukul Rohatgi, the Attorney General of India, called into question existing jurisprudence of the last 50 years on the constitutional validity of the right to privacy.¹ Mohatgi was rebutting the arguments on privacy made against Aadhaar, the unique identity project initiated and implemented in the country without any legislative mandate.² The question of the right to privacy becomes all the more relevant in the context of events over the last few years—among them, the significant rise in data collection by the state through various e-governance schemes,³ systematic access to personal data by various wings of the state through a host of surveillance and law enforcement initiatives launched in the last decade,⁴ the multifold increase in the number of Indians online, and the ubiquitous collection of personal data by private parties.⁵

These developments have led to a call for a comprehensive privacy legislation in India and the adoption of the National Privacy Principles as laid down by the Expert Committee led by Justice AP Shah.⁶ There are privacy-protection legislation currently in place such as the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act), which was enacted to govern digital content and communication and provide legal recognition to electronic transactions. This legislation has provisions that can safeguard—and dilute—online privacy. At the heart of the data protection provisions in the IT Act lies section 43A and the rules framed under it, i.e., Reasonable security practices and procedures and sensitive personal data information.⁷Section 43A mandates that body corporates who receive, possess, store, deal, or handle any personal data to implement and maintain ‘reasonable security practices’, failing which, they are held liable to compensate those affected. Rules drafted under this provision also mandated a number of data protection obligations on corporations such the need to seek consent before collection, specifying the purposes of data collection, and restricting the use of data to such purposes only. There have been questions raised about the validity of the Section 43A Rules as they seek to do much more than mandate in the parent provisions, Section 43A— requiring entities to maintain reasonable security practices.

Privacy as control?

Even setting aside the issue of legal validity, the kind of data protection framework envisioned by Section 43A rules is proving to be outdated in the context of how data is now being collected and processed. The focus of Section 43 A Rules—as well as that of draft privacy legislations in India⁸—is based on the idea of individual control. Most apt is Alan Westin’s definition of privacy: “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to other.”⁹ Westin and his followers rely on the normative idea of “informational self- determination”, the notion of a pure, disembodied, and atomistic self, capable of making rational and isolated choices in order to assert complete control over personal information. More and more this has proved to be a fiction especially in a networked society.

Much before the need for governance of information technologies had reached a critical mass in India, Western countries were already dealing with the implications of the use of these technologies on personal data. In 1973, the US Department of Health, Education and Welfare appointed a committee to address this issue, leading to a report called ‘Records, Computers and Rights of Citizens.’¹⁰ The Committee’s mandate was to “explore the impact of computers on record keeping about individuals and, in addition, to inquire into, and make recommendations regarding, the use of the Social Security number.” The Report articulated five principles which were to be the basis of fair information practices: transparency; use limitation; access and correction; data quality; and security. Building upon these principles, the Committee of Ministers of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) arrived at the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data in 1980.¹¹ These principles— Collection Limitation, Data Quality, Purpose Specification, Use Limitation, Security Safeguards, Openness, Individual Participation and Accountability—are what inform most data protection regulations today including the APEC Framework, the EU Data Protection Directive, and the Section 43A Rules and Justice AP Shah Principles in India.

Fred Cate describes the import of these privacy regimes as such:

“All of these data protection instruments reflect the same approach: tell individuals what data you wish to collect or use, give them a choice, grant them access, secure those data with appropriate technologies and procedures, and be subject to third-party enforcement if you fail to comply with these requirements or individuals’ expressed preferences”¹²

This is in line with Alan Westin’s idea of privacy exercised through individual control. Therefore the focus of these principles is on empowering the individuals to exercise choice, but not on protecting individuals from harmful or unnecessary practices of data collection and processing. The author of this article has earlier written¹³ about the sheer inefficacy of this framework which places the responsibility on individuals. Other scholars like Daniel Solove,¹⁴ Jonathan Obar¹⁵ and Fred Cate¹⁶ have also written about the failure of traditional data protection practices of notice and consent. While these essays dealt with the privacy principles of choice and informed consent, this paper will focus on the principles of purpose limitation.

Purpose Limitation and Impact of Big Data

The principles of purpose limitation or purpose specification seeks to ensure the following four objectives:

Personal information collected and processed should be adequate and relevant to the purposes for which they are processed.
The entities collect, process, disclose, make available, or otherwise use personal information only for the stated purposes.
In case of change in purpose, the data’s subject needs to be informed and their consent has to be obtained.
After personal information has been used in accordance with the identified purpose, it has to be destroyed as per the identified procedures.

The purpose limitation along with the data minimisation principle—which requires that no more data may be processed than is necessary for the stated purpose—aim to limit the use of data to what is agreed to by the data subject. These principles are in direct conflict with new technology which relies on ubiquitous collection and indiscriminate uses of data. The main import of Big Data technologies on the inherent value in data which can be harvested not by the primary purposes of data collection but through various secondary purposes which involve processing of the data repeatedly.¹⁷Further, instead to destroying the data when its purpose has been achieved, the intent is to retain as much data as possible for secondary uses. Importantly, as these secondary uses are of an inherently unanticipated nature, it becomes impossible to account for it at the stage of collection and providing the choice to the data subject.

Followers of the discourse on Big Data would be well aware of its potential impacts on privacy. De-identification techniques to protect the identities of individuals in dataset face a threat from an increase in the amount of data available either publicly or otherwise to a party seeking to reverse-engineer an anonymised dataset to re-identify individuals. ¹⁸ Further, Big Data analytics promise to find patterns and connections that can contribute to the knowledge available to the public to make decisions. What is also likely is that it will lead to revealing insights about people that they would have preferred to keep private.¹⁹In turn, as people become more aware of being constantly profiled by their actions, they will self-regulate and ‘discipline’ their behaviour. This can lead to a chilling effect.²⁰ Meanwhile, Big Data is also fuelling an industry that incentivises businesses to collect more data, as it has a high and growing monetary value. However, Big Data also promises a completely new kind of knowledge that can prove to be revolutionary in fields as diverse as medicine, disaster-management, governance, agriculture, transport, service delivery, and decision-making.²¹ As long as there is a sufficiently large and diverse amount of data, there could be invaluable insights locked in it, accessing which can provide solutions to a number of problems. In light of this, it is important to consider what kind of regulatory framework is most suitable which could facilitate some of the promised benefits of Big Data and at the same time mitigate its potential harm. This, coupled with the fact that the existing data protection principles have, by most accounts, run their course, makes the examination of alternative frameworks even more important. This article will examine some alternate proposals made to the existing framework of purpose limitation below.

Harms-based approach

Some scholars like Fred Cate²² and Daniel Solove²³ have argued that there is a need for the primary focus of data protection law to move from control at the stage of data collection to actual use cases. In his article on the failure of Fair Information Practice Principles,²⁴Cate puts forth a proposal for ‘Consumer Privacy Protection Principles.’ Cate envisions a more interventionist role of the data protection authorities by regulating information flows when required, in order to protect individuals from risky or harmful uses of information. Cate’s attempt is to extend the principles of consumer protection law of prevention and remedy of harms.

