Centre for Internet and Society

First Asia Pacific Workshop on Empirical Methods in Innovation, Intellectual Property and Competition

praskrishna — 2017-03-14T14:14:12Z

Rohini Lakshané took part in a workshop organized by Centre for Innovation Intellectual Property & Competition in New Delhi from March 9 to 11, 2017.

The workshop was open for legal academicians (who are working in the areas of intellectual property law and/or competition law) and regulators working with intellectual property law and competition law issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Click here for the Agenda. More details on Spicy IP Blog here

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/news/first-asia-pacific-workshop-on-empirical-methods-in-innovation-intellectual-property-and-competition

Fifth International IPR Conference (GIPC 2013)

praskrishna — 2013-02-03T02:04:49Z

ITAG Business Solutions is organizing its Fifth International IPR conference "GIPC 2013" at Hotel LaLit Ashok, Bangalore, India on the theme "IPR: The Powerhouse of Tomorrow". Snehashish Ghosh is participating in the event and will speak on Pervasive Technologies: Access to Knowledge in the Market Place.

The Institute of International Trade and Sughrue are the co-organisers of this event. Full details of the event can be seen here.

The conference shall deal with specific technology in various industries, World leaders and the various IPR solutions.

The subjects to be covered in the conference are from idea to asset encompassing all relevant topics including valuation, commercialization, technology transfer, litigation, counterfeiting, analyzing the techno, legal and commercial solution to all associated problems in the field of intellectual property. The conference will deal with complex issues in simple manner about patentability of business methods, software and emerging field of technologies namely electronics, telecommunications, green technologies, nanotechnologies and pharmaceuticals. The emerging BRICS economies need to provide IP competitiveness to the Western Nations through innovation and creativity.

Click to see the agenda.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/fifth-intl-ipr-conference-gipc-2013

Fallacies, Lies, and Video Pirates

pranesh — 2011-08-04T04:43:08Z

At a recent conference on counterfeiting and piracy, industry representatives variously pushed for stiffer laws for IP violation, more stringent enforcement of existing IP laws, and championed IP as the most important thing for businesses today. This blog post tries to show how their arguments are flawed.

The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) organized its third annual conference on counterfeiting and piracy, with support from the United States Embassy and the Quality Brands Protection Committee of China (a body comprising more than 80 multinational companies). Last week we criticised the conference in an open letter. This week, we examine a few of the recurring themes that came up at the conference.

Something being substandard is not the same as something being counterfeit.

This was a mistake made by many whenever they invoked 'counterfeit' in the sense of something that is violative of one's patent and trademark rights. The Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act itself distinguishes between 'misbranded', 'adulterated', and 'spurious' drugs, thus recognizing that something that is made without proper authorization from rights owners isn't necessarily of a bad quality. Indeed, this was substantiated by an audience member, a lawyer from Dr. Reddy's Lab. She spoke of a mandi in Agra where they seized medicines being sold under the Dr. Reddy's name, but produced by local manufacturers. Upon lab testing, it turned out, much to their surprise, that the medicines were of the highest quality and were not substandard. Similarly, many large companies including trusted FMCG companies like Hindustan Unilever and ITC are upbraided by authorities for violations of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act (for the cosmetics they produce) as well as the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Thus, even legitimate businesses can produce substandard products. Thus, a product can be unauthorized but not substandard, just as a product can be substandard but not counterfeit.

This distinction becomes very important when we talk about patents, and especially drug patents. A generic drug is by definition identical or within an acceptable bio-equivalent range to the brand name counterpart with respect to pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic properties. Thus, this entire category of high-quality drugs is often sought to be made illegal or counterfeit by large pharma companies. Some countries like Kenya have capitulated. But so far the World Health Assembly has been forced by developing countries to keep the issue of substandard medicines separate from patent-bypassing medicines.

The industry, for all their talk about "out of the box" thinking on the issue, still only consider metrics such the number of piracy raids conducted as measures of success. A question was put forth by Manisha Shridhar of the Intellectual Property & Trade Unit of the World Health Organization upon learning of the quality of the drugs seized at the Agra mandi: Why not cut a licensing deal with those manufacturers, who obviously have excellent production facilities? That kind of thinking, which helped HMV in India in the 1980s, and copying innovative features from video pirates and pricing their products competitively has helped an Indian company, Moserbaer, do extremely well.

Counterfeiters and pirates are not always seeking to fool consumers.

Only lawyers hired by the industry would think that a consumer aspiring towards a Rolex watch would actually think that the one he purchased off the streets for one-hundredth the original's price was in fact original. Street-side DVD hawkers are not thought by the general public to be selling original wares. Still, despite knowing the difference between the original and the fake, consumers many times opt for the latter.

Having said that, counterfeiting, by using someone else's trademark and trying to pass off fake goods as real ones, is quite obviously wrong. It harms customers, and it harms the manufacturers. Thus, a distinction deserves to be made here between the counterfeiters who try to deceive consumers (for instance by copying authenticity marks, like holograms, etc.) and those who are just providing them with highly cheaper alternatives (pirated DVDs, etc.). In this light, it is also important here to distinguish between counterfeiting, traditionally taken to be trademark violation, and piracy, traditionally taken to be a violation of international law, but now generally meaning a large-scale violation of copyright law. While the former can lead to consumer confusion, the latter scarcely ever does. This is ignored by industry people who evoke the image of the consumer quite often, but only when it helps them, and not in any meaningful manner. They negate consumer choice when it comes to consciously purchasing pirated goods, and consumer freedoms when it comes to usage of copyrighted materials.

While commercial film piracy funds terrorists, so does pretty much every business activity.

A favourite of the MPAA (and by association, the MPA) is the RAND report on Film Piracy and its Connection to Organized Crime and Terrorism. This report, which was funded by the MPAA, predictably concludes that film piracy funds organized crime and terrorism. Even if we are to believe its findings wholesale, it leaves us wondering whether all business activities from which terrorists derive funds should be banned.

In India, there is a substantiated link between organized crime and film and music production, and terrorists have been said to make money off the stock market. If the MPA's arguments are taken to their logical conclusions, then film production and equity trading should also be prosecuted. Furthermore, while the mafia and terrorists are the ostensible targets, the laws that are brought about to tackle it affect poor roadside vendors and non-commercial online file sharers. To tackle the funding of terrorists, roadside piracy shouldn't become the target just as film production per se shouldn't. The invocation of the RAND report is thus only meant for rhetorical effect, as it is hard to find logic in there.

"To copy without authorization is to steal", the death penalty, and drug peddling.

At the conference, Dominic Keating of the US Embassy pointed out that "to copy without authorization is to steal" and David Brener of US Customs and Border Protection kept emphasising, on at least two occasions, that "drug peddling merits an automatic death sentence in many countries". There are numerous arguments one can make to show the lack of thought in the former. One could point out that 'stealing' and 'theft' are things that happen to tangible property, and that not only is copyright not tangible, but it is barely property. Copying without authorization creates one more of what existed, without depriving the authorizer (usually a corporation) of its original. This goes against our notion of 'stealing'. If the argument is to be shifted to the terrain of control over one's property/copyright, Mark Lemley in an illuminative article shows how the economic theories behind externalities in property and copyright are vastly different, and that complete control over either has never been, nor should it ever be, an aim of the law. Simply put, someone free riding on your property leaves you worse off than earlier, while someone free riding on your copyright usually doesn't.

One could also point out that 'stealing' is endemic in activities involving human creativity. T.S. Eliot notes that "Immature poets imitate; mature poets steal; bad poets deface what they take, and good poets make it into something better, or at least something different". He does not even consider the possibility that artistic borrowing, whether by imitation or by 'stealing' does not happen. Even Y.S. Rajan, Principal Adviser to CII recognized this when during the conference he noted that "imitation and innovation have an interesting and intertwining philosophical history". If we are to take Mr. Keating's admonishment seriously, we would indeed have a very illustrious list of thieves on our hands, including the Walt Disney Corporation, William Shakespeare, Vladamir Nabokov, Public Enemy, and pretty much every creative person who has ever lived. Books can be written about this (and indeed, numerous books have been), so we shall not dwell on this issue.

Mr. Brener's repeatedly spoke of how drug peddling attracts death penalty in many countries (though in neither the US nor in India has anyone ever received capital punishment for drug peddling), but he also clarified that he is not advocating for the death penalty for copyright violations. That made one wonder why he was bringing up the death penalty at all. He also made the dubious, non-substantiated claim (noting it as "true fact") that pirating movies is more profitable than selling heroin. This claim appears in an article about a report produced by the Australian Federation Against Counterfeit Theft (AFACT), but the original report is nowhere to be found. The article about the AFACT report also claims that the pirates are using their illicit profits promote drug smuggling. The seeming contradiction of film pirates investing in something that is riskier and less profitable doesn't seem to have caught the eye of the writers. One version of the 'drugs are less profitable than pirated DVDs' claim (with marijuana taking heroin's place) was debunked on the Commons Law mailing list. Pirated DVDs are sold for a fraction of the cost of the original. It would be obvious to anyone that DVDs that are typically sold for Rs.30-50, where the cost of manufacture alone may be estimable to be around Rs. 10, cannot be more profitable than heroin peddling. That apart, most online file sharing (deemed to be "piracy") is non-commercial. Thus the question of profit does not really arise. Still, for the industry, absence of a profit is equal to a loss.

Thus, the rhetoric of crime, and that too heinous crime, is continually used, despite its being completely inapposite. Why does used to try to make IP enforcement a matter of state concern, rather than a matter of private, and civil, interest. This way, illegitimate statistics and factoids are used to make individual file-sharers who earn no money get lengthy prison sentences. This and other ways in which IP enforcement has expanded are carefully documented in this paper by Susan Sell.

Repeating false 'statistics' does not make them true.

Again, we were subjected to a number of dubious claims during the conference: If only counterfeiting and piracy were eliminated, India's fiscal deficit would disappear; the Indian entertainment industry loses 16000 crore (USD 4 billion) yearly to piracy; 820,000 direct jobs are lost due to film piracy; software piracy costs the industry USD 2.7 billion annually, etc. These reports' methodologies have been thorougly discredited. Even The Economist, a very conservative and pro-industry newspaper, believes that the BSA-IDC annual reports on software piracy are utterly distorted. Similarly, in the U.S., the figure of 750,000 jobs (around 8% of the U.S. unemployed in 2008) being lost due to piracy were touted by everyone from the Department of Commerce, the Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Border and Customs Protection, and the MPAA, RIAA, and BSA. The amount of money lost each year in the U.S. due to IP infringement has been estimated to be between USD 200-250 billion (that's more than the combined 2005 gross domestic revenues of the movie, music, software, and video game industries). In a lengthy piece in Ars Technica, Julian Sanchez traces back the history of both these figures, and shows how they are just large numbers used for lobbying, and are not based on actual studies. The industry-commissioned Ernst & Young report ("The Effects of Counterfeiting and Piracy on India's Entertainment Industry") was never made available to the public at large, thereby making it impossible to judge the methodological soundness of the survey and the veracity of the figures.

IP expansion and more stringent enforcement is counter-productive.

Chander Mohan Lall, copyright lawyer to various film studios (including Warner Bros.) in India, used a number of short film clips in presentation during the conference. Upon being questioned about it, he admitted that he did not have permissions of the copyright holders, but claimed that his use fell under "the education exception" in Indian copyright law. While I wish he were correct (because what he was doing was indeed educational use), as per the law he is wrong. Section 52(1)(i) of the Copyright Act only exempts educational usage of cinematograph film recordings when "audience is limited to such staff and students [of an educational institution], the parents and guardians of the students and persons directly connected with the activities of the institution". While there are other arguments he could seek to use to make his usage of the film clilps non-infringing, being excepted by the educational fair dealings clauses isn't one of them. Thus, more stringent enforcement of IP rights actually engenders such unauthorized, but perfectly legitimate copying and communication to the public such as that done by Mr. Lall.

Another way in which IP enforcement is being sought to be increased is by way of the so-called Goonda Acts. These are generally statutes aimed at criminals and lumpen elements in society. The Maharastra version, the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders and Dangerous Persons Act, 1981, just became the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders, Dangerous Persons and Video Pirates Act. The term "video pirate" is very widely defined, to include any copyright infringement-chargesheeter who is "engaged or is making preparations for engaging in any of his activities as a video pirates, which affect adversely or likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order". Public order is deemed to be disturbed by "producing and distributing pirated copies of music or film products, thereby resulting in a loss of confidence in administration". Thus video pirates can possibly be interpreted to include individual sitting at home and using P2P networks to share films. The only requirement is that they should have had a chargesheet lodged against them previously -- they needn't even have been convicted; being chargesheeted suffices. Thus, non-commercial activities of file-sharing are equated to bootleggers and drug smugglers, and preventive detention (an anti-civil rights relic of India's colonial past) is applicable to them.

