Centre for Internet and Society

Multi-stakeholder Models of Internet Governance within States: Why, Who & How?

geetha — 2014-06-16T14:27:38Z

Internet governance, for long a global exercise, has found new awareness within national frameworks in recent times. Especially relevant for developing countries, effective national IG mechanisms are important to raise awareness and ensure multi-stakeholder participation at technical, infrastructural and public policy levels.

This post is a surface-level overview of national IG bodies, and is intended to inform introductory thoughts on national IG mechanisms.

A Short Introduction

The previous decade has seen a proliferation of regional, sub-regional and national initiatives for Internet governance (IG). Built primarily on the multi-stakeholder model, these initiatives aim at creating dialogue on issues of regional, local or municipal importance. In Asia, Bangladesh has instituted a national IGF, the Bangladesh IGF, with the stated objective of creating a national multi-stakeholder forum that is specialized in Internet governance issues, and to facilitate informed dialogue on IG policy issues among stakeholders. India, too, is currently in the process of instituting such a forum. At this juncture, it is useful to consider the rationale and modalities of national IG bodies.

The Internet has long been considered a sphere of non-governmental, multi-stakeholder, decentralized, bottom-up governance space. The Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace, John Perry Barlow’s defiant articulation of the Internet’s freedom from governmental control, is a classic instance of this. The Internet is a “vast ocean”, we claimed; “no one owns it”.[1] Even today, members of the technical community insist that everyone ought to “let techies do their job”: a plea, if you will, of the complexity of cyber-walls and –borders (or of their lack).

But as Prof. Milton Mueller argues in Ruling the Root, the Internet has always been a contentious resource: battles over its governance (or specifically, the governance of the DNS root, both the root-zone file and the root servers) have leapt from the naïveté of the Declaration of Independence to a private-sector-led, contract-based exploitation of Internet resources. The creation of ICANN was a crucial step in this direction, following arbitrary policy choices by Verizon and entities managing the naming and numbering resources of the Internet.

The mushrooming of parallel tracks of Internet governance is further evidence of the malleability of the space. As of today, various institutions – inter-governmental and multi-stakeholder – extend their claims of governance. ICANN, the World Summit of Information Society, the World Conference on International Telecommunications, the Internet Governance Forum and the Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation under the ECOSOC Committee for Science, Technology and Development are a few prominent tracks. As of today, the WSIS process has absorbed various UN special bodies (the ITU, UNESCO, UNCTAD, UNDP are but a few), with the UNESCO instituting a separate study on Internet-related issues. A proposal for a multilateral Committee on Internet-Related Policies remains stillborn.

Amongst these, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) remains a strong contender for a truly multi-stakeholder process facilitating dialogue on IG. The IGF was set up following the recommendation of the Working Group of Internet Governance (WGIG), constituted after the Geneva phase of the WSIS.

Rationale: Why Have National IG bodies?

The issue of national multi-stakeholder cooperation/collaboration in IG is not new; it has been alive since the early 2000s. The Tunis Agenda, in paragraph 80, encourages the “development of multi-stakeholder processes at the national, regional and international levels to discuss and collaborate on the expansion and diffusion of the Internet as a means to support development efforts to achieve internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals” (emphasis supplied).

In its June 2005 Report, the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) emphasizes that “global Internet governance can only be effective if there is coherence with regional, subregional and national-level policies”. Towards this end it recommends that “coordination be established among all stakeholders at the national level and a multi-stakeholder national Internet governance steering committee or similar body be set up” (emphasis supplied). The IGF, whose creation the WGIG recommended, has since been commended for its impact on the proliferation of national IGFs.

The rationale, then, was that multi-stakeholder steering committees at the national level would help to create a cohesive body to coordinate positions on Internet governance. In Reforming Internet Governance, WGIG member Waudo Siganga writes of the Internet Steering Committee of Brazil as a model, highlighting lessons that states (especially developing countries) may learn from CGI.br.

The Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) was set up in 1995 and is responsible, inter alia, for the management of the .br domain, distribution of Internet addresses and administration of metropolitan Internet exchange points. CERT.br ensures network security and extends support to network administrators. Siganga writes that CGI.br is a “well-structured multistakeholder entity, having representation from government and democratically chosen representatives of the business sector, scientific and technological community and an Internet expert”.

Why is CGI.br a model for other states? First, CGI.br exemplifies how countries can structure in an effective manner, a body that is involved in creating awareness about IG issues at the national level. Moreover, the multi-stakeholder nature of CGI.br shows how participation can be harnessed effectively to build capacity across domestic players. This also reflects the multi-stakeholder aspects of Internet governance at the global level, clarifying and implementing the WSIS standards (for instance). Especially in developing countries, where awareness and coordination for Internet governance is lacking at the national level, national IG committees can bridge the gap between awareness and participation. Such awareness can translate into local solutions for local issues, as well as contributing to an informed, cohesive stance at the global level.

Stakeholders: Populating a national IG body

A national IG body – be in steering committee, IGF or other forum – should ideally involve all relevant stakeholders. As noted before, since inception, the Internet has not been subject to exclusive governmental regulation. The World Summit on Information Society recognized this, but negotiations amongst stakeholders resulted in the delegation of roles and responsibilities: the controversial and much-debated paragraph 35 of the Tunis Agenda reads:

Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States. They have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues.
The private sector has had, and should continue to have, an important role in the development of the Internet, both in the technical and economic fields.
Civil society has also played an important role on Internet matters, especially at community level, and should continue to play such a role.
Intergovernmental organizations have had, and should continue to have, a facilitating role in the coordination of Internet-related public policy issues.
International organizations have also had and should continue to have an important role in the development of Internet-related technical standards and relevant policies.

This position remains endorsed by the WSIS process; the recent WSIS+10 High Level Event endorsed by acclamation the WSIS+10 Vision for WSIS Beyond 2015, which “respect mandates given by Tunis Agenda and respect for the multi-stakeholder principles”. In addition to government, the private sector and civil society, the technical community is identified as a distinct stakeholder group. Academia has also found a voice, as demonstrated by stakeholder-representation at NETmundial 2014.

A study of the Internet Society (ISOC) on Assessing National Internet Governance Arrangements, authored by David Souter, maps IG stakeholders at the global, regional and national levels. At the global level, primary stakeholders include ICANN (not-for-profit, private sector corporation involved in governance and technical coordination of the DNS), the IETF, IAB and W3C (technical standards), governments and civil society organizations, all of which participate with different levels of involvements at the IGF, ICANN, ITU, etc.

At the national/municipal level, the list of stakeholders is as comprehensive. Governmental stakeholders include: (1) relevant Ministries (in India, these are the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology – the Department of Electronics and Information Technology under the MCIT is particularly relevant), and (2) regulators, statutory and independent (the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, for example). At the national level, these typically seek inputs from other stakeholders while making recommendations to governments, which then enact laws or make policy. In India, for instance, the TRAI conducts consultations prior to making recommendations to the government.

Within the private sector, there may be companies (1) on the supply-side, such as infrastructure networks, telecommunications service companies, Internet Service Providers, search engines, social networks, cybercafés, etc., and (2) on the demand-side, online businesses, advertising/media, financial service providers, etc. who use the Internet. There may also be national registries managing ccTLDs, such as the Registro.br or the National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI). There may also the press and news corporations representing both corporate and public interest under specific circumstances (media ownership and freedom of expression, for distinct examples).

Civil society organisations, including consumer organisations, think-tanks and grassroots organisations, participate at various levels of policy-making in the formal institutional structure, and are crucial in representing users and public interest. The complexity of stakeholders may be seen from Souter’s report, and this enumeration is but a superficial view of the national stakeholder-population.

Processes: Creating effective national IG bodies

National IG bodies – be they steering committees, IGFs, consultative/working groups or other forums – may be limited by formal institutional governmental settings. While limited by the responsibility-gradient in paragraph 35 of the Tunis Agenda, an effective national IG body requires robust multi-stakeholder participation, as Souter notes, in technical governance, infrastructure and public policy issues. Its effectiveness also lies in governmental acquiescence of its expertise and recommendations; in short, in the translation of the IG body’s decisions into policy.

How do these stakeholders interact at the national level? In addition to the Brazilian example (CGI.br), an ISOC study by Souter and Monica Kerretts-Makau, Internet Governance in Kenya: An Assessment, provides a detailed answer. At the technical level, the registry KENIC manages the .ke domain, while the Kenya Computer Incident Response Team Coordination Centre coordinates national responses to incidents and collaborates internationally on cyber-security issues. A specific IPv6 Force to promote Kenya’s transition to IPv6 was also created.

At the infrastructural level, both the government and the private sector play important roles. Directly, ministries and government departments consult with infrastructure providers in creating policy. In India, for instance, the TRAI conducts multi-stakeholder consultations on issues such as telecom tariffs, colocation tariffs for submarine cable stations and mobile towers, etc. The government may also take a lead in creating infrastructure, such as the national optic fibre networks in India and Kenya, as also creating investment opportunities such as liberalizing FDI. At the public policy level, there may exist consultations initiated by government bodies (such as the TRAI or the Law Commission), in which other stakeholders participate.

As one can see, government-initiated consultations by ministries, regulators, law commissions or specially constituted committees. Several countries have also set up national IGFs, which typically involve all major stakeholders in voluntary participation, and form a discussion forum for existing and emerging IG issues. National IGFs have been considered particularly useful to create awareness within the country, and may best address IG issues at the domestic policy level. However, Prof. Mueller writes that what is necessary is a “reliable mechanism reliable mechanisms for consistently feeding the preferences expressed in these forums to actual global policy-making institutions like ICANN, RIRs, WIPO, and WTO which impact distributional outcomes”.

