Centre for Internet and Society

Charting the Charter: Internet Rights and Principles Online

praskrishna — 2013-10-21T07:03:53Z

This workshop is being organised by IRP Coalition on October 22 in Bali Nusa Dua Convention Centre. Pranesh Prakash is participating as a panelist.

The Internet Governance Forum 2013 is being held at Bali from October 22 to 25. The overarching theme for the 2013 IGF meeting is: "Building Bridges"- Enhancing Multistakeholder Cooperation for Growth and Sustainable Development".

Read the original published on the IGF website

Theme: Human Rights / Freedom of Expression on the Internet

Since the Charter of Internet Rights and Principles was developed dialogue about diverse internet related human rights issues have emerged in various UN human rights mechanisms e.g. racism/racial discrimination, human rights defenders, women's human rights, freedom of association, business and human rights, protection of cultural heritage. The workshop will map the issues under discussion in the UNHRC against those in the Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet (‘IRP Charter’) and explore multistakeholder perspectives and best practice examples of adherence to the Charter and human rights standards from diverse regions.

The focus is on progress, opportunities and challenges to monitor and advocate for the IRP Charter provisions particularly for marginalised groups e.g. rural and indigenous peoples, disabled people, urban poor as the second part of the two workshops put forward by the IRP Coalition and partners. Wider questions that the workshop looks to cover include: How are understandings about the interrelationship of internet governance and human rights standards developing at the Human Rights Council? Aside from freedom of expression and the right to Privacy, what other human rights are important in relation to the internet? How can the Charter be used to broaden the engagement of the Human Rights Council in internet governance issues? How does the work of the HRC inform the Charter, and other internet policy documents and mechanisms?

Since the 2009 IGF, the Internet Rights and Principles Coalition has organised a range of workshops and Coalition meetings looking at the application of human rights standards (primarily those espoused in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) to the Internet. In 2010 the previous draft of the IRP Charter (http://internetrightsandprinciples.org/site/charter/) was launched with a rigorous discussion about what correct interpretation of existing standards is and the role of different stakeholders in relation to these.

In 2011 the IRP Charter was distilled down to 10 key advocacy points, the Ten Internet Rights and Principles (http://internetrightsandprinciples.org/site/campaign/). These were debated as the Coalition undertook a closer analysis of the issue of copyright protection and how it interrelated with human rights on the internet. In 2012 the Coalition looked at how the Charter was feeding in to a derivative initiative at the Council of Europe to create a user-friendly Compendium of rights of internet users. The Coalition made a close analysis of the issue of anonymity online. This year we want to focus on human rights which, while contained in the Charter, have not received high levels of attention. We also want to loop in the work of Coalition members working on human rights, women’s rights, social, cultural and economic rights as well as the recent work of the Human Rights Council (which is the most authoritative global body applying human rights to the Internet) to incorporating human rights as an integral part of the internet governance field.

Has the proponent organised a workshop with a similar subject during past IGF meetings?
Yes

Indication of how the workshop will build on but go beyond the outcomes previously reached
The IRP Coalition launched the IRP Charter and Ten Principles in 2010/2011 (www.internetrightsandprinciples.org). These launches started a vigorous and productive chain of discussions and outreach initiatives in and around IGF Meetings. These were followed up in 2011 and 2012 with IGF workshops that focused in specific issues such as copyright, access as a right, and existing rights of internet users. This year we focus on human rights which, while contained in the Charter, have not received high levels of attention. We also want to loop in the work of Coalition members working on human rights, women’s rights, social, cultural and economic rights as well as the recent work of the Human Rights Council (which is the most authoritative global body applying human rights to the Internet) to incorporating human rights as an integral part of the internet governance field. Recent events underscore that the moment has come to ground human rights principles in internet governance practice as this affects everyday life, work, and government.

Background Paper

Download Background Paper

Session Type: Roundtable

Co-organisers

Ms. Dixie Hawtin, Global Partners and Associates, Private Sector, Western Europe and Others Group - WEOG
Ms. Joy Liddicoat, Association for Progressive Communications, Civil Society, New Zealand, Asia-Pacific Group
Ms. Marianne Franklin, Goldsmiths (University of London, UK)/ IRP Coalition), Civil Society, United Kingdom, Western Europe and Others Group - WEOG

Have the Proponent or any of the co-organisers organised an IGF workshop before?
Yes

The link(s) to the workshop report(s)

Panelists

Please click on the biography to view the profile of the panelists:

Joy Liddicoat, Association for Progressive Communications, Female, Civil Society, New Zealand, Western Europe and Others Group – WEOG
Biography
Frank La Rue, United Nations, Male, Civil Society, Guatemala, Latin American and Caribbean Group - Grulac
Asif Kabani, Ministry of Finance, Male, Government, Pakistan, Asia-Pacific Group
Biography
Carl Fredrik Wettermark, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Male, Government, Sweden, Western Europe and Others Group – WEOG
Biography
Marianne Franklin, (IRP Coalition/Goldsmiths (University of London, UK), Female, Civil Society, New Zealand, Asia-Pacific Group
Biography
Pranesh Prakash, Centre for Internet and Society, Male, Civil Society, India, Asia-Pacific Group
Biography
Cornelia Kutterer, Microsoft, Female, Private Sector, BELGIUM, Western Europe and Others Group – WEOG
Biography
Michael Rotert, eco-German Internet Industry, Male, Technical Community, Germany, Western Europe and Others Group – WEOG
Biography

Moderator

Dixie Hawtin, Global Partners and Associates

Remote Moderator

Rebecca Zausmer, Global Partners and Associates

Agenda

This round table session explores the opportunities and challenges for upholding human rights standards on the internet using the IRP Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet (http://internetrightsandprinciples.org/site/charter/). In tandem with the session on Disabilities and Indigenous rights this session aims to:

Address a number of human rights – moving beyond freedom of expression and privacy - to consider the IRP Charter provisions for socio-economic rights, education, women’s rights and rights of the visually impaired in the online environment.
Provide an assessment of the implementation of human rights standards on the internet o date.
Feed recommendations in to the IRP Coalition initiative to create a final version of the IRP Charter (in terms of substance, process, and uses of the document in practice)

The session will start by focusing on a selection of concrete examples (such as, the PRISM revelations, the Marrakesh Treaty on exceptions and limitations to copyright for the blind, racial discrimination, education rights online) before opening to a wider discussion. It brings together diverse perspectives on the relationship between human rights and internet policy, where the human rights movement needs to engage more or more effectively, and how the IRP Charter should be developed to assist this process. The outcomes of the workshop will feed into the IRP Coalition Meeting, ‘Towards the IRP Charter 2.0’.

Inclusiveness of the Session

Panellists will make short initial statements of up to 3 minutes, each will be tasked with a particular perspective to bring and enable several rounds of the table. It will also allow ample time for audience questions and comments. The audience will be invited to ask questions, and to answer questions which the moderators will pose to the floor.

Suitability for Remote Participation

Both the IRP and the APC have a good track record of marketing their workshops across a range of email lists, websites and social media to ensure that potential remote participants know about the workshop and can participate. Remote participants will be engaged by the remote moderator who will pose questions to them and facilitate an active remote conversation alongside the conversation in situ– making links between the two wherever possible.

Questions or Comments

Please note that Mr Frank La Rue has been invited. As his office needs some time to respond we have included his name as an unconfirmed participant for the time being.

Also a note on the number of participants:
As this is a roundtable, open discussion format there are more than five speakers in order to generate the range and depth needed for this sort of interactive and dynamic discussion. The IRP Coalition has taken the lead in instigating these sorts of discussion formats in multistakeholder meetings such as the UNESCO WSIS+10 event and the Lisbon EuroDIG. The session moderator is experienced for this format and the participants aware that long speeches are not required.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/igf-2013-workshop-99-charting-the-charter-internet-rights-and-principles-online

Centre blocks 32 websites for security reasons, restores some later

praskrishna — 2015-01-02T14:13:03Z

The Centre on Wednesday asked Internet Service Providers (ISP) to block 32 websites citing national security concerns, especially from terror group ISIS.

The article by S. Ronendra Singh was published in the Hindu Businessline on December 31, 2014. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

The move created a flutter on social networking sites, as most of the Web sites, such as archive.org, vimeo.com, github.com, pastebin.com, codepad.org and paste2.org, were being used by global communities like application developers for free movies and books, coders and text sharing.

