Centre for Internet and Society

Revolving Door Analysis: IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group

Lakshmi Venkataraman — 2014-12-16T05:44:40Z

The IANA Stewardship Coordination Group (ICG) is the body that will accept and coordinate different proposals for IANA transition. It will make the global Internet community's final proposal for transition to the NTIA. Lakshmi Venkataraman finds that a majority of the ICG's membership have had longstanding affiliations with I-star organisations. What will this mean for IANA transition?

Following the NTIA’s announcement of its decision to not renew the IANA Functions contract, ICANN instituted a process in search of an alternative oversight mechanism. The IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group (ICG), comprising 30 individuals, is the body set up to accept and coordinate proposals for IANA transition, and after this, to make a final proposal to the NTIA. ICANN claims that the ICG comprises individuals representing 13 different communities and the interests of different stakeholders (direct and indirect), including those of governments, technical community and non-commercial users.

The communities represented in the ICG are as follows:

ALAC – At-Large Advisory Committee to ICANN
ASO – Policy making body of ICANN w.r.t. IP addresses
ccNSO – Policy making body of ICANN w.r.t. ccTLDs
GNSO – Makes recommendations on gTLDs to the ICANN Board
IAB – Deals with technical and engineering aspects of the ISOC
IETF – Deals with the development of standards under the ISOC
NRO – Policy Advisor to ICANN w.r.t. IP addresses
SSAC – Advisory body of ICANN, w.r.t. security of naming systems
RSSAC – Advisory body of ICANN, w.r.t. operation, security and integrity of the Internet’s Root Server System

Now, the ICG has been set up to devise and present to the NTIA, an IANA transition proposal that incorporates views and concerns of diverse stakeholders of the global Internet community. The composition of the ICG is, for this purpose, an indicator of the nature of proposals that may find final favour.

At CIS, we examined the affiliations of ICG members with this in mind. Our assumptions are two-fold: (1) greater the diversity in ICG membership, greater the chance of diverse views being heard and represented, including those departing from the status quo; (2) conversely, if the ICG members have histories of affiliations to existing centres of power in global Internet governance (say, the I* organisations), chances of status quo being maintained are greater.

Our findings are presented in tabular format below:

(X – Unknown number of years spent in the organization)

I-star Organisation ________________ Name of person	ICANN	IETF	IAB	W3C	ISOC	AfriNIC	ARIN	APNIC	LACNIC	RIPE-NCC
Patrik Faltstrom	3	X	X	-	3	-	-	-	-	-
Paul Wilson	X	-	-	-	X	-	-	16	-	-
Lynn St. Amour	-	-	13	-	16	-	-	-	-	-
Jari Arkko	-	8	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Keith Davidson	4	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
Demi Getschko	4	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-
Russell Housley	-	6	1.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Xiaodong Lee	2	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Elise Gerich	4	-	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hartmut Glaser	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
Wolf Ulrich Knobben	4	-	-	-	X	-	-	-	-	-
Russ Mundy	X	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Kuo-Wei Wu	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	-
Narelle Clark	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-
Daniel Karrenberg	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-
Mohamed el Bashir	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Martin Boyle	X	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Keith Drazek	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jean Jacques Subrenat	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
James Bladel	†	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

(† - To serve on the GNSO Council from November 2015.)

As you will have noticed, 20 out of 30 ICG members (66.67%) have occupied positions in seemingly different organizations, but in actuality, these are organisations with very close links to each other. We see not 13, but 2 organizations that all the communities seem to be affiliated to, i.e., ICANN and ISOC. It seems all too ironic that the body that has been allocated the task of the IANA functions’ transition, in line with the ‘multi-stakeholder’ model, is itself representative of only 2 organizations.

A prodding into the histories of these 30 members from ‘varied’ backgrounds reveals that most of them have rotationally served in the I-Star organizations. A close reading of their bio-data (from their ICANN and LinkedIn pages) reveals our findings on the number of years several of the members of the IANA Stewardship Transition Cooperation Group, have spent at the I-Star organizations.

It is not rocket science to recognise the power the I* organisations have over Internet governance today. Indeed, ICANN tells us that the I* run the Internet. They are the leaders of the status quo.

But the IANA transition is anything but an affirmation of the status quo. Stakeholders and participants in IANA transition (in the CWG, CRISP and IETF) have raised serious concerns about the desirability of IANA continuing within ICANN, and about ICANN’s (inadequate) accountability and transparency. True, ICANN has instituted processes to enable discussion on these issues, and the ICG is part of the process. It is entrusted with the momentous task of shifting from the status quo of the IANA Functions contract to a new mechanism of oversight. Given its composition, an assumption that the ICG may have vested interests in maintaining status quo is not out-of-the-way. In fact, some members of the ICG have previously made statements to the effect that Internet is not broken, and it does not need fixing. This poses a real danger to the IANA transition process and the global Internet community must demand safeguards.

Lakshmi Venkataraman performed the revolving door analysis on the ICG. She is a IV year at NALSAR University of Law and an intern at CIS during December 2014. Geetha Hariharan assisted in writing this post.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ianas-revolving-door

Report on ICANN 50

jyoti — 2014-10-12T05:42:04Z

Jyoti Panday attended ICANN 50 in London from 22-26 June. Below are some of the highlights from the meeting.

From 22- 26 June, ICANN hosted its 50^th meeting in London, the largest congregation of participants, so far. In the wake of the IANA transition announcement, Internet governance was the flavor of the week. ICANN’s transparency and accountability measures emerged as much contested notions as did references to NETmundial. This ICANN meeting clearly demonstrated that questions as to the role of ICANN in internet governance need to be settled.

ATLAS II

Coinciding with ICANN meeting was the 2^nd At-Large Summit, or ATLAS II, bringing together a network of regionally self organized and self supporting At-Large structures, representing individual Internet users throughout the world. The goal of the meeting was to discuss, reach consensus and draft reports around five issues organized around five issues organized around thematic groups of issues of concerns to the At-Large Community.

The subjects for the thematic groups were selected by the representatives of ALSes, each summit participant was allocated to thematic groups according to his/her preferences. The groups included were:

Future of Multistakeholder models
The Globalization of ICANN
Global Internet: The User perspective
ICANN Transparency and Accountability
At-Large Community Engagement in ICANN

Fahad Chehade Five Point Agenda

ICANN President, Mr Chehade in his address to the ICANN community covered five points which he felt were important for ICANN in planning its future role. The first topic was the IANA Stewardship and transition, and he stated that ICANN is committed to being a transparent organization and seeks to be more accountable to the community as the contract with the US government ends. Regarding the IANA transition, he remarked that ICANN had received thousands of comments and proposals regarding the transition of IANA stewardship and understood there would be much more discussion on this subject, and that a coordination group has been proposed of 27 members representing all different stakeholders in order to plot the course forward for IANA transition.

His second topic was about ICANN globalization and hardening of operations. He said that ICANN has about 2-3 years to go before he is comfortable that ICANN operations are where they need to be. He applauded the new service channels which allows customer support in many different languages and time zones, and mentioned local language support that would add to the languages in which ICANN content is currently available. Chehade spent a few minutes discussing the future of WHOIS "Directory" technology and highlighted the initial report that a working group had put together, led by Jean-Francois Poussard.

Next he covered the GDD, the Global Domains Division of ICANN and an update from that division on the New gTLD program. He mentioned the ICANN Auction, the contracts that had been signed, and the number of New gTLDs that had already been delegated to the Root. Internet Governance was Chehade's 4th topic of discussion, he applauded the NETmundial efforts, though he stressed that internet governance is one of the things that ICANN does and it will not be a high priority. He ended his speech with his last point, calling for more harmony within the ICANN community.

High Level Government Meeting

During ICANN London, UK government hosted a high-level meeting, bringing together representatives from governments of the world to discuss Internet Governance and specifically the NTIA transition of the IANA contract. Government representatives recognized that the stewardship of IANA should be a shared responsibility between governments and private sector groups, while other representatives stressed giving governments a stronger voice than other stakeholders. The consensus at the meeting held that the transition should not leave specific governments or interest groups with more control over the Internet, but that governments should have a voice in political issues in Internet Governance.

GAC Communiqué

GAC Communique, is a report drafted by the Governmental Advisory Committee, advising the ICANN board on decisions involving policy and implementation. Highlights from the communiqué include:

The GAC advises the Board regarding the .africa string, saying it would like to see an expedited process, especially once the Independent Review Panel comes to a decision regarding the two applicants for the string. They reaffirm their decision that DotConnectAfrica's application should not proceed.
The GAC mentioned the controversy surrounding .wine and .vin, where some European GAC representatives strongly felt that the applications for these strings should not proceed without proper safeguards for geographic names at the second level. However, the GAC was unable to reach consensus advice regarding this issue and thus did not relay any formal advice to the Board.
The GAC requested safeguards in the New gTLDs for IGO (Inter-Governmental Organization) names at the second level, and specifically related such advice for names relating to Red Cross and Red Crescent.

Civil Society in ICANN and Internet Governance

NCUC, or the Noncommercial Users Constituency www.ncuc.org, voice of civil society in ICANN’s policy processes on generic top level domain names and related matters, as well as other civil society actors from the ICANN community organized a workshop to provide an opportunity for open and vigorous dialogue between public interest advocates who are active both within and outside the ICANN community.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/report-on-icann-50

Peering behind the veil of ICANN’s DIDP (I)

Padmini Baruah — 2015-10-15T02:42:14Z

One of the key elements of the process of enhancing democracy and furthering transparency in any institution which holds power is open access to information for all the stakeholders. This is critical to ensure that there is accountability for the actions of those in charge of a body which utilises public funds and carries out functions in the public interest.

As the body which “...coordinates the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions, which are key technical services critical to the continued operations of the Internet's underlying address book, the Domain Name System (DNS)”^{^[1]}, the centrality of ICANN in regulating the Internet (a public good if there ever was one) makes it vital that ICANN’s decision-making processes, financial flows, and operations are open to public scrutiny. ICANN itself echoes the same belief, and upholds “...a proven commitment to accountability and transparency in all of its practices”^{^[2]}, which is captured in their By-Laws and Affirmation of Commitments. In furtherance of this, ICANN has created its own Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, where it promises to “...ensure that information contained in documents concerning ICANN's operational activities, and within ICANN's possession, custody, or control, is made available to the public unless there is a compelling reason for confidentiality.”^{^[3]}

ICANN has a vast array of documents that are already in the public domain, listed here. These include annual reports, budgets, registry reports, speeches, operating plans, correspondence, etc. However, their Documentary Information Disclosure Policy falls short of meeting international standards for information disclosure. In this piece, I have focused on an examination of their defined conditions for non-disclosure of information, which seem to undercut the entire process of transparency that the DIDP process aims towards upholding. The obvious comparison that comes to mind is with the right to information laws that governments the world over have enacted in furtherance of democracy. While ICANN cannot be equated to a democratically elected government, it nonetheless does exercise sufficient regulatory power of the functioning of the Internet for it to owe a similar degree of information to all the stakeholders in the internet community. In this piece, I have made an examination of ICANN’s conditions for non-disclosure, and compared it to the analogous exclusions in India’s Right to Information Act, 2005

ICANN’ꜱ Defined Conditions for Non-Disclosure versus Exclusions in Indian Law :

ICANN, in its DIDP policy identifies a lengthy list of conditions as being sufficient grounds for non-disclosure of information. One of the most important indicators of a strong transparency law is said to be minimum exclusions.^{^[4]} However, as seen from the table below, ICANN’s exclusions are extensive and vast, and this has been a barrier in the way of free flow of information. An analysis of their responses to various DIDP requests (available here) shows that the conditions for non-disclosure have been invoked in over 50 of the 85 requests responded to (as of 11.09.2015); i.e., over two-thirds of the requests that ICANN receives are subjected to the non-disclosure policies.