[1] M. Mueller, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace 57 (2002).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/multi-stakeholder-models-of-internet-governance-within-states-why-who-how

Indian Government's Submission to ITU

pranesh — 2012-12-09T00:48:10Z

The following is the text of the submission made by the Government of India to the World Conference of International Telecommunications, Dubai on November 3, 2012. This is the final version of a draft that was circulated earlier.

Read the detailed comments on India's draft proposal on the Proposed Amendments to the ITU’s ITR’s – November 3, 2012

World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12) Dubai, 3-14 December 2012
PLENARY MEETING														Document 21-E 3 November 2012 Original: English

India (Republic of)

PROPOSALS FOR THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

Introduction

We recognise and appreciate the efforts of International Telecommunication Union in preparing the Draft on proposed ITRs for WCIT 2012.

The attached proposal is developed through a consultation process involving various stakeholder groups, both, in Indian Public and Private sectors. Due consideration has been given to the existing legislations and government policies in the preparation of this proposal. We acknowledge that since 1988, there have been significant changes and challenges in Telecommunications / ICTs in terms of Technological breakthroughs, New Services and Market Structure. Acknowledging this fact, India’s proposal is offered in the form of addition (ADD) or modification (MOD) only on some of the relevant proposals, by giving reference to the appropriate CWG/4/XXX number mentioned in the Annex 2 of the ITU Document 4(Add.2)-E. Considering the magnitude of issues in International Telecommunications, India may take appropriate stand on other provisions of the draft ITR document during the WCIT discussions.

Further, the proposals from different regions to the conference as well as its preparatory process were carefully studied. In order to help the conference achieve a consensus on the various issues being discussed, the content of this proposal has been largely drawn from the output of the Council Working Group on WCIT (WCIT/4 Add.2 ” Draft of the future ITRs”).

A new proposal on 5A: Confidence and Security of Telecommunications/ICTs is also included as India believes that an international framework on Security is of importance in today’s connected world.

INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION
REGULATIONS
PREAMBLE

MOD	IND/21/1

1 While the sovereign right of each Member State to regulate its telecommunications is fully recognized, the provisions of the present International Telecommunication Regulations (hereinafter “Regulations”) complement the Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, with a view to attaining the purposes of the International Telecommunication Union in promoting the development of telecommunication services and their most efficient operation while harmonizing the development of facilities for world-wide telecommunications.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/3.

Article 1

Purpose and Scope of the Regulations

ADD IND/21/2

3A c) These Regulations recognize that Member States should endeavour to take the necessary measures to prevent interruptions of services and ensure that no harm is caused by their operating agencies to the operating agencies of other Member States which are operating in accordance with the provisions of these Regulations.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/12.

ADD IND/21/3

3B d) These Regulations recognize the absolute priority for safety of life telecommunications, including distress telecommunications, emergency telecommunications services and telecommunications for disaster relief as provided in Article.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/14.

Article 2

Definitions

ADD IND/21/4

14A 2.1A Telecommunication/ICT: Any transmission, emission or reception, including processing, of signs, signals, writing, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic systems, having a bearing on Telecommunication Technologies and Services.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/48.

ADD IND/21/5

27A 2.11 Transit rate: a rate set by the point of transit in a third country (indirect relation).

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/74.

ADD IND/21/6

27C 2.13 Spam: information transmitted over telecommunication networks as text, sound, image, tangible data used in a man-machine interface bearing advertizing nature or having no meaningful message, simultaneously or during a short period of time, to a large number of particular addressees without prior consent of the addressee (recipient) to receive this information or information of this nature.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/78.

ADD IND/21/7

27D 2.14 Hub: a transit center (or network operator) that offers to other operators a telecommunication traffic termination service to nominated destinations contained in the offer.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/80.

ADD IND/21/8

27E 2.15 Hubbing: the routing of telecommunication traffic in hubbing mode consists in the use of hub facilities to terminate telecommunication traffic to other destinations.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/82.

ADD IND/21/9

27F 2.16 Network fraud: (fraud on international telecommunication networks): The causing of harm to operating agencies or to the public, the wrongful obtaining of gain in the provision of international telecommunication services through abuse of trust or deception, including through inappropriate use of numbering resources.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/87.

ADD IND/21/10

27G 2.17 Global telecommunication service (GTS): A service which enables communication to be established through a global number between subscribers whose physical location and national jurisdiction have no bearing on the tariff to be set for the service’s use; which satisfies and complies with recognized and accepted international standards; and which is provided over the public telecommunication network by operating agencies having obtained the relevant numbering resources from ITU-T.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/89.

ADD IND/21/11

27H 2.21 Originating Identification: The Originating Identification is the service by which the terminating party shall receive the identity information in order to identify the origin of the communication.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/81.

ADD IND/21/12

27L 2.25 Stability of the international telecommunication network: The capability of the international telecommunication network to carry international traffic in the event of failure of telecommunication nodes or links and also in the face of internal and external destructive actions and to return to its original state.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/99.

ADD IND/21/13

27M 2.26 Security of the international telecommunication network: The capability of the international telecommunication network to withstand internal and external destabilizing actions liable to compromise its functioning.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/101.

ADD IND/21/14

27N 2.27 International Roaming: Provision to the subscriber of the opportunity to use telecommunication services offered by other operating agencies of other member states, with which the subscriber has not concluded an agreement.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/103.

ADD IND/21/15

27O 2.28 IP interconnection: IP interconnection refers to means and rules employed to ensure the delivery of IP traffic through different networks.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/105.

ADD IND/21/16

27P 2.29 End to end quality of service delivery and best effort delivery: End to End quality of service delivery refers to the delivery of PDU (Packet Data Unit) with predefined end-to-end performance objectives; Best-effort delivery refers delivery to of a PDU without predefined performance targets.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/107.

Article 3

International Network

ADD IND/21/17

31A 3.5 Member States shall ensure that international naming, numbering, addressing and identification resources are used only by the assignees and only for the purposes for which they were assigned; and that unassigned resources are not used. The provisions of the relevant ITU-T Recommendations shall be applied.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/134.

ADD IND/21/18

31B 3.6 International calling party number delivery shall be provided in accordance with relevant ITU-T Recommendations.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/142.

Article 4

International Telecommunication Services

MOD IND/21/19

34 4.3 Subject to national law, Member States shall endeavour to ensure that operating agencies provide and maintain, to the greatest extent practicable, a satisfactory quality of service corresponding to the relevant ITU-T Recommendations with respect to:

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/168.

MOD IND/21/20

35 a) access to the international network by users using terminals which are permitted to be connected to the network and which do not cause harm or diminish the level of safety and security of technical facilities and personnel;

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/174.

MOD IND/21/21

36 b) international telecommunication facilities and services available to customers for their use;

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/176.

MOD IND/21/22

37 c) at least a form of telecommunication service which is reasonably accessible to the public, including those who may not be subscribers to a specific telecommunication service; and

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/179.

MOD IND/21/23

38 d) a capability for interworking between different services, as appropriate, to facilitate international telecommunication services.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/181.

ADD IND/21/24

38A 4.4 Member States shall ensure that operating agencies providing international telecommunication services, including roaming, make available to subscribers information on tariffs and taxes. Each subscriber should be able to have access to such information and receive it in a timely manner and free of charge when roaming (entering into roaming), except where the subscriber has previously declined to receive such information.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/188.

ADD IND/21/25

38B 4.5 Given the particular characteristics of GTS, which allows subscribers to have a worldwide number, implement GTSs in accordance with the National regulations.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/195.

ADD IND/21/26

38E 4.8 Member States, subject to national security requirements, may foster the establishment of mutual agreements on mobile services accessed within a predetermined border zone in order to prevent or mitigate inadvertent roaming charges.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/201.

Article 5

Safety of Life and Priority of Telecommunications

MOD IND/21/27

39 5.1 Safety of life telecommunications, including distress telecommunications, emergency telecommunication services and telecommunications for disaster relief, shall be entitled to transmission as of right and shall, where technically practicable, have absolute priority over all other telecommunications, in accordance with the relevant Articles of the Constitution, Convention and relevant ITU-T Resolutions and Recommendations.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/204.

ADD IND/21/28

41B 5.5 Member States should cooperate to introduce in addition to their existing national emergency numbers, a global number for calls to the emergency services globally.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/217.

ADD IND/21/29

41C 5.6 Member States shall ensure that operating agencies inform every roaming subscriber of the number to be used for calls to the emergency services, while entering into roaming, free of charge.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/219.

ADD IND/21/30

Article 5A

Confidence and security of telecommunications/ICTs

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/221.

ADD IND/21/31

41D 5A1. Member‐States shall have the right to take appropriate measures to protect and Secure the ICT Network infrastructure and data contained in or flowing through the Network and also to prevent the misuse of ICT network and services within their state.

5A2. The Member States should endeavour to take appropriate measures, individually or in cooperation with other Member states, to ensure Security of the ICT Network and information, including user information, contained in or flowing through the ICT network within their jurisdiction.

5A3. Member‐States should endeavour to oversee that Operating Agencies in their territory do not engage in activities which impinge on the security and integrity of ICT network such as denial of service attack, unsolicited electronic communication (spam), unsolicited access to network elements and devices etc., to enable effective functioning of ICTs in secure and trustworthy conditions.

5A4. Member States should endeavour to cooperate to harmonize national laws, jurisdictions, and practices in the relevant areas.

