Centre for Internet and Society

Can Judges Order ISPs to Block Websites for Copyright Infringement? (Part 3)

ananth — 2014-02-14T05:13:36Z

In a three-part study, Ananth Padmanabhan examines the "John Doe" orders that courts have passed against ISPs, which entertainment companies have used to block dozens, if not hundreds, of websites. In this, the third and concluding part, he looks at the Indian law in the Copyright Act and the Information Technology Act, and concludes that both those laws restrain courts and private companies from ordering an ISP to block a website for copyright infringement.

In the third part of his study, Ananth Padmanabhan looks into the fair use provisions recently introduced in respect of mere conduit intermediaries by the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012, and concludes that there is no scope for any general, or specific, access blocking orders at the behest of the plaintiff in a civil suit, in India. He also argues that the Information Technology Act, 2000 read with the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 do not in any manner permit the Government to override the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957 (as amended) while facilitating the denial of access to websites on grounds of copyright infringement, because the Copyright Act, 1957, is a complete code by itself.

Fair Use Provisions Introduced by the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012

In 2010, the controversial Copyright (Amendment) Bill came up for deliberation before the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resource Development headed by Mr. Oscar Fernandes. While a major part of the discussion on this amendment revolved around the altered royalty structure and rights allocation between music composers and lyricists on the one hand and film producers on the other, it can be safely stated that this is the most significant amendment to the Copyright Act, 1957 for more than this one reason. The amendment seeks to reform the Copyright Board, bring in a scheme of statutory licenses, expand the scope of performers’ rights and introduce anti-circumvention measures to check copyright piracy. As part of its ambitious objective, the amendment also attempts a new fair use model to protect intermediaries and file-sharing websites.

The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012, which gives expression to this fair use model through Sections 52(1)(b) and (c), reads thus:

52. Certain acts not to be infringement of copyright. - (1) The following acts shall not constitute an infringement of copyright, namely:

(a) to (ad) - *****

(b) the transient or incidental storage of a work or performance purely in the technical process of electronic transmission or communication to the public;

(c) transient or incidental storage of a work or performance for the purpose of providing electronic links, access or integration, where such links, access or integration has not been expressly prohibited by the right holder, unless the person responsible is aware or has reasonable grounds for believing that such storage is of an infringing copy:

Provided that if the person responsible for the storage of the copy has received a written complaint from the owner of copyright in the work, complaining that such transient or incidental storage is an infringement, such person responsible for the storage shall refrain from facilitating such access for a period of twenty-one days or till he receives an order from the competent court refraining from facilitating access and in case no such order is received before the expiry of such period of twenty-one days, he may continue to provide the facility of such access;

From a plain reading, it is clear that two important exceptions are carved out: one, in respect of the technical process of electronic transmission and the other, in respect of providing electronic links, access or integration. The material distinction between these exceptions is the presence of a take-down proviso in respect of the latter kind of activity, ie. when providing electronic links, access or integration. This window of opportunity is not provided to the copyright owner when the third party is an ISP involved in the pure technical process of electronic transmission of data.

In R.K. Productions, the court was not informed of the introduction of these provisions vide the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012, despite the hearing happening on a date subsequent to the amendment coming into force. This probably influenced the outcome as well, since the court held that ISPs were liable to block access to infringing content, once the specific webpage was brought to the notice of the concerned ISP. Newly introduced Section 52(1)(b) however makes it abundantly clear that ISPs cannot, in any manner, be held liable when they are acting as mere conduit pipes for the transmission of information. This legal position is also materially different from jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom where, the ISPs though not liable for copyright infringement, are statutorily mandated to lend all possible assistance such as take-down or blocking of access upon notice of infringement being furnished to them. This dichotomy between liability for infringement on the one hand and a general duty to assist in the prevention of infringement on the other is explained clearly by the Chancery Division in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v. British Telecommunications Plc.[1]

In Newzbin2, the Chancery Division took note of the safe harbour provisions created by the E-Commerce Directive,[2] particularly Articles 12 to 14 that dealt with acting as a “mere conduit”, caching and hosting respectively. The interesting feature with the “mere conduit” exception, which in all other respects is akin to the exception contained in Section 52(1)(b) of the Copyright Act, 1957, is the additional presence of Article 12(3). This provision clarifies that the “mere conduit” exception shall not stand in the way of a court or administrative authority requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement. Article 18 of this Directive also casts an obligation upon Member States to ensure that court actions available under national law permit the rapid adoption of measures, including interim measures, designed to terminate any alleged infringement and to prevent any further impairment of the interests involved. Similarly, the court looked into the Information Society Directive,[3]

Article 8(3) of which provides that “Member States shall ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right.” This Directive was transposed into the domestic law in UK by the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2498, resulting in the insertion of Section 97A in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This provision empowers the court to grant an injunction against a service provider who has actual knowledge of another person using their service to infringe copyright, such as where the service provider is given sufficient notice of the infringement. Finally, the Chancery Division also took note of the Enforcement Directive,[4]

Article 11 of which provided that Member States shall ensure that copyright owners are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right. This entire legislative scheme compelled the court in Newzbin2 to conclude that an order of injunction could be granted against ISPs who are “mere conduits”, restraining them from providing access to websites that indulged in mass copyright infringement. The court reasoned that the language used in Section 97A did not require knowledge of any particular infringement but only a more general kind of knowledge about certain persons using the ISPs’ services to infringe copyright. Thus, it is seen that in the United Kingdom, though a “mere conduit” activity is not infringement at all, the concerned ISP can be directed by the court to block access to a website that hosts infringing content on the basis of the above legislative scheme. The enquiry should therefore be directed towards whether India has a similar scheme for copyright enforcement.

The Information Technology Act – An Inapplicable Scheme for Website Blocking

The Information Technology Act, 2000[5]read with certain recently framed guidelines provides for a duty that could be thrust upon even “mere conduit” ISPs to disable access to copyrighted works. This is due to the presence of Section 79(2)(c) of this Act, which makes it clear that an intermediary shall be exempt from liability only where the intermediary observes due diligence as well as complies with the other guidelines framed by the Central Government in this behalf. Moreover, Section 79(3) provides that the intermediary shall not be entitled to the benefit of the exemption in Section 79(1) in a situation where the intermediary, upon receiving actual knowledge that any information, data, or communication link residing in or connected to a computer resource controlled by the intermediary is being used to commit an unlawful act, fails to expeditiously remove or disable access to that material on that resource without vitiating the evidence in any manner. In pursuance of Section 79(2)(c), the Central Government has also framed the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011, which came into effect on 11.04.2011. Rule 4 of these Rules, when read along with Rule 2(d), casts obligation on an intermediary on whose computer system, copyright infringing content has been stored, hosted or published, to disable such information within thirty six hours from when it is brought to actual knowledge of the existence of such content by any affected person.

One way of understanding and interpreting in harmonious fashion, the provisions of the IT Act and the Rules therein and the recent amendments to the Copyright Act, is to contend that the issue of infringement of copyright by “mere conduit” ISPs is governed by Section 52(1)(b), which completely absolves them of any liability, while that of enforcement of copyright through the medium of such ISPs is governed by the IT Act. This bifurcation suffers from the difficulty that Section 79 of the IT Act is not an enforcement provision. It is a provision meant to exempt intermediaries from certain kinds of liability, in the same way as Section 52 of the Copyright Act. This provision, read with Section 81, makes it clear that the IT Act does not speak to liability for copyright infringement. From this, it has to necessarily follow that all issues pertaining to liability for such infringement have to be decided by the provisions of the Copyright Act. Therefore, the scheme in the IT Act read with the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules cannot confer additional liability for copyright infringement on ISPs where the Copyright Act exempts them from liability. More to the point, the intermediary cannot be liable for copyright infringement in the event of non-compliance with Section 79(3) or Rule 4 of the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules read with Section 79(1)(c) of the IT Act. Rule 4 of the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules, 2011, to the extent that it renders intermediaries outside the protective ambit of Section 79(1) upon failure to disable access to copyrighted content, is of no relevance as “mere conduits” have already been exempted from liability under Section 52(1)(b). Moreover, since these provisions in the IT Act do not deal with enforcement measures such as injunction orders from the court to disable access to infringing content in particular or infringing websites in general, it would be wrong to contend that the scheme in India is similar to the one in the United Kingdom where the issue of infringement has been divorced from that of enforcement.

To conclude, Section 52(1)(b) is a blanket “mere conduit” exemption from liability for copyright infringement that stands uninfluenced by the presence of Section 79 of the IT Act or the Intermediaries Guidelines Rules. In the absence of a legislative scheme for enforcement in India akin to Section 97A of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, Indian Courts cannot grant an injunction directing such “mere conduit” ISPs to block access to websites in general or infringing content in particular and any such action is not even maintainable in law post the insertion of Section 52(1)(b). The decision to the contrary in the R.K.Productions case is incorrect.

[1]. [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch.). Hereinafter referred to as Newzbin2.

[2]. European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (8 June 2000). This Directive was transposed into the domestic law in UK by the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2013.

[3]. European Parliament and Council Directive 2001/29/EC on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society (22 May 2001).

[4]. European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (29 April 2004). This Directive was transposed into the UK domestic law primarily by the Intellectual Property (Enforcement, etc.) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1028.

[5]. Hereinafter referred to as the IT Act.

