Centre for Internet and Society

NGOs, individuals urge state CMs to curb Internet shutdown

praskrishna — 2017-04-07T02:43:39Z

Amid rising instances of Internet curbs, a group of individuals and organisations have urged the chief ministers of 12 states to only restrict specific online content rather than resort to complete shutdown.

The article was published in the Times of India on April 4, 2017.

SFLC.in, a Delhi-based not-for-profit organisation, along with various Internet-related firms have sent letters in this regard to the chief ministers of these states impacted by Internet shutdowns.

The letters have been written to the chief ministers of Uttar Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Maharashtra, J&K, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat and Haryana.

"The Internet shutdowns are imposed using state power under Section 144 by these specific states and not by the Union Government. The central government is bound to follow the process under Section 69 IT act.

"These letters to the chief ministers of all 12 states, which have been affected by Internet shutdowns till date, are an effort by us to address the source of the problem," SFLC.in President and Legal Director Mishi Choudhary told .

As per Internet Shutdown tracker of SFLC, there have been 28 incidents of Internet closure in Jammu & Kashmir, 9 cases each in Gujarat and Haryana, 8 in Rajasthan, 3 Nagaland, 2 cases each in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Manipur and 1 incident each in Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Meghalaya and Arunachal Pradesh since 2012.

As per the tracker, far India has experienced a record number of 66 such incidents since 2012, with the number increasing more than two-fold from 14 in 2015 to 31 in 2016.

The letters sent to the chief ministers urge them to "take requisite action that would prohibit the issuance of orders that make Internet services entirely inaccessible for a particular area, and rather recommend that Section 69A and the procedure established by the rules therein be applied to limit the restriction to certain specific online content."

The signatories of the letters include the Centre for Internet and Society, Digital Empowerment Foundation, Internet Democracy Project, IT for Change and Society for Knowledge Commons, individuals like Anivar Aravind (Executive Director, Indic Project), IIT Bombay professor Kannan Moudgalya and others.

"We are hopeful that our efforts will make the government take in account the enormous effects of Internet shutdowns on the social-economic condition of our citizens and understand their plight," Choudhary said. PRS MKJ

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/times-of-india-april-4-2017-ngos-individuals-urge-state-cms-to-curb-internet-shutdown

New rules leave social media users vulnerable: Experts

Krupa Joseph — 2021-06-14T11:27:53Z

They analyse the implications of the government vs Twitter controversy on individual privacy

The article by Krupa Joseph was published in the Deccan Herald on 10 June 2021. Torsha Sarkar has been quoted.

The government had notified the changes on February 25, and allowed social media companies three months to comply. Twitter and WhatsApp had then separately approached the Delhi High Court against the new regulations, fearing they could compromise user privacy.

On Monday, the court gave Twitter three weeks to file a response to the government’s charge that it had not appointed a grievance officer as claimed.

Vague rules

Karthik Srinivasan, communications consultant, who uses his blog Beast of Traal to comment on social media, says the new rules are “vague and open-ended”.

“Coupled with the fact that we still do not have a data protection law, the rules could be severely misused both by government and private entities,” he says.

Users are particularly vulnerable in a country where anything and everything offends a lot of people, he says.

Law overreach

Torsha Sarkar, researcher with the Centre for Internet and Society, says the rules introduce additional obligations for social media platforms and classify intermediaries.

“Intermediaries with over five million users would have obligations to introduce traceability, instal automated filtering, provide detailed grievance redressal mechanisms, and publish compliance reports detailing action taken on takedown orders,” she says.

While some of these obligations are similar to those laid down internationally, some alterations are causing concern. The traceability requirement, for example, is highly contentious as it would erode user privacy.

“It is also concerning that the user threshold, for a country like India, with such vast Internet usage, is set at a very low level. This means that even smaller social media platforms might becompelled to carry out economically crippling obligations,” she explains.

The legislative overreach is seen in how the initial draft , which only covered entities like Twitter and Facebook, now seeks to cover digital news media and content curators like Netfl ixand Hulu, she says.

Stretching the scope of the legislation this way is undemocratic since it was not subject to any public consultation, she notes.

Case in High Court

Mishi Choudhary, technology lawyer and founder of SFLC.in, a legal services organisation specialising in law, technology and policy, says the IT rules notified by the government are unconstitutional. “In the garb of addressing misinformation and regulating technology companies, the government has been exceeding the powers granted through subordinate legislation and using it for political purposes,” she says. It is on these grounds that the Free and Open Source Software community has challenged the new rules in the Kerala High Court. “Technology companies need regulation but not at the expense of user rights,” she says.

Congress ‘toolkit’ row

A few weeks after social media platforms were asked to take down posts critical of thegovernment’s management of India’s Covid-19 crisis, Twitter once again found itself at thereceiving end. Last week, Twitter labelled a tweet by BJP leader Sambit Patra, accusing theCongress of working with a ‘toolkit, as ‘manipulated media’. Twitter says it gives the label totweets that include media (videos, audio, and images) that are “deceptively altered orfabricated”. The Delhi police then sent a notice to Twitter in connection and asked the micro-blogging site to explain the reasons for assigning the tag. The police also conducted raids onTwitter offices in India. Things escalated when Twitter said the government was intimidating it. The government hit back saying law-making was its privileges, and Twitter, being a social media platform, should not dictate legal policy framework.

New rules

Under the new IT rules, social media companies like Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter will be responsible for identifying the originator of a flagged message within 36 hours. They also have to appoint a chief compliance officer, a nodal contact person and a resident grievance officer. Failing to comply with these rules would cause the platforms to lose their status as intermediaries, and make them liable for whatever is posted on their platforms.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/deccan-herald-krupa-joseph-june-10-2021-new-rules-leave-social-media-users-vulnerable

New Delhi Expands Curbs on Web Content

praskrishna — 2012-08-24T13:16:22Z

India on Thursday broadened recent efforts to regulate the Internet with moves to block Twitter accounts of some prominent journalists and content from mainstream news organizations, sparking a backlash across social media in the country.

This article by R Jai Krishna and Rumman Ahmed was published in the Wall Street Journal on August 23, 2012. Sunil Abraham is quoted.

Since last week, the government has blocked content that it claims has fueled continuing communal violence in the northeast of the country. That fighting, between Muslim settlers and members of an indigenous group in the state of Assam, has left more than 80 people dead and sent ripples of tension across India.

The government confirms it has blocked around 250 Web pages it says were inciting Muslims to attack northeasterners, including sites carrying doctored photos purporting to show Muslim victims of fighting in Assam. Officials say these images on the sites, coupled with mass SMS phone messages threatening reprisals, have caused panicked northeasterners to flee their homes in a number of large Indian cities.

In recent days, though, the government has quietly widened its offensive, drawing up lists of journalists' Twitter accounts and news stories by local and foreign media organizations to be blocked. The lists, some of which were reviewed by The Wall Street Journal and confirmed by two telecom operators, include Twitter handles of journalists who have been critical of the government and some who have parodied Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

The government didn't respond to requests for comment.

The government's actions caused an uproar on Twitter, where hashtags such as #GOIBlocks and #Emergency2012 were trending Thursday. "The Emergency" refers to a period in the 1970s when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi cracked down on media freedoms and civil liberties.

"The government's move to block several Twitter handles is a clear case of administrative overreach," said Sunil Abraham, executive director at the Bangalore-based Centre for Internet and Society. "This action means citizens are less likely to believe that the government can use its powers responsibly."

Government officials said Internet curbs are necessary to maintain harmony in a multicultural nation of 1.2 billion people.

Pankaj Pachauri, a spokesman for Mr. Singh, acknowledged the government had asked for Twitter's help to block six accounts that impersonate the prime minister. One of those accounts appeared on the government's lists. Twitter, based in San Francisco, has agreed to review the requests, he said. A Twitter spokeswoman declined to comment. Mr. Pachauri said earlier this week that Indian cyber authorities unilaterally blocked those six accounts.

Those six Twitter accounts faced government scrutiny because they made remarks that could have increased tensions, not because they poked fun at the prime minister, Mr. Pachauri said. "We're all for media freedom and encourage criticism by the media," he added. "But when it comes to inciting trouble between communities then we have to take firm action."

U.S. State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said on Tuesday that "we are always on the side of full freedom of the Internet." She added that "we also always urge the government to maintain its own commitment to human rights, fundamental freedoms, rule of law."

India's Constitution allows restrictions on free speech for a number of reasons, including defense of "the sovereignty and integrity" of the country and in order to maintain "public order, decency or morality." Critics say the government has used the vague framing of the Constitution to clamp down on a widening array of Internet material, threatening India's democratic traditions.

Last year, the government framed new rules that require Internet companies to remove within 36 hours material that falls into a range of subjective categories—for instance, anything "ethnically objectionable," "grossly harmful," "defamatory" or "blasphemous."