Reasons: Combined proposal on clauses proposed from CWG /4 A 2/222 to 232 in 5A and 5B.

Article 6

Charging and Accounting

ADD IND/21/32

43A 6.1.1A Cost of International Roaming Services

a) Member States shall encourage competition in the international roaming market;

b) Member States are encouraged to cooperate to develop policies for reducing charges on international roaming services.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/243.

MOD IND/21/33

45 6.1.3 Member States are free to levy fiscal taxes on international telecommunication services in accordance with their national laws; however, the Member States should endeavour to avoid international double taxation on such services.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/249.

ADD IND/21/34

54E 6.10 Subject to national law, Member States shall ensure that Operating Agencies collaborate in preventing and controlling fraud in international telecommunications by:

– Identifying and transmitting to the transit and destination Operating Agencies the pertinent information required for the purposes of payment for the routing of international traffic, in particular the originating Country Code, National Destination Code and the Calling Party Number.

– Following up requests of other Member States or their Operating Agencies to investigate calls that cannot be billed, and helping to resolve outstanding accounts.

– Following up requests of other Member States or their Operating Agencies to identify the source of calls originated from their territories exerting potential fraudulent activity.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/287.

ADD IND/21/35

54F 6.11 The ITU Standardization Sector shall be responsible for disseminating the regulatory frameworks in place in administrations having an impact on matters related to fraud.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/289.

ADD IND/21/36

54H 6.12A Member States shall foster the establishment of international roaming mobile services prices based on principles of reasonability, competitiveness and non-discrimination relative to prices applied to local users of the visited country.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/293.

ADD IND/21/37

54K 6.14 Member States should foster continued investment in high-bandwidth infrastructures.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/299.

ADD IND/21/38

54L 6.15 Member States shall promote cost-oriented pricing. Regulatory measures may be imposed to the extent that this cannot be achieved through market mechanisms and to the extent that such measures do not hinder competition.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/301.

ADD IND/21/39

54N 6.17 Member States shall promote transparency of end-user prices, in particular to avoid surprising bills for international services (e.g mobile roaming and data roaming).

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/305.

ADD IND/21/40

54S 6.D Member States should endeavour to take measures to ensure that an adequate return is provided on investments in network infrastructures in identified areas. If this cannot be achieved through market mechanisms, then other mechanisms may be used.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/315.

ADD IND/21/41

54O 6.18 Member States should consider measures to favour special interconnection rates for landlocked countries.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/307.

ADD IND/21/42

54P 6.18A Member States should endeavour that Recognized Operating Agencies establish charging units and parameters that bill telecommunication service consumers according to what is effectively consumed.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/309.

ADD IND/21/43

54R 6.20 Rendering and Settlement of Accounts

6.20.1 The settlement of international accounts shall be regarded as current transactions and shall be effected in accordance with the current international obligations of the Member States and Sector Members concerned in those cases where their governments have concluded arrangements on this subject. Where no such arrangements have been concluded, and in the absence of special agreements made under Article 42 of the Constitution, these settlements shall be effected in accordance with the Administrative Regulations.

6.20.2 Administrations of Member States and Sector Members which operate international telecommunication services shall come to an agreement with regard to the amount of their debits and credits.

6.20.3 The statement of accounts with respect to debits and credits referred to in No. 498 above shall be drawn up in accordance with the provisions of the Administrative Regulations, unless special arrangements have been concluded between the parties concerned.

Reasons: The text is taken from CV 497, 498 and 499. This proposal is based on CWG /4 A 2/313.

ADD IND/21/44

57B Member States shall encourage the provision of global services based on international standards that ensure accessible telecommunications and ICT services to persons with disabilities.

Reasons: This Proposal is based on HNG /5/2.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/indian-govts-submission-to-itu

India's Statement at ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, 2014

geetha — 2014-11-04T05:50:06Z

India's Draft Resolution at the ITU Plenipot, which we have previously blogged about, was not passed following discussions at the Ad Hoc Working Group on Internet-related Resolutions. Subsequently, India made a statement at the Working Group of the Plenary, emphasizing the importance of the issues and welcoming further discussions. The statement was delivered by Mr. Ram Narain, DDG-IR, Department of Telecommunications and Head of India's Delegation at PP-14. The full text of the statement is provided below.

"Chairman of Working Group Plenary, Mr Musab Abdulla, Head of Delegations, delegates, ladies and gentlemen, good morning/afternoon to you all. I was indeed impressed with the camaraderie with which discussions were held inspite of the fact that delegates discussing the issues have different cultures, languages, nuances, impressions and sometime interests.

"Governance of packet-switched data telecom Networks based on Internet Protocol (IP), popularly known as Internet, has become an important and contentious issue due to several reasons known to all of us. We put up a draft resolution to address some of these key issues pertaining to IP based networks. When we put up the proposal, I had thought that the proposal would contribute in diminishing some of the differences. These issues and their probable solutions are given in our draft resolution, document 98, about which we were ready to take constructive inputs.

"Information is power these days. The wise Lord Acton said about hundred and fifty years ago that Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. The countries in modern times have become great on the principles of equality, liberty and justice. As and when these principles were compromised great powers lost their hold. Broadband penetration and connectivity has been the important running theme of this conference. We believe this, like great empires, can only be built on the principles of fairness, justice, and equality. No Telecom Network whether IP based or otherwise can function without naming and numbering, which is the lifeline of a network. Their availability in a fair, just and equitable manner, therefore, is an important public policy issue and need to be dealt that way. We believe that respecting the principle of sovereignty of information through network functionality and global norms will go a long way in increasing the trust and confidence in use of ICT.

"There are number of existing Internet related resolutions, but they only touch the issue in general and, therefore, without focus concrete action does not happen. Our Resolution was with a view to deal with the issues in a focused manner. Some countries supported our draft resolution, while some other were not able to support it. Some stated since the proposal is a comprehensive one, dealing with number of important issues, more time is needed for them to develop a view on it. Due to the number of proposals with Ad Hoc Group lined up before our draft resolution, there was no time left for detailed discussion on the proposal. Therefore, India agreed not to press the resolution for discussion due to paucity of time, with an understanding that for these issues of concerns for many Member States, contributions can be made in various fora dealing with development of IP based networks and future networks, including ITU. India would like that discussion should take place on these issues and look forward to these discussions. We would request that this Statement is included in the records of Plenipotentiary-14 meeting.

"We would like to thank for the cooperation extended by various Member States, particularly USA, for appreciating our concerns and all those who shared our concerns and supported the draft resolution. I would also like to thank Mr. Fabio Bigi, Chairman of Ad Hoc Working Group for giving patient hearing to all us and tolerating all our idiosyncrasies and still arriving at consensus. This is because of his wisdom, which comes with experience.

Thank you all."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/indias-statement-at-itu-plenipotentiary-conference-2014

Good Intentions, Recalcitrant Text – II: What India’s ITU Proposal May Mean for Internet Governance

geetha — 2014-11-03T07:07:16Z

The UN's International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is hosting its Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-14) this year in South Korea. At PP-14, India introduced a new draft resolution on ITU's Role in Realising Secure Information Society. The Draft Resolution has grave implications for human rights and Internet governance. Geetha Hariharan explores.

Disclaimer and update (2 November 2014): India's Draft Resolution was discussed during the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Internet-related Resolutions at the ITU Plenipot on the evening of November 1, 2014 (KST). After the discussion, India revised the text of the resolution, seeking to address concerns raised by ITU member states. The revised resolution may be found here. However, this blog post was written with reference to the original text of India's Draft Resolution.

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As I mentioned in my last post, India’s Draft Resolution on ‘ITU’s Role in Realising Secure Information Society’ raises security and equity concerns. The Draft Resolution has 3 security concerns: (i) security weaknesses in the network architecture that permit “camouflaging the identity of the originator of the communication” and make “tracing of communication difficult”; (ii) non-systematic, non-contiguous allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources on the Internet, which makes it difficult to identify both the users and what states the IP addresses are located in; (iii) non-local routing and address resolution relating to traffic originating and terminating in the same country. Op. §§1, 3-7 seek to address these. It also identifies the present system of allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources as inequitable, unfair, unjust and undemocratic (Op. §2 of the Draft Resolution offers a solution). I discussed some human rights implications of India’s Draft Resolution in my last post.

In this post, I explore the implications of the Draft Resolution for Internet governance and multi-stakeholder approaches (most notably, an equal footing model).[1] Given the uncertainties around defining multi-stakeholderism for Internet governance, this is rather ambitious. So I will try to point to concerns with certain textual interpretations of the Draft Resolution, map that against the positions India’s representatives have taken on Internet governance in the past, and the motivations/concerns that underlie the tabling of the Draft Resolution. This Resolution may not be the best way to allay India's concerns, for there are technical and rights implications. But the concerns it raises are worth discussion and knowledge, and at forums where concerns are heard, acknowledged and discussed collectively. The text of the Draft Resolution and its attendant implications are not, then, the sole subjects of this post.

The Draft Resolution and Internet governance:

The text of the Draft Resolution is problematic. Many of its clauses may be seen as taking positions against multi-stakeholder approaches to Internet governance. Introducing such a resolution at the ITU may itself bring back memories of the controversies surrounding Resolution 3 of the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), 2012.[2] In 3 ways, the text of the Draft Resolution has indications for multi-stakeholder approaches.