In a re-examination of the OECD Privacy Principles, Cate and Viktor Mayer Schöemberger attempt to discard the use of personal data to only purposes specified. They felt that restricting the use of personal to only specified purposes could significantly threaten various research and beneficial uses of Big Data. Instead of articulating a positive obligations of what personal data collected could be used for, they attempt to arrive at a negative obligation of use-cases prevented by law. Their working definition of the Use specification principle broaden the scope of use cases by only preventing use of data “if the use is fraudulent, unlawful, deceptive or discriminatory; society has deemed the use inappropriate through a standard of unfairness; the use is likely to cause unjustified harm to the individual; or the use is over the well-founded objection of the individual, unless necessary to serve an over-riding public interest, or unless required by law.”²⁵

While most standards in the above definition have established understanding in jurisprudence, the concept of unjustifiable harm is what we are interested in. Any theory of harms-based approach goes back to John Stuart Mill’s dictum that the only justifiable purpose to exert power over the will of an individual is to prevent harm to others. Therefore, any regulation that seeks to control or prevent autonomy of individuals (in this case, the ability of individuals to allow data collectors to use their personal data, and the ability of data collectors to do so, without any limitation) must clearly demonstrate the harm to the individuals in question.

Fred Cate articulates the following steps to identify tangible harm and respond to its presence:²⁶

Focus on Use — Actual use of the data should be considered, not mere possession. The assumption is that the collection, possession, or transfer of information do not significantly harm people, rather it is the use of information following such collection, possession, or transfer.
Proportionality — Any regulatory measure must be proportional to the likelihood and severity of the harm identified.
Per se Harmful Uses — Uses which are always harmful must be prohibited by law
Per se not Harmful Uses — If uses can be considered inherently not harmful, they should not be regulated.
Sensitive Uses — In case where the uses are not per se harmful or not harmful, individual consent must be sought for using that data for those purposes.

The proposal by Cate argues for what is called a ‘use based system’, which is extremely popular with American scholars. Under this system, data collection itself is not subject to restrictions; rather, only the use of data is regulated. This argument has great appeal for both businesses who can reduce their overheads significantly if consent obligations are done away with as long as they use the data in ways which are not harmful, as well as critics of the current data protection framework which relies on informed consent. Lokke Moerel explains the philosophy of ‘harms based approach’ or ‘use based system’ in United States by juxtaposing it against the ‘rights based approach’ in Europe.²⁷ In Europe, rights of individuals with regard to processing of their personal data is a fundamental human right and therefore, a precautionary principle is followed with much greater top-down control upon data collection. However, in the United States, there is a far greater reliance on market mechanisms and self-regulating organisations to check inappropriate processing activities, and government intervention is limited to cases where a clear harm is demonstrable.²⁸

Continuing research by the Centre for Information Policy Leadership under its Privacy Risk Framework Project looks at a system of articulating what harms and risks arising from use of collected data. They have arrived a matrix of threats and harms. Threats are categorised as —a) inappropriate use of personal information and b) personal information in the wrong hands. More importantly for our purposes, harms are divided into: a) tangible harms which are physical or economic in nature (bodily harm, loss of liberty, damage to earning power and economic interests); b) intangible harms which can be demonstrated (chilling effects, reputational harm, detriment from surveillance, discrimination and intrusion into private life); and c) societal harm (damage to democratic institutions and loss of social trust).²⁹For any harms-based system, a matrix like above needs to emerge clearly so that regulation can focus on mitigating practices leading to the harms.

Legitimate interests

Lokke Moerel and Corien Prins, in their article “Privacy for Homo Digitalis – Proposal for a new regulatory framework for data protection in the light of Big Data and Internet of Things”³⁰ use the ideal of responsive regulation which considers empirically observable practices and institutions while determining the regulation and enforcement required. They state that current data protection frameworks—which rely on mandating some principles of how data has to be processed—is exercised through merely procedural notification and consent requirements. Further, Moerel and Prins feel that data protection law cannot only involve a consideration of individual interest but also needs to take into account collective interest. Therefore, the test must be a broader assessment than merely the purpose limitation articulating the interests of the parties directly involved, but whether a legitimate interest is achieved.

Legitimate interest has been put forth as an alternative to the purpose limitation. Legitimate is not a new concept and has been a part of the EU Data Protection Directive and also finds a place in the new General Data Protection Regulation. Article 7 (f) of the EU Directive³¹ provided for legitimate interest balanced against the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject as the last justifiable reason for use of data. Due to confusion in its interpretation, the Article 29 Working Party, in 2014,³²looked into the role of legitimate interest and arrived at the following factors to determine the presence of a legitimate interest— a) the status of the individual (employee, consumer, patient) and the controller (employer, company in a dominant position, healthcare service); b) the circumstances surrounding the data processing (contract relationship of data subject and processor); c) the legitimate expectations of the individual.

Federico Ferretti has criticised the legitimate interest principle as vague and ambiguous. The balancing of legitimate interest in using the data against fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject gives the data controllers some degree of flexibility in determining whether data may be processed; however, this also reduces the legal certainty that data subject have of their data not being used for purposes they have not agreed to.³³However, it is this paper’s contention that it is not the intent of the legitimate interest criteria but the lack of consensus on its application which creates an ambiguity. Moerel and Prins articulate a test for using legitimate interest which is cognizant of the need to use data for the purpose of Big Data processing, as well as ensuring that the rights of data subjects are not harmed.

As demonstrated earlier, the processing of data and its underlying purposes have become exceedingly complex and the conventional tool to describe these processes ‘privacy notices’ are too lengthy, too complex and too profuse in numbers to have any meaningful impact.³⁴The idea of information self-determination, as contemplated by Westin in American jurisprudence, is not achieved under the current framework. Moerel and Prins recommend five factors³⁵ as relevant in determining the legitimate interest. Of the five, the following three are relevant to the present discussion:

Collective Interest — A cost-benefit analysis should be conducted, which examines the implications for privacy for the data subjects as well as the society, as a whole.
The nature of the data — Rather than having specific categories of data, the nature of data needs to be assessed contextually to determine legitimate interest.
Contractual relationship and consent not independent grounds — This test has two parts. First, in case of contractual relationship between data subject and data controller: the more specific the contractual relationship, the more restrictions apply to the use of the data. Second, consent does not function as a separate principle which, once satisfied, need not be revisited. The nature of the consent (opportunities made available to data subject, opt in/opt out, and others) will continue to play a role in determining legitimate interest.

Conclusion

Replacing the purpose limitation principles with a use-based system as articulated above poses the danger of allowing governments and the private sector to carry out indiscriminate data collection under the blanket guise that any and all data may be of some use in the future. The harms-based approach has many merits and there is a stark need for more use of risk assessments techniques and privacy impact assessments in data governance. However, it is important that it merely adds to the existing controls imposed at data collection, and not replace them in their entirety. On the other hand, the legitimate interests principle, especially as put forth by Moerel and Prins, is more cognizant of the different factors at play — the inefficacy of existing purpose limitation principles, the need for businesses to use data for purposes unidentified at the stage of collection, and the need to ensure that it is not misused for indiscriminate collection and purposes. However, it also poses a much heavier burden on data controllers to take into account various factors before determining legitimate interest. If legitimate interest has to emerge as a realistic alternative to purpose limitation, there needs to be greater clarity on how data controllers must apply this principle.

