Centre for Internet and Society

Right to be forgotten poses a legal dilemma in India

praskrishna — 2014-06-09T10:02:25Z

The “right to be forgotten” judgment has raised a controversy, while some argue that it upholds an individual’s privacy, others say it leaves a lot of room for interpretation.

The article by Leslie D' Monte was published in Livemint on June 5, 2014. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

Medianama.com has become perhaps the first Indian website to be asked by an individual to remove a link, failing which the user would approach Google Inc. to delete the link under the “right to be forgotten” provision granted by a European court. There’s one hitch: India doesn’t have any legal provision to entertain or process such request.

In his request to the media website, the individual cited a landmark 13 May judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU), which said users could ask search engines like Google or Bing to remove links to web pages that contain information about them.

According to the judgement, the user is also free to approach “the competent authorities in order to obtain, under certain conditions, the removal of that link from the list of results” if the search engines do not comply.

“...this individual told us of a plan to appeal to Google on the basis of the judgment of the European Court of Justice, and asked us to either convert the public post into a non-indexable post, such that it may not be surfaced by search engines, or to modify the individual’s name, place and any references to his/her employer in the post that we’ve written, so that it cannot be linked directly to the individual,” said Nikhil Pahwa, founder of medianama.com.

Pahwa did not reveal the identity of the individual, who made the request on 31 May. Medianama, according to Pahwa, had written about the individual “a few years ago, protesting against attacks on his/her freedom of speech.” It did not give details. The media website reported about the request on 2 June.

Under legal pressure, the individual eventually relented and retracted the request.

The individual, Pahwa said, requested medianama.com to retain only his last name on the web page, cautioning that if the website does not do so, he would submit the URL (uniform resource locator or address of that link) of that web page to Google in a “right to be forgotten” request.

This, Pahwa said, “might hurt our search ranking, or lead to a blanket removal of our website from Google’s search index.”

“This is a tricky one, and we’ve declined this request,” said Pahwa. He added that “the implications for media are immense, since digital data, which is a recording of online history, will be affected.”

The EU ruling came after a Spanish national complained in 2010 that searching his name in Google threw up links to two newspaper webpages which reported a property auction to recover social security debt he once owed, even though the information had become irrelevant since the proceedings had since been resolved.

Following the ruling, Google put up an online form (mintne.ws/1oYVP5Y), inviting users in Europe to submit their requests.

“...we will assess each individual request and attempt to balance the privacy rights of the individual with the public’s right to know and distribute information,” the form reads.

“When evaluating your request, we will look at whether the results include outdated information about you, as well as whether there’s a public interest in the information—for example, information about financial scams, professional malpractice, criminal convictions, or public conduct of government officials...”

A Google spokesman said on Tuesday that the company had received over 41,000 requests to be forgotten so far.

On the first day itself, Google had received 12,000 requests.

“Almost a third of the requests were in relation to accusations of fraud, 20% were in relation to violent/serious crimes, and around 12% regarded child pornography arrests. More than 1,500 of these requests are believed to have come from people in the UK. An ex-politician seeking re-election, a paedophile and a GP (general practitioner) were among the British applicants”, according to a 2 June report inThe Telegraph of London.

The “right to be forgotten” judgment has raised a controversy. While some argue that it upholds an individual’s privacy, others say it leaves a lot of room for interpretation.

In an interview to Mint on 26 May, Anupam Chander, director of the California International Law Center, reasoned that if a person could simply scrub all the bad information about him from being searchable on the Internet, she/he could do so by claiming that such information was “no longer relevant”.

“Do we want search engines to then judge whether information remains “relevant” or is somehow “inadequate” under the threat of liability for leaving information accessible? An Internet sanitized of accessible negative information will only tell half the truth,” he argued.

The ruling is not binding on India and applies only to EU countries.

According to legal experts, the country has no provision for a right to be forgotten, either in the Information Technology (IT) Act 2000 (amended in 2008) or the IT Rules, 2011. India, for that matter, does not even have a privacy act as yet.

“In India, we do not have a concept of the right to be Forgotten. It’s a very Western concept,” said Pavan Duggal, a cyberlaw expert and Supreme Court advocate.

Still, intermediaries like search engines and Internet services providers, under the country’s IT Act and IT Rules, have the obligation to exercise due diligence if an aggrieved party sends them a written notice, he said.

According to Sunil Abraham, executive director of the Centre for Internet and Society, an Internet rights lobby group, “right to be forgotten” cases should pass the “public interest” test.

“Privacy protection should not have a chilling effect on transparency. The question is: Does the content (which a user wants to be removed) serve a public interest that outweighs the harm that it is doing to the individual concerned? If no public interest is being served, there is no point in knowing what the content is all about. The complication with the EU ruling is that it wants intermediaries and over-the-top providers to play the role of judges,” said Abraham.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/livemint-leslie-d-monte-june-5-2014-right-to-be-forgotten-poses-legal-dilemma-in-india

Free Speech and Contempt of Court – I: Overview

Gautam Bhatia — 2014-06-08T15:29:33Z

Gautam Bhatia explores an under-theorised aspect of India's free speech jurisprudence: the contempt power that equips courts to "protect the dignity of the Bench". In this introductory post, he examines jurisprudence from the US and England to inform our analysis of Indian law.

On May 31, the Times of India reported some observations of a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court on its contempt powers. The Court noted that the power to punish for contempt was necessary to “secure public respect and confidence in the judicial process”, and also went on to add – rather absurdly – to lay down the requirements, in terms of timing, tone and tenor, of a truly “contrite” apology. This opinion, however, provides us with a good opportunity to examine one of the most under-theorised aspects of Indian free speech law: the contempt power.

Indeed, the contempt power finds express mention in the Constitution. Article 19(2) permits the government to impose reasonable restrictions upon the freedom of speech and expression “… in relation to contempt of court.” The legislation governing contempt powers is the 1971 Contempt of Courts Act. Contempt as a civil offence involves willful disobedience of a court order. Contempt as a criminal offence, on the other hand, involves either an act or expression (spoken, written or otherwise visible) that does one of three things: scandalises, or tends to scandalize, or lowers, or tends to lower, the authority of any court; prejudices or interferes (or tends to interfere) with judicial proceedings; or otherwise obstructs, or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice. As we can see, contempt can – broadly – take two forms: first, obstructing the proceedings of the Court by acts such as disobeying an order, holding up a hearing through absence or physical/verbal disturbance etc. This is straightforward enough. More problematically, however, contempt also covers instances of what we may call “pure speech”: words or other forms of expression about the Court that are punished for no other reason but their content. In particular, “scandalising the Court” seems to be particularly vague and formless in its scope and ambit.

“Scandalising the court” is a common law term. The locus classicus is the 1900 case of R v. Gray, which – in language that the Contempt of Courts Act has largely adopted – defined it as “any act done or writing published calculated to bring a Court or a judge of the Court into contempt, or to lower his authority.” The basic idea is that if abusive invective against the Court is permitted, then people will lose respect for the judiciary, and justice will be compromised.

It is obvious that this argument is flawed in many respects, and we shall analyse the Supreme Court’s problematic understanding of its contempt powers in the next post. First, however, it is instructive to examine the fate of contempt powers in the United States – which, like India, constitutionally guarantees the freedom of speech – and in England, whose model India has consciously followed.

America’s highly speech-protective Courts have taken a dim view of contempt powers. Three cases stand out. Bridges v. California involved a contempt of court accusation against a labour leader for calling a Court decision “outrageous”, and threatening a strike if it was upheld. Reversing his prior conviction, the Supreme Court noted that “public interest is much more likely to be kindled by a controversial event of the day than by a generalization, however penetrating, of the historian or scientist.” Given the strong public interest, the burden of justifying restrictions upon this speech was particularly high. The Court identified two possible justifications: respect for the judiciary, and the orderly administration of justice. On the first, it observed that “an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.” On the second, it held that since striking itself was entirely legal, it was no argument that the threat of a strike would illegally intimidate a judge and subvert the course of justice. Throughout the case, the Court stressed that unfettered speech on matters of public interest was of paramount value, and could only be curtailed if there was a “clear and present danger” that the substantially evil consequences would result out of allowing it.

Similarly, in Garrison v. Lousiana, an attorney accused certain judges of inefficiency and laziness. Reversing his conviction, the Supreme Court took note of “the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public officials, their servants…. few personal attributes are more germane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even though these characteristics may also affect the official's private character.” Consequently, it held that only those statements could be punished that the author either knew were false, or were made with reckless disregard for the truth. And lastly, in Landmark Communications v. Virginia, the Court held that “the operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern”, and endorsed Justice Frankfurter’s prior statement, that “speech cannot be punished when the purpose is simply "to protect the court as a mystical entity or the judges as individuals or as anointed priests set apart from the community and spared the criticism to which in a democracy other public servants are exposed.”

What stands out here is the American Courts’ rejection of the ideas that preserving the authority of judges by suppressing certain forms of speech is an end in itself, and that the Courts must be insulated to some greater degree than other officials of government. Consequently, it must be shown that the impugned expression presents a clear and present danger to the administration of justice, before it can be punished.

Now to England. The last successful prosecution of the offence was in 1931. In 2012, the Law Commission published a paper on contempt powers, in which it expressly recommended abolishing the offence of “scandalising the Court”; its recommendations were accepted, and the offence was abolished in 2013. Admittedly, the offence remains on the statute books in many commonwealth nations, although two months ago – in April 2014 – the Privy Council gave it a highly circumscribed interpretation while adjudicating a case on appeal from Mauritius: there must, it held, be a “real risk of undermining public confidence in the administration of justice” (something akin to clear and present danger?), and the Prosecution must demonstrate that the accused either intended to do so, or acted in reckless disregard of whether or not he was doing so.

What is particularly interesting is the Law Commission’s reasoning in its recommendations. Tracing the history of the offence back to 18^th century England, it noted that the original justification was to maintain a “haze of glory” around the Courts, and it was crucial that the Courts not only be universally impartial, but also perceived to be so. Consequently, the Law Commission observed that “this language suggests that “to be impartial” and “to be universally thought so” are two independent requirements, implying that the purpose of the offence is not confined to preventing the public from getting the wrong idea about the judges, and that where there are shortcomings, it is equally important to prevent the public from getting the right idea.” Obviously, this was highly problematic.