First, the Draft Resolution frames issues primarily from the perspective security. In its preamble, the Draft Resolution makes several references to security threats posed by and on the Internet. For instance, it points to the ability of the network to “camouflage the identity of the originator of the communication” (Pream. §(e) [recognizing]), as well as national security concerns in the present-day system of routing Internet traffic through multiple countries (Pream. §§(f) and (g), [recognizing]). The apparent difficulty in tracing IP addresses, due to their random allocation, is another concern (Pream. §(h), [recognizing]). Among the “significant public policy issues” identified in telecom/ICT management, “security and safety of the Telecom/ICTs” is specifically noted (Pream. §(i) [considering]). In the Context note to the Draft Resolution and in several places in the Preamble, there are references to ITU Resolution 130 (‘Strengthening the role of ITU in building confidence and security in the use of information and communication technologies’) and ITU’s Cyber-security Agenda. Given the (legitimate or otherwise) disproportionate involvement of governments and not other stakeholders in matters of cyber-security, the framing of issues from a security perspective may lend itself to worries for multi-stakeholderism. Specifically, the Draft Resolution notes: “ensuring security of ICT networks is sovereign right of Member States” (Pream. §(b) [recognizing]).

Second, the Draft Resolution emphasizes the sovereign right of states to regulate and control telecom/ICT. It says, for instance, “it is the sovereign right of each state to regulate its telecommunication” (Pream. §(b) [considering]). With regard to the Internet, the Context note to the Draft Resolution (page 1) considers the Internet to be synonymous with telecom/ICTs: “the Telecom/ICTs, which in common lexicon is used interchangeably many times as Internet…”. Public telecom networks managed by telecom service providers, interconnected with other networks, are necessary for “proper functioning of a telecom network resources namely, among others, naming, numbering and addressing” (Pream. §(k) [considering]). It is worth noting that the sovereign authority of states over Internet public policy issues is settled text from §35 of the Tunis Agenda, though expressing it as synonymous with telecom may lead to possibilities of licensing and registration, which Bulgaria, for instance, does not do.

Third, the Draft Resolution identifies issues of equity and fairness in the allocation of Internet resources such as naming, numbering and addressing (Pream. §(g) [consdering], Op. §2). It states that to correct this inequity, “facilitation and collaboration among international, inter-governmental organizations and individual member states to ensure planning, implementation, monitoring and cooperation in its policies” is required (Pream. §(g) [considering]). In operative paragaphs, our Draft Resolution calls for collaboration with “all the concerned stakeholders including International and intergovernmental organizations to develop policies for allocation, assignment and management of IP resources including naming, numbering and addressing which is systematic, equitable, fair, just, democratic and transparent” (Op. §2). One may pay attention to the oversight over implementation and the necessity of inter-governmental involvement in planning and monitoring as problematic to iterations of multi-stakeholderism.

These concerns are valid and legitimate, and it is desirable that the text of the resolution be altered to address them. The text should also be altered to address the human rights concerns I point out in my previous post. But human rights enforcement or implementation is within the domain of states, though civil society may be a careful watchdog. The Draft Resolution's text, most certainly, will face certain oppositions: for instance, that it is outside the scope and mandate of the ITU. That the ITU does not deal with content regulation – and this issue touches upon content – will be mentioned. That Internet governance is already being discussed and performed in multiple other multi-stakeholder fora, such as ICANN, the NRO and RIRs, IGF and WSIS, will be emphasized. That the Draft Resolution implicates national security concerns will be mentioned as well. But as an aside, on national security: under international law, states always mention their prerogative over national security, and so as a matter of international custom, national security is outside the scope of agreements unless expressly surrendered.

At the same time, debates around the role of ITU in Internet governance are not new, and those familiar will remember the ITU’s views right before the creation of ICANN (also see Mueller, Ruling the Root 145-48 (2002)), Resolution 3 of the WCIT, and the constant tug-of-war since then. The new Secretary-General of the ITU, Mr. Houlin Zhao, wrote a note in October 2004, before the Tunis phase of the WSIS, justifying ITU’s involvement in Internet governance, advocating that IPv6 address blocks be allocated to countries. Mr. Zhao describes, with specific examples, ITU's role in the development and widespread growth of the Internet. He takes the examples of standards developed within the ITU and ITU's policy role in liberalisation and spread of telecommunications (such as Articles 4 & 9 of the 1988 ITRs).

Mr. Zhao’s concrete proposals are rendered inapplicable by the creation of the NRO and RIRs, and the growth and entrenchment of ICANN. But it may be argued that his principled justifications for ITU involvement remain. It is these that India hopes to highlight, I was told, along with the inequities in resource allocation (IPv4 was spoken of), and the disproportionate weight some states enjoy in Internet governance. Her concerns are, I am told, also shared by some other states. Given that the text exhibits a less-than-friendly approach to multi-stakeholderism, India's previous positions on the issue are of interest. While this would not correct the snags in the Draft Resolution's text, allaying these concerns may be ideal to craft an inclusive and transparent multi-stakeholder model for Internet governance.

India and Multi-stakeholderism in Internet Governance:

India’s position on multi-stakeholder models for Internet governance is a matter of some obscurity. Statements at various forums exhibit a certain disagreement – or at the least, lack of engagement – among India’s ministries on our position on multi-stakeholder approaches, particularly the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the Department of Telecommunications (DOT) and the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY), both within the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MCIT). While both the MEA and DOT have been cautious supporters of a diluted form of multi-stakeholderism (they have repeatedly emphasized §35 of the Tunis Agenda), DeitY has been more open in entertaining multi-stakeholder approaches for Internet governance.

At the 66^th session of UN General Assembly, Mr. Dushyant Singh, Member of India’s Parliament from the Bharatiya Janata Party, presented our proposal for a Committee on Internet-related Policies. The proposal sought the establishment of a UN committee comprising 50 member-states, with advisory groups including the private sector and civil society, to deal with Internet-related matters.[3] Though India was not opposed to multi-stakeholder advisories in its CIRP proposal, it was less than inviting in this regard.

At NETmundial (April 2014), the Indian government’s contribution document highlighted §35 of the Tunis Agenda, which delineates ‘roles and responsibilities’ of ‘respective stakeholders’ – i.e., governments (with whom reside “sovereign policy authority”), the private sector (technical and economic development of the Internet) and civil society (grassroots participation). At NETmundial, Mr. Vinay Kwatra of the MEA echoed this, also noting the lack of consensus on what multi-stakeholderism means for Internet governance (page 64).

Admittedly, this is a legitimate concern. Internet governance at various fora does not seem to have a clear answer on what multi-stakeholderism means. The debate was/is alive, for instance, at NETmundial 2014, the ICANN-convened IANA transition process, the World Economic Forum’s new NETmundial Initiative, and in the many calls and suggestions (pages 38-46) made over the years on strengthening the IGF (see also, Malcolm, Multi-stakeholder Governance and the IGF (2008), chapter 6). It is hardly surprising then, that India and other states raise this as a concern.

With regard to multi-stakeholderism, the DeitY in India has been the outlier. Speaking at the 2014 IGF in Istanbul, Mr. R.S. Sharma, Secretary (DeitY), expressed “no doubt that Internet Governance mechanism require the involvement of all the stakeholders, since the evolution of Internet has been a product of many different diverse groups working together in a loosely coordinated manner”, advocating strengthening of the IGF and pointing to India’s proposed India-IGF as an example of multi-stakeholderism at home. Most interestingly, Mr. Sharma did not focus on international Internet-related policies being the “sovereign policy authority of states”. Also in the transcripts of the four meetings of the Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation under the Committee for Science, Technology and Development (CSTD), I have been unable to find outright rejections of multi-stakeholder approaches, though India has not advocated multi-stakeholderism unequivocally either.

But this – the emphasis on “sovereign policy authority of states” in Internet governance – has been a consistent position for India, especially the MEA and DOT. Here at the ITU PP-14 as well, members of the Indian delegation also emphasized states’ sovereign monopoly over policy matters. “Why not take this to the ITU”, I was asked, as “many governments are uncomfortable” with the way Internet governance is being conducted at other fora. There are grave concerns, I was told, about the possibility of excessive control some governments have over both user and government data of other states (government-speak, of course, for the Snowden revelations).

These are, of course, concerns similar to those of authoritarian governments, or those reluctant to open up to multi-stakeholderism and looking for excuses to retain/increase government control. But it is equally possible that these concerns need not be limited only to such states. Perhaps for developing countries as well, these are real concerns. In conversation with members of the Indian delegation at the ITU Plenipot, I was able to discern 3 broad concerns. First, the definition of multi-stakeholderism in Internet governance. India has not shown herself comfortable with an all-out endorsement of multi-stakeholderism. This is troubling. Civil society and the private sector in India will attest to the difficulties in engaging with our government at all levels. For instance, seeking a place on India's delegation for the Plenipot proved a disheartening exercise for some members of India's civil society.

But there are also conflicting indications. India is in the process of instituting an India-IGF, and CIS' Executive Director, Sunil Abraham, is on the MAG. India expressed agreement, at least in informal conversation, to opening up ITU documents to the public on grounds of public interest. The Law Commission of India recently conducted a multi-stakeholder consultation on media laws in India, and Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) regularly conducts consultations, though the private sector is more active there. What is lacking in India, however, is a set of clear procedures and processes for multi-stakeholder engagement, particularly on Internet issues. Clear, public, accessible, foreseeable and predictable set of rules or processes on participation from civil society, private sector and academia would make a world of difference to multi-stakeholderism within India. But this lack should not blind states or other stakeholders to the genuineness of privacy/security or equity concerns - for instance, of the protection of our information from mass surveillance or the feasibility and actual participation of developing countries at many Internet governance fora.