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Can Judges Order ISPs to Block Websites for Copyright Infringement? (Part 2)

ananth — 2014-03-06T16:48:18Z

In a three-part study, Ananth Padmanabhan examines the "John Doe" orders that courts have passed against ISPs, which entertainment companies have used to block dozens, if not hundreds, of websites. In this, the second part, he looks at the law laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court on secondary and contributory copyright infringement, and finds that those wouldn't allow Indian courts to grant "John Doe" orders against ISPs.

In the second part of his study, Ananth Padmanabhan proceeds to examine applying a general theory of secondary or contributory copyright infringement against ISPs. He traces the basis for holding a third party liable as a contributory by closely examining the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios[1] and MGM Studios, Inc. v Grokster, Ltd.[2] and concludes that this basis does not hold good in the case of a mere conduit intermediary such as an ISP.

[1]. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Hereinafter referred to as Betamax.

[2]. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Hereinafter referred to as Grokster.

Primary and Secondary Infringement

Liability for copyright infringement can either be primary or secondary in character. In the case of ISPs, liability as primary infringers does not arise at all, and it is in their capacity as conduit pipes facilitating the transmission of information that they could be held secondarily liable. Even in such cases, the contention of copyright owners is that once the ISP is notified of infringing content, it has the primary responsibility of preventing access to such content. This contention is essentially rooted in a theory of secondary infringement based on knowledge and awareness, and the means to prevent further infringement.

The controversy around a suitable model of secondary infringement is reflected in two judicial pronouncements – separated by a gap of more than two decades – delivered by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Sony Corp. v Universal City Studios,[3] the US Supreme Court held that the manufacturers of home video recording devices known in the market as Betamax would not be liable to copyright owners for secondary infringement since the technology was capable of substantially non-infringing and legitimate purposes. The U.S. Supreme Court even observed that these time-shifting devices would actually enhance television viewership and hence find favour with majority of the copyright holders too. The majority did concede that in an appropriate situation, liability for secondary infringement of copyright could well arise. In the words of the Court, “vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another”. However, if vicarious liability had to be imposed on the manufactures of the time-shifting devices, it had to rest on the fact that they sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers may use that equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material. In the view of the Court, there was no precedent in the law of copyright for the imposition of vicarious liability merely on the showing of such fact.

Notes of dissent were struck by Justice Blackmun, who wrote an opinion on behalf of himself and three other judges. The learned Judge noted that there was no private use exemption in favour of making of copies of a copyrighted work and hence, unauthorised time-shifting would amount to copyright infringement. He also concluded that there was no fair use in such activity that would exempt it from the purview of infringement. The dissent held the manufacturer liable as a contributory infringer and reasoned that the test for contributory infringement would only be whether the contributory infringer had reason to know or believe that infringement would take place and not whether he actually knew of the same. Off-the-air recording was not only a foreseeable use for the Betamax, but also its intended use, for which Sony would be liable for copyright infringement.

This dissent has considerably influenced the seemingly contrarian position taken by the majority in the subsequent decision, MGM Studios, Inc. v Grokster, Ltd.[4] This case called into question the liability of websites that facilitated peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing. Re-formulating the test for copyright infringement, the US Supreme Court held that ‘one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties’. In re-drawing the boundaries of contributory infringement, the Court observed that contributory infringement is committed by any person who intentionally induces or encourages direct infringement, and vicarious infringement is committed by those who profit from direct infringement while declining to exercise their right to limit or stop it. When an article of commerce was good for nothing else but infringement, there was no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability and there would be no injustice in presuming or imputing intent to infringe in such cases. This doctrine would at the same time absolve the equivocal conduct of selling an item with substantial lawful as well as unlawful uses and would limit the liability to instances of more acute fault than the mere understanding that some of the products shall be misused, thus ensuring that innovation and commerce are not unreasonably hindered.

The Court distinguished the case at hand from Betamax, and noted that there was evidence here of active steps taken by the respondents to encourage direct copyright infringement, such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use. This evidence revealed an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and an active encouragement of infringement. Without reversing the decision in Betamax, but holding that it was misinterpreted by the lower court, the Court observed that Betamax was not an authority for the proposition that whenever a product was capable of substantial lawful use, the producer could never be held liable as a contributory for the use of such product for infringing activity by third parties. In the view of the Court, Betamax did not displace other theories of secondary liability. This other theory of secondary liability applicable to the case at hand was held to be the inducement rule, as per which any person who distributed a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as evidenced by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, would be liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. However, the Court clarified that mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough under this rule to subject a distributor to liability. Similarly, ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical support or product updates, support liability etc. would not by themselves attract the operation of this rule. The inducement rule, instead, premised liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus did nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise.

These seemingly divergent views on secondary infringement expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court are of significant relevance for India, due to the peculiar language used in the Indian Copyright Act, 1957.[4]

Section 51 of the Act, which defines infringement, bifurcates the two types of infringement – ie. primary and secondary infringement – without indicating so in as many words. While Section 51(a)(i) speaks to primary infringers, 51(a)(ii) and 51(b) renders certain conduct to be secondary infringement. Even here, there is an important distinction between 51(a)(ii) and 51(b). The former exempts the alleged infringer from liability if he could establish that he was not aware and had no reasonable ground for believing that the communication to the public, facilitated through the use of his “place”, would amount to copyright infringement. The latter on the other hand permits no such exception. Thus, any person, who makes for sale or hire, or by way of trade displays or offers for sale or hire, or distributes for the purpose of trade, or publicly exhibits by way of trade, or imports into India, any infringing copies of a work, shall be liable for infringement, without any specific mens rea required to attract such liability. It is in the context of the former provision, ie. 51(a)(ii) that the liability of certain file-sharing websites for copyright infringement has arisen.[5]

Mere Conduit ISPs – Secondary Infringement Absent

In MySpace, the Delhi High Court examined the liability for secondary infringement on the part of a website that provides a platform for file-sharing. While holding the website liable, the Single Judge considered material certain facts such as the revenue model of the defendant, which depended largely on advertisements displayed on the webpages, and automatically generated advertisements that would come up for a few seconds before the infringing video clips started playing. Shockingly, the Court even considered relevant the fact that the defendant did provide for safeguards such as hash block filters, take down stay down functionality, and rights management tools operational through fingerprinting technology, to prevent or curb infringing activities being carried on in their website. This, in the view of the Court, made it evident that the defendant had a reasonable apprehension or belief that the acts which were being carried on in the website could infringe someone else’s copyright including that of the plaintiff. The logic employed by the Court to attribute liability for secondary infringement on file-sharing websites is befuddling and reveals complete disregard for the degree of regulatory authority available on the internet even where the space, i.e., the website, is supposedly “under the control” of a person. However, a critical examination of this decision is not relevant in understanding the liability of mere conduit ISPs. This is for the reason that none of the factual considerations relied on by the Single Judge to justify imposition of liability on a file-sharing website under Section 51(a)(ii) arise when the defendant is an ISP that only provides the path for content-neutral transmission of data.

This was completely ignored by the Madras High Court in R.K.Productions v. B.S.N.L.,[6] where the producers of the Tamil film “3”, which enjoyed considerable pre-release buzz due to its song “Kolaveri Di”, sought an omnibus order of injunction against all websites that host torrents or links facilitating access to, or download of, this film. Though this was worded as a John Doe plaint by branding the infringers as unknown administrators of different torrent sites and so on, the real idea was to look to the resources and wherewithal of the known defendants, ie. the ISPs, to block access to the content hosted by the unknown defendants.

This prompted the ISPs to file applications under Or. VII, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit against them was barred by law. The Single Judge of the Madras High Court dismissed these applications for rejection of the plaint, after accepting the contention that the ISPs are necessary parties to the suit as the act of piracy occurs through the channel or network provided by them. The High Court heavily, and incorrectly, relied on MySpace without appreciating the distinction between a mere conduit ISP and a file-sharing website such as MySpace or YouTube, as regards their respective roles and responsibilities, the differing degrees of regulatory control over content enjoyed by them, and most importantly, the recognition and formalisation of these distinctions in the Copyright Act, 1957, vide the Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012.

[3]. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Hereinafter referred to as Betamax.

[4]. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Hereinafter referred to as Grokster.

[5]. Hereinafter the Act.

[6]. Super Cassette Industries Ltd. v MySpace Inc., MIPR 2011 (2) 303 (hereinafter referred to as MySpace). This decision of the Delhi High Court has been rightly criticised. See http://cis-india.org/a2k/blog/super-cassettes-v-my-space (last accessed on 24.03.2013).

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Can Judges Order ISPs to Block Websites for Copyright Infringement? (Part 1)

ananth — 2014-01-31T06:00:47Z

In a three-part study, Ananth Padmanabhan examines the "John Doe" orders that courts have passed against ISPs, which entertainment companies have used to block dozens, if not hundreds, of websites. In this part, he looks at the theory behind John Doe orders and finds that it would be wrong for Indian courts to grant "John Doe" orders against ISPs.

The Madras High Court, in its 2012 order in R.K.Productions v. B.S.N.L.,[1] has affirmed the possibility of a suit against internet service providers (ISPs) to block access to certain webpages upon notification by the copyright owner. Though this appears to be a reasonable order at first glance, keeping in mind the fact that access to identified copyrighted works alone is targeted and not websites in their entirety, the legal basis for the same is highly questionable. In this two-part study, Ananth Padmanabhan explores the legal sanctity of these orders, especially post the coming into force of the Copyright Amendment, 2012. The first part of this study explores the genesis of John Doe orders and proceeds to examine the conceptual problems arising from tagging along website blocking orders within the broad sweep of John Doe action. This part concludes that website blocking orders against ISPs stand separately from, and cannot be justified in the same manner as, John Doe orders.