The Law Commission also noted the adverse impact of the law on free speech: the well-known chilling effect, whereby people would self-censor even justified criticism. This was exacerbated by the vagueness of the offence, which left unclear the intent requirement, and the status of defences based on truth and public interest. The Law Commission was concerned, as well, about the inherently self-serving nature of the offence, which give judges the power to sit in judgment over speech and expression that was directly critical of them. Lastly, the Law Commission noted that the basic point of contempt powers was similar to that of seditious libel: to ensure the good reputation of the State (or, in the case of scandalising, the judges) by controlling what could be said about them. With the abolition of seditious libel, the raison d’être of scandalising the Court was also – now – weakened.

We see, therefore, that the United States has rejected sweeping contempt powers as unconstitutional. England, which created the offence that India incorporated into its law, stopped prosecuting people for it in 1931, and formally abolished it last year. And even when its hands have been bound by the law that it is bound the enforce, the Privy Council has interpreted the offence in as narrow a manner as possible, in order to remain solicitous of free speech concerns. Unfortunately, as we shall see in the next essay, all these developments have utterly passed our Courts by.

Gautam Bhatia — @gautambhatia88 on Twitter — is a graduate of the National Law School of India University (2011), and presently an LLM student at the Yale Law School. He blogs about the Indian Constitution at http://indconlawphil.wordpress.com. Here at CIS, he blogs on issues of online freedom of speech and expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/free-speech-and-contempt-of-court-2013-i-overview

FOEX Live: June 1-7, 2014

geetha — 2014-06-07T13:33:45Z

A weekly selection of news on online freedom of expression and digital technology from across India (and some parts of the world).

Delhi NCR:

Following a legal notice from Dina Nath Batra, publisher Orient BlackSwan “set aside… for the present” Communalism and Sexual Violence: Ahmedabad Since 1969 by Dr. Megha Kumar, citing the need for a “comprehensive assessment”. Dr. Kumar’s book is part of the ‘Critical Thinking on South Asia’ series, and studies communal and sexual violence in the 1969, 1985 and 2002 riots of Ahmedabad. Orient BlackSwan insists this is a pre-release assessment, while Dr. Kumar contests that her book went to print in March 2014 after extensive editing and peer review. Dina Nath Batra’s civil suit led Penguin India to withdraw Wendy Doniger’s The Hindus: An Alternative History earlier this year.

The Delhi Police’s Facebook page aimed at reaching out to Delhi residents hailing from the North East proved to be popular.

Goa:

Shipbuilding engineer Devu Chodankar’s ordeal continued. Chodankar, in a statement to the cyber crime cell of the Goa police, clarified that his allegedly inflammatory statements were directed against the induction of the Sri Ram Sene’s Pramod Muthalik into the BJP. Chodankar’s laptop, hard-disk and mobile Internet dongle were seized.

Jammu & Kashmir:

Chief Minister Omar Abdullah announced the withdrawal of a four-year-old SMS ban in the state. The ban was instituted in 2010 following widespread protests, and while it was lifted for post-paid subscribers six months later, pre-paid connections were banned from SMSes until now.

Maharashtra:

In a move to contain public protests over ‘objectionable posts’ about Chhatrapati Shivaji, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and the late Bal Thackeray (comments upon whose death led to the arrests of Shaheen Dhada and Renu Srinivasan under Section 66A), Maharashtra police will take action against even those who “like” such posts. ‘Likers’ may be charged under the Information Technology Act and the Criminal Procedure Code, say Nanded police.

A young Muslim man was murdered in Pune, apparently connected to the online publication of ‘derogatory’ pictures of Chhatrapati Shivaji and Bal Thackarey. Members of Hindu extremists groups celebrated his murder, it seems. Pune’s BJP MP, Anil Shirole, said, “some repercussions are natural”. Members of the Hindu Rashtra Sena were held for the murder, but it seems that the photographs were uploaded from foreign IP addresses. Across Maharashtra, 187 riotingcases have been registered against a total of 710 persons, allegedly in connection with the offensive Facebook posts.

On a lighter note, Bollywood hopes for a positive relationship with the new government on matters such as film censorship, tax breaks and piracy.

News & Opinion:

Shocking the world, Vodafone reported the existence of secret, direct-access wires that enable government surveillance on citizens. India is among 29 governments that sought access to its networks, says Vodafone.

I&B Minister Prakash Javadekar expressed his satisfaction with media industry self-regulation, and stated that while cross-media ownership is a matter for debate, it is the legality of transactions such as the Reliance-Network18 acquisition that is important.

Nikhil Pahwa of Medianama wrote of a ‘right to be forgotten’ request they received from a user in light of the recent European Court of Justice ruling. The right raises a legal dilemma in India, LiveMint reports. Medianama also comments on Maharashtra police’s decision to take action against Facebook ‘likes’, noting that at the very least, a like and a comment do not amount to the same thing.

The Hindu was scorching in its editorial on the Pune murder, warning that the new BJP government stands to lose public confidence if it does not clearly demonstrate its opposition to religious violence. The Times of India agrees.

Sanjay Hegde wrote of Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (as amended in 2008) as a medium-focused criminalization of speech. dnaEdit also published its criticism of Section 66A.

Ajit Ranade of the Mumbai Mirror comments on India as a ‘republic of hurt sentiments’, criminalizing exercises of free speech from defamation, hate speech, sedition and Section 66A. But in this hurt and screaming republic, dissent is crucial and must stay alive.

A cyber security expert is of the opinion that the police find it difficult to block webpages with derogatory content, as servers are located outside India. But data localization will not help India, writes Jayshree Bajoria.

Dharma Adhikari tries to analyze the combined impact of converging media ownership, corporate patronage of politicians and elections, and recent practices of forced and self-censorship and criminalization of speech.

Elsewhere in the world:

In Pakistan, Facebook has been criticized for blocking pages of a Pakistani rock band and several political groups, primarily left-wing. Across the continent in Europe, Google is suffering from a popularity dip.

The National Council for Peace and Order, the military government in Thailand, has taken over not only the government,but also controls the media. The military cancelled its meetings with Google and Facebook. Thai protesters staged a quiet dissent. The Asian Human Rights Commission condemned the coup. For an excellent take on the coup and its dangers, please redirect here. For a round-up of editorials and op-eds on the coup, redirect here.

China has cracked down on Google, affecting Gmail, Translate and Calendar. It is speculated that the move is connected to the 25^th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests and government reprisal. At the same time, a Tibetan filmmaker who was jailed for six years for his film, Leaving Fear Behind, has been released by Chinese authorities. Leaving Fear Behind features a series of interviews with Tibetans of the Qinghai province in the run-up to the controversial Beijing Olympics in 2008.

Japan looks set to criminalize possession of child pornography. According to reports, the proposed law does not extend to comics or animations or digital simulations.

Egypt’s police is looking to build a social media monitoring system to track expressions of dissent, including “profanity, immorality, insults and calls for strikes and protests”.

Human rights activists asked Facebook to deny its services to the election campaign of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, ahead of elections on June 3.

Call for inputs:

The Law Commission of India seeks comments from stakeholders and citizens on media law. The consultation paper may be found here. The final date for submission is June 19, 2014.

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For feedback and comments, Geetha Hariharan is available by email at geetha@cis-india.org or on Twitter, where her handle is @covertlight.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/foex-live-june-1-7-2014

WSIS+10 High-Level Event: Open Consultation Process

praskrishna — 2014-06-04T10:14:01Z

Jyoti Panday represented the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) at the WSIS+10 High-Level Event:Open Consultation Process held in Geneva from May 28 to 31, 2014.

The Fifth Physical Meeting marked Phase Six of the Open Consultation Process for the WSIS+10 High-Level Event (HLE) to be held in Geneva from June 10 to 13, 2014.

The meeting saw the culmination of the multistakeholder review process on the WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of the WSIS Outcomes and the WSIS+10 Vision for WSIS Beyond 2015.

CIS made interventions on text related to increasing women's participation, freedom of expression, media rights, data privacy, network security and human rights.

CIS also endorsed text on action line 'Media' which reaffirmed committment to freedom of expression, data privacy and media rights offline and online including protection of sources, publishers and journalists.

Download the final agreed draft of the WSIS+10 Statement on the Implementation of WSIS Outcomes that will be deliberated upon and agreed at the HLE, for your reference.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/wsis-high-level-event-open-consultation-process

Two Arguments Against the Constitutionality of Section 66A

Gautam Bhatia — 2014-06-04T03:42:17Z

Gautam Bhatia explores the constitutionality of Section 66A in light of recent events.

In the immediate aftermath of the elections, free speech issues have come to the fore again. In Goa, a Facebook user was summoned for a post warning a second holocaust if Modi was elected to power. In Karnataka, a MBA student was likewise arrested for circulating an MMS that showed Modi’s face morphed onto a corpse, with the slogan “Abki baar antim sanskaar”. These arrests have reopened the debate about the constitutional validity of Section 66A of the IT Act, which is the legal provision governing online speech in India. Section 66A criminalises, among other things, the sending of information that is “grossly offensive or menacing in character” or causes “annoyance or inconvenience”. The two instances cited above raise – not for the first time – the concern that when it comes to implementation, Section 66A is unworkable to the point of being unconstitutional.

Like all legal provisions, Section 66A must comply with the fundamental rights chapter of the Indian Constitution. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees the freedom of speech and expression, and Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions in the interests of – inter alia – “public order, decency or morality”. Presumably, the only way in which Section 66A can be justified is by showing that it falls within the category of “public order” or of “morality”. The precedent of the Supreme Court, however, has interpreted Article 19(2) in far narrower terms than the ones that Section 66A uses. The Court has held that “public order” may only be invoked if there is a direct and immediate relation between the offending speech and a public order disturbance – such as, for instance, a speaker making an incendiary speech to an excited mob, advocating imminent violence (the Court has colloquially stated the requirement to be a “spark in a powder keg”). Similarly, while the Court has never precisely defined what “morality” – for the purposes of Article 19(2) – means, the term has been invoked where (arguably) pornographic materials are concerned – and never simply because speech has “offended” or “menaced” someone. Indeed, the rhetoric of the Court has consistently rejected the proposition that the government can prohibit individuals from offending one another.

This raises two constitutional problems with Section 66A: the problems of overbreadth and vagueness. Both doctrines have been developed to their fullest in American free speech law, but the underlying principles are universal.