Second, members of the delegation expressed concern over inequalities in the allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources. While I am uncertain how IPv6 allocation falls within this concern, the inequalities of IPv4 allocations are well documented. To gather a sense of this, it would be useful to read chapter 5 of Professor DeNardis’ Protocol Politics, and to glance at Figure 5.7 (page 173). Africa controls, for instance, a mere 1% of all available IPv4 addresses, while North America and Europe control about 63%. A study on engagement from the Asia-Pacific in Internet standards organisations shows, for instance, greater participation from Western countries and from some states like Japan.[4] India and other states from Asia and Africa have lesser participation. Even at ICANN, with efforts to increase participation, meaningful engagement is still from a majority of Western countries. Perhaps states and other stakeholders on the other side of the table can address these concerns through clear, inclusive, non-discriminatory commitments and implementation.

Third, India emphasized how the Draft Resolution does not propose that ITU be involved in content management or resources control, but only seeks to systematize allocation by asking the ITU Secretary General to collaborate and coordinate with other Internet governance organisations to create a set of principles for fair, equitable, transparent and democratic - as well as secure - allocation of resources. ITU Resolution 101 already instructs the Secretary General to collaborate with relevant Internet governance organisations, and the Draft Resolution merely seeks to spell out his tasks. However, as I pointed out in my previous post, the text of the Draft Resolution is at odds with this intention of India's. By dint of its drafting, it gravely implicates human rights, as well as touching upon resource allocation oversight ("needs to be adhere to" in Op. §2). To reflect the above stated intention, the Draft Resolution would need to be redrafted.

Finally, the text of the Draft Resolution exhibits, unfortunately, a certain disregard for existing network architecture and efficiency within the Internet, and to the principles of a free, open and inter-operable and unified Internet, when it seeks to develop a network architecture that facilitates (domestic) localization of traffic-routing, address resolution and allocation of naming, numbering and addressing. An argument may, of course, be made in favour of efficiency and costs, including reduced latency. But it is clear that this has the potential to increase domestic surveillance capabilities and government censorship of content. In any case, traffic localization (if not local address resolution) can be achieved without ITU coordination: through Internet Exchange Points, and through more efficient and better-negotiated peering and transit arrangements (pages 14-17). Internationally coordinated rules for localized traffic routing is not necessary; you just need to have a more efficient Internet Exchange Point. How to get more ISPs to interconnect through India’s National Internet Exchange (NIXI) is one of the very questions that India’s Telecom Regulatory Authority has taken up in its recent consultation on expanding broadband access (page 49). So it is possible that India's concerns could be addressed without ITU involvement, though I am unsure of its impact on the global Internet.

The Draft Resolution will be discussed at the ITU Plenipot today. The discussion will allow India and sympathetic countries to raise several of their concerns relating to the present system of Internet governance, and the direction of its progress. I will report on these discussions upon their completion.

A Note on Limitations:

The aim of this post is to clarify. I would caution against its being the last word on anything, much less India’s positions on Internet governance. An issue as important as this needs far greater access to and confirmation from India’s government – and a more in-depth understanding of the politics – than I do, at the moment.

At the same time, India has not been a model for civil society engagement, as illustratively, the Narmada Bachao Andolan and/or P. Sainath’s evaluation of government policies in Everybody Loves a Good Drought reveal. It has been harder to effectively engage with India’s government than in many states in North America, Latin America and Europe. But I believe the complex dynamics of that is not unique to India. The NSA and GCHQ revelations (as an example of governmental trust deficit of unmatched proportions) have shown that where governments want to keep everyone out and oblivious, they do it well.

I am not in favour of a purely multilateral approach to Internet governance. But at the same time, I share concerns over definition and the evolution of processes as well, as I am sure others in civil society also do. Particularly on the issue of Internet governance and multi-stakeholderism, evidence reveals inconsistency among India’s various ministries. Until this is addressed by our government (hopefully in consultation with all concerned stakeholders), an open mind would probably be the best thing we - including states - could keep.

Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Sunil Abraham, Pranesh Prakash, Rishabh Dara, Arun Sukumar, Anja Kovacs and Parminder Jeet Singh for the freedom to bounce ideas, feedback and the many discussions about multi-stakeholder approaches and Internet governance. I also wish to acknowledge Samir Saran’s article in CFR, which offers an interesting perspective on India’s Draft Resolution.

[1] For this post, I will use ‘multi-stakeholder approaches’ as an umbrella term, but would urge readers to keep in mind the many uncertainties and disagreements about defining multi-stakeholderism for Internet governance. These disagreements exist among and within all stakeholders, including government and civil society. In addition to various iterations of the ‘equal footing model’, the model proposed in §35 of the Tunis Agenda is also multi-stakeholder, albeit in a different – and for many in civil society, less desirable – sense.

[2] For those unacquainted with WCIT, see Mueller, ITU Phobia: Why WCIT was derailed, Internet Governance Blog (18 December 2012), http://www.internetgovernance.org/2012/12/18/itu-phobia-why-wcit-was-derailed/; Kleinwächter, WCIT and Internet governance: Harmless resolution or Trojan horse?, CircleID Blog (17 December 2012), http://www.circleid.com/posts/20121217_wcit_and_internet_governance_harmless_resolution_or_trojan_horse/.

[3] For a commentary, see Mueller, A United Nations Committee for Internet-related Policies? A Fair Assessment, Internet Governance Blog (29 October 2011), http://www.internetgovernance.org/2011/10/29/a-united-nations-committee-for-internet-related-policies-a-fair-assessment/.

[4] Contreras, Divergent Patterns of Engagement in Internet Standardization: Japan, Korea and China. I am unable to find this paper online. Please email me for information.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-recalcitrant-text-2013-ii-what-india2019s-itu-proposal-may-mean-for-internet-governance

Good Intentions, Recalcitrant Text - I: Why India’s Proposal at the ITU is Troubling for Internet Freedoms

geetha — 2014-11-02T15:13:45Z

At the 2014 Plenipotentiary Conference (‘PP-14’ or ‘Plenipot’) of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), India has tabled a draft proposal on “ITU’s Role in Realising Secure Information Society” [Document 98, dated 20 October 2014] (“Draft Resolution”). India’s proposal has incited a great deal of concern and discussion among Plenipot attendees, governments and civil society alike. Before offering my concerns and comments on the Draft Resolution, let us understand the proposal.

Our Draft Resolution identifies 3 security concerns with exchange of information and resource allocation on the Internet:

First, it is troubling for India that present network architecture has “security weaknesses” such as “camouflaging the identity of the originator of the communication”;[1] random IP address distribution also makes “tracing of communication difficult”;[2]
Second, India is concerned that under the present allocation system of naming, numbering and addressing resources on the Internet, it is impossible or at the very least, cumbersome to identify the countries to which IP address are allocated;[3]
Third, India finds it insecure from the point of view of national security that traffic originating and terminating in the same country (domestic traffic) often routes through networks overseas;[4] similarly, local address resolution also routes through IP addresses outside the country or region, which India finds troubling.[5]

In an effort to address these concerns, the Draft Resolution seeks to instruct the ITU Secretary General:

First, to develop and recommend a ‘traffic routing plan’ that can “effectively ensure the traceability of communication”;[6]
Second, to collaborate with relevant international and intergovernmental organisations to develop an “IP address plan” which facilitates identification of locations/countries to which IP addresses are allocated and coordinates allocation accordingly;[7]
Third, to develop and recommend “a public telecom network architecture” that localizes both routing[8] as well as address resolution[9] for local/domestic traffic to “within the country”.

Admittedly, our Draft Resolution is intended to pave a way for “systematic, fair and equitable allocation” of, inter alia, naming, numbering and addressing resources,[10] keeping in mind security and human rights concerns.[11] In an informal conversation, members of the Indian delegation echoed these sentiments. Our resolution does not, I was told, raise issues about the “concentration of control over Internet resources”, though “certain governments” have historically exercised more control. It also does not, he clarified, wish to make privacy or human rights a matter for discussion at the ITU. All that the Draft Resolution seeks to do is to equip the ITU with the mandate to prepare and recommend a “roadmap for the systematization” of allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources, and for local routing of domestic traffic and address resolution. The framework for such mandate is that of security, given the ITU’s role in ‘building confidence and security in the use of ICTs’ under Action Line C5 of the Geneva Plan of Action, 2003.

Unfortunately, the text of our Draft Resolution, by dint of imprecision or lack of clarity, undermines India’s intentions. On three issues of utmost importance to the Internet, the Draft Resolution has unintended or unanticipated impacts. First, its text on tracing communication and identity of originators, and systematic allocation of identifiable IP address blocks to particular countries, has impacts on privacy and freedom of expression. Given Edward Snowden’s NSA files and the absence of adequate protections against government incursions or excesses into privacy,[12] either in international human rights law or domestic law, such text is troublesome. Second, it has the potential to undermine multi-stakeholder approaches to Internet governance by proposing text that refers almost exclusively to sovereign monopolies over Internet resource allocation, and finally, displays a certain disregard for network architecture and efficiency, and to principles of a free, open and unified Internet, when it seeks to develop global architecture that facilitates (domestic) localization of traffic-routing, address resolution and allocation of naming, numbering and addressing.

In this post, I will address the first concern of human rights implications of our Draft Resolution.

Unintended Implications for Privacy and Freedom of Expression:

India’s Draft Resolution has implications for individual privacy. At two different parts of the preamble, India expresses concerns with the impossibility of locating the user at the end of an IP address:

Pream. §(e): “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”;
Pream. §(h): “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.