In contrast, an analysis of India’s Right to Information Act, considered to be among the better drafted transparency laws of the world, reveals a much narrower list of exclusions that come in the way of a citizen obtaining any kind of information sought. The table below compares the two lists:

No.	ICANN^{^[5]}	India	Analysis
1.	Information provided by or to a government or international organization which was to be kept confidential or would materially affect ICANN’s equation with the concerned body.	Information, disclosure of which would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security, "strategic, scientific or economic" interests of the State, relation with foreign State or lead to incitement of an offense^{^[6]}/ information received in confidence from foreign government^{^[7]}	The threshold for both the bodies is fairly similar for this exclusion.
2.	Internal (staff/Board) information that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of ICANN's deliberative and decision-making process	Cabinet papers including records of deliberations of the Council of Ministers, Secretaries and other officers, provided that such decisions the reasons thereof, and the material on the basis of which the decisions were taken shall be made public after the decision has been taken, and the matter is complete, or over (unless subject to these exemptions)^{^[8]}	The Indian law is far more transparent as it ultimately allows for the records of internal deliberation to be made public after the decision is taken.
3.	Information related to the deliberative and decision-making process between ICANN, its constituents, and/or other entities with which ICANN cooperates that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of the deliberative and decision-making process	No similar provision in Indian Law.	This is an additional restriction that ICANN introduces in addition to the one above, which in itself is quite broad.
4.	Records relating to an individual's personal information	Information which relates to personal information the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest, or which would cause unwarranted invasion of the privacy of the individual (but it is also provided that the information which cannot be denied to the Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied by this exemption);^{^[9]}	Again, the Indian law contains a proviso for information with “relationship to any public activity or interest”
5.	Proceedings of internal appeal mechanisms and investigations.	Information which has been expressly forbidden to be published by any court of law or tribunal or the disclosure of which may constitute contempt of court;^{^[10]}	While ICANN prohibits the disclosure of all proceedings, in India, the exemption is only to the limited extent of information that the court prohibits from being made public.
6.	Information provided to ICANN by a party that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to materially prejudice the commercial interests, financial interests, and/or competitive position of such party or was provided to ICANN pursuant to a nondisclosure agreement or nondisclosure provision within an agreement.	Information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property, the disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a third party, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;^{^[11]}	This is fairly similar for both lists.
7.	Confidential business information and/or internal policies and procedures.	No similar provision in Indian Law. This is encapsulated in the abovementioned provision	This is fairly similar in both lists.
8.	Information that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to endanger the life, health, or safety of any individual or materially prejudice the administration of justice.	Information, the disclosure of which would endanger the life or physical safety of any person or identify the source of information or assistance given in confidence for law enforcement or security purposes;^{^[12]}	This is fairly similar for both lists.
9.	Information subject to any kind of privilege, which might prejudice any investigation	Information, the disclosure of which would cause a breach of privilege of Parliament or the State Legislature^{^[13]}/Information which would impede the process of investigation or apprehension or prosecution of offenders;^{^[14]}	This is fairly similar in both lists.
10.	Drafts of all correspondence, reports, documents, agreements, contracts, emails, or any other forms of communication.	No similar provision in Indian Law	This exclusion is not present in Indian law, and it is extremely broadly worded, coming in the way of full transparency.
11.	Information that relates in any way to the security and stability of the Internet	No similar provision in Indian Law	This is perhaps necessary to ICANN’s role as the IANA Functions Operator. However, given the large public interest in this matter, there should be some proviso to make information in this regard available to the public as well.
12.	Trade secrets and commercial and financial information not publicly disclosed by ICANN.	Information including commercial confidence, trade secrets or intellectual property, the disclosure of which would harm the competitive position of a third party, unless the competent authority is satisfied that larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;^{^[15]}	This is fairly similar in both cases.
13.	Information requests: ● which are not reasonable; ● which are excessive or overly burdensome ● complying with which is not feasible ● which are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual.	No similar provision in Indian Law	Of all the DIDP exclusions, this is the one which is most loosely worded. The terms in this clause are not clearly defined, and it can effectively be used to deflect any request sought from ICANN because of its extreme subjectivity. What amounts to ‘reasonable’? Whom is the process going to ‘burden’? What lens does ICANN use to define a ‘vexatious’ purpose? Where do we look for answers?
14.	No similar provision in ICANN’s DIDP.	Information available to a person in his fiduciary relationship, unless the competent authority is satisfied that the larger public interest warrants the disclosure of such information;^{^[16]}	-
15.	No similar provision in ICANN’s DIDP.	Information which providing access to would involve an infringement of copyright subsisting in a person other than the State.^{^[17]}	-

Thus, the net cast by the DIDP exclusions policy is more vast than even than that of a democratic state’s transparency law. Clearly, the exclusions above have effectively allowed ICANN to dodge answers to most of the requests floating its way. One can only hope that ICANN realises that these exclusions come in the way of the transparency that they are so committed to, and does away with this unreasonably wide range on the road to the IANA Transition.

^{^[1]} https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/welcome-2012-02-25-en

^{^[2]} https://www.icann.org/resources/accountability

^{^[3]} https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/didp-2012-02-25-en

^{^[4]} Shekhar Singh, India: Grassroot Initiatives in Tʜᴇ Rɪɢʜᴛ ᴛᴏ Kɴᴏᴡ 19, 44 (Ann Florin ed., 2007)

^{^[5]} In a proviso, ICANN’s DIDP states that all these exemptions can be overridden if the larger public interest is higher. However, this has not yet been reflected in their responses to any DIDP requests.

^{^[6]} Section 8(1)(a), Right to Information Act, 2005.

^{^[7]} Section 8(1)(f), Right to Information Act, 2005.

^{^[8]} Section 8(1)(i), Right to Information Act, 2005.

^{^[9]} Section 8(1)(j), Right to Information Act, 2005.

^{^[10]} Section 8(1)(b), Right to Information Act, 2005.

^{^[11]} Section (1)(d), Right to Information Act, 2005

^{^[12]} Section 8(1)(g), Right to Information Act, 2005.

^{^[13]} Section 8(1)(c), Right to Information Act, 2005.

^{^[14]} Section 8(1)(h), Right to Information Act, 2005.

^{^[15]} Section (1)(d), Right to Information Act, 2005

^{^[16]} Section 8(1)(e), Right to Information Act, 2005.

^{^[17]} Section 9, Right to Information Act, 2005.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icann2019s-didp

Peering behind the veil of ICANN's DIDP (II)

Padmini Baruah — 2015-10-15T03:14:18Z

In a previous blog post, I had introduced the concept of ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (“DIDP”) and their extremely vast grounds for non-disclosure. In this short post, I have made an analysis of every DIDP request that ICANN has ever responded to, to point out the flaws in their policy that need to be urgently remedied.

Read the previous blog post here. Every DIDP request that ICANN has ever responded to can be accessed here.

The table here is a comprehensive breakdown of all the different DIDP requests that ICANN has responded to. This table is to be read with this document, which has a numbered list of the different non-disclosure exceptions outlined in ICANN’s policy. What I sought to scrutinize was the number of times ICANN has provided satisfactory information, the number of times it has denied information, and the grounds for the same. What we found was alarming:

Of a total of 91 requests (as of 13/10/2015), ICANN has fully and positively responded to only 11.
It has responded partially to 47 of 91 requests, with some amount of information (usually that which is available as public records).
It has not responded at all to 33 of 91 requests.
The Non-Disclosure Clause (1)^{^[1]} has been invoked 17 times.
The Non-Disclosure Clause (2)^{^[2]} has been invoked 39 times.
The Non-Disclosure Clause (3)^{^[3]} has been invoked 31 times.
The Non-Disclosure Clause (4)^{^[4]} has been invoked 5 times.
The Non-Disclosure Clause (5)^{^[5]} has been invoked 34 times.
The Non-Disclosure Clause (6)^{^[6]} has been invoked 35 times.
The Non-Disclosure Clause (7)^{^[7]} has been invoked once.
The Non-Disclosure Clause (8)^{^[8]} has been invoked 22 times.
The Non-Disclosure Clause (9)^{^[9]} has been invoked 30 times.
The Non-Disclosure Clause (10)^{^[10]} has been invoked 10 times.
The Non-Disclosure Clause (11)^{^[11]} has been invoked 12 times.
The Non-Disclosure Clause (12)^{^[12]} has been invoked 18 times.

This data is disturbing because it reveals that ICANN has in practice been able to deflect most requests for information. It regularly utilised its internal processes and discussions with stakeholders clauses, as well as clauses on protecting financial interests of third parties (over 50% of the total non-disclosure clauses ever invoked - see chart below) to do away with having to provide information on pertinent matters such as its compliance audits and reports of abuse to registrars. We believe that even if ICANN is a private entity legally, and not at the same level as a state, it nonetheless plays the role of regulating an enormous public good, namely the Internet. Therefore, there is a great onus on ICANN to be far more open about the information that they provide.

Finally, it is extremely disturbing that they have extended full disclosure to only 12% of the requests that they receive. An astonishing 88% of the requests have been denied, partly or otherwise. Therefore, it is clear that there is a failure on part of ICANN to uphold the transparency it claims to stand for, and this needs to be remedied at the earliest.

^{^[1]} “Information provided by or to a government or international organization, or any form of recitation of such information, in the expectation that the information will be kept confidential and/or would or likely would materially prejudice ICANN's relationship with that party”

^{^[2]} “Internal information that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of ICANN's deliberative and decision-making process by inhibiting the candid exchange of ideas and communications, including internal documents, memoranda, and other similar communications to or from ICANN Directors, ICANN Directors' Advisors, ICANN staff, ICANN consultants, ICANN contractors, and ICANN agents”

^{^[3]} “Information exchanged, prepared for, or derived from the deliberative and decision-making process between ICANN, its constituents, and/or other entities with which ICANN cooperates that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to compromise the integrity of the deliberative and decision-making process between and among ICANN, its constituents, and/or other entities with which ICANN cooperates by inhibiting the candid exchange of ideas and communications”

^{^[4]} “Personnel, medical, contractual, remuneration, and similar records relating to an individual's personal information, when the disclosure of such information would or likely would constitute an invasion of personal privacy, as well as proceedings of internal appeal mechanisms and investigations”

^{^[5]} “Information provided to ICANN by a party that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to materially prejudice the commercial interests, financial interests, and/or competitive position of such party or was provided to ICANN pursuant to a nondisclosure agreement or nondisclosure provision within an agreement”

^{^[6]} “Confidential business information and/or internal policies and procedures”

^{^[7]} “Information that, if disclosed, would or would be likely to endanger the life, health, or safety of any individual or materially prejudice the administration of justice”

^{^[8]} “Information subject to the attorney– client, attorney work product privilege, or any other applicable privilege, or disclosure of which might prejudice any internal, governmental, or legal investigation”

^{^[9]} “Drafts of all correspondence, reports, documents, agreements, contracts, emails, or any other forms of communication”

^{^[10]} “Information that relates in any way to the security and stability of the Internet, including the operation of the L Root or any changes, modifications, or additions to the root zone”

^{^[11]} “Trade secrets and commercial and financial information not publicly disclosed by ICANN”

^{^[12]} “Information requests: (i) which are not reasonable; (ii) which are excessive or overly burdensome; (iii) complying with which is not feasible; or (iv) are made with an abusive or vexatious purpose or by a vexatious or querulous individual”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/peering-behind-the-veil-of-icanns-didp-ii

NTIA to give up control of the Internet's root

pranesh — 2014-03-18T18:21:40Z

On Friday evening the U.S. government's National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced that it was setting into motion a transition to give up a few powers that it holds over some core Internet functions, and that this would happen by September 2015. Pranesh Prakash provides a brief response to that announcement.

As it noted in the NTIA's press release:

NTIA’s responsibility includes the procedural role of administering changes to the authoritative root zone file – the database containing the lists of names and addresses of all top-level domains – as well as serving as the historic steward of the [Domain Name System (DNS)]. NTIA currently contracts with [the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN] to carry out the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions and has a Cooperative Agreement with Verisign under which it performs related root zone management functions. Transitioning NTIA out of its role marks the final phase of the privatization of the DNS as outlined by the U.S. Government in 1997.

This move was welcomed by "Internet technical leaders".

While this announcement cannot be said to be unexpected, it is nonetheless an important one and is also a welcome one. The NTIA seems to have foreclosed any option of the US government's role being performed by any government-led organization by noting in their press release, "NTIA will not accept a proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an inter-governmental organization solution," once again reaffirming their belief in American exceptionalism: the NTIA could fulfil its role despite being a government, but now even a body involving multiple stakeholders can't replace the NTIA's role if it is going to be government-led.

Unfortunately, this announcement to relax American "stewardship" or "oversight" over some aspects of the Internet's technical functioning cannot restore the trust that has been lost due to actions taken by the US government and US companies. This new announcement won't change the US government's ability to 'tap' the Internet, nor will it affect their ability to unilaterally seize .com/.net/.name/.org/.edu/.tv/.cc/.us and other US-based domain names. Nor will a shift away from NTIA oversight lead to any of the chilling visions that some believe might lie in our future: the fears of the Association of National Advertisers and of some politicians and members of the US Congress is based on ignorance of what NTIA's role is.

The European Commission in a communiqué last month noted: "recent revelations of large-scale surveillance have called into question the stewardship of the U.S. when it comes to Internet governance". Unfortunately, the U.S. giving up that stewardship role will not prevent the continuation of their large-scale surveillance, just as the lack of such a stewardship role has not prevented other governments — U.K., India, Canada, Sweden, France, etc. — from engaging in large-scale surveillance.

There are three main benefits from the U.S. giving up this role.

First, it will put an end to the political illegitimacy of the U.S. government having a core authority in a global system, somehow making it first among equals;
Second, will focus light on ICANN, which under US oversight performs the IANA functions, and might, one hopes, lead to needed reform in ICANN's other functions;
Third, it will allow us to collectively move on from this dreaded political issue at the heart of Internet governance, which nevertheless is of little practical consequence if ICANN's accountability mechanisms are strengthened. As difficult as it may be, ICANN has to be accountable not just to one government or another but to the world, and ensuring that accountability to all doesn't become accountability to none, as NetChoice's Steve DelBianco put it, is the formidable task ahead of us.

Yet, all the ICANN reform in the world will still not lead to a less spied-upon, more open, and more equitable Internet.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ntia-to-give-up-control-of-internets-root

NETmundial: Tracking Multistakeholder across Contributions

sumandro — 2014-04-25T09:53:37Z

This set of analysis of the contributions submitted to NETmundial 2014 is part of the effort by the Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore, India, to enable productive discussions of the critical internet governance issues at the meeting and elsewhere.

Created by Sumandro using Google Charts.
Google Terms of Use and Data Policy.
Data compiled by Sumandro and Jyoti.
Download the data .

This scatter plot shows the number of times the word *multistakeholder* (including *multi-stakeholder* and *multistakeholderism*) appears across contributions submitted to NETmundial.

X axis (horizontal) gives the serial number of contributions and Y axis (vertical) gives the number of times the word appears on a contribution.

Click on the types of organisation below the chart to highlight the corresponding organisations on the chart.

The Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore, India, is a non-profit research organization that works on policy issues relating to freedom of expression, privacy, accessibility for persons with disabilities, access to knowledge and IPR reform, and openness, and engages in academic research on digital natives and digital humanities.