A statute is overbroad when it potentially includes within its prohibitions both speech that it is entitled to prohibit, and speech that it is not. In Gooding v. Wilson, a Georgia statute criminalized the use of “opprobrious words or abusive language”. In defending the statute, the State of Georgia argued that its Courts had read it narrowly, limiting its application to “fighting words” – i.e., words that by their very nature tended to incite an imminent breach of the peace, something that was indisputably within the power of the State to prohibit. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and invalidated the statute. It found that the words “opprobrious” and “abusive” had greater reach than “fighting words”. Thus, since the statute left “wide open the standard of responsibility, so that it [was] easily susceptible to improper application”, the Court struck it down.

A statute is vague when persons of “ordinary intelligence… have no reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.” In Grayned v. Rockford, the American Supreme Court noted that “a vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” There are, therefore, a number of problems with vague laws: one of the fundamental purposes of law is to allow citizens to plan their affairs with a degree of certainty. Vagueness in legislation prevents that. And equally importantly, vague laws leave a wide scope of implementing power with non-elected bodies, such as the police – leading to the fear of arbitrary application.

While overbreadth and vagueness are problems that affect legislation across the board, they assume a particular urgency when it comes to free speech. This is because, as the American Supreme Court has recognized on a number of occasions, speech regulating statutes must be scrutinized with specific care because of the chilling effect: when speech is penalized, people will – out of fear and caution – exercise self-censorship, and the political discourse will be impoverished. If we accept – as the Indian Courts have – that a primary reason for guaranteeing free expression rights is their indispensability to democracy, then the danger of self-censorship is one that we should be particularly solicitous of. Hence, when speech-regulating statutes do proscribe expression, they must be clear and narrowly drawn, in order to avoid the chilling effect. As the American Supreme Court euphemistically framed it, “free speech needs breathing space to survive.” Overbroad and vague speech-restricting statutes are particularly pernicious in denying it that breathing space.

There seems to be little doubt that Section 66A is both overbroad and vague. However ill-judged a holocaust comparison or a morphed corpse-image may be, neither of them are like sparks in a powder keg, which will lead to an immediate breach in public order – or “immoral” in the way of explicit pornography. We can therefore see, clearly, that the implementation of the law leaves almost unbounded scope to officials such as the police, provides room for unconstitutional interpretations, and is so vaguely framed that it is almost impossible to know, in advance, what actions fall within the rule, and which ones are not covered by it. If there is such a thing as over-breadth and vagueness par excellence, then Section 66A is surely it!

At various times in its history, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the problems of overbreadth, vagueness and the chilling effect, but never directly incorporated them into Indian law. As we have seen, each of these elements is connected to the other: over-broad and vague speech-regulating statutes are problematic because of the chilling effect. Since Section 66A is presently being challenged before the Supreme Court, there is a great opportunity for the Court both to get rid of this unconstitutional law, as well as strengthen the foundations of our free speech jurisprudence.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/two-arguments-against-the-constitutionality-of-section-66a

FOEX Live: May 28-29, 2014

geetha — 2014-05-29T08:58:47Z

A selection of news from across India with a bearing on online freedom of expression and use of digital technology

Media focus on the new government and its ministries and portfolios has been extensive, and to my knowledge, few newspapers or online sources have reported violations of freedom of speech. However, on his first day in office, the new I&B Minister, Prakash Javadekar, acknowledged the importance of press freedom, avowing that it was the “essence of democracy”. He has assured that the new government will not interfere with press freedom.

Assam:

A FICCI discussion in Guwahati, attended among others by Microsoft and Pricewaterhouse Coopers, focused on the role of information technology in governance.

Goa:

Following the furore over allegedly inflammatory, ‘hate-mongering’ Facebook posts by shipping engineer Devu Chodankar, a group of Goan netizens formed a ‘watchdog forum’ to police “inappropriate and communally inflammatory content” on social media. Diana Pinto feels, however, that some ‘compassion and humanism’ ought to have prompted only a stern warning in Devu Chodankar’s case, and not a FIR.

Karnataka:

Syed Waqar was released by Belgaum police after questioning revealed he was a recipient of the anti-Modi MMS. The police are still tracing the original sender.

Madhya Pradesh:

The cases of Shaheen Dhada and Rinu Srinivasan, and recently of Syed Waqar and Devu Chodankar have left Indore netizens overly cautious about “posting anything recklessly on social media”. Some feel it is a blow to democracy.

Maharashtra:

In Navi Mumbai, the Karjat police seized several computers, hard disks and blank CDs from the premises of the Chandraprabha Charitable Trust in connection with an investigation into sexual abuse of children at the Trust’s school-shelter. The police seek to verify whether the accused recorded any obscene videos of child sexual abuse.

In Mumbai, even as filmmakers, filmgoers, artistes and LGBT people celebrated the Kashish Mumbai International Queer Film Festival, all remained apprehensive of the new government’s social conservatism, and were aware that the films portrayed acts now illegal in India.

Manipur:

At the inauguration of the 42nd All Manipur Shumang Leela Festival, V.K. Duggal, State Governor and Chairman of the Manipur State Kala Akademi, warned that the art form was under threat in the digital age, as Manipuri films are replacing it in popularity.

Rajasthan:

Following the lead of the Lok Sabha, the Rajasthan state assembly has adopted a digital conference and voting system to make the proceedings in the House more efficient and transparent.

Seemandhra:

Seemandhra Chief Minister designate N. Chandrababu Naidu promised a repeat of his hi-tech city miracle ‘Cyberabad’ in Seemandhra.

West Bengal:

West Bengal government has hired PSU Urban Mass Transit Company Limited to study, install and operationalize Intelligent Transport System in public transport in Kolkata. GPS will guide passengers about real-time bus routes and availability. While private telecom operators have offered free services to the transport department, there are no reports of an end-date or estimated expenditure on the project.

News and Opinion:

Over a week ago, Avantika Banerjee wrote a speculative post on the new government’s stance towards Internet policy. At Fair Observer, Gurpreet Mahajan laments that community politics in India has made a lark of banning books.

India’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In) has detected high-level virus activity in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 8, and recommends upgrading to Explorer 11.

Of the projected 400 million users that Twitter will have by 2018, India and Indonesia are expected to outdo the United Kingdom in user base. India saw nearly 60% growth in user base this year, and Twitter played a major role in Elections 2014. India will have over 18.1 million users by 2018.

Elsewhere in the world:

Placing a bet on the ‘Internet of Everything’, Cisco CEO John Chambers predicted a “brutal consolidation” of the IT industry in the next five years. A new MarketsandMarkets report suggests that the value of the ‘Internet of Things’ may reach US $1423.09 billion by 2020 at an estimated CAGR of 4.08% from 2014 to 2020.

China’s Xinhua News Agency announced its month-long campaign to fight “infiltration from hostile forces at home and abroad” through instant messaging. Message providers WeChat, Momo, Mi Talk and Yixin have expressed their willingness to cooperate in targeting those engaging in fraud, or in spreading ‘rumours’, violence, terrorism or pornography. In March this year, WeChat deleted at least 40 accounts with political, economic and legal content.

Thailand’s military junta interrupted national television broadcast to deny any role in an alleged Facebook-block. The site went down briefly and caused alarm among netizens.

Snowden continues to assure that he is not a Russian spy, and has no relationship with the Russian government.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/foex-live-may-28-29-2014

FOEX Live: May 26-27, 2014

geetha — 2014-05-27T12:42:51Z

A selection of news from across India implicating online freedom of expression and use of digital technology

Media reports across India are focusing on the new government and its Cabinet portfolios. In the midst of the celebration of and grief over the regime change, we found many reports indicating that civil society is wary of the new government’s stance towards Internet freedoms.

Andhra Pradesh:

Andhra MLA and All India Majlis-e-Ittihad ul-Muslimin member Akbaruddin Owaisi has been summoned to appear before a Kurla magistrate’s court on grounds of alleged hate speech and intention to harm harmony of Hinduism and Islam. Complainant Gulam Hussain Khan saw an online video of a December 2012 speech by Owaisi and filed a private complaint with the court. “I am prima facie satisfied that it disclosed an offence punishable under Section(s) 153A and 295A of the Indian Penal Code,” the Metropolitan Magistrate said.

Goa:

A Goa Sessions Judge has dismissed shipbuilding diploma engineer Devu Chodankar’s application for anticipatory bail. On the basis of an April 26 complaint by CII state president Atul Pai Kane, Goa cybercrime cell registered a case against Chodankar for allegedly posting matter on a Facebook group with the intention of promoting enmity between religious groups in view of the 2014 general elections. The Judge noted, inter alia, that Sections 153A and 295A of the Indian Penal Code were attracted, and that it is necessary to find out whether, on the Internet, “there is any other material which could be considered as offensive or could create hatred among different classes of citizens of India”.

Karnataka:

Syed Waqas, an MBA student from Bhatkal pursuing an internship in Bangalore, was picked up for questioning along with four of his friends after Belgaum social activist Jayant Tinaikar filed a complaint. The cause of the complaint was a MMS, allegedly derogatory to Prime Minister Narendra Modi. After interrogation, the Khanapur (Belgaum) police let Waqas off on the ground that Waqas was not the originator of the MMS, and that Mr. Tinaikar had provided an incorrect mobile phone number.

In another part of the country, Digvijaya Singh is vocal about Indian police’s zealous policing of anti-Modi comments, while they were all but visible when former Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh was the target of abusive remarks.

Kerala:

The Anti-Piracy Cell of Kerala Police plans to target those uploading pornographic content on to the Internet and its sale through memory cards. A circular to this effect has been issued to all police stations in the state, and civil society cooperation is requested.

In other news, Ernakulam MLA Hibi Eden inaugurated “Hibi on Call”, a public outreach programme that allows constituents to reach the MLA directly. A call on 1860 425 1199 registers complaints.

Maharashtra:

Mumbai police are investigating pizza delivery by an unmanned drone, which they consider a security threat.

Tamil Nadu:

Small and home-run businesses in Chennai are flourishing with the help of Whatsapp and Facebook: Mohammed Gani helps his customers match bangles with Whatsapp images, Ayeesha Riaz and Bhargavii Mani send cakes and portraits to Facebook-initiated customers. Even doctors spread information and awareness using Facebook. In Madurai, you can buy groceries online, too.

Opinion:

Chethan Kumar fears that Indian cyberspace is strangling freedom of expression through the continued use of the ‘infamous’ Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (as amended in 2008). Sunil Garodia expresses similar concerns, noting a number of arrests made under Section 66A.

However, Ankan Bose has a different take; he believes there is a thin but clear line between freedom of expression and a ‘freedom to threaten’, and believes Devu Chodankar and Syed Waqar may have crossed that line. For more on Section 66A, please redirect here.