Endnotes

Prachi Shrivastava, “Privacy not a fundamental right, argues Mukul Rohatgi for Govt as Govt affidavit says otherwise,” Legally India, Jyly 23, 2015, http://www.legallyindia.com/Constitutional-law/privacy-not-a-fundamental-right-argues-mukul-rohatgi-for-govt-as-govt-affidavit-says-otherwise.
Rebecca Bowe, “Growing Mistrust of India’s Biometric ID Scheme,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, May 4, 2012, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/05/growing-mistrust-india-biometric-id-scheme.
Lisa Hayes, “Digital India’s Impact on Privacy: Aadhaar numbers, biometrics, and more,” Centre for Democracy and Technology, January 20, 2015, https://cdt.org/blog/digital-indias-impact-on-privacy-aadhaar-numbers-biometrics-and-more/.
“India’s Surveillance State,” Software Freedom Law Centre, http://sflc.in/indias-surveillance-state-our-report-on-communications-surveillance-in-india/.
“Internet Privacy in India,” Centre for Internet and Society, http://cis-india.org/telecom/knowledge-repository-on-internet-access/internet-privacy-in-india.
Vivek Pai, “Indian Government says it is still drafting privacy law, but doesn’t give timelines,” Medianama, May 4, 2016, http://www.medianama.com/2016/05/223-government-privacy-draft-policy/.
Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011,
http://deity.gov.in/sites/upload_files/dit/files/GSR314E_10511%281%29.pdf.
Discussion Points for the Meeting to be taken by Home Secretary at 2:30 pm on 7-10-11 to discuss the drat Privacy Bill, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/draft-bill-on-right-to-privacy.
Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York: Atheneum, 2015).
US Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens, http://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf.
OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm
Fred Cate, “The Failure of Information Practice Principles,” in Consumer Protection in the Age of the Information Economy, ed. Jane K. Winn (Burlington: Aldershot, Hants, England, 2006) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1156972.
Amber Sinha and Scott Mason, “A Critique of Consent in Informational Privacy,” Centre for Internet and Society, January 11, 2016, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/a-critique-of-consent-in-information-privacy.
Daniel Solove, “Privacy self-management and consent dilemma,” Harvard Law Review 126, (2013): 1880.
Jonathan Obar, “Big Data and the Phantom Public: Walter Lippmann and the fallacy of data privacy self management,” Big Data and Society 2(2), (2015), doi: 10.1177/2053951715608876.
Supra Note 12.
Supra Note 14.
Paul Ohm, “Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization” available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450006; Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov, “Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets” available at https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_oak08netflix.pdf.
D. Hirsch, “That’s Unfair! Or is it? Big Data, Discrimination and the FTC’s Unfairness Authority,” Kentucky Law Journal, Vol. 103, available at: http://www.kentuckylawjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/103KyLJ345.pdf
A Marthews and C Tucker, “Government Surveillance and Internet Search Behavior”, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2412564; Danah Boyd and Kate Crawford, “Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a cultural, technological, and scholarly phenomenon”, Information, Communication & Society, Vol. 15, Issue 5, (2012).
Scott Mason, “Benefits and Harms of Big Data”, Centre for Internet and Society, available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/benefits-and-harms-of-big-data#_ftn37.
Cate, “The Failure of Information Practice Principles.”
Solove, “Privacy self-management and consent dilemma,” 1882.
Cate, “The Failure of Information Practice Principles.”
Fred Cate and Viktor Schoenberger, “Notice and Consent in a world of Big Data,” International Data Privacy Law 3(2), (2013): 69.
Solove, “Privacy self-management and consent dilemma,” 1883.
Lokke Moerel, “Netherlands: Big Data Protection: How To Make The Draft EU Regulation On Data Protection Future Proof”, Mondaq, March 11. 2014, http://www.mondaq.com/x/298416/data+protection/Big+Data+Protection+How+To+Make+The+Dra%20ft+EU+Regulation+On+Data+Protection+Future+Proof%20al%20Lecture.
Moerel, “Netherlands: Big Data Protection.”
Centre for Information Policy Leadership, “A Risk-based Approach to Privacy: Improving Effectiveness in Practice,” Hunton and Williams LLP, June 19, 2014, https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/uploads/5/7/1/0/57104281/white_paper_1-a_risk_based_approach_to_privacy_improving_effectiveness_in_practice.pdf.
Lokke Moerel and Corien Prins, “Privacy for Homo Digitalis: Proposal for a new regulatory framework for data protection in the light of Big Data and Internet of Things”, Social Science Research Network, May 25, 2016, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2784123.
EU Directive 95/46/EC – The Data Protection Directive, https://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/EU-Directive-95-46-EC-Chapter-2/93.htm.
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC,” http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp217_en.pdf.
Frederico Ferretti, “Data protection and the legitimate interest of data controllers: Much ado about nothing or the winter of rights?,” Common Market Law Review 51(2014): 1-26. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/9724/1/Fulltext.pdf.
Sinha and Mason, “A Critique of Consent in Informational Privacy.”
Moerel and Prins, “Privacy for Homo Digitalis.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/digital-policy-portal-july-13-2016-new-approaches-to-information-privacy-revisiting-the-purpose-limitation-principle

New $1 Billion RIC Project Casts Doubts on Aadhaar

praskrishna — 2013-04-04T08:28:51Z

The Indian Government is going ahead with a new project dubbed RIC that will effectively undermine the existing UIDAI – Unique Identification Authority of India project and will cost a whopping $1 billion.

This was published in AEG India on March 16, 2013. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

The National Population Register and the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) are the two organizations which will capture the biometric details of the citizens and will develop the resident identity card (RIC) and create the unique identifier number (UID) popularly known as Aadhar number respectively.

Both the RIC and UID projects are designed to unify the distribution of social and welfare services to the citizens. Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of Centre for Internet and Society India, said that the ID number and the ID smartcard are both different and are not at all complementary as declared by the Indian Government previously.

The ID number and the ID smart card are two completely separate visions. They cannot be mixed up together to make some kind of salad which can be consumed partly, added Abraham.

He said that it was easy for the Indian government to proceed simultaneously with both the projects rather than cancelling the much criticized Aadhaar project.

Minister P. Karunakaran, on March 12 in the Lok Sabha, asked R.P.N. Singh, the Minister of State, to clarify the confusion over the proposed biometric identity card and the UID (Aadhaar number). The government has planned to spend more than US$1 billion to issue the Indian citizens a resident identity card (RIC) which will also feature the Aadhaar number as well.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/aeg-india-march-16-2013-new-dollar-one-billion-ric-project-casts-doubts-on-aadhar

Networked Economies and Gender Action Learning

Admin — 2018-10-02T03:10:02Z

Elonnai Hickok, Sunil Abraham and Ambika Tandon participated in a meeting organized by IDRC for grantees under their networked economies programme to discuss gender-based outputs and development outcomes in their work. The event was held in Ottawa on September 20 - 21, 2018, facilitated by Gender at Work.

Sunil Abraham, Swaraj Paul Barooah and Ambika Tandon also attended a workshop on Gender Action Learning on September 24 - 25, 2018, which discussed strategies to work on gender under a grant for Cyber Policy Centres. Other organizations present at the workshop were Research ICT Africa, Lirne Asia, and Centre Latam Digital at CIDE, Mexico. Gender at Work facilitated this workshop as well, and will be working with all the grantees over a period of 18 months.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/networked-economies-and-gender-action-learning

Network Neutrality Regulation across South Asia: A Roundtable on Aspects of Differential Pricing

praskrishna — 2016-01-17T02:41:13Z

The Centre of Internet and Society (CIS) in association with Observer Research Foundation, and IT For Change in collaboration with the Annenberg School for Communications at the University of Pennsylvania is pleased to announce a roundtable on ‘Network Neutrality Regulation Across South Asia: Aspects of Differential Pricing” that will take place on January 22, 2016 from 11.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. at TERI in Bangalore.

