Centre for Internet and Society

The thrill of saving India from cybercrime

praskrishna — 2016-11-21T02:42:48Z

Geeks seize the chance to help the government, defence forces and banks draw up fences against tech crimes.

The article by Peerzada Abrar was published in the Hindu on November 20, 2016.

Saket Modi loves long flights. The 26-year-old hacker likes to do most of his reasoning while criss-crossing the world. It was on one such flight from the United States to India that the co-founder of cybersecurity start-up Lucideus Tech read about India's largest data security breaches. While surfing the in-flight Internet he came to know that the security of about 3.2 million debit cards had been compromised.

“I was not surprised but I started thinking about how it would have happened. What was the ‘exploit’ used, how long was it there,” said Mr. Modi. Soon after reaching New Delhi, he received multiple requests from several banks and organisations to protect them from the hacking incident, which is just one of the thousands of cybercrimes that the country is facing.

In India, there has been a surge of approximately 350 per cent of cybercrime cases registered under the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000 from the year of 2011 to 2014, according to a joint study by The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India and consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers. The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) has also reported a surge in the number of incidents handled by it, with close to 50,000 security incidents in 2015, noted the Assocham-PwC joint study.

Ethical hackers

Mr. Modi is among a new breed of ethical hackers-turned-entrepreneurs who are betting big on this opportunity. An ethical hacker is a computer expert who hacks into a computer network on the behalf of its owner in order to test or evaluate its security, rather than with malicious or criminal intent.

“You cannot live in a world where you think that you can't be hacked. It doesn’t matter who you are,” said Mr. Modi who cofounded Lucideus four years ago. The company clocked revenues of Rs.4 crore in the last fiscal. This compares with the Rs.2.5 lakh revenues in the first year. The New Delhi-based firm now counts Reserve Bank of India, Ministry of Defence and Standard Chartered among its top clients.

Mr. Modi, who is also a pianist, discovered his skills for hacking into secure computer systems while preparing for his board exams. He hacked into his school computer and stole the chemistry question paper, after realising that he would not be able to clear the test conducted by his school. However, a guilty conscience compelled him to confess to his teacher who permitted him to still take the test. The incident transformed him to use his skills to protect and not misuse them. This year, Lucideus was hired by National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) along with other information security specialists to protect its most ambitious project, the Unified Payment Interface (UPI) platform, from cyber attacks. UPI aims to bring digital banking to 1.2 billion people in the country. Lucideus has a team of 70 people mostly fresh college graduates who do hacking with authorisation.

“The reason behind choosing Lucideus was their young, energetic and knowledgeable team," said Bhavesh Lakhani, chief technology officer of DSP BlackRock, one of the premier asset management companies. Mr. Lakhani said that India is currently the epicentre of financial and technological advancements which make it a probable target of cyber-attacks.

Hacking lifeline

Indeed, a new breed of cyber criminals has emerged, whose main aim is not just financial gains but also cause disruption and chaos to businesses in particular and the nation at large, according to the Assocham-PwC study. Attackers can gain control of vital systems such as nuclear plants, railways, transportation and hospitals. This can subsequently lead to dire consequences such as power failures, water pollution or floods, disruption of transportation systems and loss of life, noted the study.

“The hacker doesn’t care whether he is attacking an Indian or a U.S. company. It is bread and butter for him and he wants to eat it wherever he gets it from,” said Trishneet Arora, a 22-year-old ethical hacker. In an office tucked away in Mohali, a commercial hub lying adjacent to the city of Chandigarh in Punjab, Mr.Arora fights these cyberattacks on a daily basis to protect his clients. His start-up TAC Security provides an emergency service to customers who have been hacked or are anticipating a cyberattack. It alerted a hospital in the U.S. after detecting vulnerabilities in their computer network.

Mr.Arora said that the hackers could have easily shut down the intensive care unit which was connected to it and remotely killed the patients. TAC said the data server of a bank in the UAE containing critical information got hacked recently. The bank also lost access to the server. TAC said that it not only helped the organisation to get back access to the server but also traced the hacker’s identity.

A school drop out, Mr.Arora founded TAC three years ago. But he initially found it tough to convince enterprises about his special skills. “I was a backbencher in the classroom and not good in studies, but I loved playing video games and hacking,” he said. He conducted workshops on hacking and provided his expertise to law enforcement agencies such as the Central Bureau of Investigation and various State police departments. His firm now provides its services to customers such as Reliance Industries, dairy brand Amul and tractor manufacturer Sonalika.

“We were surprised by their expertise,” said R.S. Sodhi, managing director of Amul. “We wanted to be sure that the company’s vital IT infrastructure is in the right hands – the big question was, ‘Who can that be?’ In TAC, we found that team.”

TAC expects to cross revenues of $5 million (Rs.33 crore) and employ about 100 ethical hackers by next year.

Budget woes

Security watchers such as Sunil Abraham, executive director of Bengaluru-based think tank Centre for Internet and Society said that India’s cybersecurity budget is woefully inadequate when compared to the spending by other countries. In 2014-15, the government doubled its cybersecurity budget by earmarking Rs.116 crore. “We require a budget of $1 billion per annum or every two years to build the cybersecurity infrastructure. The current cyber security policy has no such budget,” said Mr. Abraham.

According to Data Security Council of India (DSCI), India's cybersecurity market is expected to grow nine-fold to $35 billion by 2025, from about $4 billion. This would mainly be driven by an ecosystem to promote the growth of indigenous security product and services start-up companies.

The Cyber Security Task Force (CSTF) set up by DSCI and industry body Nasscom expects to create a trained base of one million certified and skilled cybersecurity professionals. It also aims to build more than 100 successful security product companies from India. Investors who normally focus on e-commerce ventures or public markets are now taking note of this opportunity and are betting on such ventures. Amit Choudhary, director, MotilalOswal Private Equity and an investor in Lucideus, said he saw tremendous opportunity in the cybersecurity market as hackers are shifting their focus from developed countries to emerging countries like India.

“There is a huge opportunity. The recent security breaches of a few Indian banks are an example,” said Vijay Kedia an ace stock picker and an investor in TAC Security. He said that organisations are still unaware of the widespread damage that can be caused by hackers. “The next war will be a ‘cyberwar’,” he said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-peerzada-abrar-november-20-2016-the-thrill-of-saving-india-from-cybercrime

The Supreme Court Judgment in Shreya Singhal and What It Does for Intermediary Liability in India?

jyoti — 2015-04-17T23:59:34Z

Even as free speech advocates and users celebrate the Supreme Court of India's landmark judgment striking down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000, news that the Central government has begun work on drafting a new provision to replace the said section of the Act has been trickling in.

The SC judgement in upholding the constitutionality of Section 69A (procedure for blocking websites) and in reading down Section 79 (exemption from liability of intermediaries) of the IT Act, raises crucial questions regarding transparency, accountability and under what circumstances may reasonable restrictions be placed on free speech on the Internet. While discussions and analysis of S. 66A continue, in this post I will focus on the aspect of the judgment related to intermediary liability that could benefit from further clarification from the apex court and in doing so, will briefly touch upon S. 69A and secret blocking.

Conditions qualifying intermediary for exemption and obligations not related to exemption

The intermediary liability regime in India is defined under S. 79 and assosciated rules that were introduced to protect intermediaries for liability from user generated content and ensure the Internet continues to evolve as a “marketplace of ideas”. But as intermediaries may not have sufficient legal competence or resources to deliberate on the legality of an expression, they may end up erring on the side of caution and takedown lawful expression. As a study by Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) in 2012 revealed, the criteria, procedure and safeguards for administration of the takedowns as prescribed by the rules lead to a chilling effect on online free expression.

S. 69A grants powers to the Central Government to “issue directions for blocking of public access to any information through any computer resource”. The 2009 rules allow the blocking of websites by a court order, and sets in place a review committee to review the decision to block websites as also establishes penalties for the intermediary that fails to extend cooperation in this respect.

There are two key aspects of both these provisions that must be noted:

a) S. 79 is an exemption provision that qualifies the intermediary for conditional immunity, as long as they fulfil the conditions of the section. The judgement notes this distinction, adding that “being an exemption provision, it is closely related to provisions which provide for offences including S. 69A.”

b) S. 69A does not contribute to immunity for the intermediary rather places additional obligations on the intermediary and as the judgement notes “intermediary who finally fails to comply with the directions issued who is punishable under sub-section (3) of 69A.” The provision though outside of the conditional immunity liability regime enacted through S. 79 contributes to the restriction of access to, or removing content online by placing liability on intermediaries to block unlawful third party content or information that is being generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted by them. Therefore restriction requests must fall within the contours outlined in Article 19(2) and include principles of natural justice and elements of due process.

Subjective Determination of Knowledge

The provisions for exemption laid down in S. 79 do not apply when they receive “actual knowledge” of illegal content under section 79(3)(b). Prior to the court's verdict actual knowledge could have been interpreted to mean the intermediary is called upon its own judgement under sub-rule (4) to restrict impugned content in order to seek exemption from liability. Removing the need for intermediaries to take on an adjudicatory role and deciding on which content to restrict or takedown, the SC has read down “actual knowledge” to mean that there has to be a court order directing the intermediary to expeditiously remove or disable access to content online. The court also read down “upon obtaining knowledge by itself” and “brought to actual knowledge” under Rule 3(4) in the same manner as 79(3)(b).

Under S.79(3)(b) the intermediary must comply with the orders from the executive in order to qualify for immunity. Further, S. 79 (3)(b) goes beyond the specific categories of restriction identified in Article 19(2) by including the term “unlawful acts” and places the executive in an adjudicatory role of determining the illegality of content. The government cannot emulate private regulation as it is bound by the Constitution and the court addresses this issue by applying the limitation of 19(2) on unlawful acts, “the court order and/or the notification by the appropriate government or its agency must strictly conform to the subject matters aid down in Article 19(2).”

By reading down of S. 79 (3) (b) the court has addressed the issue of intermediaries complying with takedown requests from non-government entities and has made government notifications and court orders to be consistent with reasonable restrictions in Article 19(2). This is an important clarification from the court, because this places limits on the private censorship of intermediaries and the invisible censorship of opaque government takedown requests as they must and should adhere, to the boundaries set by Article 19(2).

Procedural Safeguards

The SC does not touch upon other parts of the rules and in not doing so, has left significant procedural issues open for debate. It is relevant to bear in mind and as established above, S. 69A blocking and restriction requirements for the intermediary are part of their additional obligations and do not qualify them for immunity. The court ruled in favour of upholding S. 69A as constitutional on the basis that blocking orders are issued when the executive has sufficiently established that it is absolutely necessary to do so, and that the necessity is relatable to only some subjects set out in Article 19(2). Further the court notes that reasons for the blocking orders must be recorded in writing so that they may be challenged through writ petitions. The court also goes on to specify that under S. 69A the intermediary and the 'originator' if identified, have the right to be heard before the committee decides to issue the blocking order.