While Nikhil Pahwa is cautious of the new government’s stance towards Internet freedoms, given the (as yet) mixed signals of its ministers, Shaili Chopra ruminates on the new government’s potential dive into a “digital mutiny and communications revolution” and wonders about Modi’s social media management strategy. For Kashmir Times reader Hardev Singh, even Kejriwal’s arrest for allegedly defaming Nitin Gadkari will lead to a chilling effect on freedom of expression.

Elsewhere, the Hindustan Times is intent on letting Prime Minister Narendra Modi know that his citizens demand their freedom of speech and expression. Civil society and media all over India express their concerns for their freedom of expression in light of the new government.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/foex-live-may-26-27-2014

Net Neutrality, Free Speech and the Indian Constitution – III: Conceptions of Free Speech and Democracy

gautam — 2014-05-27T10:21:24Z

In this 3 part series, Gautam Bhatia explores the concept of net neutrality in the context of Indian law and the Indian Constitution.

In the modern State, effective exercise of free speech rights is increasingly dependent upon an infrastructure that includes newspapers, television and the internet. Access to a significant part of this infrastructure is determined by money. Consequently, if what we value about free speech is the ability to communicate one’s message to a non-trivial audience, financial resources influence both who can speak and, consequently, what is spoken. The nature of the public discourse – what information and what ideas circulate in the public sphere – is contingent upon a distribution of resources that is arguably unjust and certainly unequal.

There are two opposing theories about how we should understand the right to free speech in this context. Call the first one of these the libertarian conception of free speech. The libertarian conception takes as given the existing distribution of income and resources, and consequently, the unequal speaking power that that engenders. It prohibits any intervention designed to remedy the situation. The most famous summary of this vision was provided by the American Supreme Court, when it first struck down campaign finance regulations, in Buckley v. Valeo: “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some [in] order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” This theory is part of the broader libertarian worldview, which would restrict government’s role in a polity to enforcing property and criminal law, and views any government-imposed restriction on what people can do within the existing structure of these laws as presumptively wrong.

We can tentatively label the second theory as the social-democratic theory of free speech. This theory focuses not so much on the individual speaker’s right not to be restricted in using their resources to speak as much as they want, but upon the collective interest in maintaining a public discourse that is open, inclusive and home to a multiplicity of diverse and antagonistic ideas and viewpoints. Often, in order to achieve this goal, governments regulate access to the infrastructure of speech so as to ensure that participation is not entirely skewed by inequality in resources. When this is done, it is often justified in the name of democracy: a functioning democracy, it is argued, requires a thriving public sphere that is not closed off to some or most persons.

Surprisingly, one of the most powerful judicial statements for this vision also comes from the United States. In Red Lion v. FCC, while upholding the “fairness doctrine”, which required broadcasting stations to cover “both sides” of a political issue, and provide a right of reply in case of personal attacks, the Supreme Court noted:

“[Free speech requires] preserv[ing] an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee… it is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.”

What of India? In the early days of the Supreme Court, it adopted something akin to the libertarian theory of free speech. In Sakal Papers v. Union of India, for example, it struck down certain newspaper regulations that the government was defending on grounds of opening up the market and allowing smaller players to compete, holding that Article 19(1)(a) – in language similar to what Buckley v. Valeo would hold, more than fifteen years later – did not permit the government to infringe the free speech rights of some in order to allow others to speak. The Court continued with this approach in its next major newspaper regulation case, Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, but this time, it had to contend with a strong dissent from Justice Mathew. After noting that “it is no use having a right to express your idea, unless you have got a medium for expressing it”, Justice Mathew went on to hold:

“What is, therefore, required is an interpretation of Article 19(1)(a) which focuses on the idea that restraining the hand of the government is quite useless in assuring free speech, if a restraint on access is effectively secured by private groups. A Constitutional prohibition against governmental restriction on the expression is effective only if the Constitution ensures an adequate opportunity for discussion… Any scheme of distribution of newsprint which would make the freedom of speech a reality by making it possible the dissemination of ideas as news with as many different facets and colours as possible would not violate the fundamental right of the freedom of speech of the petitioners. In other words, a scheme for distribution of a commodity like newsprint which will subserve the purpose of free flow of ideas to the market from as many different sources as possible would be a step to advance and enrich that freedom. If the scheme of distribution is calculated to prevent even an oligopoly ruling the market and thus check the tendency to monopoly in the market, that will not be open to any objection on the ground that the scheme involves a regulation of the press which would amount to an abridgment of the freedom of speech.”

In Justice Mathew’s view, therefore, freedom of speech is not only the speaker’s right (the libertarian view), but a complex balancing act between the listeners’ right to be exposed to a wide range of material, as well as the collective, societal right to have an open and inclusive public discourse, which can only be achieved by preventing the monopolization of the instruments, infrastructure and access-points of speech.

Over the years, the Court has moved away from the majority opinions in Sakal Papers and Bennett Coleman, and steadily come around to Justice Mathew’s view. This is particularly evident from two cases in the 1990s: in Union of India v. The Motion Picture Association, the Court upheld various provisions of the Cinematograph Act that imposed certain forms of compelled speech on moviemakers while exhibiting their movies, on the ground that “to earmark a small portion of time of this entertainment medium for the purpose of showing scientific, educational or documentary films, or for showing news films has to be looked at in this context of promoting dissemination of ideas, information and knowledge to the masses so that there may be an informed debate and decision making on public issues. Clearly, the impugned provisions are designed to further free speech and expression and not to curtail it.”

LIC v. Manubhai D. Shah is even more on point. In that case, the Court upheld a right of reply in an in-house magazine, “because fairness demanded that both view points were placed before the readers, however limited be their number, to enable them to draw their own conclusions and unreasonable because there was no logic or proper justification for refusing publication… the respondent’s fundamental right of speech and expression clearly entitled him to insist that his views on the subject should reach those who read the magazine so that they have a complete picture before them and not a one sided or distorted one…” This goes even further than Justice Mathew’s dissent in Bennett Coleman, and the opinion of the Court in Motion Picture Association, in holding that not merely is it permitted to structure the public sphere in an equal and inclusive manner, but that it is a requirement of Article 19(1)(a).

We can now bring the threads of the separate arguments in the three posts together. In the first post, we found that public law and constitutional obligations can be imposed upon private parties when they discharge public functions. In the second post, it was argued that the internet has replaced the park, the street and the public square as the quintessential forum for the circulation of speech. ISPs, in their role as gatekeepers, now play the role that government once did in controlling and keeping open these avenues of expression. Consequently, they can be subjected to public law free speech obligations. And lastly, we discussed how the constitutional conception of free speech in India, that the Court has gradually evolved over many years, is a social-democratic one, that requires the keeping open of a free and inclusive public sphere. And if there is one thing that fast-lanes over the internet threaten, it is certainly a free and inclusive (digital) public sphere. A combination of these arguments provides us with an arguable case for imposing obligations of net neutrality upon ISPs, even in the absence of a statutory or regulatory obligations, grounded within the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of speech and expression.

For the previous post, please see: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/-neutrality-free-speech-and-the-indian-constitution-part-2.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Gautam Bhatia — @gautambhatia88 on Twitter — is a graduate of the National Law School of India University (2011), and presently an LLM student at the Yale Law School. He blogs about the Indian Constitution at http://indconlawphil.wordpress.com. Here at CIS, he will be blogging on issues of online freedom of speech and expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-neutrality-free-speech-and-the-indian-constitution-2013-iii-conceptions-of-free-speech-and-democracy

European Court of Justice rules Internet Search Engine Operator responsible for Processing Personal Data Published by Third Parties

jyoti — 2014-05-14T14:18:46Z

The Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled that an "an internet search engine operator is responsible for the processing that it carries out of personal data which appear on web pages published by third parties.” The decision adds to the conundrum of maintaining a balance between freedom of expression, protecting personal data and intermediary liability.

The ruling is expected to have considerable impact on reputation and privacy related takedown requests as under the decision, data subjects may approach the operator directly seeking removal of links to web pages containing personal data. Currently, users prove whether data needs to be kept online—the new rules reverse the burden of proof, placing an obligation on companies, rather than users for content regulation.

A win for privacy?

The ECJ ruling addresses Mario Costeja González complaint filed in 2010, against Google Spain and Google Inc., requesting that personal data relating to him appearing in search results be protected and that data which was no longer relevant be removed. Referring to the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament, the court said, that Google and other search engine operators should be considered 'controllers' of personal data. Following the decision, Google will be required to consider takedown requests of personal data, regardless of the fact that processing of such data is carried out without distinction in respect of information other than the personal data.

The decision—which cannot be appealed—raises important of questions of how this ruling will be applied in practice and its impact on the information available online in countries outside the European Union. The decree forces search engine operators such as Google, Yahoo and Microsoft's Bing to make judgement calls on the fairness of the information published through their services that reach over 500 million people across the twenty eight nation bloc of EU.

ECJ rules that search engines 'as a general rule,' should place the right to privacy above the right to information by the public. Under the verdict, links to irrelevant and out of date data need to be erased upon request, placing search engines in the role of controllers of information—beyond the role of being an arbitrator that linked to data that already existed in the public domain. The verdict is directed at highlighting the power of search engines to retrieve controversial information while limiting their capacity to do so in the future.

The ruling calls for maintaining a balance in addressing the legitimate interest of internet users in accessing personal information and upholding the data subject’s fundamental rights, but does not directly address either issues. The court also recognised, that the data subject's rights override the interest of internet users, however, with exceptions pertaining to nature of information, its sensitivity for the data subject's private life and the role of the data subject in public life. Acknowledging that data belongs to the individual and is not the right of the company, European Commissioner Viviane Reding, hailed the verdict, "a clear victory for the protection of personal data of Europeans".

The Court stated that if data is deemed irrelevant at the time of the case, even if it has been lawfully processed initially, it must be removed and that the data subject has the right to approach the operator directly for the removal of such content. The liability issue is further complicated by the fact, that search engines such as Google do not publish the content rather they point to information that already exists in the public domain—raising questions of the degree of liability on account of third party content displayed on their services.

The ECJ ruling is based on the case originally filed against Google, Spain and it is important to note that, González argued that searching for his name linked to two pages originally published in 1998, on the website of the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia. The Spanish Data Protection Agency did not require La Vanguardia to take down the pages, however, it did order Google to remove links to them. Google appealed this decision, following which the National High Court of Spain sought advice from the European court. The definition of Google as the controller of information, raises important questions related to the distinction between liability of publishers and the liability of processors of information such as search engines.