By late evening, some sites were restored.

Sources in the Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology confirmed the development and told BusinessLine: “It was based on some national security issues, and we cannot compromise with our nation’s security….”

A senior official from the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) said the directive had come from a Mumbai court after the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) had approached it to block some Web sites carrying anti-India content.

The matter came to light after a circular, purportedly sent by DoT to ISPs, showed up on social networking sites, listing the sites, along with some screen shots. Incidentally, the said circular had edited out the letter head, date and the signature below. The ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s IT cell head, Arvind Gupta, tweeted saying ‘the Web sites that have been blocked were based on an advisory by the Anti-Terrorism Squad, and were carrying anti-India content from ISIS’.

However, later in the evening, Gupta, in his tweet said, some of the Web sites such as vimeo.com have been restored because they have removed ‘objectionable content and/or cooperated with the on going investigations’.

However, the blocked Web sites raised a furore in the social media wherein people said the Government should amend the laws than do such things.

“The problem isn’t just about the specific sites that are blocked; the problem is always about the bad law + process relating to #GoIBlocks,” Pranesh Prakash, Policy Director at Centre for Internet and Society tweeted. He said the 69A Rules (of the IT Act 2000) does not allow for transparency, accountability and time-limits on blocks, so it is easily misused by the Government, the courts and individuals.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-hindu-businessline-december-31-2015-s-ronendra-singh-

Censorship makes India fall two places on global internet freedom chart

praskrishna — 2012-09-27T10:37:47Z

A recently released global report on the internet freedom rated India 39th in 2012, a slip from two places last year.

The article by Dilnaz Boga was published in DNA on September 27, 2012.

The report titled, Freedom on the net 2012 (FOTN): A global assessment of internet and digital media by Freedom House, a Washington-based monitoring group conducted a comprehensive study of internet freedom in 47 countries.

Quoting Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society, the report said 309 specific items (URLs, Twitter accounts, img tags, blog posts, blogs, and a handful of websites) have been blocked by the government. But officially, the government has admitted to blocking 245 web pages for inflammatory content hosting of provocative content.

Ketan Tanna, India analyst for Freedom House told DNA, “A reflection of the downward spiral in the freedom on the net that Indians enjoy is evident in the upward revision of scores for India in the FOTN 2012 report. India was one of the only 4 of the 20 countries that “recently experienced declines” and are democracies. The other three are Mexico, Turkey and South Korea.”

Internet usage in India continues to increase, with tens of millions of new users getting online each year. According to the International Telecommunications Union, internet penetration was 10% — or about 120 million people at the end of 2011. Among internet users, 90 million were ‘active,’ accessing it at least once a month (70 million urban and 20 million rural).

The report has mentioned that in India, “amid several court cases regarding intermediaries’ responsibility for hosting illegal content, much evidence has surfaced that intermediaries are taking down content without fully evaluating or challenging the legality of the request”.

Citing an example, Tanna said in December 2011, the website Cartoons against Corruption was suspended by its hosting company after a complaint filed with the Mumbai police alleged that the site’s cartoons ridiculed parliament and national emblems. “As a result of such dynamics, large swaths of online content are disappearing, and the losses are far more difficult to reverse than the mere blocking of a website,” he added.

More common than website blocking is the removal of content based on judicial orders, government directives, and citizen complaints. This phenomenon that has increased in recent years and in some cases, targeted content on political, social, and religious topics, the report said.

The Indian authorities had submitted 68 removal requests covering 358 items between January and June 2011. According to Google, 255 items related to what it categorised as “government criticism,” while 39 involved defamation and 8 pertained to hate speech.

In January, responding to a freedom of information request, the home ministry reported that the government orders 7,500 to 9,000 phone interceptions per month, the report disclosed. Criticising this practice and the government’s disregard for the Constitution, the data revealed, “Established guidelines regulate the ability of state officials to intercept communications, but India lacks an appropriate legal framework and procedures to ensure proper oversight of Intelligence agencies’ growing surveillance and interception capabilities, opening the possibility of misuse and unconstitutional invasion of citizens’ privacy.”

As another method of controlling speech and activism online, governments have imposed temporary shutdowns of the internet or mobile phone networks during protests or other sensitive times. Localised internet shutdowns and mobile phone shutdowns occurred in India due to security concerns, the report said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/dna-india-sep-27-2012-dilnaz-boga-censorship-makes-india-fall-two-places-on-global-internet-freedom-chart

Censorship — A Death Knell for Freedom of Expression Online

praskrishna — 2011-12-19T10:12:46Z

On December 8, 2011, NDTV aired an interesting discussion on internet censorship. Shashi Tharoor, Soli Sorabjee, Shekhar Kapoor, Ken Ghosh and Sunil Abraham participated in this discussion with NDTV's Sonia Singh.

Sunil said that we need to reflect upon the limitations of freedom of expression which was listed out by Soli Sorabjee and then ask the question whether they are the same limitations in the IT Act. If one reads section 66A, one comes to the conclusion that the IT Act places many additional limitations on the freedom of expression (annoying speech, speech harmful to minors, inconvenient speech) and these are limitations that don’t have existing definitions either in the IT Act or any other statute or case laws.

Sunil further said that through section 79 which is the intermediary liability regime, the government places together a private censorship regime. We did some research at CIS. We sent fraudulent take down notices to seven large international and national intermediaries and through our empirical research we can demonstrate that these intermediaries over-comply with these fraudulent take down notices. So there is already (since the amended IT Act and the notification of the Rules in April this year) a huge chilling effect on the internet thanks to post facto censorship and what the minister is now calling for is preemptive or pro-active censorship which is really going to be the death knell for freedom of expression online.

VIDEO

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/internet-censorship

Can India Trust Its Government on Privacy?

pranesh — 2013-07-15T10:35:33Z

In response to criticisms of the Centralized Monitoring System, India’s new surveillance program, the government could contend that merely having the capability to engage in mass surveillance won’t mean that it will. Officials will argue that they will still abide by the law and will ensure that each instance of interception will be authorized.

Pranesh Prakash's article was published in the New York Times on July 11, 2013.

In fact, they will argue that the program, known as C.M.S., will better safeguard citizens’ privacy: it will cut out the telecommunications companies, which can be sources of privacy leaks; it will ensure that each interception request is tracked and the recorded content duly destroyed within six months as is required under the law; and it will enable quicker interception, which will save more lives. But there are a host of reasons why the citizens of India should be skeptical of those official claims.

Cutting out telecoms will not help protect citizens from electronic snooping since these companies still have the requisite infrastructure to conduct surveillance. As long as the infrastructure exists, telecom employees will misuse it. In a 2010 report, the journalist M.A. Arun noted that “alarmingly, this correspondent also came across several instances of service providers’ employees accessing personal communication of subscribers without authorization.” Some years back, K.K. Paul, a top Delhi Police officer and now the Governor of Meghalaya, drafted a memo in which he noted mobile operators’ complaints that private individuals were misusing police contacts to tap phone calls of “opponents in trade or estranged spouses.”

India does not need to have centralized interception facilities to have centralized tracking of interception requests. To prevent unauthorized access to communications content that has been intercepted, at all points of time, the files should be encrypted using public key infrastructure. Mechanisms also exist to securely allow a chain of custody to be tracked, and to ensure the timely destruction of intercepted material after six months, as required by the law. Such technological means need to be made mandatory to prevent unauthorized access, rather than centralizing all interception capabilities.

At the moment, interception orders are given by the federal Home Secretary of India and by state home secretaries without adequate consideration. Every month at the federal level 7,000 to 9,000 phone taps are authorized or re-authorized. Even if it took just three minutes to evaluate each case, it would take 15 hours each day (without any weekends or holidays) to go through 9,000 requests. The numbers in Indian states could be worse, but one can’t be certain as statistics on surveillance across India are not available. It indicates bureaucratic callousness and indifference toward following the procedure laid down in the Telegraph Act.

In a 1975 case, the Supreme Court held that an “economic emergency” may not amount to a “public emergency.” Yet we find that of the nine central government agencies empowered to conduct interception in India, according to press reports — Central Board of Direct Taxes, Intelligence Bureau, Central Bureau of Investigation, Narcotics Control Bureau, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Enforcement Directorate, Research & Analysis Wing, National Investigation Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency — three are exclusively dedicated to economic offenses.