Under S. 79 the intermediary must also comply with government restriction orders and the procedure for notice and takedown is not sufficiently transparent and lacks procedural safeguards that have been included in the notice and takedown procedures under S. 69. For example, there is no requirement for committee to evaluate the necessity of issuing the restriction order, though the ruling does clarify that these restriction notices must be within the confines of Article 19(2). The judgement could have gone further to directing the government to state their entire cause of action and provide reasonable level of proof (prima facie). It should have also addressed issues such as the government using extra-judicial measures to restrict content including collateral pressures to force changes in terms of service, to promote or enforce so-called "voluntary" practices.

Accountability

The judgement could also have delved deeper into issues of accountability such as the need to consider 'udi alteram partem' by providing the owner of the information or the intermediary a hearing prior to issuing the restriction or blocking order nor is an post-facto review or appeal mechanism made available except for the recourse of writ petition. Procedural uncertainty around wrongly restricted content remains, including what limitations should be placed on the length, duration and geographical scope of the restriction. The court also does not address the issue of providing a recourse for the third party provider of information to have the removed information restored or put-back remains unclear. Relatedly, the court also does not clarify the concerns related to frivolous requests by establishing penalties nor is there a codified recourse under the rules presently, for the intermediary to claim damages even if it can be established that the takedown process is being abused.

Transparency

The bench in para 113 in addressing S. 79 notes that the intermediary in addition to publishing rules and regulations, privacy policy and user agreement for access or usage of their service has to also inform users of the due diligence requirements including content restriction policy under rule 3(2). However, the court ought to have noted the differentiation between different categories of intermediaries which may require different terms of use. Rather than stressing a standard terms of use as a procedural safeguard, the court should have insisted on establishing terms of use and content restriction obligations that is proportional to the role of the intermediary and based on the liability accrued in providing the service, including the impact of the restriction by the intermediary both on access and free speech. By placing requirement of disclosure or transparency on the intermediary including what has been restricted under the intermediary's own terms of service, the judgment could have gone a step further than merely informing users of their rights in using the service as it stands presently, to ensuring that users can review and have knowledge of what information has been restricted and why. The judgment also does not touch upon broader issues of intermediary liability such as proactive filtering sought by government and private parties, an important consideration given the recent developments around the right to be forgotten in Europe and around issues of defamation and pornography in India.

The judgment, while a welcome one in the direction of ensuring the Internet remains a democratic space where free speech thrives, could benefit from the application of the recently launched Manila principles developed by CIS and others. The Manila Principles is a framework of baseline safeguards and best practices that should be considered by policymakers and intermediaries when developing, adopting, and reviewing legislation, policies and practices that govern the liability of intermediaries for third-party content.

The court's ruling is truly worth celebrating, in terms of the tone it sets on how we think of free speech and the contours of censorship that exist in the digital space. But the real impact of this judgment lies in the debates and discussions which it will throw open about content removal practices that involve intermediaries making determinations on requests received, or those which only respond to the interests of the party requesting removal. As the Manila Principles highlight a balance between public and private interests can be obtained through a mechanism where power is distributed between the parties involved, and where an impartial, independent, and accountable oversight mechanism exists.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/sc-judgment-in-shreya-singhal-what-it-means-for-intermediary-liability

The real Sibal’s law: Resisting Section 66A is futile

praskrishna — 2012-12-03T05:16:11Z

The Information Technology Act is “substantially the same” as laws instituted in other democracies like UK and the United States. What’s more, the language that is employed in various sections is exactly the same. Thus was the thrust of Kapil Sibal’s defense of Section 66A on NDTV last night.

The article by Lakshmi Chaudhry was published in FirstPost on November 30. Pranesh Prakash's blog post on section 66A which was also carried in Outlook is quoted.

The problem therefore lies not in the law but in its interpretation: “It’s very difficult to interpret the act on the ground. If you give this power to a sub-inspector of police, it is more than likely to be misused.” Sibal is hence “open” to putting in place guidelines that may prevent such abuse, whether it involves requiring a senior police officer to make the call or specifying the “circumstances” in which the law is applicable.

Now, there are many ways to tear apart Sibal’s logic. In Outlook, for example, Centre for Internet and Society’s Pranesh Prakash offers a detailed comparison with the UK law to show that: one, the UK courts have “read down” the “broad wording” of the law; two, they remain subject to EU human rights provisions; and three, UK law may well be unconstitutional under the Indian Constitution which offers stronger free speech protection.

Prakash’s legal arguments are worthy, meticulously argued and — in my view — somewhat moot.

Here’s why. Would discarding or amending Section 66A prevent the MNS goons from hauling Sunil Vishwakarma to the police station for a Facebook update? Would it prevent the Palghar policemen from filing a case against Shaheen and Rinu under pressure from the local Sainiks? Would that Jadhavpur professor then be immune from Trinamool harrassment for offending Mamata?

The answer is a big fat N-O.

Sibal is right. In India, the actual law is often irrelevant. Interpretation is all. And that interpretation in the real world of the police thana is determined not by legal standards but according to political power. So we have wonderfully progressive statutes on the book — as we do in the matter of women’s rights — that exist only in theory. More effective and employed are the draconian, colonial-era laws that are routinely used to punish the innocent. The IT act is just one of them.

In India, law is a weapon, a brahmastra of the powerful. The Sainiks were looking to make an example of someone, to exercise their political brawn. Shaheen and Rinu were convenient targets, and once selected, no law could have saved them from Shiv Sena wrath. The legal threshold for “offensive” content is irrelevant to NCP Kiran Pawaskar who put pressure on the police to arrest two Air India employees because they “shared lewd jokes about politicians, made derogatory comments against the Prime Minister and insulted the national flag in their posts.”

The goonda raj of politicians on the Internet merely reflects the reality offline. All that our online activity does is make the aam aadmi more visible, and therefore easier to target and victimise. They can’t put in spy cameras in every living room, but now they can monitor our conversations on Facebook and Twitter instead. In a sense, the Internet has allowed Big Brother into our homes

This is why comparisons to UK or US — which enjoy the rule of law — are irrelevant. And why upgrading the rank of the policeman — DCP or Inspector-general — making the call will not change the outcome in most cases. The political pressures on a DCP or IG are not different than on a lowly sub-inspector who takes action not because he doesn’t understand the law, but because he understands all too well the costs of non-compliance. As for putting a magistrate in charge, well, it was a magistrate who authorised the arrests of Shaheen and Rinu.

The only reason the policemen who arrested the girls may be punished is that the Congress party is in power in Maharashtra, as in not the Shiv Sena or the BJP. In Kolkata, for example, Mamata-di has no intention of taking action against those who arrested Ambikesh Mahapatra. ‘Raja chale bazaar to kutta bhonke hazaar‘ (the king walks to market, though a thousand dogs bark),” declared Didi when pressed on Justice Katju’s criticism of her anti-free speech stance.

It succinctly embodies the attitude of our leaders. Sibal may be saddened by the Palghar case but he was every bit as unruffled as Mamata when Ravi Srinivasan was arrested for an innocuous tweet accusing Karti Chidambaram of corruption. There are naturally no plans to drop the case against him. So it matters little if the IT act is amended or who is tasked with interpreting Section 66A. Who is punished, who receives justice, however delayed, is determined by politics not law.

In his NDTV interview, Sibal chided Barkha for bringing up “5-10 instances” of unlawful arrests when “there must be millions of [abusive] comments that have been put on the internet.” It’s a familiar Sibal strategy that he has employed in the past. Pressed on Ravi Srinivasan’s arrest, he told reporters, “There are 500 things by the name of Kapil Sibal and there are some things which I really don’t like. But I have not taken action.”

What he’s really saying is that each time we update, tweet or comment, we enter an online version of russian roulette, the kind you play with a gun. You never know which chamber is loaded, or when a politician is likely to pull the trigger. We survive not by the mercy of the law but at the whim of the powerful. In India, law isn’t an ass; it’s our dear netaji’s chaprasi.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/first-post-politics-lakshmi-chaudhry-november-30-2012-the-real-sibals-law-resisting-section-66a-is-futile

The noose tightens on freedom of speech on the Internet

praskrishna — 2015-03-27T01:06:52Z

A WORRYING trend has emerged in the last few years, where intermediaries around the world are being used as chokepoints to restrict freedom of expression online, and to hold users accountable for content.

The blog post by Gabey Goh was published by Digital News Asia on March 26, 2015. Jyoti Panday gave her inputs.

“All communication across the Internet is facilitated by intermediaries: Service providers, social networks, search engines, and more,” said Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) senior global policy analyst Jeremy Malcolm.

“These services are all routinely asked to take down content, and their policies for responding are often muddled, heavy-handed, or inconsistent.

“That results in censorship and the limiting of people’s rights,” he told Digital News Asia (DNA) on the sidelines of RightsCon, an Internet and human rights conference hosted in Manila from March 24-25.

This year, the government of France is moving to implement regulation that makes Internet operators ‘accomplices’ of hate-speech offences if they host extremist messages.

In February, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) urged ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) to ensure that domain name registries and registrars “investigate copyright abuse complaints and respond appropriately.”

Closer to home, the Malaysian Government passed a controversial amendment to the Evidence Act 1950 – Section 114A – back in 2012.

Under Section 114A, an Internet user is deemed the publisher of any online content unless proven otherwise. The new legislation also makes individuals and those who administer, operate or provide spaces for online community forums, blogging and hosting services, liable for content published through their services.

Due to the potential negative impact on freedom of expression, a roadmap called the Manila Principles on Internet Liability was launched during RightsCon.

The EFF, Centre for Internet Society India, Article 19, and other global partners unveiled the principles, whose framework outlines clear, fair requirements for content removal requests and details how to minimise the damage a takedown can do.

For example, if content is restricted because it’s unlawful in one country or region, then the scope of the restriction should be geographically limited as well.

The principles also urge adoption of laws shielding intermediaries from liability for third-party content, which encourages the creation of platforms that allow for online discussion and debate about controversial issues.

“Our goal is to protect everyone’s freedom of expression with a framework of safeguards and best practices for responding to requests for content removal,” said Malcolm.

Jyoti Panday from the Centre for Internet and Society India noted that people ask for expression to be removed from the Internet for various reasons, good and bad, claiming the authority of myriad local and national laws.