The 'right to be forgotten'

The decision also brings to the fore, the ongoing debate and fragmented opinions within the EU, on the right of the individual to be forgotten. The 'right to be forgotten' has evolved from the European Commission's wide-ranging plans of an overhaul of the commission's 1995 Data Protection Directive. The plans for the law included allowing people to request removal of personal data with an obligation of compliance for service providers, unless there were 'legitimate' reasons to do otherwise. Technology firms rallying around issues of freedom of expression and censorship, have expressed concerns about the reach of the bill. Privacy-rights activist and European officials have upheld the notion of the right to be forgotten, highlighting the right of the individual to protect their honour and reputation.

These issues have been controversial amidst EU member states with the UK's Ministry of Justice claiming the law 'raises unrealistic and unfair expectations' and has sought to opt-out of the privacy laws. The Advocate General of the European Court Niilo Jääskinen's opinion, that the individual's right to seek removal of content should not be upheld if the information was published legally, contradicts the verdict of the ECJ ruling. The European Court of Justice's move is surprising for many and as Richard Cumbley, information-management and data protection partner at the law firm Linklaters puts it, “Given that the E.U. has spent two years debating this right as part of the reform of E.U. privacy legislation, it is ironic that the E.C.J. has found it already exists in such a striking manner."

The economic implications of enforcing a liability regime where search engine operators censor legal content in their results aside, the decision might also have a chilling effect on freedom of expression and access to information. Google called the decision “a disappointing ruling for search engines and online publishers in general,” and that the company would take time to analyze the implications. While the implications of the decision are yet to be determined, it is important to bear in mind that while decisions like these are public, the refinements that Google and other search engines will have to make to its technology and the judgement calls on the fairness of the information available online are not public.

The ECJ press release is available here and the actual judgement is available here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/ecj-rules-internet-search-engine-operator-responsible-for-processing-personal-data-published-by-third-parties

Re:publica 2014: Looking for Freedom

praskrishna — 2014-06-04T05:37:57Z

Re:publica in partnership with DAIMLER, Global Innovation Gathering, Microsoft and Science:Lab organized this conference at Berlin from May 6 to 8, 2014.

Pranesh Prakash was a speaker at the session "The Architecture of Invisible Censorship: How Digital and Meatspace Censorship Differ". Click to read the full list of speakers here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/re-publica-2014-looking-for-freedom

Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference 2

praskrishna — 2014-06-04T04:48:22Z

Yale Law School organized the Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference 2 from May 2 to 4, 2014. Pranesh Prakash participated as a discussant in the session "Speech and Safety Laboratories".

Click to see the agenda here.

List of Participants

A
Tabatha Abu El-Haj - Associate Professor of Law, Drexel University School of Law
BJ Ard - Thomson Reuters Resident Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School
Enrique Armijo - Associate Professor of Law, Elon University School of Law

B
Jack Balkin - Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School; Director, Yale Information Society Project
Derek Bambauer - Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law
Jane Bambauer - Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law
Vincent Blasi - Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia Law School
Joseph Blocher - Associate Professor, Duke Law School
Nicholas Bramble - Senior Policy Fellow, Google
Kiel Brennan-Marquez - Resident Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School

C
Alan Chen - Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law
Danielle Citron - Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

D
Deven Desai - Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law

F
Stephen Feldman - Jerry W. Housel / Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming College of Law

G
Hillary Greene - Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law
James Grimmelmann - Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

H
David Han - Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law
Thomas Healy - Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law

I
John Inazu - Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Washington University School of Law

K
Margot Kaminski - Executive Director, Information Society Project, Yale Law School
Leslie Kendrick - Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law
Jeremy Kessler - David Berg Foundation Fellow, Tikvah Center for Law & Jewish Civilization, New York University
Randy Kozel -Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School

L
Laura Little - Charles Klein Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law

M
Greg Magarian - Professor of Law, Washington University Law School
Jonathan Manes -Associate Research Scholar in Law and Abrams Clinical Fellow, Informaiton Society Project, Yale Law School
Toni Massaro - Regents' Professor, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law
Kerry Monroe - Law Ph.D. Candidate, Yale Law School

N
Helen Norton - Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law

P
Mary-Rose Papandrea - Professor, Boston College Law School
Pranesh Prakash - Postgraduate Associate in Law and Access to Knowledge Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School
Tamara Piety - Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law

R
Neil Richards - Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law
Lee Rowland -Staff Attorney, ACLU Speech, Privacy and Technology Project

S
Esteve Sanz - Resident Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School

T
David Thaw - Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law
Alexander Tsesis - Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law
Andrew Tutt - Law Clerk and Visiting Fellow, Yale Information Society Project

W
Felix Wu - Associate Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law

Z
Tim Zick - Mills E. Godwin, Jr. Professor of Law, Willian & Mary Law School

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/freedom-of-expression-scholars-conference-2

Net Neutrality, Free Speech and the Indian Constitution - II

gautam — 2014-04-29T07:42:40Z

In this 3 part series, Gautam Bhatia explores the concept of net neutrality in the context of Indian law and the Indian Constitution.

To sum up the previous post: under Article 12 of the Constitution, fundamental rights can be enforced only against the State, or State-like entities that are under the functional, financial and administrative control of the State. In the context of net neutrality, it is clear that privately-owned ISPs do not meet the exacting standards of Article 12. Nonetheless, we also found that the Indian Supreme Court has held private entities, which do not fall within the contours of Article 12, to an effectively similar standard of obligations under Part III as State organizations in certain cases. Most prominent among these is the case of education: private educational institutions have been required to adhere to standards of equal treatment which are identical in content to Article 14, even though their source lies elsewhere. If, therefore, we are to impose obligations of net neutrality upon private ISPs, a similar argument must be found.

I will suggest that the best hope is by invoking the free speech guarantee of Article 19(1)(a). To understand how an obligation of free speech might operate in this case, let us turn to the case of Marsh v. Alabama, an American Supreme Court case from 1946.

Marsh v. Alabama involved a “company town”. The “town” of Chickasaw was owned by a private company, the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. In its structure it resembled a regular township: it had building, streets, a sewage system, and a “business block”, where stores and business places had been rented out to merchants and other service providers. The residents of the “town” used the business block as their shopping center, to get to which they used the company-owned pavement and street. Highway traffic regularly came in through the town, and its facilities were used by wayfarers. As the Court noted:

“In short the town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the title to the property belongs to a private corporation.”

Marsh, who was a Jehovah’s Witness, arrived in Chickasaw with the intention of distributing religious literature on the streets. She was asked to leave the sidewalk, and on declining, she was arrested by the police, and charged under an anti-trespassing statute. She argued that if the statute was applied to her, it would violate her free speech and freedom of religion rights under the American First Amendment. The lower Courts rejected her argument, holding that since the street was owned by a private corporation, she had no constitutional free speech rights, and the situation was analogous to being invited into a person’s private house. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower Courts, and found for Marsh.

Four (connected) strands of reasoning run through the Supreme Court’s (brief) opinion. First, it found that streets, sidewalks and public places have historically been critically important sites for dissemination and reception of news, information and opinions, whether it is through distribution of literature, street-corner oratory, or whatever else. Secondly, it found that private ownership did not carry with it a right to exclusive dominion. Rather, “the owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation.” Thirdly, it noted that a large number of Americans throughout the United States lived in company towns, and acted just as other American citizens did, in their duties as residents of a community. It would therefore be perverse to deny them rights enjoyed by those who lived in State-municipality run towns. And fourthly, on balance, it held that the private rights of property-owners was subordinate to the right of the people to “enjoy freedom of press and religion.”

No one factor, then, but a combination of factors underlie the Court’s decision to impose constitutional obligations upon a private party. It mattered that, historically, there have been a number of spaces traditionally dedicated to public speech: parks, squares and streets – whose public character remained unchanged despite the nature of ownership. It mattered that individuals had no feasible exit option – that is, no other place they could go to in order to exercise their free speech rights. And it mattered that free speech occupied a significant enough place in the Constitutional scheme so as to override the exclusionary rights that normally tend to go with private property.

The case of the privately-owned street in the privately-owned town presents a striking analogy when we start thinking seriously about net neutrality. First of all, in the digital age, the traditional sites of public discourse – parks, town squares, streets – have been replaced by their digital equivalents. The lonely orator standing on the soap-box in the street corner now tweets his opinions and instagrams his photographs. The street-pamphleteer of yesteryear now updates his Facebook status to reflect his political opinions. Specialty and general-interest blogs constitute a multiplicity of town-squares where a speaker makes his point, and his hearers gather in the comments section to discuss and debate the issue. While these examples may seem frivolous at first blush, the basic point is a serious one: the role of opinion formation and transmission that once served by open, publicly accessible physical infrastructure, held – in a manner of speaking – in public trust by the government, is now served in the digital world, under the control of private gatekeepers. To that extent, it is a public function, undertaken in public interest, as the Court held in Marsh v. Alabama.

The absence of an exit option is equally important. The internet has become not only a space of exchanging information, but it has become a primary – non-replaceable source – of the same. Like the citizens of Chickasaw lacked a feasible alternative space to exercise their public free speech rights (and we operate on the assumption that it would be unreasonably expensive and disruptive for them to move to a different town), there is now no feasible alternative space to the internet, as it exists today, where the main online spaces are owned by private parties, and access to those spaces is determined by gatekeepers – which are the ISPs.

The analogy is not perfect, of course, but there is a case to be made that in acting as the gatekeepers of the internet, privately-owned ISPs are in a position quite similar to the corporate owners of they public streets Company Town.

In the last post, we saw how it is possible – constitutionally – to impose public obligations upon private parties, although the Court has never made its jurisprudential foundation clear. Here, then, is a thought: public obligations ought to be imposed when the private entity is providing a public function and/or when the private entity is in effectively exclusive control of a public good. There is an argument that ISPs satisfy both conditions. Of course, we need to examine in detail how precisely the rights of free expression are implicated in the ISP context. That is the subject for the next post.

Gautam Bhatia — @gautambhatia88 on Twitter — is a graduate of the National Law School of India University (2011), and presently an LLM student at the Yale Law School. He blogs about the Indian Constitution at http://indconlawphil.wordpress.com. Here at CIS, he will be blogging on issues of online freedom of speech and expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/-neutrality-free-speech-and-the-indian-constitution-part-2

Net Neutrality, Free Speech and the Indian Constitution - I

gautam — 2014-04-29T08:03:57Z

In this post, I will explore net neutrality in the context of Indian law and the Indian Constitution.