Download the Invite

The objective of this roundtable will be to look into the issue of differential pricing in light of TRAI’s recent consultation process, with the specific intention of research building. The network neutrality debate has gained significant momentum in India during the past year, with competing interests of internet service providers, OTTs and the public giving rise to important questions of ICT regulation and policy.

With Facebook looking to expand its zero rated walled garden, Free Basics, into nascent markets, differential pricing is an important point of regulatory policy not just in India, but in jurisdictions across South Asia. These countries have limited connectivity, large consumer potential and low internet penetration which bring to the fore questions of access, diversity, competition and innovation. To this end, the roundtable will seek to address the regulatory and market aspects of differential pricing as well as the impact on rights. Broadly, the roundtable will be forward looking and seek to build future research agendas.

Draft Agenda

11:00 – 11:30	Tea and Registration
11:30 – 12:30	Roundtable 1: Framing the issue: The practice of differential pricing Examples of differential pricing Stakeholder perspectives Competition and market effect of differential pricing Larger social consequences of differential pricing
12:30 – 1:00	Lunch
1:00 – 2:30	Roundtable 2: Regulatory response: Discerning governmental actions Locating public interest Moving from research to action
2:30 – 3:00	Tea
3:00 – 4:30	Roundtable 3: Impact on rights: Access Freedom of expression Privacy Equity and Social Justice
4:30 – 5:00	Discussion and research agenda building

Roundtable Questions:

Roundtable 1: FRAMING THE ISSUE:

What is differential pricing and how does it work? What are the technical components and policy components of differential pricing? What are examples of differential pricing?
What has been the response from different stakeholders to differential pricing schemes? What are the arguments for/against differential pricing?
What could be the market effect of differential pricing?
What are possible larger social impacts of differential pricing?

Roundtable 2: REGULATORY RESPONSE:

How have governments responded to differential pricing? What can these responses tell us about the position of governments?
What are the different components for consideration with developing a regulatory response? What are different forms of regulation for differential pricing?
What type of policy research around differential pricing can drive meaningful action?

Roundtable 3: IMPACT ON RIGHTS:

How does differential pricing impact the right to access, freedom of expression, privacy, and equity and social justice?
Are there ways to mitigate this impact through regulation? Market incentives? Company policy?
What are forms of redress that individuals could seek in the context of differential pricing?

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/network-neutrality-regulation-across-south-asia-a-roundtable-on-aspects-of-differential-pricing

Netizen Report: The EU Wrestles With Facebook Over Privacy

praskrishna — 2016-02-27T07:39:01Z

Global Voices Advocacy's Netizen Report offers an international snapshot of challenges, victories, and emerging trends in Internet rights around the world.

The blog post published in Global Voices on February 11, 2016 quotes Pranesh Prakash and Subhashish Panigrahi.

In the latest development in the negotiations between the United States and European Union over data transfer rules, Reuters reports France’s data protection authority gave Facebook three months to stop tracking non-users’ Web activity without their consent, and ordered Facebook to cease some transfers of personal data to the United States or face fines. In response, Facebook asserted it does not use the now-defunct Safe Harbor agreement to move data to the United States and instead has set up alternative legal structures to keep its data transfers in line with EU law. Despite this, Facebook was forced last year to stop tracking Belgian non-users after it was taken to court by the Belgian regulator. Last week, the United States and European Union agreed upon a new legal framework to replace Safe Harbor, but as it is not yet operational, several European data protection authorities are still deciding whether data transfers should be restricted.

Big Blow for Facebook’s Free Basics

Indian regulators officially banned “differential pricing”or discriminatory tariffs placed on data services depending on their content. This means that Internet users in India are guaranteed equal access to any website they want, regardless of how they connect to the Internet, ays Global Voices’ Subhashish Panigrahi. The decision is a particular blow to Facebook’s Free Basics application, which uses differential pricing mechanisms to make accessing Facebook, WhatsApp and a limited number of other websites free to users who do not pay for mobile data plans. Though Facebook promotes the program as a means to increasing digital access, it has come under backlash in India and a number of other countries. Internet policy expert Pranesh Prakash emphasizedthat though the ruling is a win for open access in India, these efforts must continue until India is truly and equally connected.

Google’s new scheme to combat online extremism

In an effort to combat groups like ISIS that recruit online, Google has launched apilot schemeto point users who search for extremist terms toward anti-radicalization links. It announced the new effort on February 2 at a meeting with the U.K. Home Affairs Select Committee on Countering Extremism. Representatives of Twitter and Facebook were also challenged by members of Parliament on their role in combatting the spread of terrorist material. Twitter announcedthat it had suspended 125,000 accounts associated with extremism since mid-2015 in response to pressure from the US government. However, as the New York Times’ Mike Isaac notes, “these companies must walk a fine line between bearing responsibility for their platforms and avoiding becoming the arbiter of what constitutes free speech.”

What’s going to happen to Ukraine’s database of ‘explicit content’?

The Ukrainian censorship body, National Expert Commission for Protection of Public Morality, dissolved last year, but its legacy lives on as a database of “explicit content” that no one in the government seems to know what to do with. The database includes a sizeable amount of content “containing elements of sexual nature and erotica,” but the commission was also well known for its attempt to ban Spongebob Squarepants, Shrek, and Teletubbies. Users have suggested the team responsible for dissolving the commission make the content more widely available, so they can see where taxpayers’ money went.

How to protect yourself from government hacking

Hacking human rights workers, journalists, and NGOs has become common practice for governments around the world, according to Amnesty International’s Morgan Marquis-Boire and Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Eva Galperin. In a post for Amnesty International, the two provide a brief history of government hacking and give suggestions for NGOs and human rights organizations to protect themselves.

Taking on Russia’s invasive surveillance

Two Russian Internet service providers are taking the Federal Security Service to court to challenge the surveillance system employed by Russian federal police to spy on Internet use. ISPs play a critical role in making surveillance possible, by installing expensive equipment that provides police access—making this case a significant affront to Russia’s invasive surveillance apparatus.

Telegram in Iran

Messaging app Telegram’s growing influence is being characterized as a major factor in the dissemination and spread of information leading up to Iran’s Feb. 26 parliamentary elections, but the platform’s susceptibility to state manipulation is also becoming more apparent. After the arrest of former BBC journalist Bahman Doroshafaei, the government took over his Telegram account and started to message his contacts. Some believe this was an effort to extract sensitive information or to distribute spyware. Fatemeh Shams, a friend of Doroshafaei, posted the following warning to her Facebook account:

Someone has been talking to me for two hours from Bahman's hacked Telegram account and now is chatting with my friends with my account..If anyone messaged you on Telegram [from my account] please ignore it. I've lost access to my account.

Mahsa Alimardani, Ellery Roberts Biddle, Hae-in Lim and Sarah Myers West contributed to this report.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/global-voices-february-11-2016-netizen-report

Net Neutrality and Privacy

divij — 2014-03-20T05:01:58Z

The highly contentious and polarising debate on net-neutrality will have a large impact on shaping the future of the internet and ultimately on the users of the internet. One important issue which needs to be prioritized while debating the necessity or desirability of a legal regime which advocates net-neutrality is its implication on privacy.