India's telecoms minister, Kapil Sibal, in December urged Google Inc., and other Internet companies to screen derogatory material from their sites. The requests came amid anger over content that parodied Mr. Singh and Sonia Gandhi, president of the ruling Congress party, as well as other leading politicians.

"One always wonders if the government is using the garb of hate speech and communalism to…limit political criticism online," said Apar Gupta, a cyberlaw expert at Advani & Co., a Delhi-based law firm.

Google and Facebook executives are facing criminal charges in a New Delhi court for allegedly hosting objectionable material on their sites. If found guilty, the executives could face jail time or fines. The companies have petitioned to have the charges dropped, arguing that they shouldn't be held liable for material posted by users. Both firms have said they will remove material that contravenes their own standards or local laws.

Google, Facebook and Twitter again came under fire from India this week amid violence in Assam. Google and Facebook said Tuesday that they were complying with Indian government requests to remove content. Twitter hasn't commented.

Kanchan Gupta, a columnist who has been a fierce critic of the Congress party-led government, said his Twitter account had been temporarily blocked Wednesday night and Thursday. His name was on the government lists. "They thought they could do this slyly," he said. "They didn't anticipate the backlash on Twitter."

Raghavan Jagannathan, editor in chief of FirstPost.com, an Indian news portal that was on the lists, said some of its stories had been blocked.

"We understand that the government wants to stop the circulation of incendiary material that may inflame passions, but should it be blocking news and opinions on the subject?" he said. "I am not sure the decisions are well-thought-out."

Doha, Qatar-based Al Jazeera, an international cable-news organization, was also on the list. An Al Jazeera spokesman said the company was seeking a response from the government on reports of media restrictions affecting it and other outlets.

The government appeared unmoved. "Every company whether it's a construction company or an entertainment company or a social media company, it has to operate within the laws of the given country," Junior Minister for Communications Sachin Pilot told reporters on Wednesday.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/wsj-com-jai-krishna-and-rumman-ahmed-aug-23-2012-new-delhi-expands-curbs-on-web-content

Network Neutrality Regulation across South Asia: A Roundtable on Aspects of Differential Pricing

praskrishna — 2016-01-17T02:41:13Z

The Centre of Internet and Society (CIS) in association with Observer Research Foundation, and IT For Change in collaboration with the Annenberg School for Communications at the University of Pennsylvania is pleased to announce a roundtable on ‘Network Neutrality Regulation Across South Asia: Aspects of Differential Pricing” that will take place on January 22, 2016 from 11.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. at TERI in Bangalore.

Download the Invite

The objective of this roundtable will be to look into the issue of differential pricing in light of TRAI’s recent consultation process, with the specific intention of research building. The network neutrality debate has gained significant momentum in India during the past year, with competing interests of internet service providers, OTTs and the public giving rise to important questions of ICT regulation and policy.

With Facebook looking to expand its zero rated walled garden, Free Basics, into nascent markets, differential pricing is an important point of regulatory policy not just in India, but in jurisdictions across South Asia. These countries have limited connectivity, large consumer potential and low internet penetration which bring to the fore questions of access, diversity, competition and innovation. To this end, the roundtable will seek to address the regulatory and market aspects of differential pricing as well as the impact on rights. Broadly, the roundtable will be forward looking and seek to build future research agendas.

Draft Agenda

11:00 – 11:30	Tea and Registration
11:30 – 12:30	Roundtable 1: Framing the issue: The practice of differential pricing Examples of differential pricing Stakeholder perspectives Competition and market effect of differential pricing Larger social consequences of differential pricing
12:30 – 1:00	Lunch
1:00 – 2:30	Roundtable 2: Regulatory response: Discerning governmental actions Locating public interest Moving from research to action
2:30 – 3:00	Tea
3:00 – 4:30	Roundtable 3: Impact on rights: Access Freedom of expression Privacy Equity and Social Justice
4:30 – 5:00	Discussion and research agenda building

Roundtable Questions:

Roundtable 1: FRAMING THE ISSUE:

What is differential pricing and how does it work? What are the technical components and policy components of differential pricing? What are examples of differential pricing?
What has been the response from different stakeholders to differential pricing schemes? What are the arguments for/against differential pricing?
What could be the market effect of differential pricing?
What are possible larger social impacts of differential pricing?

Roundtable 2: REGULATORY RESPONSE:

How have governments responded to differential pricing? What can these responses tell us about the position of governments?
What are the different components for consideration with developing a regulatory response? What are different forms of regulation for differential pricing?
What type of policy research around differential pricing can drive meaningful action?

Roundtable 3: IMPACT ON RIGHTS:

How does differential pricing impact the right to access, freedom of expression, privacy, and equity and social justice?
Are there ways to mitigate this impact through regulation? Market incentives? Company policy?
What are forms of redress that individuals could seek in the context of differential pricing?

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/events/network-neutrality-regulation-across-south-asia-a-roundtable-on-aspects-of-differential-pricing

Netizens Rejoice Over SC Ruling to Keep the Net Free

praskrishna — 2015-03-25T15:16:03Z

The Supreme Court ruling to strike down Section 66A of the Information Technology (IT) Act has been welcomed by the city’s netizens.

The article by Parina Dhilla was published in the New Indian Express on March 25, 2015. T. Vishnu Vardhan gave his inputs.

Sharanya Gopinathan, a recent graduate, was overjoyed at the decision. The youngster, who is now pursuing her masters in London, recalls the time her post on Facebook about Prime Minister Narendra Modi was reported for being offensive.

“It was just a sentence about how I felt about Mr Modi. Nothing obscene but it still got reported,” she says. She believes the Internet to be “the last guard of freedom”, where free speech has real meaning because there is no government and corporate control.

Forums propagating freedom on the World Wide Web too have applauded the verdict.

T Vishnu Vardhan, programme director of Access to Knowledge at the Centre for Internet and Society, says the draconian aspect of the IT Act has finally been removed.

The other laws coming under the IT Act’s ambit too need to be reviewed and changed, he said.

Lawyers told Express that many times, they have advised clients to take down posts that could be construed as offensive under Section 66A.

Lawrence Liang, a lawyer with the Alternative Law Forum, says, “Recently, we were approached by a woman saying she was being harassed by a mob after she tweeted about the beef ban in Maharashtra. We asked her to delete the tweet and lie low.”

“But now, I won’t advise people to take down their posts from the internet. It is a good ruling and gives people their freedom of speech and expression on the Internet,” Lawrence says.

Change on the Horizon

With bans raining down in the country, many believe the apex court’s decision will bring about change.

Yogita Dakshina, a freelance content writer who regularly posts about the hardships faced by the LGBT community, says she has always posted fearlessly but some of her family members were always scared that she would court trouble due to the provisions of Section 66A.

Prabahan Chakravorty, a PhD student, is of the view that this will be a big lift for those in the creative field. “The rights to freedom and expression need to be given to all citizens, especially writers and artists. Some people may consider a few posts offensive, but then, the world is offensive and people need to deal with that.”

On the responsibility that falls upon netizens with this verdict, Ankura Nayak, a student of Mount Carmel College, says, “People are responsible and they know what to post. There were a few people who posted irresponsible content even before this ruling. But these are few in number compared to responsible netizens.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/new-indian-express-march-25-2015-parina-dhilla-netizens-rejoice-over-sc-ruling-to-keep-the-net-free

Net neutrality: Net activism packs a punch

praskrishna — 2015-05-09T09:02:03Z

For the first time in the history of internet campaigns in India, a protest movement has successfully changed the course of a debate without having to take to the streets. The net neutrality movement is being fought almost totally in the virtual world. Hashtag activism isn't new in India. In recent times, several big campaigns have been bolstered by the internet which helped mobilize mass support and kept people constantly updated on events. Pink Chaddi, Jan Lokpal and the Nirbhaya movements were some examples of successful on-the-ground campaigns that were galvanized by social media. But they still needed public action — dharnas, candlelight vigils and actual pink undies — to make a difference.

The article by Sandhya Soman was published in the Times of India on April 19, 2015. Pranesh Prakash was quoted.

But the ongoing battle for internet freedom has proved that clicktivism isn't just about passive engagement with a cause. While it's all too easy to 'like' a cause, leading to what David Carr describes as "favoriting fatigue" in an article in the New York Times, some clicks can count in the real world.

It all started when the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) posted a vaguely worded and complicated discussion paper on net neutrality and called for public responses to it. "Clearly, many people understood that some of the proposals put forward by Trai in its paper threatened the internet as they knew it," says Anja Kovacs, who directs the Internet Democracy Project and has closely followed online activism in India.

Soon, an unlikely collective of techies, lawyers, journalists and even stand-up comics had banded together. Some of them — such as tech entrepreneur Kiran Jonnalagadda and journalist Nikhil Pahwa — had been writing and tweeting about the issue for a while but the Trai paper galvanized them. "I dropped everything and asked for help. Kiran, (lawyers) Apar Gupta amd Raman Chima, Sandeep Pillai, standup group All India Bakchod and several Reddit India users (some of whom remain anonymous), started getting involved," says Pahwa, who is the founder of Medianama. The only common factor was their love for internet and an acute worry what this policy consultation might do to destroy its open and equal nature.