Let us take, for the purposes of this post, the following definition:

“The idea that all Internet traffic should be treated equally is known as network neutrality. In other words, no matter who uploads or downloads data, or what kind of data is involved, networks should treat all of those packets in the same manner.”

In other words, put simply, net neutrality in its broadest form requires the extant gatekeepers of the internet – such as, for instance, broadband companies – to accord a form of equal and non-discriminatory treatment to all those who want to access the internet. Examples of possible discrimination – as the quote above illustrates – include, for instance, blocking content or providing differential internet speed (perhaps on the basis of a tiered system of payment for access).

Net neutrality has its proponents and opponents, and I do not have space here to address that dispute. In its broadest and absolutist form, net neutrality is highly controversial (including arguments that existing status quo is not neutral in any genuine sense). I take as given, however, that some form of net neutrality is both an important and a desirable goal. In particular, intentional manipulation of information that is available to internet users – especially for political purposes – is, I assume, an undesirable outcome, as are anti-competitive practices, as well as price-discrimination for the most basic access to the internet (this brief article in the Times of India provides a decent, basic primer on the stakes involved).

An example of net neutrality in practice is the American Federal Communications Commission’s Open Internet Order of 2010, which was the subject of litigation in the recently concluded Verizon v. FCC. The Open Internet order imposed obligations of transparency, no blocking, and no unreasonable discrimination, upon internet service providers. The second and third requirements were vacated by a United States Court of Appeals. The rationale for the Court’s decision was that ISPs could not be equated, in law, to “common carriers”. A common carrier is an entity that offers to transport persons and/or goods in exchange for a fee (for example, shipping companies, or bus companies). A common carrier is licensed to be one, and often, one of the conditions for license is an obligation not to discriminate. That is, the common carrier cannot refuse to carry an individual who is willing and able to pay the requisite fees, in the absence of a compelling reason (for example, if the individual wishes the carrier to transport contraband). Proponents of net neutrality have long called for treating ISPs as common carriers, a proposition – as observed above – was rejected by the Court.

With this background, let us turn to India. In India, internet service providers are both state-owned (BSNL and MTNL), and privately-owned (Airtel, Spectranet, Reliance, Sify etc). Unlike many other countries, however, India has no network-neutrality laws. As this informative article observes:

“The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), in its guidelines for issuing licences for providing Unified Access Service, promotes the principle of non-discrimination but does not enforce it… the Information Technology Act does not provide regulatory provisions relating to Internet access, and does not expressly prohibit an ISP from controlling the Internet to suit their business interests.”

In the absence of either legislation or regulation, there are two options. One, of course, is to invoke the rule of common carriers as a common law rule in court, should an ISP violate the principles of net neutrality. In this post (and the next), however, I would like to analyze net neutrality within a constitutional framework – in particular, within the framework of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and expression.

In order to do so, two questions become important, and I shall address them in turn. First, given that most of the ISPs are privately owned, how does the Constitution even come into the picture? Our fundamental rights are enforceable vertically, that is, between individuals and the State, and not horizontally – that is, between two individuals, or two private parties. Where the Constitution intends to depart from this principle (for instance, Article 15(2)), it specifically and expressly states so. As far as Article 19 and the fundamental freedoms are concerned, however, it is clear that they do not admit of horizontal application.

Yet what, precisely, are we to understand by the term “State”? Consider Article 12:

“In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.”

The key question is what, precisely, falls within the meaning of “other authorities”. The paradigmatic example – and this is something Ambedkar had in mind, as is evidenced by the Constituent Assembly Debates – is the statutory corporation – i.e., a company established under a statute. There are, however, more difficult cases, for instance, public-private partnerships of varying types. For the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has struggled with the issue of defining “other authorities” for the purposes of Part III of the Constitution, with the pendulum swinging wildly at times. In the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, a 2002 judgment by a Constitution bench, the Court settled upon the following definition:

“The question in each case would be whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.”

Very obviously, this dooms the ISP argument. There is no way to argue that ISPs are under the pervasive financial, functional and administrative domination or control of the State. If we step back for a moment, though, the Pradeep Kumar Biswas test seems to be radically under-inclusive. Consider the following hypothetical: tomorrow, the government decides to privatize the nation’s water supply to private company X. Company X is the sole distributor of water in the country. On gaining control, it decides to cut off the water supply to all households populated by members of a certain religion. There seems something deeply wrong in the argument that there is no remedy under discrimination law against the conduct of the company.

The argument could take two forms. One could argue that there is a certain minimum baseline of State functions (ensuring reasonable access to public utilities, overall maintenance of communications, defence and so on). The baseline may vary depending on your personal political philosophy (education? Health? Infrastructure?), but within the baseline, as established, if a private entity performs a State function, it is assimilated to the State. One could also argue, however, that even if Part III isn’t directly applicable, certain functions are of a public nature, and attract public law obligations that are identical in content to fundamental rights obligations under Part III, although their source is not Part III.

To unpack this idea, consider Justice Mohan’s concurring opinion in Unnikrishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, a case that involved the constitutionality of high capitation fees charged by private educational institutions. One of the arguments raised against the educational institutions turned upon the applicability of Article 14’s guarantee of equality. The bench avoided the issue of whether Article 14 directly applied to private educational institutions by framing the issue as a question of the constitutionality of the legislation that regulated capitation fees. Justice Mohan, however, observed:

“What is the nature of functions discharged by these institutions? They discharge a public duty. If a student desires to acquire a degree, for example, in medicine, he will have to route through a medical college. These medical colleges are the instruments to attain the qualification. If, therefore, what is discharged by the educational institution, is a public duty that requires… [it to] act fairly. In such a case, it will be subject to Article 14.”

In light of Pradeep Kumar Biswas, it is obviously difficult to hold the direct application of the Constitution to private entities. We can take Justice Mohan, however, to be making a slightly different point: performing what are quintessentially public duties attract certain obligations that circumscribe the otherwise free action of private entities. The nature of the obligation itself depends upon the nature of the public act. Education, it would seem, is an activity that is characterized by open and non-discriminatory access. Consequently, even private educational institutions are required to abide by the norms of fairness articulated by Article 14, even though they may not, as a matter of constitutional law, be held in violation of the Article 14 that is found in the constitutional text. Again, the content of the obligation is the same, but its source (the constitutional text, as opposed to norms of public law) is different.

We have therefore established that in certain cases, it is possible to subject private entities performing public functions to constitutional norms without bringing them under Article 12’s definition of the State, and without the need for an enacted statute, or a set of regulations. In the next post, we shall explore in greater detail what this means, and how it might be relevant to ISPs and net neutrality.

Gautam Bhatia — @gautambhatia88 on Twitter — is a graduate of the National Law School of India University (2011), and presently an LLM student at the Yale Law School. He blogs about the Indian Constitution at http://indconlawphil.wordpress.com. Here at CIS, he will be blogging on issues of online freedom of speech and expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-neutrality-free-speech-and-the-indian-constitution-part-1

Marco Civil da Internet: Brazil’s ‘Internet Constitution’

geetha — 2014-06-19T10:38:10Z

On March 25, 2014, Brazil's lower house of parliament passed bill no. 2126/2011, popularly known as Marco Civil da Internet. The Marco Civil is a charter of Internet user-rights and service provider responsibilities, committed to freedom of speech and expression, privacy, and accessibility and openness of the Internet. In this post, the author looks at the pros and cons of the bill.

Introduction:

Ten months ago, Edward Snowden’s revelations of the U.S. National Security Agency’s extensive, warrantless spying dawned on us. Citizens and presidents alike expressed their outrage at this sweeping violation of their privacy. While India’s position remained carefully neutral, or indeed, supportive of NSA’s surveillance, Germany, France and Brazil cut the U.S. no slack. Indeed, at the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff (whose office the NSA had placed under surveillance) stated, “Tampering in such a manner in the affairs of other countries is a breach of International Law and is an affront to the principles that must guide the relations among them, especially among friendly nations.” Brazil, she said, would “redouble its efforts to adopt legislation, technologies and mechanisms to protect us from the illegal interception of communications and data.”

Some may say that Brazil has lived up to its word. Later this month, Brazil will be host to NETmundial, the Global Multi-stakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance, jointly organized by the Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) and the organization /1Net. The elephantine invisible presence of Snowden vests NETmundial with the hope and responsibility of laying the ground for a truly multi-stakeholder model for governing various aspects of the Internet; a model where governments are an integral part, but not the only decision-makers. The global Internet community, comprising users, corporations, governments, the technical community, and NGOs and think-tanks, is hoping devise a workable method to divest the U.S. Government of its de facto control over the Internet, which it wields through its contracts to manage the domain name system and the root zone.

But as Internet governance expert Dr. Jeremy Malcolm put it, these technical aspects do not make or break the Internet. The real questions in Internet governance underpin the rights of users, corporations and netizens worldwide. Sir Tim Berners-Lee, when he called for an Internet Bill of Rights, meant much the same. For Sir Tim, an open, neutral Internet is imperative if we are to keep our governments open, and foster “good democracy, healthcare, connected communities and diversity of culture”. Some countries agree. The Philippines envisaged a Magna Carta for Internet Freedom, though the Bill is pending in the Philippine parliament.

Marco Civil da Internet:

Last week, on March 25, 2014, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of parliament) passed the Marco Civil da Internet, bill 2126/2011, a charter of Internet rights. The Marco Civil is considered by the global Internet community as a one-of-a-kind bill, with Sir Tim Berners-Lee hailing the “groundbreaking, inclusive and participatory process has resulted in a policy that balances the rights and responsibilities of the individuals, governments and corporations who use the Internet”.

The Marco Civil’s journey began with a two-stage public consultation process in October 2009, under the aegis of the Brazilian Ministry of Justice’s Department of Legislative Affairs, jointly with the Getulio Vargas Foundation’s Center for Technology and Society of the Law School of Rio de Janeiro (CTS-FGV). The collaborative process involved a 45-day consultation process in which over 800 comments were received, following which a second consultation in May 2010 received over 1200 comments from individuals, civil society organizations and corporations involved in the telecom and technology industries. Based on comments, the initial draft of the bill was revamped to include issues of popular, public importance, such as intermediary liability and online freedom of speech.