The principle behind net-neutrality, simply put, is that the data being transmitted to and from the user should be treated equally, i.e. that data carriage, at the level of ISP’s, should be ‘dumb’. This would mean that internet service providers cannot discriminate between different data based on the content of the data. Without the principle of net-neutrality being followed, ISP’s would become the ‘internet gatekeepers’, choosing what data gets to reach the end-user and how. There are many arguments for favouring or disfavouring net-neutrality, however, advocates of privacy on the internet should be wary of the possible implications of endorsing a non-neutral internet and allowing greater network management by ISP’s. So, how does the net-neutrality debate affect privacy?

It all depends upon what kind of network management ISP’s employ. Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) is a method of data inspection which allows the network manager to scrutinize data at the application level, and in real time. As compared to shallow packet inspection, which identifies based on headers like IP addresses or protocols like TCP and UDP, which are analogous to envelopes on a letter, DPI would be akin to having access to the contents. DPI-based network management can identify the programs, software and applications being used, and what they are being used for in real time. Unlike any ordinary online service provider ISP’s are in the unique position of having comprehensive access to all of their customers’ data. Allowing DPI-based network management for prioritizing certain data or applications, an almost certain outcome if net-neutrality is weakened, would mean that ISP’s would be able to intercept and scrutinize any and all user data, which would reveal substantial information about the user, and would be a serious blow to privacy. While DPI can have several benefits in its application (such as finding and fighting malware or viruses), but where it is used, must be for a targeted and legitimate aim. Even where DPI is not used, if network discrimination is allowed, based on a user-to-user basis it would require inspecting the IP addresses of the user, which can also be a problematic intrusion of privacy, especially since the ISP also has other data like addresses and names of users which it can use to identify them.

Privacy may not necessarily be affected through non-neutral internet systems, but in all probability, with the growth of systems like the DPI and commercial incentives for “gatekeeper ISP’s” who are in a position to profit greatly from an ability to scrutinize and discriminate between data, it is likely that it will. In India, though government ISP’s like MTNL and BSNL deny using DPI,[1] it’s likely that it is still applied by others, and that the government is aware of this (http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2161541/indian-isps-block-104-websites). Even as the TRAI advocates and supports net-neutrality, Indian ISP’s seem to be heading the other way.[2] Before the trend becomes the norm, it’s high time for a comprehensive discussion about how policies should be framed for keeping the internet a more neutral, and more private, space.

References

Apar Gupta, TRAI(ing) to keep it neutral, http://www.iltb.net/2010/09/traiing-keep-it-neutral/
For a lay discussion on Deep Packet Inspection and net-neutrality, visit http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2007/07/deep-packet-inspection-meets-net-neutrality/

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-neutrality-and-privacy

Net Neutrality across South Asia

praskrishna — 2016-02-27T08:09:29Z

The Centre for Internet & Society (CIS) and the Observer Research Foundation in association with Centre for Global Communication Studies, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennnsylvania and Internet Policy Observatory is organizing this event at the Observer Research Foundation's office in New Delhi from 10 a.m. to 5 p.m., on December 12, 2015.

Context

Net neutrality can broadly be understood as the principle of non-discrimination which in practice allows the internet to be free and open by preventing service providers from slowing or interfering with the transfer of data. Net neutrality has risen as a global policy issue, yet cultural, political, commercial, and economical factors influence how net neutrality is understood and addressed in a particular context. Indeed, the factors driving the net neutrality debate, the way in which governments are addressing net neutrality, the role and response of industry, the public response, and the role of civil society has been varied across contexts. The topic of net neutrality is not limited to a technical debate and brings together a number of issues including the right to access, the right to freedom of expression, fair competition practices, and privacy.

This conference seeks to bring together domain experts, industry, government, and civil society across South Asia to understand how net neutrality is understood in different contexts, how it is being addressed from a policy point of view, what the varying public dialogues around net neutrality are, and what role civil society can play in influencing the debate.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/net-neutrality-across-south-asia

National Stakeholders Consultation on the National Digital Health Blueprint

Admin — 2019-08-07T14:21:29Z

Ambika Tandon and Aayush Rathi attended the National Stakeholders Consultation on the National Digital Health Blueprint organised by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare on 6 August 2019 at Constitution Club of India in New Delhi.

It was also attended by representatives from MeitY apart from industry and civil society. We raised questions about the provisions for privacy andinteroperability in the NDHB, in relation to provisions in the DISHA Act and the Srikrishna report. The public call for the event can be found here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/national-stakeholders-consultation-on-the-national-digital-health-blueprint

National Privacy Workshop

Admin — 2017-12-05T14:24:16Z

Centre for Internet & Society is organizing a round-table to discuss the potential impact of numerous policy developments with wide ranging implications for recognition and governance of privacy in India. The round-table will be held on December 9, 2017 at India International Centre in New Delhi, 10.30 a.m. to 5.00 p.m.

Background

The recent past in India has seen numerous policy developments with wide ranging implications for recognition and governance of privacy in India. The emphatic and unanimous avowal of the right to privacy by the Supreme Court, the government’s stated commitment to a data protection law and the formation of the Sri Krishna Committee are developments which will continue to inform policymaking around privacy in India for a long time to come. The Supreme Court’s conception of a robust right to privacy encompassing different element - spatial, decisional and informational, and its guidance on strict limiting tests may have a wide impact on a range of issues. The impact of this judgment and a data protection law on informational privacy in India will be immense and it is important to delve in challenges and issues that it may throw up. In last year, we have also seen instances of purported conflict between the transparency instruments such as the right to information and the right to informational privacy. How these conflicts are resolved in law and practice will be key to these two essential human rights in the modern information society. Further, while these general consensus on privacy principles, the appropriate ways to govern and enforce privacy remains an open issue, and the success of any data protection framework will depend as much on what kind of privacy governance models are adopted.This roundtable will look to discuss the potential impact of these policy decisions, what theories should guide the data protection law in India, what models of privacy governance are workable and how privacy can co-exist with transparency principle and robust RTI regime.

Agenda

10.30 - 11.00	Tea
11.00 - 11.30	Welcome and setting the scene
11.30 - 12.30	Session 1: Policy Developments around Informational Privacy in India What do different policy developments indicate about privacy in India? What are the (potential) impacts of these developments? What questions are being asked and are these the right questions to ask? How do we expect the ‘state of privacy’ to change in India in response to these policy developments?
12.30 - 13.30	Session 2: Approaches to Privacy and Data Protection for India What are different approaches to privacy and government the Indian government can take? What cultural/political etc. aspects should be taken into consideration when thinking through this question? What are the pros and cons to different approaches? What are the pros and cons to the below approaches: - Privacy as control - Data as property - Utilitarian approaches - Technological Solutions
13.30 - 14.30	Lunch
14.30 - 15.30	Session 3: Transparency and Privacy How can transparency from the private sector enable the right to privacy? What are key principles that can guide this relationship? Where is transparency from the private sector most needed with respect to privacy? What are incentives that governments can adopt to encourage privacy?
15.30 - 16.30	Governance Models for Data Protection What kind of institutional framework is required for governance of privacy in India? How do we address questions of liability, penalties and enforcement? What role do sectoral players have in a data governance framework? What is best way for other stakeholders like industry, civil society and academia in collaborative governance of privacy?
16.30 - 17.00	Tea and snacks