[1]. (2012) 5 LW 626. Hereinafter referred to as R.K. Productions.

John Doe Orders and their Conceptual Understanding

The concept of John Doe Orders in ex parte proceedings for copyright infringement came in due to the peculiar character of copyright piracy. Orders of this nature were being passed in jurisdictions across the world till they were, probably for the first time, passed in India in 2003. Since then, such orders have become a somewhat regular feature. In short, such orders permit the plaintiff to enforce an injunction order against unidentified / unnamed defendants, ‘John Doe’ being a generic name for such defendants. To understand the nature and mechanism of such enforcement and the various guidelines governing such orders, exploring the genesis of these orders is imperative.

In Billy Joel v Various John Does,[2] one of the earliest instances of a John Doe order, the plaintiff who was a musician and a successful recording artist, found to his annoyance that his success had spawned an underground industry that capitalised on his popularity through the sale of merchandise, usually T-shirts bearing his picture and name. These sales were carried on by unauthorised persons who showed up at his concerts with the merchandise and sold them outside the concert halls where he was performing. The plaintiff had in fact granted his recording company the exclusive right to market such merchandise, and the company was doing so inside the concert halls. Obviously, the presence of the unauthorised vendors outside the concert halls hurt the company’s sales and the plaintiff’s revenue share. This compelled him to approach the district court in Wisconsin seeking injunctive relief against various "John Does" or unidentified defendants who were carrying on the unauthorised sale of merchandise. The order was specifically sought seeking an ex parte temporary restraining order prohibiting certain unnamed persons from selling merchandise bearing the plaintiff’s name or likeness outside the Milwaukee Arena where he was scheduled to perform on that day. Thus, the order sought was confined to one particular instance and the situation demanded expedient preventive action since the concert was on the very same day.

The district court, while finding the propriety of an order against unidentified defendants "troubling", still went ahead and passed the order sought for. The court felt that the problem of the defendants’ identities would be met if the copies of the summons, complaint, and restraining order itself were to be served on all persons from whom merchandise connected with the plaintiff was seized on the night of the concert. Additionally, the court clarified that all these parties would be entitled to have their names added as parties to the cause title and even otherwise, to contest the seizures. The plaintiff had also furnished a bond to cover damages that may arise due to the awarding of such relief. The court applied the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium – where there is a wrong done, there has to be a remedy in law – while granting this relief. This is clear from the last paragraph of the judgement where the Court says : "Were the injunction to be denied, plaintiffs would be without any legal means to prevent what is clearly a blatant infringement of their valid property rights. While the proposed remedy is novel, that in itself should not weigh against its adoption by this court. A court of equity is free to fashion whatever remedies will adequately protect the rights of the parties before it."

Subsequently, various courts in the United States have granted such relief. However, most such instances of judicial intervention in cases of piracy have confined themselves to specific instances of piracy as opposed to orders of wider applicability extending to more than one instance of apprehended or real piracy. For instance, in Brockum Intern., Inc. v Various John Does,[3] the plaintiff sought a nation-wide order prohibiting the same activity in other cities visited by the popular rock band, The Who, on its national tour. The court declined to do so.

The Metallica Order

In New Zealand, the High Court has specifically applied the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium while justifying the issuance of John Doe Orders. In Tony Blain Pty.Limited v Splain and other Persons Unknown,[4] the court likened this kind of relief sought against unidentified defendants, to an order in the nature of Anton Piller remedy. The court stated that both these orders involved a common feature, being an intrusion into the privacy of the defendants. However, such an intrusion would be justified applying the maxim of ubi jus ibi remedium. According to the court, "in circumstances where it is plain that persons are infringing proprietary interests which the law recognises, or deceiving the public by way of trade in a manner which may indirectly affect the commercial interests of others, the law should, if it reasonably can, provide a remedy". Emphasising on the conduct-centric nature of these reliefs, the court held that John and Jane Does will be known by their works.

However, in its attempt to bring in some safeguards before passing such an order, the court held that it would be better in the future to bring such applications a little in advance so that amicus curiae could be appointed to represent the view point of the John and Jane Does. Further, the court observed that it was important to build into the procedure appropriate protections, including means of informing persons served with orders for injunction in clear language and simple terms what their remedies were. These remedies, in turn, would include a right to apply to the court within twenty four hours for a review of the order and a right to claim damages in an appropriate case, not merely on the basis of the usual undertaking to be given by plaintiffs, but also on the basis of the tort of misfeasance of public office. It will also be necessary for the plaintiff to file before the court, a full report verified by affidavit, of the process of execution of the particular orders.

It is thus seen that the High Court, though keen to do justice by providing a remedy that is effective enough to protect the plaintiff’s rights, also tried to mitigate the harshness of the measures proposed by bringing in some safeguards. This decision gave birth to the Metallica Order in New Zealand, the New Zealander’s equivalent of a John Doe Order. It has to be added that the nature of the order passed by the High Court in this case is very detailed and can be used as precedent, even for the requisite format, by all courts that pass similar orders.[5]

John Doe Orders in India

The decision in Tej Television Ltd. v Rajan Mandal,[6] will have to find first mention since these kind of orders against unidentified defendants hit the shores of the Indian legal landscape through this decision. Here, the plaintiff owned the Ten Sports television channel and had procured the broadcasting rights to several important sporting events including the 2002 Football World Cup matches. Being a paid channel, the cable operators had to part with royalty to the plaintiff for airing the programs broadcasted on this channel. To the plaintiff’s consternation, many local cable operators were airing these sporting events without taking licenses from the plaintiff / its authorised marketing agency. This resulted in the channel approaching the Delhi High Court and seeking, for the first time, a John Doe order against unidentified defendants. The channel had some evidence of unauthorised broadcasting of the initial matches by certain cable operators and apprehended that this conduct by more operators would not only result in revenue loss but also cause the 1377 cable operators, who had taken licenses from the plaintiff, to re-think the very necessity of doing so when they could air the sporting events in an unauthorised manner without any fear of liability. Another concern was the ease with which those who carried on the practise of unauthorised transmission could destroy any evidence of such conduct. The prayer sought by the plaintiff was an ex parte order against six named cable operators and “John Doe” orders against a further fourteen unnamed persons who, the plaintiff claimed, were wrongfully transmitting the Ten Sports channel. The order against unidentified defendants was sought to be justified on two broad grounds: (i) Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which gives courts the inherent power to evolve a fair and reasonable procedure for meeting exigent situations, and (ii) international practise in the form of John Doe orders issued by courts in various countries including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia.

The High Court refused to grant a John Doe order on the facts and circumstances of this case but also clarified that in an appropriate situation, courts could well award a John Doe order even in India. The court granted relief to the plaintiff by appointing a Court Commissioner who was authorised to visit the premises of various cable operators, and search, make an inventory, and take into custody all equipment / wires used for the broadcast of the plaintiff’s channel. The court empowered the Commissioner to take the assistance of technical experts and police officials in carrying out this order, and directed him to prepare a report after gathering evidence of cable piracy in the form of video recordings and photographs. The court also considered itself at liberty, on the basis of this report, to issue notices to all alleged violators, and after the hearing, to initiate civil and criminal action against them in accordance with law. The Court Commissioner was also empowered to issue warnings to such prospective violators though there was no mention of any contempt proceedings against the violators for ignoring the warning given by the Commissioner. Upon close examination, this order was nothing but a mild modification of the power vested in the court under Order XXVI, Rule 9 of the CPC.

Final and Interim John Doe Orders

The Delhi High Court has, in some subsequent decisions, considered the possibility of a John Doe order without expressly granting the same. In Ardath Tobacco Co. Ltd. v Munna Bhai & Ors.,[7] the plaintiff was the proprietor of a tobacco brand, “State Express 555”. Aggrieved by the conduct of the defendants who were distributing "Peacock" cigarettes in packaging and trade dress that bore deceptive similarity to that of the plaintiff’s brand, the plaintiff sought a John Doe order against all such distributors including unidentified ones. From the report, it appears that an ex parte order appointing Court Commissioners, similar to the order in Tej Television, was awarded by the High Court initially. In the final order, the court was constrained to confine the order of permanent injunction to the named defendants since the plaintiff had failed to identify any John Does and add them to the array of parties for the purpose of securing injunctive relief. The same was again found to be the case in 3M Company v A. Patel,[8] where the final order of injunction was granted only against the 2 identified defendants.

Thus, in these cases, a distinction seems to be made between the interim orders that may be passed against the unidentified defendants, and the final relief granted by the court. The principle that emerges from these decisions is that orders against unidentified defendants can only go to the extent of collecting evidence against them through search of their premises by the Court Commissioner, or with the assistance of the Station House Officer (S.H.O) as was directed in ESPN Software India Private Ltd. v Tudu Enterprises.[9] No final relief can be granted against any person who is unnamed in the array of parties as a defendant. The purpose of an Ashok Kumar order (as such orders are branded in India) is only to bring such persons on record.