Suspicion of tax evasion cannot legally justify a wiretap, which is why the government said it had believed that Nira Radia, a corporate lobbyist, was a spy when it defended putting a wiretap on her phone in 2008 and 2009. A 2011 report by the cabinet secretary pointed out that economic offenses might not be counted as “public emergencies,” and that the Central Board of Direct Taxes should not be empowered to intercept communications. Yet the tax department continues to be on the list of agencies empowered to conduct interceptions.

India has arrived at a scary juncture, where the multiple departments of the Indian government don’t even trust each other. India’s Department of Information Technology recently complained to the National Security Advisor that the National Technical Research Organization had hacked into National Informatics Center infrastructure and extracted sensitive data connected to various ministries. The National Technical Research Organization denied it had hacked into the servers but said hundreds of e-mail accounts of top government officials were compromised in 2012, including those of “the home secretary, the naval attaché to Tehran, several Indian missions abroad, top investigators of the Central Bureau of Investigation and the armed forces,” The Mint newspaper reported. Such incidents aggravate the fear that the Indian government might not be willing and able to protect the enormous amounts of information it is about to collect through the C.M.S.

Simply put, government entities have engaged in unofficial and illegal surveillance, and the C.M.S. is not likely to change this. In a 2010 article in Outlook, the journalist Saikat Datta described how various central and state intelligence organizations across India are illegally using off-the-air interception devices. “These systems are frequently deployed in Muslim-dominated areas of cities like Delhi, Lucknow and Hyderabad,” Mr. Datta wrote. “The systems, mounted inside cars, are sent on ‘fishing expeditions,’ randomly tuning into conversations of citizens in a bid to track down terrorists.”

The National Technical Research Organization, which is not even on the list of entities authorized to conduct interception, is one of the largest surveillance organizations in India. The Mint reported last year that the organization’s surveillance devices, “contrary to norms, were deployed more often in the national capital than in border areas” and that under new standard operating procedures issued in early 2012, the organization can only intercept signals at the international borders. The organization runs multiple facilities in Mumbai, Bangalore, Delhi, Hyderabad, Lucknow and Kolkata, in which monumental amounts of Internet traffic are captured. In Mumbai, all the traffic passing through the undersea cables there is captured, Mr. Datta found.

In the western state of Gujarat, a recent investigation by Amitabh Pathak, the director general of police, revealed that in a period of less than six months, more than 90,000 requests were made for call detail records, including for the phones of senior police and civil service officers. This high a number could not possibly have been generated from criminal investigations alone. Again, these do not seem to have led to any criminal charges against any of the people whose records were obtained. The information seems to have been collected for purposes other than national security.

India is struggling to keep track of the location of its proliferating interception devices. More than 73,000 devices to intercept mobile phone calls have been imported into India since 2005. In 2011, the federal government asked various state governments, private corporations, the army and intelligence agencies to surrender these to the government, noting that usage of any such equipment for surveillance was illegal. We don’t know how many devices were actually turned in.

These kinds of violations of privacy can have very dangerous consequences. According to the former Intelligence Bureau head in the western state of Gujarat, R.B. Sreekumar, the call records of a mobile number used by Haren Pandya, the former Gujarat home minister, were used to confirm that it was he who had provided secret testimony to the Citizens’ Tribunal, which was conducting an independent investigation of the 2002 sectarian riots in the state. Mr. Pandya was murdered in 2003.

The limited efforts to make India’s intelligence agencies more accountable have gone nowhere. In 2012, the Planning Commission of India formed a group of experts under Justice A.P. Shah, a retired Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, to look into existing projects of the government and to suggest principles to guide a privacy law in light of international experience. (Centre for Internet and Society, where I work was part of the group). However, the government has yet to introduce a bill to protect citizens’ privacy, even though the governmental and private sector violations of Indian citizens’ privacy is growing at an alarming rate.

In February, after frequent calls by privacy activists and lawyers for greater accountability and parliamentary oversight of intelligence agencies, the Centre for Public Interest Litigation filed a case in the Supreme Court. This would, one hopes, lead to reform.

Citizens must also demand that a strong Privacy Act be enacted. In 1991, the leak of a Central Bureau of Investigation report titled “Tapping of Politicians’ Phones” prompted the rights groups, People’s Union of Civil Liberties to file a writ petition, which eventually led to a Supreme Court of India ruling that recognized the right to privacy of communications for all citizens as part of the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and of life and personal liberty. However, through the 2008 amendments to the Information Technology Act, the IT Rules framed in 2011 and the telecom licenses, the government has greatly weakened the right to privacy as recognized by the Supreme Court. The damage must be undone through a strong privacy law that safeguards the privacy of Indian citizens against both the state and corporations. The law should not only provide legal procedures, but also ensure that the government should not employ technologies that erode legal procedures.

A strong privacy law should provide strong grounds on which to hold the National Security Advisor’s mass surveillance of Indians (over 12.1 billion pieces of intelligence in one month) as unlawful. The law should ensure that Parliament, and Indian citizens, are regularly provided information on the scale of surveillance across India, and the convictions resulting from that surveillance. Individuals whose communications metadata or content is monitored or intercepted should be told about it after the passage of a reasonable amount of time. After all, the data should only be gathered if it is to charge a person of committing a crime. If such charges are not being brought, the person should be told of the incursion into his or her privacy.

The privacy law should ensure that all surveillance follows the following principles: legitimacy (is the surveillance for a legitimate, democratic purpose?), necessity (is this necessary to further that purpose? does a less invasive means exist?), proportionality and harm minimization (is this the minimum level of intrusion into privacy?), specificity (is this surveillance order limited to a specific case?) transparency (is this intrusion into privacy recorded and also eventually revealed to the data subject?), purpose limitation (is the data collected only used for the stated purpose?), and independent oversight (is the surveillance reported to a legislative committee or a privacy commissioner, and are statistics kept on surveillance conducted and criminal prosecution filings?). Constitutional courts such as the Supreme Court of India or the High Courts in the Indian states should make such determinations. Citizens should have a right to civil and criminal remedies for violations of surveillance laws.

Indian citizens should also take greater care of their own privacy and safeguard the security of their communications. The solution is to minimize usage of mobile phones and to use anonymizing technologies and end-to-end encryption while communicating on the Internet. Free and open-source software like OpenPGP can make e-mails secure. Technologies like off-the-record messaging used in apps like ChatSecure and Pidgin chat conversations, TextSecure for text messages, HTTPS Everywhere and Virtual Private Networks can prevent Internet service providers from being able to snoop, and make Internet communications anonymous.

Indian government, and especially our intelligence agencies, violate Indian citizens’ privacy without legal authority on a routine basis. It is time India stops itself from sleepwalking into a surveillance state.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/new-york-times-july-11-2013-can-india-trust-its-government-on-piracy

Campaign against curbs on websites gathers steam

praskrishna — 2012-04-25T11:19:29Z

For political cartoonist Aseem Trivedi and his blogger-cum-journalist friend Alok Dixit, who both ran a website against corruption, a tryst with the blind side of law triggered their mission against “gagging” of the new-age Indian Internet user.

The blog post by Arpan Daniel Varghese was published by IBN Live on April 23, 2012.

It all started when they were in Mumbai, taking part in the first public protest seeking a strong Lokpal led by social activist Anna Hazare. “During the course of the protest, we got word that our website had been taken off,” recalls Alok.

The Mumbai Police had banned the website without any prior notice, apparently after a complaint was filed by a Congress leader that some content on the site, CartoonsAgainstCorruption, was objectionable, he says.

“We then contacted Bigrocks, the domain provider, but they did not divulge the exact procedure to restore our website,” he adds.

Kerala High Court lawyer P Jacob, who has a masters in cyber law and is a researcher in the field, clarifies. “Let’s say that you are a website, blog or domain owner... As per the intermediary rules incorporated into the IT laws, introduced through an amendment in 2011, if a third person sends a complaint, be it a frivolous one, to you (the intermediary ) about some objectionable content, you will have to take off the said content within 36 hours.”

This could happen to any one and could be quite dangerous, points out Sunil Abraham, the executive director of The Centre for Internet and Society (CIS-India).� “If a company wants to target your organization’s social media network, they can keep sending fraudulent emails to you and you will have to keep deleting it unless you are ready to face litigation or government action. And then there is no penalty for abusing the provision. There is no transparency, the people who comment will not be told,” says Sunil.