“It’s easy for important, lawful content to get caught in the crossfire. We hope these principles empower everyone – from governments and intermediaries, to the public – to fight back when online expression is censored,” she said.

The Manila Principles can be summarised in six key points:

Intermediaries should be shielded by law from liability for third-party content.

Content must not be required to be restricted without an order by a judicial authority.

Requests for restrictions of content must be clear, be unambiguous, and follow due process.

Laws and content restriction orders and practices must comply with the tests of necessity and proportionality.

Laws and content restriction policies and practices must respect due process.

Transparency and accountability must be built in to laws and content restriction policies and practices.

“Right now, different countries have differing levels of protection when it comes to intermediary liability, and we’re saying that there should be expansive protection across all content,” said Malcolm (pic).

“In addition, there is no logic in distinguishing between intellectual property (IP) and other forms of content as in the case in the United States for example, where under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, intermediaries are not liable for third party content but that doesn’t apply to IP,” he added.

The Manila Principles have two main targets: Governments and intermediaries themselves. The coalition, led by EFF, will be approaching governments to present the document and discuss the recommendations on how best to establish an intermediary liability regime.

This includes immunising intermediaries from liability and requiring a court order before any content can be taken down.

With intermediaries, the list includes companies such as Facebook, Twitter and Google, to discuss establishing transparency, responsibility and accountability in any actions taken.

“We recognise that a lot of the time, intermediaries are not waiting for a court order before taking down content, and we’re telling them to avoid removing content unless there is a sufficiently good reason and users have been notified and presented that reason,” said Malcolm.

The overall aim with the Manila Principles is to influence policy changes for the better.

Malcolm pointed out that by coincidence, some encouraging developments have taken place in India. On the same day the principles were released, the Indian Supreme Court struck down the notorious Section 66A of the country’s Information Technology Act.

Since 2009, the law had allowed both criminal charges against users and the removal of content by intermediaries based on vague allegations that the content was “grossly offensive or has menacing character,” or that false information was posted “for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will.”

Calling it a “landmark decision”, Malcolm noted that the case shows why the establishment and promotion of the Manila Principles are important.

“Not only is the potential overreach of this provision obvious on its face, but it was, in practice, misused to quell legitimate discussion online, including in the case of the plaintiffs in that case – two young women, one of whom made an innocuous Facebook post mildly critical of government officials, and the other who ‘liked’ it,” he said.

The court however, upheld section 69A of the Act, which allows the Government to block online content; and Section 79(3), which makes intermediaries such as YouTube or Facebook liable for not complying with government orders for censorship of content.

Gabey Goh reports from RightsCon in Manila at the kind invitation of the South-East Asian Press Alliance or Seapa.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/digital-news-asia-gabey-goh-march-26-2015-noose-tightens-on-freedom-of-speech-on-internet

The Last Word: Is there a need to review Information Technology Act?

praskrishna — 2012-11-21T12:10:15Z

Does the high-handed arrest of two young girls mean it's time to review and revise the IT Act?

Aryaman Sundaram, Pavan Duggal, Pranesh Prakash and Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad took part in a discussion with Karan Thapar on section 66A of the IT Act. This was aired on CNN-IBN on November 20, 2012.

Pranesh Prakash said that it was just not a history of misuse of section 66A of the IT Act because that presumes that the law is otherwise fine and it has just been applied wrongly. This law is fundamentally flawed. It is unconstitutional. It is like a law in which there is a provision on rape, murder, theft, nuisance, everything put together in a single section with the same punishment being given for all of them. This obviously is not good law making but that is exactly what has been done in this case by taking bits from laws in the UK and from elsewhere and mashing them all up into one omnibust gargantuan monster which is unconstitutional.

Pranesh Prakash also added that the fact is that if you have bad laws they will be used to harass people. Having good law is one part of that. Apart from that there has been also other laws which have been misapplied in this case. In all these recent cases, section 66A of the IT Act wasn't the only provision used. This particular section has been used in conjunction with some other laws. So section 66A of the IT Act independently is not required. There are other laws in the Indian Penal Code and elsewhere which are usually enough to cover all the things that section 66A of the IT Act is right now covering. It is just an add on provision that really can't justify its existence unless it is really reduced in scope.

Watch the full video that was aired on CNN-IBN

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/ibnlive-videos-november-20-2012-the-last-word-is-there-a-need-to-review-information-technology-act

The flaw in cyber law

praskrishna — 2012-11-30T09:06:25Z

Legal experts and netizens want the controversial clause in the IT Act to be scrapped after two Mumbai girls were arrested for a post on Facebook.

This article by S Ronendra Singh was published in the Hindu BusinessLine on November 29, 2012. Sunil Abraham and Snehashish Ghosh are quoted.

Shaheen Dhada, 21, and her friend Rini Srinivas would never have imagined that they could land in jail because of a Facebook post. The two girls were arrested in Palghar following a complaint from local Shiv Sena workers against Shaheen's post on Facebook, where she questioned the need for a 'bandh' being observed in Mumbai on the death of the Sena supremo Bal Thackery.

While the two girls’ experience was traumatic, the action by the police has given fodder to activists and cyber experts to raise the clamour for scrapping section 66A of the IT Act, which they term as being draconian.

The Palghar incident is not an isolated event. Recently, Ravi Srinivasan, a 45-year-old supplier of plastic parts to telecom companies and a volunteer with India Against Corruption got into trouble with police after he tweeted about alleged corruption charges against Karti Chidambram, son of Finance Minister P Chidambaram.

There was a common factor in all these cases - arbitrary use of the Section 66 (A) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The only mistake that most of these so-called offenders had committed was publishing their views online.

So, should we consider the law draconian now?

Assess Ambiguity

According to Snehashish Ghosh, Policy Associate at Centre for Internet and Society (Bangalore-based organisation looking at multidisciplinary research and advocacy in the field of Internet and society), the main reason for such inconsistent application of the law can be found in the history of the provision.

He said the language used in Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000 has been borrowed from Section 127 of the UK Communication Act, 2003 and the Malicious Communications Act, 1988.

“These two particular provisions are applicable in cases where the communication is directed to a particular person. Section 1 of the Malicious Prosecution Act begins with the, “any person who sends to another person” and hence it is clear that the provision does not include any post or electronic communication which is broadcasted to the world and deals with only one-to-one communication,” said Ghosh.

Section 127 only deals with “improper use of public electronic communications network”. It was meant to prevent misuse of public communication services. Therefore, social media Web sites do not fall under its ambit. However, the Section 66(A) in its current form fails to define any specific category, which has led to inconsistent and arbitrary use of the provision, said Ghosh.

One of the principles of interpretation of statute is that of absurdity. It states that when there are two interpretation of the law - where one renders it absurd and arbitrary, while the other puts it within the constitutional limits - then the latter interpretation is adopted.

“In the case of 66(A), interpreting it to include any form of communication transmitted using computer resource or communication device renders it to be absurd and arbitrary. Therefore, it should be interpreted and made applicable only to communication between two parties,” he opined.

According to Pavan Duggal, cyber law expert and advocate at Supreme Court of India, primarily section 66(A) is for protecting reputation and preventing misuse of its own.

“It is so vast – what is annoyance and inconvenience – gives a tremendous handle in the hands of the complainant and the police to target anyone. Further, if you send any information through email or SMS, which aims to mislead the addressee about such mail or message is a crime. All this suddenly opens a Pandora box of offences,” he said.

“So, when you look at case of Mamta Banerjee or latest case of those two girls getting arrested in Mumbai, it shows that Section 66(A) becomes an effective tool in the hands of ingenious complainants to gag free speech. And, that is why there is so much noise,” Duggal said.

To Use, Not Abuse

Sighting the recent case of the two girls from Mumbai, he said the law was abused and all they need to do is just exploit – whether clicking a ‘Like’ button on Facebook could involve Section 66(A) – and this case is setting a precedence that ‘liking’ a comment can be an offensive of Section 66(A).

“When you click a ‘Like’ button, you do not send any information that is defined under Section 66(A). You only send information of ‘liking’ that information or message,” he said.

However, it has become a code of misuse in its own sense. Parameters given there in the Act are extremely wide and can be interpreted.

“It has only one good thing – it makes the offence bailable, which means bail as a matter of right. But, once you get stuck under Section 66(A), along with that invites a long period of mental agony and trauma because the trial will take five-six years and you will have to undergo the trial,” he added.

So does it mean the Government should scrap or completely abolish this Section from the IT Act, 2000 or should the people of India file a petition against this Section?

Sunil Abraham, Executive Director, Centre for Internet and Society says there are laws specifically dealing with cyber stalking and communications and therefore, there we do not need an additional law.

“Either scrap or retain narrow parameters, which could be made defamatory. Otherwise, more such cases would be seen in future under this section. It has not done anything significant and has an impact on basic free online speech to public,” says Duggal.

A better approach would be to strike down the provision and include separate well defined anti-stalking and anti-spamming provision, said Ghosh of Centre for Internet and Society.

However, Mahesh Uppal, Director, ComFirst India (consultancy firm on regulatory issues) said it would be premature, in these circumstances, for any litigation against this Section.

“The issue is serious. However, this is as much to do with policing in general as it is to do with Section 66(A) which needs an amendment and clarification to remove any scope for abuse,” he said.

But, is the Government ready for any change?

Minister of Communications and IT, Kapil Sibal recently said, “Just because some people do not follow it properly, we cannot entirely scrap the law. Can we do away with penal code? We cannot.”

So, does that mean we, as citizens, have to consult legal notes before posting a message online or sending an SMS? And, even if we do, are all laws, sections and under-sections comprehendible by the common man? If not, how big a risk are we, and the person who ‘Likes’ what we say is taking?

The answers to these questions determine the future of freedom of speech.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/the-hindu-businessline-november-29-2012-the-flaw-in-cyber-law

The Case of Whatsapp Group Admins

Japreet Grewal — 2015-12-08T10:25:42Z

Censorship laws in India have now roped in group administrators of chat groups on instant messaging platforms such as Whatsapp (group admin(s)) for allegedly objectionable content that was posted by other users of these chat groups. Several incidents[1] were reported this year where group admins were arrested in different parts of the country for allowing content that was allegedly objectionable under law. A few reports mentioned that these arrests were made under Section 153A[2] read with Section 34[3] of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 67[4] of the Information Technology Act (IT Act).

Targeting of a group admin for content posted by other members of a chat group has raised concerns about how this liability is imputed. Whether a group admin should be considered an intermediary under Section 2 (w) of the IT Act? If yes, whether a group admin would be protected from such liability?