Though scattered across India, once they came together online, this 'apolitical collective' was able to rope in engineers, developers, open source activists, entrepreneurs, policy experts, lawyers and journalists as volunteers.

The best way to counter propaganda and opposition was to get people involved. An abridged version of the voluminous Trai paper was posted online, and a FAQ section created on a public Google Doc. "Many came forward to answer the questions and that exercise helped create an understanding of the situation," explains Pahwa. By the time, Jonnalagadda and a few other developers set up the savetheinternet.in website by April 1, there was enough information and data points. Lawyers Gupta and Chima had also decoded the legalese and prepared cogent answers to Trai's 20 questions. This was turned into a ready-to-use email template for users to hit 'send'.

And send they did. The flood of emails to the Trai inbox number is already 803,723 and counting. The results of the social media backlash are evident — with e-commerce retailer Flipkart pulling out of Airtel Zero and several websites backing out of Facebook and Reliance's internet.org. "I was hoping to get around 15,000 responses to counter, say, 15 from the telecom lobby. Now, people make fun of me because I said that," laughs Pahwa. In this case, what also struck a chord was the idea of a bunch of young guys using tech to take on mismanagement by the older generation and corporate greed, says entrepreneur Mahesh Murthy. "We were telling them we like things on the internet as they are now."

But it is hard to sustain online outrage without an action plan, relentless groundwork and some comic warfare. So, when the contentious paper came out on March 27, the website was followed by AIB's punchy video that decoded the concept and took irreverent potshots at those who wanted to limit access while urging people to write to Trai. A lot of the lessons for the campaign came from the US where a John Oliver video turned the tide in the net neutrality debate. "We had seen that several people don't take internet petitions seriously. Also, we wanted to follow the proper legal course in this issue and not hold dharnas," says Jonnalagadda.

It is also important for campaigns to result in doable action. As Kovacs points out, savetheinternet.in and netneutrality. in gave users practical tools to respond before the April 24 deadline. The team also kept clarifying doubts and complex concepts on social media and also had an AMA (ask me anything) chat on Scrollback on Saturday while the 'other side' stuck to big words and jargon.

Of course, like every movement, this one too has attracted criticism. The proneutrality band has been branded as socialist and utopian and there were intense arguments amongst supporters. "Disagreements and arguments are not unique to the activism online," says Pranesh Prakash, policy director at Centre for Internet and Society.

Earlier in the debate, Prakash had said he'd received strong pushback from friends and allies when he spoke about the possible benefits of non-competitive zero rating, an example would be allowing companies to offer free access to their sites and apps via an arrangement with a telecom company — if effective competition exists. Airtel Zero and Reliance's Internet.org claim to do the same though most supporters remain critical. Says Prakash: "There might've been differences. But the fact that a lot of people are thinking about effects of 'free', and comparing it to predatory pricing shows that #savetheinternet is one of the better examples of engaged activism."

Online campaigns have previously also successfully mobilized people to get involved in issues they do not know much about, says author Nilanajana Roy, who is an influential voice on Twitter. The J&K flood relief efforts last year started on Twitter but got volunteers moving on the ground, she says. "People don't always realize what they care strongly about so, despite the risk of compassion fatigue or armchair volunteerism, it's worth having some online activism," says Roy.

Meanwhile, those behind the savetheinternet campaign are struggling with their new-found identity as "activists". "I think of myself as a venture capitalist and marketing consultant, not a khadi kurta-jholawala from JNU," says Mahesh Murthy, among those who strongly support the movement.

And at the end of the day, most of these activists would like to go back to their cubicles, free to browse or start a business. But not before they've tried to keep the internet open.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-sandhya-soman-april-19-2015-net-neutrality-net-activism-packs-a-punch

Net Neutrality, Free Speech and the Indian Constitution – III: Conceptions of Free Speech and Democracy

gautam — 2014-05-27T10:21:24Z

In this 3 part series, Gautam Bhatia explores the concept of net neutrality in the context of Indian law and the Indian Constitution.

In the modern State, effective exercise of free speech rights is increasingly dependent upon an infrastructure that includes newspapers, television and the internet. Access to a significant part of this infrastructure is determined by money. Consequently, if what we value about free speech is the ability to communicate one’s message to a non-trivial audience, financial resources influence both who can speak and, consequently, what is spoken. The nature of the public discourse – what information and what ideas circulate in the public sphere – is contingent upon a distribution of resources that is arguably unjust and certainly unequal.

There are two opposing theories about how we should understand the right to free speech in this context. Call the first one of these the libertarian conception of free speech. The libertarian conception takes as given the existing distribution of income and resources, and consequently, the unequal speaking power that that engenders. It prohibits any intervention designed to remedy the situation. The most famous summary of this vision was provided by the American Supreme Court, when it first struck down campaign finance regulations, in Buckley v. Valeo: “the concept that government may restrict the speech of some [in] order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.” This theory is part of the broader libertarian worldview, which would restrict government’s role in a polity to enforcing property and criminal law, and views any government-imposed restriction on what people can do within the existing structure of these laws as presumptively wrong.

We can tentatively label the second theory as the social-democratic theory of free speech. This theory focuses not so much on the individual speaker’s right not to be restricted in using their resources to speak as much as they want, but upon the collective interest in maintaining a public discourse that is open, inclusive and home to a multiplicity of diverse and antagonistic ideas and viewpoints. Often, in order to achieve this goal, governments regulate access to the infrastructure of speech so as to ensure that participation is not entirely skewed by inequality in resources. When this is done, it is often justified in the name of democracy: a functioning democracy, it is argued, requires a thriving public sphere that is not closed off to some or most persons.

Surprisingly, one of the most powerful judicial statements for this vision also comes from the United States. In Red Lion v. FCC, while upholding the “fairness doctrine”, which required broadcasting stations to cover “both sides” of a political issue, and provide a right of reply in case of personal attacks, the Supreme Court noted:

“[Free speech requires] preserv[ing] an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee… it is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here.”

What of India? In the early days of the Supreme Court, it adopted something akin to the libertarian theory of free speech. In Sakal Papers v. Union of India, for example, it struck down certain newspaper regulations that the government was defending on grounds of opening up the market and allowing smaller players to compete, holding that Article 19(1)(a) – in language similar to what Buckley v. Valeo would hold, more than fifteen years later – did not permit the government to infringe the free speech rights of some in order to allow others to speak. The Court continued with this approach in its next major newspaper regulation case, Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, but this time, it had to contend with a strong dissent from Justice Mathew. After noting that “it is no use having a right to express your idea, unless you have got a medium for expressing it”, Justice Mathew went on to hold:

“What is, therefore, required is an interpretation of Article 19(1)(a) which focuses on the idea that restraining the hand of the government is quite useless in assuring free speech, if a restraint on access is effectively secured by private groups. A Constitutional prohibition against governmental restriction on the expression is effective only if the Constitution ensures an adequate opportunity for discussion… Any scheme of distribution of newsprint which would make the freedom of speech a reality by making it possible the dissemination of ideas as news with as many different facets and colours as possible would not violate the fundamental right of the freedom of speech of the petitioners. In other words, a scheme for distribution of a commodity like newsprint which will subserve the purpose of free flow of ideas to the market from as many different sources as possible would be a step to advance and enrich that freedom. If the scheme of distribution is calculated to prevent even an oligopoly ruling the market and thus check the tendency to monopoly in the market, that will not be open to any objection on the ground that the scheme involves a regulation of the press which would amount to an abridgment of the freedom of speech.”

In Justice Mathew’s view, therefore, freedom of speech is not only the speaker’s right (the libertarian view), but a complex balancing act between the listeners’ right to be exposed to a wide range of material, as well as the collective, societal right to have an open and inclusive public discourse, which can only be achieved by preventing the monopolization of the instruments, infrastructure and access-points of speech.

Over the years, the Court has moved away from the majority opinions in Sakal Papers and Bennett Coleman, and steadily come around to Justice Mathew’s view. This is particularly evident from two cases in the 1990s: in Union of India v. The Motion Picture Association, the Court upheld various provisions of the Cinematograph Act that imposed certain forms of compelled speech on moviemakers while exhibiting their movies, on the ground that “to earmark a small portion of time of this entertainment medium for the purpose of showing scientific, educational or documentary films, or for showing news films has to be looked at in this context of promoting dissemination of ideas, information and knowledge to the masses so that there may be an informed debate and decision making on public issues. Clearly, the impugned provisions are designed to further free speech and expression and not to curtail it.”