IP expansion is happening without the ostensible justifications for IP being kept in mind. That Tirupathi ladoos are going to get GI (geographical indicator) protection was announced at the conference with great pride. Geographical indicators are used to protect consumer interests, to ensure that no one outside a particular region (Champagne) can lay claim to be producing that product (Champagne) if the production of that product is intrinsically linked to special features found in that region (climate, etc.). However, no devout person would want to purchase anything advertised as "Tirupathi ladoo" if it were produced outside the Venkateswara temple at Tirupathi, thus the question of consumer confusion does not arise. What if someone malignantly advertises something as Tirupathi ladoo and claims it was made in Tirupathi (and not just that it tastes like the ladoo made there)? Such a person can be taken to task for deceptive advertising, and there is no need for something to have IP protection to do so. This represents a senseless expansionism of IP. It is now IP for IP's sake.

One of the speakers, Mr. V.N. Deshmukh, who though pro-stringent IP enforcement, astutely noted that, "When local demand is not met, they [consumers] turn to counterfeiters and pirates." Local demand can be unsatisfied because of lack of supply, or because the supply is overpriced, or because the supply is not easy to access, or because what is supplied is inferior to what is demanded. At the end of the day, as William Patry, Google's lead counsel, has noted, what companies sell to the public are products and services, and not IP. It would thus be wise for businesses to be innovative and compete rather than trying to extend their monopolies and engaging in rent-seeking behaviour that is economical harmful to consumers. They would also do well to remember that IP is not only a product but an input as well, so they are ultimately consumers themselves. All the harsher laws and enforcement mechanisms that they push for right now will have unintended consequences, and come to affect them adversely.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/fallacies-lies-and-video-pirates

Expert Meeting on Freedom of Expression and Intellectual Property Rights

praskrishna — 2012-03-16T07:41:39Z

This report provides an overview of the discussion from the Expert Meeting on Freedom of Expression and Intellectual Property Rights, organized by ARTICLE 19 in London on November 18, 2011.

At the meeting, nineteen international scholars, experts and human rights activists met to explore the antagonistic relationship between Intellectual Property (IP) and the rights to freedom of expression and information (FoE). This conversation is timely if not overdue, as governments are increasingly using the pretext of IP protection to place unjustified restrictions on the exercise of FoE, particularly on the Internet. ARTICLE 19 believes that increasing the profile of the human rights perspective in debates on IP law and policy is essential to protecting FoE, particularly in the digital environment. The objective of the meeting was therefore to develop an appropriate rights framework for evaluating IP law and enforcement mechanisms, to advance a policy paper on the issue and eventually to establish a set of key principles on IP and FoE.

This report outlines:

A summary of the discussions that took place during the meeting; and
Outstanding issues and those requiring follow-up discussion in order to conceptualise and complete a position paper on the subject.

List of Participants

Andrew Puddephatt: Director, Global Partners & Associates
Brett Soloman: Executive Director, ACCESS.
Dinah PoKempner: General Counsel, Human Rights Watch.
Jérémie Zimmermann: Co-founder and spokesperson, LaQuadrature du Net: Internet & Libertés
Jeremy Malcolm: Project Coordinator for IP and Communications; Consumer International.
Jim Killock: Executive Director, Open Rights Group
Michael Camilleri: Human Rights Specialist, Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression at OAS.
Michael Geist: Chair of Internet and E-commerce Law, Univesity of Ottowa.
Pranesh Prakash: Programme Manager, Center for Internet and Society
Raegan MacDonald: Policy Analyst, ACCESS (Brussels)
Saskia Walzel: Senior Policy Advocate, Consumer Focus
Yaman Akdeniz: Associate Professor in Law; Human Rights Law Research Center, Faculty of Law, Istanbul Bilgi University.
Walter van Holst: IT legal consultant, Mitopics
Agnes Callamard: Executive Director, ARTICLE 19
Barbora Bukovska: Senior Direct for Law and Policy, ARTICLE 19
David Banisar: Senior Legal Counsel, ARTICLE 19
Gabrielle Guillemin: Legal Officer, ARTICLE 19
Andrew Smith: Lawyer, ARTICLE 19
Michael Polak: Intern, ARTICLE 19

Welcome, Introductions, Purpose

Agnès Callamard opened the meeting with a welcome and introduction, giving a brief overview of ARTICLE 19’s extensive experience over twenty years bringing together coalitions to increase the profile of various advocacy issues and develop key policy documents, including the Camden Principles on FoE and equality, and the Johannesburg Principles on FoE and national security.

In the last three years, the Internet has increasingly come to the forefront of ARTICLE 19’s work. During this time it has become clear that the agenda for protecting IP negatively impacts FoE, and that there is a notable absence of traditional human rights groups engaged with the IP agenda or campaigning on its implications for human rights. ARTICLE 19 believes that there is a clear need for this gap to be filled, for us to enter this dialogue and challenge current preconceptions with an alternative human rights narrative that counters that promoted by IP industries.

The purpose of this meeting, therefore, is to develop a strategy for promoting the FoE perspective in debates on IP. To do this, it is important to first conceptualise the relationship between FoE and IP within a rights framework: to identify how or if these interests should be balanced and what the areas of conflict and conciliation are. This discussion should clarify the best way to proceed, with a view to arrive at a policy paper and eventually a set of principles on how to best protect FoE in the IP context.

Session 1: Brief comments by participants on issues of concern for freedom of expression campaigners in relation to IPR

The objective of the first session was for all participants to identify the most significant issues in current debates on freedom of expression and IP, and the extent to which some issues may have been overlooked, underestimated, or over-emphasised. These issues, ideas and perspectives would then guide discussions during the remainder of the meeting and at future meetings.

All participants agreed that applying a human rights framework to this debate is an important and worthwhile endeavour. The following issues were identified during the discussions:

Conceptual starting point

Participants agreed that the status quo should not be the “starting point” for discussions, and that we should avoid being trapped in the narrative that has been developed and imposed by IP rights holders. This requires questioning accepted language and norms, pushing the boundaries of the debate and thinking outside the box. The proliferation of terms such as “piracy”, “theft” and other criminal law language to describe non-commercial copyright infringement demonstrates the extent to which corporate interest groups have controlled the agenda. We should reject these terms and instead adopt positive language that emphasises the cultural and economic value of information sharing, and frame IP as a potential obstacle to these values. This dialogue should recognise that the relationship between people and information has changed in the digital age, and that a new generation of people express themselves through sharing media online and creating new works such as video mash-ups.

A human right to IP?
Several participants questioned whether we should accept interests in IP as “human rights”, particularly as the concept is one born from censorship. Rejecting IP as a human right would require challenging accepted language such as “intellectual property rights” and “rights holder”. If we speak of IP interests or claims, rather than human rights, then it is also inaccurate to speak of their interaction with other rights as a “conflict between rights” that requires “balancing”. Instead, certain IP claims, and the detection or enforcement mechanisms that support them, should be framed as restrictions on the right to freedom of expression.

Some participants expressed doubts over the value of advocating that IP is not a human right when the idea is already embedded and various regional courts have already recognised it as such. Such a campaign would be difficult and achieve little, particularly as it may require changing established agreements such as Berne and TRIPS that would take decades to reform. Staying within the existing legal framework may be the only pragmatic way to achieve change in the short and medium-term. There was agreement that understanding how different treaties and human rights instruments or bodies understand IP is important before proceeding.

In the alternative, it was suggested that IP could be viewed as a “human right” to the extent that it complements other human rights, such as FoE. Copyright is often justified on terms that it is essential for incentivising creativity and that it is an “engine” of free speech – this argument needs further exploration, as it shows that the two rights may sometimes be complementary. ARTICLE 19 is familiar with a strategy focussed on complementarity, as the Camden Principles promoted a similar approach to advocate that the right to equality and right to FoE were mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory. Similarly, participants spoke about a “social value” approach to viewing IP as a human right, i.e. the greater the social value behind the IP protection, the more weight it would have in a rights “balancing” exercise.

Other suggestions on reframing or reversing IP preconceptions included recommending a system where the “public domain” is the norm and any monopoly interest the exception. Exceptions would have to be argued on a case-by-case basis and would be granted only when it would be in the public interest to do so.

A consensus seemed to develop that rejecting the idea of IP as a right would not be a helpful strategy. However, between the various alternative suggestions the only agreement seemed to be that the issue requires more exploration so that the nature of IP as a right can be better understood. It is anticipated that reaching a definite conclusion on this issue will inevitably not satisfy everyone, but would be necessary to proceed with an advocacy campaign.

The Right to Culture
As well as the right to property and the right to freedom of expression, there is also the right to culture in Article 27 of the UDHR and Article 15 of the ICESCR. Both instruments reflect the tension between a right to access culture and the competing right of individuals to protect the material interests in their intellectual property. Participants recommended further exploration of the economic, social and cultural rights perspective on IP issues and integrating this into a campaign.

Pulling apart multiple IP issues
Participants identified a number of ways in which IP engages freedom of expression, and that it is therefore important that a FoE analysis dealt with these issues separately. One focus should be on the IP protections themselves – these give individuals monopolies over information and thereby restrict others’ FoE. Within this, the breadth of exceptions regimes is important, as these vary significantly between countries, in particular the duration of copyright protection and how ‘fair use’ or ‘fair dealing’ type exceptions are defined. The use of digital rights management systems (DRMS) as preventative measures also relate to this area. A second focus, and a current “hot topic” in IP circles, is the enforcement agenda. This includes the criminalisation of non-commercial IP infringement, the privatisation of policing IP infringement and its impact on net neutrality, and criminal and civil law protections for DRMS.

The difference between types of IP was also discussed. There are different rationales behind copyright, trademarks, and patents. Our approach should be as nuanced and specific as possible – when we are criticising copyright we should only refer to copyright and not IP generally. Unpacking the issues in relation to the different types of IP will be important for developing a coherent policy.

The way that international trade agreements have consistently augmented IP rights was also highlighted. In relation to electronic data, the copyright holder now has so much control over the use of the information, particularly through digital rights management systems protected by the criminal law, that purchasing such products is increasingly more like renting than owning. This augmentation should be tracked and highlighted in an advocacy campaign.

Advocacy Strategy
It was also noted that developing a human rights perspective on IP is not only an intellectual pursuit but needs to be viewed in terms of a citizen movement capable of achieving outcomes. Participants identified several further issues that should be considered when developing an advocacy strategy.

One consideration would be how we develop campaigning alliances. Some industries are potential allies, in particular Internet intermediaries that are increasingly under pressure to be the private police of copyright holders. Some artists themselves are also sympathetic to FoE arguments. More obviously, consumers and information users should be mobilised by a campaign. It is important to develop distinct strategies for targeting identified groups that reflects our understanding of their diverse interests; this would allow us to build commonalities between actors who may normally be regarded as having divergent objectives, and mobilise each to push for change in a direction that supports our ultimate goal.

Central to a campaign strategy is also the idea of having a clear message as to what the problem is and how it impacts people on a day to day basis. The utility of graphics illustrating the inequitable geographic distribution of IP interests was recommended as a useful tool to demonstrate the scale of this global problem. Ways of countering campaigns conducted by IP holders over the last two decades were also discussed, in particular how to push back against the idea of copyright infringement as “theft”, as has been promoted through slogans such as “you wouldn’t steal a handbag.” Illustrative analogies were discussed, including viewing IP infringement as mere trespass rather than theft and as “copying” rather than depriving a person of property. However, it was concluded that these analogies were helpful for developing our understanding of the issues, but would not be as effective as campaign tools. An effective campaign would have to distinguish between background issues and our actual advocacy points, which would be focussed on a clear set of key fundamental principles.

Participants also identified the importance of engaging governments and the media on the inconsistency of their policies and coverage of FoE and IP. The US, in particular, is loudly proclaiming its commitments to FoE on-line whilst simultaneously promoting aggressive enforcements mechanisms for IP that directly undermine FoE rights.

The campaign against ACTA in the European Parliament (EP) was also recommended as a platform from which to launch further dialogue on FoE and IP. Since the meeting, ARTICLE 19 has released a statement on ACTA that we have shared with all participants, and plans to circulate this statement to various EP committees and MEPs in the coming weeks.[1]

Opportunities for strategic litigation were also identified. In particular, there are a number of Article 10 ECHR cases pending before the European Court of Human Rights on the blocking of websites, many being from Turkey.

Session 2: The tension between freedom of expression and IPR

The second session began with a presentation by Gabrielle of the background paper on intellectual property and freedom of expression. Participants gave feedback on issues raised in the paper and suggested ways of developing it into a policy paper to compliment an advocacy campaign.