Group admin as an intermediary

Whatsapp is an instant messaging platform which can be used for mass communication by opting to create a chat group. A chat group is a feature on Whatsapp that allows joint participation of Whatsapp users. The number of Whatsapp users on a single chat group can be up to 100. Every chat group has one or more group admins who control participation in the group by deleting or adding people. [5] It is imperative that we understand that by choosing to create a chat group on Whatsapp whether a group admin can become liable for content posted by other members of the chat group.

Section 34 of the IPC provides that when a number of persons engage in a criminal act with a common intention, each person is made liable as if he alone did the act. Common intention implies a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. It is interesting to note that group admins have been arrested under Section 153A on the ground that a group admin and a member posting content on a chat group that is actionable under this provision have common intention to post such content on the group. But would this hold true when for instance, a group admin creates a chat group for posting lawful content (say, for matchmaking purposes) and a member of the chat group posts content which is actionable under law (say, posting a video abusing Dalit women)? Common intention can be established by direct evidence or inferred from conduct or surrounding circumstances or from any incriminating facts.[6]

We need to understand whether common intention can be established in case of a user merely acting as a group admin. For this purpose it is necessary to see how a group admin contributes to a chat group and whether he acts as an intermediary.

We know that parameters for determining an intermediary differ across jurisdictions and most global organisations have categorised them based on their role or technical functions.[7] Section 2 (w) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) defines an intermediary as any person, who on behalf of another person, receives, stores or transmits messages or provides any service with respect to that message and includes the telecom services providers, network providers, internet service providers, web-hosting service providers, search engines, online payment sites, online-auction sites, online marketplaces and cyber cafés. Does a group admin receive, store or transmit messages on behalf of group participants or provide any service with respect to messages of group participants or falls in any category mentioned in the definition? Whatsapp does not allow a group admin to receive, or store on behalf of another participant on a chat group. Every group member independently controls his posts on the group. However, a group admin helps in transmitting messages of another participant to the group by allowing the participant to be a part of the group thus effectively providing service in respect of messages. A group admin therefore, should be considered an intermediary. However his contribution to the chat group is limited to allowing participation but this is discussed in further detail in the section below.

According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in a 2010 report[8], an internet intermediary brings together or facilitates transactions between third parties on the Internet. It gives access to, hosts, transmits and indexes content, products and services originated by third parties on the Internet or provide Internet-based services to third parties. A Whatsapp chat group allows people who are not on your list to interact with you if they are on the group admins’ contact list. In facilitating this interaction, according to the OECD definition, a group admin may be considered an intermediary.

Liability as an intermediary

Section 79 (1) of the IT Act protects an intermediary from any liability under any law in force (for instance, liability under Section 153A pursuant to the rule laid down in Section 34 of IPC) if an intermediary fulfils certain conditions laid down therein. An intermediary is required to carry out certain due diligence obligations laid down in Rule 3 of the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 (Rules). These obligations include monitoring content that infringes intellectual property, threatens national security or public order, or is obscene or defamatory or violates any law in force (Rule 3(2)).[9] An intermediary is liable for publishing or hosting such user generated content, however, as mentioned earlier, this liability is conditional. Section 79 of IT Act states that an intermediary would be liable only if it initiates transmission, selects receiver of the transmission and selects or modifies information contained in the transmission that falls under any category mentioned in Rule 3 (2) of the Rules. While we know that a group admin has the ability to facilitate sharing of information and select receivers of such information, he has no direct editorial control over the information shared. Group admins can only remove members but cannot remove or modify the content posted by members of the chat group. An intermediary is liable in the event it fails to comply with due diligence obligations laid down under rule 3 (2) and 3 (3) of the Rules however, since a group admin lacks the authority to initiate transmission himself and control content, he can’t comply with these obligations. Therefore, a group admin would be protected from any liability arising out of third party/user generated content on his group pursuant to Section 79 of the IT Act.

It is however relevant to note whether the ability of a group admin to remove participants amounts to an indirect form of editorial control.

Other pertinent observations

In several reports[10] there have been discussions about how holding a group admin liable makes the process convenient as it is difficult to locate all the users of a particular group. This reasoning may not be correct as the Whatsapp policy[11] makes it mandatory for a prospective user to provide his mobile number in order to use the platform and no additional information is collected from group admins which may justify why group admins are targeted. Investigation agencies can access mobile numbers of Whatsapp users and gain more information from telecom companies.

It is also interesting to note that the group admins were arrested after a user or someone familiar to a user filed a complaint with the police about content being objectionable or hurtful. Earlier this year, the apex court had ruled in the case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India[12] that an intermediary needed a court order or a government notification for taking down information. With actions taken against group admins on mere complaints filed by anyone, it is clear that the law enforcement officials have been overriding the mandate of the court.

Conclusion

According to a study conducted by a global research consultancy, TNS Global, around 38 % of internet users in India use instant messaging applications such as Snapchat and Whatsapp on a daily basis, Whatsapp being the most widely used application. These figures indicate the scale of impact that arrests of group admins may have on our daily communication.

It is noteworthy that categorising a group admin as an intermediary would effectively make the Rules applicable to all Whatsapp users intending to create groups and make it difficult to enforce and would perhaps blur the distinction between users and intermediaries.

The critical question however is whether a chat group is considered a part of the bundle of services that Whatsapp offers to its users and not as an independent platform that makes a group admin a separate entity. Also, would it be correct to draw comparison of a Whatsapp group chat with a conference call on Skype or sharing a Google document with edit rights to understand the domain in which censorship laws are penetrating today?

Valuable contribution by Pranesh Prakash and Geetha Hariharan

[1] http://www.nagpurtoday.in/whatsapp-admin-held-for-hurting-religious-sentiment/06250951 ; http://www.catchnews.com/raipur-news/whatsapp-group-admin-arrested-for-spreading-obscene-video-of-mahatma-gandhi-1440835156.html ; http://www.financialexpress.com/article/india-news/whatsapp-group-admin-along-with-3-members-arrested-for-objectionable-content/147887/

[2] Section 153A. “Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony.— (1) Whoever— (a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities…” or 2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine.

[3] Section 34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention – When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

[4] Section 67 Publishing of information which is obscene in electronic form. -Whoever publishes or transmits or causes to be published in the electronic form, any material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to one lakh rupees and in the event of a second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and also with fine which may extend to two lakh rupees."

[5] https://www.whatsapp.com/faq/en/general/21073373

[6] Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1955 SC 216

[7]https://www.eff.org/files/2015/07/08/manila_principles_background_paper.pdf; http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002311/231162e.pdf

[8] http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf

[9] Rule 3(2) (b) of the Rules

[10]http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/if-you-are-a-whatsapp-group-admin-better-be-careful/article7531350.ece; http://www.newindianexpress.com/states/tamil_nadu/Social-Media-Administrator-You-Could-Land-in-Trouble/2015/10/10/article3071815.ece; http://www.medianama.com/2015/10/223-whatsapp-group-admin-arrest/; http://www.thenewsminute.com/article/whatsapp-group-admin-you-are-intermediary-and-here%E2%80%99s-what-you-need-know-35031

[11] https://www.whatsapp.com/legal/

[12] http://supremecourtofindia.nic.in/FileServer/2015-03-24_1427183283.pdf

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-case-of-whatsapp-group-admins

Statutory Motion Against Intermediary Guidelines Rules

pranesh — 2012-04-03T09:35:41Z

Rajya Sabha MP, Shri P. Rajeev has moved a motion that the much-criticised Intermediary Guidelines Rules be annulled.

Motion to Annul Intermediary Guidelines Rules

A motion to annul the Intermediary Guidelines Rules was moved on March 23, 2012, by Shri P. Rajeeve, CPI(M) MP in the Rajya Sabha from Thrissur, Kerala.

The motion reads:

"That this House resolves that the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 issued under clause (zg) of sub-section (2) of Section 87 read with sub-section (2) of Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 published in the Gazette of India dated the 13th April, 2011 vide Notification No. G.S.R 314(E) and laid on the Table of the House on the 12th August, 2011, be annuled; and

That this House recommends to Lok Sabha that Lok Sabha do concur on this Motion."

This isn't the first time that Mr. Rajeeve is raising his voice against the Intermediary Guidelines Rules. Indeed, even when the Rules were just in draft stage, he along with the MPs Kumar Deepak Das, Rajeev Chandrashekar, and Mahendra Mohan drew Parliamentarians' attention to the rules. Yet, the government did not heed the MPs' concern, nor the concern of all the civil society organizations that wrote in to them concerned about human rights implications of the new laws. On September 6, 2011, Lok Sabha MP Jayant Choudhary gave notice (under Rule 377 of the Lok Sabha Rules) that the Intermediary Guidelines Rules as well as the Reasonable Security Practices Rules need to be reviewed. Yet, the government has not even addressed those concerns, and indeed has cracked down even harder on online freedom of speech since then.

Fundamental Problems with Intermediary Guidelines Rules

The fundamental problems with the Rules, which deal with objectionable material online:

Shifting blame.

It makes the 'intermediary', including ISPs like BSNL and Airtel responsible for objectionable content that their users have put up.

No chance to defend.

There is no need to inform users before this content is removed. So, even material put up by a political party can be removed based on anyone's complaint, without telling that party. This was done against a site called *CartoonsAgainstCorruption.com". This goes against Article 19(1)(a).

Lack of transparency

No information is required to be provided that content has been removed. It's a black-box system, with no one, not even the government, knowing that content has been removed following a request. So even the government does not know how many sites have been removed after these Rules have come into effect.

No differentiation between intermediaries.

A one-size-fits-all system is followed where an e-mail provider is equated with an online newspaper, which is equated with a video upload site, which is equated with a search engine. This is like equating the post-office and a book publisher as being equivalent for, say, defamatory speech. This is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, which requires that unequals be treated unequally by the law.

No proportionality.

A DNS provider (i.e., the person who gives you your web address) is an intermediary who can be asked to 'disable access' to a website on the basis of a single page, even though the rest of the site has nothing objectionable.

Vague and unconstitutional requirements.

Disparaging speech, as long as it isn't defamatory, is not criminalised in India, and can't be because the Constitution does not allow for it. Content about gambling in print is not unlawful, but now all Internet intermediaries are required to remove any content that promotes gambling.

Allows private censorship.

The Rules do not draw a distinction between arbitrary actions of an intermediary and take-downs subsequent to a request.

Presumption of illegality.