LIC v. Manubhai D. Shah is even more on point. In that case, the Court upheld a right of reply in an in-house magazine, “because fairness demanded that both view points were placed before the readers, however limited be their number, to enable them to draw their own conclusions and unreasonable because there was no logic or proper justification for refusing publication… the respondent’s fundamental right of speech and expression clearly entitled him to insist that his views on the subject should reach those who read the magazine so that they have a complete picture before them and not a one sided or distorted one…” This goes even further than Justice Mathew’s dissent in Bennett Coleman, and the opinion of the Court in Motion Picture Association, in holding that not merely is it permitted to structure the public sphere in an equal and inclusive manner, but that it is a requirement of Article 19(1)(a).

We can now bring the threads of the separate arguments in the three posts together. In the first post, we found that public law and constitutional obligations can be imposed upon private parties when they discharge public functions. In the second post, it was argued that the internet has replaced the park, the street and the public square as the quintessential forum for the circulation of speech. ISPs, in their role as gatekeepers, now play the role that government once did in controlling and keeping open these avenues of expression. Consequently, they can be subjected to public law free speech obligations. And lastly, we discussed how the constitutional conception of free speech in India, that the Court has gradually evolved over many years, is a social-democratic one, that requires the keeping open of a free and inclusive public sphere. And if there is one thing that fast-lanes over the internet threaten, it is certainly a free and inclusive (digital) public sphere. A combination of these arguments provides us with an arguable case for imposing obligations of net neutrality upon ISPs, even in the absence of a statutory or regulatory obligations, grounded within the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of speech and expression.

For the previous post, please see: http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/-neutrality-free-speech-and-the-indian-constitution-part-2.

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Gautam Bhatia — @gautambhatia88 on Twitter — is a graduate of the National Law School of India University (2011), and presently an LLM student at the Yale Law School. He blogs about the Indian Constitution at http://indconlawphil.wordpress.com. Here at CIS, he will be blogging on issues of online freedom of speech and expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-neutrality-free-speech-and-the-indian-constitution-2013-iii-conceptions-of-free-speech-and-democracy

Net Neutrality, Free Speech and the Indian Constitution - II

gautam — 2014-04-29T07:42:40Z

In this 3 part series, Gautam Bhatia explores the concept of net neutrality in the context of Indian law and the Indian Constitution.

To sum up the previous post: under Article 12 of the Constitution, fundamental rights can be enforced only against the State, or State-like entities that are under the functional, financial and administrative control of the State. In the context of net neutrality, it is clear that privately-owned ISPs do not meet the exacting standards of Article 12. Nonetheless, we also found that the Indian Supreme Court has held private entities, which do not fall within the contours of Article 12, to an effectively similar standard of obligations under Part III as State organizations in certain cases. Most prominent among these is the case of education: private educational institutions have been required to adhere to standards of equal treatment which are identical in content to Article 14, even though their source lies elsewhere. If, therefore, we are to impose obligations of net neutrality upon private ISPs, a similar argument must be found.

I will suggest that the best hope is by invoking the free speech guarantee of Article 19(1)(a). To understand how an obligation of free speech might operate in this case, let us turn to the case of Marsh v. Alabama, an American Supreme Court case from 1946.

Marsh v. Alabama involved a “company town”. The “town” of Chickasaw was owned by a private company, the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. In its structure it resembled a regular township: it had building, streets, a sewage system, and a “business block”, where stores and business places had been rented out to merchants and other service providers. The residents of the “town” used the business block as their shopping center, to get to which they used the company-owned pavement and street. Highway traffic regularly came in through the town, and its facilities were used by wayfarers. As the Court noted:

“In short the town and its shopping district are accessible to and freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distinguish them from any other town and shopping center except the fact that the title to the property belongs to a private corporation.”

Marsh, who was a Jehovah’s Witness, arrived in Chickasaw with the intention of distributing religious literature on the streets. She was asked to leave the sidewalk, and on declining, she was arrested by the police, and charged under an anti-trespassing statute. She argued that if the statute was applied to her, it would violate her free speech and freedom of religion rights under the American First Amendment. The lower Courts rejected her argument, holding that since the street was owned by a private corporation, she had no constitutional free speech rights, and the situation was analogous to being invited into a person’s private house. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower Courts, and found for Marsh.

Four (connected) strands of reasoning run through the Supreme Court’s (brief) opinion. First, it found that streets, sidewalks and public places have historically been critically important sites for dissemination and reception of news, information and opinions, whether it is through distribution of literature, street-corner oratory, or whatever else. Secondly, it found that private ownership did not carry with it a right to exclusive dominion. Rather, “the owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm. Since these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation.” Thirdly, it noted that a large number of Americans throughout the United States lived in company towns, and acted just as other American citizens did, in their duties as residents of a community. It would therefore be perverse to deny them rights enjoyed by those who lived in State-municipality run towns. And fourthly, on balance, it held that the private rights of property-owners was subordinate to the right of the people to “enjoy freedom of press and religion.”

No one factor, then, but a combination of factors underlie the Court’s decision to impose constitutional obligations upon a private party. It mattered that, historically, there have been a number of spaces traditionally dedicated to public speech: parks, squares and streets – whose public character remained unchanged despite the nature of ownership. It mattered that individuals had no feasible exit option – that is, no other place they could go to in order to exercise their free speech rights. And it mattered that free speech occupied a significant enough place in the Constitutional scheme so as to override the exclusionary rights that normally tend to go with private property.

The case of the privately-owned street in the privately-owned town presents a striking analogy when we start thinking seriously about net neutrality. First of all, in the digital age, the traditional sites of public discourse – parks, town squares, streets – have been replaced by their digital equivalents. The lonely orator standing on the soap-box in the street corner now tweets his opinions and instagrams his photographs. The street-pamphleteer of yesteryear now updates his Facebook status to reflect his political opinions. Specialty and general-interest blogs constitute a multiplicity of town-squares where a speaker makes his point, and his hearers gather in the comments section to discuss and debate the issue. While these examples may seem frivolous at first blush, the basic point is a serious one: the role of opinion formation and transmission that once served by open, publicly accessible physical infrastructure, held – in a manner of speaking – in public trust by the government, is now served in the digital world, under the control of private gatekeepers. To that extent, it is a public function, undertaken in public interest, as the Court held in Marsh v. Alabama.

The absence of an exit option is equally important. The internet has become not only a space of exchanging information, but it has become a primary – non-replaceable source – of the same. Like the citizens of Chickasaw lacked a feasible alternative space to exercise their public free speech rights (and we operate on the assumption that it would be unreasonably expensive and disruptive for them to move to a different town), there is now no feasible alternative space to the internet, as it exists today, where the main online spaces are owned by private parties, and access to those spaces is determined by gatekeepers – which are the ISPs.

The analogy is not perfect, of course, but there is a case to be made that in acting as the gatekeepers of the internet, privately-owned ISPs are in a position quite similar to the corporate owners of they public streets Company Town.

In the last post, we saw how it is possible – constitutionally – to impose public obligations upon private parties, although the Court has never made its jurisprudential foundation clear. Here, then, is a thought: public obligations ought to be imposed when the private entity is providing a public function and/or when the private entity is in effectively exclusive control of a public good. There is an argument that ISPs satisfy both conditions. Of course, we need to examine in detail how precisely the rights of free expression are implicated in the ISP context. That is the subject for the next post.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/-neutrality-free-speech-and-the-indian-constitution-part-2

Net Neutrality, Free Speech and the Indian Constitution - I

gautam — 2014-04-29T08:03:57Z

In this post, I will explore net neutrality in the context of Indian law and the Indian Constitution.

Let us take, for the purposes of this post, the following definition:

“The idea that all Internet traffic should be treated equally is known as network neutrality. In other words, no matter who uploads or downloads data, or what kind of data is involved, networks should treat all of those packets in the same manner.”

In other words, put simply, net neutrality in its broadest form requires the extant gatekeepers of the internet – such as, for instance, broadband companies – to accord a form of equal and non-discriminatory treatment to all those who want to access the internet. Examples of possible discrimination – as the quote above illustrates – include, for instance, blocking content or providing differential internet speed (perhaps on the basis of a tiered system of payment for access).

Net neutrality has its proponents and opponents, and I do not have space here to address that dispute. In its broadest and absolutist form, net neutrality is highly controversial (including arguments that existing status quo is not neutral in any genuine sense). I take as given, however, that some form of net neutrality is both an important and a desirable goal. In particular, intentional manipulation of information that is available to internet users – especially for political purposes – is, I assume, an undesirable outcome, as are anti-competitive practices, as well as price-discrimination for the most basic access to the internet (this brief article in the Times of India provides a decent, basic primer on the stakes involved).

An example of net neutrality in practice is the American Federal Communications Commission’s Open Internet Order of 2010, which was the subject of litigation in the recently concluded Verizon v. FCC. The Open Internet order imposed obligations of transparency, no blocking, and no unreasonable discrimination, upon internet service providers. The second and third requirements were vacated by a United States Court of Appeals. The rationale for the Court’s decision was that ISPs could not be equated, in law, to “common carriers”. A common carrier is an entity that offers to transport persons and/or goods in exchange for a fee (for example, shipping companies, or bus companies). A common carrier is licensed to be one, and often, one of the conditions for license is an obligation not to discriminate. That is, the common carrier cannot refuse to carry an individual who is willing and able to pay the requisite fees, in the absence of a compelling reason (for example, if the individual wishes the carrier to transport contraband). Proponents of net neutrality have long called for treating ISPs as common carriers, a proposition – as observed above – was rejected by the Court.