It was this realization that drove Alok, who then quit his job as a reporter, and Aseem Trivedi to start a movement against such blind curbs. ‘Save Your Voice’ was thus born.

A research conducted by the CIS gave further credence to their fears that it was very “easy to ban any website in India.”

“We call it a policy sting operation,” details Sunil. “We sent out fraudulent take- down notices (or complaints) to seven of the largest intermediaries in India. They gladly over-complied and promptly took off the material in question. You can try this. You could look at a legitimate comment and complain that this is blasphemous, offensive or plain annoying. And without questioning your locus standi, the intermediary sites will have to take it off.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/campaign-against-curbs-on-websites

Breaking Down Section 66A of the IT Act

pranesh — 2012-12-14T09:51:17Z

Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, which prescribes 'punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.' is widely held by lawyers and legal academics to be unconstitutional. In this post Pranesh Prakash explores why that section is unconstitutional, how it came to be, the state of the law elsewhere, and how we can move forward.

Back in February 2009 (after the IT Amendment Act, 2008 was hurriedly passed on December 22, 2008 by the Lok Sabha, and a day after by the Rajya Sabha[1] but before it was notified on October 27, 2009) I had written that s.66A is "patently in violation of Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India":

Section 66A which punishes persons for sending offensive messages is overly broad, and is patently in violation of Art. 19(1)(a) of our Constitution. The fact that some information is "grossly offensive" (s.66A(a)) or that it causes "annoyance" or "inconvenience" while being known to be false (s.66A(c)) cannot be a reason for curbing the freedom of speech unless it is directly related to decency or morality, public order, or defamation (or any of the four other grounds listed in Art. 19(2)). It must be stated here that many argue that John Stuart Mill's harm principle provides a better framework for freedom of expression than Joel Feinberg's offence principle. The latter part of s.66A(c), which talks of deception, is sufficient to combat spam and phishing, and hence the first half, talking of annoyance or inconvenience is not required. Additionally, it would be beneficial if an explanation could be added to s.66A(c) to make clear what "origin" means in that section. Because depending on the construction of that word s.66A(c) can, for instance, unintentionally prevent organisations from using proxy servers, and may prevent a person from using a sender envelope different from the "from" address in an e-mail (a feature that many e-mail providers like Gmail implement to allow people to send mails from their work account while being logged in to their personal account). Furthermore, it may also prevent remailers, tunnelling, and other forms of ensuring anonymity online. This doesn't seem to be what is intended by the legislature, but the section might end up having that effect. This should hence be clarified.

I stand by that analysis. But given that it is quite sparse, in this post I will examine s.66A in detail.

Here's what s. 66A of the IT (Amendment) Act, 2008 states:

66A. Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.,
Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device,—
(a) any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character;
(b) any information which he knows to be false, but for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred, or ill will, persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device,
(c) any electronic mail or electronic mail message for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and with fine.

Explanation: For the purposes of this section, terms "electronic mail" and "electronic mail message" means a message or information created or transmitted or received on a computer, computer system, computer resource or communication device including attachments in text, images, audio, video and any other electronic record, which may be transmitted with the message.[2]

A large part of s.66A can be traced back to s.10(2) of the UK's Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1935:

If any person —
(a) sends any message by telephone which is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene, or menacing character; or
(b) sends any message by telephone, or any telegram, which he knows to be false, for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, or needless anxiety to any other person; or
(c) persistently makes telephone calls without reasonable cause and for any such purposes as aforesaid;
he shall be liable upon summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ten pounds, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month, or to both such fine and imprisonment.

Section 66A bears a striking resemblance to the three parts of this law from 1935, with clauses (b) and (c) being merged in the Indian law into a single clause (b) of s.66A, with a whole bunch of new "purposes" added. Interestingly, the Indian Post Office Act, 1898, was never amended to add this provision.

The differences between the two are worth exploring.

Term of Punishment

The first major difference is that the maximum term of imprisonment in the 1935 Act is only one month, compared to three years in s.66A of the IT Act. It seems the Indian government decided to subject the prison term to hyper-inflation to cover for the time. If this had happened for the punishment for, say, criminal defamation, then that would have a jail term of up to 72 years! The current equivalent laws in the UK are the Communications Act, 2003 (s. 127) and the Malicious Communications Act 1988 (s.1) for both of which the penalty is up to 6 months' imprisonment or to a maximum fine of £5000 or both. What's surprising is that in the Information Technology (Amendment) Bill of 2006, the penalty for section 66A was up to 2 years, and it was changed on December 16, 2008 through an amendment moved by Mr. A. Raja (the erstwhile Minister of Communications and IT) to 3 years. Given that parts of s.66A(c) resemble nuisance, it is instructive to note the term of punishment in the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for criminal nuisance: a fine of Rs. 200 with no prison term.

"Sending" vs. "Publishing"

J. Sai Deepak, a lawyer, has made an interesting point that the IT Act uses "send" as part of its wording, and not "publish". Given that, only messages specifically directed at another would be included. While this is an interesting proposition, it cannot be accepted because: (1) even blog posts are "sent", albeit to the blog servers — s.66A doesn't say who it has to be sent to; (2) in the UK the Communications Act 2003 uses similar language and that, unlike the Malicious Communication Act 1988 which says "sends to another person", has been applied to public posts to Twitter, etc.; (3) The explanation to s.66A(c) explicitly uses the word "transmitted", which is far broader than "send", and it would be difficult to reconcile them unless "send" can encompass sending to the publishing intermediary like Twitter.

Part of the narrowing down of s.66A should definitely focus on making it applicable only to directed communication (as is the case with telephones, and with the UK's Malicious Communication Act), and not be applicable to publishing.

Section 66A(c)

Section 66A(c) was also inserted through an amendment moved by Mr. Raja on December 16, 2008, which was passed by the Lok Sabha on December 22, 2008, and a day after by the Rajya Sabha. (The version introduced in Parliament in 2006 had only 66A(a) and (b).) This was done in response to the observation by the Standing Committee on Information Technology that there was no provision for spam. Hence it is clear that this is meant as an anti-spam provision. However, the careless phrasing makes it anything but an anti-spam provision. If instead of "for the purpose of causing annoyance or inconvenience or to deceive or to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages" it was "for the purpose of causing annoyance and inconvenience and to deceive and to mislead the addressee or recipient about the origin of such messages", it would have been slightly closer to an anti-spam provision, but even then doesn't have the two core characteristics of spam: that it be unsolicited and that it be sent in bulk. (Whether only commercial messages should be regarded as spam is an open question.) That it arise from a duplicitous origin is not a requirement of spam (and in the UK, for instance, that is only an aggravating factor for what is already a fine-able activity).

Curiously, the definitional problems do not stop there, but extend to the definitions of "electronic mail" and "electronic mail message" in the 'explanation' as well. Those are so vast that more or less anything communicated electronically is counted as an e-mail, including forms of communication that aren't aimed at particular recipients the way e-mail is.

Hence, the anti-spam provision does not cover spam, but covers everything else. This provision is certainly unconstitutional.

Section 66A(b)

Section 66A(b) has three main elements: (1) that the communication be known to be false; (2) that it be for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, obstruction, insult, injury, criminal intimidation, enmity, hatred or ill will; (3) that it be communicated persistently. The main problem here is, of course, (2). "Annoyance" and "inconvenience", "insult", "ill will" and "hatred" are very different from "injury", "danger", and "criminal intimidation". That a lawmaker could feel that punishment for purposes this disparate belonged together in a single clause is quite astounding and without parallel (except in the rest of the IT Act). That's akin to having a single provision providing equal punishment for calling someone a moron ("insult") and threatening to kill someone ("criminal intimidation"). While persistent false communications for the purpose of annoying, insulting, inconveniencing, or causing ill will should not be criminalised (if need be, having it as a civil offence would more than suffice), doing so for the purpose of causing danger or criminal intimidation should. However, the question arises whether you need a separate provision in the IT Act for that. Criminal intimidation is already covered by ss. 503 and 506 of the IPC. Similarly, different kinds of causing danger are taken care of in ss.188, 268, 283, 285, 289, and other provisions. Similarly with the other "purposes" listed there, if, for instance, a provision is needed to penalise hoax bomb threats, then the provision clearly should not be mentioning words like "annoyance", and should not be made "persistent". (At any rate, s. 505(1) of the IPC suffices for hoax bomb threats, so you don't need a separate provision in the IT Act).