Gabrielle’s opening comments acknowledged that the background paper is very much focussed on FoE in the digital age, and is centred more on copyright rather than trademarks and patents. Gabrielle outlined the way in which conflicts between tangible property rights and freedom of expression have been dealt with by the ECHR. She also identified key challenges to reframing understandings of IP, in particular in relation to the notion that the public domain and information sharing should be the norm while information monopolies should be the exception. Gabrielle also highlighted the timeliness of this discussion as significant changes to the enforcement agenda are taking place; including the criminalisation of copyright infringement and DRMS circumvention.

Participants agreed that the policy paper was an excellent starting point for discussions on FoE and IP, and recommended a number of areas for further elaboration in future drafts:

The objective tone of the paper, placing ARTICLE 19 as an impartial arbiter, is a productive starting point.
The legal framework for IP/FoE should be elaborated to acknowledge the right to culture as contained in Article 27 of the UDHR and Article 15 of the IESCR. The ways that states periodically report their IESCR compliance could be explored.
Intermediaries should be referred to in broader terms than just as ISPs. “Information society service providers” is an umbrella phrase that includes search engines, advertisers, payment services.
The Scarlett decision by the ECJ should be incorporated once it is released.[2]
The concept of “filtering” is essentially a type of “blocking”, both may be referred to as censorship to clarify their immediate impact on FoE.
Some participants felt that explaining why the FoE implications are different for civil and criminal law would be helpful.
Participants felt that the section on the implications of the ACTA regime could be built upon.[3]
In developing the section on FoE rights, the Latin American view of FoE as a collective right may also be worth emphasising. It may also be worth comparing the potential balance between IP and FoE to other balancing exercises related to privacy or reputational rights.
The differences between copyright, trademarks and patents should be explained.
A section outlining the philosophical foundations of these protections, in particular the difference between the US (incentivise creation) and European (natural rights) approach to IP might also be helpful.
It should be stressed that the failure of IP law to adapt to new technologies is the problem, not new technologies themselves. This failure undermines the justifications for protecting IP rights.
Greater emphasis should be placed on the way in which the current legal framework is based on an ideal of an 18th century author, and does not acknowledge the impact of IP on scientific research and collaboration, indigenous knowledge, peer-to-peer sharing, the creative power of new technology etc.
Positive examples of IP infringement would be useful for illustrating why IP protection shouldn’t be safeguarded at all costs. In particular, efforts to make works more accessible to minority language speakers (crowd-sourcing methods in particular) and the impact that IP law has on blind people’s access to information.
Similarly, examples of censorship that make the impact of IP protections of FoE clearer to policy makers would be helpful in debunking the myth that the interests of the IP industry giants are synonymous with those of the individual creators.
It would also be helpful to illustrate that IP protection is also a geographic concentration of wealth issues as much as a moral issue.[4]
The role of de minimis exception regimes in protecting FoE should also be explored in greater depth.
Several sources were also recommended, including the Association littéraire et artistique internationale (ALAI)[5], the International Federation of Libraries Association (Stuart Hamilton identified as a contact)[6] and the OSCE study on Internet Freedom.[7]

Session 3: Key questions, issues and challenges

Dave chaired a third session to elaborate upon the key issues discussed prior to lunch, with a view to reaching some level of consensus on the appropriate scope of restrictions on freedom of expression in defence of IPR.

Gabrielle offered comments on the balance that could be applied between the right to property (Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR) and the right to freedom of expression (Article 10 of the ECHR). However, as the European Court of Human Rights has not ruled on the balance that ought to be struck between these two rights in the context of intellectual property, it is difficult to speculate on how it would be litigated.

Participants agreed that the ‘public interest’ is central to assessing when property rights can be restricted to promote other rights, including FoE. The need to stress the importance of the Internet as a public forum was also identified.

The participants also discussed what limitations are appropriate to place on IP rights. Various ideas were suggested, but it was concluded that any recommended framework on the substance of IP rights would have to be compliant with the Berne Convention. This means that in terms of copyright duration, the minimum that could be recommended is 50 years. It was also stated that any system that recommends a default public domain with a system of registration for copyright “exceptions” would not be compliant with Berne. The augmentation of IP rights through these international agreements was again referenced, as there appears to have been a pattern of the US and EU exporting the worst aspects of their IP regimes abroad through trade arrangements without elaborating on how exceptions to IP rights should be developed. It was also noted that copyright holders will continue to support this process, as their business model depends upon having as much control over the use of information as possible.

Again participants identified the need to distinguish between the limitations that are imposed on FoE by the IP rights themselves, those limitations imposed by preventative technological measures and those imposed by enforcement mechanisms.

The importance of distinguishing the different actors involved was also emphasised, i.e. whether we are discussing competing rights between private creators (e.g. original creator vs. derivative creator) or the direct relationship between the state and individuals (e.g. enforcement of criminal provisions against an individual infringing IP). It is important that our analysis does not conflate private actors with state actors, and that it is clear what positive and negative obligations are on these parties and the rationale for their application.

It was suggested that an approach that balances competing human rights is appropriate where the interests of two creators are in conflict, but perhaps not when the state intervenes to prevent or punish IP infringements. Where the state acts to restrict an individual’s access to the Internet, it is not a balance issue but an unnecessary and disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of expression.

Participants stressed the economic and social significance of blanket (and even many specific) restrictions on Internet access. Blanket prohibitions on access to the Internet was compared to solitary confinement, and participants agreed that sanctions such as these are never necessary or proportionate responses to IP infringement. An analogy was made to a statement recently issued by ARTICLE 19 on services to counterfeit mobile telephones being shut down in Kenya.[8] Participants also indicated that these blanket measures are increasingly rare, but that states still violate the principles of necessity and proportionality through limitations that they impose.

Further FoE concerns were raised in relation to the enforcement of IP rights in the digital environment. In order to monitor the Internet for IP infringement, it is necessary to monitor the content of all Internet communications. This has implications for FoE rights and privacy rights, and has a potential chilling effect on all on-line expression.

There was also some discussion on defining what our working definition of FoE should be in this context, particularly in relation to use of new technologies and DRMS. Does FoE necessarily include the right to scan a document, to use translation technology on it, to copy and paste, to save in various formats etc?

Participants also discussed that the ordinary de minimis exceptions cannot simply be transplanted and applied as ‘exceptions’ or defences to DRMS circumvention offences. DRMS limit the use of works severely, and unless you have the technical knowledge to circumvent these devices, it is not possible to take advantage of exceptions or defences.

There were also discussions on access to justice issues, due to the prohibitively expensive cost of contesting litigation against large corporations.

Several participants mentioned that discussions on these issues have a tendency to become too narrow in their focus. Examples given were that the focus drifts to copyright rather than trademarks and patents, that peer2peer sharing gets more attention than other technology uses, and that artistic expression is talked about but not technical or scientific forms of expression. At the same time, some participants expressed an aversion to a “kitchen sink” approach in any campaign, as it may result in an incoherent message.

Various sources were recommended for further reading. These included a report by Consumers International on best state practices (Brazil, Canada and South Africa mentioned for enacting progressive legislation recently),[9] and the UN guidelines on consumer protection.[10]

Session 4: Measures for protecting and enforcing IP rights on the Internet: finding a better balance with FOE

At the fourth session, Barbora chaired a discussion on procedural issues that pose a threat to freedom of expression and Internet freedom. Key issues identified at the outset were whether sticking to a human rights view that judicial oversight is the best option or is there a human rights compliant alternative model? As it was decided in the previous session that disconnection is disproportionate, are all forms of criminal liability for Internet use disproportionate? And what limits should be placed on civil remedies, such as damages-award ceilings.

Discussions began on whether an administrative model for notice and takedown would be appropriate. Advantages that were identified of non-judicial models include:

An administrative system is more effective in terms of time and cost. The number of notice and takedown requests that happen on-line would overwhelm a traditional judicial organ.
Protections for intermediaries from liability can be built into the system.
Guidelines can ensure compliance with legal certainty, transparency, due process, specificity of remedies, protections for the identities of users.
Could also be subject to judicial oversight.
That limitations on cost would also “disarm” corporations who would not be able to threaten expensive court procedures that intimidate individuals into prematurely settling civil actions.
The need for fast remedies in digital infringements was also stressed. For example, a website may be created only for the 90 minutes of a football game and then disappear – traditional judicial methods cannot be used to provide redress in these circumstances. Although this may appear to be a “shoot first, aim later” approach, one needs to consider these pragmatic concerns. An administrative model is better suited to this than a judicial system.
Alternatives to an administrative model included the use of non-legal ombudsmen or arbitration proceedings. These measures could also keep costs low.

A number of participants disagreed that an administrative model was appropriate. Their concerns focussed on the following issues:

That the independence of an administrative body could not be guaranteed.
That an administrative procedure should never be used to impose criminal liability.
The procedural guarantees in an administrative system are less robust, particularly in countries that do not have a strong separation of powers.
That the time and cost of a judicial system is necessary to comply with international human rights standards.

Concerns were also raised about recommending any boilerplate solution that should be ‘copy and pasted’ into all national contexts without adequate consideration being paid to that country’s legal system or traditions. In terms of accuracy of language, it was also commented that notice and takedown affects hosts of content, and not ISPs, who are mere conduits.

Systems in place in Canada and Japan for “notice and notice” were also discussed. In these systems, the IP holder notifies the intermediary, who notifies the user, who has a time to reply before action is taken. The role of the intermediary in this system is to facilitate communications and they are not subject to liability. The accommodation of “emergency requests” could also be considered within this system.

With any notice and takedown system it would also be important to make it clear to those controlling the content how you object to a takedown notice. Access to justice principles are important here, particularly considering the amount of misinformation that has circulated in recent years on the nature of IP infringement.

Various examples were given of forum shopping by IP owners in provincial courthouses where judges are less experienced in IP law and therefore more responsive to the arguments of IP holders.

There was also a discussion on why copyright holders would favour criminal sanctions as opposed to civil remedies. On the one hand, it seems intuitive that the rights holder would rather receive damages than have a person fined or imprisoned by the government. It was suggested that the criminal law has the advantage of having a more significant chilling effect. Also, in criminal cases, the costs of detection and enforcement can be placed on the state.

A number of initial principles were identified through this discussion:

Intermediaries should be immunised from civil liability.
There should not be liability for hyperlinking. It must be distinguished from “re-publication”.
Non-commercial infringement should not be criminalized. It was noted that TRIPS requires commercial scale infringement to be criminalized. Narrowly defining what is meant by “commercial” is important:

Peer-to-peer sharing should not be considered commercial.
IP infringement committed by individuals should not be considered commercial.

The need for clarity in the law and for information on IP law to be available to end-users facing litigation threats from copyright holders. In particular, states should educate individuals in the exceptions to copyright protections that serve the public interest.
Possible limitations on damages could be developed.

Session 5: Political developments and strategies of response

The purpose of the fifth session was to provide participants with the opportunity to discuss developing strategies for working together to better combat governments’ attempts at restricting FoE on the basis of protecting IP.

The first priority that was identified was to finalise a policy paper on the issue. This would perhaps take some time to formulate, and may require further meetings to discuss key issues.

A second priority for advocacy was identified in relation to ACTA, which will be voted upon by the European Parliament in the coming months. ARTICLE 19 has issued a statement on ACTA that will also be circulated among participants.

A third discussion concerned the possibility of uncovering a wikileaks-type “scandal” in which the hypocrisy of copyrights holders, and their true motivations, could be exposed. Receiving internal emails from whistleblowers interested in exposing such a story would provide a good media storm in which to launch an advocacy campaign. Examples of IP industries illegally lobbying governments or interfering with the administration of justice would be helpful. The involvement of the British Phonographic Industry in lobbying for the Digital Economy Act was referenced in this discussion.

The utility of engaging with the copyright industries was also discussed. These industries have a reputation for not negotiating– they want as much control over information as possible, as control is essential to their business model. There may be some utility in identifying who our enemies’ enemies are. It was mentioned that the occupy movements may be interested in pursuing a human rights narrative against corporate property interests. These groups are very much engaged in promoting FoE rights. The traditional media was also identified as a group that may be interested in supporting a movement for greater FoE protections against IP.

In terms of developing strategy, it was also recommended that we look at successful human rights campaigns from the past, particularly any in the field of cultural rights. Potential partners for coalition building need to be looked at, and many of these partners may be within emerging economies such as BRIC or South Africa.

As we develop a strategy, we need to remain focussed on framing this battle as a human rights fight. We need to identify victims, perpetrators, and a call to action. A different plan may be needed for each audience that we identify. From the experience of activists at the meeting, theoretical arguments will not succeed in rousing a people-driven campaign. The use of new media, such as campaign videos on youtube, that clearly outline the human rights case would be helpful. It is also necessary to bridge the gap between popular campaigns and videos, and getting those campaigns into the mainstream media and creating a political issue out of it. As technology users that would be interested in this campaign tend not to vote, making this a political issue means making people who do vote understand the issue as one that is a mass-scale human rights violation.