With this background, let us turn to India. In India, internet service providers are both state-owned (BSNL and MTNL), and privately-owned (Airtel, Spectranet, Reliance, Sify etc). Unlike many other countries, however, India has no network-neutrality laws. As this informative article observes:

“The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), in its guidelines for issuing licences for providing Unified Access Service, promotes the principle of non-discrimination but does not enforce it… the Information Technology Act does not provide regulatory provisions relating to Internet access, and does not expressly prohibit an ISP from controlling the Internet to suit their business interests.”

In the absence of either legislation or regulation, there are two options. One, of course, is to invoke the rule of common carriers as a common law rule in court, should an ISP violate the principles of net neutrality. In this post (and the next), however, I would like to analyze net neutrality within a constitutional framework – in particular, within the framework of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and expression.

In order to do so, two questions become important, and I shall address them in turn. First, given that most of the ISPs are privately owned, how does the Constitution even come into the picture? Our fundamental rights are enforceable vertically, that is, between individuals and the State, and not horizontally – that is, between two individuals, or two private parties. Where the Constitution intends to depart from this principle (for instance, Article 15(2)), it specifically and expressly states so. As far as Article 19 and the fundamental freedoms are concerned, however, it is clear that they do not admit of horizontal application.

Yet what, precisely, are we to understand by the term “State”? Consider Article 12:

“In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.”

The key question is what, precisely, falls within the meaning of “other authorities”. The paradigmatic example – and this is something Ambedkar had in mind, as is evidenced by the Constituent Assembly Debates – is the statutory corporation – i.e., a company established under a statute. There are, however, more difficult cases, for instance, public-private partnerships of varying types. For the last fifty years, the Supreme Court has struggled with the issue of defining “other authorities” for the purposes of Part III of the Constitution, with the pendulum swinging wildly at times. In the case of Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, a 2002 judgment by a Constitution bench, the Court settled upon the following definition:

“The question in each case would be whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State.”

Very obviously, this dooms the ISP argument. There is no way to argue that ISPs are under the pervasive financial, functional and administrative domination or control of the State. If we step back for a moment, though, the Pradeep Kumar Biswas test seems to be radically under-inclusive. Consider the following hypothetical: tomorrow, the government decides to privatize the nation’s water supply to private company X. Company X is the sole distributor of water in the country. On gaining control, it decides to cut off the water supply to all households populated by members of a certain religion. There seems something deeply wrong in the argument that there is no remedy under discrimination law against the conduct of the company.

The argument could take two forms. One could argue that there is a certain minimum baseline of State functions (ensuring reasonable access to public utilities, overall maintenance of communications, defence and so on). The baseline may vary depending on your personal political philosophy (education? Health? Infrastructure?), but within the baseline, as established, if a private entity performs a State function, it is assimilated to the State. One could also argue, however, that even if Part III isn’t directly applicable, certain functions are of a public nature, and attract public law obligations that are identical in content to fundamental rights obligations under Part III, although their source is not Part III.

To unpack this idea, consider Justice Mohan’s concurring opinion in Unnikrishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, a case that involved the constitutionality of high capitation fees charged by private educational institutions. One of the arguments raised against the educational institutions turned upon the applicability of Article 14’s guarantee of equality. The bench avoided the issue of whether Article 14 directly applied to private educational institutions by framing the issue as a question of the constitutionality of the legislation that regulated capitation fees. Justice Mohan, however, observed:

“What is the nature of functions discharged by these institutions? They discharge a public duty. If a student desires to acquire a degree, for example, in medicine, he will have to route through a medical college. These medical colleges are the instruments to attain the qualification. If, therefore, what is discharged by the educational institution, is a public duty that requires… [it to] act fairly. In such a case, it will be subject to Article 14.”

In light of Pradeep Kumar Biswas, it is obviously difficult to hold the direct application of the Constitution to private entities. We can take Justice Mohan, however, to be making a slightly different point: performing what are quintessentially public duties attract certain obligations that circumscribe the otherwise free action of private entities. The nature of the obligation itself depends upon the nature of the public act. Education, it would seem, is an activity that is characterized by open and non-discriminatory access. Consequently, even private educational institutions are required to abide by the norms of fairness articulated by Article 14, even though they may not, as a matter of constitutional law, be held in violation of the Article 14 that is found in the constitutional text. Again, the content of the obligation is the same, but its source (the constitutional text, as opposed to norms of public law) is different.

We have therefore established that in certain cases, it is possible to subject private entities performing public functions to constitutional norms without bringing them under Article 12’s definition of the State, and without the need for an enacted statute, or a set of regulations. In the next post, we shall explore in greater detail what this means, and how it might be relevant to ISPs and net neutrality.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/net-neutrality-free-speech-and-the-indian-constitution-part-1

Net Neutrality Advocates Rejoice As TRAI Bans Differential Pricing

subha — 2016-02-23T02:10:42Z

India would not see any more Free Basics advertisements on billboards with images of farmers and common people explaining how much they benefited from this Facebook project.

The article by Subhashish Panigrahi was published by Odisha TV on February 9, 2016.

Because the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) has taken a historical step by banning differential pricing without discriminating services. In their notes TRAI has explained, “In India, given that a majority of the population are yet to be connected to the internet, allowing service providers to define the nature of access would be equivalent of letting TSPs shape the users’ internet experience.” Not just that, violation of this ban would cost Rs. 50,000 every day.

Facebook planned to launch Free Basics in India by making a few websites – mostly partners with Facebook—available for free. The company not just advertised aggressively on bill boards and commercials across the nation, it also embedded a campaign inside Facebook asking users to vote in support of Free Basics. TRAI criticized Facebook’s attempt to manipulate public opinion. Facebook was also heavily challenged by many policy and internet advocates including non-profits like Free Software Movement of India and Savetheinternet.in campaign. The two collectives strongly discouraged Free Basics by moulding public opinion against it with Savetheinternet.in alone used to send over 2.4 million emails to TRAI to disallow Free Basics. Furthermore, 500 Indian start-ups, including major names like Cleartrip, Zomato, Practo, Paytm and Cleartax, also wrote to India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi requesting continued support for Net Neutrality – a concept that advocates equal treatment of websites – on Republic Day. Stand-up comedians like Abish Mathew and groups like All India Bakchod and East India Comedy created humorous but informative videos explaining the regulatory debate and supporting net neutrality. Both went viral.

Technology critic and Quartz writer Alice Truong reacted to Free Basics saying; “Zuckerberg almost portrays net neutrality as a first-world problem that doesn’t apply to India because having some service is better than no service.”

The decision of the Indian government has been largely welcomed in the country and outside. In support of the move, Web We Want programme manager at the World Wide Web Foundation Renata Avila has said; “As the country with the second largest number of Internet users worldwide, this decision will resonate around the world. It follows a precedent set by Chile, the United States, and others which have adopted similar net neutrality safeguards. The message is clear: We can’t create a two-tier Internet – one for the haves, and one for the have-nots. We must connect everyone to the full potential of the open Web.”

There are mixed responses on the social media, both in support and in opposition to the TRAI decision. Josh Levy, Advocacy Director at Accessnow, has appreciated saying, “India is now the global leader on #NetNeutrality. New rules are stronger than those in EU and US.”

Had differential pricing been allowed, it would have affected start-ups and content-based smaller companies adversely as they could never have managed to pay the high price to a partner service provider to make their service available for free. On the other hand, tech-giants like Facebook could have easily managed to capture the entire market. Since the inception, the Facebook-run non-profit Internet.org has run into a lot of controversies because of the hidden motive behind the claimed support for social cause.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/odisha-tv-february-9-2016-subhashish-panigrahi-net-neutrality-advocates-rejoice-as-trai-bans-differential-pricing

Net nanny meets muscular law

Admin — 2018-10-02T05:48:32Z

India’s new human-trafficking bill could criminalise sex workers and curtail free speech.

The article by Laxmi Murthy was published in Himal South Asian on September 26, 2018.

When conservative morality is armed with the law and prejudice is given legal validity, the state is transformed into a wet nurse cum security guard. The Trafficking of Persons (Prevention, Protection and Rehabilitation) Bill 2018, passed on 26 July in the lower house of the Indian Parliament, represents a growing trend of increased state surveillance and control, and a carceral approach to dealing with non-compliance with overbroad and vague laws laced with prudery.

Trafficking in persons, as defined by the United Nations, is “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons” by coercion, deception or the abuse of power or position for the purpose of exploitation. Human trafficking is considered to be a form of modern-day slavery and is outlawed in most countries.