Speakers

Usha Ramanathan
Rahul Sharma
Apar Gupta
Malavika Raghavan
Shankar Narayanan
Ujwala Uppaluri
Rebecca MacKinnon
Nikhil Pahwa
Kamlesh Bajaj
Manasa Venkatraman
Smitha K Prasad

Download the Agenda

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/national-privacy-workshop-at-india-international-centre

National Health Stack: Data For Data’s Sake, A Manmade Health Hazard

Murali Neelakantan, Swaraj Barooah, Swagam Dasgupta and Torsha Sarkar — 2018-09-16T05:01:18Z

On Oct. 5, 2017, an HIV positive woman was denied admission in Hyderabad’s Osmania General Hospital even though she was entitled to free treatment under India’s National AIDS Control Organisation programme. Another incident around the same time witnessed a 24-year-old pregnant woman at Tikamgarh district hospital in Madhya Pradesh being denied treatment by hospital doctors once she tested positive for HIV. The patient reportedly delivered the twins outside the maternity ward after she was turned away by the hospital, but her newborn twin girls died soon after.

The op-ed was published in Bloomberg Quint on August 14, 2018.

Apart from facing the severity of their condition, patients afflicted with diseases such as HIV, tuberculosis, and mental illnesses, are often subject to social stigma, sometimes even leading to the denial of medical treatment. Given this grim reality would patients want their full medical history in a database?

The ‘National Health Stack’ as described by the NITI Aayog in its consultation paper, is an ambitious attempt to build a digital infrastructure with a “deep understanding of the incentive structures prevalent in the Indian healthcare ecosystem”. If the government is to create a database of individuals’ health records, then it should appreciate the differential impact that it could have on the patients.

The collection of health data, without sensitisation and accountability, has the potential to deny healthcare to the vulnerable.

We have innumerable instances of denial of services due to Aadhaar and there is a real risk that another database will lead to more denial of access to the most vulnerable.

Earlier, we had outlined some key aspects of the NHS, the ‘world’s largest’ government-funded national healthcare scheme. Here we discuss some of the core technical issues surrounding the question of data collection, updating, quality, and utilisation.

Resting On A Flimsy Foundation: The Unique Health ID

The National Health Stack envisages the creation of a unique ID for registered beneficiaries in the system — a ‘Digital Health ID’. Upon the submission of a ‘national identifier’ and completion of the Know Your Customer process, the patient would be registered in the system, and a unique health ID generated.

This seemingly straightforward process rests on a very flimsy foundation. The base entry in the beneficiary registry would be linked to a ‘strong foundational ID’. Extreme care needs to be taken to ensure that this is not limited to an Aadhaar number. Currently, the unavailability of Aadhaar would not be a ground for denial of treatment to a patient only for their first visit; the patient must provide Aadhaar or an Aadhaar enrolment slip to avail treatment thereafter. This suggests that the national healthcare infrastructure will be geared towards increasing Aadhaar enrollment, with the unstated implication that healthcare is a benefit or subsidy — a largess of government, and not, as the courts have confirmed, a fundamental right.

Not only is this project using government-funded infrastructure to deny its citizens the fundamental right to healthcare, it is using the desperate need of the vulnerable for healthcare to push the ‘Aadhaar’ agenda.

Any pretence that Aadhaar is voluntary is slowly fading with the government mandating it at every step of our lives.

Aadhaar Seva kendra. (Source: Aadhaar Official Account/Facebook

Is The Health ID An Effective And Unique Identifier?

Even if we choose to look past the fact that the validity of Aadhaar is still pending the test of legality before the apex court, a foundational ID would mean that the data contained within that ID is unique, accurate, incorruptible, and cannot be misused. These principles, unfortunately, have been compromised by the UIDAI in the Aadhaar project with its lack of uniqueness of identity (i.e, fake IDs and duplicity), failure to authenticate identity, numerous alleged data leaks (‘alleged’ because UIDAI maintains that there haven’t been any leaks), lack of connectivity to be able to authenticate identity and numerous instances of inaccurate information which cannot be corrected.

Linking something as crucial and basic as healthcare data with such a database is a potential disaster.

There is a real risk that incorrect linking could cause deaths or inappropriate medical care.

The High Risk Of Poor Quality Data

The NITI Aayog paper envisages several expansive databases that are capable of being updated by different entities. It includes enrollment and updating processes but seems to assume that all these extra steps will be taken by all the relevant stakeholders and does not explain the motivation for stakeholders to do so.

In a country where government doctors, hospitals, wellness centres, etc are overburdened and understaffed, this reliance is simply not credible. For instance, all attributes within the registries are to be digitally signed by an authorised updater, there must be an audit trail for all changes made to the registries, and surveyors will be tasked with visiting providers in person to validate the data. Identifying these precautions as measures to assure accurate data is a great step towards building a national health database, but this seems an impossible task.

Who are these actors and what will incentivise them to ensure the accuracy and integrity of data?

In other words, what incentive and accountability structures will ensure that data entry and updating is accurate, and not approached from a more ‘jugaad’ ‘let’s just get this done for the sake of it’ attitude that permeates much of the country. How will patients have access to the database to be able to check its accuracy? Is it possible for a patient (who will presumably be ill) to gain easy access to an updater to change their data? If so, how? It is worth noting that the patient’s ‘right’ to check her data assumes that they have access to a computer that is connected to the internet as well as a good level of digital literacy, which is not the case in India for a significant section of the population. Even data portability loses its potential benefits if the quality of data on these registries is not reliable. In this case, healthcare providers will need to verify their patients’ health history using physical records instead, rendering the stack redundant.

Who will be liable to the patient for misdiagnosis based on the database?

A sonographic image is displayed on a monitor as a patient undergoes an ultrasound scan in Bikaner, Rajasthan, India. (Photographer: Prashanth Vishwanathan/Bloomberg)

Leaving the question of accountability vague opens updaters to the possibility of facing dangerous and unnecessarily punitive measures in the future. The NITI Aayog paper fails to address this key issue which arose recently. Despite being a notifiable disease, there are reports that numerous doctors from the private sector failed to notify or update TB cases to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare ostensibly on the grounds that they did not receive consent from their patients to share their information with the government. This was met with a harsh response from the government which stated that clinical establishment that failed to notify tuberculosis patients would face jail time. According to a few doctors, the government’s new move would coerce patients to go to ‘underground clinics’ to receive treatment discreetly and hence, would not solve the issue of TB.

The document also offers no specific recommended procedures regarding how inaccurate entries will be corrected or deleted.

It is then perhaps not a stretch to imagine that these scenarios would affect the quality of the data stored; defeating NITI Aayog’s objective of researchers using the stack for high-quality medical data.

The reason why the quality and integrity of data is at the head of the table is that all the proposed applications of the NHS (analytics, fraud detection etc.) assume a high quality, accurate dataset. At the same time, the enrolment process, updating process and disclosed measures to ensure data quality will effectively lead to poor quality data. If this is the case, then applications derived from the NHS dataset should assume an imperfect data, rather than an accurate dataset, which should make one wonder if no data is better than data that is certainly inaccurate.