John Doe Orders – Procedure and Guidelines

Recently, the Delhi High Court has enunciated, with sufficient clarity, the procedure to be followed while granting interim orders against unidentified defendants. In Luxottica S.R.L v Mr. Munny & Ors.,[10] the plaintiff which owned the popular trade mark "Ray Ban" in respect of sunglasses, sought John Doe orders from the Delhi High Court with the aim of tacking rampant piracy and counterfeiting of its products. Surprisingly, there was no exigent necessity cited by the plaintiff for justifying the grant of such an order, unlike in Billy Joel, Metallica, Brockum, or Tej Television. Piracy had been going on in the past, and it continues to occur – that was broadly the case of the plaintiff here. Despite this, the Delhi High Court went on to issue an order of ex parte injunction restraining third parties from carrying on such counterfeiting activities. Extending the powers of the Court Commissioner, the High Court held:

The Commissioners are also authorized to visit any other premises/warehouse/store where they may have reason to suspect and/or information be received that counterfeit optical sunglasses bearing the Plaintiffs trademark RAY BAN are being stored/sold/offered for sale and thereafter. In respect of such Ashok Kumar Defendants, upon the seizure of any infringing/counterfeit products, the Commissioners shall forthwith serve such Ashok Kumar Defendants with a complete set of papers and a copy of the notice and summons. The Commissioners will seize and make an inventory of all the infringing goods including packaging material, cartons, stationery, literature, dyes, blocks, moulds, etc. bearing the impugned RAY BAN trademark and sign all books of accounts including ledgers, cash books, purchase and sale records etc., and return the seized goods on suprdari to such Ashok Kumar defendants and obtain undertakings from each of them that they will produce the seized goods as and when directed by the court.

The object behind this order seems to be the prevention of any destruction of the evidence. In consonance with this object, the High Court has even made provision for return of the seized material to the unnamed defendants during the pendency of this order, and given them the option of approaching the court and vacating the ex parte order of injunction issued against them. This Luxottica decision can be considered as India’s equivalent of the Metallica Order, as it gives a clear roadmap for courts that pass such orders in the future. Considering that John Doe orders have attracted criticism on the ground that they make serious inroads into the rights of the defendant, these safeguards specifically articulated by the Court do go some way in addressing these concerns and mitigating the hardship caused to the defendants.

Website Blocking Orders

An extension of the John Doe orders discussed above is the recent spate of decisions from various High Courts blocking access to certain websites that upload, or permit the uploading of, copyrighted content such as sound recordings and cinematograph films, without authorisation from the copyright owner. The relief granted is either movie-specific but against unknown persons, or website-specific.

To give a sample of the movie-specific relief: For the foregoing reasons, defendants and other unnamed and undisclosed persons, are restrained from copying, recording or allowing camcording or communicating or making available or distributing, or duplicating, or displaying, or releasing, or showing, or uploading, or downloading, or exhibiting, or playing, and/or defraying the movie ‘DON2’ in any manner without a proper license from the plaintiff or in any other manner which would violate/infringe the plaintiff?s copyright in the said cinematograph film ‘DON2’ through different mediums like CD, DVD, Blue- ray disc, VCD, Cable TV, DTH, Internet services, MMS, Pen drives, Hard drives, Tapes, CAS or in any other like manner.[11]

Similarly, in R.K.Productions Pvt. Ltd. v B.S.N.L. & Ors.[12]an order of the above nature has been passed in respect of the Tamil film "3". There are a few more that have already been passed by the Delhi and Madras High Courts, indicating that these kind of protective orders under Or.XXXIX R.1 and 2, read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are well going to be the order of the day, especially when it comes to online piracy of copyrighted content.

The Indian Music Industry and a sound recording label have also approached the Calcutta High Court and obtained an order of the second kind, ie. a direction to the known defendants who are Internet Service Providers (ISPs), to block access to various websites listed in the Schedule to the Plaint, which are used exclusively for providing unauthorised access to copyrighted sound and video recordings. The order[13] is extracted below:

This is an application by the plaintiffs in aid of a suit complaining of copyright infringement. The plaintiff no. 1 and the members of the plaintiff no. 2 are the copyright owners of Hindi film songs. It is argued that the website mentioned in the prayers are posting and playing the songs, without any copyright or licence. This application is made ex parte on the apprehension that if notice of this application was served on the website they would shift their service to a different website.

In those circumstances, I pass an order of injunction in terms of prayer (a) of the Notice of Motion till further orders. I direct the respondent ISPs to indicate to the plaintiff the address of the website owner/operator referred to in the prayers.

I also make it clear that the above order of blocking should be confined to the above website only and should not otherwise interfere with internet service.

The last part of the last sentence extracted above has been emphasised as this is precisely what is happening as a consequence of the dual kind of orders discussed in this section. Though the first kind of order is, on its own terms, confined to only the film that is the subject matter of the suit, ISPs have used it to block access to entire websites in contravention of all recognised principles of network neutrality. Even in the case of the second kind of orders, there is absolutely no transparency as to how ISPs have been interpreting the order, and what websites are being targeted by them under the garb of such an order.[14] It is a well-established maxim that courts and judicial orders cannot be used as a vehicle for oppression, harassment, or to perpetrate abuse of power. This is precisely what has been witnessed since the last year in relation to the website blocking, and film-access blocking, orders passed by different courts. It is felt that legislative intervention is absolutely necessary in this field without any further delay to lay down parameters for exercise of judicial power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which power can otherwise be construed in any manner by any Court with little checks and balances on the possibility of such exercise of power.[15]

Conceptual Differences between John Doe and Website Blocking Orders

The most crucial point of distinction between these two types of orders is that while John Doe orders speak to the primary infringer, website blocking orders impose onerous responsibility on the ISP. John Doe orders as used in India thus far have served the purpose of a blanket search and seize mandate to gather evidence of direct infringement. As seen above, the final relief in the suit is granted only against those John Does who are subsequently identified and arrayed as parties to the main suit.[16] Website blocking orders, on the other hand, amount to granting the final relief at the interim stage itself, as access is blocked to web links hosted by unknown persons by taking recourse to the ISP.

Moreover, there is a vital difference between holding primary infringers liable and making mere conduits, such as ISPs. parties to a civil suit. The maxim ubi jus ibi remedium is clearly applicable in the former case, because the remedy is fashioned to bring on board the primary infringer and then afford him an opportunity of hearing before confirming the ex parte order against him. In the case of website blocking orders, the court straightaway directs the ISP to block access to the content, and the third party infringer is really a non-entity in the whole process as the attempt is not to bring him on board or to gather evidence. Hence, it is impermissible for an Indian court to grant an ex parte order directing the denial of access to a website or webpage by taking umbrage under its power to grant a John Doe order. However, Indian courts have done so, and the recent decision of the Madras High Court in R.K.Productions v. B.S.N.L.[17] has also affirmed the legality of such action. The court has judicially created a responsibility on ISPs that is akin to the take-down requirements thrust upon file-sharing websites, and which kicks in upon notice of infringing content given to the ISP by the copyright owner. This decision deserves serious critical evaluation, and an understanding of the different types of liability for copyright infringement is material for the same.

[2]. 499 F.Supp. 791 (1980). Hereinafter referred to as Billy Joel.

[3]. 551 F.Supp. 1054 (D.C.Wis.,1982). Hereinafter referred to as Brockum.

[4]. [1994] F.S.R. 497. Hereinafter referred to as Metallica. The plaintiff here was the exclusive authorised merchandiser for Metallica and Sir Paul McCartney, and the piracy alleged was similar to the one in Billy Joel’s case. Here too, the order was sought in respect of a specific concert to be held in Auckland within the next few days. The plaintiff innovatively sought an order by virtue of which certain solicitors named in the plaintiff’s application would, due to their status as officers of the court, be authorised to accost bootleggers at the concert venues and require them to provide their current addresses and evidence of identity, and these bootleggers would have to surrender up to these named solicitors all merchandise including T-shirts, head-bands, badges, or programmes in their possession or control.

[5]. See Bloomsbury Publishing Group Limited v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2003] 3 All E.R. 736.

[6]. [2003] F.S.R. 22. Hereinafter referred to as Tej Television.

[7]. 2009 (39) PTC 208 (Del).

[8]. Order dated 15.01.2009 in C.S. (O.S.) 1771 / 2006, reported as MANU/DE/1991/2009.

[9]. MANU/DE/1061/2011.

[10]. Order dated 25.09.2009 in C.S. (O.S.) 1846 / 2009, available at http://courtnic.nic.in/dhcorder/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=173895&yr=2009 (last accessed on 24.03.2013)

[11]. Order of the Delhi High Court dated 19.12.2011 in I.A. No.20510/2011 in C.S.(O.S.) No. 3207/2011 (Reliance Big Entertainment Pvt Ltd v Multivision Network & Ors.), available at http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=269404&yr=2011 (last accessed on 24.03.2013)

[12]. Order of the Madras High Court dated 29.03.2012 in O.A.No. 230 of 2012 in C.S.No. 208 of 2012, the link to which is provided at http://spicyipindia.blogspot.in/search?q=madras+high+court+first+john+doe (last accessed on 24.03.2013)

[13]. Order of the Calcutta High Court dated 27.01.2012 in GA No. 187 of 2012 in CS No. 23 of 2012 (Sagarika Music Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v Dishnet Wireless Ltd. & Ors.), available at http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/147345981/ (last accessed on 24.03.2013)

[14]. The prayers sought in some of these civil suits are in complete contravention of the salutary principle in Or.VII, R.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, that “every plaint shall state specifically the relief which the plaintiff claims”.