The visualisations are done by Sumandro Chattapadhyay, based on data compilation and analysis by Jyoti Panday, and with data entry suport from Chandrasekhar.

Built on Bootstrap by Sumandro

All code, content and data is co-owned by the author(s) and Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore, India, and shared under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 India license.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-tracking-multi-stakeholder-across-contributions

NETmundial Roadmap: Defining the Roles of Stakeholders in Multistakeholderism

jyoti — 2014-04-28T12:51:40Z

NETmundial, one of the most anticipated events in the Internet governance calendar, will see the global community convening at Sao Paolo, with an aim to establish 'strategic guidelines related to the use and development of the Internet in the world.' This post analyses the submissions at NETmundial that focused on Roadmap, towards an understanding of stakeholder roles in relation to specific governance functions and highlighting the political, technical and architectural possibilities that lie ahead.

Introduction

A technically borderless Internet, in a world defined by national boundaries, brings many challenges in its wake. The social, ethical and legal standards of all countries are affected by technical standards and procedures, created by a few global players. This disparity in capacity and opportunities to participate and shape Internet policy, fuelled by Edward Snowden's revelations led to the development of the Global Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance or NETmundial. Set against, an urgent need for interdisciplinary knowledge assessment towards establishing global guiding principles with respect to the technological architecture and the legal framework of the Internet–NETmundial is seen as a critical step in moving towards a global policy framework for Internet Governance (IG). As stakeholder groups from across the world come together to discuss future forms of governance, one of the most widely discussed issues will be that of Multistakeholderism (MSism).

Multistakeholderism

The governance structure of the Multistakeholder model is based on the notion, that stakeholders most impacted by decisions should be involved in the process of decision making. The collaborative multistakeholder spirit has been widely adopted within the Internet Governance fora, with proponents spread across regions and communities involved in the running, management and use of the Internet. So far, MSism has worked well in the coordination of technical networking standards and efforts to set norms and best practices in defined areas, in the realm of technical governance of the Internet. However, the extension of MSism beyond truly voluntary, decentralized and targeted contexts and expanding its applicability, to other substantive areas of Internet Governance is proving a challenge. Beyond defining how the process of policymaking should be undertaken, MSism does not provide any guidance on substantive policy issues of Internet governance. With the increasing impact of Internet technology on human lives and framed against the complexity of issues such as security, access and privacy, the consensus on MSism is further rendered unattainable.

The need for contextualizing the model aside, as with most policy negotiations certain open concepts and words have also prevented agreement and adoption of MSism as the best way forward for IG. One such open and perhaps, the most contentious issue with respect to the legitimacy of MSism in managing Internet functions is the role of stakeholders. A key element of MSism is that decisions will be made by and including all relevant stakeholders. Stakeholder groups are broadly classified to include governments, technical community and academia, private sector and civil society. With each stakeholder representing diverse and often conflicting interests, creating a consensus process that goes beyond a set of rules and practices promising a seat at the negotiation table and is supportive of broad public interest is a challenging task that needs urgent addressing.

This post aims to add to the discourse on defining the role and scope of stakeholders' decision-making powers, towards a better understanding of the term "in their respective role". Addressing the complexity of functions in managing and running the Internet and the diversity of stakeholders that are affected and hence should be included in decision making, I have limited the scope of my analysis to cover three broad internet management functions:

Technical: Issues related to infrastructure and the management of critical Internet resources
Policy: Issues relating to the developmental aspects, capacity building, bridging digital divide, human rights
Implementation: Issues relating to the use of the Internet including jurisdictional law, legislation spam, network security and cybercrime

While this may be an oversimplification of complex and interconnected layers of management and coordination, in my opinion, broad categorisation of issues is necessary, if not an ideal starting point for the purpose of this analysis. I have considered only the submissions categorised under the theme of Roadmap, seeking commonalities across stakeholder groups and regions on the role of stakeholders and their participation in the three broad functions of technology, policy and implementation.

Towards a definition of respective roles: Analysis NETmundial submissions on Roadmap

There were a total of 44 submissions specific to Roadmap with civil society (20) contributing more than any other group including academia (7), government (4), technical community (5), private sector (3) and other (5). MSism sees support across most stakeholder groups and many submissions highlight or agree on participation and inclusion in decision making processes.

Regionally, submissions from North (24) were dominated by USA (10) with contributions cutting across academia (4), civil society (2), technical community (2) and other (2). Brazil (5) contributed the most to submissions from South (15), followed by Argentina (3). The submissions were consistent with the gender disparity prevalent in the larger technology community with only 12 females contributing submissions. An overwhelming number of submissions (38), thought that the multistakeholder (MS) model needs further definition or improvements, however, suggestions on how best to achieve this varied widely across stakeholders and regional boundaries. Only 16 submissions referenced or suggested Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in its present capacity or with an expanded policy role as a mechanism of implementing MSism on the Internet.

Many submissions referred to issues related to the management of critical internet resources (CIRs), the role of ICANN and US oversight of IANA functions. A total of 11 submissions referred to or specified governance processes with respect to technical functions and issues related to critical resources with civil society (5) and academia (3) contributing the most. In an area that perhaps has the most direct relevance to their work, the technical community was conspicuous with just two submissions making any concrete recommendations. The European Commission was the only governmental organisation that addressed this issue, recommending an expansion of the role of IGF. There were no specific recommendations from the private sector.

The suggestions on oversight and decision making mechanism were most conflicted for this category of Internet functions and included:

setting up a technical advisory group, positioned within a new intergovernmental body World Internet Organization (WIO) framework;
splitting IANA functions into protocol parameters, that Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) will be responsible for and IP address-related functions retained by ICANN
expanding the role of IGF, possibly creating an IGF Secretariat
expanding the role of Government Advisory Committee (GAC) to mainstream government representatives participation within supporting organisations, in particular the Generic Name Supporting Organisation (GNRO)
expanding the role of private sector
expanding the role of ICANN with multistakeholder values
expanding the role of all stakeholders
implementing changes that do not necessarily require legislative acts or similar hard law approaches and implementation does not necessitate international treaties or intergovernmental structures
establishing a new non-profit corporation DNS Authority (DNSA) combining the IANA Functions and the Root Zone Maintainer roles in
improving transparency and accountability of current bodies managing CIRs

16 submissions referred to issues related to policy development and implementation including developmental aspects, capacity building, bridging digital divide and human rights. All submissions called for a reform or further definition of MSism and included recommendations from civil society (5), academia (4), technical community (2), governments (2), private sector (1) and Other (2). All stakeholder groups across regions, unanimously agreed that all stakeholders within their respective role should have a role in decision making and within public policy functions. There was however, no broad consensus on the best way to achieve this.

Specific recommendations and views captured on who should be involved in policy related decision making and what possible frameworks could be developed included:

improving existing intergovernmental organizations
creating Internet Ad Hoc Group
modularization of ICANN’s functions
creating a stewardship group IETF, ICANN and the RIRs
creating an independent IANA as an International NGO with host country agreements governed by its MOUs-defined by the IANA Stewardship Group prior to the signing of MOUs with IANA Partners
creating a 'new body' to develop international level public policies in concerned areas; seek appropriate harmonization of national level policies; and facilitate required treaties, conventions and agreements
responsibility of the definition of these policies rests within the States as an inalienable right
continuity of bottom-up oversight enables a better view of an organization and thus better accountability as government oversight will destroy multistakeholder character
evolving global governance norms that separate DNS maintenance from policies on TLDs, as well as public policies that intersect with nations’ rights to make them
policy makers incrementally develop formal and informal relationships
dealing with conflict of interest and ensuring pluralism
full multi-stakeholder framework including possible establishment of Working Groups where all parties concerned are represented

18 submissions referred to issues related to the implementation of standards including issues relating to the use of the Internet including jurisdiction, law, legislation, spam, network security and cybercrime. All submissions called for a reform or further definition of MSism values and included recommendations from civil society (8), academia (3), technical community (3), governments (2), private sector (1) and other (1). Stakeholders from academia (5), civil society (3) and government (1) collectively called for the reform of ICANN guided by multistakeholder values, but did not specify how this reform would be achieved.

Specific recommendations on the improvements of institutional frameworks and arrangements for issues related to implementation of standards included:

establishment of double system of arbitrage/settlement placed under World Internet Forum (WIF) scrutiny and under the neutral oversight and arbitrage of the UN general secretariat
new legal instruments in establishing MS model need to be adopted
establishment of the Internet Technical Oversight and Advisory Board (ITOAB) replace the US government's current oversight role
multilateral frameworks with oversight role of governments

In summation, the classification of Internet functions discussed above, presents a very broad view of complex, dynamic and often, interrelated relationships amongst stakeholder groups. However, even within these very broad categories there are various interpretations of how MSism should evolve.

To come back to the very beginning of this post, NETmundial is an important step towards a global policy framework for Internet governance. This is the first meeting outside formal processes and it is difficult to know what to expect, partly as the expectations are not clear and range widely across stakeholders. Whatever the outcome, NETmundial's real contribution to Internet Governance has been sparking anew, the discourse on multistakeholderism and its application on the Internet through the creation of a spontaneous order amongst diverse actors and providing a common platform for divergent views to come together.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-roadmap-defining-roles-of-stakeholders-in-multistakeholderism

NETmundial Day 2

achal — 2014-04-25T04:58:26Z

Fadi Chehade, the ICANN boss, closed NETmundial 2014 with these words "In Africa we say if you want to go first, go alone, but if you want to go far, go together." He should have added: And if you want to go nowhere, go multi-stakeholder.

For all the talk of an inclusive global meeting, there was exactly one governmental submission from the African continent, and it was from Tunisia; and the overall rate of submissions from Africa and West Asia were generally very low.

The outcome document perfectly reflects the gloss that the "multi-stakeholder" model was designed to achieve: an outcome that is celebrated by businesses (and by all embedded institutions like ICANN) for being harmless, met with relief by governments for not upsetting the status quo, all of it lit up in the holy glow of "consensus" from civil society.

Of course there was no consensus. Civil society groups who organised on Day 0 put up their position: the shocking omission of a strong case for net neutrality, ambiguous language on surveillance, weak defences of free expression and privacy. All valid points. But it's striking that civil society takes such a pliant position towards authority: other than exactly two spirited protests (one against the data retention in Marco Civil, and the other against the NSA's mass surveillance program) there was no confrontation, no provocation, no passionate action that would give civil society the force it needs to win. If we were to compare this to other international struggles, the gay rights battle, or its successor, the AIDS medicines movement, for instance - what a difference there is. People fought to crush with powerful, forceful action. Only after huge victories with public and media sympathy, and only after turning themselves into equals of the corporations and governments they were fighting, did they allow themselves to sit down at the table and negotiate nicely. Internet governance fora are marked by politeness and passivity, and perhaps - however sad - it's no wonder that the least powerful groups in these fora always come away disappointed.

It's also surprising that there is no language in the outcome document that explicitly addresses the censorious threat posed by the global expansion of a sovereign application of copyright, as seen most vividly in the proposed SOPA/PIPA legislation in the United States. The outcome document has language that seems to more or less reflect the civil society proposal, and it's possible that a generous interpretation of the language could mean that it opposes the selective, restrictive and damaging application of what the intellectual property industries want to accomplish on the Internet. But it's puzzling that the language isn't stronger or more explicit, and even more puzzling that civil society doesn't seem to want to fight for such language.

This seems like an appropriate time to end the multi-stakeholder diaries. Hasn't the word been used enough? Here is one last instalment. We thank the kind folks who gave us their time.

Q: What does "multi-stakeholder" mean? What is "multi-stakeholderism"?

A large part of the discourse prior to the NETmundial conference has been centered around the issue of what is the best structural system to regulate a global network – this has commonly been portrayed as a choice between a multistakeholder system – which broadly speaking, aims to place ‘all stakeholders’ on equal footing – against multilateralism – a recognized concept in International law / the Comity of Nation States, where a nation state is recognized as the representative of its citizens, making decisions on their behalf and in their interests.

In our opinion, the issue is not about the dichotomy between multilateralism and multistakeholderism; it is about what functions or issues can legitimately be dealt with through each of the processes in terms of adequately protecting civil liberties and other public interest principles – including the appropriate enforcement of norms. For instance, how do you deal with something like cyber warfare without the consent of states? Similarly, how do we address regulatory issues such as determining (and possibly subsidizing) costs of access, or indeed to protect a right of a country against unilateral disconnection?

.....The crux of the matter rests in deciding which is the best governance ‘basket’ to include a particular issue within – taken from both a substantive and enforcement perspective. The challenge is trying to demarcate issues to ensure that each is dealt with effectively by placing it in an appropriate bucket. (The full post can be accessed here).
Rishab Bailey from the Society for Knowledge Commons (India)

If I would have signed the campaign http://wepromise.eu as a candidate to the European Parliament I would have made it an election promise to defend "the principle of multistakeholderism".

That means that I "support free, open, bottom-up, and multi-stakeholder models of coordinating the Internet resources and standards - names, numbers, addresses etc" and that I "support measures which seek to ensure the capacity of representative civil society to participate in multi-stakeholder forums." Further, I "oppose any attempts by corporate, governmental or intergovernmental agencies to take control of Internet governance."

My very rudimentary personal view is basically that it's a bad idea to institutionalise conflicting competences.
Erik Josefsson, Adviser on Internet policies for the Greens/EFA group in the European Parliament

And so it ends.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-day-2

NETmundial Day 1

achal — 2014-04-24T09:02:49Z

Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff's speech at the opening of NETmundial in São Paulo was refreshingly free of the UN-speak that characterised virtually every single other presentation this morning. The experience of sitting for five hours in a room where the word "multi-stakeholder" is repeated at the rate of five mentions per minute is not for the faint-hearted; it almost makes you wish for more of the straight-talking tough-love of people like Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt.