Lack Of Data Utilisation Guidelines

Issues with data quality are exacerbated depending on how and where it is used, and who uses it. The paper has identified some users to be health-sector stakeholders such as healthcare providers (hospitals, clinics, labs etc), beneficiaries, doctors, insurers and accredited social health activists but misses laying down utilisation guidelines. The foresight to create a dataset that can be utilised by multiple actors for numerous applications is commendable, but potentially problematic -- especially if guidelines on how this data is to be used by stakeholders (especially the private sector) are ignored.

In order to bridge this knowledge gap, India has the opportunity to learn from the legal precedent set by foreign institutions. As an example, one could examine the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the U.S. which sets out strict guidelines for how businesses are to handle sensitive health data in order to maintain the individual’s privacy and security. It goes one step further to also lay down incentive and accountability structures in order that business associates necessarily report security breaches to their respective covered entities.

If we do not take necessary precautions now, we not only run the risk of poor security and breach of privacy but of inaccurate data that renders the national health data repository a health risk for the whole patient population.

There’s also the lack of clarity on who is meant to benefit from using such a database or whether the benefits are equal to all stakeholders, but more on that in a subsequent piece.

A medical team uses a glucometer to check the blood glucose level of a patient at a mobile clinic in Pancharala, on the outskirts of Bengaluru, India. (Photographer: Dhiraj Singh/Bloomberg)

It’s Your Recipe, You Try It First!

If the NITI Aayog and the government are sure that there is a need for a national healthcare database, perhaps they can start using the Central Government Health Scheme (which includes all current and retired government employees and their families) as a pilot scheme for this. Once the software, database and the various apps built on it are found to be good value for money and patients benefit from excellent treatment all over the country, it could be expanded to those who use the Employees’ State Insurance system, and then perhaps to the armed forces. After all, these three groups already have a unique identifier and would benefit from the portability of healthcare records since they are likely to be transferred and posted all over the country. If, and only if, it works for these groups and the claimed benefits are observed, then perhaps it can be expanded to the rest of the country’s healthcare systems.

Murali Neelakantan is an expert in healthcare laws. Swaraj Barooah is Policy Director at The Centre for Internet and Society. Swagam Dasgupta and Torsha Sarkar are interns at The Centre for Internet and Society.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/bloomberg-quint-murali-neelakantan-swaraj-barooah-swagam-dasgupta-torsha-sarkar-august-14-2018-national-health-stack-data-for-datas-sake-a-manmade-health-hazard

National Consultation on Media Law

praskrishna — 2014-09-30T06:52:50Z

The Law Commission of India and the National University, Delhi have joined hands to organize the National Consultation on Media Law at the India Habitat Centre in New Delhi on September 27 and 28, 2014. Nehaa Chaudhari participated in this event.

Click to view the:

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/national-consultation-on-media-law

Nasscom chief saying full data protection isn’t possible should wake us from our digital slumber

praskrishna — 2017-03-17T01:47:25Z

Considering India is rapidly moving towards a digital economy, the hurdles not withstanding, data and identity security are topics which have to be taken very seriously. Since the demonetisation, a large part of the population who would never bother with digital transactions has suddenly come online. But there is no such thing as complete security of personal data, according to Nasscom chief R Chandrashekhar.

This was published by First Post on March 16, 2017. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

Attending the World Consumer Rights Day, R Chandrashekhar said that personal data of online consumers cannot be completely secure and stressed on the need to have strict enforcement of consumer protection laws. Speaking to PTI, Chandrashekhar said, “More than 3 million credit card data details were misused recently. Let us face it, these kind of security breaches will take place. There is nothing called fully perfect security in IT.”

It’s high time we call a spade, a spade

R Chandrashekhar, President Nasscom. Image: PIB

Coming from the head of Nasscom, this announcement pertaining to security is very important. According to Chandrashekhar one cannot expect complete cyber security, but there are definitely ways in which such attacks and incidents can be minimised. He very rightly said that that protecting the online consumer data, specially looking at how rapidly e-commerce is growing in the country, is of prime importance.

One cannot help but agree with Chandrashekhar, specially considering the fact India does not have a privacy law ecosystem that is present in countries such as the US and the UK, where online consumer protection is taken very seriously. Germany and other EU nations have always been at the forefront, when it comes to protecting data privacy, and it has ensured that consumer-facing technology companies do not run roughshod when it comes to protecting user data.

Chandrashekhar stated that there was no need for separate regulations for e-commerce sites, but the priority was ensuring means to enforce consumer laws in the digital world.

Lack of dedicated privacy laws

According to cyberlaw and cybersecurity expert, Pavan Duggal, “Going forward, there is an urgent need for India to take a strong view on privacy in terms of legislative frameworks. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, India does not have a dedicated law on privacy.”

Image: Foamy Media

Social media websites for instance have a lot of user data. But what happens when they suddenly change their privacy policies? For instance, a lot of users signed on to WhatsApp when it was an independent company. But post the Facebook acquisition, there have been a lot of instances where WhatsApp has updated its terms and conditions to suit its parent Facebook.

That’s not completely illegal one may say. Loss of privacy is a price you pay for free services. But what if, I as a consumer of WhatsApp do not want the app to share any of my data with Facebook? The only option I am left with is to delete WhatsApp. But then again, I do not know if my data is also deleted from WhatsApp servers or it has already been shared. Social media apps, only let you know what updates are being added. Consent is only required to update the app. You can stall that, up to a point. But there will come a time when you will have to update an app. Then by default you have given approval to all the terms and conditions associated with the app.

Two students had challenged WhatsApp’s revision to its privacy policy before Delhi High Court. The Court dismissed the petition insisting that users could opt out by deleting their accounts.

When a similar challenge was mounted before the authorities in UK, Facebook had to put a pause on their data sharing – and this was because of its strong data protection policy. Under the UK data protection law, the company has to inform the authority established under the Act of any changes in the use of user data. In the case of WhatsApp, the UK authority objected to such sharing.

Aadhaar – the 12-digit biometric storehouse

Aadhaar card is being used for many financial and non financial transactions. Also the Aadhaar number associated with an individual also holds a lot of personal and biometric data. So when recently, there was news about a possible Aadhaar data breach when UIDAI filed a police complaint against Axis Bank, business correspondent Suvidhaa Infoserve and e-sign provider eMudhra, it was naturally a shock to many.

Unlike a password which can be changed, with biometric information there is no scope to do that if it is compromised. Although UIDAI claims that there are multiple levels of security and firewalls to ensure there is no breach of Aadhaar information of an individual, one can only hope that it is robust enough to withstand any attack. Collection of biometric data by the government to form a database, for instance, was debated and ultimately not used in the UK.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director of the Centre for Internet and Society, expressed concern about the pace at which we are progressing when it comes to having a legal and regulatory framework when it comes to the Digital India push. “While the security architecture of Aadhaar Enabled Payment Systems (AEPS) might in itself be good, the idea of providing your fingerprints to merchants for financial transactions is a terrible idea since that is like asking you to give your bank password to a merchant, and the merchant can reuse that password, and you can’t ever change the password,” said Prakash.