The Rules are based on the presumption that all complaints (and resultant mandatory taking down of the content) are correct, and that the incorrectness of the take-downs can be disputed in court (if they ever discover that it has been removed). This is contrary to the presumption of validity of speech used by Indian courts, and is akin to prior restraint on speech. Courts have held that for content such as defamation, prior restraints cannot be put on speech, and that civil and criminal action can only be taken post-speech.

Government censorship, not 'self-regulation'.

The government says these are industry best-practices in existing terms of service agreements. But the Rules require all intermediaries to include the government-prescribed terms in an agreement, no matter what services they provide. It is one thing for a company to choose the terms of its terms of service agreement, and completely another for the government to dictate those terms of service.

Problems Noted Early

We have noted in the past the problems with the Rules, including when the Rules were still in draft form:

Other organizations like the Software Freedom Law Centre also sent in scathing comments on the law, noting that they are unconstitutional.

We are very glad that Shri Rajeeve has moved this motion, and we hope that it gets adopted in the Lok Sabha as well, and that the Rules get defeated.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/statutory-motion-against-intermediary-guidelines-rules

Stats from 2014 reveal horror of scrapped section 66A of IT Act

praskrishna — 2015-09-26T07:28:13Z

An average of six netizens were arrested every day in 2014 for posting offensive content online under section 66A of the Information Technology Act, a draconian and much abused law no longer in use.

The article by Aloke Tikku was published in the Hindustan Times on August 20, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.

A first-of-its-kind set of statistics compiled by the National Crime Records Bureau reveals that 2,402 people, including 29 women, were arrested in 4,192 cases under section 66A — which was struck down in March by the Supreme Court that ruled that it violated the constitutional freedom of speech.

These arrests made up nearly 60% of all arrests under the IT Act, and 40% of arrests for cyber crimes in 2014. It was also a little less than twice the number of people caught red-handed accepting bribes the same year.

“These statistics are shocking. I had assumed there may be a few hundred cases, at worst,” said Shreya Singhal, on whose petition the top court had scrapped the provision.

“It validates the judgment even more than when it was delivered,” said Singhal, a law student.

Quite like Rinu Srinivasan – one of two Mumbai girls arrested in 2012 for a Facebook post regarding Shiv Sena chief Bal Thackrey’s death — nearly half of those arrested (1,217) were in the 18-29 age group. This included nine girls. Another 1,015 were in the 30-44 age group while 166 were between 45 and 59 years old.

The now-repealed section 66A prescribed a three-year jail term for online content that could be construed to be offensive or false.

This is the first time the NCRB has collected detailed statistics on cyber crimes, listing out the number of cases registered under each section of the IT Act.

A government official conceded that the large number of cases registered under section 66A meant that the Centre’s guidelines — issued after a public outcry in November 2012 against its misuse — had served little purpose. In May 2013, the Supreme Court too put its weight behind the guidelines and made it legally binding on them.

In these guidelines, the Centre had made prior approval of an inspector general of police-rank officer mandatory for all arrests under section 66A. “Either this rule wasn’t followed or the IGPs did not rise to the occasion,” the official said.

The NCRB did not give a state-wise break-up of arrests under section 66A.

But in terms of cases registered, Uttar Pradesh led the pack with 898, followed by Karnataka (603), Assam (377), Maharashtra (375), Telangana (352), Rajasthan (291), Kerala (229), Punjab (123) and Delhi (137).

“It was “unconscionable that 2,402 persons were arrested in 2014, and many made to languish in jail, under a provision that we now know to have been unconstitutional,” said Pranesh Prakash at the Bengaluru-headquartered research and advocacy group, Centre for Internet and Society.

“Even after the Supreme Court laid down more stringent ad-hoc guidelines on arrests under Section 66A, it is clear they were not effective in the least: 860 charge-sheets were filed by the police under Section 66A in 2014,” the policy director at CIS said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/hindustan-times-august-20-2015-aloke-tikku-stats-from-2014-reveal-horror-of-scrapped-section-66-a-of-it-act

Shreya Singhal and 66A

sunil — 2015-04-19T08:09:42Z

Most software code has dependencies. Simple and reproducible methods exist for mapping and understanding the impact of these dependencies. Legal code also has dependencies --across court orders and within a single court order. And since court orders are not produced using a structured mark-up language, experts are required to understand the precedential value of a court order.

The article was published in the Economic and Political Weekly Vol-L No.15. Vidushi Marda, programme officer at the Centre for Internet and Society, was responsible for all the research that went into this article. PDF version here.

As a non–lawyer and engineer, I cannot authoritatively comment on the Supreme Court’s order in Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015) on sections of the Information Technology Act of 2000, so I have tried to summarise a variety of views of experts in this article. The Shreya Singhal order is said to be unprecedented at least for the last four decades and also precedent setting as its lucidity, some believe, will cause a ripple effect in opposition to a restrictive understanding of freedom of speech and expression, and an expansiveness around reasonable restrictions. Let us examine each of the three sections that the bench dealt with.

The Section in Question

Section 66A of the IT Act was introduced in a hastily-passed amendment. Unfortunately, the language used in this section was a pastiche of outdated foreign laws such as the UK Communications Act of 2003, Malicious Communications Act of 1988 and the US Telecommunications Act, 1996.¹ Since the amendment, this section has been misused to make public examples out of innocent, yet uncomfortable speech, in order to socially engineer all Indian netizens into self-censorship.²

Summary: The Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act in its entirety holding that it was not saved by Article 19(2) of the Constitution on account of the expressions used in the section, such as "annoying," "grossly offensive," "menacing,", "causing annoyance." The Court justified this by going through the reasonable restrictions that it considered relevant to the arguments and testing them against S66A. Apart from not falling within any of the categories for which speech may be restricted, S66A was struck down on the grounds of vagueness, over-breadth and chilling effect. The Court considered whether some parts of the section could be saved, and then concluded that no part of S66A was severable and declared the entire section unconstitutional. When it comes to regulating speech in the interest of public order, the Court distinguished between discussion, advocacy and incitement. It considered the first two to fall under the freedom of speech and expression granted under Article 19(1)(a), and held that it was only incitement that attracted Article 19(2).

Between Speech and Harm

Gautam Bhatia, a constitutional law expert, has an optimistic reading of the judgment that will have value for precipitating the ripple effect. According to him, there were two incompatible strands of jurisprudence which have been harmonised by collapsing tendency into imminence.³ The first strand, exemplified by Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP⁴ and Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar,⁵ imported an older and weaker American standard, that is, the tendency test, between the speech and public order consequences. The second strand exemplified byRam Manohar Lohia vs State of UP,⁶ S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram,⁷ andArup Bhuyan vs Union of India,⁸ all require greater proximity between the speech and the disorder anticipated. In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court held that at the stage of incitement, the reasonable restrictions will step in to curb speech that has a tendency to cause disorder. Other experts are of the opinion that Justice Nariman was doing no such thing, and was only sequentially applying all the tests for free speech that have been developed within both these strands of precedent. In legal activist Lawrence Liang's analysis, "Ramjilal Modi was decided by a seven judge bench and Kedarnath by a constitutional bench. As is often the case in India, when subsequent benches of a lower strength want to distinguish themselves from older precedent but are unable to overrule them, they overcome this constraint through a doctrinal development by stealth. This is achieved by creative interpretations that chip away at archaic doctrinal standards without explicitly discarding them."⁹

Compatibility with US Jurisprudence

United States (US) jurisprudence has been imported by the Indian Supreme Court in an inconsistent manner. Some judgments hold that the American first amendment harbours no exception and hence is incompatible with Indian jurisprudence, while other judgments have used American precedent when convenient. Indian courts have on occasion imported an additional restriction beyond the eight available in 19(2)-the ground of public interest, best exemplified by the cases of K A Abbas¹⁰ and Ranjit Udeshi.¹¹ The bench in its judgment-which has been characterised by Pranesh Prakash as a masterclass in free speech jurisprudence¹²-clarifies that while the American first amendment jurisprudence is applicable in India, the only area where a difference is made is in the "sub serving of general public interest" made under the US law. This eloquent judgment will hopefully instruct judges in the future on how they should import precedent from American free speech jurisprudence.

Article 14 Challenge

The Article 14 challenge brought forward by the petitioners contended that Section 66A violated their fundamental right to equality because it differentiated between offline and online speech in terms of the length of maximum sentence, and was hence unconstitutional. The Court held that an intelligible differentia, indeed, did exist. It found so on two grounds. First, the internet offered people a medium through which they can express views at negligible or no cost. Second, the Court likened the rate of dissemination of information on the internet to the speed of lightning and could potentially reach millions of people all over the world. Before Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court had already accepted medium-specific regulation. For example in K A Abbas, the Court made a distinction between films and other media, stating that the impact of films on an average illiterate Indian viewer was more profound than other forms of communication. The pessimistic reading of Shreya Singhal is that Parliament can enact medium-specific law as long as there is an intelligible differentia which could even be a technical difference-speed of transmission. However, the optimistic interpretation is that medium-specific law can only be enacted if there are medium-specific harms, e g, phishing, which has no offline equivalent. If the executive adopts the pessimistic reading, then draconian sections like 66A will find their way back into the IT Act. Instead, if they choose the optimistic reading, they will introduce bills that fill the regulatory vacuum that has been created by the striking down of S66A, that is, spam and cyberbullying.

Section 79

Section 79 was partially read down. This section, again introduced during the 2008 amendment, was supposed to give legal immunity to intermediaries for third party content by giving a quick redressal for those affected by providing a mechanism for takedown notices in the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules notified in April 2011. But the section and rules had enabled unchecked invisible censorship¹³ in India and has had a demonstrated chilling effect on speech¹⁴ because of the following reasons:

One, there are additional unconstitutional restrictions on speech and expression. Rule 3(2) required a standard "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" that would have to be incorporated by all intermediaries. Under these rules, users are prohibited from hosting, displaying, uploading, modifying, publishing, transmitting, updating or sharing any information that falls into different content categories, a majority of which are restrictions on speech which are completely out of the scope of Article 19(2). For example, there is an overly broad category which contains information that harms minors in any way. Information that "belongs to another person and to which the user does not have any right to" could be personal information or could be intellectual property. A much better intermediary liability provision was introduced into the Copyright Act with the 2013 amendment. Under the Copyright Act, content could be reinstated if the takedown notice was not followed up with a court order within 21 days.¹⁵ A counter-proposal drafted by the Centre for Internet and Society for "Intermediary Due Diligence and Information Removal," has a further requirement for reinstatement that is not seen in the Copyright Act.¹⁶

Two, a state-mandated private censorship regime is created. You could ban speech online without approaching the court or the government. Risk-aversive private intermediaries who do not have the legal resources to subjectively determine the legitimacy of a legal claim err on the side of caution and takedown content.