Following the ratification of the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others in 1949, India enacted the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act 1956. However, nowhere was trafficking clearly defined in the law. The acronym of this law, SITA, seemingly deliberately modelled after Sita, the chaste wife of Rama from the epic Ramayana, reinforced the moralism already codified into law. Moving from suppression to prevention of ‘immoral’ trafficking took three decades, but the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act (ITPA), as the act was renamed in 1986, continued to prioritise morality over human rights, focusing its attention on raiding brothels and “rescuing and rehabilitating” sex workers, whether or not they wanted such intervention. Though sex work is not illegal per se in India – with some notable exceptions with respect to soliciting in public places – the ITPA views consensual adult sex work as a misnomer and approaches all women in sex work as victims in need of rescue. This ultimately criminalises even consenting adult sex workers by treating solicitation, brothel ownership and procurement as criminal activity.

Unfortunately, the 2018 trafficking bill has been drafted with this very mindset, and goes on to widen the scope to cover “aggravated” forms of trafficking, including trafficking for the purpose of forced labour, begging, trafficking by administering chemical substance or hormones for early sexual maturity among other things. It also includes in its ambit trafficking for the purpose of surrogacy, at a time when questions around commercial surrogacy and consent of surrogates have yet to be settled in Indian law.

The bill also aims to unify existing criminal law provisions on trafficking. The definition of trafficking in the Indian law is drawn primarily from Section 370 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which includes ‘any act’ of physical exploitation, sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery and servitude. Trafficking under this bill also includes begging and domestic work. However, critics of the bill, including a collective of sex-worker-rights groups and organisations working with bonded labour, children and adolescents under the banner of the Coalition for an Inclusive Approach on the Trafficking Bill, say that the bill, with its criminalised approach, will further stigmatise sex workers, transgender persons and beggars. The supposed ‘victims’ of trafficking would, therefore, be forcibly rescued, rehabilitated and repatriated, and denied their chosen residence as well as their means of livelihood. The elaborate anti-trafficking bureaucracy to be set up at district, state and national levels seems unwieldy and without representation of the communities it purports to protect.

Cross-purposes

The anti-trafficking bill embodies a constitutional conundrum: in attempting to fulfil the mandate under Article 23 of the Constitution – to protect persons from exploitation inherent in human trafficking – it can potentially violate fundamental freedoms, in particular, the freedom of speech and expression, a core protection guaranteed by Article 19.

According to Section 39 (2) of the bill, “Whoever solicits or publicises electronically, taking or distributing obscene photographs or videos or providing materials or soliciting or guiding tourists or using agents or any other form which may lead to the trafficking of a person shall be punished (emphasis added)”.

This provision, while intending to criminalise online soliciting, casts a wide net and prescribes penalties – rigorous imprisonment for a term of five to ten years and a fine between INR 50,000 (USD 700) and INR 100,000 (USD 1400) – for vaguely defined acts which may lead to trafficking. It is not necessary, as per this provision, to prove a direct causal link between these acts – such as distributing obscene photographs or providing materials – and the actual crime of trafficking. Such a broad brush is highly problematic and violates well-established tenets of criminal jurisprudence which require criminal intention (mens rea) along with the actual criminal act (actus reus). That is, a criminal act must be accompanied by a criminal intention. Without any burden to prove a causal link, anything deemed to potentially lead to trafficking can be proscribed – for example, any artistic work, academic publication or cinematic representation.

Sexually explicit content – text, audio and visual – has evoked deeply contentious opinions right from the time of the Kamasutra and the erotic sculptures of the Khajuraho temples. There is no one single position on pornography or obscenity among feminists, despite their shared concern about enhancing women’s rights and stopping exploitation. On the one hand, American feminist Robin Morgan’s famous pronouncement back in 1974, that pornography is the theory and rape is the practice, implying that pornography was directly responsible for violence and sexual abuse of women, influenced early feminists the world over, and continues to hold sway among sections of women’s rights advocates. However, while images undoubtedly impact on the human psyche, the causal links between pornography and rape are not established firmly enough to warrant censorship and bans. On the other hand, sex-positive feminists who celebrate varied expressions of sexual desire, especially female sexuality, advocates of feminist pornography (which is not seen as a contradiction in terms), adult entertainers and sex workers have practiced and theorised sexual desire and its many manifestations in ways that are undergirded by consent, respect, agency and autonomy, but not necessarily confined to contemporary social mores. Conversations around sexuality and desire have moved beyond criminalisation of what is considered deviant, but echoes of these conversations do not seem to have been heard in the corridors of the Parliament.

With the prevalent moral disapproval of pornography and adult entertainment, the phrase “taking or distributing obscene photographs or videos or providing materials” can easily be misinterpreted as leading to trafficking. The word ‘obscene’ is itself too subjective and culturally loaded a term to withstand rigorous legal scrutiny. It is a no-brainer that deciding what is aesthetically pleasing erotica and what is unacceptable pornography is in the eye of the beholder and is, therefore, subjective. Where there is no requirement to prove intention, or mens rea, any image or video deemed to be obscene can be censored. This could bring into its ambit online material, articles, literature, magazines as well as artists and their work, and consenting adult sexual interactions in the digital space including adult dating apps like Tinder or OkCupid.

It was only as recently as 2014 that India’s Supreme Court jettisoned the archaic Hicklin Test, which was developed in an 1868 case in England to determine whether specific material could “deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such influences”. This outdated standard was applied, for instance, in the landmark case of Udeshi v State of Maharashtra in 1964 to uphold the ban on the D H Lawrence classic Lady Chatterley’s Lover and to convict Ranjit Udeshi, a bookseller, under Section 292 of the IPC for distributing “obscene” material.

Half a century on, in 2014, Anand Bazaar Patrika, publishers of Sportsworld, a magazine which reprinted a nude photograph of tennis champion Boris Becker and his fiancée, won the case in the apex court which rejected the Hicklin Test. However, the court adopted a ‘community standards’ test derived from the 1957 Roth v United States case that determined what was obscene and was, therefore, unprotected by the First Amendment to the American Constitution that protects freedom of speech. The ‘community standards’ test has itself been challenged for its vagueness, since what is considered to have social importance is itself variable. In addition, the Supreme Court in the Sportsworld case allowed the nude photograph because, in the court’s view, it did not have “a tendency to arouse feeling or reveal an overt sexual desire”. The nude photograph of a white-skinned Becker with his dark-skinned fiancée was deemed to be in the public interest, as its intention was to cast a spotlight on racism and apartheid. However, the justification that the photo did not arouse sexual desire and was, therefore, acceptable, is both highly subjective and problematic in its criminalisation of sexual desire, in that it allows – without any evidence whatsoever – the dangerous possibility of nudity having a causal effect on violence.

Stormy seas and safe harbours

The Trafficking Bill 2018 in its “offences related to media” chapter, continues in its inexorable march towards criminalisation on the basis of vague definitions. According to Section 36, a person is said to be engaged in trafficking of person even if that person “advertises, publishes, prints, broadcasts or distributes, or causes the advertisement, publication, printing or broadcast or distribution by any means, including the use of information technology or any brochure, flyer or any propaganda material that promotes trafficking of person or exploitation of a trafficked person in any manner.”

However, since “promoting trafficking or exploitation” has not been clearly defined, it makes room for different interpretations of liability. There is little in this provision that attempts to impose a clear, rigorous standard of evidence that could demonstrate direct cause. The Bengaluru-based non-profit Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) cautions that, under this clause, the likelihood of authors of adult material, videographers, filmmakers and internet sites being charged with promoting trafficking or exploitation is quite high, since the clause might build a legal link between hosting or producing pornography and trafficking.

Clamping down on internet freedom on the basis of obscenity is not new. In July 2015, the government banned 857 websites that it considered pornographic. This followed the Kamlesh Vaswani case in the Supreme Court where the then chief justice of India expressed his inability to order a ban as it would go against the right to personal liberty guaranteed in Article 21 of the Constitution. In their submission challenging the ban, and underlining the subjectivity in viewing and interpreting content, the Internet Service Providers Association of India (ISPAI) said, “one man’s pornography is another man’s high art”, making it impossible for them to ban any sites. The ISPs were later told that they should ban only sites showing child pornography, but they submitted that they neither created content nor owned it and that it was not possible for them to view content before hosting it. And therein lies one of the most controversial features of the trafficking bill.

The most pernicious provision of the bill, Section 41 (2), displays a complete lack of understanding of the manner in which the digital space functions. The section penalises anyone who “distributes, or sells or stores, in any form in any electronic or printed form showing incidence of sexual exploitation, sexual assault, or rape for the purpose of exploitation or for coercion of the victim or his family members, or for unlawful gain.”

As the CIS critique of the bill points out, digital infrastructure requires third party intermediaries to handle information during transmission, storage or display. As it is not always desirable or even practically possible to verify the legality of every bit of data that gets transferred or stored by the intermediary, the CIS points out, the law provides ‘safe harbours’ to protect intermediaries from liability, ensuring that entities that act as architectural requirements and intermediary platforms are able to operate smoothly and without fear. It must be noted that users who upload and initiate transfer of information online, are not always the same parties who are directly involved in transmission of content.