The concerns here surround difficulties in tracking IP addresses due to the widespread use of NATs, as also the existence of IP anonymisers like Tor. Anonymisers like Tor permit individuals to cover their online tracks; they conceal user location and Internet activity from persons or governments conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis. For this reason, Tor has caused much discomfort to governments. Snowden used Tor while communicating with Laura Poitras. Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning of Wikileaks fame is reported to have used Tor (page 24). Crypto is increasingly the safest – perhaps the only safe – avenue for political dissidents across the world; even Internet companies were coerced into governmental compliance. No wonder, then, that governments are doing all they can to dismantle IP anonymisers: the NSA and GCHQ have tried to break Tor; the Russian government has offered a reward to anyone who can.

Far be it from me to defend Tor blindly. There are reports suggesting that Tor is being used by offenders, and not merely those of the Snowden variety. But governments must recognize the very obvious trust deficit they face, especially after Snowden’s revelations, and consider the implications of seeking traceability and identity/geolocation for every IP address, in a systematic manner. The implications are for privacy, a right guaranteed by Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Privacy has been recognized by the UN General Assembly as applicable in cases of surveillance, interception and data collection, in Pream. §4 of its resolution The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. But many states do not have robust privacy protections for individuals and data. And while governments may state the necessity to create international policy to further effective criminal investigations, such an aim cannot be used to nullify or destroy the rights of privacy and free speech guaranteed to individuals. Article 5(1), ICCPR, codifies this principle, when it states that States, groups or persons may not “engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein…”.

Erosion of privacy has a chilling effect on free speech [New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254], so free speech suffers too. Particularly with regard to Tor and identification of IP address location and users, anonymity in Internet communications is at issue. At the moment, most states already have anonymity-restrictions, in the form of identification and registration for cybercafés, SIM cards and broadband connections. For instance, Rule 4 of India’s Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011, mandates that we cannot not use computers in a cybercafé without establishing our identities. But our ITU Draft Resolution seeks to dismantle the ability of Internet users to operate anonymously, be they political dissidents, criminals or those merely acting on their expectations of privacy. Such dismantling would be both violative of international human rights law, as well as dangerous for freedom of expression and privacy in principle. Anonymity is integral to democratic discourse, held the US Supreme Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission [514 U.S. 334 (1995)].[13] Restrictions on Internet anonymity facilitate communications surveillance and have a chilling effect on the free expression of opinions and ideas, wrote Mr. Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (¶¶ 48-49).

So a law or international policy for blanket identification and traceability of IP addresses has grave consequences for and prima facie violates privacy, anonymity and freedom of speech. But these rights are not absolute, and can be validly restricted. And because these human rights are implicated, the ITU with its lack of expertise in the area may not be the adequate forum for discussion or study.

To be valid and justified interference, any law, policy or order interfering with privacy and free speech must meet the standards of reasonableness and proportionality, even if national security were the government’s legitimate aim, laid down in Articles 19(3) and 17 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) [Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), ¶6.4]. And as the European Court of Human Rights found in Weber & Saravia v. Germany [Application no. 54934/00, 29 June 2006 (ECHR), ¶95], law or executive procedure that enables surveillance without sufficient safeguards is prima facie unreasonable and disproportionate. Re: anonymity, in Delfi AS v. Estonia [Application no. 64569/09, 17 February 2014, ¶83], while considering the liability of an Internet portal for offensive anonymous comments, the ECHR has emphasized the importance of balancing freedom of expression and privacy. It relied on certain principles such as “contribution to a debate of general interest, subject of the report, the content, form and consequences of the publication” to test the validity of government’s restrictions.

The implications of the suggested text of India’s Draft Resolution should then be carefully thought out. And this is a good thing. For one must wonder why governments need perfect traceability, geolocation and user identification for all IP addresses. Is such a demand really different from mass or blanket surveillance, in scale and government tracking ability? Would this not tilt the balance of power strongly in favour of governments against individuals (citizens or non-citizens)? This fear must especially arise in the absence of domestic legal protections, both in human rights, and criminal law and procedure. For instance, India’s Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in 2008) has Section 66A, which criminalizes offensive speech, as well as speech that causes annoyance or inconvenience. Arguably, arrests under Section 66A have been arbitrary, and traceability may give rise to a host of new worries.

In any event, IP addresses and users can be discerned under existing domestic law frameworks. Regional Internet Registries (RIR) such as APNIC allocate blocks of IP addresses to either National Internet Registries (NIR – such as IRINN for India) or to ISPs directly. The ISPs then allocate IP addresses dynamically to users like you and me. Identifying information for these ISPs is maintained in the form of WHOIS records and registries with RIRs or NIRs, and this information is public. ISPs of most countries require identifying information from users before Internet connection is given, i.e., IP addresses allocated (mostly by dynamic allocation, for that is more efficient). ISPs of some states are also regulated; in India, for instance, ISPs require a licence to operate and offer services.

If any government wished, on the basis of some reasonable cause, to identify a particular IP address or its user, then the government could first utilize WHOIS to obtain information about the ISP. Then ISPs may be ordered to release specific IP address locations and user information under executive or judicial order. There are also technical solutions, such as traceroute or IP look-up that assist in tracing or identifying IP addresses. Coders, governments and law enforcement must surely be aware of better technology than I.

If we take into account this possibility of geolocation of IP addresses, then the Draft Resolution’s motivation to ‘systematize’ IP address allocations on the basis of states is unclear. I will discuss the implication of this proposal, and that of traffic and address localization, in my next post.

[1] Pream. §(e), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”.

[2] Pream. §(h), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.

[3] Op. §1, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to collaborate with all stakeholders including International and intergovernmental organizations, involved in IP addresses management to develop an IP address plan from which IP addresses of different countries are easily discernible and coordinate to ensure distribution of IP addresses accordingly”.

[4] Pream. §(g), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that communication traffic originating and terminating in a country also many times flows outside the boundary of a country making such communication costly and to some extent insecure from national security point of view”.

[5] Pream. §(f), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that even for local address resolution at times, system has to use resources outside the country which makes such address resolution costly and to some extent insecure from national security perspective”.

[6] Op. §6, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend a routing plan of traffic for optimizing the network resources that could effectively ensure the traceability of communication”.

[7] Op. §1, Draft Resolution; see note 3.

[8] Op. §5, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures that effectively the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country remains within the country”.

[9] Op. §4, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures effectively that address resolution for the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country/region takes place within the country”.

[10] Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶3: “Planning and distribution of numbering and naming resources in a systematic, equitable, fair and just manner amongst the Member States…”

[11] Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶2: “…there are certain areas that require critical attention to move in the direction of building the necessary “Trust Framework” for the safe “Information Society”, where privacy, safety are ensured”.

[12] See, for instance, Report of the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014), ¶34-35, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf. See esp. note 30 of the Report, ¶35.

[13] Many thorny political differences exist between the US and many states (including India and Kenya, who I am told has expressed preliminary support for the Draft Resolution) with regard to Internet governance. Irrespective of this, the US Constitution’s First Amendment and judicial protections to freedom of expression remain a yardstick for many states, including India. India, for instance, has positively referred to the US Supreme Court’s free speech protections in many of its decisions; ex. see Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 Cri. L.J. 329; R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-going-awry-i-why-india2019s-proposal-at-the-itu-is-troubling-for-internet-freedoms

Five Frequently Asked Questions about the Amended ITRs

chinmayi — 2013-01-30T05:36:26Z

This piece discusses the five major questions that have been the subject of debate after the World Conference on International Telecommunications 2012 (WCIT). The politics surrounding the WCIT are not discussed here but it must be kept in mind that they have played a significant role in the outcome of the conference and in some of the debates about it.

Each question is discussed with reference to the text of the treaty, to the minutes of the plenary sessions (which are available via the ITU website), a little international law and a few references to other people’s comments on the treaty.

1. Do the ITRs apply to content on the internet?

Article 1.1 (a) has been amended to add the sentence “These Regulations do not address the content-related aspects of telecommunications”. Although some discussions about the International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) and content have ignored this altogether, others seem concerned about its interpretation.

The ITU Secretary General has issued a statement in which he has clarified that “The new ITR treaty does NOT cover content issues and explicitly states in the first article that content-related issues are not covered by the treaty”.

Commentators like Chuan-Zheng Lee however, continue to view the treaty with suspicion, on the basis that it is necessary to examine content in order to tell whether it is spam (Lee and Chaparro differ on this question). However, others like Eric Pfanner have pointed to this paragraph in their skepticism about the US refusal to sign.

Some highlights from the plenary session discussions

The Chairman proposed the addition to Article 1.1(a) at the tenth plenary session. He did this to address concerns that the ITRs text could be interpreted to apply to content on the Internet. The original formulation that he proposed was ‘These regulations do not address and cannot be interpreted as addressing content’. This text was suggested in the middle of an extended discussion on Article 5A.

Many countries were skeptical of this insertion. Sudan argued that content could not be avoided in telecommunication networks “because it will always be in transit.” The United Arab Emirates seemed concerned about international interference in states’ existing regulation of content, and said “maybe we could actually say this in the minutes of the meeting that this regulation should not be interpreted as on alteration to Member States content regulation”.

Concerns about what the term ‘content’ means and whether it would apply broadly were raised by more than one country, including Saudi Arabia. For instance, it was argued that the text proposed by the Chairman might interfere with parts of the treaty that require operators to send tariff information correspondence. More than one country that felt that the insertion of this text would impact several parts of the treaty, and that it would be difficult to determine what amounted to dealing with content. The primary issue appeared to be that the term ‘content’ was not defined, and it therefore remained unclear what was being excluded. In response to these concerns, the Chairman withdrew his proposal for the amendment excluding content.