I would argue that in its current form this provision is unconstitutional, since there is no countervailing interest in criminalising false and persistent "insults", etc., that will allow those parts of this provision to survive the test of 'reasonableness' under Art.19(2). Furthermore, even bits that survive are largely redundant. While this unconstitutionality could be cured by better, narrower wording, even then one would need to ensure that there is no redundancy due to other provisions in other laws.

Section 66A(a)

In s.66A(a), the question immediately arises whether the information that is "grossly offensive" or "menacing" need to be addressed at someone specific and be seen as "grossly offensive" or "menacing" by that person, or be seen by a 'reasonable man' test.

Additionally, the term "grossly offensive" will have to be read in such a heightened manner as to not include merely causing offence. The one other place where this phrase is used in Indian law is in s.20(b) of the Indian Post Office Act (prohibiting the sending by post of materials of an indecent, obscene, seditious, scurrilous, threatening, or grossly offensive character). The big difference between s.20(b) of the IPO Act and s.66A of the IT Act is that the former is clearly restricted to one-to-one communication (the way the UK's Malicious Communication Act 1988 is). Reducing the scope of s.66A to direct communications would make it less prone to challenge.

Additionally, in order to ensure constitutionality, courts will have to ensure that "grossly offensive" does not simply end up meaning "offensive", and that the maximum punishment is not disproportionately high as it currently is. Even laws specifically aimed at online bullying, such as the UK's Protection from Harassment Act 1997, can have unintended effects. As George Monbiot notes, the "first three people to be prosecuted under [the Protection from Harassment Act] were all peaceful protesters".

Constitutional Arguments in Importing Laws from the UK

The plain fact is that the Indian Constitution is stronger on free speech grounds than the (unwritten) UK Constitution, and the judiciary has wide powers of judicial review of statutes (i.e., the ability of a court to strike down a law passed by Parliament as 'unconstitutional'). Judicial review of statutes does not exist in the UK (with review under its EU obligations being the exception) as they believe that Parliament is supreme, unlike India. Putting those two aspects together, a law that is valid in the UK might well be unconstitutional in India for failing to fall within the eight octagonal walls of the reasonable restrictions allowed under Art.19(2). That raises the question of how they deal with such broad wording in the UK.

Genealogy of UK Law on Sending 'Indecent', 'Menacing', 'Grossly Offensive' Messages

Quoting from the case of DPP v. Collins [2006] UKHL 40 [6]:

The genealogy of [s. 127(1) of the Communication Act] may be traced back to s.10(2)(a) of the Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1935, which made it an offence to send any message by telephone which is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character. That subsection was reproduced with no change save of punctuation in s.66(a) of the Post Office Act 1953. It was again reproduced in s.78 of the Post Office Act 1969, save that "by means of a public telecommunication service" was substituted for "by telephone" and "any message" was changed to "a message or other matter". Section 78 was elaborated but substantially repeated in s.49(1)(a) of the British Telecommunications Act 1981 and was re-enacted (save for the substitution of "system" for "service") in s.43(1)(a) of the Telecommunications Act 1984. Section 43(1)(a) was in the same terms as s.127(1)(a) of the 2003 Act, save that it referred to "a public telecommunication system" and not (as in s.127(1)(a)) to a "public electronic communications network". Sections 11(1)(b) of the Post Office Act 1953 and 85(3) of the Postal Services Act 2000 made it an offence to send certain proscribed articles by post.

While the above quotation talks about s.127(1) it is equally true about s.127(2) as well. In addition to that, in 1988, the Malicious Communications Act (s.1) was passed to prohibit one-to-one harassment along similar lines.

The UK's Post Office Act was eclipsed by the Telecommunications Act in 1984, which in turn was replaced in 2003 by the Communications Act. (By contrast, we still stick on to the colonial Indian Post Office Act, 1898.) Provisions from the 1935 Post Office Act were carried forward into the Telecommunications Act (s.43 on the "improper use of public telecommunication system"), and subsequently into s.127 of the Communications Act ("improper use of public electronic communications network"). Section 127 of the Communications Act states:

127. Improper use of public electronic communications network
(1) A person is guilty of an offence if he —
(a) sends by means of a public electronic communications network a message or other matter that is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character; or
(b) causes any such message or matter to be so sent.
(2) A person is guilty of an offence if, for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to another, he —
(a) sends by means of a public electronic communications network, a message that he knows to be false,
(b) causes such a message to be sent; or
(c) persistently makes use of a public electronic communications network.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both.
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to anything done in the course of providing a programme service (within the meaning of the Broadcasting Act 1990 (c. 42)).

Currently in the UK there are calls for repeal of s.127. In a separate blog post I will look at how the UK courts have 'read down' the provisions of s.127 and other similar laws in order to be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights.

Comparison between S. 66A and Other Statutes

Section 144, IPC, 1860

Power to issue order in urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger

...obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity

Babulal Parate v. State of Maharastra and Ors. [1961 AIR SC 884] (Magistrates order under s. 144 of the Cr. PC, 1973 was in violation of Art.19(1)(a) of the Constitution).

A special thanks is due to Snehashish Ghosh for compiling the below table.

Section	Term(s)/phrase(s) used in 66A	Term(s)/ phrase(s) used in similar sections
Section 66A (heading)	Punishment for sending offensive messages through communication service, etc	Section 127, CA, 2003, "Improper use of public electronic communications network"
Section 66A(a)	Any person who sends, by means of a computer resource or a communication device	Section 1(1), MCA 1988, "Any person who sends to another person..."
Section 66A(a)	Grossly offensive	Section 1(1)(a)(i), MCA 1988; Section 127(1)(a),CA, 2003; Section 10(2)(a), Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1935; Section 43(1)(a), Telecommunications Act 1984; Section 20, India Post Act 1898
Section 66A(a)	Menacing character	Section127(1)(a),CA, 2003
Section 66A(b)	Any information which he knows to be false	Section 1(1)(a)(iii), MCA 1988 "information which is false and known or believed to be false by the sender"; Section 127(2)(a), CA, 2003, "a message that he knows to be false"
Section 66A(b) “purpose of...”	Causing annoyance	Section127(2), CA, 2003
	Inconvenience	Section 127 (2), CA, 2003
	Danger
	Insult	Section 504, IPC, 1860
	Injury	Section 44 IPC, 1860, "The word 'injury' denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in body, mind, reputation or property."
	Criminal intimidation	Sections 503 and 505 (2), IPC, 1860
	Enmity, hatred or ill-will	Section 153A(1)(a), IPC, 1860
	Persistently by making use of such computer resource or a communication device	Section 127(2)(c), CA, 2003, "persistently makes use of a public electronic communications network."
Section 66A(c)	Deceive or to mislead	-

Notes
MCA 1988: Malicious Communications Act (s.1)
CA: Communications Act 2003 (s.127)
*Replaced by Communications Act 2003

[1]. The Information Technology (Amendment) Bill, 2008, was one amongst the eight bills that were passed in fifteen minutes on December 16, 2008.
[2]. Inserted vide Information Technology Amendment Act, 2008.

This was re-posted in Outlook (November 28, 2012)

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/breaking-down-section-66-a-of-the-it-act

Blocking Twitter: How Internet Service Providers & telcos were caught between tweets and tall egos

praskrishna — 2012-08-25T07:36:04Z

Long derided as 'dumb pipes' to the Web, Internet service providers (ISPs) are discovering these days that insult is being increasingly followed up by injury.

Joji Thomas Philip and Harsimran Julka's article was published in the Times of India on August 25, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

In the fight between netizens who spare no effort at lampooning the powers that be and alarmingly frequent government flashes of rage at comments that can range from the mildly disrespectful to downright defamatory, telcos and ISPs find themselves much like the grass in the age-old Swahili saying "When two elephants fight, it's the grass that suffers".

The latest reminder of the hard place they find themselves in came earlier this week when news first broke that the government had asked for some accounts on social media site Twitter to also be part of websites and Internet pages it wanted blocked by ISPs. The news triggered a wave of outrage across cyberspace, with many users venting their rage at the first entity they associate the web with - their ISP, which in many cases is also their telecom operator.