[15]. The website blocking order dated 29.01.2013 passed by a District Court in Dabra near Gwalior in respect of websites that posted content related to the Indian Institute of Planning and Management, a Business School, and the subsequent unblocking order by the same Court dated 28.02.2013 have again brought back the spotlight on the legality of such orders passed by the judiciary. See http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/unblock-urls-about-iipm-court/articleshow/18743461.cms (last accessed on 24.03.2013).

[16]. Ardath Tobacco Co. Ltd. v Munna Bhai & Ors., 2009 (39) PTC 208 (Del); 3M Company v A. Patel, MANU/DE/1991/2009.

[17]. (2012) 5 LW 626. Hereinafter referred to as R.K.Productions.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/john-doe-orders-isp-blocking-websites-copyright-1

ಡಿಜಿಟಲ್ ನಿರ್ಬಂಧಗಳ ನಿರ್ವಹಣೆ

sunil — 2012-06-18T11:19:35Z

ಸ್ವತಂತ್ರ ತಂತ್ರಾಂಶ ಪ್ರತಿಷ್ಠಾನದ ಸ್ಥಾಪಕ ರಿಚರ್ಡ್ ಸ್ಟಾಲ್‌ಮನ್ ಡಿಆರ್‌ಎಂ (ಡಿಜಿಟಲ್ ರೈಟ್ಸ್ ಮ್ಯಾನೇಜ್‌ಮೆಂಟ್) ಎಂಬ ಪರಿಕಲ್ಪನೆಯನ್ನು `ಡಿಜಿಟಲ್ ರೆಸ್ಟ್ರಿಕ್ಷನ್ ಮ್ಯಾನೇಜ್ಮೆಂಟ್` ಎಂದು ಬಿಡಿಸಿಡುತ್ತಾರೆ. ಅವರ ದೃಷ್ಟಿಯಲ್ಲಿ ಇದು ಡಿಜಿಟಲ್ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳ ನಿರ್ವಹಣೆಯಲ್ಲ. ಡಿಜಿಟಲ್ ನಿರ್ಬಂಧಗಳ ನಿರ್ವಹಣೆ. ಈ ಡಿಆರ್‌ಎಂ ತಂತ್ರ ಬಳಕೆದಾರನ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳನ್ನು ನಿಯಂತ್ರಿಸುತ್ತದೆ.

The article was published in Prajavani on June 9, 2012

ಕಾಪಿ ರೈಟ್ ಹೊಂದಿರುವವನಿಗೆ ಬಳಕೆದಾರನ ಹಾರ್ಡ್‌ವೇರ್, ಸಾಫ್ಟ್‌ವೇರ್ ಮತ್ತು ಅದರಲ್ಲಿ ನೋಡುವ, ಆಲಿಸುವ ಮತ್ತು ಓದುವ ವಸ್ತು-ವಿಷಯದ ಮೇಲೆಯೂ ನಿಯಂತ್ರಣ ಹೇರುವ ಅನೈತಿಕ ಅಧಿಕಾರವನ್ನು ಕೊಟ್ಟು ಬಿಡುತ್ತದೆ ಎಂಬುದು ಸ್ಟಾಲ್‌ಮನ್ ಅವರ ಅಭಿಪ್ರಾಯ.

ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್‌ನ ಮಾಲೀಕರು ಈ ಡಿಆರ್‌ಎಂ ತಂತ್ರ ತಮ್ಮ ಹಕ್ಕಿನ ಉಲ್ಲಂಘನೆಯನ್ನು ತಡೆಯುತ್ತದೆ ಎಂದು ಹೇಳುತ್ತಾರಾದರೂ ಇದು ಜಾರಿಯಲ್ಲಿರುವ ಅನೇಕ ದೇಶಗಳ ಉದಾಹರಣೆಯನ್ನು ಮುಂದಿಟ್ಟುಕೊಂಡು ನೋಡಿದರೆ ಬಳಕೆದಾರನ ಮಟ್ಟಿಗೆ ಡಿಆರ್‌ಎಂ ಜ್ಞಾನದ ಬಾಗಿಲುಗಳನ್ನು ಮುಚ್ಚುತ್ತದೆ ಎಂಬುದೇ ನಿಜ.

ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಯನ್ವಯ ಅಸ್ತಿತ್ವದಲ್ಲೇ ಇರದ ಹಕ್ಕುಗಳನ್ನು ಈ ಡಿಆರ್‌ಎಂ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್‌ನ ಮಾಲೀಕರಿಗೆ ನೀಡಿಬಿಡುತ್ತದೆ. ಅಂಗವಿಕಲರು ತಮಗೆ ಓದಲು ಅನುಕೂಲವಾಗುವ ಮಾಧ್ಯಮಕ್ಕೆ ಒಂದು ಪುಸ್ತಕವನ್ನು ಪರಿವರ್ತಿಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವುದು, ಸಂಶೋಧಕರು ಪುಸ್ತಕ ಅಥವಾ ಈ ಬಗೆಯ ಜ್ಞಾನದ ಮಾಧ್ಯಮಒಂದರಲ್ಲಿರುವ ವಿಷಯವನ್ನು ತಮ್ಮ ಸಂಶೋಧನೆಗೆ ಬಳಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವುದು, ಹಾಗೆಯೇ ಸಿನಿಮಾ, ಸಾಫ್ಟ್‌ವೇರ್ ಇತ್ಯಾದಿಗಳನ್ನು ವೈಯಕ್ತಿಕ ಬಳಕೆಗಾಗಿ ಉಳಿಸಿ ಇಟ್ಟುಕೊಳ್ಳಲು (ಬ್ಯಾಕ್‌ಅಪ್) ಬೇಕಾದಂತೆ ಪರಿವರ್ತಿಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವುದು, ಸಾಫ್ಟ್‌ವೇರ್‌ನಂಥ ಉತ್ಪನ್ನ ಗಳನ್ನು ಅವುಗಳನ್ನು ಉದ್ದೇಶಿತ ಉಪಯೋಗ ಕ್ಕಿಂತ ಭಿನ್ನ ಬಗೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಬಳಸುವುದು, ಉದ್ದೇಶಿತ ವೇದಿಕೆಗಳಿಗಿಂತ ಭಿನ್ನವಾದ ವೇದಿಕೆಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ಬಳಸಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಾಗುವಂತೆ ಸಾಫ್ಟ್‌ವೇರ್‌ಗಳಂಥ ಉತ್ಪನ್ನಗಳನ್ನು ರಿವರ್ಸ್ ಇಂಜಿನಿಯರಿಂಗ್ ಮಾಡುವಂಥ ಕ್ರಿಯೆಗಳಿಗೆ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆ ಅನುವು ಮಾಡಿಕೊಡುತ್ತದೆ.

ಆದರೆ ಡಿಆರ್‌ಎಂ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನ ಕಾನೂನುಬದ್ಧವಾಗಿಯೇ ಇರುವ ಈ ಎಲ್ಲಾ ಕೆಲಸಗಳಿಗೂ ತಡೆಯೊಡುತ್ತದೆ.2011ರ ತಿದ್ದುಪಡಿಯೊಂದಿಗೆ ಹೊಸ ರೂಪ ಪಡೆದುಕೊಂಡಿರುವ 1957ರ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಕಾಯ್ದೆ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ಮೂಲಕ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಉಲ್ಲಂಘನೆಯನ್ನು ತಡೆಯುವ ವಿಧಾನಕ್ಕೆ ಕಾನೂನಿನ ಮಾನ್ಯತೆಯನ್ನು ನೀಡಿದೆ.

ತನ್ನ ಹಕ್ಕಿನ ಉಲ್ಲಂಘನೆಯನ್ನು ತಡೆಯುವು ದಕ್ಕಾಗಿ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಮಾಲೀಕ ಅಳವಡಿಸಿರುವ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನವನ್ನು ಹ್ಯಾಕ್ ಮಾಡುವಂಥ ಕೆಲಸ ಮಾಡಿದವರಿಗೆ ಎರಡು ವರ್ಷಗಳ ಕಾರಾಗೃಹ ವಾಸದಂಥ ಶಿಕ್ಷೆಯೂ ಹೊಸ ಕಾನೂನಿನಲ್ಲಿದೆ. ಹಾಗೆಂದು ಈ ಕಾನೂನು ಬಹಳ ಋಣಾತ್ಮಕವಷ್ಟೇ ಆಗಿದೆ ಎನ್ನಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಿಲ್ಲ.

ಇದರಲ್ಲಿ ಮೂರು ಅತಿ ಮುಖ್ಯ ಧನಾತ್ಮಕ ಅಂಶಗಳಿವೆ. ಮೊದಲನೆಯದ್ದು ಸಾರ್ವತ್ರಿಕ ಲಭ್ಯತೆಯ ವಸ್ತು-ವಿಷಯಗಳನ್ನು ಈ ಬಗೆಯ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನ ಉಪಯೋಗಿಸಿ ಬಳಕೆದಾರರನ್ನು ನಿರ್ಬಂಧಿಸಲು ಅವಕಾಶವಿಲ್ಲ. ಎರಡನೆಯದ್ದು ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ಮಿತಿಯನ್ನು ಪರೀಕ್ಷಿಸುವ ಉದ್ದೇಶದಿಂದ ನಡೆಸಲಾಗುವ ಹ್ಯಾಕಿಂಗ್ ಅಪರಾಧವಲ್ಲ. ಮೂರನೆಯದ್ದು ಹೀಗೆ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನದ ಮಿತಿಗಳನ್ನು ಬಳಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳುವ ಮತ್ತೊಂದು ತಾಂತ್ರಿಕ ವಿಧಾನವನ್ನು ಆವಿಷ್ಕರಿಸುವುದನ್ನು ಕಾನೂನು ತಡೆಯುತ್ತಿಲ್ಲ.