In India, immunity from liability or a ‘safe harbour’ for intermediaries involved with transmission or temporary storage of content is currently provided by Section 79 of the Information Technology Act 2000 (IT Act), on condition that they: (i) act as a mere ‘conduit’ and do not initiate the transmission, select the receiver of the transmission, or select or modify the information contained in the transmission and (ii) exercise due diligence, which has been defined under the law. The provision for safe harbours has also been tested in court, notably in the case of the virtual market Baazee.com (later acquired by eBay), which had hosted an advertisement for an ‘obscene’ video for two days before it was taken down. The court held that the IT Act would prevail over the IPC, and the managers could not be held liable for the content of the advertisement.

With Section 59 of the proposed trafficking bill set to override existing legislation, the provision of safe harbours under the IT Act will be in jeopardy. Notably, this move to prosecute internet intermediaries is in keeping with a worldwide trend. In April 2018, the United States President Donald Trump signed into law two controversial pieces of legislation aimed to tackle human trafficking online, which have grave implications for free speech. The US Congress bill, the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA), and the Senate bill, the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (SESTA), have been welcomed by some as a victory for victims of sex trafficking. Alarmingly, however, the bills, better known by their acronyms FOSTA-SESTA, create an exception to the safe harbour rule, ie Section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act (CDA). This provision, which is regarded as a landmark protection, says “no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” For over two decades, in the spirit of actualising the immense potential of the digital space to share information, ideas and opinions, this section has provided immunity for intermediaries, allowing users to freely generate content without making platforms and ISPs accountable for such content.

Under FOSTA-SESTA, however, websites are liable to be penalised for advertisements promoting consensual adult sex work, dating or escort services (such as Backpage.com or Craigslist) which could be deemed to promote trafficking. Sex-worker-rights activists in the US posit that such an unwarranted clampdown on these avenues through which adult sex workers could safely screen clients and avoid potentially dangerous situations, is putting them at risk.

Despite the protests against the impact of FOSTA-SESTA on the internet and free expression, parliamentarians in the United Kingdom seem set to follow a similar regulatory route. An All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Prostitution and the Global Sex Trade in July 2018 called for a ban on “prostitution websites”, by which they mean virtual advertising sites such as Vivastreet and Adultwork which host adult advertisements. Anticipating the same fallout as in the US, Amnesty UK tweeted, “Taking down these platforms will push sex workers deeper underground exposing them to greater risks of violence, exploitation and trafficking.”

Beyond criminalisation

According to Interpol, trafficking in human beings is a multi-billion-dollar international criminal industry, which is usually carried out for forced labour, sexual exploitation or for harvesting of tissue, cells and organs. Despite this recognition of the different motives for trafficking, the crime has largely been linked – in the popular imagination, media and, unfortunately, even law enforcement – to sexual exploitation. The thrust of anti-trafficking efforts in India, post-Independence, set the stage for decades of human-rights violations in the name of anti-trafficking, using an ineffective law that penalised victims more than traffickers. The proposed bill, with its ill-conceived criminalised regime, is likely to do more harm than good, and give rise to a repressive regime that is not in the interests of marginalised populations most vulnerable to traffickers. Not only is the bill unlikely to make any dent in the organised trafficking networks, but the fallout of its provisions policing the internet is also likely to hamper freedom of expression and consensual, adult sexual activity mediated through the digital space.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/himal-south-asian-laxmi-murthy-net-nanny-meets-muscular-law

Need a standard strategy to deal with Web issues: Chandrasekhar

praskrishna — 2012-09-05T08:37:09Z

The government has been facing allegations of Internet censorship for over a year now.

This article by Surabhi Agarwal was published in LiveMint on September 4, 2012. Pranesh Prakash's analysis is quoted.

The government said it needed to improve the way in which it dealt with issues such as Internet hate messages besides blog posts and SMSes that seek to create panic so that it’s not accused of trying to gag free speech.

"We all have agreed that we need some combination of self-regulation and government interventions. But we need to do it in a proper way,” said department of telecom secretary R. Chandrasekhar, while addressing a Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Ficci) conference on the issue of “legitimate restrictions on freedom of online speech".

	The Union government has been facing allegations of censorship after it sought to contain messages that led to communal violence and a panicexodus by people from the north-eastern states in some cities. Last month, the government ordered the blocking of almost 310 web pages for content deemed to be attacking particular communities. According to a post by Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society, 33% of them were on Facebook, 28% on Google Inc.’s YouTube and around 10% on Twitter.

The Union government has been facing allegations of censorship after it sought to contain messages that led to communal violence and a panicexodus by people from the north-eastern states in some cities.

Last month, the government ordered the blocking of almost 310 web pages for content deemed to be attacking particular communities. According to a post by Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society, 33% of them were on Facebook, 28% on Google Inc.’s YouTube and around 10% on Twitter.

Defending the government move, Gulshan Rai, chief of the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-in), said it was the first time that the emergency provision of the Information Technology Act 2008 had been exercised. Even though the list was not drawn up by his agency, due scrutiny was carried out before issuing orders to block the sites.

This came after allegations that government may have also blocked bona fide posts as it sought to block content related to the North-East.

Twitter accounts of some journalists and other individuals associated with and sympathetic to right-wing causes were blocked, according to a list published earlier by The Economic Times.

"This is certainly not the last time we are seeing such a situation, so meaningful ways to respond to such complex situations will have to be devised," said Chandrasekhar.

He added that there was also a need to collaborate better with all stakeholders to devise not just defensive strategies during a crisis but also ways to contain its impact using the social media.

Ankhi Das, head of public policy at Facebook India, said that during the London riots of 2011, the UK government enlisted the support of social networking sites to dispel rumours.

"Social media can also be allies of the government at times like this," she said.

Raman Jit Singh Cheema, a senior policy analyst at Google India, cited a similar example of authorities in Japan using such methods to send out correct information following the tsunami that hit the country in 2011.

"We need to collaborate on a continuing basis, so that when you are faced with such a crisis, you are able to deal with it," said Chandrasekhar.

The government has been facing allegations of Internet censorship for over a year after minister for communication and information technology Kapil Sibal raised the issue of regulating social networking sites. They had allegedly not complied with the government’s demand that offensive content be removed.

Chandrasekhar said that processes should be clearer, more transparent and well-defined.

"These need to be brought out in the form of some kind of a standard operating procedure, so that they (stakeholders) are expected to know how to conduct themselves and how they can expect the government to deal if a contingency arises," he said.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/www-livemint-com-surabhi-agarwal-sep-4-2012-need-a-strategy-to-deal-with-web-issues

NE exodus: List containing 309 blocked URLs leaks online

praskrishna — 2012-08-24T13:37:21Z

Latest reports coming in have confirmed that a list containing 309 URLs, whose ban the government had sought in light of the Assam violence and the subsequent NE exodus, has been leaked online.

Published in tech2. Pranesh Prakash's analysis is quoted.

The aforementioned URLs comprise URLs, Twitter accounts, img tags, blog posts, blogs and a handful of websites, and were blocked between August 18, 2012 till August 21, 2012. In an analysis that Pranesh Prakash, programme manager at the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), carried of the leaked items, among other things in his post, he wrote that, "It is clear that the list was not compiled with sufficient care."

In his post, he further noted that the censorship process itself has been riddled with egregious mistakes. Giving instances of the egregious mistakes, he added that even some people and posts debunking the rumours were blocked as part of the censorship. Further, he wrote that some of the items that were blocked were not even web addresses (e.g., a few HTML img tags were included). In his findings, Prakash also found that despite there having been a clear warning issued by the DIT pertaining to the blocking of "above URLs only" and not that of main websites, like www.facebook.com, www.youtube.com, some ISPs (like Airtel) went "overboard in their blocking". This incident, in particular pertains to yesterday's reports, wherein it had been revealed that Airtel had blocked the entire YouTube short URL youtu.be in some cities.