"We acted immediately to the government's orders, but ended up being targetted and criticised wrongly only because we acted first," explained one official, who sought anonymity for himself and the company to avoid offending bureaucrats.

It's a common feeling. Telcos and ISPs are increasingly finding themselves in a 'Damned if you do, Damned if you don't' predicament these days, having to walk a tightrope between government orders and a restive netizenry.

And government orders can range from the super-urgent to arbitrary to sometimes ill-conceived. Very often, its 'one ban fits all' makes little allowance for differences between social networking sites and regular websites.

Executives in telecom companies recounted the instance when the government on August 18 ordered a ban on bulk SMSes and restricted text messages to five per day as part of efforts to combat the large-scale migration of people of north-eastern origins from other states to their home provinces fearing reprisal attacks.

"Within an hour of the directive, we started getting calls seeking compliance," said a top executive with a leading telco. But as the Centre was demanding compliance reports, operators were busy trying to decipher its notification, which read: "(a) Block bulk SMS (more than 5) for the next 15 days in the entire country across all states/UTs (b) Block bulk MMS (more than 5) and all MMS with attachment more than 25 KB for the next 15 days in the entire country across all states/UTs."

Shoot first, talk later

Telecom operators were nonplussed by the notification. Did it apply only to senders of bulk text messages who use this facility for commercial purposes? Or, did it mean customers could not send SMSes to more than five people simultaneously?

"When we sought clarification, the explanation was completely different and took a new dimension. It was five text messages per day per customer," said the regulatory head of a GSM operator, requesting anonymity as he did not want to offend the government.

Mobile phone companies then approached the department of telecom explaining that they did not have any technology with which they could impose a five SMSes a day limit for postpaid users. "The home and telecom ministries had not even realised that a facility did not exist before issuing the directive," said the marketing head of a leading telco.

In this case, the government accepted the operator's arguments and relented, but still told the companies not to highlight the limitation. "This time around, our arguments were accepted. Going by past instances, some operators had feared that the government would slap a hefty penalty for non-compliance without considering what we had to say," the marketing head said.

Industry officials say the tendency of 'shoot first, talk later' among bureaucrats and ministers long used to having their orders followed, especially when it came to the world of social networking which very few of them had any idea about, meant that it was safer to obey first and correct later.

"We don't even do any application of mind to the government's notices on requests. We wholesale block them. We can't even question the government's requests. A notice is a law in effect. Violation means a potential penalty which can go up to the cancellation of my licence and thus end to my business," said the head of a Delhi-based ISP that serves business users.

Executives with several ISPs and telcos say most often, court orders, government notifications and directives are not in public domain, and these result in angry consumers assuming that their service provider is up to some mischief.

ISPs say public clarifications by the government would go a long way in addressing the issue. "There has to be transparency. The government should have proactively disclosed the names of the websites it wanted blocked. The persons and intermediaries hosting the content should have been notified and provided with 48 hours to respond as required by the IT Act," said Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society, a research organisation.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/times-of-india-aug-25-2012-blocking-twitter

Blocked websites: Where India flawed

praskrishna — 2012-08-27T03:00:16Z

Apart from not giving 48 hours response time, the Indian government has blocked some websites which don't exist or don't have web addresses, says an analyst.

Published in CIOL on August 23, 2012. Pranesh Prakash's analysis is quoted.

India is threatening to block Twitter as the latter has allegedly failed to respond to the government's order to remove some inflammatory posts.

That has come to light as it is being widely covered in media, but there are hundreds of websites which have already been shut, apparently without due notice to the owners.

Apart from Facebook, Twitter and YouTube accounts, the blocked websites include which are sympathetic to Hindu and Muslim radical groups.

In an analysis of 309 websites blocked in the wake of exodus of North eastern people from Bangalore, Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), says the government has blocked these sites under the Information Technology Act, but it failed to provide the mandatory 48 hours to respond (under Rule 8 of the Information Technology Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public, Rules 2009).

He writes in his post: "The persons and intermediaries hosting the content should have been notified. Even if the emergency provision (Rule 9) was used, the block issued on August 18, 2012, should have been introduced before the "Committee for Examination of Request" by August 20, 2012 (within 48 hours), and that committee should have notified the persons and intermediaries hosting the content.

Internet censorship is acceptable as long as it is in the purview of the law and doesn't encroach one's freedom. In this case, some people and posts debunking rumours have been blocked, says Pranesh.

He points to some discrepancies in the way the websites are blocked:

Some of the items are not even web addresses (e.g., a few HTML img tags were included). Some of the items they have tried to block do not even exist (e.g., one of the Wikipedia URLs).
An entire domain was blocked on Sunday, and a single post on that domain was blocked on Monday.
For some YouTube videos, the 'base' URL of YouTube videos is blocked, but for other the URL with various parameters (like the "&related=" parameter) is blocked. That means that even nominally 'blocked' videos will be freely accessible.

He concludes: "All in all, it is clear that the list was not compiled with sufficient care."

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/www-ciol-com-aug-23-2012-blocked-websites

Arrests over Facebook posts: Why we’re on a dangerous slide

praskrishna — 2012-11-20T11:47:43Z

The most bizarre thing about the arrest of Shaheen Dhada and Renu Srinivasan on Monday over a Facebook post that questioned the wisdom of a bandh to mark Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray‘s death is that no laws were actually violated by the post.

Venky Vembu's article was published in FirstPost on November 20, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

In tone and in content, the post is remarkably restrained, particularly when compared to the rather more incendiary messages that are commonplace on social media platforms. Nor was it even halfways defamatory in the way that many rants on Twitter and Facebook have unfortunately come to be.

Yet, the Mumbai police appear to have cravenly capitulated in the face of some arm-twisting by a local Sena strongman and gone ahead to arrest the two young women on charges that seem laughable even given the extraordinarily sweeping, catch-all clauses of the Information Technology Act.

It is hard to see how Shaheen Dhada violated the two sections of the law under which she has been charged – Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code (“outraging religous feelings of any class”) or even the draconian Section 66A of the IT Act (“sending offensive messages through communication service, etc.”) – with her contemplative post, or what crimes Renu Srinivasan committed in merely ‘liking’ the post.

But it is a sign of the disquieting nature of the provision of the law, and the perverse manner in which it is being implemented, that there weren’t adequate checks and balances to inhibit the wilful deployment of the law on such frivolous grounds. Ironically, the goons who actually wrecked the clinic of Dhada’s uncle haven’t been called to account.

If that is bad enough, it is doubly perverse for Kapil Sibal to claim in all innocence that he is “deeply saddened” by the arrest of the two young women and to insinuate that the IT Act, which he was instrumental in passing, was being misused on grounds of improper implementation.

The fact of it is that the IT Act that he fathered, and particularly the notorious Section 66A, was deliberately worded to give maximum potential for mischief. There have been far too many egregious instances of its misuse by discredited governments and politicians for Sibal to claim that these are random incidents of misuse of the law. Just last month, Finance Minister P Chidambaram’s son Karti had a Puducherry businessmen and anti-corruption activist hauled up by the police for a Twitter post in which the businessman alleged that Karti had “amassed more wealth” than Sonia Gandhi‘s son-in-law.

It’s important to get a sense of why the latest arrests take us further on the slippery slope towards curtailing free speech. Justice Markandeya Katju has repeatedly pointed to the egregious encroachment on the freedom of speech by this provision of law, and has been vocal in calling both politicians and policemen to account whenever the law is abused in this manner.

“It is absurd to say that protesting against the bandh hurts religious sentiments,” Katju observed in a letter to the Maharashtra Chief Minister. “Under Article 19 of our Constitution, freedom of speech is guaranteed fundamental right. We are living in a democracy, not a fascist dictatorship.”

If anything, Katju argued, “this arrest itself appears to be a criminal act since under Sections 341 and 342, it is a crime to wrongfully arrest or wrongfully confine someone who has committed no crime.”

As Pranesh Prakash at the Centre for Internet and Society points out, in the context of Monday’s arrests, “This should not be seen merely as ‘social media regulation’, but as a restriction on freedom of speech and expression by both the law and the police.” Section 66A, he says, makes certain kinds of speech-activities (“causing annoyance”) illegal if communicated online, but legal if that same speech-activity is published in a newspaper.