ಒಂದು ವಿಡಿಯೋ/ಆಡಿಯೋ ಕಂಪೆನಿ ಒಂದು ಡಿವಿಡಿಯನ್ನು ಕೇವಲ ಮೈಕ್ರೋಸಾಫ್ಟ್ ಮೀಡಿಯಾ ಪ್ಲೇಯರ್‌ನಲ್ಲಿ ಮಾತ್ರ ವೀಕ್ಷಿಸಲು ಅಥವಾ ಆಲಿಸಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಿರುವಂತೆ ಡಿಆರ್‌ಎಂ ಮಾಡಿದ್ದರೆ ಲೀನಕ್ಸ್ ಹೊಂದಿರುವ ಬಳಕೆದಾರರು ಅದನ್ನು ತಮ್ಮ ಕಂಪ್ಯೂಟರ್‌ಗಳಲ್ಲಿ ನೋಡಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಿರುವಂತೆ ಪರಿವರ್ತಿಸಿ ಕೊಳ್ಳುವುದು ಅಪರಾಧವಲ್ಲ. ಇಲ್ಲಿ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಉಲ್ಲಂಘನೆಯಾಗುವುದಿಲ್ಲ.

ಹಾಗೆಯೇ ಆಡಿಯೋ ಪುಸ್ತಕವೊಂದನ್ನು ಬಿಡುಗಡೆ ಮಾಡಿರುವ ಕಂಪೆನಿ ಅದನ್ನು ಅಂಧರು ಬಳಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳಲಾಗದಂತೆ ಡಿಆರ್‌ಎಂ ಬಳಸಿದ್ದರೆ ಅಂಧರಿಗೆ ಅದನ್ನು ತಮಗೆ ಬೇಕಾದ ಸ್ವರೂಪಕ್ಕೆ ಪರಿವರ್ತಿಸಿಕೊಂಡು ಬಳಸುವ ಸ್ವಾತಂತ್ರ್ಯವನ್ನು ಕಾಯ್ದೆ ನೀಡುತ್ತದೆ. ಹಾಗೆಯೇ ಗೆಳೆಯನೊಬ್ಬನಿಂದ ಪಡೆದ ಡಿಆರ್‌ಎಂ ಇರುವ ಡಿವಿಡಿಯಿಂದ ಶಿಕ್ಷಕರೊಬ್ಬರು ತಮ್ಮ ತರಗತಿ ಅನುಕೂಲಕ್ಕಾಗಿ ಪ್ರತಿ ಮಾಡಿಕೊಂಡು ವಿಡಿಯೋ ಕ್ಲಿಪ್‌ಗಳನ್ನು ರೂಪಿಸಿದರೂ ಅದು ಅಪರಾಧವಾಗು ವುದಿಲ್ಲ. ಹಾಗೆಯೇ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞನೊಬ್ಬ ಅಂತರ ಜಾಲಸಂಪರ್ಕವನ್ನು ಬಳಸಿ ಆಡಬಲ್ಲ ಕಂಪ್ಯೂಟರ್ ಗೇಮ್ ಒಂದರಲ್ಲಿ ಸ್ಪೈವೇರ್ ಇದೆ ಅನುಮಾನಿಸಿ ಅದರ ಆಕರ ಸಂಕೇತಗಳನ್ನು ನೋಡಿ ಬದಲಾಯಿಸಲು ಪ್ರಯತ್ನಿಸಿದರೆ ಅದು ತಪ್ಪಲ್ಲ.

ಈ ಸವಲತ್ತನ್ನು ಭದ್ರತಾ ಏಜನ್ಸಿಗಳೂ ಬಳಸಿಕೊಳ್ಳಲು ಸಾಧ್ಯವಿದೆ. ಹಾಗೆಯೇ ಜಾಗತಿಕ ಮಾರುಕಟ್ಟೆಯಲ್ಲಿರುವ ಪ್ರಖ್ಯಾತವಾಗಿರುವ ಒಂದು ಸಾಫ್ಟ್‌ವೇರನ್ನು ಹೋಲುವಂಥದ್ದೇ ಉತ್ಪನ್ನವನ್ನು ಬೆಂಗಳೂರಿನ ಉತ್ಸಾಹಿಯೊಬ್ಬ ರೂಪಿಸಿ ಜಾಗತಿಕವಾಗಿ ಮಾರಾಟ ಮಾಡಲು ಹೊರಟರೂ ಅದನ್ನು ನಿಯಮ ತಪ್ಪು ಎನ್ನುವುದಿಲ್ಲ. ಆದರೆ ಇದರಲ್ಲಿ ಆತ ಅನುಕರಿ ಸುತ್ತಿರುವ ಉತ್ಪನ್ನ ಬಳಸಿರುವ ಆಕರ ಸಂಕೇತಗಳು ಇರಬಾರದಷ್ಟೇ.

ಎಲ್ಲವನ್ನೂ ಮಸಿ ನುಂಗಿತು ಎಂಬಂತೆ ಈ ಕಾಯ್ದೆಯಲ್ಲಿರುವ ಎರಡು ಋಣಾತ್ಮಕ ಅಂಶಗಳು ಅದರ ಧನಾತ್ಮಕತೆಗೆ ದೊಡ್ಡ ಮಿತಿಯನ್ನು ಹೇರಿಬಿಟ್ಟಿವೆ. ನಿರ್ದಿಷ್ಟ ಉತ್ಪನ್ನವನ್ನು ಪರಿವರ್ತಿಸಲು ಬೇಕಿರುವ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನವನ್ನು ಒದಗಿಸುವ ಕಂಪೆನಿಗಳು ಅದನ್ನು ಯಾರಿಗೆ ಮಾರಿದ್ದೇವೆ ಎಂಬ ದಾಖಲೆಗಳನ್ನು ಇಟ್ಟುಕೊಳ್ಳಬೇಕೆಂಬ ನಿಯಮವಿದೆ.

ಅಂದರೆ ಇದೊಂದು ಬಗೆಯಲ್ಲಿ ಪರೋಕ್ಷವಾಗಿ ಈ ತಂತ್ರಜ್ಞಾನವನ್ನು ಬಳಸುವುದರ ಮೇಲೆ ಹೇರಿರುವ ನಿಯಂತ್ರಣದಂತಿದೆ. ಯಾರಿಗೆ ಮಾರಿದ್ದೇವೆಂಬ ದಾಖಲೆಯನ್ನು ಕಡ್ಡಾಯವಾಗಿ ಇಟ್ಟುಕೊಳ್ಳುತ್ತಾ ಹೋಗುವ ಕ್ರಿಯೆಯೇ ಮಾರಾಟ ಗಾರರ ಉತ್ಸಾಹಕ್ಕೆ ತಣ್ಣೀರೆರಚುತ್ತದೆ.

ಹಾಗೆಯೇ ಬಳಕೆದಾರರು ತಮ್ಮ `ಪರಿವರ್ತಿಸುವ ಹಕ್ಕನ್ನು` ಚಲಾಯಿಸಲು ಅಗತ್ಯವಿರುವ ಸವಲತ್ತು ಒದಗಿಸುವುದಕ್ಕೆ ಕಾಪಿರೈಟ್ ಮಾಲೀಕರನ್ನು ಬಾಧ್ಯಸ್ಥರನ್ನಾಗಿಸಿಲ್ಲ. ಅಂದರೆ ಬಳಕೆದಾರನಿಗೆ ಹಕ್ಕಿದೆ. ಆದರೆ ಅದನ್ನು ಚಲಾಯಿಸುವ ಅವಕಾಶದ ಬಗ್ಗೆ ಮಾತ್ರ ಖಾತರಿ ಇಲ್ಲ ಎಂಬ ಸ್ಥಿತಿ ಇದೆ.

ಲೇಖಕರು ಸೆಂಟರ್ ಫಾರ್ ಇಂಟರ್‌ನೆಟ್‌ಅಂಡ್ ಸೊಸೈಟಿಯ ಕಾರ್ಯನಿರ್ವಾಹಕ ನಿರ್ದೇಶಕರು

English translation below:

Digital Restrictions Management

As Richard Stallman the founder of the Free Software movement puts it the correct expansion of the acronym DRM is Digital Restrictions Management and not Digital Rights Management. According to his analysis DRM is used to limit the rights of consumers and enables rights-holders to exercise unethical control over the consumer's hardware, software and content.

Even though copyrights holders will tell us that DRM helps cut down on wilful and unwitting infringement. For consumers and members of the general public evidence from other countries reveal that DRM in most cases undermines access to knowledge. DRM permits the copyright holder to claim rights that don't exist as per copyright law and to restrict fair dealing (also referred to as far use) guarantees. Fair dealing protections include access by the disabled, use in research or academic context, archiving or making a personal backup, reverse engineering for academic reasons to to create interoperable/competing products/services etc.

The 2012 amendment to the Indian Copyright Act 1957 has resulted in legal recognition for effective technological measures [also called Technological Protection Measures or TPMs] and rights management information [RMI] applied for protecting the rights of the copyright-holder. Circumvention of such a measure could result in a 2 year jail term and a fine.