Three, the principles of natural justice are not observed by the rules of the new censorship regime. The creator of information is not required to be notified nor given a chance to be heard by the intermediary. There is no requirement for the intermediary to give a reasoned decision.

Four, different classes of intermediaries are all treated alike. Since the internet is not an uniform assemblage of homogeneous components, but rather a complex ecosystem of diverse entities, the different classes of intermediaries perform different functions and therefore contribute differently to the causal chain of harm to the affected person. If upstream intermediaries like registrars for domain names are treated exactly like a web-hosting service or social media service then there will be over-blocking of content.

Five, there are no safeguards to prevent abuse of takedown notices. Frivolous complaints could be used to suppress legitimate expressions without any fear of repercussions and given that it is not possible to expedite reinstatement of content, the harm to the creator of information may be irreversible if the information is perishable. Transparency requirements with sufficient amounts of detail are also necessary given that a human right was being circumscribed. There is no procedure to have the removed information reinstated by filing a counter notice or by appealing to a higher authority.

The judgment has solved half the problem by only making intermediaries lose immunity if they ignore government orders or court orders. Private takedown notices sent directly to the intermediary without accompanying government orders or courts order no longer have basis in law. The bench made note of the Additional Solicitor General's argument that user agreement requirements as in Rule 3(2) were common practice across the globe and then went ahead to read down Rule 3(4) from the perspective of private takedown notices. One way of reading this would be to say that the requirement for standardised "rules and regulation, terms and condition or user agreement" remains. The other more consistent way of reading this part of the order in conjunction with the striking down of 66A would be to say those parts of the user agreement that are in violation of Article 19(2) have also been read down.

This would have also been an excellent opportunity to raise the transparency requirements both for the State and for intermediaries: for (i) the person whose speech is being censored, (ii) the persons interested in consuming that speech, and (iii) the general public. It is completely unclear whether transparency in the case of India has reduced the state appetite for censorship. Transparency reports from Facebook, Google and Twitter claim that takedown notices from the Indian government are on the rise.¹⁷ However, on the other hand, the Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DEITY) claims that government statistics for takedowns do not match the numbers in these transparency reports.¹⁸ The best way to address this uncertainty would be to require each takedown notice and court order to be made available by the State, intermediary and also third-party monitors of free speech like the Chilling Effects Project.

Section 69A

The Court upheld S69A which deals with website blocking, and found that it was a narrowly-drawn provision with adequate safeguards, and, hence, not constitutionally infirm. In reality, unfortunately, website blocking usually by internet service providers (ISPs) is an opaque process in India. Blocking under S69A has been growing steadily over the years. In its latest response to an RTI (right to information)¹⁹ query from the Software Freedom Law Centre, DEITY said that 708 URLs were blocked in 2012, 1,349 URLs in 2013, and 2,341 URLs in 2014. On 30 December 2014 alone, the centre blocked 32 websites to curb Islamic State of Iraq and Syria propaganda, among which were "pastebin" websites, code repository (Github) and generic video hosting sites (Vimeo and Daily Motion).²⁰ Analysis of leaked block lists and lists received as responses to RTI requests have revealed that the block orders are full of errors (some items do not exist, some items are not technically valid web addresses), in some cases counter speech which hopes to reverse the harm of illegal speech has also been included, web pages from mainstream media houses have also been blocked and some URLs are base URLs which would result in thousands of pages getting blocked when only a few pages might contain allegedly illegal content.²¹

Pre-decisional Hearing

The central problem with the law as it stands today is that it allows for the originator of information to be isolated from the process of censorship. The Website Blocking Rules provide that all "reasonable efforts" must be made to identify the originator or the intermediary who hosted the content. However, Gautam Bhatia offers an optimistic reading of the judgment, he claims that the Court has read into this "or" and made it an "and"-thus requiring that the originator must also be notified of blocks when he or she can be identified.²²

Transparency

Usually, the reasons for blocking a website are unknown both to the originator of material as well as those trying to access the blocked URL. The general public also get no information about the nature and scale of censorship unlike offline censorship where the court orders banning books and movies are usually part of public discourse. In spite of the Court choosing to leave Section 69A intact, it stressed the importance of a written order for blocking, so that a writ may be filed before a high court under Article 226 of the Constitution. While citing this as an existing safeguard, the Court seems to have been under the impression that either the intermediary or the originator is normally informed, but according to Apar Gupta, a lawyer for the People's Union for Civil Liberties, "While the rules indicate that a hearing is given to the originator of the content, this safeguard is not evidenced in practice. Not even a single instance exists on record for such a hearing."²³ Even worse, block orders have been unevenly implemented by ISPs with variations across telecom circles, connectivity technologies, making it impossible for anyone to independently monitor and reach a conclusion whether an internet resource is inaccessible as a result of a S69A block order or due to a network anomaly.

Rule 16 under S69A requires confidentiality with respect to blocking requests and complaints, and actions taken in that regard. The Court notes that this was argued to be unconstitutional, but does not state their opinion on this question. Gautam Bhatia holds the opinion that this, by implication, requires that requests cannot be confidential. Chinmayi Arun, from the Centre for Communication Governance at National Law University Delhi, one of the academics supporting the petitioners, holds the opinion that it is optimism carried too far to claim that the Court noted the challenge to Rule 16 but just forgot about it in a lack of attention to detail that is belied by the rest of the judgment.

Free speech researchers and advocates have thus far used the RTI Act to understand the censorship under S69A. The Centre for Internet and Society has filed a number of RTI queries about websites blocked under S69A and has never been denied information on grounds of Rule 16.²⁴ However, there has been an uneven treatment of RTI queries by DEITY in this respect, with the Software Freedom Law Centre²⁵ being denied blocking orders on the basis of Rule 16. The Court could have protected free speech and expression by reading down Rule 16 except for a really narrow set of exceptions wherein only aggregate information would be made available to affected parties and members of the public.

Conclusions

In Shreya Singhal, the Court gave us great news: S66A has been struck down; good news: S79(3) and its rules have been read down; and bad news: S69A has been upheld. When it comes to each section, the impact of this judgment can either be read optimistically or pessimistically, and therefore we must wait for constitutional experts to weigh in on the ripple effect that this order will produce in other areas of free speech jurisprudence in India. But even as free speech activists celebrate Shreya Singhal, some are bemoaning the judgment as throwing the baby away with the bathwater, and wish to reintroduce another variant of S66A. Thus, we must remain vigilant.

Notes

1 G S Mudur (2012): "66A 'Cut and Paste Job,'" The Telegraph, 3 December, visited on 3 April, 2015, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1121 203/jsp/frontpage/story_16268138.jsp

2 Sunil Abraham (2012): "The Five Monkeys and Ice Cold Water," Centre for Internet and Society, 26 September, visited on 3 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/www-deccan-chronicle-sep-16-201...

3 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Striking Down of 66A: How Free Speech Jurisprudence in India Found Its Soul Again," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 26 March, visited on 4 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/26/the-striking-down-of-sect...

4 Ramjilal Modi vs State of UP, 1957, SCR 860.

5 Kedar Nath Singh vs State of Bihar, 1962, AIR 955.

6 Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of UP, AIR, 1968 All 100.

7 S Rangarajan vs P Jagjivan Ram, 1989, SCC(2), 574.

8 Arup Bhuyan vs Union of India, (2011), 3 SCC 377.

9 Lawrence Liang, Alternative Law Forum, personal communication to author, 6 April 2015.

10 K A Abbas vs Union of India, 1971 SCR (2), 446.

11 Ranjit Udeshi vs State of Maharashtra,1965 SCR (1) 65.

12 Pranesh Prakash (2015): "Three Reasons Why 66A Verdict Is Momentous"/ Times of India/(29 March). Visited on 6 April 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/sunday-times/all-that-matters/Th...

13 Pranesh Prakash (2011): "Invisble Censorship: How the Government Censors Without Being Seen," The Centre for Internet and Society, 14 December, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/invisible-censorship

14 Rishabh Dara (2012): "Intermediary Liability in India: Chilling Effects on Free Expression on the Internet," The Centre for Internet and Society, 27 April, visited on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/chilling-effects-on-free-expres... .

15 Rule 75, Copyright Rules, 2013.

16 The Draft Counter Proposal is available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/counter-proposal-by-cis-draft-i...

17 According to Facebook's transparency report, there were 4,599 requests in the first half of 2014, followed by 5,473 requests in the latter half. Available at https://govtrequests.facebook. com/country/India/2014-H2/ also see Google's transparency report available at http: //www.google. com/transparencyreport/removals/government/IN/?hl=en and Twitter's report, available at https:// transparency.twitter.com/country/in

18 Surabhi Agarwal (2015): "Transparency Reports of Internet Companies are Skewed: Gulashan Rai," Business Standard, 31 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/transparency-re... .

19 http://sflc.in/deity-says-2341-urls-were-blocked-in-2014-refuses-to-reve...

20 "32 Websites Go Blank," The Hindu, 1 January 2015, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/now-modi-govt-blocks-32-websites/a...

21 Pranesh Prakash (2012): "Analysing Latest List of Blocked Sites (Communalism and Rioting Edition)," 22 August, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysing-blocked-sites-ri... . Also, see Part II of the same series at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/analyzing-the-latest-list-of-bl... and analysis of blocking in February 2013, at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analyzing-latest-list-of-b...

22 Gautam Bhatia (2015): "The Supreme Court's IT Act Judgment, and Secret Blocking," Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 25 March, viewed on 6 April 2015, https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/03/25/the-supreme-courts-it-act...

23 Apar Gupta (2015): "But What about Section 69A?," Indian Express, 27 March, viewed on 5 April 2015, http://indianexpress. com/article/opinion/ columns/but-what-about-section-69a/

24 Pranesh Prakash (2011): DIT's Response to RTI on Website Blocking, The Centre for Internet and Society, 7 April, viewed on 6 April 2015, http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/rti-response-dit-blocking ). Also see http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/analysis-dit-response-2nd-... and http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/reply-to-rti-applicat...

25 http://sflc.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/RTI-blocking-final-reply-from-...

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/economic-and-political-weekly-sunil-abraham-april-11-2015-shreya-singhal-and-66a

Section 66F of the Information Technology Act, 2000

snehashish — 2012-12-02T09:39:01Z

Section 66F: Punishment for cyber terrorism.