However, several states then spoke up in favour of the Chairman’s proposal, suggesting that the proposed amendment to Article 1.1 influenced their acceptance of Article 5A (on security and robustness of networks – discussed in detail below). Brazil suggested that an answer to the definitional concerns may be found in the work by Study Group 17, which had a definition available.

Following this, the next day, at the twelfth plenary, the Chairman brought back the Article 1.1 amendment excluding content. He stated explicitly that this amendment might be the way to get Articles 5A and 5B approved. The text he read out was insertion of the words “to the exclusion of their content”, after ‘’services’ at the end of 1.1A. Interestingly however, the term ‘content’ was never defined.

At the next plenary session, Iran raised the objection that this phrase was overbroad, and proposed the following formulation instead: “These Regulations do not address the content-related aspects of telecommunications”. This formulation found its way into the amended ITRs as the treaty stands today.

2. Does Article 5A on network security legitimize surveillance of Internet content?

Article 5A deals with ‘security and robustness of networks’ and requires member states to “individually and collectively endeavour to ensure the security and robustness of international telecommunication networks...”. This may have given rise to concerns about interpretations that may extend the security of networks to malware or viruses, and therefore to content on the Internet. However, Article 5A has to be read with Article 1.1(a), and therefore must be interpreted such that it does not ‘address the content-related aspects of telecommunications’.

Some commentators continue to see Article 5A as problematic. Avri Doria has argued that the use of the word ‘security’ in addition to ‘robustness’ of telecommunication infrastructure suggests that it means Internet security. However Emma Llansó of the Centre for Democracy and Technology has noted that the language used in this paragraph is “ far too vague to be interpreted as a requirement or even a recommendation that countries surveil users on their networks in order to maintain security”. Llansó has suggested that civil society advocates make it clear to countries which attempt to use this article to justify surveillance, that it does not lend itself to such practices.

Some highlights from the plenary session discussions

Article 5A was one of the most controversial parts of the ITRs and was the subject of much debate.

On December 11^th, in the Chairman’s draft that was being discussed, Article 5A was titled ‘security of networks’, and required members to endeavour to ensure the “security and robustness of international telecommunication networks”. The Chairman announced that this was the language that came out of Committee 5’s deliberations, and that ‘robustness’ was inserted at the suggestion of CEPT.

Several countries like Poland, Australia, Germany and the United States of America were keen on explicitly stating that Article 5A was confined to the physical or technical infrastructure, and either wanted a clarification that to this effect or use of the term ‘robustness’ instead of security. Many other countries, such as Russia and China, were strongly opposed to this suggestion and insisted that the term security must remain in the document (India was one of the countries that preferred to have the document use the term ‘security’).

It was in the course of this disagreement, during the tenth plenary session, that the Chairman suggested his global solution for Article 1.1 – a clarification that this would not apply to content. This solution was contested by several countries, withdrawn and then reinstated (in the eleventh plenary) after many countries explained that their assent to Article 5A was dependant on the existence of the Article 1 clarification about content (see above for details).

There was also some debate about whether Article 5A should use the term ‘robustness’ or the term ‘security’ (eg. The United States clarified that its preference was for the use of ‘resilience and robustness’ rather than security). The Secretary General referred to this disagreement, and said that he was therefore using both terms in the draft. The title of Article 5A was changed, in the eleventh plenary, to use both terms, instead of only referring to security.

3. Does Article 5B apply to spam content on the Internet?

The text of the amended treaty talks of ‘unsolicited bulk electronic communications’ and does not use the term ‘spam’[Article 5B says that ‘Members should endeavour to take necessary measures to prevent the propagation of unsolicited bulk electronic communications and minimize its impact on international telecommunication services’].If this phrase is read in isolation, it may certainly be interpreted as being applicable to spam. Commentators like Avri Doria have pointed to sources like Resolution 130 of the Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union (Guadalajara, 2010) to demonstrate that ‘unsolicited bulk electronic communications’ ordinarily means spam. However, others like Enrique A. Chaparro argue that it cannot possibly extend to content on the Internet given the language used in Article 1.1(a). Chapparo has explained, that given the exclusion of content, Article 5B it authorizes anti-spam mechanisms that do not work on content.

Article 5B, which discusses ‘unsolicited bulk electronic communications’, must be read with Article 1, which is the section on purpose and scope of the ITRS. Article 1.1 (a) specifies that the ITRs “do not address the content-related aspects of telecommunications”. Therefore it may be argued that ‘unsolicited bulk electronic communications’ cannot be read as being applicable to content on the Internet.

However, many continue to be concerned about Article 5B’s applicability to spam on the Internet. Although some of them that their fear is that some states may interpret Article 5B as applying to content, despite the contents of Article 1.1(a), many have failed to engage with the issue in the context of Article 1.1(a).

Some highlights from the plenary session discussions

Article 5B is inextricably linked with the amendment to Article 1.1. Mexico asked specifically about what the proposed amendment to Article 1.1 would mean for Article 5B: “I’m referring to the item which we’ll deal with later, namely unsolicited bulk electronic communications. Could that be referred to as content, perhaps?”. The Chairman responded saying, “This is exactly will solve the second Article 5B, that we are not dealing with content here. We are dealing with measures to prevent propagation of unsolicited bulk electronic messages”.

The amendment to Article 1.1 was withdrawn soon after it was introduced. Before it was reintroduced, Sweden said (at the eleventh plenary) that it could not see how Article 5B could apply without looking into the content of messages. The United States agreed with this and went on state that the issue of spam was being addressed at the WTSA level, as well as by other organisations. It argued that the spam issue was better addressed at the technical level than by introducing it in treaty text.

The amendment excluding content was reintroduced during the twelfth plenary. The Chairman explicitly stated that it might be the way to get Articles 5A and 5B approved.

The word ‘spam’ was dropped from the ITRs in the eight plenary, and “unsolicited bulk electronic communications” was used instead. However, in the eleventh plenary, as they listed their reasons for not signing the newly-amended ITRs, Canada and the United States of America referred to ‘spam’ which suggests that they may have viewed the change as purely semantic.

4. Does the resolution on Internet Governance indicate that the ITU plans to take over the Internet?

Much controversy has arisen over the plenary resolution ‘to foster an enabling environment for the greater growth of the Internet’. This controversy has arisen partly thanks to the manner in which it was decided to include the resolution, and partly over the text of the resolution. The discussion here focuses on the text of the resolution and then describes the proceedings that have been (correctly) criticized.

The history of this resolution, as Wolfgang Kleinwächter has explained, is that it was part of a compromise to appease the countries which were taking positions on the ITU’s role in Internet governance, that were similar to the controversial Russian proposal. The controversial suggestions about Internet governance were excluded from the actual treaty and included instead in a non-binding resolution.

The text of the resolution instructs the Secretary General to “to continue to take the necessary steps for ITU to play an active and constructive role in the development of broadband and the multi-stakeholder model of the Internet as expressed in § 35 of the Tunis Agenda”. This paragraph is particularly controversial since of paragraph 35 of the Tunis Agenda says “Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States. They have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues.” Kleinwächter has pointed out that this selection leaves out later additions that have taken place with progression towards a multi-stakeholder model.

The resolution also resolves to invite member states to “to elaborate on their respective positions on international Internet-related technical, development and public-policy issues within the mandate of ITU at various ITU forums including, inter alia, the World Telecommunication/ICT Policy Forum, the Broadband Commission for Digital Development and ITU study groups”.

A little after its introduction, people began expressing concerns such as the Secretary General may treat the resolution as binding, While the language may raise cause for concern, it is important to note that resolutions of this nature are not binding and countries are free to opt out of them. Opinions vary about the intentions that have driven the inclusion of this resolution, and what it may mean for the future. However commentators like Milton Mueller have scoffed at these concerns, pointing out that the resolution is harmless and may have been a clever political maneuver to resolve the basic conflict haunting the WCIT, and that mere discussion of the Internet in the ITU harms no one.

Some highlights from the plenary session discussions

Egypt and Bulgaria suggested that the resolution refer to paragraph 55 of the Tunis agenda instead of paragraph 35, by inserted the following text “”Recognizing that the existing arrangements for Internet Governance have worked effectively to make the Internet the highly robust, dynamic and geographically diverse medium it is today, with the private sector taking the lead in day-to-day operations and with innovation and value creation at the edges.” The US was also quite insistent on this language (although it did also argue that this was the wrong forum to discuss these issues).

The Chairman was willing to include paragraph 55 in addition to paragraph 35 but Saudi Arabia objected to this inclusion. Finland suggested that the resolution should be removed since it was not supported by all the countries present and was therefore against the spirit of consensus. The Secretary General defended the resolution, suggesting both that it was harmless and that since it was a key component of the compromise, eliminating it would threaten the compromise. South Africa and Nigeria supported this stand.

It was during this debate that the procedural controversy arose. Late into the night, the Chairman said there was a long list of countries that wished to speak and said “I just wanted to have the feel of the room on who will accept the draft resolution”. He proceeded to have countries indicate whether they would accept the draft resolution or not, and then announced that the majority of the countries in the room were in favour of retaining the resolution. The resolution was then retained. Upon Spain’s raising the question, the Chairman clarified that this was not a vote. The next day, other countries raised the same question and the Chairman, while agreeing that the resolution was adopted on the basis of the ‘taking of temperature’ insisted that it was not a vote so much as an effort to see what majority of the countries wanted.