The DRM provisions per the amendment does three things correctly. One, it does not allow copyright-holder to use technological measure as a means to enclose public domain content or secure rights that are not granted to them under the Act. Two, any circumvention to exercise limitations and exceptions under the fair dealing provisions of the Act is not considered to be an offence. Three, it does not criminalise the creation of circumvention technologies. Unfortunately, however the Amendment also gets two things wrong. One, there are onerous recording keeping mandates for those providing circumvention technologies to consumers and members of the general public. Two, the provision does not make the rights-holder responsible for providing the means to consumers and members of the general public who wish to exercise their right to circumvention.

Suppose a movie studio released DVD version of its films with DRM that only worked with Microsoft Windows operating system. Those who bought the DVD but ran GNU/Linux or any other operating system would then have a right to circumvent the DRM and republish the content in an video encoding format. This would not be considered an offence because the customer is not attempting any copyright infringement.

Suppose a publishing house only released audio versions of its books with DRM that prevented accessibility to the content by the disabled. Another newly-introduced exception specifically for the disabled would apply if the rights-holder has ignored the disabled as a market but not making available accessible versions of their content. In other words, the disabled have a right to make accessible versions for themselves and therefore circumvent the DRM if necessary.

Suppose the very same movie studio also ensured that the DRM on its DVDs prevented customers from extracting video clips. If a teacher borrowed the film from a friend and then used circumvention technology to copy and paste video clips into her classroom presentation. This would not be considered an offence as she was only taking advantage of an exception meant for educational institutions.

Suppose a security researcher suspected the DRM technology in network enabled gaming console contained spy-ware. He would have the right to circumvent the DRM and reverse engineer the source code of the console in order to audit the code for the existence of back-doors. This exception will also be used by law enforcement agencies and military/intelligence organisations to purge our supply-chain of electronic infrastructure of spy-ware.

Finally assume a young entrepreneur from Bengaluru wanted to make a competing and yet interoperable product based on an existing product with global market penetration. Assume that the developers of the existing product used DRM to keep their source code and file format inaccessible to competitors. Again under the latest amendment our friend would have the right to circumvent the DRM as long as the code he write is not copied from the existing product.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/digital-restrictions-management

Analysis of the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010

pranesh — 2011-09-21T06:01:54Z

CIS analyses the Copyright (Amendment) Bill, 2010, from a public interest perspective to sift the good from the bad, and importantly to point out what crucial amendments should be considered but have not been so far.

The full submission that CIS and 21 other civil society organizations made to the Rajya Sabha Standing Committee on HRD (which is studying the Bill) is available here. Given below is the summary of our submissions:

Existing Copyright Act

The Indian Copyright Act, 1957 has been designed from the perspective of a developing country. It has always attempted a balance between various kinds of interests. It has always sought to ensure that rights of authors of creative works is carefully promoted alongside the public interest served by wide availability and usability of that material. For instance, our Copyright Act has provisions for:

compulsory and statutory licensing: recognizing its importance in making works available, especially making them available at an affordable rate.
cover versions: recognizing that more players lead to a more vibrant music industry.
widely-worded right of fair dealing for private use: recognizing that individual use and large-scale commercial misuse are different.

These provisions of our Act have been lauded, and India has been rated as the most balanced copyright system in a global survey conducted of over 34 countries by Consumers International.

The Indian Parliament has always sought to be responsive to changing technologies by paying heed to both the democratisation of access as well as the securing of the interests of copyright holders. This approach needs to be lauded, and importantly, needs to be maintained.

Proposed Amendments

Some positive amendments

Fair Dealings, Parallel Importation, Non-commercial Rental: All works (including sound recordings and cinematograph films) are now covered the fair dealings clause (except computer programmes), and a few other exceptions; parallel importation is now clearly allowed; and non-commercial rental has become a limitation in some cases.
Persons with disabilities: There is finally an attempt at addressing the concerns of persons with disabilities. But the provisions are completely useless the way they are currently worded.
Public Libraries: They can now make electronic copies of works they own, and some other beneficial changes relating to public libraries.
Education: Some exceptions related to education have been broadened (scope of works, & scope of use).
Statutory and compulsory licensing: Some new statutory licensing provisions (including for radio broadcasting) and some streamlining of existing compulsory licensing provisions.
Copyright societies: These are now responsible to authors and not owners of works.
Open licences: Free and Open Source Software and Open Content licensing is now simpler.
Partial exemption of online intermediaries: Transient and incidental storage of copyrighted works has been excepted, mostly for the benefit of online intermediaries.
Performer’s rights: The general, and confusing, exclusive right that performers had to communicate their performance to the public has been removed, and instead only the exclusive right to communicate sound/video recordings remains.
Enforcement: Provisions on border measures have been made better, and less prone to abuse and prevention of legitimate trade.

Some negative amendments

WCT and WPPT compliance: India has not signed either of these two treaties, which impose TRIPS-plus copyright protection, but without any corresponding increase in fair dealing / fair use rights.
Increase in duration of copyright: This will significantly reduce the public domain, which India has been arguing for internationally.
Technological Protection Measures: TPMs, which have been shown to be anti-consumer in all countries in which they have been introduced, are sought to be brought into Indian law.
Version recordings: The amendments make cover version much more difficult to produce.
Moral rights: Changes have been made to author’s moral rights (and performer’s moral rights have been introduced) but these have been made without requisite safeguards.

Missed opportunities

Government-funded works: Taxpayers are still not free to use works that were paid for by them. This goes against the direction that India has elected to march towards with the Right to Information Act.
Copyright terms: The duration of all copyrights are above the minimum required by our international obligations, thus decreasing the public domain which is crucial for all scientific and cultural progress.
Criminal provisions: Our law still criminalises individual, non-commercial copyright infringement.
Libraries and archives: The exceptions for ‘public libraries’ are still too narrow in what they perceive as ‘public libraries’.
Educational exceptions: The exceptions for education still do not fully embrace distance and digital education.
Communication to the public: No clear definition is given of what constitute a ‘public’, and no distinction is drawn between commercial and non-commercial ‘public’ communication.
Internet intermediaries: More protections are required to be granted to Internet intermediaries to ensure that non-market based peer-production projects such as Wikipedia, and other forms of social media and grassroots innovation are not stifled.
Fair dealing and fair use: We would benefit greatly if, apart from the specific exceptions provided for in the Act, more general guidelines were also provided as to what do not constitute infringement. This would not take away from the existing exceptions.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/copyright-bill-analysis

An Interview of Vera Franz

praskrishna — 2013-07-15T09:49:16Z

This interview was conducted at the Diplomatic Conference to Conclude a Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works by Visually Impaired Persons and Persons with Print Disabilities on June 26, 2013.

Vera Franz praises Rahul Cherian of Inclusive Planet while talking about her work. Watch the video below:

Video

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/interview-of-vera-franz

An FAQ on the Copyright Amendment Bill, 2012, for the Benefit of Persons with Disabilities

Dr. Sam Taraporevala and Rahul Cherian — 2012-06-02T04:35:51Z

The Copyright Amendment Bill 2012 introduced certain provisions for the benefit of persons with disabilities and as it has been passed by both houses of parliament (By the Rajya Sabha on May 17, 2012 and the Lok Sabha on May 22, 2012).