This distinction is important, Prakash notes, since the mere fact that it was a Facebook status update “should not grant Shaheen Dhada any special immunity”. If anything, it is the fact that her update is not punishable under Section 295 of the IPC or of Section 66A of the IT Act that should give her the immunity, he adds.

With each instance in which Section 66A of the IT Act is being invoked, the potential for mischief embedded in the law is being exposed. Monday’s arrests – of two young women for crimes they did not even commit – are the most brazen instance of their abuse.

Of course, the perverse provision of law has been abused in the real world through selective and arbitrary invocation of the law. But the original sin lies in the law itself. It is the most potent threat to free speech online, and if the law isn’t amended to throw out these perverse provisions, India can kiss goodbye to any lingering pretensions to being a democracy of any sort.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/first-post-politics-venky-vembu-nov-20-2012-arrests-over-facebook-posts-why-were-on-a-dangerous-slide

Arrested for tweeting: Legitimate or Curbing Free Speech?

praskrishna — 2012-11-02T06:09:57Z

As a man in Puducherry is arrested for allegedly posting on Twitter that MR Chidambaram's son had amassed wealth more than that of Robert Vadra, we discuss whether freedom of speech is absolute.

Sunil Abraham along with Shivam Vij, Journalist and Blogger, SB Mishra, Additional DCP, Census Wing, Economic Offence Wing, Delhi Police, and Sanjay Pinto, Advocate, Madras High Court participated in this discussion aired in NDTV on October 31, 2012.

Watch the full video on NDTV

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/ndtv-news-oct-31-2012-arrested-for-tweeting-legitimate-or-curbing-free-speech

Arrest of girl over Thackeray FB update a clear misuse of Sec 295A

praskrishna — 2012-11-20T12:00:53Z

The arrest of 21-year-old Shaheen Dhada over her Facebook status update questioning the shutdown of Mumbai over Shiv Sena supremo Bal Thackeray‘s death, is a clear misapplication of section 295 A of the Indian Penal Code (“outrage religious feelings of any class”), according to Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society.

The article was published in FirstPost on November 19, 2012. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

In comments to Firstpost, Prakash said that this law had been misused numerous times in the state of Maharashtra.

“Even the banning of James Laine’s book Shivaji happened under section 295 A, and the ban was subsequently held to have been unlawful. What makes this seem ironic, and almost a parodic news report, is the fact that Bal Thackeray probably violated this provision more times than most other politicians, but was only charged under it once or twice”, he said.

Dhada’s status update reportedly read, “People like Thackeray are born and die daily and one should not observe a bandh for that.” A friend of hers who ‘liked’ the comment was also arrested.

Prakash said that the arrest called for a discussion on the regulation of speech and expression. “It being a Facebook status update should not grant it any special immunity; the fact of that update not being punishable under s.295 A should! It isn’t regulation of social media that needs to be discussed, but regulation of speech and expression”, he said.

News of the arrest has understandably drawn a lot of attention on social media, and forums like Facebook and Twitter reflected outrage at the news.

The Times of India also reported that a mob of Shiv Sena workers attacked and ransacked the girl’s uncle’s orthopaedic clinic at Palghar, even though she withdrew her comment and apologised.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/first-post-india-nov-19-2012-arrest-of-girl-over-thackeray-fb-update-clear-misuse-of-sec-295a

Are we Losing the Right to Privacy and Freedom of Speech on Indian Internet?

Amber Sinha — 2016-03-16T14:44:19Z

The article was published in DNA on March 10, 2016.

Last month, it was reported that National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) had proposed the setting up of a National Media Analytics Centre (NMAC). This centre’s mandate would be to monitor blogs, media channels, news outlets and social media platforms. Sources were quoted as stating that the centre would rely upon a tracking software built by Ponnurangam Kumaraguru, an Assistant Professor at the Indraprastha Institute of Information Technology in Delhi. The NMAC seems to mirror other similar efforts in countries such as US, Canada, Australia and UK, to monitor online content for the reasons as varied as prevention of terrorist activities, disaster relief and criminal investigation.

The NSCS, the parent body that this centre will fall under, is a part of the National Security Council, India’s highest agency looking to integrate policy-making and intelligence analysis, and advising the Prime Minister’s Office on strategic issues as well as domestic and international threats. The NSCS represents the Joint Intelligence Committee and its duties include the assessment of intelligence from the Intelligence Bureau, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Directorates of Military, Air and Naval Intelligence, and the coordination of the functioning of intelligence agencies.

From limited reports available, it appears that the tracking software used by NMAC will generate tags to classify post and comments on social media into negative, positive and neutral categories, paying special attention to “belligerent” comments. The reports say that the software will also try to determine if the comments are factually correct or not. The idea of a government agency systematically tracking social media, blogs and news outlets and categorising content as desirable and undesirable is bound to create a chilling effect on free speech online. The most disturbing part of the report suggested that the past pattern of writers’ posts would be analysed to see how often her posts fell under the negative category, and whether she was attempting to create trouble or disturbance, and appropriate feedback would be sent to security agencies based on it. Viewed alongside the recent events where actors critical of the government and holding divergent views have expressed concerns about attempts to suppress dissenting opinions, this initiative sounds even more dangerous, putting at risk individuals categorised as “negative” or “belligerent”, for exercising their constitutionally protected right to free speech.

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It has been argued that the Internet is a public space, and should be treated as subject to monitoring by the government as any other space. Further, this kind of analysis does not concern itself with private communication between two or more parties but only with publicly available information. Why must we raise eyebrows if the government is accessing and analysing it for the purposes of legitimate state interests? There are two problems with this argument. First, any surveillance of communication must always be limited in scope, specific to individuals, necessary and proportionate, and subject to oversight. There are no laws passed by the Parliament in India which allow for mass surveillance measures. Such activities are being conducted through bodies like NSC which came into existence through an Executive Order and have no clear oversight mechanisms built into its functioning. A quick look at the history of intelligence and surveillance agencies in India will show that none of them have been created through a legislation. A host of surveillance agencies have come up in the last few years including the Central Monitoring System, which was set up to monitor telecommunications, and the absence of legislative pedigree translates into lack of appropriate controls and safeguards, and zero public accountability.

The second and the larger issue is that the scale and level of granularity of personal information available now is unprecedented. Earlier, our communications with friends and acquaintances, our movements, our association, political or otherwise, were not observable in the manner it is today. It would be remiss to underestimate the importance of personal information merely because it exists in the public domain. The ability to act without being subject to monitoring and surveillance is key to the right to free speech and expression. While we accept the importance of free speech and the value of an open internet and newer technologies to enable it, we do not give sufficient importance to how these technologies are affecting the right to privacy.

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In the last few years, the social media scene in India has been characterised by extreme polemic with epithets such as ‘bhakt’, ‘sanghi’, ‘sickular’ and ‘presstitutes’ thrown around liberally, turning political discussions into a mess of ugliness. It remains to be seen whether the NMAC intends to deal with the professional trolls who rely on a barrage of abuse to disrupt public conversations online. However, the appropriate response would not be greater surveillance, let alone a body like NMAC, with a sweeping mandate and little accountability.

Link to the original here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/dna-amber-sinha-march-10-2016-are-we-losing-right-to-privacy-and-freedom-of-speech-on-indian-internet

Arbitrary Arrests for Comment on Bal Thackeray's Death

pranesh — 2013-01-02T03:42:37Z

Two girls have been arbitrarily and unlawfully arrested for making comments about the late Shiv Sena supremo Bal Thackeray's death. Pranesh Prakash explores the legal angles to the arrests.

Facts of the case

This morning, there was a short report in the Mumbai Mirror about two girls having been arrested for comments one of them made, and the other 'liked', on Facebook about Bal Thackeray:

Police on Sunday arrested a 21-year-old girl for questioning the total shutdown in the city for Bal Thackeray’s funeral on her Facebook account. Another girl who ‘liked’ the comment was also arrested.

The duo were booked under Section 295 (a) of the IPC (for hurting religious sentiments) and Section 64 (a) of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Though the girl withdrew her comment and apologised, a mob of some 2,000 Shiv Sena workers attacked and ransacked her uncle’s orthopaedic clinic at Palghar.

“Her comment said people like Thackeray are born and die daily and one should not observe a bandh for that,” said PI Uttam Sonawane.

What provisions of law were used?