Enforcing the correct processes

Last year, a malware affected the systems of Hitachi Payment Services, which provides back end services to ATM machines and Point of Sale nodes across India. As a result of this, around 32 lakh debit cards were compromised including those issued by SBI, HDFC, Yes Bank, Axis, BOB and ICICI. Security experts and consultants have pointed out various holes in the electronic transaction systems in place in India. Intel has also warned that ATM machines in India are vulnerable to malicious attacks. Intel points out that countries in the Asia Pacific region are developing and are particularly vulnerable because of old systems and machines being used.

Image: REUTERS/Amit Dave

According to Mahesh Patel, president and group CTO, AGS Transact Technologies this was more of a governance issue of the data centre than any technical error. “It is not about the software, but it is about the processes and procedures you put in place to ensure that the system is secure. Everything from physical security to computing security to admin management, etc should be process driven. So somewhere there could have been a weak link there. Cloud has to be secure and encrypted which suffices the use case of payments. This cloud is different from the ones used by e-commerce sites to display all their products,” said Patel.

We may have the best of software and security measures, but ensuring that they are implemented the right way is equally important. Plugging the loopholes in current regulations is also important.

Existing laws and regulations, not enough

According to Duggal, “The Information Technology Act, 2000 hardly has effective provisions to protect any data and personal privacy in the digital ecosystem. The Indian Government needs to come up with strong privacy law which can protect both personal privacy and data privacy in an effective manner.”

One may find it really shocking to hear the head of Nasscom saying something to the extent that full data protection for online consumers is not possible, but there is definitely truth to the matter. It will require concerted efforts from not only regulators, governments, digital wallet players and banking industry to come up with these privacy laws, but also you the consumer has to ensure that you are aware of the dangers lurking in the digital world. Educating oneself of the various ways in which your data can be compromised is a good way to protect your online self.

Because, let’s face it, for all practical purposes if you are online, your privacy is dead.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/first-post-march-16-nimish-sawant-nasscom-chief-saying-full-data-protection-isnt-possible-should-wake-us-from-our-digital-slumber

Nasscom against differential pricing for data services

praskrishna — 2016-01-06T15:12:17Z

The National Association of Software and Services Companies says it should be the regulator that decides on such content, not firms.

The article by Moulishree Srivastava was published in Livemint on January 5, 2016. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.

India’s top software lobby on Monday said if select web content needs to be provided cheaper for some Indians, it must be the regulator that decides on such content, not companies.

In its response to a consultation paper by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) on differential pricing for data usage, the National Association of Software and Services Companies (Nasscom) objected to plans such as Free Basics and Airtel Zero where companies choose content to be provided at different speeds and prices, but backed powers for the regulator to allow such a model if the regulator deems they are in “public interest”, while adhering to principles of net neutrality.

“We strongly oppose any model where telecom service providers (TSPs) or their partners have a say or discretion in choosing content that is made available at favourable rates, speed... any differential pricing by TSP either directly such as Airtel Zero or indirectly as in the case of Free Basics through a platform provider which limits access to the internet services or websites (selected by the TSP or by the partners) violate the idea of net neutrality,” said R. Chandrashekhar, president, Nasscom.

“But when we recognize the reality of India as a country which has low internet penetration and even lower broadband penetration, apart from low levels of digital literacy and limited local language content... there may be a need to provide certain services in public interest at differential or lower prices which the regulator feels are necessary,” he said.

“Therefore, it is important that the regulator should have the power to allow differential pricing for certain types or classes of services that are deemed to be in public interest and based on mandatory prior approvals,” he said. “Any such programmes should abide by the principles of net neutrality and not constrain innovation in any way and not constrain innovation in any way.”

Differential pricing for data usage means offering services at different price points to different users. However, analysts say it could lead to an anti-competitive environment, hurting small companies and start-ups, while giving the TSPs and their partner platforms near-monopolistic access to the vast amount of user data that has potential commercial value in a country such as India where privacy laws are not strong.

Differential pricing is a significant aspect of the net neutrality debate that erupted in India in 2015, when Trai released a consultation paper in April. Soon, telecom operator Bharti Airtel Ltd launched Zero, a marketing platform that allows customers to access mobile applications for free but charges the application providers.

Facebook’s Free Basics service (the new name for Internet.org) aims to offer people without the Internet free access to a handful of websites and a range of services through mobile phones, which net neutrality activists say will violate the core principle that everyone should have unrestricted access to Internet and it should not be regulated by a company.

Following the outrage, Trai put Free Basics on hold, asking Reliance Communications Ltd to furnish the detailed terms and conditions of its Free Basics service. The next step will be announced later this month.

In an op-ed in the Times of India last week, Nandan Nilekani, co-founder of Infosys Ltd. and former chairman of Unique Identification Authority of India, publicly criticized Facebook’s Free Basics, calling it a walled garden.

“The walled garden of Free Basics goes against the spirit of openness on the internet, and in the guise of being pro-poor, balkanises it. Only Free Basics-approved websites will be accessible for free,” he said in the article which he co-authored with Viral Shah who led the design of government’s subsidy platforms using Aadhaar. “In theory, anyone meeting the technical guidelines today can participate. However, services that may potentially compete with telco offerings may not join Free Basics. Since Facebook does not currently subsidise free usage, telcos will have to foot the bill by raising prices.”

He said schemes such as direct benefit transfer for Internet data packs would be better compared to programmes such as Free Basics.

Nasscom, in its response, recommended “mandatory prior approval of such services by the regulator and sharing of periodic information on tariff plans seek to lower the price as well as zero rating services,” adding that these programmes should abide by the principle of net neutrality, meaning it should not limit consumers access to pre-defined set of services or websites.

“Any such differential pricing programs should have explicit approval of the regulator—and should be deemed to be in the public interest and the onus of proving it to be in the public interest in the first instance would be on service provider and before Trai arrives at a final decision a public consultation is also advised because of the dangers involved,” Nasscom said. “Even after the approval, suitable oversight mechanism should be maintained by the regulator in all such case.”

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), said Nasscom’s approach to make differential pricing plans and options as an exception rather than the rule was quite reasonable. “It says that if differential pricing services adhere to the guidelines of being non-discriminatory, non-anti-competitive, non-predatory, non-ambiguous and transparent, they can be allowed under the supervision of the regulator, which is similar to the position adopted by CIS,” he said.

“Though some of their positions are ambiguous—for instance what they mean by non-discriminatory, and whether they are okay with differential pricing between classes of applications, are unclear—and some of their recommendations increase regulatory complexity, such as their proposal for independent not-for-profit entities with independent boards to own and manage such differential pricing programs, by and large it is a useful submission,” Prakash added.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-moulishree-srivastava-january-5-2016-nasscom-against-differential-pricing-for-data-services

Narendra Modi’s personal app sparks India data privacy row

Admin — 2018-03-28T16:17:32Z

PM’s NaMo app sends user data to third party in US, says researcher.

Sunil Abraham was quoted in the article published by Financial Times on March 28, 2018.

“People are outraged that there is a peephole,” says Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, a non-profit research organisation. “They are not outraged that anyone has looked into the peephole — because there is no evidence of that yet.”

For Mr Abraham, however, the controversy demonstrates that “Indian political parties have a voracious appetite for political data. If unchecked by law or public outrage, they will continue to hoover up as much data as they can from our devices.”

“Privacy is definitely a political issue,” says Mr. Abraham. “Political parties are reacting not because they will get into trouble under the law. They are reacting because they areafraid their supporters may not like it.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/financial-times-march-28-2018-narendra-modi-personal-app-sparks-india-data-privacy-row