Concluding comments and closing

Agnès closed the session by identifying several key steps:

The need to revise the policy paper in light of discussions throughout the day’s sessions.
The need to meet again to discuss the revised policy paper and to continue these discussions.
The objective of developing our role as advocates, identifying what we can initiate, what existing efforts we can support, and what our overall strategy should be.

[1].ARTICLE 19 statement “European Parliament must reject ACTA”, see: http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/2901/en/european-parliament:-reject-anti-counterfeiting-trade-agreement-%28acta%29

[2].This judgment has since been released. See ARTICLE 19 press release: http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/2872/en/landmark-digital-free-speech-ruling-at-european-court-of-justice

[3].ARTICLE 19 has since released a statement on ACTA. See: http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/2901/en/european-parliament:-reject-anti-counterfeiting-trade-agreement-(acta)

[4].http://www.worldmapper.org/images/largepng/167.png was recommended for its map of patent distribution in 2002.

[5].ALAI homepage: http://alaiorg.vincelette.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=50&Itemid=24

[6].See a list of publications at: http://www.ifla.org/en/publications

[7].OSCE study “Freedom of Expression on the Internet” (2010): http://www.osce.org/fom/80723

[8].ARTICLE 19 statement on FoE and counterfeit mobile telephones: http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/2762/en/kenya:-free-expression-standards-should-guide-fight-against-%E2%80%9Ccounterfeit%E2%80%9D-mobile-phones

[9].http://a2knetwork.org/watchlist

[10].http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/consumption_en.pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/freedom-of-expression-and-ipr-meeting

Exhaustion: Imports, Exports and the Doctrine of First Sale in Indian Copyright Law

pranesh — 2014-05-29T06:18:31Z

This article by Pranesh Prakash was published in the Manupatra Intellectual Property Reports, February 2011, Volume 1, Part 2, pp. 149-160. In this short note, the author argues that Indian courts have fundamentally misunderstood the doctrine of first sale, and consequently have wrongly held that parallel importation is disallowed by Indian law. He further looks at the ingenuity displayed by a court in prohibiting export of low-priced editions from India, and comes to the conclusion that this is also wrong in law. He believes there is a way out of this quagmire that we find ourselves in due to judicial inventions: that of accepting a proposed amendment to the Copyright Act.

Can foreign works be copyrighted works?

Section 13(2) of the Indian Copyright Act states that insofar as published works go, copyright only subsists if the work is first published in India or if the work is by an Indian citizen. It does except the application of this section to all those works to which sections 40 and 41 of the Act apply. Section 40 allows for the provisions of the Act to be extended to foreign works and foreign authors by special order of the government. The government is required to do so, being a member of the Berne Convention, the Universal Copyright Convention as well as the TRIPS Agreement, and has fulfilled its requirement via International Copyright Order, the latest such order having been issued in 1999.

Thus, for purposes of our law, we protect not only Indian works, but foreign works as well. It expressly places foreign authors and works published in a foreign country in the same shoes as Indian authors and works published in India, respectively.

Import of copyrighted works

Thus having established that foreign books enjoy protection under Indian law, we now turn to the question of whether import of foreign works into India is permissible under Indian law. There is no provision of the Copyright Act by which the owner or licensee of copyright given the exclusive right to import a copyrighted work into India. Section 51(b)(iv) does, however, makes it illegal to import infringing copies of a work.[1];It is clear that illegally published copies are infringing copies, and thus cannot be imported. But are legally published copies that are legally purchased outside of India also ‘infringing copies’ and is their import also prohibited by the section 51?

This question is laid out as:

We now arrive at one of the most difficult topics in copyright law. It is our ambition to expound this subject as clearly as possible but inevitably this involves exposing some troublesome problems which lurk not far beneath the surface. The basic idea is simple. It has long been the policy of copyright law in the UK and other countries which follow our system that as a rule, mere selling or other secondary dealings with articles manufactured in the home market shall not be treated as copyright infringement unless their marking was piratical in the first place. Further, it is policy that traders should be free to buy and sell goods without getting involved in copyright proceedings, so long as they do so in good faith. Do not deal in pirate copies where you can tell they are probably such” is a law anyone can understand. Dealing in pirate copies where you know or have reason to believe that they are such is called secondary infringement in contrast to primary infringement (e.g. manufacturing) where liability is strict.

This idea works fine as long as one does not need to examine too closely, what one means by pirate copies; it is usually pretty obvious. However, when it comes to parallel imports it is not so obvious, and one has to know precisely what is meant. It is plain that the test cannot be whether the copy was made piratically in its country of origin because the copyright laws of foreign states are irrelevant so far as rights in the UK are concerned, and in some cases these laws may not even exist. Since foreign copyrights are separate and distinct rights, and since it is commonplace for these to be assigned so as to be exploited by different hands, it cannot matter whether a copy imported from Britannia was lawfully made in its country of origin; this principle has been recognized from an early date.

According to section 2(m) of the Act, a reproduction of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, a copy of a film or sound recording is an "infringing copy" if such reproduction, copy or sound recording is made or imported in contravention of the provisions of this Act. So section 2(m) does not clarify matters either, because it applies only to that importation that is “in contravention of the provisions of” the Copyright Act. So we look to section 14 which lays down the meaning of copyright and is read with section 51 when determining what does and does not constitute infringement. Nowhere, in section 14 of the Act is a right to import granted to the copyright owner. However, section 14 does clearly lays down that insofar as literary, dramatic or musical works go; it is the copyright owner’s exclusive right to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in circulation”. The explanation to this section goes to clarify that for the purposes of this section, a copy which has been sold once shall be deemed to be a copy already in circulation.”What this means and how this has been construed by various courts shall be seen in the following sections.

Judicial history on importation

The Penguin case [2]

The issue of parallel importation first reached the higher judiciary in 1984 when the Delhi High Court was called upon to pronounce judgment on whether import by a third party without the express authorisation of the copyright owner constitute infringement. The court, bizarrely, ruled that it constituted infringement because it constituted a violation of the owner’s right to publish:

While publication generally refers to issue to public, importation for the specified purpose may be a necessary step in the process of issuing to the public, and therefore of publishing. It appears to me that the exclusive right of the copyright owner to print, publish and sell these titles in India would extend to the exclusive right to import copies into India for the purpose of selling or by way of trade offering or exposing for sale the hooks in question. This is the true meaning of the word “publish” as used in section 14(1)(a)(4).

It is also an infringement of copyright knowingly to import into India for sale or hire infringing copies of a work without the consent of the owner of the copyright, though they may have been made by or with the consent of the owner of the copyright in the place where they were made.

It should be noted that prior to the 1994 amendment of the Copyright Act, the first two clauses of section 14 read: “(i) to reproduce the work in any material form; (ii) to publish the work”. Thus, this judgment extends the right to “publish the work” (or in the words of the judge, “print, publish and sell”) to include a right of importation out of thin air, simply by stating that it appears so. While the judge notes that “publication” under the Act (in 1984) was defined as meaning the issue of copies of the work, either in whole or in part, to the public in a manner sufficient to satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public having regard to the nature of the work”, he does not explain how importation is subsumed under that definition contrary to a plain reading of the law. Finally, the judge does note that, “It is true that India Distributors are not printing these books and are not guilty of what is called primary infringement”, but goes on to state however, that “when they issue copies of these titles for public distribution they are guilty of secondary infringement”. These categories are created, but neither explained nor explored in the judgment. One other legal nuance that was examined was the allowance granted to the Registrar of Copyright under section 53 to “order that copies made out of India of the work which if made in India would infringe copyright shall not be imported. The judge noted that the words infringing copy as contained in section 53 could not be different in meaning from the same words contained in section 51(b). The implication of this shall be demonstrated shortly.

Importantly, the judgment does not look into section 16 of the Act which states that there shall be no copyright except as provided by the Act, and how this should prevent a judge from expanding the rights provided in the law to include a new judicially created right to prevent imports.

Privity of contract

Nowhere in the judgment does the judge explain how an exclusive distribution contract between two parties can affect a third party in violation of the well-held principle of privity of contract. This is an important issue because in effect, the judgment makes a third party bound by the contract entered into by two private parties. The parties agree inter se (for example) to ensure that the India distributor does not sell the book outside of India and that the owner of rights will not give the right to sell in India to any other person. How could this contract between those two parties come in way of a third person buying from a foreign market and importing into India? If it was the case of an exclusive UK licensee selling in India, then both the exclusive Indian licensee as well as the owner of the copyright would have cause of action in India on the basis of both violation of contract as well as violation of copyright (for exceeding his territorial licence). However, a third party who buys from a stream of commerce cannot be bound by these contracts because he becomes the owner of the book and not a licensee. Thus, the judgment makes a contract between two private parties, which merely creates a right in personam, applicable to the entire world. By doing this it allows a contract to create a right in rem without any express provision of the law doing do. Indeed, this issue was examined by the United State Supreme Court in 1908 in the case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,[3] in which the doctrine of first sale was judicially evolved.

Doctrine of first sale/exhaustion

Importantly, nowhere in the judgment does the judge bother to go into the details of the interaction between the sale of a copy of a book (upon the occurrence of which no further conditions can be laid) and the Copyright Act. If I sell you a bicycle laying down a condition that you cannot re-sell it, such a condition cannot be upheld in a court of law because by sale I divest all saleable interest I have in the bicycle. This principle is what is embodied in sections 10 and 11 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 10 states–“Where property is transferred subject to a condition or limitation absolutely restraining the transferee or any person claiming under him from parting with or disposing of his interest in the property, the condition or limitation is void, except in the case of a lease where the condition is for the benefit of the lessor or those claiming under him. In the same vein, section 11 states–“Where, on a transfer of property, an interest therein is created absolutely in favour of any person, but the terms of the transfer direct that such interest shall be applied or enjoyed by him in a particular manner, he shall be entitled to receive and dispose of such interest as if there were no such direction.” Thus, by selling of a copy of a book (as opposed to a licensing the book), I divest myself of all saleable interests in that particular copy of the book (though not copyright). I cannot prevent you from re-selling that book. However, copyright law would require that you can only re-sell a copy of a book without the owner’s permission, and cannot sell it without the owner’s permission. This is known as the doctrine of first sale, which evolved as a via media between copyright law, which gave the owner of copyright rights in a book, and property law, which gave the buyer of a book rights in her particular copy of the book.

The best appreciation of this doctrine of first sale (also known as “exhaustion of rights”) has come in a judgment by Justice Ravindra Bhat, who states the meaning of the doctrine very clearly:

The doctrine of exhaustion of copyright enables free trade in material objects on which copies of protected works have been fixed and put into circulation with the right holder’s consent. The exhaustion principle in a sense arbitrates the conflict between the right to own a copy of a work and the author’s right to control the distribution of copies. Exhaustion is decisive with respect to the priority of ownership and the freedom to trade in material carriers on the condition that a copy has been legally brought into trading. Transfer of ownership of a carrier with a copy of a work fixed on it makes it impossible for the owner to derive further benefits from the exploitation of a copy that was traded with his consent. The exhaustion principle is thus termed legitimate by reason of the profits earned for the ownership transfer, which should be satisfactory to the author if the work is not being exploited in a different exploitation field.

Exhaustion of rights is linked to the distribution right. The right to distribute objects (making them available to the public) means that such objects (or the medium on which a work is fixed) are released by or with the consent of the owner as a result of the transfer of ownership. In this way, the owner is in control of the distribution of copies since he decides the time and the form in which copies are released to the public. Content wise the distribution rights are to be understood as an opportunity to provide the public with copies of a work and put them into circulation, as well as to control the way the copies are used. The exhaustion of rights principle thus limits the distribution right, by excluding control over the use of copies after they have been put into circulation for the first time.

1994 Amendment to the Act

Interestingly, the Penguin judgment was sought to be overturned by an amendment to section 14 in 1994. That amendment removed the right to “publish”, and instead made it a right to “to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in circulation”. It stands to reason that this not only ensures the centrality of the doctrine of first sale in India, but also allows for international exhaustion, thus allowing for parallel import. This is clear from the fact that we, in Indian law (as per section 40), makes it clear that “all or any provisions of this Act shall apply to work first published in any class territory outside India to which the order (under section 40) relates in like manner as if they were first published within India.

Thus, even books published internationally are, under the legal fiction under section 40, akin to books published in India. Since we are granting foreign works all the protection under the Act as though they had been published in India by Indian authors, it is but natural that they should be subject to all the same limitations as well (such as the doctrine of first sale).