Surveillance was mentioned by a few brave souls. Two peaceful, silent - and rather effective - protests broke out during the opening speeches; one, against the data retention clause in Brazil's otherwise path-breaking and brand-new law for civil rights on the Internet, Marco Civil, and another for honouring US NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden and urging action against surveillance. Sadly for Brazilian civil society, the Marco Civil protestations went unheard, and Rousseff signed the bill into law in full.

There were lots of speeches. Lots. If you missed them, here's a handy visualisation you can use to catch up quickly: just add some prepositions and conjunctions, and you'll have a perfectly anodyne and universally acceptable bureaucrat/politician keynote address.

The afternoon was given over to assimilating previously received comments on the outcome document and adding new ones from people in the room. Much contention, much continuity, lots of hard work, lots of nitpicking (some of it even useful) and lots of ambiguity; after more consultation - the slog goes on until tomorrow afternoon - the outcome document will be laid to rest. Lunch was excellent: there's a reason the Grand Hyatt São Paulo costs as much as it does.

Our quest to plumb the depths of multi-stakeholderism continued: we thank the kind folks who gave us their time and allowed us to record them.

Q: What does "multi-stakeholder" mean? What is "multi-stakeholderism"?

Multi-stakeholderism to me is the ability to engage with every stakeholder and have them in the room, and have them understand that it is not an equal opportunity for all. I also understand that civil society and academia will never be at the same place as business, which has far more resources, or governments, which have the sovereign right to make laws, or even the technical community, which is often missing from the policy dialogue. There are three things which are important to me: (1) Will I be able to make interventions not just in the dialogue but in the decision making process? For me, that is key. (2) Do I have recourse in a process which might be multilateral or inter-governmental - do I have recourse when international treaties are ratified or signed, because they become binding national laws? and (3) What is it that happens to dissent in a process that is not multi-stakeholder? I think even the ITU (the International Telecommunications Union) has taken cognizance of multi-stakeholderism. So it's not new, but it's also not old or accepted, which is why we contest it. We will never have equal stakeholders. And who gets to represent the stakeholder communities? I don't think power imbalances get resolved, and I think it's a deeply flawed process. It's not perfect. But what worries me is the alternative. So give me a better alternative.
Subi Chaturvedi, Media for Change/ Lady Shriram College (India)

Simply put, multi means many components, and stakeholders are people who have the stakes. So multi-stakeholder means many people who are informed to take the process forward. The process is still on: it's evolving. The idea is that everyone who has an interest should bring it forward, and the dialogue must be balanced. Proof of concept is important - it's not about taking a dogmatic position but a scientific position. Business is concerned about the justification around return on investment.
Jimson Olufuye, Africa ICT Alliance (Nigeria)

Everyone who has a stake in the use and operation of the Internet should have a stake in the way it is managed. I think we shouldn't be considering this as a power game - it's not winner takes all. Decision making should be as much as possible consensual, where no one has a veto power.
Getachew Engida, Deputy Director-General, UNESCO (France)

It is very simple. I think people are complicating matters. It's not a power game. The Internet is fundamentally a global network of interconnected computers. People have become not only consumers of information but providers of information, so the stakes in the media/ICT world are massive. Unprecedented. Therefore, around major issues confronting the Internet, decision making should be as participatory as possible.
Indrajit Banerjee, Director, UNESCO (France)

Additional Links

Watch Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff's speech at the opening of NETmundial
Follow Swedish foreign minister Carl Bildt on Twitter

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-day-1

NETmundial and Suggestions for IANA Administration

smarika — 2014-04-23T04:00:49Z

Following NTIA's announcement to give up control over critical Internet functions, the discussion on how that role should be filled has gathered steam across the Internet governance space.

This post maps the discussion across the NETmundial submissions and presents six emerging evolution scenarios related to the IANA functions:

Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body
Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body
No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body
No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body
Multiplication of TLD registries and root servers
Maintenance of status quo

I. Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body

The proposal under this category demands for the separation of IANA function from technical policy making, and suggests that the IANA function be transferred to an intergovernmental body.

Such proposal is listed below:

Sl.No.	Proposal No.	Name of Proposal	Organization	Sector	Region	Link
1	186	The Next Best Stage for the Future of Internet Governance is Democracy	Global Geneva	Civil Society	Geneva, Switzerland	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/the-next-best-stage-for-the-future-of-internet-governance-is-democracy/305

This proposal by Global Geneva seeks the establishment of an intergovernmental organisation called World Internet Organisation (WIO), under which IANA (which is understood to be essentially technical and concerning safety and security of the Internet would be located. WIO would additionally have a special link/status/contract with IANA to avoid unwanted interference from governments. A 75% majority at WIO would be requested to act/modify/contest an IANA decision, making it difficult for governments to go beyond reasonable and consensual demands. WIO would act in concert with World Internet Forum, under which ICANN would be located, whereby it would make policy decisions regarding gTLDs apart from its other present functions.

II. Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body

There are certain proposals whereby it is proposed that IANA function should be separated from technical policy making, or ICANN, and IANA function, which is perceived to be a purely administrative one in such submissions, should be handed over to some sort of non-multilateral organisation, which take different forms in each proposal.

Most such submissions have emerged from the civil society or the technical community.

The Internet Governance Project submission envisions the creation of a DNS Authority under whose umbrella IANA would function. The DNS Authority would be separate from ICANN. This proposal has been endorsed by the submissions of InternetNZ as well as Article 19 and Best Bits. Avri Doria’s submission, along with the submission of APC, envisions the establishment of an independent IANA, separate from the technical policy function. Such independence is sought to be preceded by a transition period by a body called IANA Stewardship Group which would be constituted mostly by members from the technical community. IANA is sought to be governed via MoUs with all stakeholders, on the same lines as the MoU between ICANN and the IETF, as described in RFC2860, RFC6220. The focus of these MoUs would not be policy but will be on performance and adherence to service level agreements.

These submissions are listed below:

Sl. No.	Proposal No.	Name of Proposal	Organisation	Sector	Region	Link
1	19	Roadmap for Globalising IANA: Four Principles and a Proposal for Reform	Internet Governance Project	Civil Society	North America	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-globalizing-iana-four-principles-and-a-proposal-for-reform-a-submission-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/96
2	26	Roadmap for the Further Evolution of the Internet Governance Ecosystem- ICANN	Article 19 and Best Bits	Civil Society	Global	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem-icann/109
3	42	Content Contribution to NetMundial on the Roadmap for the Futher Evolution of the IG Ecosystem regarding the Internationalisation of the IANA Function	InternetNZ	Technical Community	New Zealand	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/content-contribution-to-netmundial-on-the-roadmap-for-the-futher-evolution-of-the-ig-ecosystem-regarding-the-internationalisation-of-the-iana-function/130
4	60	One Possible Roadmap for IANA Evolution	Avri Doria, Independent Researcher	Other	USA	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/one-possible-roadmap-for-iana-evolution/153
5	162	APC Proposals for the Further Evolution of the Internet Governance Ecosystem	Association for Progressive Communications (APC)	Civil Society	APC is an international organisation with its executive director's office in South Africa	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/apc-proposals-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/280

III. No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body

These submissions propose that the IANA function should come under a multilateral body. However they do not suggest the separation of IANA function from policymaking, or from ICANN; or they are at least silent on this latter issue. 2 such proposals come from the civil society and 2 from the government.

A list of these submissions is provided below:

Sl. No.	Proposal No.	Name of Proposal	Organisation	Sector	Region	Link
1	8	Roadmaps for Further Evolution of Internet Governance	Association for Proper Internet Governance	Civil Society	Switzerland	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmaps-for-further-evolution-of-internet-governance/65
2	45	Russian Parliament Submission to NET mundial	State Duma of the Russian Federation (Parliament of the Russia)	Government	Russian Federation	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/themes/133
3	121	Contribution from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Global Multiskaeholder (sic) Meeting for the Future of the Internet, 23-24 April 2014 Sao Paulo, Brazil	Cyber Space National Center, Iran	Government	Islamic Republic of Iran	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-from-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-to-the-global-multiskaeholder-meeting-for-the-future-of-the-internet-23-24-april-2014-sao-paolo-brazil/236
4	125	Towards Reform of Global Internet Governance	The Society for Knowledge Commons	Civil Society	India and Brazil	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/towards-reform-of-global-internet-governance/240

IV. No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body

These submissions do not consider the issue of separation of IANA function from policymaking, or ICANN, or at least do not state an opinion on the separation of IANA function from ICANN. However, they do suggest that the control of IANA should be held by a non-multilateral body, and not the US Government.

Many of these submissions also suggest that the oversight of ICANN should be done by a non-multilateral body, therefore it makes sense that the IANA function is administered by a non-multilateral body, without its removal from the ICANN umbrella.

A list of such submissions is provided below:

Sl.No.	Proposal No.	Name of Proposal	Organisation	Sector	Region	Link
1	46	Norwegian Contribution to the Sao Paulo Meeting	Norwegian government	Government	Norway, Europe	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/norwegian-government/137
2	50	Contribution from the GSM Association to the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance	GSMA	Private Sector	Global	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-from-the-gsm-association-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/141
3	51	Contribution of Telefonica to NETmundial	Telefonica, S.A.	Private Sector	Spain	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/contribution-of-telefonica-to-netmundial/143
4	56	ETNO Contribution to NETmundial	ETNO [European Telecommunications Network Operators' Association]	Private Sector	Belgium	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/etno-contribution-to-netmundial/148
5	61	French Government Submission to NETmundial	French Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Government	France	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/french-government-submission-to-netmundial/154
6	63	Nominet Submission on Internet Governance Principles and the Roadmap	Nominet	Private Sector	UK	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/nominet-submission-on-internet-governance-principles-and-the-roadmap/156
7	64	Submission by AHCIET to the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance. NETmundial	AHCIET	Private Sector	Latin America	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/submission-by-ahciet-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance-netmundial/157
8	70	Spanish Government Contribution to the Global Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance	Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism, Spain	Government	Spain	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/multistakeholder-human-rights-stability-gac/165
9	80	Roadmap for the Further Evolution of the Internet Governance Ecosystem	European Commission	Government	Europe	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/177
10	94	Roadmap for the Future Development of the Internet Governance Ecosystem	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina	Government	Argentina	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/roadmap-for-the-future-development-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/196
11	97	Orange Contribution for NETmundial	Orange Group	Private Sector	Deputy to the Chief Regulatory Officer Orange Group	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/orange/199
12	106	Submission on Internet Governance Principles and Roadmap for the Further Evolution of the Internet Governance Ecosystem	Kuwait Information Technology Society	Civil Society	Kuwait	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/kuwait-information-technology-society-kits-submission-on-internet-governance-principles-and-roadmap-for-the-further-evolution-of-the-internet-governance-ecosystem/214
13	111	Content Submission by the Federal Government of Mexico	Secretara de Comunicaciones y Transportes, Mexico	Government	Mexico	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/content-submission-by-the-federal-government-of-mexico/219
14	114	Better Understanding and Co-operation for Internet Governance Principles and Its Roadmap	Japan Internet Service Providers Association	Private Sector	Japan	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/better-understanding-cooperation-for-internet-governance-principles-its-roadmap/222
15	116	Deutsche Telekom’s Contribution for to the Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance	Deutsche Telekom AG	Private Sector	Germany / Europe	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/deutsche-telekom-s-contribution-for-to-the-global-multistakeholder-meeting-on-the-future-of-internet-governance/225
16	148	NRO Contribution to NETmundial	NRO (for AFRINIC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC, RIPE-NCC)	Technical Community	Mauritius	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/nro-contribution-to-netmundial/259
17	146	Evolution and Internationalisation of ICANN	CGI.br- Brazilian Internet Steering Committee	Other	Brazil	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/evolution-and-internationalization-of-icann/263
18	176	Addressing Three Prominent “How To” Questions on the Internet Governance Ecosystem Future	Luis Magalhes, Professor at IST of University of Lisbon, Portugal; Panelist of ICANN’s Strategy Panel on the Role in the Internet Governance System	Academia	Portugal	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/addressing-three-prominent-how-to-questions-on-the-internet-governance-ecosystem-future/294
19	183	NETmundial Content Submission- endorsed by NIC Mexico	NIC Mexico	Technical Community	Mexico	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/netmundial-content-submission-endorsed-by-nic-mexico/302

V. Multiplication of TLD registries and Root Servers

These submissions are based on the assumption that reform in the current ICANN/IANA administrative structure is impossible as the US government is unlikely to give up its oversight role over both. Instead, these submissions suggest that multiple TLD registries and root servers should be created as alternatives to today’s IANA/ICANN so that a healthy market competition can be fostered in this area, rather than fostering monopoly of IANA.

A list of such submissions is provided below:

Sl.No.	Proposal No.	Name of Proposal	Organisation	Sector	Region	Link
1	41	Internet Governance: What Next?	EUROLINC	Civil Society	France, Europe	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/internet-governance-what-next/129
2	175	The Intergovernance of the InterPLUS	INTLNET	Civil Society	France	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/the-intergovernance-of-the-interplus/293

VI. Maintenance of status quo

These submissions are based on the “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” principle, and are of the opinion that there is no need to change the administration of IANA function as it functions efficiently in the current system.