An official English translation of the Marco Civil is as yet unavailable. But an unofficial translation (please note that the file is uploaded on Google Drive), triangulated against online commentary on the bill, reveals that the following issues were of primary importance:

The fundamentals:

The fundamental principles of the Marco Civil reveal a commitment to openness, accessibility neutrality and democratic collaboration on the Internet. Art. 2 (see unofficial translation) sets out the fundamental principles that form the basis of the law. It pledges to adhere to freedom of speech and expression, along with an acknowledgement of the global scale of the network, its openness and collaborative nature, its plurality and diversity. It aims to foster free enterprise and competition on the Internet, while ensuring consumer protection and upholding human rights, personality development and citizenship exercise in the digital media in line with the network’s social purposes. Not only this, but Art. 4 of the bill pledges to promote universal access to the Internet, as well as “to information, knowledge and participation in cultural life and public affairs”. It aims to promote innovation and open technology standards, while ensuring interoperability.

The Marco Civil expands on its commitment to human rights and accessibility by laying down a “discipline of Internet use in Brazil”. Art. 3 of the bill guarantees freedom of expression, communication and expression of thoughts, under the terms of the Federal Constitution of Brazil, while at the same time guaranteeing privacy and protection of personal data, and preserving network neutrality. It also focuses on preserving network stability and security, by emphasizing accountability and adopting “technical measures consistent with international standards and by encouraging the implementation of best practices”.

These principles, however, are buttressed by rights assured to Internet users and responsibilities of and exceptions provided to service providers.

Rights and responsibilities of users and service providers:

Net neutrality:

Brazil becomes one of the few countries in the world (joining the likes of the Netherlands, Chile and Israel in part) to preserve network neutrality by legislation. Art. 9 of the Marco Civil requires all Internet providers to “to treat any data package with isonomy, regardless of content, origin and destination, service, terminal or application”. Not only this, but Internet providers are enjoined from blocking, monitoring or filtering content during any stage of transmission or routing of data. Deep packet inspection is also forbidden. Exceptions may be made to discriminate among network traffic only on the basis of essential technical requirements for services-provision, and for emergency services prioritization. Even this requires the Internet provider to inform users in advance of such traffic discrimination, and to act proportionately, transparently and with equal protection.

Data retention, privacy and data protection:

The Marco Civil includes provisions for the retention of personal data and communications by service providers, and access to the same by law enforcement authorities. However, record, retention and access to Internet connection records and applications access-logs, as well as any personal data and communication, are required to meet the standards for “the conservation of intimacy, private life, honor and image of the parties directly or indirectly involved” (Art. 10). Specifically, access to identifying information and contents of personal communication may be obtained only upon judicial authorization.

Moreover, where data is collected within Brazilian territory, processes of collection, storage, custody and treatment of the abovementioned data are required to comply with Brazilian laws, especially the right to privacy and confidentiality of personal data and private communications and records (Art. 11). Interestingly, this compliance requirement is applicable also to entities incorporated in foreign jurisdictions, which offer services to Brazilians, or where a subsidiary or associate entity of the corporation in question has establishments in Brazil. While this is undoubtedly a laudable protection for Brazilians or service providers located in Brazil, it is possible that conflicts may arise (with penal consequences) between standards and terms of data retention and access by authorities in other jurisdictions. In the predictable absence of harmonization of such laws, perhaps rules of conflicts of law may prove helpful.

While data retention remained a point of contention (Brazil initially sought to ensure a 5-year data retention period), under the Marco Civil, Internet providers are required to retain connection records for 1 year under rules of strict confidentiality; this responsibility cannot be delegated to third parties (Art. 13). Providers providing the Internet connection (such as Reliance or Airtel in India) are forbidden from retaining records of access to applications on the Internet (Art. 14). While law enforcement authorities may request a longer retention period, a court order (filed for by the authority within 60 days from the date of such request) is required to access the records themselves. In the event the authority fails to file for such court order within the stipulated period, or if court order is denied, the service provider must protect the confidentiality of the connection records.

Though initially excluded from the Marco Civil, the current draft passed by the Chamber of Deputies requires Internet application providers (such as Google or Facebook) to retain access-logs for their applications for 6 months (Art. 15). Logs for other applications may not be retained without previous consent of the owner, and in any case, the provider cannot retain personal data that is in excess of the purpose for which consent was given by the owner. As for connection records, law enforcement authorities may request a greater retention period, but require a court order to access the data itself.

These requirements must be understood in light of the rights that the Marco Civil guarantees to users. Art. 7, which enumerates these user-rights, does not however set forth their content; this is probably left to judicial interpretation of rights enshrined in the Federal Constitution. In any event, Art. 7 guarantees to all Internet users the “inviolability of intimacy and privacy”, including the confidentiality of all Internet communications, along with “compensation for material or moral damages resulting from violation”. In this regard, it assures that users are entitled to a guarantee that no personal data or communication shall be shared with third parties in the absence of express consent, and to “clear and complete information on the collection, use, storage, treatment and protection of their personal data”. Indeed, where contracts violate the requirements of inviolability and secrecy of private communications, or where a dispute resolution clause does not permit the user to approach Brazilian courts as an alternative, Art. 8 renders such contracts null and void.

Most importantly, Art. 7 states that users are entitled to clear and complete information about how connection records and access logs shall be stored and protected, and to publicity of terms/policies of use of service providers. Additionally, Art. 7 emphasizes quality of service and accessibility to the Internet, and forbids suspension of Internet connections except for failure of payments. Read comprehensively, therefore, Arts. 7-15 of the Marco Civil prima facie set down robust protections for private and personal data and communications.

An initial draft of the Marco Civil sought to mandate local storage of all Brazilians’ data within Brazilian territory. This came in response to Snowden’s revelations of NSA surveillance, and President Rousseff, in her statement to the United Nations, declared that Brazil sought to protect itself from “illegal interception of communications and data”. However, the implications of this local storage requirement was the creation of a geographically isolated Brazilian Internet, with repercussions for the Internet’s openness and interoperability that the Marco Civil itself sought to protect. Moreover, there are implications for efficiency and business; for instance, small businesses may be unable to source the money or capacity to comply with local storage requirements. Also, they lead to mandating storage on political grounds, and not on the basis of effective storage. Amid widespread protest from corporations and civil society, this requirement was then withdrawn which, some say, propelled the quick passage of the bill in the Chamber of Deputies.

Intermediary liability:

Laws of many countries make service providers liable for third party content that infringes copyright or that is otherwise against the law (such as pornography or other offensive content). For instance, Section 79 of the Indian Information Technology Act, 2000 (as amended in 2008) is such a provision where intermediaries (i.e., those who host user-generated content, but do not create the content themselves) may be held liable. However, stringent intermediary liability regimes create the possibility of private censorship, where intermediaries resort to blocking or filtering user-generated content that they fear may violate laws, sometimes even without intimating the creator of the infringing content. The Marco Civil addresses this possibility of censorship by creating a restricted intermediary liability provision. Please note, however, that the bill expressly excludes from its ambit copyright violations, which a copyright reforms bill seeks to address.

At first instance, the Marco Civil exempts service providers from civil liability for third party content (Art. 18). Moreover, intermediaries are liable for damages arising out of third party content only where such intermediaries do not comply with court orders (which may require removal of content, etc.) (Art. 19). This leaves questions of infringement and censorship to the judiciary, which the author believes is the right forum to adjudicate such issues. Moreover, wherever identifying information is available, Art. 20 mandates the intermediary to appraise the creator of infringing content of the reasons for removal of his/her content, with information that enables the creator to defend him- or herself in court. This measure of transparency is particularly laudable; for instance, in India, no such intimation is required by law, and you or I as journalists, bloggers or other creators of content may never know why our content is taken down, or be equipped to defend ourselves in court against the plaintiff or petitioner who sought removal of our content. Finally, a due diligence requirement is placed on the intermediary in circumstances where third party content discloses, “without consent of its participants, of photos, videos or other materials containing nudity or sexual acts of private character”. As per Art. 21, where the intermediary does not take down such content upon being intimated by the concerned participant, it may be held secondarily liable for infringement of privacy.

This restricted intermediary liability regime is further strengthened by a requirement of specific identification of infringing content, which both the court order issued under Art. 20 and the take-down request under Art. 21 must fulfill. This requirement is missing, for instance, under Section 79 of the Indian Information Technology Act, which creates a diligence and liability regime without requiring idenfiability of infringing content.

Conclusion:

Brazil’s ‘Internet Constitution’ has done much to add to the ongoing discussion on the rights and responsibilities of users and providers. By expressly adopting protections for net neutrality and online privacy and freedom of expression, the Marco Civil may be considered to set itself up as a model for Internet rights at the municipal level, barring a Utopian bill of rights. Indeed, in an effusive statement of support for the bill, Sir Tim Berners-Lee stated: “If Marco Civil is passed, without further delay or amendment, this would be the best possible birthday gift for Brazilian and global Web users.”

Of course, the Marco Civil is not without its failings. Authors say that the data retention requirements by connection and application providers, with leeway provided for law enforcement authorities to lengthen retention periods, is problematic. Moreover, the discussions surrounding data localization and a ‘walled-off’ Internet that protects against surveillance ignores the interoperability and openness that forms the core of the Internet.

On the whole, though, the Marco Civil may be considered a victory, on many counts. It is possibly the first successful example of a national legislation that is the outcome of a broad, consultative process with civil society and other affected entities. It expressly affirms Brazil’s commitment to the protection of privacy and freedom of expression, as well as to Internet accessibility and the openness of the network. It aims to eliminate the possibility of private censorship online, while upholding privacy rights of users. It seeks to reduce the potential for abuse of personal data and communication by government authorities, by requiring judicial authorization for the same. In a world where warrantless government spying extends across national border, such a provision is novel and desirable. One hopes that, when the global Internet community sits down at its various fora to identify and enumerate principles for Internet governance, it will look to the Marco Civil as an example of standards that governments may adhere to, and not necessarily resort to the lowest common denominator standards of international rights and protections.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/marco-civil-da-internet

Intermediary Liability Resources

elonnai — 2014-07-03T06:45:48Z

We bring you a list of intermediary resources as part of research on internet governance. This blog post will be updated on an ongoing basis.