There's a small mistake in Mumbai Mirror's reportage as there is no section "64(a)"¹ in the Information Technology (IT) Act, nor a section "295(a)" in the Indian Penal Code (IPC). They must have meant section 295A of the IPC ("outraging religious feelings of any class") and section 66A of the IT Act ("sending offensive messages through communication service, etc."). (Update: The Wall Street Journal's Shreya Shah has confirmed that the second provision was section 66A of the IT Act.)

Section 295A of the IPC is cognizable and non-bailable, and hence the police have the powers to arrest a person accused of this without a warrant.² Section 66A of the IT Act is cognizable and bailable.

Update: Some news sources claim that section 505(2) of the IPC ("Statements creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes") has also been invoked.

Was the law misapplied?

This is clearly a case of misapplication of s.295A of the IPC.³ This provision has been frivolously used numerous times in Maharashtra. Even the banning of James Laine's book Shivaji: Hindu King in Islamic India happened under s.295A, and the ban was subsequently held to have been unlawful by both the Bombay High Court as well as the Supreme Court. Indeed, s.295A has not been applied in cases where it is more apparent, making this seem like a parody news report.

Interestingly, the question arises of the law under which the friend who 'liked' the Facebook status update was arrested. It would take a highly clever lawyer and a highly credulous judge to make 'liking' of a Facebook status update an act capable of being charged with electronically "sending ... any information that is grossly offensive or has menacing character" or "causing annoyance or inconvenience", or under any other provision of the IT Act (or, for that matter, the IPC).⁴ That 'liking' is protected speech under Article 19(1)(a) is not under question in India (unlike in the USA where that issue had to be adjudicated by a court), since unlike the wording present in the American Constitution, the Indian Constitution clearly protects the 'freedom of speech and expression', so even non-verbal expression is protection.

Role of bad law and the police

In this case the blame has to be shared between bad law (s.66A of the IT Act) and an abuse of powers by police. The police were derelict in their duty, as they failed to provide protection to the Dhada Orthopaedic Hospital, run by the uncle of the girl who made the Facebook posting. Then they added insult to injury by arresting Shaheen Dhada and the friend who 'liked' her post. This should not be written off as a harmless case of the police goofing up. Justice Katju is absolutely correct in demanding that such police officers should be punished.

Rule of law

Rule of law demands that laws are not applied in an arbitrary manner. When tens of thousands were making similar comments in print (Justice Katju's article in the Hindu, for instance), over the Internet (countless comments on Facebook, Rediff, Orkut, Twitter, etc.), and in person, how did the police single out Shaheen Dhada and her friend for arrest?⁵

This should not be seen merely as "social media regulation", but as a restriction on freedom of speech and expression by both the law and the police. Section 66A makes certain kinds of speech-activities ("causing annoyance") illegal if communicated online, but legal if that same speech-activity is published in a newspaper. Finally, this is similar to the Aseem Trivedi case where the police wrongly decided to press charges and to arrest.

This distinction is important as it being a Facebook status update should not grant Shaheen Dhada any special immunity; the fact of that particular update not being punishable under s.295 or s.66A (or any other law) should.

Section 64 of the IT Act is about "recovery of penalty" and the ability to suspend one's digital signature if one doesn't pay up a penalty that's been imposed.↩
The police generally cannot, without a warrant, arrest a person accused of a bailable offence unless it is a cognizable offence. A non-bailable offence is one for which a judicial magistrate needs to grant bail, and it isn't an automatic right to be enjoyed by paying a bond-surety amount set by the police.↩
Section 295A of the IPC has been held not to be unconstitutional. The first case to challenge the constitutionality of section 66A of the IT Act was filed recently in front of the Madurai bench the Madras High Court.)↩
One can imagine an exceptional case where such an act could potentially be defamatory, but that is clearly exceptional.↩
This is entirely apart from the question of how the Shiv Sena singled in on Shaheen Dhada's Facebook comment.↩

This blog entry has been re-posted in the following places

Outlook (November 19, 2012).
KAFILA (November 19, 2012).

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/bal-thackeray-comment-arbitrary-arrest-295A-66A

Anti-trafficking Bill may lead to censorship

Swaraj Barooah and Gurshabad Grover — 2018-08-02T13:59:16Z

There are a few problematic provisions in the proposed legislation—it may severely impact freedom of expression.

The article was published in Livemint on July 24, 2018.

The legislative business of the monsoon session of Parliament kicked off on 18 July with the introduction of the Trafficking of Persons (Prevention, Protection and Rehabilitation) Bill, 2018, in the Lok Sabha. The intention of the Union government is to “make India a leader among South Asian countries to combat trafficking” through the passage of this Bill. Good intentions aside, there are a few problematic provisions in the proposed legislation, which may severely impact freedom of expression.

For instance, Section 36 of the Bill, which aims to prescribe punishment for the promotion or facilitation of trafficking, proposes a minimum three-year sentence for producing, publishing, broadcasting or distributing any type of material that promotes trafficking or exploitation. An attentive reading of the provision, however, reveals that it has been worded loosely enough to risk criminalizing many unrelated activities as well.

The phrase “any propaganda material that promotes trafficking of person or exploitation of a trafficked person in any manner” has wide amplitude, and many unconnected or even well-intentioned actions can be construed to come within its ambit as the Bill does not define what constitutes “promotion”. For example, in moralistic eyes, any sexual content online could be seen as promoting prurient interests, and thus also promoting trafficking.

Rather than imposing a rigorous standard of actual and direct nexus with the act of trafficking or exploitation, a vaguer standard which includes potentially unprovable causality, including by actors who may be completely unaware of such activity, is imposed. This opens the doors to using this provision for censorship and imposes a chilling effect on any literary or artistic work which may engage with sensitive topics, such as trafficking of women.

In the past, governments have been keen to restrict access to online escort services and pornography. In June 2016, the Union government banned 240 escort sites for obscenity even though it cannot do that under Section 69A or Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, or Section 8 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act. In July 2015, the government asked internet service providers (ISPs) to block 857 pornography websites sites on grounds of outraging “morality” and “decency”, but later rescinded the order after widespread criticism. If historical record is any indication, Section 36 in this present Bill will legitimize such acts of censorship.

Section 39 proposes an even weaker standard for criminal acts by proposing that any act of publishing or advertising “which may lead to the trafficking of a person shall be punished” (emphasis added) with imprisonment for 5-10 years. In effect, the provision mandates punishment for vaguely defined actions that may not actually be connected to the trafficking of a person at all. This is in stark contrast to most provisions in criminal law, which require mens rea (intention) along with actus reus (guilty act). The excessive scope of this provision is prone to severe abuse, since without any burden of showing a causal connect, it could be argued that anything “may lead” to the trafficking of a person.

Another by-product of passing the proposed legislation would be a dramatic shift in India’s landscape of intermediary liability laws, i.e., rules which determine the liability of platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, and messaging services like Whatsapp and Signal for hosting or distributing unlawful content.

Provisions in the Bill that criminalize the “publication” and “distribution” of content, ignore that unlike the physical world, modern electronic communication requires third-party intermediaries to store and distribute content. This wording can implicate neutral communication pipeways, such as ISPs, online platforms, mobile messengers, which currently cannot even know of the presence of such material unless they surveil all their users. Under the proposed legislation, the fact that human traffickers used Whatsapp to communicate about their activities could be used to hold the messaging service criminally liable.

By proposing such, the Bill is in direct conflict with the internationally recognized Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability, and in dissonance with existing principles of Indian law, flowing from the Information Technology Act, 2000, that identify online platforms as “safe harbours” as long as they act as mere conduits. From the perspective of intermediaries, monitoring content is unfeasible, and sometimes technologically impossible as in the case of Whatsapp, which facilitates end-to-end encrypted messaging. And as a 2011 study by the Centre for Internet & Society showed, platforms are happy to over-comply in favour of censorship to escape liability rather than verify actual violations. The proposed changes will invariably lead to a chilling effect on speech on online platforms.

Considering these problematic provisions, it will be a wise move to send the Bill to a select committee in Parliament wherein the relevant stakeholders can engage with the lawmakers to arrive at a revised Bill, hopefully one which prevents human trafficking without threatening the Constitutional right of free speech.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/livemint-july-24-2018-swaraj-barooah-and-gurshabad-grover-anti-trafficking-bill-may-lead-to-censorship