On account of the sensitivity of the issue, he writes that it "would be premature to share the whole list." He, however, writes that CIS plans to make the entire list public soon. The list that CIS has released, however includes -

ABC.net.au
AlJazeera.com
AllVoices.com
WN.com
AtjehCyber.net
BDCBurma.org
Bhaskar.com
Blogspot.com
Blogspot.in
Catholic.org
CentreRight.in
ColumnPK.com
Defence.pk
EthioMuslimsMedia.com
Facebook.com
Farazahmed.com
Firstpost.com
HaindavaKerelam.com
HiddenHarmonies.org
HinduJagruti.org
Hotklix.com
HumanRights-Iran.ir
Intichat.com
Irrawady.org
IslamabadTimesOnline.com
Issuu.com
JafriaNews.com
JihadWatch.org
KavkazCenter
MwmJawan.com
My.Opera.com
Njuice.com
OnIslam.net
PakAlertPress.com
Plus.Google.com
Reddit.com
Rina.in
SandeepWeb.com
SEAYouthSaySo.com
Sheikyermami.com
StormFront.org
Telegraph.co.uk
TheDailyNewsEgypt.com
TheFaultLines.com
ThePetitionSite.com
TheUnity.org
TimesofIndia.Indiatimes.com
TimesOfUmmah.com
Tribune.com.pk
Twitter.com
TwoCircles.net
Typepad.com
Vidiov.info
Wikipedia.org
Wordpress.com
YouTube.com
YouTu.be

Further, in response to the question - as to why some items could still be accessed that were supposed to be blocked, he wrote that there are several errors in the list, making it difficult to apply. And the order has to be put into action by hundreds of ISPs. He adds that some ISPs may not have begun enforcing the blocks yet. "This analysis is based on the orders sent around to ISPs, and not on the basis of actual testing of how many of these have actually been blocked by Airtel, BSNL, Tata, etc. Additionally, if you are using Twitter through a client (on your desktop, mobile, etc.) instead of the web interface, you will not notice any of the Twitter-related blocks," he elaborated further.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/tech-2-in-com-ne-exodus

Nasscom against differential pricing for data services

praskrishna — 2016-01-06T15:12:17Z

The National Association of Software and Services Companies says it should be the regulator that decides on such content, not firms.

The article by Moulishree Srivastava was published in Livemint on January 5, 2016. Pranesh Prakash gave inputs.

India’s top software lobby on Monday said if select web content needs to be provided cheaper for some Indians, it must be the regulator that decides on such content, not companies.

In its response to a consultation paper by the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (Trai) on differential pricing for data usage, the National Association of Software and Services Companies (Nasscom) objected to plans such as Free Basics and Airtel Zero where companies choose content to be provided at different speeds and prices, but backed powers for the regulator to allow such a model if the regulator deems they are in “public interest”, while adhering to principles of net neutrality.

“We strongly oppose any model where telecom service providers (TSPs) or their partners have a say or discretion in choosing content that is made available at favourable rates, speed... any differential pricing by TSP either directly such as Airtel Zero or indirectly as in the case of Free Basics through a platform provider which limits access to the internet services or websites (selected by the TSP or by the partners) violate the idea of net neutrality,” said R. Chandrashekhar, president, Nasscom.

“But when we recognize the reality of India as a country which has low internet penetration and even lower broadband penetration, apart from low levels of digital literacy and limited local language content... there may be a need to provide certain services in public interest at differential or lower prices which the regulator feels are necessary,” he said.

“Therefore, it is important that the regulator should have the power to allow differential pricing for certain types or classes of services that are deemed to be in public interest and based on mandatory prior approvals,” he said. “Any such programmes should abide by the principles of net neutrality and not constrain innovation in any way and not constrain innovation in any way.”

Differential pricing for data usage means offering services at different price points to different users. However, analysts say it could lead to an anti-competitive environment, hurting small companies and start-ups, while giving the TSPs and their partner platforms near-monopolistic access to the vast amount of user data that has potential commercial value in a country such as India where privacy laws are not strong.

Differential pricing is a significant aspect of the net neutrality debate that erupted in India in 2015, when Trai released a consultation paper in April. Soon, telecom operator Bharti Airtel Ltd launched Zero, a marketing platform that allows customers to access mobile applications for free but charges the application providers.

Facebook’s Free Basics service (the new name for Internet.org) aims to offer people without the Internet free access to a handful of websites and a range of services through mobile phones, which net neutrality activists say will violate the core principle that everyone should have unrestricted access to Internet and it should not be regulated by a company.

Following the outrage, Trai put Free Basics on hold, asking Reliance Communications Ltd to furnish the detailed terms and conditions of its Free Basics service. The next step will be announced later this month.

In an op-ed in the Times of India last week, Nandan Nilekani, co-founder of Infosys Ltd. and former chairman of Unique Identification Authority of India, publicly criticized Facebook’s Free Basics, calling it a walled garden.

“The walled garden of Free Basics goes against the spirit of openness on the internet, and in the guise of being pro-poor, balkanises it. Only Free Basics-approved websites will be accessible for free,” he said in the article which he co-authored with Viral Shah who led the design of government’s subsidy platforms using Aadhaar. “In theory, anyone meeting the technical guidelines today can participate. However, services that may potentially compete with telco offerings may not join Free Basics. Since Facebook does not currently subsidise free usage, telcos will have to foot the bill by raising prices.”

He said schemes such as direct benefit transfer for Internet data packs would be better compared to programmes such as Free Basics.

Nasscom, in its response, recommended “mandatory prior approval of such services by the regulator and sharing of periodic information on tariff plans seek to lower the price as well as zero rating services,” adding that these programmes should abide by the principle of net neutrality, meaning it should not limit consumers access to pre-defined set of services or websites.

“Any such differential pricing programs should have explicit approval of the regulator—and should be deemed to be in the public interest and the onus of proving it to be in the public interest in the first instance would be on service provider and before Trai arrives at a final decision a public consultation is also advised because of the dangers involved,” Nasscom said. “Even after the approval, suitable oversight mechanism should be maintained by the regulator in all such case.”

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), said Nasscom’s approach to make differential pricing plans and options as an exception rather than the rule was quite reasonable. “It says that if differential pricing services adhere to the guidelines of being non-discriminatory, non-anti-competitive, non-predatory, non-ambiguous and transparent, they can be allowed under the supervision of the regulator, which is similar to the position adopted by CIS,” he said.

“Though some of their positions are ambiguous—for instance what they mean by non-discriminatory, and whether they are okay with differential pricing between classes of applications, are unclear—and some of their recommendations increase regulatory complexity, such as their proposal for independent not-for-profit entities with independent boards to own and manage such differential pricing programs, by and large it is a useful submission,” Prakash added.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/livemint-moulishree-srivastava-january-5-2016-nasscom-against-differential-pricing-for-data-services

Nanny state rules porn bad for you

praskrishna — 2015-08-05T01:39:28Z

The article by Anahita Mukherji was published in the Times of India on August 4, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

Half a century ago, India banned the DH Lawrence classic, Lady Chatterley's Lover. The ban, though lambasted for its Victorian view of modesty and obscenity, was fair and square; the matter was debated in the Supreme Court, which upheld the ban. Over 50 years later, a diverse spectrum of civil society has slammed a much more insidious and far less transparent ban on internet pornography.

For starters, the 857 sites that vanished from India's internet sphere haven't been officially banned, they just don't show up when you type the url. The order blocking them isn't public. For a list of the 857 sites, one must rely on leaked documents put out on Twitter by Pranesh Prakash, policy director, Centre for Internet and Society. "The ban on Lady Chatterley's Lover was public. As for the blocked websites, the government has gone out of its way to hide the list of sites pulled down. A secret order banning material violates all principles of transparency in a democracy," says Prakash.

The document, with 'Restricted' written on it, is a letter from the department of telecom asking ISPs to disable 857 sites as they bear content related to "morality" and "decency," violating Article 19 (2).

Strangely, the order's been issued under Sec 79 (3)(b) of the IT Act dealing with intermediaries having to remove material used to commit unlawful acts. "Watching porn isn't illegal in India. Disseminating 'obscene' content can be illegal, but for that, the government must file a case against the sites, and they must be allowed a representation," says Prakash.

"Sec 79 (3)(b) of the IT act isn't the section under which governments can block sites. It should use Sec 69 that has a review process," says Nikhil Pahwa, a champion of internet freedom.

The government drew up its list of 857 sites even as SC is in the process of hearing a petition to ban porn and is yet to pass an order. It includes playboy.com that, says Prakash, is a legitimate adult site. Pahwa points to the ban's "bizarrely moralistic undertones".

"As society evolves, government and regulatory regime are stuck in medieval ages," he says, adding a ban on websites will be rendered ineffective, pushing users to VPNs, a black hole for government monitoring mechanisms.

"A government that hasn't succeeded with Make in India is trying to prevent Make out in India," says venture capitalist Mahesh Murthy, who earlier backed net neutrality.

"The government is blocking websites to keep Rightwing lunatic fringes happy after its unsuccessful bid to pass the land bill," says Murthy.

"It isn't merely looking at blocking porn, but is trying to bring back Sec 66A (IT Act), ruled unconstitutional by the SC," he adds. "It's part of the bid to restrict individual freedom, create an artificial separation between Indian culture and anything erotic, driven by a diktat from Hindutva forces. It's ironic as Modi came to power as someone looking to activate individual agency. Now he's wary about where that leads to," says Subir Sinha, professor at the School of Oriental and African Studies (London). Murthy and Sinha believe the issue stems from a refusal to accept Indian culture in totality. "Victorian morality is considered Hindu, Khajuraho isn't," says Murthy.

"The government seems to be acting in a more high-handed manner than previous ones. The press and public opinion should wake up to this," says sociologist Andre Beteille.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-august-4-2015-anahita-mukherji-nanny-state-rules-porn-bad-for-you