As one commentator puts it, “with amendments, the decision of the Penguin case is no more the law. Like most other nations, we have also accepted the principle of international exhaustion. This seems to be after taking into view the public interest angle.”[4]

Unfortunately, legal commentators seemed to have paid greater attention to legislative changes than did the courts.

Eurokids case[5]

In 2005, the same issue of parallel importation in literary works arose before the Bombay High Court. Highly unfortunately, the decision by the Bombay High Court was even more ill-reasoned than that of the Delhi High Court in the Penguin case. Nowhere in the judgment is the issue of the first sale doctrine, on which the issue of parallel importation rests, even cursorily examined. Nowhere is the amendment to section 14 of the Copyright Act even noted. Indeed, the only time that section 14 is even mentioned is when the section is quoted to establish it as providing the meaning of “copyright” in Indian law. The implications of section 14 in terms of exhaustion of rights are simply not examined. Section 2(m) of the Act, which it is necessary to examine (as shown above) to understand what to make of the phrase “infringing copy” in section 51, is not even mentioned once. As per the logic of the judgment, any copy that is sold in India by a third party in contravention of an exclusive licence contract is automatically assumed to be infringing. Thus, once again, copyright law magically overrides the concept of privity of contract without so much as an explanation.

Most importantly, because the case relies on the Penguin decision without having noticed and accounting for the subsequent change in the text of the law because of the 1994 amendment, it should be held to be per incuriam, and should not act as a precedent.

Warner Bros. case [6]

In 2009, the Delhi High Court pronounced yet another verdict on parallel importation in the case of Warner Bros. v. Santosh V.G. However, this was a case on DVDs, and not on books. While the Court correctly understands the meaning of the first sale doctrine in terms of literary works (and thus becoming the first judgment to explicitly talk about this doctrine), it is open to debate whether it was correct in its ruling on the inapplicability of the doctrine when it came to cinematograph films. The reasoning of the court (in paragraphs 77 and 78) as to why parallel importation is not allowed under Indian law is faulty, and is worth quoting in extenso:

In this case, the copies that are being let out for rent/hire by the defendant are not made in India. Rather, they have been made in the US and imported into India. As noticed earlier, copyright in a work published abroad, in a Berne Convention country, like the United States, entitles its owner to assert copyright in India; such rights are “as if” the works were published in India (section 40 and provisions of the order). An infringing copy is one “made or imported in contravention of the provisions of this Act”. In this context, the proviso to section 51(b)(iv), in the court’s view, provides the key to Parliamentary intention. It carves only one exception, permitting “import of one copy of any work for the private and domestic use of the importer”. The plaintiffs’ argument is that there would have been no need to enact this exception, if there were no restriction on import of cinematograph films, genuinely made outside India. The effect of the proviso to section 51(b)(iv) is plainly, not to relax the importation of genuinely made cinematographic films but to allow for the importation of one copy of any work “for the private and domestic use of the importer.” This would mean that the proviso allows for the importation of an infringing work, for private and domestic use of the importer, and not commercial use.

Quite obviously, there are some glaring problems in the court’s reasoning. The proviso to section 51(b)(iv) does indeed carve out an exception, but that exception is for infringing copies of a work, and not for non-infringing or “genuine” copies. The plaintiffs’ argument, according to the judge, is: If all genuine copies of the cinematograph film could be legally imported, there would be no need to enact this exception. However, there could well be a need to enact this exception to cover a single non-genuine copy of a cinematograph film. It is precisely because of this that the exception is so very narrow, being for not only private use, as in section 52(1)(a), but of a single copy of a work and that too only for “private and domestic use”. This possibility of allowing import of a non-genuine copy is completely overlooked by the judge. The judgment continues:

The defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs lost the power to deal with the copy, once placed in the market place, in the United States, is also unsupportable as too broad a proposition. In the context of the Act, the argument is more hopeful, than convincing. Even in the United States, it has been held (United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1977)) that though, after “first sale", a vendee “is not restricted by statute from further transfers of that copy”, yet a first sale does not, however, exhaust other rights, such as the copyright holder’s right to prohibit copying of the copy he sells. The Federal Appellate Court noted that “other copyright rights (reprinting, copying, etc.) remain unimpaired”. It is clear therefore that the copies in question are infringing copies. Therefore, their importation, and more importantly, use for any of the purposes under section 51, other than the one spelt out in it the proviso is in contravention of the Act. The question, however, is whether the action of the defendants amounts to infringement of the copyright of the plaintiffs. This must be answered independently of the question of whether parallel importation of copyrighted goods is permissible under Indian copyright law.

While the reading of the law is correct (i.e., the first sale doctrine does not exhaust all rights, but merely the right to prevent further transfers), the application of the law to the facts is incorrect. In this case, the fact situation before the court was not of “reprinting, copying, etc.” but of the physical transfer of copies of a work bought in the US into India. As is noted in United States v. Wise, “after first sale,” the buyer “is not restricted by statute from further transfers of that copy”. Indeed, this was case can be seen as exactly such a “further transfer” (of the rights over that copy from a shop in the US to the buyer in India). How the judge misreads the argument as being about something other than transfer of property rights in a copy (and more as something akin to reproduction), and concludes that “it is clear therefore that the copies in question are infringing copies,” is not clear.

However, the verdict of the court does not proceed on this ground alone, and involves discussion of the doctrine of first sale with regard to cinematograph films, the provisions of section 53, which apply only to cinematograph films, none of which are applicable in case of literary works.

Export of copyrighted works

Now, that we have dealt with the traditionally contentious part on imports, we may now examine the rare, but even more contentious issue of exports. Barring a few exceptions, notably the United States, the copyright law in no country regulates exports. Even in the United States, section 602 of their Copyright Act regulates only the export of infringing works, and not the export of legitimate works. In India, though, there are two judgments of the Delhi High Court that seemingly make illegal export from India of legal copies of a copyrighted work. As one of these decisions is an ex parte order without any reasoning—indeed calling the reasoning “bare minimum” would be doing that phrase a disservice—we shall focus only on the other judgement: the one pronounced by Justice Manmohan Singh in John Wiley & Sons v. Prabhat Chander Kumar Jain [7]. The facts of the judgment are rather simple. John Wiley & Sons Inc., based in New York, exclusively licensed the rights over certain books to Wiley India Pvt. Ltd. (all the other plaintiffs follow the same model, so we shall restrict ourselves to the case of the Wiley corporation). These books were sold at a reduced cost in the Indian market and were clearly labelled as being “Wiley Student Edition restricted for sale only in Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam”. Another label on the same book read: “The book for sale only in the country to which first consigned by Wiley India Pvt. Ltd and may not be re-exported. For sale only in: Bangladesh, Myanmar, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.”[8]. Quite clearly, John Wiley & Sons, being the owner of the rights, had given exclusive license to Wiley India Pvt. Ltd. to publish and print an English Language reprint edition only in the territories entailed in the agreement and not beyond that. Further, they wished to impose this restriction on all buyers of the book by way of that notice and attached conditionality, and thus prevent exports to the United States.

At this stage, it would do us well to dwell into the facts of the 1908 US Supreme Court case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus[9]. In this case, the plaintiff-appellant sold a copyrighted novel with a clear notice under the copyright notice stating that, “The price of this book at retail is $1 net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a lower price, and a sale at a lower price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright”. Macy & Co., a famous retailer, purchased large lots of books both at wholesale prices and at retail prices, and re-sold the books to its customers at 89 cents a copy. This was quite clearly in violation of the condition imposed by the notice.

It may be seen that the facts in this case quite clearly mirror the fact situation in John Wiley & Sons v. Prabhat Chander Kumar Jain. It is only the nature of the conditionality that differentiates the two cases: in the one it was a restriction on price at which the book could be further sold, in the other it was a restriction on where the book could be further sold. How did the judge rule in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Strauss? The court ruled that it was on the record that Macy & Co. had knowledge of the notice. However, despite that, the notice was held not to be binding on Macy & Co. The court noted:

The precise question, therefore, in this case is, “Does the sole right to vend secure to the owner of the copyright the right, after a sale of the book to a purchaser, to restrict future sales of the book at retail, to the right to sell it at a certain price per copy, because of a notice in the book that a sale at a different price will be treated as an infringement, which notice has been brought home to one undertaking to sell for less than the named sum?” We do not think the statute can be given such a construction copyright statutes, while protecting the owner of the copyright in his right to multiply and sell his production, do not create the right to impose, by notice, such as is disclosed in this case, a limitation at which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers, with whom there is no privity of contract …To add to the right of exclusive sale, the authority to control all future retail sales, by a notice that such sales must be made at a fixed sum, would give a right not included in the terms of the statute, and, in our view, extend its operation, by construction, beyond its meaning, when interpreted with a view to ascertaining the legislative intent in its enactment.

This judgment proceeded on privity of contract, the factum of a sale having occurred, and created what is now known as the doctrine of first sale–an established principle that the exclusive right to sell, distribute or circulate a copy of the copyrighted work exhausts the moment the item is placed into a stream of commerce through a sale. This can, of course, be contradicted if explicitly stated so in a statute.[10] However, as we noted earlier, the Indian statute explicitly notes that the right to issue copies of a work to the public, guaranteed to the owner of the copyright over a literary, dramatic, or artistic work is restricted to copies not already in circulation. Thus, it might seem to one to be quite clear how the court would in the John Wiley & Sons case. One would then be wrong.

In fact, Justice Manmohan Singh, in a very detailed and circuitous judgment, rules that the activity done by the defendant is a violation not of some implied contract between Wiley India Pvt. Ltd. and him, but that it constituted a violation of the Indian Copyright Act, and notably section 51 of the Copyright Act. How does he reach this conclusion?

His reasoning rests on 3 dubious pillars:

that the rights of the licensee are distinct from that of the owner, and that the former may get exhausted without affecting the latter;
that the licensee cannot pass on better title to those that buy from him than he himself has;
that sale or even offer for sale or taking of orders for sale are all forms of putting into circulation or issuance of copies.

First, through a close reading of the various provisions of the Copyright Act he notes that the Act creates a clear difference between the rights of the owner and the rights of the licensee (para 47-50). He then finally comes to noting that,

“A logical corollary drawn from above analysis which needs reiteration at this stage is that for the purposes of section 51 which is in the preceding chapter, the term owner of the copyright does not include exclusive licensee. Thus, the rights of the owner although may include rights of the exclusive licensee but the court cannot read the term owner of the copyright as that of the exclusive licensee and their rights are different as per the allocation by the owner.” (para 62).

Thus, he establishes that some rights of the licensee may be extinguished (as per the doctrine of exhaustion) without extinguishing that same right of the owner. In other words, while the right of circulation of the licensee get exhausted, the right of circulation of the owner remains unaffected. Justice Singh doesn’t go into the implications of this, but there can be two ways of interpreting what this means. It could mean that by virtue of the circulation rights of the licensee getting exhausted, the circulation right of the owner gets exhausted in those nine countries for which the licensee had been granted rights of circulation. Else, it could mean that the exhaustion of the licensee’s circulation rights does not at all affect the owner’s circulation rights. This latter one is obviously an absurd idea, since that would, in all cases, leave the owner with a cause of action in case of all sales even when the owner is in India. Thus, one is left considering the former the only logical meaning.

However, that this cannot possibly be right is demonstrated by the fact that this can easily be applied to an all-in-India transaction as well. Thus, for instance, the owner of rights can decide never to directly sell any book, but only allow its licensees to sell. Thus, it can contractually bind a licensee to sell only in Andhra Pradesh and hold that because of that license contract any buyer who buys from the Andhra Pradesh licensee and decides to re-sell to a second-hand bookstore in Karnataka is actually violating the terms of the license (because the circulation right gets extinguished only insofar as the licensee is concerned, and that licence only allows sales in Andhra Pradesh).

That is obviously cannot be held to be the purpose of the law. Thus, the privity of the contract between the owner of the right and the licensee must be upheld and may not be held to bind a third party purchaser.

The second ground on which Justice Singh rules is on the general property law principle that a person cannot pass on a better title than she herself has. Thus, Justice Singh holds that when the licensee sells a book to a person, that person only receives as much of the title to that book that the licensee has. Thus, since the licensee only has title in the book insofar as those nine countries go, the person who buys that book cannot get better title.

The plain fault in this reasoning is the very founding basis of the doctrine of first sale: the differentiation between property rights in a copy of a book and the copyright in the book. No one has contended in this case that the transaction between the licensee and the book purchaser is not a sale. Once a sale happens, all property rights in that copy of the book are alienated to the book purchaser. It must be remembered that this transaction is not the case of the licensee sub-licensing the right to circulate the book. The licensee cannot sub-license to another party the right to sell the book in, say, Australia, because she does not have that right in the first place. However, in this case, the licensee is invoking the right to sell the book in India, and is not passing on that right. The right of a book buyer to re-sell comes from the statute— from the doctrine of first sale and not from a passing on of that right from the licensee.