1[66-F. Punishment for cyber terrorism.—(1) Whoever,—

(A) with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of India or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people by—

(i) denying or cause the denial of access to any person authorised to access computer resource; or

(ii) attempting to penetrate or access a computer resource without authorisation or exceeding authorised access; or

(iii) introducing or causing to introduce any computer contaminant,

and by means of such conduct causes or is likely to cause death or injuries to persons or damage to or destruction of property or disrupts or knowing that it is likely to cause damage or disruption of supplies or services essential to the life of the community or adversely affect the critical information infrastructure specified under Section 70; or

(B) knowingly or intentionally penetrates or accesses a computer resource without authorisation or exceeding authorised access, and by means of such conduct obtains access to information, data or computer database that is restricted for reasons of the security of the State or foreign relations; or any restricted information, data or computer database, with reasons to believe that such information, data or computer database so obtained may be used to cause or likely to cause injury to the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, group of individuals or otherwise,

commits the offence of cyber terrorism.

(2) Whoever commits or conspires to commit cyber terrorism shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to imprisonment for life.]

1. Inserted by Act 10 of 2009, Section 32 (w.e.f. 27-10-2009)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/section-66f-of-the-i-t-act-2000

SECTION 66A: DELETE

praskrishna — 2015-03-30T01:32:18Z

The Supreme Court has killed a law that allowed the Government to control social media. What’s the Net worth of freedom hereafter?

The article by Kumar Anshuman was published in the Open Magazine on March 27, 2015. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

It was in 2009 that Section 66A was added as an amendment to India’s IT Act by the then UPA Government, but it took three years before it came to the notice of Shreya Singhal, a student of Law at Delhi University. By then, the Section had already earned itself a fair amount of notoriety for how much leeway it provided for the police and politicians to abuse the law.

The first time was in September 2011 when Musafir Baitha, a famous poet and government employee in Bihar, was suspended from his job because he criticised the state government on Facebook. An uproar followed, as people realised that freedom of speech in social media could now be construed as a criminal activity. Ambikesh Mahapatra, a professor at Jadavpur Unversity, became a target of the Mamata Banerjee government in April 2012 when he made cartoons of her. In September 2012, cartoonist Aseem Trivedi was arrested in Mumbai for a caricature of corruption under the UPA. But the case that caught Shreya Singhal’s attention was perhaps the most shocking of all. In November 2012, after Shiv Sena founder Bal Thackeray’s death, Shaheen Dhada, a Thane resident, posted a comment on her Facebook page criticising the near-total shutdown of Mumbai for the funeral. She wrote that Mumbai was shut not in respect, but fear, and that a leader should earn respect instead of forcing it out of people. Her friend Renu Srinivasan ‘liked’ this post. Hours later, both were arrested and booked under Section 66A. "I was shocked when I heard of this news," Singhal says, "I went and checked the post and there was nothing which could have provoked such an outrage." Her mother, Manali Singhal, a lawyer at the Supreme Court, advised her to file a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) against the Section.

The case continued for two years in the Supreme Court, while arbitrary arrests continued to be made. The UPA Government first defended 66A in court, taking the position that the current NDA Government took as well. It argued that the law would be used only in extreme cases where a person overreaches his or her online freedom to curtail the rights of others. Unconvinced, on 24 March, the apex court struck 66A down, saying that it could not allow such a law to exist on mere government assurances. The Court found several terms in the Act, such as ‘grossly offensive’ and ‘insult’, that were not clearly defined and could be interpreted arbitrarily to suit one’s convenience. ‘It is clear that Section 66A is unconstitutionally vague and it takes away a guaranteed freedom,’ observed the bench of Justice J Chelameswar and Justice Rohinton Nariman.

"We can celebrate the scrapping of Section 66A, but with caution," says Sunil Abraham, executive director at The Centre for Internet & Society in Bangalore. "[As for] those who are booked under Section 66A, the police also imposes different sections of the Indian Penal Code to justify their arrest." There are examples to support his statement, a recent one being the arrest of a Bareilly-based student, Gulrez Khan, who had posted a picture on Facebook of UP minister Azam Khan along with some derogatory comments about Hindus that he allegedly made. Gulrez Khan denied the comments, saying that his image was being maligned. The boy was arrested and booked. "People are making it out as a moment of triumph against the UP government. The fact is this boy had been arrested under Section 153A and 504 of the IPC along with Section 66A of the IT Act. We have said this even in the Supreme Court," says Gaurav Bhatia, a spokesperson of the Samajwadi Party and also a senior advocate.

But the import of scrapping Section 66A is that there is now one less law that can be misused, one that specifically stifles online freedom. "It’s an excellent judgment," says Lawrence Liang of Alternative Law Forum, Bangalore. “It couldn’t have been better than this. The fact that the apex court termed it ‘vague and overreaching’ signifies how important it was to scrap this."

Once the 122-page judgment arrived, there was a rush to welcome it—even by those who were responsible for Section 66A to begin with. Former Congress minister Kapil Sibal was one of them. "The Supreme Court has scrapped Section 66A to allow freedom of speech in cyberspace and we should welcome it,” he said. His former cabinet colleague P Chidambaram went to the extent of saying that it was poorly drafted. But the Congress as a party also warned of the possible misuse of this freedom, saying that it had woven various safeguards into Section 66A, including the condition that an arrest could only be made after an officer of the level of Inspector General or Superintendent of Police had okayed it. "The Supreme Court, it appears, has not found the safeguards sufficient," says Congress spokesperson and senior lawyer Abhishek Manu Singhvi. “It is now up to the current Government [to decide] how to strike the right balance between freedom of speech on one hand and [prevention of] abuse and hounding of groups or individuals through obscene or incorrigibly false information [on the other] to deter unbridled defamation in cyberspace." The Left parties, which were supporting the UPA Government back when Section 66A was imposed, have expressed happiness over the verdict. “The draconian provision of 66A was used to arrest people who express dissenting views against the Government and the State and to suppress criticism of those in power,” says senior CPM leader Sitaram Yechury.

The NDA Government has also welcomed the verdict. "The Government absolutely respects the right to freedom of speech and expression on social media and has no intention of curbing it," says Ravi Shankar Prasad, Union Minister for Information Technology.

But the scrapping of the Section leaves the Government with very little power to act against real abuse of online freedoms. Like Congress leader Milind Deora says, "An unregulated internet can be more dangerous than a regulated one." This argument is easily countered: there are enough provisions in existing laws that prevent a person from misusing freedom of speech. Says Apar Gupta, a senior lawyer, “Section 66A was a bailable section and arrests were made only with further imposition of IPC acts." While Article 19 (1) of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, at the same time Article 19 (2) provides a list of reasonable restrictions on freedom of speech. This is enough, experts believe, to curtail misuse of the internet. The court judgment also grants the Centre the freedom to enact any other law specific to the internet, provided it does not violate the provisions of freedom of speech as laid down by the Constitution of India.

This does, however, put a question mark on the necessity of Section 66A to begin with, if existing laws were quite enough to address freedom-of- speech abuses. "Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000, was enacted to prevent online abuse and hounding of groups and individuals, check the propagation of obscene or incorrigibly false information with the intent to create social divides and unrest, and deter unbridled defamation in cyberspace. This Act came into effect in 2008 when social media was yet evolving," says Singhvi. But experts disagree with this argument. "It is a perfect case of confusion and mixing up of facts,” says Sunil Abraham. “The purpose of this law was to curb unsolicited messages, spamming and harassing someone through fake identities in the internet space." He says that the Government claimed to borrow law provisions from the US, Canada and other countries, but the legislation was so poorly drafted that it didn’t have any teeth for action against spammers. "Even words like ‘unsolicited commercial mails’ were not included in the Act and that is the reason not a single person has been arrested in India for spam mails even after this Act came into being."

A section of the Indian legal fraternity believes that the country’s apex court should also have made a statement about the problem of spamming and harassment on the internet.

But there is bad news too. The same judgment that struck down Section 66A has upheld Section 69A of the IT Act as constitutionally valid. This allows the Government to block any website which it deems a direct threat to public order and security that might spread propaganda.

"In this case, the Government [can decide] to block a website without notifying [it with any] reason for it. If I am an internet user who wants to visit this site, I am also not notified why that website has been taken down. It is just the whims and fancies of a few officials in the Government, what to block and what not," says Apar Gupta. Using the section, the Union Government had blocked 32 websites just this January, saying that anti- national groups were using these websites for ‘jihadi propaganda’.

All major democracies have some form of legal net regulation. "Laws in foreign jurisdictions vary widely as per the guarantees of civil rights afforded to citizens in any legal system," adds Gupta. "The legislations of the United States, which borrowed certain phrases in Section 66A, have already been declared unconstitutional. In the United Kingdom, similar phrases have come under fierce critique and have been limited by guidelines issued by the office of prosecutions. In these jurisdictions, as in India, existing criminal law applies equally to online speech as much as to offline."

Also, while social media enthusiasts rejoice over their first big victory against restrictions on online freedom of speech, the internet is still a matter of great concern for any government, thanks to its reach and influence. The Union Government walks a thin line while dealing with instances of abuse on social media, and many believe India needs an IT Act drafted in proper consultation with all stakeholders.

For now, a young law student has found a place in the legal history of India. "It will always be remembered as Shreya Singhal vs Union of India," says Singhal.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT

‘66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc. Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device:

Any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character; or
Any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device;
Any electronic mail or message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages...

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine’

SUPREME COURT ORDER

‘In conclusion, we may summarise what has been held by us: Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 is struck down in its entirety being violative of Article 19(1)(a) and not saved under Article 19(2)’

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/open-magazine-march-27-2015-kumar-anshuman-section-66a-delete

Section 66-A, Information Technology Act, 2000: Cases

snehashish — 2012-12-06T09:20:51Z

In this blog post Snehashish Ghosh summarizes the facts of a few cases where Section 66-A, Information Technology Act, 2000, has been mentioned or discussed.

There has been numerous instances application of the Section 66-A, Information Technology Act, 2000 (“ITA”) in the lower courts. Currently, there are six High Court decisions, in which the section has been mentioned or discussed. In this blog post, I will be summarizing facts of a few cases insofar as they can be gathered from the orders of the Court and are pertinent to the application of 66-A, ITA.

Sajeesh Krishnan v. State of Kerala (Kerala High Court, Decided on June 5, 2012)

Petition before High Court for release of passport seized by investigating agency during arrest

In the case of Sajeesh Krishnan v. State of Kerala (Decided on June 5, 2012), a petition was filed before the Kerala High Court for release of passport seized at the time of arrest from the custody of the investigating agency. The Court accordingly passed an order for release of the passport of the petitioner.