Shielding the Messengers: Protecting Platforms for Expression and Innovation. The Centre for Democracy and Technology. December 2012, available at: https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-Intermediary-Liability-2012.pdf: This paper analyses the impact that intermediary liability regimes have on freedom of expression, privacy, and innovation. In doing so, the paper highlights different models of intermediary liability regimes, reviews different technological means of restricting access to content, and provides recommendations for intermediary liability regimes and provides alternative ways of addressing illegal content online.
Internet Intermediaries: Dilemma of Liability: Article 19. 2013, available at: http://www.article19.org/data/files/Intermediaries_ENGLISH.pdf:This Policy Document reviews different components of intermediary liability and highlights the challenges and risks that current models of liability have to online freedom of expression. Relying on international standards for freedom of expression and comparative law, the document includes recommendations and alternative models that provide stronger protection for freedom of expression. The key recommendation in the document include: web hosting providers or hosts should be immune from liability to third party content if they have not modified the content, privatised enforcement should not be a model and removal orders should come only from courts or adjudicatory bodies, the model of notice to notice should replace notice and takedown regimes, in cases of alleged serious criminality clear conditions should be in place and defined.
Comparative Analysis of the National Approaches to the Liability of Internet Intermediaries: Prepared by Daniel Seng for WIPO, available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/liability_of_internet_intermediaries.pdf:This Report reviews the intermediary liability regimes and associated laws in place across fifteen different contexts with a focus on civil copyright liability for internet intermediaries. The Report seeks to find similarities and differences across the regimes studied and highlight principles and components in different that can be used in international treaties and instruments, upcoming policies, and court decisions.
Freedom of Expression, Indirect Censorship, & Liability for Internet Intermediaries. The Electronic Frontier Foundation. February 2011, available at: http://infojustice.org/download/tpp/tpp-civil-society/EFF%20presentation%20ISPs%20and%20Freedom%20of%20Expression.pdf:This presentation was created for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Stakeholder Forum in Chile and highlights that for freedom of expression to be protected, clear legal protections for internet intermediaries are needed and advocates for a regime that provides blanket immunity to intermediaries or is based on judicial takedown notices.
Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries. Contracted by the European Commission. 2007, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf. This Report provides insight on the application of the intermediary liability sections of the EU e-commerce directive and studies the impact of the regulations under the Directive on the functioning of intermediary information society services. To achieve this objective, the study identifies relavant case law across member states, calls out and evaluates developing trends across Member States, and draws conclusions.
Internet Intermediary Liability: Identifying Best Practices for Africa. Nicolo Zingales for the Association for Progressive Communications, available at: https://www.apc.org/en/system/files/APCInternetIntermediaryLiability_BestPracticesAfrica_20131125.pdf: This background paper seeks to identify challenges and opportunities in addressing intermediary liability for countries in the African Union and recommend safeguards that can be included in emerging intermediary liability regimes in the context of human rights. The paper also reviews different models of intermediary liability and discusses the limitations, scope, and modes of operation of each model.
The Liability of Internet Intermediaries in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, and Uganda: An uncertain terrain. Association for Progressive Communications. October 2012, available at: http://www.academia.edu/2484536/The_liability_of_internet_intermediaries_in_Nigeria_Kenya_South_Africa_and_Uganda_An_uncertain_terrain:This Report reviews intermediary liability in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and Uganda – providing background to the political context, relevant legislation, and present challenges . In doing so, the Report provides insight into how intermediary liability has changed in recent years in these contexts and explores past and present debates on intermediary liability. The Report concludes with recommendations for stakeholders affected by intermediary liability.
The Fragmentation of intermediary liability in the UK. Daithi Mac Sithigh. 2013, available at: http://jiplp.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/7/521.full.pdf?keytype=ref&ijkey=zuL8aFSzKJqkozT. This article looks at the application of the Electronic Commerce Directive across Europe and argues that it is being intermixed and subsequently replaced with provisions from national legislation and provisions of law from area specific legislation. Thus, the article argues that systems for intermediary liability are diving into multiple systems – for example for content related to copyright intermediaries are being placed with new responsibilities while for content related to defamation, there is a reducing in the liability that intermediaries are held to.
Regimes of Legal Liability for Online Intermediaries: an Overview. OECD, available at: http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/45509050.pdf. This article provides an overview of different intermediary liability regimes including EU and US.
Closing the Gap: Indian Online Intermediaries and a Liability System Not Yet Fit for Purpose. GNI. 2014, available at: http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/sites/default/files/Closing%20the%20Gap%20-%20Copenhagen%20Economics_March%202014_0.pdf. This Report argues that the provisions of the Information Technology Act 2000 are not adequate to deal with ICT innovations , and argues that the current liability regime in India is hurting the Indian internet economy.
Intermediary Liability in India. Centre for Internet and Society. 2011, available at: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/intermediary-liability-in-india.pdf. This report reviews and ‘tests’ the effect of the Indian intermediary liability on freedom of expression. The report concludes that the present regime in India has a chilling effect on free expression and offers recommendations on how the Indian regime can be amended to protect this right.
The Liability of Internet Service providers and the exercise of the freedom of expression in Latin America have been explored in detail through the course of this research paper by Claudio Ruiz Gallardo and J. Carlos Lara Galvez. The paper explores the efficacy and the implementation of proposals to put digital communication channels under the oversight of certain State sponsored institutions in varying degrees. The potential consequence of legal intervention in media and digital platforms, on the development of individual rights and freedoms has been addressed through the course of this study. The paper tries to arrive at relevant conclusions with respect to the enforcement of penalties that seek to redress the liability of communication intermediaries and the mechanism that may be used to oversee the balance between the interests at stake as well as take comparative experiences into account. The paper also analyses the liability of technical facilitators of communications while at the same time attempting to define a threshold beyond which the interference into the working of these intermediaries may constitute an offence of the infringement of the privacy of users. Ultimately, it aims to derive a balance between the necessity for intervention, the right of the users who communicate via the internet and interests of the economic actors who may be responsible for the service: http://www.palermo.edu/cele/pdf/english/Internet-Free-of-Censorship/02-Liability_Internet_Service_Providers_exercise_freedom_expression_Latin_America_Ruiz_Gallardo_Lara_Galvez.pdf

Click to read the newsletter from the Association of Progressive Communications. The summaries for the reports can be found below:

Internet Intermediaries: The Dilemma of Liability in Africa. APC News, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/node/19279/. This report summarizes the challenges facing internet content regulators in Africa, and the effects of these regulations on the state of the internet in Africa. Many African countries do not protect intermediaries from potential liability, so some intermediaries are too afraid to transmit or host content on the internet in those countries. The report calls for a universal rights protection for internet intermediaries.

APC’s Frequently Asked Questions on Internet Intermediary Liability: APC, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/node/19291/. This report addresses common questions pertaining to internet intermediaries, which are entities which provide services that enable people to use the internet, from network providers to search engines to comments sections on blogs. Specifically, the report outlines different models of intermediary liability, defining two main models. The “Generalist” model intermediary liability is judged according to the general rules of civil and criminal law, while the “Safe Harbour” model protects intermediaries with a legal safe zone.

New Developments in South Africa: APC News, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/news/intermediary-liability-new-developments-south-afri. This interview with researchers Alex Comninos and Andrew Rens goes into detail about the challenges of intermediary in South Africa. The researchers discuss the balance that needs to be struck between insulating intermediaries from a fear of liability and protecting women’s rights in an environment that is having trouble dealing with violence against women. They also discuss South Africa’s three strikes policy for those who pirate material.

Preventing Hate Speech Online In Kenya: APCNews, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/news/intermediary-liability-preventing-hate-speech-onli. This interview with Grace Githaiga investigates the uncertain fate of internet intermediaries under Kenya’s new regime. The new government has mandated everyone to register their SIM cards, and indicated that it was monitoring text messages and flagging those that were deemed risky. This has led to a reduction in the amount of hate speech via text messages. Many intermediaries, such as newspaper comments sections, have established rules on how readers should post on their platforms. Githaiga goes on to discuss the issue of surveillance and the lack of a data protection law in Kenya, which she sees as the most pressing internet issue in Kenya.

New Laws in Uganda Make Internet Providers More Vulnerable to Liability and State Intervention: APCNews, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/news/new-laws-uganda-make-internet-providers-more-vulne. In an interview, Lilian Nalwoga discusses Uganda’s recent anti-pornography law that can send intermediaries to prison. The Anti-Pornography Act of 2014 criminalizes any sort of association with any form of pornography, and targets ISPs, content providers, and developers, making them liable for content that goes through their systems. This makes being an intermediary extremely risky in Uganda. The other issue with the law is a vague definition of pornography. Nalwoga also explains the Anti-Homosexuality Act of 2014 bans any promotion or recognition of homosexual relations, and the monitoring technology the government is using to enforce these laws.

New Laws Affecting Intermediary Liability in Nigeria: APCNews, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/news/new-laws-affecting-intermediary-liability-nigeria. Gbenga Sesan, executive director of Paradigm Initiative Nigeria, expounds on the latest trends in Nigerian intermediary liability. The Nigerian Communications Commission has a new law that mandates ISPs store users data for at least here years, and wants to make content hosts responsible for what users do on their networks. Additionally, in Nigeria, internet users register with their real name and prove that you are the person who is registration. Sesan goes on to discuss the lack of safe harbor provisions for intermediaries and the remaining freedom of anonymity on social networks in Nigeria.

Internet Policies That Affect Africans: APC News, May 2014, available at: http://www.apc.org/en/news/intermediary-liability-internet-policies-affect-af. The Associsation for Progressive Communcations interviews researcher Nicolo Zingales about the trend among African governments establishing further regulations to control the flow of information on the internet and hold intermediaries liable for content they circulate. Zingales criticizes intermediary liability for “creating a system of adverse incentives for free speech.” He goes on to offer examples of intermediaries and explain the concept of “safe harbor” legislative frameworks. Asked to identify best and worst practices in Africa, he highlights South Africa’s safe harbor as a good practice, and mentions the registration of users via ID cards as a worst practice.

Towards Internet Intermediary Responsibility: Carly Nyst, November 2013, available at: http://www.genderit.org/feminist-talk/towards-internet-intermediary-responsibility. Nyst argues for a middle ground between competing goals in internet regulation in Africa. Achieving one goal, of protecting free speech through internet intermediaries seems at odds with the goal of protecting women’s rights and limiting hate speech, because one demands intermediaries be protected in a legal safe harbor and the other requires intermediaries be vigilant and police their content. Nyst’s solution is not intermediary liability but responsibility, a role defined by empowerment, and establishing an intermediary responsibility to promote positive gender attitudes.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/intermediary-liability-resources