The last pillar of the judge’s reasoning is that the sale—or even offer for sale, or taking of orders for sale—of a book online are all forms of putting into circulation or issuance of copies. Section 40 does not work two ways. It only deems a foreign work “Indian”, and does not deem a sale in a foreign land the same as sale in India. Thus, even if we are to accept the other two pillars of Justice Singh’s reasoning, it is unclear how an offer made online to sell a book is equated to actually placing a book in circulation in India. How can an India law prohibit circulation on the streets of Bogotá? This is only possible if a separate right of export is recognised. But Justice Singh is extremely clear that he is not creating such a distinct right.

A notice to the buyer that re-exports are prohibited cannot be held to constitute a valid contract because the Transfer of Property Act clearly makes such a prohibition invalid (sections 10 and 11) after all, it is a sale that takes place and not a license as does the Copyright Act (section 14).

Amendment to Section 2(m)

There has been much controversy lately with some publishers trying to stop the government from amending section 2(m) of the Indian Copyright Act, clarifying that a parallel import will not be seen as an “infringing copy”. Some lawyers for the publishing industry have made the claim that allowing for parallel importation would legally allow for the exports of low-priced edition and overturn the basis of the Wiley judgment. This is false.

The amendment itself merely adds the following proviso at the end of section 2(m) (which itself defines what an “infringing copy” means):

Provided that a copy of a work published in any country outside India with the permission of the author of the work and imported from that country shall not be deemed to be an infringing copy.

It seems that this is in fact a provision introduced solely to clarify that this (i.e., following international exhaustion) is the position that India holds, and not to change the statute itself. It is merely to clarify that the courts have misread the provisions of the law, or that they have indeed not read the provisions of the law (as in the Eurokids case).

This provision will have no effect whatsoever on the Wiley ruling. While the Wiley ruling deserves to fail on its own merits, the reasoning in that case does not depend on whether we follow international or national exhaustion. Indeed, in para 104, the judge states:

As per my opinion, as the express provision for international exhaustion is absent in our Indian law, it would be appropriate to confine the applicability of the same to regional exhaustion.

Be that as it may, in the present case, the circumstances do not even otherwise warrant this discussion as the rights if at all are exhausted are to the extent to which they are available with the licensees as the books are purchased from the exclusive licensees who have limited rights and not from the owner. In these circumstances, the question of exhaustion of rights of owner in the copyright does not arise at all.

Thus, the argument that following the principle of international exhaustion will upturn this judgment is faulty. Imports and exports are two distinct things. India’s following of the principle of “international exhaustion” means that the right to first sale is exhausted in India, when the work is legally published anywhere internationally (i.e., regardless of where that copyrighted work is legally published). The principle of international exhaustion does not not exhaust the right of first sale internationally—the word “international” is used to indicate where the publication has to take place for exhaustion to occur, and not where the exhaustion takes place. After all, Indian law on a matter cannot determine whether a book can or cannot be sold anywhere else in the world (which is precisely what it would do if it is to hold that rights are exhausted internationally by virtue of a book being printed in India).

Conclusion

I think the best way of concluding this are by quoting, in extenso, a passage from a book on the Indian intellectual property law by Prof. N.S. Gopalakrishnan & Dr. T.G. Agitha:

Under the Indian law there is no express provision recognising the right of importation. This would in fact enable parallel importation of works. “Parallel importation” means transportation of “legitimate” goods which are available at a cheaper rate in one country by independent buyers (e.g. book sellers), for sale in another country. This could act as an effective check on creating monopoly in the market. Hence, it is an important aspect to be borne in mind for a developing country like India. Since there is no international obligation against parallel importation, nothing prevented the court from taking the stand that unless there is an express provision conferring importation rights on the owner of copyright or prohibiting parallel importation, it need not be considered to be prohibited in India. It is pertinent to note that India supported the principle of international exhaustion and not the national exhaustion principle. [11]

However, it is submitted that the court (in Penguin v. India Book Distributors) failed to take note of these aspects while deciding this case.”[12]

One can only hope those words by these leading experts on IP law in India are paid heed to, and that the arguments otherwise will fail to convince both the government as well as future court decisions.

* Please do not cite this note in an academic paper. Feel free to cite elsewhere. This note is still very much a work in progress. However, given the urgency of this issue and the importance of ensuring debate on the legal ramifications of the proposed amendment to s.2(m), this note should prove useful.

Notes

[1]. Section 51(b)(iv) states: “Copyright in a work shall be deemed to be infringed (b) when any person (iv) imports into India, any infringing copies of the work.” A proviso to the section reads: “Provided that nothing in Sub-clause (iv) shall apply to the import of one copy of any work for the private and domestic use of the importer.”

[2]. Ed.: MANU/DE/0402/1984: AIR 1985 Delhi 29, 26 (1984) DLT 316”

[3]. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).

[4]. Arathi Ashok, Economic Rights of Authors under Copyright Law, 15 J. Intell. Prop. Rights 46 (2010) at 50.

[5]. MANU/MH/0938/2005.

[6]. MANU/DE/0406/2009.

[7]. MANU/DE/1142/2010: MIPR 2010 (2) 0247.

[8]. While the exact countries were different in the case of each of the plaintiffs, there were all restricted to sale in India and a few of its neighbouring countries.

[9]. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).

[10]. All signatories of the TRIPS Agreement have to ensure a right of rental, over and above a right of first sale, for all video (or what are known as cinematograph films in the Indian law).

[11]. R.V. Vaidyanatha Ayyar, The Process and Politics of a Diplomatic Conference on Copyright (1998) 1 JWIP 3 at 17, cited in N.S. Gopalakrishnan and T.G. Agitha, Principles of Intellectual Property 256 (2009).

[12]. N.S. Gopalakrishnan and T.G. Agitha, Principles of Intellectual Property 256 (2009).

Also see SSRN

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Exhaustion PDF

praskrishna — 2011-10-03T05:16:58Z

file

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Exceptions and Limitations in Indian Copyright Law for Education: An Assessment

lawrence — 2011-10-20T14:08:01Z

This paper examines the nature of exceptions and limitations in copyright law for the purposes of the use of copyrighted materials for education. It looks at the existing national and international regime, and argues for why there is a need for greater exceptions and limitations to address the needs of developing countries. The paper contextualizes the debate by looking at the high costs of learning materials and the impediment caused to e-learning and distance education by strong copyright regimes.

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EU stalls treaty talks to allow copyright waiver for print disabilities

praskrishna — 2012-07-25T09:37:25Z

India and other developing countries support such a legally binding treaty, writes Priscilla Jebaraj in an article published in the Hindu on July 25, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

The European Union is holding up a treaty to allow books and other printed works to be converted into a format accessible to the visually impaired and other print disabled people without seeking the permission of the copyright holder.

India, and most other developing countries, strongly support such a legally binding treaty currently being negotiated at a World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) meeting in Geneva. However, non-governmental organisation sources at that summit say that the EU is stalling the treaty by placing unreasonable restrictions on how copyrighted works are to be converted, and by whom. The EU office in Delhi and Brussels did not respond to a request for comment on their position.

"[The treaty] would allow organisations working for the blind to import and export accessible works without seeking the copyright holder's permission, since very little money is spent in developing countries on converting books into accessible formats, while they are much more readily available elsewhere," according to Pranesh Prakash of the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society who is attending the summit as an NGO member. If the treaty is not finalised by Wednesday, when the meeting ends, disabled people could be forced to wait till 2014 for their next chance.

Last week, Indian delegate G.R. Raghavender pleaded with negotiators to finalise the treaty without further delay "so that we won't go back, especially the Indian delegation won't go back empty-handed, facing the 15 million blind people in India, which is almost 50 percent of the world blind population, that is 37 million."

In fact, the treaty will benefit a much larger group of print-disabled, including those who suffer from motor disabilities which prevent them from holding a book, or learning disabilities such as dyslexia, or autism, which make it hard to read. There are approximately 70 million print-disabled people in India.

Accessible formats would include Braille, electronic text and audio versions of books, making Western publishers' jittery about piracy fears. Hence, some countries are demanding stringent tracking mechanisms and legal requirements that activists say will effectively block access to disabled people in developing countries — where more than 85 per cent of them live.

"An instrument that subjects the enjoyment of fundamental freedoms by persons with visual impairments to market forces and bureaucratic practices will not work," Mr. Prakash said, in his statement to WIPO delegates. "In India, our Parliament recently passed an amendment to our copyright law that grants persons with disabilities, and those who are working for them, a strong yet simply-worded right to have equal access to copyrighted works as sighted persons."

In fact, the EU Parliament had given its unanimous approval to the treaty in February 2012. "It would be a democratic travesty if the EU’s representatives here today posed any problems to a clear road map for a binding international treaty, especially by posing unrealistic proposals with regards to authorised entities and other issues very far from consensus positions in the WIPO and in clear contradiction with the aims of the World Blind Union," said David Hammerstein, a representative of American and European consumer organisations, making a statement at the Geneva meeting.

Read the original published in the Hindu

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Enforcement of Anti-piracy Laws by the Indian Entertainment Industry

praskrishna — 2011-08-04T04:35:48Z

This brief note by Siddharth Chadha seeks to map out the key actors in enforcement of copyright laws. These bodies not only investigate cases of infringement and piracy relating to the entertainment industry, but tie up with the police and IP law firms to pursue actions against the offenders through raids (many of them illegal) and court cases. Siddharth notes that the discourse on informal networks and circuits of distribution of cultural goods remains hijacked with efforts to contain piracy as the only rhetoric which safeguards the business interests of big, mostly multinational, media corporations.

International Intellectual Property Alliance

The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) is an international lobby group of US media industries with close ties to the United States Trade Representative. It has in its reports consistently expressed dissatisfaction with Indian efforts to deal with piracy. IIPA works in close cooperation the other US lobby groups like the MPAA (Motion Picture Association of America) and the BSA (Business Software Alliance). The IIPA reports, which place India in a 'danger zone', significantly influence regional and international discourses on piracy. Interestingly, the IIPA in India has been very successful in regionalizing and nationalizing a global discourse. Thus, in the past few years, local industry associations in India in cinema, music and software have independently run highly emotional campaigns against piracy, reminiscent of IIPA's own campaigns.

Motion Pictures Association

The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) through its international counterpart, Motion Pictures Association (MPA), has been unofficially operational in India for the last 15 years. Its member companies are Walt Disney, Paramount, Sony Entertainment, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal Studios, and Warner Bros. The MPA's work in India was mostly non-obtrusive till 1994 when MPA Asia-Pacific, based in Singapore, started being represented by the high profile legal firm Lall & Sethi Advocates.

They have collectively worked on forming enforcement teams for coordinated raids in Mumbai and Delhi since 1995. Earlier this year, MPA announced its first India office to be set up in Mumbai, called the Motion Picture Distributor's Association India (Pvt.) Limited (MPDA), under the directorship of Rajiv Dalal. Mr. Dalal had previously directed strategic initiatives from the MPAA's Los Angeles office. The MPDA will engage itself in working jointly with local Indian film industries and the Indian government to promote the protection of motion pictures and television rights.

According to the organization's own assertion, in 2006 the MPA's Asia-Pacific operation investigated more than 30,000 cases of piracy and assisted law enforcement officials in conducting nearly 12,400 raids. These activities resulted in the seizure of more than 35 million illegal optical discs, 50 factory optical disc production lines and 4,482 optical disc burners, as well as the initiation of more than 11,000 legal actions.

Indian Music Industry

The world's second-oldest music companies' association, Indian Music Industry (IMI), was first established as Indian Phonographic Industry in 1936. It was re-formed in its present avatar in 1994, as a non-commercial and non-profit organization affiliated to the International Federation of Phonographic Industry (IFPI) and is registered as a society in West Bengal. IMI members includes major record companies like Saregama, HMV, Universal Music (India), Tips, Venus, Sony BMG (India), Crescendo, Virgin Records, Magnasound, Milestone, Times Music and several other prominent national and regional labels that represent over 75 per cent of the output in corporate recordings.

It was one of the first organizations in the country to start the trend of hiring ex-police officers to lead anti-piracy operations. In 1996, IMI hired Julio Ribeiro (a former Commissioner of Police, Mumbai; Director General of Police, Punjab; and Indian Ambassador to Romania) to head its anti-piracy operations. Their anti-piracy work is split into three specific regions, North and North Eastern, Western and Southern and East, each zone headed by a former senior police officer. IMI operates through offices in Kolkata, Mumbai, New Delhi, Chennai, Bangalore and several other cities and towns across India, focusing on surveillance, law enforcement, and gathering intelligence through an 80 member team hired to tackle piracy. During 2001 to 2004, IMI registered over 5500 cases, seized over 10 lakh music cassettes, and around 25 lakh CDs.