A list of such submissions is provided below:

Sl.No.	Proposal No.	Name of Proposal	Organisation	Sector	Region	Link
1	12	United Kingdom Government Submission	Department For Culture Media and Sport, United Kingdom Government	Government	Government	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/united-kingdom-government-submission/79
2	133	Perspectives from the Domain Name Association	Domain Name Association	Private Sector	Private Sector	http://content.netmundial.br/contribution/perspectives-from-the-domain-name-association/249

Read more on ICANN/IANA: Role and Structural Considerations (PDF Document, 1215 Kb)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-mundial-and-suggestions-for-iana-administration

Net Freedom Campaign Loses its Way

sunil — 2014-05-27T11:07:04Z

A recent global meet was a victory for governments and the private sector over civil society interests.

The article was published in the Hindu Businessline on May 10, 2014.

One word to describe NetMundial: Disappointing! Why? Because despite the promise, human rights on the Internet are still insufficiently protected. Snowden’s revelations starting last June threw the global Internet governance processes into crisis.

Things came to a head in October, when Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff, horrified to learn that she was under NSA surveillance for economic reasons, called for the organisation of a global conference called NetMundial to accelerate Internet governance reform.

The NetMundial was held in São Paulo on April 23-24 this year. The result was a statement described as “the non-binding outcome of a bottom-up, open, and participatory process involving … governments, private sector, civil society, technical community, and academia from around the world.” In other words — it is international soft law with no enforcement mechanisms.

The statement emerges from “broad consensus”, meaning governments such as India, Cuba and Russia and civil society representatives expressed deep dissatisfaction at the closing plenary. Unlike an international binding law, only time will tell whether each member of the different stakeholder groups will regulate itself.

Again, not easy, because the outcome document does not specifically prescribe what each stakeholder can or cannot do — it only says what internet governance (IG) should or should not be. And finally, there’s no global consensus yet on the scope of IG. The substantive consensus was disappointing in four important ways:

Mass surveillance : Civil society was hoping that the statement would make mass surveillance illegal. After all, global violation of the right to privacy by the US was the raison d'être of the conference.

Instead, the statement legitimised “mass surveillance, interception and collection” as long as it was done in compliance with international human rights law. This was clearly the most disastrous outcome.

Access to knowledge: The conference was not supposed to expand intellectual property rights (IPR) or enforcement of these rights. After all, a multilateral forum, WIPO, was meant to address these concerns. But in the days before the conference the rights-holders lobby went into overdrive and civil society was caught unprepared.

The end result — “freedom of information and access to information” or right to information in India was qualified “with rights of authors and creators”. The right to information laws across the world, including in India, contains almost a dozen exemptions, including IPR. The only thing to be grateful for is that this limitation did not find its way into the language for freedom of expression.

Intermediary liability: The language that limits liability for intermediaries basically provides for a private censorship regime without judicial oversight, and without explicit language protecting the rights to freedom of expression and privacy. Even though the private sector chants Hillary Clinton's Internet freedom mantra — they only care for their own bottomlines.

Net neutrality: Even though there was little global consensus, some optimistic sections of civil society were hoping that domestic best practice on network neutrality in Brazil’s Internet Bill of Right — also known as Marco Civil, that was signed into law during the inaugural ceremony of NetMundial — would make it to the statement. Unfortunately, this did not happen.

For almost a decade since the debate between the multi-stakeholder and multilateral model started, the multi-stakeholder model had produced absolutely nothing outside ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, a non-profit body), its technical fraternity and the standard-setting bodies.

The multi-stakeholder model is governance with the participation (and consent — depending on who you ask) of those stakeholders who are governed. In contrast, in the multilateral system, participation is limited to nation-states.

Civil society divisions

The inability of multi-stakeholderism to deliver also resulted in the fragmentation of global civil society regulars at Internet Governance Forums.

But in the run-up to NetMundial more divisions began to appear. If we ignore nuances — we could divide them into three groups. One, the ‘outsiders’ who are best exemplified by Jérémie Zimmermann of the La Quadrature du Net. Jérémie ran an online campaign, organised a protest during the conference and did everything he could to prevent NetMundial from being sanctified by civil society consensus.

Two, the ‘process geeks’ — for these individuals and organisations process was more important than principles. Most of them were as deeply invested in the multi-stakeholder model as ICANN and the US government and some who have been riding the ICANN gravy train for years.

Even worse, some were suspected of being astroturfers bootstrapped by the private sector and the technical community. None of them were willing to rock the boat. For the ‘process geeks’, seeing politicians and bureaucrats queue up like civil society to speak at the mike was the crowning achievement.

Three, the ‘principles geeks’ perhaps best exemplified by the Just Net Coalition who privileged principles over process. Divisions were also beginning to sharpen within the private sector. For example, Neville Roy Singham, CEO of Thoughtworks, agreed more with civil society than he did with other members of the private sector in his interventions.

In short, the ‘outsiders’ couldn't care less about the outcome and will do everything to discredit it, the ‘process geeks’ stood in ovation when the outcome document was read at the closing plenary and the ‘principles geeks’ returned devastated.

For the multi-stakeholder model to survive it must advance democratic values, not undermine them.

This will only happen if there is greater transparency and accountability. Individuals, organisations and consortia that participate in Internet governance processes need to disclose lists of donors including those that sponsor travel to these meetings.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/the-hindu-business-line-may-10-2014-sunil-abraham-net-freedom-campaign-loses-its-way

Navigating the 'Reconsideration' Quagmire (A Personal Journey of Acute Confusion)

Padmini Baruah and Geetha Hariharan — 2016-11-30T13:48:41Z

An earlier analysis of ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy already brought to light our concerns about the lack of transparency in ICANN’s internal mechanisms. Carrying my research forward, I sought to arrive at an understanding of the mechanisms used to appeal a denial of DIDP requests. In this post, I aim to provide a brief account of my experiences with the Reconsideration Request process that ICANN provides for as a tool for appeal.

Backdrop: What is the Reconsideration Request Process?

The Reconsideration Request process has been laid down in Article IV, Section 2 of the

ICANN Bylaws. Some of the key aspects of this provision have been outlined below^{^[1]},

ICANN is obligated to institute a process by which a person materially affected by ICANN action/inaction can request review or reconsideration.

To file this request, one must have been adversely affected by actions of the staff or the board that contradict ICANN’s policies, or actions of the Board taken up without the Board considering material information, or actions of the Board taken up by relying on false information.
A separate Board Governance Committee was created with the specific mandate of reviewing Reconsideration requests, and conducting all the tasks related to the same.
The Reconsideration Request must be made within 15 days of:
- FOR CHALLENGES TO BOARD ACTION: the date on which information about the challenged Board action is first published in a resolution, unless the posting of the resolution is not accompanied by a rationale, in which case the request must be submitted within 15 days from the initial posting of the rationale;
- FOR CHALLENGES TO STAFF ACTION: the date on which the party submitting the request became aware of, or reasonably should have become aware of, the challenged staff action, and
- FOR CHALLENGES TO BOARD OR STAFF INACTION: the date on which the affected person reasonably concluded, or reasonably should have concluded, that action would not be taken in a timely manner

.The Board Governance Committee is given the power to summarily dismiss a reconsideration request if:
- the requestor fails to meet the requirements for bringing a Reconsideration Request;
- it is frivolous, querulous or vexatious; or
- the requestor had notice and opportunity to, but did not, participate in the public comment period relating to the contested action, if applicable

If not summarily dismissed, the Board Governance Committee proceeds to review and reconsider.
A requester may ask for an opportunity to be heard, and the decision of the Board Governance Committee in this regard is final.

The basis of the Board Governance Committee’s action is public written record information submitted by the requester, by third parties, and so on.
The Board Governance Committee is to take a decision on the matter and make a final determination or recommendation to the Board within 30 days of the receipt of the Reconsideration request, unless it is impractical to do so, and it is accountable to the Board to make an explanation of the circumstances that caused the delay.
The determination is to be made public and posted on the ICANN website.

ICANN has provided a neat infographic to explain this process in a simple fashion, and I am reproducing it here:

(Image taken from https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/accountability/reconsiderationen)

Our Tryst with the Reconsideration Process

The Grievance
Our engagement with the Reconsideration process began with the rejection of two of our requests (made on September 1, 2015) under ICANN’s Documentary Information Disclosure Policy. The requests sought information about the registry and registrar compliance audit process that ICANN maintains, and asked for various documents pertaining to the same^{^[2]}:

Copies of the registry/registrar contractual compliance audit reports for all the audits carried out as well as external audit reports from the last year (20142015).
A generic template of the notice served by ICANN before conducting such an audit.
A list of the registrars/registries to whom such notices were served in the last year.
An account of the expenditure incurred by ICANN in carrying out the audit process.
A list of the registrars/registries that did not respond to the notice within a reasonable period of time.
Reports of the site visits conducted by ICANN to ascertain compliance.
Documents which identify the registries/registrars who had committed material discrepancies in the terms of the contract.
Documents pertaining to the actions taken in the event that there was found to be some form of contractual noncompliance.
A copy of the registrar selfassessment form which is to be submitted to ICANN.

ICANN integrated both the requests and addressed them via one response on 1 October, 2015 (which can be found here). In their response, ICANN inundated us with already available links on their website explaining the compliance audit process, and the processes ancillary to it, as well as the broad goals of the programme none of which was sought for by us in our request. ICANN then went on to provide us with information on their ThreeYear Audit programme, and gave us access to some of the documents that we had sought, such as the preaudit notification template, list of registries/registrars that received an audit notification, the expenditure incurred to some extent, and so on .

Individual contracted party reports were denied to us on the basis of their grounds for nondisclosure. Further, and more disturbingly, ICANN refused to provide us with the names of the contracted parties who had been found under the audit process to have committed discrepancies. Therefore, a large part of our understanding of the way in which the compliance audit process works remains unfinished.

What we did

Dissatisfied with this response, I went on to file a Reconsideration request (number 1522) as per their standard format on November 2, 2015. (The request filed can be accessed here).As grounds for reconsideration, I stated that “As a part of my research I was tracking the ICANN compliance audit process, and therefore required access to audit reports in cases where discrepancies where formally found in their actions. This is in the public interest and therefore requires to be disclosed...While providing us with an array of detailed links explaining the compliance audit process, the ICANN staff has not been able to satisfy our actual requests with respect to gaining an understanding of how the compliance audits help in regulating actions of the registrars, and how they are effective in preventing breaches and discrepancies.” Therefore, I requested them to make the records in question publicly available “We request ICANN to make the records in question, namely the audit reports for individual contracted parties that reflect discrepancies in contractual compliance, which have been formally recognised as a part of your enforcement process. We further request access to all documents that relate to the expenditure incurred by ICANN in the process, as we believe financial transparency is absolutely integral to the values that ICANN stands by.”

The Board Governance Committee’s response³

The determination of the Board Governance Committee was that our claims did not merit reconsideration, as I was unable to identify any “misapplication of policy or procedure by the ICANN Staff”, and my only issue was with the substance of the DIDP Response itself, and substantial disagreements with a DIDP response are not proper bases for reconsideration

(emphasis supplied).

The response of the Board Governance Committee was educative of the ways in which they determine Reconsideration Requests. Analysing the DIDP process, it held that ICANN was well within its powers to deny information under its defined Conditions for NonDisclosure, and denial of substantive information did not amount to a procedural violation. Therefore, since the staff adhered to established procedure under the DIDP, there was no basis for our grievance, and our request was dismissed..

Furthermore, as a postscript, it is interesting to note that the Board Governance Committee delayed its response time by over a month, by its own admission “In terms of the timing of the BGC’s recommendation, it notes that Section 2.16 of Article IV of the Bylaws provides that the BGC shall make a final determination or recommendation with respect to a reconsideration request within thirty days, unless impractical. To satisfy the thirtyday deadline, the BGC would have to have acted by 2 December 2015. However, due to the timing of the BGC’s meetings in November and December, the first practical opportunity for the BGC to consider Request 1522 was 13 January 2016.”⁴

Whither do I wander now?

To me, this entire process reflected the absurdity of the Reconsideration request structure as an appeal mechanism under the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy. As our experience indicated, there does not seem to be any way out if there is an issue with the substance of ICANN’s response. ICANN, commendably, is particular about following procedure with respect to the DIDP. However, what is the way forward for a party aggrieved by the flaws in the existing policy? As I had analysed earlier, the grounds for ICANN to not disclose information are vast, and used to deny a large chunk of the information requests that they receive. How is the hapless requester to file a meaningful appeal against the outcome of a bad policy, if the only ground for appeal is noncompliance with the procedure of said bad policy? This is a serious challenge to transparency as there is no other way for a requester to acquire information that ICANN may choose to withold under one of its myriad clauses. It cannot be denied that a good information disclosure law ought to balance the free disclosure of information with the holding back of information that truly needs to be kept private.^{^[3]}^{^[4]} However, it is this writer’s firm opinion that even instances where information is witheld, there has to be a stronger explanation for the same, and moreover, an appeals process that does not take into account substantive issues which might adversely affect the appellant falls short of the desirable levels of transparency. Global standards dictate that grounds for appeal need to be broad, so that all failures to apply the information disclosure law/policy may be remedied.⁶ Various laws across the world relating to information disclosure often have the following as grounds for appeal: an inability to lodge a request, failure to respond to a request within the set time frame, a refusal to disclose information, in whole or in part, excessive fees and not providing information in the form sought, as well as a catchall clause for other failures.⁷

Furthermore, independent oversight is the heart of a proper appeal mechanism in such situations^{^[5]}; the power to decide the appeal must not rest with those who also have the discretion to disclose the information, as is clearly the case with ICANN, where the Board Governance Committee is constituted and appointed by the ICANN Board itself [one of the bodies against whom a grievance may be raised].