5. Does the human rights language used in the preamble, especially the part about states’ access to the Internet, threaten the Internet in any way?

The preamble says “Member States affirm their commitment to implement these Regulations in a manner that respects and upholds their human rights obligations”, and “These Regulations recognize the right of access of Member States to international telecommunication services”. The text of the preamble can be used as an interpretation aid since it is recognized as providing context to, and detailing the object and purpose of, a treaty. However if the meaning resulting from this appears to be ambiguous, obscure, absurd or unreasonable, then supplementary means such as the preparatory work for the treaty and the circumstances for its conclusion may also be taken into account.

Therefore anyone who is concerned about the impact of the text inserted in the preamble must (a) identify text within the main treaty that could be interpreted in an undesirable manner using the text in the preamble; and (b) consider preparatory work for the treaty and see whether it supports this worrying interpretation. For example, if there were concerns about countries choosing to interpret the term ‘human rights’ as subordinating political rights to economic rights, it would be important to take note of the Secretary General’s emphasis on the UDHR being applicable to all member states.

Initially, only the first insertion about ‘human rights obligations’ was part of the draft treaty. The second insertion, recognizing states’ rights followed after the discussion about human rights language. Some states argued that it was inconsistent to place human rights obligations on states towards their citizens, but to leave out their cross-border obligations. It was immediately after this text was voted into the draft, that the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries refused to sign the ITRs. This particular insertion is phrased as a right of states rather than that of individuals or citizens, which does not align with the language of international human rights. While it may not be strictly accurate to say that human rights have traditionally been individual centric (since collective rights are also recognized in certain contexts), it is certainly very unusual to treat the rights of states or governments as human rights.

Some highlights from the plenary session discussions

The United States of America and the Netherlands wanted to include language to state explicitly that states’ international human rights obligations are not altered in anyway. This was to clarify that the inclusion of human rights language was not setting the ITU up as a forum in which human rights obligations are debated. Malaysia objected to the use of human rights language in the preamble right at the outset, on the grounds that the ITRs are the wrong place for this, and that the right place is the ITU Constitution. It even pointed to the fact that jurisprudence is ever-evolving, to suggest that the meaning of human rights obligations might change over time. These were the two major perspectives offered towards the beginning of the discussion.

The Chairman underlined the fact that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is already applicable to all UN countries. He argued that reflection of these principles in the ITRs would help build universal public faith in the conference.

The first traces of the states’ access rights can be seen in Cuba’s intervention at the ninth plenary – Cuba argued that limiting states’ access to public information networks amounted to infringement of human rights. At the fourteenth plenary, Nigeria proposed on behalf of the African group that the following text be added to the preamble “And recognize the right of access of all Member States to international telecommunication networks and services." Countries like China which had been ambivalent about the human rights language in the preamble, were happy with this move away from an individual-centric understanding of human rights, to one that sees states as representative of people.

The United States was express in its dissent, and said “human rights obligations go to the individual”. Sweden was also not happy with the proposal and argued that it moved away from well-established human rights language that affirmed existing commitments to drafting new human rights language.

It was an amended version of the African group proposal that finally found its way into the preamble. It was supported by many countries such as China, Nigeria and Sudan, who took the position that group rights are included within human rights, and that governments represent their citizens and therefore have rights on their behalf. This position was strenuously disputed by states like the USA, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Canada.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/five-faqs-on-amended-itrs

An Interview on Internet Governance with Professor Milton Mueller and Jeremy Malcolm

anirudh — 2013-11-12T10:14:58Z

Anirudh Sridhar interviewed Professor Milton Mueller from the Syracuse University School of Information and Jeremy Malcolm, an Information Technology and Intellectual Property Lawyer, regarding current issues and debates surrounding internet governance.

Q1: The extent to which civil society can participate at the proceedings of WCIT’12?

Professor Mueller: I did not attend WCIT-12. Civil society and industry were both influential in the process. CS created a great deal of critical publicity and leaked documents that had formerly been private. Industry and CS both lobbied governmental officials. (I was the first to leak an official ITU document, and this led to the creation of WCIT leaks by some friends of mine who took the idea much farther.)

Professor Malcolm: Actually I did not attend the WCIT’12 in Dubai. I did attend the WTPF in May, but was not permitted to speak. I did distribute a briefing paper by hand and managed to speak to a few delegates. I also contributed some talking points to an intervention by the representatives of the Informal Experts Group (IEG). Undoubtedly the work of the IEG was influential, and the civil society representatives were influential within that group, but the role of the IEG was poorly articulated and its procedures and relationship to the plenary WTPF were quite arbitrary.

Since then, the organization that I represent, Consumers International, has been granted sector membership status of the ITU-T and ITU-D with a waiver of fees, so that next time we will have the opportunity to speak at any meeting that is open to sector members. This is all well and good for us, less so for civil society organisations that do not have expertise in telecommunications and hence would find it more difficult to apply for sector membership.

Q2: What were the central debates at the WCIT’12 conference?

Professor Mueller: The central debates were: 1) the relevance of International Telecom Regulations to Internet governance, 2) the ETNO proposal to have quality of service charging 3) role of the ITRs in "security" 4) to which entity do the ITRs apply (Operating entities, recognized operating entities, etc.)

Professor Malcolm: Proposals that ITU Recommendations should have mandatory status; that it should expand its mandate to include ICTs as well as telecommunications; that it should take over Internet naming and numbering functions from ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers); and that Internet content hosts should share more of their revenue with the operators of telecommunications networks.

Q3: What were some good outcomes and what were some bad outcomes?

Professor Malcolm: None of these proposals succeeded, and not all even officially made it to the table. With the sustained opposition of the United States, Google and other powerful stakeholders, there was never any likelihood that they would.

What did make it through into the final treaty text are two provisions that, given that they are notionally responsible for the refusal of many countries to sign the ITRs, bear that responsibility like a dwarf wears a baggy suit. First, on security – it's worth setting this out in full:

Member States shall individually and collectively endeavor to ensure the security and robustness of international telecommunication networks in order to achieve effective use thereof and avoidance of technical harm thereto, as well as the harmonious development of international telecommunication services offered to the public.

And on spam:

Member States should endeavor to take necessary measures to prevent the propagation of unsolicited bulk electronic communications and minimize its impact on international telecommunication services. Member States are encouraged to cooperate in that sense.

The theory, though it taxes the imagination somewhat, is that these provisions could allow ITU members to justify constraints on Internet content, on the pretext that they are merely addressing security or spam. But the ITU already has work programs on security and spam, and ITU members in turn already heavily regulate these fields, without having an explicit mandate in the ITRs.

Q4: Is the fear of the ITU’s takeover of the internet real?

Professor Mueller:

There is no sudden UN or ITU effort to take over the Internet. There is, instead, a longstanding struggle between the Net and states at the national and international level. The WCIT is just the latest episode; and compared to WSIS, a minor one.

There is no evidence of any recent enlargement of the political support for states and inter-governmental institutions such as ITU. The same players are taking the same positions. There may even be erosion of support for inter-governmentalism, e.g. Brazil’s abandonment of CIRP.

The ITU is a paper tiger. Neither WSIS nor any other international development has strengthened or approved ITU efforts to gain control of pieces of the Internet since 1996.

Professor Malcolm: No: IN THE wake of the anti-climactic conclusion to the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) earlier this month, readers could be forgiven for being confused about whether all the hype about the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) staging a UN takeover of the Internet had ever represented a real threat, or had just been a beat-up by special interest groups with an agenda to push.

Q5: Does the US, through ICANN exert too much unilateral influence on Internet Governance?

Professor Mueller: Off course. There are many examples of this. For example, the adoption worldwide of policies based on the DMCA and the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, the seizure of domains registered to US-based registrars even if they are foreign-owned and do not infringe foreign law, and the linking of tough IP laws to trade concessions.

Professor Malcolm: Yes, the US exerts too much influence over ICANN, via the GAC and the IANA contract. WCIT (or more accurately, the ITU) is NOT the right track to solve this, because keeping the internet away from the ITU is one of the primary reasons the US exerts unilateral control. Any attempt to solve the problem via the ITU will fail.

Q6: Are there any serious alternatives to ICANN?

Professor Mueller: It is inconceivable that IGF will ever evolve into a body that negotiates binding treaties. Its entire mission and purpose is to be an alternative to that. It is also an extremely weak and poorly funded institution.

Professor Malcolm: There are no longer any alternatives to ICANN that anyone seriously thinks are better. The only argument that people are making nowadays is that oversight of ICANN should become multilateral. Nobody (no longer even the ITU) is seriously suggesting that any other body than ICANN should be making these decisions. At most, the GAC wants more say, but even the GAC is still part of ICANN.

Q7: Can we have a multi-stakeholder process that is truly democratic with legal force?

Professor Mueller: To reconcile legally binding authority with MS, you would need some dramatic institutional changes at the global level that would create new forms of representation. These new institutional forms would have to find some way to represent all the world's people and organizations, not states. Because states are unlikely to give up this power on their own, some kind of revolutionary action would be required to bring that about, roughly analogous to the democratic revolutions of the late 18th and early 19th century.

Professor Malcolm: In the far future, yes. In the near future no, but we still need to start talking about it, because the future starts from now. Mechanisms of multi-stakeholderism are still not well enough developed that they can substitute for the legitimacy of the nation state. But nation states do not properly overlap with those who are governed by transnational rules about the Internet, so eventually change must come.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/telecom/knowledge-repository-on-internet-access/interview-with-milton-mueller-and-jeremy-malcolm