Business Software Alliance

Headquartered in Washington DC, the Business Software Alliance has a regional office in Delhi, and has been instrumental in conducting anti-piracy operations across the country. According to the BSA, India ranks 20 in global software piracy rankings, with a rate of 73 per cent while the Asia Pacific average is 53 per cent. China ranks second with a rate of 92 per cent and annual losses of $3,823 million while Pakistan ranks nine with 83 per cent piracy rate. They have engaged the general public in providing them with information on pirated software through an anti-piracy initiative – The Rewards Programme. Launched in 2005, reward amount up to Rs.50, 000, would be provided for information leading to successful legal action against companies using unlicensed software. The reward program was aimed to encourage people to support the fight against piracy and to report software piracy to the NASSCOM-BSA Anti-Piracy Software Hotline.

In 2006, BSA and NASSCOM got a shot in their arms by winning the largest settlement amount for a copyright case in India, with Netlinx India Pvt. Ltd. The case had emerged after a civil raid was conducted at the premises of Netlinx in December 2000, leading to inspection and impounding of 40 PCs, carrying illegal unlicensed software. The settlement includes damages of US$ 30,000, complete legalization of software used by them, removal of all unlicensed/pirated software and submission to an unannounced audit of computer systems during next 12 months.

Industry Enforcers

Bollywood Film and Music companies, such as T-Series and Yashraj Films, have established anti-piracy arms to combat piracy in specific markets. T-Series has been in the industry for over 15 years, as a brand of Gulshan Kumar founded Super Cassettes Industries Limited, and has often been at the forefront for conducting raids along with police officials to check piracy of its copyrighted content. In its latest announcement earlier this year, T-Series launched an anti-piracy campaign against those stealing digital content. The announcement came after they filed a complaint on June 1 with a police station in Mangalore against Classic Video shop for infringement of its copyright works like Billu, Ghajini, Aap Ka Suroor, Apne, Fashion and Karz that had been illegally downloaded and copied onto multiple discs, card readers and pen-drives.

Yashraj Films, a leading film studio, has long been a part of enforcement activities against piracy, both in the Indian market and internationally. Most recently, it was a key member in the formation of the United Producers and Distributors Forum, which also included chairman Mahesh Bhatt, Ramesh Sippy, Ronnie Screwalla of UTV, Shah Rukh Khan, Aamir Khan and Eros International. This organization is now trying to enforce anti-piracy laws by conducting raids across the country with the help of another ex-cop from Mumbai, A.A. Khan. Yashraj Films has also established anti-piracy offices in the United Kingdom and the United States to curb piracy in those markets, as overseas returns of its films, watched by the desi diaspora is one of its largest revenue earning sources. The website of Yashraj Films lists news reports from across US and Europe of instances of crackdown on pirates.

In the context of intellectual property in the creative industries, these anti-piracy agents have successfully created the halo of illegality around the subject of piracy. The discourse on informal networks and circuits of distribution of cultural goods remains hijacked with efforts to contain piracy as the only rhetoric which safeguards the business interests of big media companies and multinational corporations.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/piracy-and-enforcement

Emerging Bit Torrent Trends in India

siddharth — 2011-08-04T04:44:48Z

Internet has been a revelation ever since its introduction. The writer in this blog examines how the progress made by Internet based technologies could never be reversed.

From Kazaa to The Pirate Bay

Little did the world of the VHS era realize in its time where the future of pirate technologies were heading to. The world's favourite music and films were quickly transferred onto optical discs as magnetic tapes went obsolete a few years before the end of the last century. Internet was soon to become the nemesis of discs, which were bulky to store and scratched easily. The first tryst with peer to peer technologies on networks sent shivers down the spine of Jack Valenti and the Motion Pictures Association of America. The speed of dissemination and distribution of content over the Internet was something the world had never seen before. The lawsuits against peer to peer networks such as Kaaza and Limewire ran into millions of dollars. Websites were shut down, but time and progress of technology could never be reversed. BitTorrent soon became the most common protocol to transfer content over the Internet. BitTorrent metafiles themselves do not store copyrighted data. Hence, BitTorrent itself is not illegal. However, its use to make copies of copyrighted material that contravenes laws in many countries has created many controversies, including the now famous Pirate Bay Trial in Sweden. The popularity of torrents though is not specific to the Western world. The strength of the Internet lies in its ability to generate content from any corner of the world which is then spread across the world through a web of distribution reaching many computers and granting them access to the content simultaneously.

Desi content on Torrent Networks

Desi : A term derived from Sanskrit, meaning region, province or country. It now refers to the people and culture of South Asian Diaspora.

On the most popular BitTorrent search engines, torrentz.com, Hindi and Hindi movies are permanent search tags. Often, one would even see the names of popular Bollywood releases such as Dev D, or at the time of writing this blog entry, Telegu Films, prominently displayed on the site. Bollywood and other content created in India and the rest of the subcontinent is driving the cyberspace. With a huge diaspora spread across every part of the world and increasing Internet penetration alongside rising broadband speeds in urban India, the demand for desi content on torrent networks is on the rise. Websites such as desitorrents.com and dctorrent.com are two torrent search engines that are popular amongst Internet users and cater exclusively to desi content. A closer look at the content on these sites reveal that the most popular content on these torrent networks are television shows, cricket matches, Bollywood movies, music and regional cinema. Torrent scenes such as aXXo are not unique to Hollywood uploads alone. Desi content has its own torrent scenes, responsible for uploading torrent trackers, as soon as the content is out in the public. Users identifying themselves as Jay, Captain Jack or Gunga Din are busy uploading these files on the desi networks.

Online since January 2004 and an Internet traffic rank of 7,302, an average visitor spends 8.3 minutes on the Desi Torrents site everyday. Relative to the general Internet population, the website has the highest number of male visitors in the age group of 18 to 34.

Most users are college graduates who prefer to access the website from home. In comparison, Desi Club Torrents, which is a free website has a younger representative web demographic with males between 18 to 24 years of age being the most prominent visitors. According to the data, it is also revealed that the website has a higher ratio of visitors who have not attended Graduate School but still have attended some college for education

Impact on the Traditional Markets

In most cases, the popularity of Bollywood films in cinema halls and on torrent sites seems to be linked. For example, the most successful Bollywood film of 2008, Ghajini, which ended up raking Rs. 200 crores on the box office, is also one of the most downloaded films on Bit Torrent Networks. However, for the Pirate selling DVD's of latest films, this is not great news. A majority of their customers have migrated to downloading films on the Internet using Peer to Peer technologies. The upper middle-class niche film watching audiences, have been the fastest to acquire computers and get on the Internet. Increasing broadband speeds have ensured that this segment of consumer transitions away from the traditional 'on the corner' pirate shop.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/emerging-bit-torrrent-trends-in-india

Don't Shoot the Messenger: Speech on Intermediary Liability at 22nd SCCR of WIPO

pranesh — 2012-06-01T15:01:08Z

This is a speech made by Pranesh Prakash at an side-event co-organized by the World Intellectual Property Organization and the Internet Society on intermediary liability, to coincide with the release of Prof. Lillian Edwards's WIPO-commissioned report on 'Role and Responsibility of the Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright'.

Good afternoon. I've been asked to provide a user's perspective to the question of intermediary liability. "In what cases should an Internet intermediary—a messenger—be held liable for the doings of a third party?" is the broad question. I believe that in answering that question we can be guided by two simple principles: As long as intermediaries don't exercise direct editorial control, they should not be held liable; and as long as they don't instigate or encourage the illegal activity, they should not be held liable. In all other cases, attacking Internet intermediaries generally a sign of 'shooting the messenger'. General intermediary liability and intermediary liability for copyright infringement share a common philosophical foundation, and so I will talk about general intermediary liability first.

While going about holding intermediaries liable, we must remember that what is at stake here is the fact that intermediaries are a necessary component of ensuring freedom of speech and self-expression on the World Wide Web. In this regard, we must keep in mind the joint declaration issued by four freedom of expression rapporteurs under the aegis of the Organization of American States on June 1, 2011:

Intermediary Liability

a. No one who simply provides technical Internet services such as providing access, or searching for, or transmission or caching of information, should be liable for content generated by others, which is disseminated using those services, as long as they do not specifically intervene in that content or refuse to obey a court order to remove that content, where they have the capacity to do so (‘mere conduit principle’).

b. Consideration should be given to insulating fully other intermediaries, including those mentioned in the preamble, from liability for content generated by others under the same conditions as in paragraph 2(a). At a minimum, intermediaries should not be required to monitor user-generated content and should not be subject to extra-judicial content takedown rules which fail to provide sufficient protection for freedom of expression (which is the case with many of the ‘notice and takedown’ rules currently being applied).

It is useful to keep in mind what the kind of liability we affix on offline intermediaries: Would we hold a library responsible for unlawful material that a user has placed on its shelves without its encouragement?

Ensuring a balanced system of intermediary liability is also very important in preserving the forms of innovations we have seen online. Ensuring that intermediaries aren't always held liable for what third parties do is an essential component of encouraging new models of participation, such as Wikipedia. While Wikipedia has community-set standards with regard to copyright, obscenity, and other such issues, holding the Wikimedia Foundation (which has only around 30-40 people) itself responsible for what millions of users write on Wikipedia will hamper such new models of peer-production. This point, unfortunately, has not prevented the Wikimedia Foundation being sued a great number of times in India, a large percentage of which take the form of SLAPP ('strategic lawsuit against public participation') cases, since if the real intention had been to remove the offending content, editing Wikipedia is an easy enough way of achieving that.

While searching for these balanced solutions, we need to look beyond Europe, and look at how countries like Chile, Brazil, India and others are looking at these issues. Unfortunately, this being Geneva, most of the people I see represented in this room are from the developed world as are the examples we are discussing (France and Spain).

In India, for instance, the Internet Service Providers Association made it clear in 2006 (when there was an outcry over censorship of blogging platforms) that they do not want to be responsible for deciding whether something about which they have received a complaint is unlawful or not.

With respect to copyright and the Internet, while the Internet allows for copyright infringement to be conducted more easily, it also allows for copyright infringement to be spotted more easily. Earlier, if someone copied, it would be difficult to find out. Now that is not so. So, that balance is already ingrained, and while many in the industry focus on the fact of easier infringement and thus ask for increased legal protection, such increase in legal protection is not required since the same technological factors that enable increased infringement also enable increased ability to know about that infringement.

On the Internet, intermediaries sometimes engage in primary infringement due to the very nature of digital technology. In the digital sphere, everything is a copy. Thus, whenever you're working on a computer, copies of the copyrighted that show up on your screen are automatically copied to your computer's RAM. Whenever you download anything from the Internet, copies of it are created en route to your computer. (That is the main reason that exceptions in the copyright laws of most countries that allow you to re-sell a book you own don't apply to electronic books.) In such a case, intermediaries must be specially protected.

Additionally, online activities that we take for granted, for instance search technologies, violate the copyright law of most countries. For online search technology to be reasonably fast (instead of taking hours for each search), the searching has to be done on a copies (cache) of actual websites instead of the actual websites. For image searching, it would be unreasonable to expect search companies to take licences for all the images they allow you to search through. Yet, not doing so might violate the copyright laws of many countries. No one, or so one would think, would argue that search engines should be made illegal, but in some countries copyright law is being used to attack intermediaries.

As noted above, intermediaries are a necessary part of online free speech. Current methods of regulating copyright infringement by users via intermediaries online may well fall afoul of internationally accepted standards of human rights. Frank La Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression in his recent report to the UN Human Rights Council stated:

While blocking and filtering measures deny access to certain content on the Internet, States have also taken measures to cut off access to the Internet entirely.

The Special Rapporteur is deeply concerned by discussions regarding a centralized “on/off” control over Internet traffic. In addition, he is alarmed by proposals to disconnect users from Internet access if they violate intellectual property rights. This also includes legislation based on the concept of “graduated response”, which imposes a series of penalties on copyright infringers that could lead to suspension of Internet service, such as the so-called “three-strikes law” in France and the Digital Economy Act 2010 of the United Kingdom.

Beyond the national level, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) has been proposed as a multilateral agreement to establish international standards on intellectual property rights enforcement. While the provisions to disconnect individuals from Internet access for violating the treaty have been removed from the final text of December 2010, the Special Rapporteur remains watchful about the treaty’s eventual implications for intermediary liability and the right to freedom of expression.

With respect to graduated response, there is very little that one can add to Prof. Edwards's presentation. I would like to add one further suggestion that Prof. Ed Felten originally put forward as a 'modest proposal': Corporations which make or facilitate three wrongful accusations should face the same penalty as the users who are accused thrice. The recent US strategy of seizing websites even before trial has been sufficiently criticised, so I shall not spend my time on it.