Suggestions

We believe ICANN, in keeping with its global, multistakeholder, accountable spirit, should adopt these standards as well, especially now that the transition looms around the corner. Only then will the standards of open, transparent and accountable governance of the Internet upheld by ICANN itself as the ideal be truly, meaningfully realised. Accordingly, the following standards ought to be met with:

Establishment of an independent appeals authority for information disclosure cases
Broader grounds for appeal of DIDP requests
Inclusion of disagreement with the substantive content of a DIDP response as a ground for appeal.
Provision of proper reasoning for any justification of the witholding of information that is necessary in the public interest.

[1] Article IV, Section 2, ICANN Bylaws, 2014 available at https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/governance/bylawsen/#IV

[2] Copies of the request can be found here and here.

[3] Katherine Chekouras, Balancing National Security with a Community's RighttoKnow: Maintaining

Public Access to Environmental Information Through EPCRA 's NonPreemption Clause, 34 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev 107, (2007).

[4] Toby Mendel, Freedom of Information: A Comparative Legal Study 151 (2nd edn, 2008).

Id, at 152

³4 Available here. https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/reconsideration1522cisfinaldetermination13jan16en.pdf

[5] Mendel, supra note 6.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/navigating-reconsideration-quagmire-a-personal-journey-of-acute-confusion

Multi-stakeholder Models of Internet Governance within States: Why, Who & How?

geetha — 2014-06-16T14:27:38Z

Internet governance, for long a global exercise, has found new awareness within national frameworks in recent times. Especially relevant for developing countries, effective national IG mechanisms are important to raise awareness and ensure multi-stakeholder participation at technical, infrastructural and public policy levels.

This post is a surface-level overview of national IG bodies, and is intended to inform introductory thoughts on national IG mechanisms.

A Short Introduction

The previous decade has seen a proliferation of regional, sub-regional and national initiatives for Internet governance (IG). Built primarily on the multi-stakeholder model, these initiatives aim at creating dialogue on issues of regional, local or municipal importance. In Asia, Bangladesh has instituted a national IGF, the Bangladesh IGF, with the stated objective of creating a national multi-stakeholder forum that is specialized in Internet governance issues, and to facilitate informed dialogue on IG policy issues among stakeholders. India, too, is currently in the process of instituting such a forum. At this juncture, it is useful to consider the rationale and modalities of national IG bodies.

The Internet has long been considered a sphere of non-governmental, multi-stakeholder, decentralized, bottom-up governance space. The Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace, John Perry Barlow’s defiant articulation of the Internet’s freedom from governmental control, is a classic instance of this. The Internet is a “vast ocean”, we claimed; “no one owns it”.[1] Even today, members of the technical community insist that everyone ought to “let techies do their job”: a plea, if you will, of the complexity of cyber-walls and –borders (or of their lack).

But as Prof. Milton Mueller argues in Ruling the Root, the Internet has always been a contentious resource: battles over its governance (or specifically, the governance of the DNS root, both the root-zone file and the root servers) have leapt from the naïveté of the Declaration of Independence to a private-sector-led, contract-based exploitation of Internet resources. The creation of ICANN was a crucial step in this direction, following arbitrary policy choices by Verizon and entities managing the naming and numbering resources of the Internet.

The mushrooming of parallel tracks of Internet governance is further evidence of the malleability of the space. As of today, various institutions – inter-governmental and multi-stakeholder – extend their claims of governance. ICANN, the World Summit of Information Society, the World Conference on International Telecommunications, the Internet Governance Forum and the Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation under the ECOSOC Committee for Science, Technology and Development are a few prominent tracks. As of today, the WSIS process has absorbed various UN special bodies (the ITU, UNESCO, UNCTAD, UNDP are but a few), with the UNESCO instituting a separate study on Internet-related issues. A proposal for a multilateral Committee on Internet-Related Policies remains stillborn.

Amongst these, the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) remains a strong contender for a truly multi-stakeholder process facilitating dialogue on IG. The IGF was set up following the recommendation of the Working Group of Internet Governance (WGIG), constituted after the Geneva phase of the WSIS.

Rationale: Why Have National IG bodies?

The issue of national multi-stakeholder cooperation/collaboration in IG is not new; it has been alive since the early 2000s. The Tunis Agenda, in paragraph 80, encourages the “development of multi-stakeholder processes at the national, regional and international levels to discuss and collaborate on the expansion and diffusion of the Internet as a means to support development efforts to achieve internationally agreed development goals and objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals” (emphasis supplied).

In its June 2005 Report, the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) emphasizes that “global Internet governance can only be effective if there is coherence with regional, subregional and national-level policies”. Towards this end it recommends that “coordination be established among all stakeholders at the national level and a multi-stakeholder national Internet governance steering committee or similar body be set up” (emphasis supplied). The IGF, whose creation the WGIG recommended, has since been commended for its impact on the proliferation of national IGFs.

The rationale, then, was that multi-stakeholder steering committees at the national level would help to create a cohesive body to coordinate positions on Internet governance. In Reforming Internet Governance, WGIG member Waudo Siganga writes of the Internet Steering Committee of Brazil as a model, highlighting lessons that states (especially developing countries) may learn from CGI.br.

The Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) was set up in 1995 and is responsible, inter alia, for the management of the .br domain, distribution of Internet addresses and administration of metropolitan Internet exchange points. CERT.br ensures network security and extends support to network administrators. Siganga writes that CGI.br is a “well-structured multistakeholder entity, having representation from government and democratically chosen representatives of the business sector, scientific and technological community and an Internet expert”.

Why is CGI.br a model for other states? First, CGI.br exemplifies how countries can structure in an effective manner, a body that is involved in creating awareness about IG issues at the national level. Moreover, the multi-stakeholder nature of CGI.br shows how participation can be harnessed effectively to build capacity across domestic players. This also reflects the multi-stakeholder aspects of Internet governance at the global level, clarifying and implementing the WSIS standards (for instance). Especially in developing countries, where awareness and coordination for Internet governance is lacking at the national level, national IG committees can bridge the gap between awareness and participation. Such awareness can translate into local solutions for local issues, as well as contributing to an informed, cohesive stance at the global level.

Stakeholders: Populating a national IG body

A national IG body – be in steering committee, IGF or other forum – should ideally involve all relevant stakeholders. As noted before, since inception, the Internet has not been subject to exclusive governmental regulation. The World Summit on Information Society recognized this, but negotiations amongst stakeholders resulted in the delegation of roles and responsibilities: the controversial and much-debated paragraph 35 of the Tunis Agenda reads:

Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States. They have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues.
The private sector has had, and should continue to have, an important role in the development of the Internet, both in the technical and economic fields.
Civil society has also played an important role on Internet matters, especially at community level, and should continue to play such a role.
Intergovernmental organizations have had, and should continue to have, a facilitating role in the coordination of Internet-related public policy issues.
International organizations have also had and should continue to have an important role in the development of Internet-related technical standards and relevant policies.

This position remains endorsed by the WSIS process; the recent WSIS+10 High Level Event endorsed by acclamation the WSIS+10 Vision for WSIS Beyond 2015, which “respect mandates given by Tunis Agenda and respect for the multi-stakeholder principles”. In addition to government, the private sector and civil society, the technical community is identified as a distinct stakeholder group. Academia has also found a voice, as demonstrated by stakeholder-representation at NETmundial 2014.

A study of the Internet Society (ISOC) on Assessing National Internet Governance Arrangements, authored by David Souter, maps IG stakeholders at the global, regional and national levels. At the global level, primary stakeholders include ICANN (not-for-profit, private sector corporation involved in governance and technical coordination of the DNS), the IETF, IAB and W3C (technical standards), governments and civil society organizations, all of which participate with different levels of involvements at the IGF, ICANN, ITU, etc.

At the national/municipal level, the list of stakeholders is as comprehensive. Governmental stakeholders include: (1) relevant Ministries (in India, these are the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology – the Department of Electronics and Information Technology under the MCIT is particularly relevant), and (2) regulators, statutory and independent (the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, for example). At the national level, these typically seek inputs from other stakeholders while making recommendations to governments, which then enact laws or make policy. In India, for instance, the TRAI conducts consultations prior to making recommendations to the government.

Within the private sector, there may be companies (1) on the supply-side, such as infrastructure networks, telecommunications service companies, Internet Service Providers, search engines, social networks, cybercafés, etc., and (2) on the demand-side, online businesses, advertising/media, financial service providers, etc. who use the Internet. There may also be national registries managing ccTLDs, such as the Registro.br or the National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI). There may also the press and news corporations representing both corporate and public interest under specific circumstances (media ownership and freedom of expression, for distinct examples).

Civil society organisations, including consumer organisations, think-tanks and grassroots organisations, participate at various levels of policy-making in the formal institutional structure, and are crucial in representing users and public interest. The complexity of stakeholders may be seen from Souter’s report, and this enumeration is but a superficial view of the national stakeholder-population.

Processes: Creating effective national IG bodies

National IG bodies – be they steering committees, IGFs, consultative/working groups or other forums – may be limited by formal institutional governmental settings. While limited by the responsibility-gradient in paragraph 35 of the Tunis Agenda, an effective national IG body requires robust multi-stakeholder participation, as Souter notes, in technical governance, infrastructure and public policy issues. Its effectiveness also lies in governmental acquiescence of its expertise and recommendations; in short, in the translation of the IG body’s decisions into policy.

How do these stakeholders interact at the national level? In addition to the Brazilian example (CGI.br), an ISOC study by Souter and Monica Kerretts-Makau, Internet Governance in Kenya: An Assessment, provides a detailed answer. At the technical level, the registry KENIC manages the .ke domain, while the Kenya Computer Incident Response Team Coordination Centre coordinates national responses to incidents and collaborates internationally on cyber-security issues. A specific IPv6 Force to promote Kenya’s transition to IPv6 was also created.

At the infrastructural level, both the government and the private sector play important roles. Directly, ministries and government departments consult with infrastructure providers in creating policy. In India, for instance, the TRAI conducts multi-stakeholder consultations on issues such as telecom tariffs, colocation tariffs for submarine cable stations and mobile towers, etc. The government may also take a lead in creating infrastructure, such as the national optic fibre networks in India and Kenya, as also creating investment opportunities such as liberalizing FDI. At the public policy level, there may exist consultations initiated by government bodies (such as the TRAI or the Law Commission), in which other stakeholders participate.

As one can see, government-initiated consultations by ministries, regulators, law commissions or specially constituted committees. Several countries have also set up national IGFs, which typically involve all major stakeholders in voluntary participation, and form a discussion forum for existing and emerging IG issues. National IGFs have been considered particularly useful to create awareness within the country, and may best address IG issues at the domestic policy level. However, Prof. Mueller writes that what is necessary is a “reliable mechanism reliable mechanisms for consistently feeding the preferences expressed in these forums to actual global policy-making institutions like ICANN, RIRs, WIPO, and WTO which impact distributional outcomes”.

[1] M. Mueller, Ruling the Root: Internet Governance and the Taming of Cyberspace 57 (2002).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/multi-stakeholder-models-of-internet-governance-within-states-why-who-how

Jurisdiction: The Taboo Topic at ICANN

pranesh — 2016-06-29T07:51:05Z

The "IANA Transition" that is currently underway is a sham since it doesn't address the most important question: that of jurisdiction. This article explores why the issue of jurisdiction is the most important question, and why it remains unaddressed.

In March 2014, the US government announced that they were going to end the contract they have with ICANN to run the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), and hand over control to the “global multistakeholder community”. They insisted that the plan for transition had to come through a multistakeholder process and have stakeholders “across the global Internet community”.

Why is the U.S. government removing the NTIA contract?

The main reason for the U.S. government's action is that it will get rid of a political thorn in the U.S. government's side: keeping the contract allows them to be called out as having a special role in Internet governance (with the Affirmation of Commitments between the U.S. Department of Commerce and ICANN, the IANA contract, and the cooperative agreement with Verisign), and engaging in unilateralism with regard to the operation of the root servers of the Internet naming system, while repeatedly declaring that they support a multistakeholder model of Internet governance.

This contradiction is what they are hoping to address. Doing away with the NTIA contract will also increase — ever so marginally — ICANN’s global legitimacy: this is something that world governments, civil society organizations, and some American academics have been asking for nearly since ICANN’s inception in 1998. For instance, here are some demands made in a declaration by the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus at WSIS, in 2005:

“ICANN will negotiate an appropriate host country agreement to replace its California Incorporation, being careful to retain those aspects of its California Incorporation that enhance its accountability to the global Internet user community. "ICANN's decisions, and any host country agreement, must be required to comply with public policy requirements negotiated through international treaties in regard to, inter alia, human rights treaties, privacy rights, gender agreements and trade rules. … "It is also expected that the multi-stakeholder community will observe and comment on the progress made in this process through the proposed [Internet Governance] Forum."

In short: the objective of the transition is political, not technical. In an ideal world, we should aim at reducing U.S. state control over the core of the Internet's domain name system.¹

It is our contention that U.S. state control over the core of the Internet's domain name system is not being removed by the transition that is currently underway.

Why is the Transition Happening Now?

Despite the U.S. government having given commitments in the past that were going to finish the IANA transition by "September 30, 2000", (the White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses states: "The U.S. Government would prefer that this transition be complete before the year 2000. To the extent that the new corporation is established and operationally stable, September 30, 2000 is intended to be, and remains, an 'outside' date.") and later by "fall of 2006",² those turned out to be empty promises. However, this time, the transition seems to be going through, unless the U.S. Congress manages to halt it.

However, in order to answer the question of "why now?" fully, one has to look a bit at the past.