The Court, while deciding the case, briefly mentioned the facts of the case which were relevant to the petition. It stated that the “gist of the accusation is that the accused pursuant to a criminal conspiracy hatched by them made attempts to extort money by black mailing a Minister of the State and for that purpose they have forged some CD as if it contained statements purported to have been made by the Minister.” The Court also noted the provisions under which the accused was charged. They are Sections 66-A(b) and 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000 along with a host of sections under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (120B – Criminal Conspiracy, 419 – Cheating by personation, 511- Punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment, 420 – Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, 468 – Forgery for purpose of cheating, 469 – Forgery for purpose of harming and 201 – Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender read with 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860)

Nikhil Chacko Sam v. State of Kerala (Kerala High Court, Decided on July 9, 2012)

Order of the Kerala High Court on issuing of the summons to the petitioner

In another case, the Kerala High Court while passing an order with respect to summons issued to the accused, also mentioned the charge sheet laid by the police against the accused in its order. The accused was charged under section 66-A, ITA. The brief facts which can be extracted from the order of the Court read: “that the complainant and the accused (petitioner) were together at Chennai. It is stated that on 04.09.2009, the petitioner has transmitted photos of the de facto complainant and another person depicting them in bad light through internet and thus the petitioner has committed the offence as mentioned above.”

J.R. Gangwani and Another v. State of Haryana and Others (Punjab and Haryana High Court, Decided on October 15, 2012)

Petition for quashing of criminal proceedings under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

In the Punjab and Haryana High Court, an application for quashing of criminal proceeding draws attention to a complaint which was filed under Section 66-A(c). This complaint was filed under Section 66-A(c) on the ground of sending e-mails under assumed e-mail addresses to customers of the Company which contained material which maligned the name of the Company which was to be sold as per the orders of the Company Law Board. The Complainant in the case received the e-mails which were redirected from the customers. According to the accused and the petitioner in the current hearing, the e-mail was not directed to the complainant or the company as is required under Section 66-A (c).

The High Court held that, “the petitioners are sending these messages to the purchasers of cranes from the company and those purchasers cannot be considered to be the possible buyers of the company. Sending of such e-mails, therefore, is not promoting the sale of the company which is the purpose of the advertisement given in the Economic Times. Such advertisements are, therefore, for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience to the company or to deceive or mislead the addressee about the origin of such messages. These facts, therefore, clearly bring the acts of the petitioners within the purview of section 66A(c) of the Act.”

Mohammad Amjad v. Sharad Sagar Singh and Ors. (Criminal Revision no. 72/2011 filed before the Court of Sh. Vinay Kumar Khana Additional Sessions Judge – 04 South East: Saket Courts Delhi)

Revision petition against the order of the metropolitan magistrate

In a revision petition came up before the Additional Sessions Judge on the grounds that the metropolitan magistrate has dismissed a criminal complaint under Section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code without discussing the ingredients of section 295-A, IPC and 66-A, IT Act.

In this case, the judge observed that, “...section 66A of Information Technology Act (IT Act) does not refer at all to any 'group' or 'class' of people. The only requirement of Section 66A IT Act is that the message which is communicated is grossly offensive in nature or has menacing character.” He also observed that the previous order “not at all considered the allegations from this angle and the applicability of Section 66A Information Technology Act, 2000 to the factual matrix of the instant case.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/section-66-a-information-technology-act-2000-cases

Section 43 of the Information Technology Act

pranesh — 2013-06-07T10:37:04Z

Given below is the text of section 43 of the IT Act:

43. Penalty and compensation for damage to computer, computer system, etc.
If any person without permission of the owner or any other person who is incharge of a computer, computer system or computer network, or computer resource —

accesses or secures access to such computer, computer system or computer network;
downloads, copies or extracts any data, computer data base or information from such computer, computer system or computer network including information or data held or stored in any removable storage medium;
introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or computer virus into any computer, computer system or computer network;
damages or causes to be damaged any computer, computer system or computer network, data, computer data base or any other programmes residing in such computer, computer system or computer network;
disrupts or causes disruption of any computer, computer system or computer network;
denies or causes the denial of access to any person authorised to access any computer, computer system or computer network by any means; (g) provides any assistance to any person to facilitate access to a computer, computer system or computer network in contravention of the provisions of this Act, rules or regulations made thereunder;
charges the services availed of by a person to the account of another person by tampering with or manipulating any computer, computer system, or computer network, he shall be liable to pay damages by way of compensation to the person so affected.
destroys, deletes or alters any information residing in a computer resource or diminishes its value or utility or affects it injuriously by any means;
steel, conceals, destroys or alters or causes any person to steal, conceal, destroy or alter any computer source code used for a computer resource with an intention to cause damage;

Explanation.
For the purposes of this section:

"computer contaminant" means any set of computer instructions that are designed —
- to modify, destroy, record, transmit data or programme residing within a computer, computer system or computer network; or
- by any means to usurp the normal operation of the computer, computer system, or computer network;
"computer data base" means a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts or instructions in text, image, audio, video that are being prepared or have been prepared in a formalised manner or have been produced by a computer, computer system or computer network and are intended for use in a computer, computer system or computer network;
"computer virus" means any computer instruction, information, data or programme that destroys, damages, degrades or adversely affects the performance of a computer resource or attaches itself to another computer resource and operates when a programme, daia or instruction is executed or some other event takes place in that computer resource;
"damage" means to destroy, alter, delete, add, modify or rearrange any computer resource by any means.
"computer source code" means the listing of programmes, computer commands, design and layout and programme analysis of computer resource in any form.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/resources/section-43-it-act.txt

SC seeks govt reply on PIL challenging powers of IT Act

praskrishna — 2014-09-08T04:45:51Z

Section 66A of the IT Act punishes sending offensive messages through communication services, including posts on social media websites like Facebook.

The article by Shreeja Sen was published in Livemint on August 30, 2014. Leslie D’Monte contributed to this story. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

The Supreme Court on Friday asked for the central government’s response in a writ petition filed by Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI) challenging the arbitrary powers that the Information Technology (IT) Act confers on the government to remove user-generated content.

This is not the first time that the amended provisions of the IT Act 2000 and the IT (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 have been challenged. The rules were released by the government in April 2011, and laid down detailed procedures for regulation of intermediaries and online content.

A bench of justices J. Chelameswar and A.K. Sikri, while issuing notice to the central government, tagged the cases with others of a similar nature, including ones by MouthShut.com, a consumer review website, and Shreya Singhal, a public interest litigant who challenged the constitutionality of Section 66A in support of Shaheen Dhada, who was arrested for criticizing the shutdown of Mumbai after the death of Shiv Sena supremo Bal Thackeray in 2012. Section 66A of the IT Act punishes sending offensive messages through communication services, including posts on social media websites like Facebook.

“We’re very happy at MouthShut that IAMAI decided to take a stand regarding this,” said Faisal Farooqui, chief executive officer of MouthShut.com.

The petition, which runs into 1,100 pages according to those familiar with the case, seeks to challenge Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act. The section holds an Internet service provider (ISP) responsible for content which may be unlawful, published by third parties (not the ISPs) when they’ve been intimated by the government. It takes away the safe harbour rule, which protects ISPs from being sued because of third party actions.

According to a statement by IAMAI, the industry lobby approached the apex court for “objective interpretation of the laws”. Referring to the court agreeing to hear the petition, the statement said, “This admission today allows the industry an opportunity to argue for a clear Safe Harbour Provision for the intermediaries, which is an essential pre-condition of a thriving digital content business.”

“In my view, the court may be sympathetic to this particular situation because there is a body of research and evidence that demonstrates that the private censorship regime instituted by Section 79A that places unconstitutional limits of freedom of speech and expression,” said Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), India, a non-profit organization involved with research in freedom of expression, privacy and open access to literature.

On 27 April 2012, CIS-India had released a paper which, among other things, listed why the IT Rules 2011 could have a “chilling” effect on intermediaries. No much has changed since. The paper argued that not all intermediaries have sufficient legal competence or resources (or the willingness to devote such legal resources) to deliberate on the legality of an expression, as a result of which, intermediaries have a tendency to err on the side of caution. It also pointed out that the qualifications and due diligence requirements of different classes of intermediaries have not been clearly defined in the Rules resulting in uncertainty in the steps to be followed by the intermediary. It noted that depending on the nature of a service, it may be technically unfeasible for an intermediary to comply with the takedown within 36 hours.

“The chilling effect can primarily be attributed to the requirement for private intermediaries to perform subjective judicial determination in the course of administering the takedown. From the responses to the takedown notices, it is apparent that not all intermediaries have sufficient legal competence or resources to deliberate on the legality of an expression, as a result of which, such intermediaries have a tendency to err on the side of caution and chill legitimate expressions in order to limit their liability,” the paper said.

Another privacy lobby body, SFLC.in, had submitted feedback to the government when the draft IT Rules were put up for consultation but said that “when the final Rules were notified we found that most of our concerns were not addressed and that the Rules exceeded the scope of the parent act”.

In a July paper, SFLC.in reiterated that “Words and phrases like grossly harmful, harassing, blasphemous, disparaging and “harm minors in any way” are not defined in these Rules or in the Act or in any other legislation. These ambiguous words make the Rules susceptible to misuse…(and have a) chilling effect on free speech rights of users by making them too cautious about the content they post and byforcing them to self-censor…As technology evolves at a fast pace, the law should not be found wanting. The law should be an enabling factor that ensures that citizens enjoy their right to freedom of speech and expression without any hindrance. India, being the largest democracy in the world should lead the world in ensuring that the citizens enjoy the right to express themselves freely online.”

SFLC.in is a donor-supported legal services organization that brings together lawyers, policy analysts, technologists, and students.

According to a March study commissioned by the Global Network Initiative, a multistakeholder group of companies, civil society organizations, investors, and academics and conducted by Copenhagen Economics, an economic consultancy, the GDP contribution of online intermediaries may increase to more than 1.3 % ($ 241 billion) by 2015, provided the current liability regime is improved.

In another development, hearing a petition asking to take down pornographic website, the court deemed it fit to send it to an advisory committee that has been set up under Section 88 of the Information Technology Act. The petition, filed by lawyer Kamlesh Vaswani in 2013, asked for a direction to the central government to block pornography websites, platforms, links or downloading. Speaking to reporters, Vaswani’s lawyer Vijay Panjwani said, “as on date, there are 4 crore pornographic websites. For 18 months, the government has not blocked them.”

The central government informed the committee was considering several options to address the issue of including methods used in the US and UK. This case was being heard by a three-judge bench headed by the chief justice of India R.M. Lodha, who said that to address these technological issues, a “synthesis of law, technology and governance is required.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-august-30-2014-shreeja-sen-sc-seeks-govt-reply-on-pil-challenging-powers-of-it-act