I still have not seen any good evidence as to why for other kinds of primary or secondary liability incurred by online intermediaries the procedure for offline copyright infringement should not apply, since they are usually crafted taking into account principles of natural justice.

The only 'international' and slightly troublesome issue that a resolution is needed to is that of problems relating to different jurisdiction’s laws applying on a single global network. However, this question is much larger one that of copyright and a copyright-specific solution cannot be found. Thus WIPO is not the right forum for the redress of that problem.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/intermediary-liability-wipo-speech

Does India need its own Bayh-Dole?

sachia — 2011-04-02T15:58:46Z

Article by Pranesh Prakash, Programme Manager at Centre for Internet and Society in the Indian Express, 24 April 2009

Across the world battlelines are being drawn in the normally quiet areas of academia and research. The opposing sides: those in favour of open and collaborative research and development as a means to promote innovation, and those in favour of perpetuating the profits of big pharma companies and academic publishers. Currently before a Select Parliamentary Committee is a controversial law that will deny basic healthcare to millions by making medicines much more expensive, lock up academic knowledge, and help privatise publicly-funded research. The law titled the Protection and Utilisation of Public Funded Intellectual Property Bill 2008 (“PUPFIP Bill”, http://bit.ly/pupfip-bill) was tabled last December in the Rajya Sabha by the Minister for Science and Technology. It was created in utmost secrecy by the Department of Science and Technology, without so much as a draft version having been shared with the public for comments.

The PUPFIP Bill is an Indian version of a 1980 US legislation, the Bayh-Dole Act, and as per its statement of objects and reasons, it seeks to promote creativity and innovation to enable India “to compete globally and for the public good”. It aims to do so by ensuring the protection of all intellectual property (meaning copyright, patent, trade mark, design, plant variety, etc.) that is the outcome of government-funded research. The IP rights will be held by the grant recipient, or by the government if the recipient does not choose to protect the IP. This might seem like a good way to enable technology transfer from research institutes to the industry, but that would be a very myopic view, disregarding all evidence related to the failure of the Bayh-Dole Act. Last year Prof. Anthony So of Duke University co-authored an extensive analysis of the Bayh-Dole Act, and warned of the consequences of such legislation in developing countries.

First, such a law will shift the focus of research. Researchers will be inclined to to concentrate their efforts on issues of interest to industry, and which can have immediate benefit. This would force vital fundamental research into neglect since it cannot be commercialised with ease. Research by Saul Lach and Mark Schankerman shows that scientists are influenced by royalty rates, and will thus tend to work on industrial research rather than fundamental research. This creates, or at least exacerbates, what is popularly known as the “90/10 gap”: the fact that ninety per cent of medical research money goes into problems affecting ten per cent of the world’s population, since that ten per cent is richer.

Secondly, this law will have chilling effects on scholarly communications and promote secrecy. The Bill has requirements of non-disclosure by the grantee and the researcher to enable the commercialisation of the research, and requires researchers and institutions to inform the government before all publication of research. Such bureaucratisation of research publications will stultify intellectual pursuits. Such secrecy and permission-raj culture is anathema to intellectual and academic pursuits, where knowledge is sought to be freely disseminated, to be criticised and further revised by others. In South Africa, academics affected by the recent passage of a PUPFIP-type legislation there are questioning its constitutionality as it restrains freedom of speech.

Thirdly, this will lead to our pillars of learning and research becoming like businesses. US universities like Columbia and Duke have found themselves at the receiving end of criticism for their brazen commercialism, encouraged by the Bayh-Dole Act. Instead of promoting greater access to health for the poor, and spending money on research, the universities were spending money on patent litigation in court. The outcome of one of these cases was the rejection of Duke University’s research exemption defence (universities are generally not bound to observe patents when they wished to conduct research). The court held that the university had “business interests” which the research unmistakably furthered. This points at a fundamental divide between universities as places of learning and as places of profiteering. The Open Source Drug Discovery (OSSD) project that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is currently pursuing is a good attempt at promoting a culture of openness and transparency and collaboration, and thus ensuring cheaper and more efficient drug discovery. Even the US government is currently seeking to clear the way for generic versions of biotech drugs. In such an environment, it is counter-intuitive to bring in a regressive law, and goes against innovative efforts such as the OSSD, and will harm the generics industry.

Fourthly, the Bill assumes — erroneously, as an ever-growing amount of research demonstrates (Boldrin & Levine, Bessen & Meurer, etc.) — that intellectual property is the best and only way to promote creativity and innovation. All forms of intellectual property are state-granted monopolistic rights. At a basic level, competition promotes innovations while monopoly retards it. Much of modern science developed without the privilege of patents. Surely, Darwin and Newton were not encouraged by patents. And even whole industries — like the software industry — flourish without patent protection in most of the world.

The commendable aim of ensuring knowledge transfer can be accomplished much better if we refrain from giving away to private corporations (whether pharmaceutical manufacturers or publishers) exclusive rights to the product of publicly-funded research. Scientists and researchers can be encouraged to be consultants to various industrial projects, thereby ensuring that their expertise is tapped. Importantly, open access publishing which helps to ensure wide distribution and dissemination of knowledge is surely more desirable. That is the trend being followed the world over currently. The US president recently signed into law the Consolidated Appropriations Bill which makes permanent the National Institutes of Health’s open access policy. By doing so, he symbolically rejected calls (such as the much-criticised Conyers Bill) to privatise publicly funded research outputs. Thus, there are many ways by which the government can encourage innovation and creativity, and further public interest. The PUPFIP Bill, which will have deleterious unintended consequences if it is passed, is not one of them.

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To read the article at the Indian Express website, click here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/does-india-need-its-own-bayh-dole

Do You Have the Right to Unlock Your Smart Phone?

puneeth — 2013-08-07T07:32:52Z

In this blog post Puneeth Nagaraj looks at the recent controversy over the expiration of the exemption granted by the US Library of Congress for unlocking phones and compares the Indian position as per a 2005 Andhra Pradesh High Court judgment.

Being a gadget freak in India is difficult. Smartphone companies take months to release their latest product in India (if they do at all) and even when they are released, they are overpriced. For instance, Google's offering in the entry level tablet market, the Nexus 7 was released in India only in April — a full 9 months after its US debut. It is priced at Rs. 16,000 (USD 300) while it costs only USD 200 in the US. Google’s other device Nexus 10 is yet to make its way to the Indian market.

For long, the Indian gadget freak has relied on friends or family travelling abroad to get his/her hands on the latest gadgets on offer. It was not uncommon in the days following the release of the earlier models of the iPhone for eager owners of foreign bought phones to unlock or “jailbreak” their phones so they could use it in India. But the practice of “jailbreaking” or “android rooting” (hereinafter referred to as unlocking [*] for convenience) phones serves a wider purpose. Unlocking smart phones allows users to overcome limitations imposed by hardware manufacturers or carriers. As a result, users can freely switch service providers. While some manufacturers (like Apple) strongly oppose unlocking- even threatening to cancel warranty in case of unlocked devices, others do not mind it and some (like Google and HTC) even encourage it.

US Library of Congress Exemption

The whole controversy surrounding the legality of unlocking phones started in the US last October when the Library of Congress decided against renewing a copyright exemption it granted in 2006. As a result, the exemption expired in January and caused a furore in the US. The DMCA (1201 of the USC), prohibits circumvention of technological measures that protect access to a copyrighted work. This sort of protection is necessary to protecting copyrighted works in a digital format. But the US Congress was informed of the restrictive effects of such a prohibition. Consequently, the Congress created statutory exemptions to allow circumvention of these technological measures and empowered the Library of Congress to grant or renew such exemptions.

Despite the exemption granted by the Library of Congress in 2006, many phone companies successfully sued hardware providers who enabled unlocking of phones. With the expiration of the exemption in January, the status of phone unlocking hangs in a balance. This is especially troublesome as it is a widespread and in some cases essential practice. Both the White House and the FCC have been petitioned to legalise unlocking. In response, four different proposals have been tabled in the US Congress just for this purpose (here is an analysis of each of the bills).

At the moment, the unlocking of phones to run unapproved software is still legal as a result of an exemption granted in 2012. But this is also up for review in 2015. There is a need for a more comprehensive solution to address both these issues and the proposals before the Congress fall short.

Indian Position

Syed Asifuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh
A case based on the unlocking of phones came before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in 2005. Certain Employees of TATA Indicom had facilitated the migration of customers contracted to Reliance for 3 years by unlocking their phones. Representatives of Reliance filed a criminal complaint against them alleging criminal breach of trust (IPC Section 409), cheating (IPC Section 420) and criminal conspiracy (IPC Section 120). They also claimed the violation of copyright and sought punishment under Section 63 of the Copyright Act, as well as Section 65 of the IT Act.

The court dismissed the criminal petitions under the IPC, IT Act and the Copyright Act. However, on the question of copyright infringement, the court held that if a person alters computer programme of another person or another computer company, the same would be infringement of copyright. The court also found that a cell phone would fall under the definition of a computer under Section 2(1) (i) of the Information Technology Act. Consequently, the court held that Section 65 of the IT Act, which deals with the tampering of computer source documents, would be applicable to the present case. The decision itself may not have precedent value on the issue as the High Court was merely ruling on the admissibility of the case on the basis of the above provisions and sent the matter back to the trial court to decide based on the evidence available. But the opinion of the court on copyright infringement and the IT Act is troubling.

Criticism

First, the court used the rather expansive definition of computers in the IT Act (Section 2(1) (i)) to include mobile phones as well. The definition under the above section reads as under:

any electronic, magnetic, optical or other high speed data processing device or system which performs logical, arithmetic and memory functions by manipulations of electronic, magnetic or optical impulses, and includes all input, output, processing, storage, computer software or communication facilities which are connected or related to the computer in a computer system or computer network.

It would not be unreasonable to see smartphones as being capable of “high speed data processing” or “input, output, processing, storage”. However, the phones in question here were basic Samsung N191 and LG-2030 phones (images of these phones can be seen here and here). Even if it might be conceivable that such basic phones can be put in the same bracket as desktop computers or laptops, the court had to examine the definition in the context of the substantial provision. In this case, the substantial provisions were Section 65 and 66 of the IT Act, which deal with tampering source documents and hacking computer systems respectively. So, by equating a basic mobile phone to a computer, the court equated unlocking a mobile phone to hacking a computer. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that Section 66 prescribes criminal punishment to hackers.

Second, the court also erred in its ruling on the Copyright Act. Once again, the court held a basic phone to mean a computer under Section 2(ffb). More worryingly, it was held that the Electronic Serial Number (ESN), a unique code given to every phone would qualify as a computer program under Section 2(ffc) and is thus subject to copyright under Section 14 of the Copyright Act. In doing so, the court has set the bar extremely low for copyrightablity of computer programs. Needless to say this judgment needs to be reconsidered if not watered down. While there is recognition that bootloader protection programmes barely meet the standard for copyright, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has granted protection to a randomly generated 11 digit number.

Fortunately, the case of Syed Asifuddin was not a final ruling on the issue as the court sent the matter back to the trial court. However, there is every chance that a future court can rely on the erroneous reasoning in this case. Further, fair use arguments can always be mad in the favour of an individual consumer who wishes to migrate to another service provider.

The larger problem is that by giving an expansive meaning to the provisions in the Copyright Act and the IT Act, it can be used to target businesses that facilitate unlocking devices that can be targeted (like in the US). Unlike in the US, phone unlocking is not a business in India and is usually done by small business owners who sell and repair mobiles. The consequences of suing such businesses can be worse in India as they can end up in jail for an act that falls in an undefined area of the law. It seems that the situation may be resolved in the US in the near future in favour of the consumer — although the issue of the business of unlocking phones must be resolved finally. The position in India is worrisome especially due to the threat of criminal persecution.

[*]. The term jailbreaking is used specifically in the case of iOS devices and android rooting, as the name suggests is used in the case of android devices. Technically speaking, they are very different given that most android devices do not restrict access to their “bootloaders”. Acknowledging the difference between the two, the discussion here is focused on overriding technological measures meant to protect underlying copyrighted works.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/do-you-have-right-to-unlock-your-smart-phone

DIPP RESPONSE TO CIS RTI - IMPROPER PAYMENT - FEBRUARY, 2015

nehaa — 2015-04-14T17:35:58Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/dipp-response-to-cis-rti-improper-payment-february-2015

DIPP RESPONSE TO CIS (THIRD) RTI REQUEST - FEBRUARY, 2015

nehaa — 2015-04-14T18:16:52Z

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/dipp-response-to-cis-third-rti-request-february-2015