In 1998, through the White Paper on Management of Internet Names and Addresses the U.S. government asserted it’s control over the root, and asserted — some would say arrogated to itself — the power to put out contracts for both the IANA functions as well as the 'A' Root (i.e., the Root Zone Maintainer function that Network Solutions Inc. then performed, and continues to perform to date in its current avatar as Verisign). The IANA functions contract — a periodically renewable contract — was awarded to ICANN, a California-based non-profit corporation that was set up exclusively for this purpose, but which evolved around the existing IANA (to placate the Internet Society).

Meanwhile, of course, there were criticisms of ICANN from multiple foreign governments and civil society organizations. Further, despite it being a California-based non-profit on contract with the government, domestically within the U.S., there was pushback from constituencies that felt that more direct U.S. control of the DNS was important.

As Goldsmith and Wu summarize:

"Milton Mueller and others have shown that ICANN’s spirit of “self-regulation” was an appealing label for a process that could be more accurately described as the U.S. government brokering a behind-the-scenes deal that best suited its policy preferences ... the United States wanted to ensure the stability of the Internet, to fend off the regulatory efforts of foreign governments and international organizations, and to maintain ultimate control. The easiest way to do that was to maintain formal control while turning over day-to-day control of the root to ICANN and the Internet Society, which had close ties to the regulation-shy American technology industry." [footnotes omitted]

And that brings us to the first reason that the NTIA announced the transition in 2014, rather than earlier.

ICANN Adjudged Mature Enough

The NTIA now sees ICANN as being mature enough: the final transition was announced 16 years after ICANN's creation, and complaints about ICANN and its legitimacy had largely died down in the international arena in that while. Nowadays, governments across the world send their representatives to ICANN, thus legitimizing ICANN. States have largely been satisfied by participating in the Government Advisory Council, which, as its name suggests, only has advisory powers. Further, unlike in the early days, there is no serious push for states assuming control of ICANN. Of course they grumble about the ICANN Board not following their advice, but no government, as far as I am aware, has walked out or refused to participate.

L'affaire Snowden

Many within the United States, and some without, believe that the United States not only plays an exceptional role to play in the running of the Internet — by dint of historical development and dominance of American companies — but that it ought to have an exceptional role because it is the best country to exercise 'oversight' over 'the Internet' (often coming from clueless commentators), and from dinosaurs of the Internet era, like American IP lawyers and American 'homeland' security hawks, Jones Day, who are ICANN's lawyers, and other jingoists and those policymakers who are controlled by these narrow-minded interests.

The Snowden revelations were, in that way, a godsend for the NTIA, as it allowed them a fig-leaf of international criticism with which to counter these domestic critics and carry on with a transition that they have been seeking to put into motion for a while. The Snowden revelations led Dilma Rousseff, President of Brazil, to state in September 2013, at the 68th U.N. General Assembly, that Brazil would "present proposals for the establishment of a civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet", and as Diego Canabarro points out this catalysed the U.S. government and the technical community into taking action.

Given this context, a few months after the Snowden revelations, the so-called I* organizations met — seemingly with the blessing of the U.S. government³ — in Montevideo, and put out a 'Statement on the Future of Internet Governance' that sought to link the Snowden revelations on pervasive surveillance with the need to urgently transition the IANA stewardship role away from the U.S. government. Of course, the signatories to that statement knew fully well, as did most of the readers of that statement, that there is no linkage between the Snowden revelations about pervasive surveillance and the operations of the DNS root, but still they, and others, linked them together. Specifically, the I* organizations called for "accelerating the globalization of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment in which all stakeholders, including all governments, participate on an equal footing."

One could posit the existence of two other contributing factors as well.

Given political realities in the United States, a transition of this sort is probably best done before an ultra-jingoistic President steps into office.

Lastly, the ten-yearly review of the World Summit on Information Society was currently underway. At the original WSIS (as seen from the civil society quoted above) the issue of US control over the root was a major issue of contention. At that point (and during where the 2006 date for globalization of ICANN was emphasized by the US government).

Why Jurisdiction is Important

Jurisdiction has a great many aspects. Inter alia, these are:

Legal sanctions applicable to changes in the root zone (for instance, what happens if a country under US sanctions requests a change to the root zone file?)
Law applicable to resolution of contractual disputes with registries, registrars, etc.
Law applicable to labour disputes.
Law applicable to competition / antitrust law that applies to ICANN policies and regulations.
Law applicable to disputes regarding ICANN decisions, such as allocation of gTLDs, or non-renewal of a contract.
Law applicable to consumer protection concerns.
Law applicable to financial transparency of the organization.
Law applicable to corporate condition of the organization, including membership rights.
Law applicable to data protection-related policies & regulations.
Law applicable to trademark and other speech-related policies & regulations.
Law applicable to legal sanctions imposed by a country against another.

Some of these, but not all, depend on where bodies like ICANN [the policy-making body], the IANA functions operator [the proposed "Post-Transition IANA"], and the root zone maintainer are incorporated or maintain their primary office, while others depend on the location of the office [for instance, Turkish labour law applies for the ICANN office in Istanbul], while yet others depend on what's decided by ICANN in contracts (for instance, the resolution of contractual disputes with ICANN, filing of suits with regard to disputes over new generic TLDs, etc.).

However, an issue like sanctions, for instance, depends on where ICANN/PTI/RMZ are incorporated and maintain their primary office.

As Milton Mueller notes, the current IANA contract "requires ICANN to be incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and perform the IANA functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to U.S. law and provides America with greater political influence over ICANN."

He further notes that:

While it is common to assert that the U.S. has never abused its authority and has always taken the role of a neutral steward, this is not quite true. During the controversy over the .xxx domain, the Bush administration caved in to domestic political pressure and threatened to block entry of the domain into the root if ICANN approved it (Declaration of the Independent Review Panel, 2010). It took five years, an independent review challenge and the threat of litigation from a businessman willing to spend millions to get the .xxx domain into the root.

Thus it is clear that even if the NTIA's role in the IANA contract goes away, jurisdiction remains an important issue.

U.S. Doublespeak on Jurisdiction

In March 2014, when NTIA finally announced that they would hand over the reins to “the global multistakeholder community”. They’ve laid down two procedural condition: that it be developed by stakeholders across the global Internet community and have broad community consensus, and they have proposed 5 substantive conditions that any proposal must meet:

Support and enhance the multistakeholder model;
Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the Internet DNS;
Meet the needs and expectation of the global customers and partners of the IANA services; and,
Maintain the openness of the Internet.
Must not replace the NTIA role with a solution that is government-led or an inter-governmental organization.

In that announcement there is no explicit restriction on the jurisdiction of ICANN (whether it relate to its incorporation, the resolution of contractual disputes, resolution of labour disputes, antitrust/competition law, tort law, consumer protection law, privacy law, or speech law, and more, all of which impact ICANN and many, but not all, of which are predicated on the jurisdiction of ICANN’s incorporation), the jurisdiction(s) of the IANA Functions Operator(s) (i.e., which executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need to obey), and the jurisdiction of the Root Zone Maintainer (i.e., which executive, court, or legislature’s orders would it need to obey).

However, Mr. Larry Strickling, the head of the NTIA, in his testimony before the U.S. House Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, made it clear that,

“Frankly, if [shifting ICANN or IANA jurisdiction] were being proposed, I don't think that such a proposal would satisfy our criteria, specifically the one that requires that security and stability be maintained.”

Possibly, that argument made sense in 1998, due to the significant concentration of DNS expertise in the United States. However, in 2015, that argument is hardly convincing, and is frankly laughable.⁴

Targetting that remark, in ICANN 54 at Dublin, we asked Mr. Strickling:

"So as we understand it, the technical stability of the DNS doesn't necessarily depend on ICANN's jurisdiction being in the United States. So I wanted to ask would the US Congress support a multistakeholder and continuing in the event that it's shifting jurisdiction."

Mr. Strickling's response was:

"No. I think Congress has made it very clear and at every hearing they have extracted from Fadi a commitment that ICANN will remain incorporated in the United States. Now the jurisdictional question though, as I understand it having been raised from some other countries, is not so much jurisdiction in terms of where ICANN is located. It's much more jurisdiction over the resolution of disputes.

"And that I think is an open issue, and that's an appropriate one to be discussed. And it's one I think where ICANN has made some movement over time anyway.

"So I think you have to ... when people use the word jurisdiction, we need to be very precise about over what issues because where disputes are resolved and under what law they're resolved, those are separate questions from where the corporation may have a physical headquarters."

As we have shown above, jurisdiction is not only about the jurisdiction of "resolution of disputes", but also, as Mueller reminds us, about the requirement that ICANN (and now, the PTI) be "incorporated in, maintain a physical address in, and perform the IANA functions in the U.S. This makes IANA subject to U.S. law and provides America with greater political influence over ICANN."

In essence, the U.S. government has essentially said that they would veto the transition if the jurisdiction of ICANN or PTI's incorporation were to move out of the U.S., and they can prevent that from happening after the transition, since as things stand ICANN and PTI will still come within the U.S. Congress's jurisdiction.

Why Has the ICG Failed to Consider Jurisdiction?

Will the ICG proposal or the proposed new ICANN by-laws reduce existing U.S. control? No, they won't. (In fact, as we will argue below, the proposed new ICANN by-laws make this problem even worse.) The proposal by the names community ("the CWG proposal") still has a requirement (in Annex S) that the Post-Transition IANA (PTI) be incorporated in the United States, and a similar suggestion hidden away as a footnote. Further, the proposed by-laws for ICANN include the requirement that PTI be a California corporation. There was no discussion specifically on this issue, nor any documented community agreement on the specific issue of jurisdiction of PTI's incorporation.

Why wasn't there greater discussion and consideration of this issue? Because of two reasons: First, there were many that argued that the transition would be vetoed by the U.S. government and the U.S. Congress if ICANN and PTI were not to remain in the U.S. Secondly, the ICANN-formed ICG saw the US government’s actions very narrowly, as though the government were acting in isolation, ignoring the rich dialogue and debate that’s gone on earlier about the transition since the incorporation of ICANN itself.

While it would be no one’s case that political considerations should be given greater weightage than technical considerations such as security, stability, and resilience of the domain name system, it is shocking that political considerations have been completely absent in the discussions in the number and protocol parameters communities, and have been extremely limited in the discussions in the names community. This is even more shocking considering that the main reason for this transition is, as has been argued above, political.

It can be also argued that the certain IANA functions such as Root Zone Management function have a considerable political implication. It is imperative that the political nature of the function is duly acknowledged and dealt with, in accordance with the wishes of the global community. In the current process the political aspects of the IANA function has been completely overlooked and sidelined. It is important to note that this transition has not been a necessitated by any technical considerations. It is primarily motivated by political and legal considerations. However, the questions that the ICG asked the customer communities to consider were solely technical. Indeed, the communities could have chosen to overlook that, but they did not choose to do so. For instance, while the IANA customer community proposals reflected on existing jurisdictional arrangements, they did not reflect on how the jurisdictional arrangements should be post-transition , while this is one of the questions at the heart of the entire transition. There were no discussions and decisions as to the jurisdiction of the Post-Transition IANA: the Accountability CCWG's lawyers, Sidley Austin, recommended that the PTI ought to be a California non-profit corporation, and this finds mention in a footnote without even having been debated by the "global multistakeholder community", and subsequently in the proposed new by-laws for ICANN.

Why the By-Laws Make Things Worse & Why "Work Stream 2" Can't Address Most Jurisdiction Issues

The by-laws could have chosen to simply stayed silent on the matter of what law PTI would be incorporated under, but instead the by-law make the requirement of PTI being a California non-profit public benefit corporation part of the fundamental by-laws, which are close to impossible to amend.

While "Work Stream 2" (the post-transition work related to improving ICANN's accountability) has jurisdiction as a topic of consideration, the scope of that must necessarily discount any consideration of shifting the jurisdiction of incorporation of ICANN, since all of the work done as part of CCWG Accountability's "Work Stream 1", which are now reflected in the proposed new by-laws, assume Californian jurisdiction (including the legal model of the "Empowered Community"). Is ICANN prepared to re-do all the work done in WS1 in WS2 as well? If the answer is yes, then the issue of jurisdiction can actually be addressed in WS2. If the answer is no — and realistically it is — then, the issue of jurisdiction can only be very partially addressed in WS2.

Keeping this in mind, we recommended specific changes in the by-laws, all of which were rejected by CCWG's lawyers.

The Transition Plan Fails the NETmundial Statement

The NETmundial Multistakeholder Document, which was an outcome of the NETmundial process, states:

In the follow up to the recent and welcomed announcement of US Government with regard to its intent to transition the stewardship of IANA functions, the discussion about mechanisms for guaranteeing the transparency and accountability of those functions after the US Government role ends, has to take place through an open process with the participation of all stakeholders extending beyond the ICANN community

[...]

It is expected that the process of globalization of ICANN speeds up leading to a truly international and global organization serving the public interest with clearly implementable and verifiable accountability and transparency mechanisms that satisfy requirements from both internal stakeholders and the global community.

The active representation from all stakeholders in the ICANN structure from all regions is a key issue in the process of a successful globalization.

As our past analysis has shown, the IANA transition process and the discussions on the mailing lists that shaped it were neither global nor multistakeholder. The DNS industry represented in ICANN is largely US-based. 3 in 5 registrars are from the United States of America, whereas less than 1% of ICANN-registered registrars are from Africa. Two-thirds of the Business Constituency in ICANN is from the USA. While ICANN-the-corporation has sought to become more global, the ICANN community has remained insular, and this will not change until the commercial interests involved in ICANN can become more diverse, reflecting the diversity of users of the Internet, and a TLD like .COM can be owned by a non-American corporation and the PTI can be a non-American entity.

What We Need: Jurisdictional Resilience

It is no one's case that the United States is less fit than any other country as a base for ICANN, PTI, or the Root Zone Maintainer, or even as the headquarters for 9 of the world's 12 root zone operators (Verisign runs both the A and J root servers). However, just as having multiplicity of root servers is important for ensuring technical resilience of the DNS system (and this is shown in the uptake of Anycast by root server operators), it is equally important to have immunity of core DNS functioning from political pressures of the country or countries where core DNS infrastructure is legally situated and to ensure that we have diversity in terms of legal jurisdiction.

Towards this end, we at CIS have pushed for the concept of "jurisdictional resilience", encompassing three crucial points:

Legal immunity for core technical operators of Internet functions (as opposed to policymaking venues) from legal sanctions or orders from the state in which they are legally situated.
Division of core Internet operators among multiple jurisdictions
Jurisdictional division of policymaking functions from technical implementation functions

Of these, the most important is the limited legal immunity (akin to a greatly limited form of the immunity that UN organizations get from the laws of their host countries). This kind of immunity could be provided through a variety of different means: a host-country agreement; a law passed by the legislature; a U.N. General Assembly Resolution; a U.N.-backed treaty; and other such options exist. We are currently investigating which of these options would be the best option.

And apart from limited legal immunity, distribution of jurisdictional control is also valuable. As we noted in our submission to the ICG in September 2015:

Following the above precepts would, for instance, mean that the entity that performs the role of the Root Zone Maintainer should not be situated in the same legal jurisdiction as the entity that functions as the policymaking venue. This would in turn mean that either the Root Zone Maintainer function be taken up Netnod (Sweden-headquartered) or the WIDE Project (Japan-headquartered) [or RIPE-NCC, headquartered in the Netherlands], or that if the IANA Functions Operator(s) is to be merged with the RZM, then the IFO be relocated to a jurisdiction other than those of ISOC and ICANN. This, as has been stated earlier, has been a demand of the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus. Further, it would also mean that root zone servers operators be spread across multiple jurisdictions (which the creation of mirror servers in multiple jurisdictions will not address).

However, the issue of jurisdiction seems to be dead-on-arrival, having been killed by the United States government.

Unfortunately, despite the primary motivation for demands for the IANA transition being those of removing the power the U.S. government exercises over the core of the Internet's operations in the form of the DNS, what has ended up happening through the IANA transition is that these powers have not only not been removed, but in some ways they have been entrenched further! While earlier, the U.S. had to specify that the IANA functions operator had to be located in the U.S., now ICANN's by-laws themselves will state that the post-transition IANA will be a California corporation. Notably, while the Montevideo Declaration speaks of "globalization" of ICANN and of the IANA functions, as does the NETmundial statement, the NTIA announcement on their acceptance of the transition proposals speaks of "privatization" of ICANN, and not "globalization".

All in all, the "independence" that IANA is gaining from the U.S. is akin to the "independence" that Brazil gained from Portugal in 1822. Dom Pedro of Brazil was then ruling Brazil as the Prince Regent since his father Dom João VI, the King of United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves had returned to Portugal. In 1822, Brazil declared independence from Portugal (which was formally recognized through a treaty in 1825). Even after this "independence", Dom Pedro continued to rule Portugal just as he had before indepedence, and Dom João VI was provided the title of "Emperor of Brazil", aside from being King of the United Kingdom of Portugal and the Algarves. The "indepedence" didn't make a whit of a difference to the self-sufficiency of Brazil: Portugal continued to be its largest trading partner. The "independence" didn't change anything for the nearly 1 million slaves in Brazil, or to the lot of the indigenous peoples of Brazil, none of whom were recognized as "free". It had very little consequence not just in terms of ground conditions of day-to-day living, but even in political terms.

Such is the case with the IANA Transition: U.S. power over the core functioning of the Domain Name System do not stand diminished after the transition, and they can even arguably be said to have become even more entrenched. Meet the new boss: same as the old boss.

It is an allied but logically distinct issue that U.S. businesses — registries and registrars — dominate the global DNS industry, and as a result hold the reins at ICANN.↩
As Goldsmith & Wu note in their book Who Controls the Internet: "Back in 1998 the U.S. Department of Commerce promised to relinquish root authority by the fall of 2006, but in June 2005, the United States reversed course. “The United States Government intends to preserve the security and stability of the Internet’s Domain Name and Addressing System (DNS),” announced Michael D. Gallagher, a Department of Commerce official. “The United States” he announced, will “maintain its historic role in authorizing changes or modifications to the authoritative root zone file.”↩
Mr. Fadi Chehadé revealed in an interaction with Indian participants at ICANN 54 that he had a meeting "at the White House" about the U.S. plans for transition of the IANA contract before he spoke about that when he visited India in October 2013 making the timing of his White House visit around the time of the Montevideo Statement.↩
As an example, NSD, software that is used on multiple root servers, is funded by a Dutch foundation and a Dutch corporation, and written mostly by European coders.↩

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/jurisdiction-the-taboo-topic-at-icann

Internet's Core Resources are a Global Public Good - They Cannot Remain Subject to One Country's Jurisdiction

vidushi — 2016-11-14T06:39:52Z

This statement was issued by 8 India civil society organizations, supported by 2 key global networks, involved with internet governance issues, to the meeting of ICANN in Hyderabad, India from 3 to 9 November 2016. The Centre for Internet & Society was one of the 8 organizations that drafted this statement.

Recently, the US gave up its role of signing entries to the Internet's root zone file, which represents the addressing system for the global Internet. This is about the Internet addresses that end with .com, .net, and so on, and the numbers associated with each of them that help us navigate the Internet. We thank and congratulate the US government for taking this important step in the right direction. However, the organisation that manages this system, ICANN,[1] a US non-profit, continues to be under US jurisdiction, and hence subject to its courts, legislature and executive agencies. Keeping such an important global public infrastructure under US jurisdiction is expected to become a very problematic means of extending US laws and policies across the world.

We the undersigned therefore appeal that urgent steps be taken to transit ICANN from its current US jurisdiction. Only then can ICANN become a truly global organisation.[2] We would like to make it clear that our objection is not directed particularly against the US; we are simply against an important global public infrastructure being subject to a single country's jurisdiction.

Domain name system as a key lever of global control
A few new top level domains like .xxx and .africa are already under litigation in the US, whereby there is every chance that its law could interfere with ICANN's (global) policy decisions. Businesses in different parts of the world seeking top level domain names like .Amazon, and, hypothetically, .Ghaniancompany, will have to be mindful of de facto extension of US jurisdiction over them. US agencies can nullify the allocation of such top level domain names, causing damage to a business similar to that of losing a trade name, plus losing all the 'connections', including email based ones, linked to that domain name. For instance, consider the risks that an Indian generic drugs company, say with a top level domain, .genericdrugs, will remain exposed to.

Sector specific top level domain names like .insurance, health, .transport, and so on, are emerging, with clear rules for inclusion-exclusion. These can become de facto global regulatory rules for that sector. .Pharmacy has been allocated to a US pharmaceutical group which decides who gets domain names under it. Public advocacy groups have protested [3] that these rules will be employed to impose drugs-related US intellectual property standards globally. Similar problematic possibilities can be imagined in other sectors; ICANN could set “safety standards”, as per US law, for obtaining .car.

Country domain names like .br and .ph remain subject to US jurisdiction. Iran's .ir was recently sought to be seized by some US private parties because of alleged Iranian support to terrorism. Although the plea was turned down, another court in another case may decide otherwise. With the 'Internet of Things', almost everything, including critical infrastructure, in every country will be on the network. Other countries cannot feel comfortable to have at the core of the Internet’s addressing system an organisation that can be dictated by one government.

ICANN must become a truly global body
Eleven years ago, in 2005, the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus at the World Summit on the Information Society demanded that ICANN should “negotiate an appropriate host country agreement to replace its California Incorporation”.

A process is currently under-way within ICANN to consider the jurisdiction issue. It is important that this process provides recommendations that will enable ICANN to become a truly global body, for appropriate governance of very important global public goods.

Below are some options, and there could be others, that are available for ICANN to transit from US jurisdiction.

ICANN can get incorporated under international law. Any such agreement should make ICANN an international (not intergovernmental) body, fully preserving current ICANN functions and processes. This does not mean instituting intergovernmental oversight over ICANN.
ICANN can move core internet operators among multiple jurisdictions, i.e. ICANN (policy body for Internet identifiers), PTI [4] (the operational body) and the Root Zone Maintainer must be spread across multiple jurisdictions. With three different jurisdictions over these complementary functions, the possibility of any single one being fruitfully able to interfere in ICANN's global governance role will be minimized.
ICANN can institute a fundamental bylaw that its global governance processes will brook no interference from US jurisdiction. If any such interference is encountered, parameters of which can be clearly pre-defined, a process of shifting of ICANN to another jurisdiction will automatically set in. A full set-up – with registered HQ, root file maintenance system, etc – will be kept ready as a redundancy in another jurisdiction for this purpose. [5] Chances are overwhelming that given the existence of this bylaw, and a fully workable exit option being kept ready at hand, no US state agency, including its courts, will consider it meaningful to try and enforce its writ. This arrangement could therefore act in perpetuity as a guarantee against jurisdictional interference without actually having ICANN to move out of the US.
The US government can give ICANN jurisdictional immunity under the United States International Organisations Immunities Act . There is precedent of US giving such immunity to non-profit organisations like ICANN. [6] Such immunity must be designed in such a way that still ensures ICANN's accountability to the global community, protecting the community's enforcement power and mechanisms. Such immunity extends only to application of public law of the US on ICANN decisions and not private law as chosen by any contracting parties. US registries/registrars, with the assent of ICANN, can choose the jurisdiction of any state of the US for adjudicating their contracts with ICANN. Similarly, registries/registrars from other countries should be able to choose their respective jurisdictions for such contracts.

We do acknowledge that, over the years, there has been an appreciable progress in internationalising participation in ICANN's processes, including participation from governments in the Governmental Advisory Committee. However, positive as this is, it does not address the problem of a single country having overall jurisdiction over its decisions.

Issued by the following India based organisation:

Centre for Internet and Society, Bangalore
IT for Change, Bangalore
Free Software Movement of India, Hyderabad
Society for Knowledge Commons, New Delhi
Digital Empowerment Foundation, New Delhi
Delhi Science Forum, New Delhi
Software Freedom Law Centre - India, New Delhi
Third World Network - India, New Delhi

Supported by the following global networks:

Association For Progressive Communications
Just Net Coalition

For any clarification or inquiries you may may write to or call:

Parminder Jeet Singh: parminder@itforchange.net +91 98459 49445, or
Vidushi Marda: vidushi@cis-india.org +91 99860 92252

[1] Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers

[2] The “NetMundial Multistakeholder Statement” , endorsed by a large number of governments and other stakeholders, including ICANN and US government, called for ICANN to become a “truly international and global organization”.

[3] See, https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130515/00145123090/big-pharma-firms-seeking-pharmacy-domain-to-crowd-out-legitimate-foreign-pharmacies.shtml

[4] Public Technical Identifier, a newly incorporated body to carry out the operational aspects of managing Internet's identifiers.

[5] This can be at one of the existing non US global offices of ICANN, or the location of one of the 3 non-US root servers. Section 24.1 of ICANN Bylaws say, “The principal office for the transaction of the business of shall be in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United States of America. may also have an additional office or offices within or outside the United States of America as it may from time to time establish”.

[6] E.g., International Fertilizer and Development Center was designated as a public, nonprofit, international organisation by US Presidential Decree, granting it immunities under United States International Organisations Immunities Act . See https://archive.icann.org/en/psc/corell-24aug06.html

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/internets-core-resources-are-a-global-public-good

Centre for Internet and Society

Revolving Door Analysis: IANA Stewardship Transition Coordination Group

Report on ICANN 50

Peering behind the veil of ICANN’s DIDP (I)

Peering behind the veil of ICANN's DIDP (II)

NTIA to give up control of the Internet's root

NETmundial: Tracking *Multistakeholder* across Contributions

NETmundial Roadmap: Defining the Roles of Stakeholders in Multistakeholderism

Introduction

Multistakeholderism

Towards a definition of respective roles: Analysis NETmundial submissions on Roadmap

NETmundial Day 2

NETmundial Day 1

NETmundial and Suggestions for IANA Administration

I. Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body

II. Separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body

III. No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a multilateral body

IV. No separation of IANA from policy/ICANN, control of IANA to a non-multilateral body

V. Multiplication of TLD registries and Root Servers

VI. Maintenance of status quo

Net Freedom Campaign Loses its Way

Navigating the 'Reconsideration' Quagmire (A Personal Journey of Acute Confusion)

Backdrop: What is the Reconsideration Request Process?

Our Tryst with the Reconsideration Process

What we did

Whither do I wander now?

Suggestions

Multi-stakeholder Models of Internet Governance within States: Why, Who & How?

A Short Introduction

Rationale: Why Have National IG bodies?

Stakeholders: Populating a national IG body

Processes: Creating effective national IG bodies

Jurisdiction: The Taboo Topic at ICANN

Why is the U.S. government removing the NTIA contract?

Why is the Transition Happening Now?

ICANN Adjudged Mature Enough

L'affaire Snowden

Why Jurisdiction is Important

U.S. Doublespeak on Jurisdiction

Why Has the ICG Failed to Consider Jurisdiction?

Why the By-Laws Make Things Worse & Why "Work Stream 2" Can't Address Most Jurisdiction Issues

The Transition Plan Fails the NETmundial Statement

What We Need: Jurisdictional Resilience

Internet's Core Resources are a Global Public Good - They Cannot Remain Subject to One Country's Jurisdiction

NETmundial: Tracking Multistakeholder across Contributions