Who does this amendment benefit?
This amendment benefits all persons with disabilities who cannot enjoy works in their normal format thus amongst others it would cover totally blind, low vision, learning disabled, the deaf and hard of hearing and orthopedically challenged people who are unable to hold books or turn its pages.
What can be done now that was not possible earlier?
Persons with disabilities who cannot access a work in their normal format and organizations can suitably modify a work so as to make it accessible to meet the specific needs of the person with disability. This means that a standard printed book, for example may be converted to an alternate format (not necessarily a special format) including Braille, large font, text readable by screen reader, audio (be it synthetic audio or human voice recording) without seeking the permission of the rights holder.
How is this different?
In the past, any alternate format creation would have been an infringement unless it was backed up by prior written permission from the rights holder. One had to seek the permission if one had to be on the right side of the law. Now these permissions are not needed for non-profit conversion and distribution.
Are there any restrictions? Yes, there are reasonable restrictions such as:
(a) conversion should be a not for profit activity. In case it is a for profit activity, there is a separate clause under which a special license can be obtained.-
(b) The accessible format copy has to be distributed to a bonafide print impaired person or organizations that serve them.
(c) reasonable precaution need to be taken by all that the accessible copy is not misused commercially.
What is the meaning of a “work”?
A work means:
(a) a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work;
(b) a cinematograph film;
(c) and a sound recording;
It includes all works which are available in India in the normal channels of business.
What activities are permitted for the benefit of persons with disabilities?
The adaption, reproduction, issue of copies or communication to the public of any work in any accessible format to facilitate persons with disability to access works.
Is permission required from publishers to undertake the above activities?
No, permission from publishers are not required to undertake the above activities subject to the points given below.
What are “accessible formats”?
Accessible formats include, Braille, audio (be it synthetic audio or human voice recording), Daisy, accessible pdf, large print, movies with subtitles etc.
What is the meaning of “adaption”?
“Adaption” in relation to any work, mean any use of such work involving its re-arrangement or alteration. Conversion of a work into an accessible format would be treated as an adaption
What is the meaning of “communication to the public”?
"Communication to the public" means making any work available for being seen or heard or otherwise enjoyed by the public directly or by any means of display or diffusion other than by issuing copies of such work. This includes making the accessible format copy available over the Internet or distributing it from a website.
Who can create and distribute accessible formats?
(a) Any person can create and distribute accessible formats if it is done for facilitating access by persons with disabilities. Parents, friends and persons with disabilities themselves can create accessible formats.
(b) An organization working for the benefit of the persons with disabilities can also create and distribute accessible formats.
Are there any preconditions on the type of organization that can undertake the activities?
Yes, the organization must satisfy one of the following conditions to undertake the activities:
(a) The organization must be registered under section 12A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and work for the benefit of persons with disability; or
(b) The organization must be recognized under Chapter X of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995; or
(c) The organization must receive grants from the Government for facilitating access to persons with disabilities; or
(d) The organization must be an educational institution or library or archives recognized by the Government.
Can accessible format copies be shared between persons with disabilities?
Yes, they can be shared
Can any of the activities be undertaken for profit?
No, for profit activities require a separate license from the copyright board. This license will prescribe several conditions including the royalty, if any, that must be paid. For further details, see point 23 of this note.
Can the costs of production of accessible format copies be recovered?
Yes the cost can be recovered.
Does this mean that the publisher has to give you a soft copy?
No. Publishers are not required to give a soft copy under the amendment.
What steps are required to be taken by organizations who undertake the activity?
The organization must ensure that the copies of works in such accessible format are made available to persons with disabilities and takes reasonable steps to prevent its entry into ordinary channels of business.
Can works be simplified so that people with psycho social disabilities or intellectual disabilities can enjoy the work?
Yes, this can be done since this will fall within the meaning of “adaption” as given above.
Can subtitles be added to movies and other audio visual work for the benefit of the deaf/hard of hearing?
Yes, this can be done since this will fall within the meaning of “adaption” as given above.
Can audio descriptions be added to movies and other audio visual works for the benefit of the blind/low vision?
Yes, this can be done since this will fall within the meaning of “adaption” as given above.
Can an organization in India import or export accessible format copies from/to organizations and beneficiaries abroad?
The Copyright Amendment Bill, 2012, does not address import and export and this depends on various factors and legal preconditions. In this case, it is advisable to check with your legal advisors before undertaking such an activity.
What is the wording of the section?
Section 52 (1)The following act shall not be an infringement of copyright, namely:
(zb) the adaptation, reproduction, issue of copies or communication to the public of any work in any accessible format, by —
(i) any person to facilitate persons with disability to access to works including sharing with any person with disability of such accessible format for private or personal use, educational purpose or research; or
(ii) any organization working for the benefit of the persons with disabilities in case the normal format prevents the enjoyment of such works by such persons:
Provided that the copies of the works in such accessible format are made available to the persons with disabilities on a nonprofit basis but to recover only the cost of production:
Provided further that the organization shall ensure that the copies of works in such accessible format are used by persons with disabilities and takes reasonable steps to prevent its entry into ordinary channels of business.
Explanation. For the purposes of the sub-clause, “any organization” includes an organization registered under section 12A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and working for the benefit of persons with disability or recognized under Chapter X of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 or receiving grants from the Government for facilitating access to persons with disabilities or an educational institution or library or archives recognized by the Government.
What is the wording of the section relating to for profit activity?
³31B. (1) Any person working for the benefit of persons with disability on a profit basis or for business may apply to the Copyright Board, in such form and manner and accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed, for a compulsory license to publish any work in which copyright subsists for the benefit of such persons, in a case to which clause (zb) of sub-section (1) of section 52 does not apply and the Copyright Board shall dispose of such application as expeditiously as possible and endeavor shall be made to dispose of such application within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the application.
(2) The Copyright Board may, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), inquire, or direct such inquiry as it considers necessary to establish the credentials of the applicant and satisfy itself that the application has been made in good faith.
(3) If the Copyright Board is satisfied, after giving to the owners of rights in the work a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after holding such inquiry as it may deem necessary, that a compulsory license needs to be issued to make the work available to the disabled, it may direct the Registrar of Copyrights to grant to the applicant such a license to publish the work.
(4) Every compulsory license issued under this section shall specify the means and format of publication, the period during which the compulsory license may be exercised and, in the case of issue of copies, the number of copies that may be issued including the rate or royalty: Provided that where the Copyright Board has issued such a compulsory license it may, on a further application and after giving reasonable opportunity to the owners of rights, extend the period of such compulsory license and allow the issue of more copies as it may deem fit.

Compiled By:

The Xavier’s Resource Centre for the Visually Challenged (XRCVC)
Dr. Sam Taraporevala
St. Xavier’s College, 5 Mahapalika Marg, Mumbai 400001
#+91-22-22623298/ + 91- 9967028769
sam@xrcvc.org
info@xrcvc.org
www.xrcvc.org
Inclusive Planet Centre for Disability Law and Policy
Rahul Cherian
12/21 Custain Beach Road, Santhome,
Chennai – 600004
# +91 9840357991
rahul.cherian@inclusiveplanet.com
www.inclusiveplanet.org.in

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/accessibility/faq-on-copyright-amendment-bill-2012

Accessing pirated content might lead to prison term & Rs 3-lakh fine

praskrishna — 2016-08-23T02:47:52Z

India puts onus of downloading and viewing pirated content on individuals.

The article by Alnoor Peermohammed was published in the Business Standard on August 22, 2016. Sunil Abraham was quoted.

The central government is putting the onus of downloading and viewing of copyrighted content from sites it has blocked (with the help of internet service providers) on users.

Visiting torrent (a particular type of files) websites while on Tata Communications’ network recently had users being shown a message that viewing or downloading content on those sites could land them in prison for up to three years and a fine of up to Rs 3 lakh.

“There is not enough room in our prisons to keep these infringers and enough time in our courts to try them. It might sound very exciting as a message to put out but, essentially, they’re trying to scare people into good behaviour,” said Sunil Abraham, executive director at research firm Centre for Internet and Society.

There has been no change to the Copyright Act of 1957 or the Information Technology Act of 2000 for the updated notice being shown to users upon visiting blocked sites. Under these provisions, visiting a site, which is blocked is not illegal, unless it is child pornography.

“Copyright infringement happens all the time and even in developed countries, the rates are very high. Crackdowns on individuals and consumers are never going to solve the problem,” added Abraham.

Experts say the most the government could do is prosecute a couple of people and make examples of them, to dissuade others. This practice is followed globally. There are no examples, though, in India of prosecution for copyright infringement of online content.

The recent alteration of the statement seen by users on Tata networks was done on the directives of the Bombay High Court, after the company appealed that showing individual messages for why each website was blocked was not feasible. The resulting message sparked media frenzy that visitors of blocked websites could now be imprisoned.

Other media reports revealed that the recent blocking of websites by internet service providers was prompted by court orders to prevent piracy of Dishoom, the Bollywood movie.

Globally, there’s been a move to clamp on torrent websites which host pirated content, aided by large information technology entities such as Apple or Facebook. Last month, the US authorities arrested Kickass Torrents’ founder, Arten Vaulin, and blocked all the domains of the website, only to have it resurface a day later.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/business-standard-august-22-2016-accessing-pirated-content-might-lead-to-prison-term-and-rs-3-lakh-fine

A Treat for the Blind

praskrishna — 2013-07-11T06:02:27Z

The WIPO treaty will provide copyright exceptions on books making them available to blind people in formats they can use.

The article by Chitra Narayanan was published in Business World on June 26, 2013. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

For millions of visually impaired people around the globe, it’s a landmark treaty that could open up the kingdom of books for them. After days of intense deliberations at Marrakesh in Morrocco, about 600 World Intellectual Property Organisation (Wipo) negotiators, including delegates from India, reached a consensus on a treaty that will provide copyright exceptions on books making them available to blind people in formats they can use.

Wipo, a United Nations agency, is dedicated to the use of intellectual property as a means of stimulating innovation and creativity. The agency has 186 member states.

Sure, content is king. But for the visually impaired, the right platform for accessing content is what makes the difference. Thanks to audio books, a host of apps, and digital platforms such as Bookshare, which provides content in accessible formats, the technology is already there to bring the rich world of 'hardcovers' and 'paperbacks' alive for those who cannot see. What’s more, these books are compatible with all kinds of devices from mobile phones to tablets to PCs.

Now, at last, there is legal sanction as well to content that was not being made available in accessible formats by the copyrights holders. For the 15 million people who are blind in India, the treaty is expected to open education doors as well as provide entertainment needs. India has the world’s largest number of blind people.

Bangalore-based Centre for Internet Society, a policy research organisation, has been at the forefront of negotiations at WIPO to get the treaty through. Minutes after the session concluded, Pranesh Prakash, policy Director at CIS and his colleague Sunil Abraham were tweeting ecstatically about the “win”.

For five long years, this Wipo treaty has witnessed contentious discussions on issues such as including exports of copyrighted works, translations of copyrighted works and so on. According to Prakash, who responded over twitter, “On Exports we won, but re-exports which was earlier permitted has become much more difficult.”

There are also other grainy areas such as commercial availability of the books. According to a post on the Intellectual Property Watch website, soon after the agreement was reached, commercial availability still stands under Article 4 (National Law Limitations and Exceptions on Accessible Format Copies) but has disappeared from Article 5 (cross border exchange of accessible format copies).

Although blind music legend Stevie Wonder, one of the most ardent supporters of the treaty, must be crooning Signed, Sealed, Delivered... it’s early days yet. The draft of the treaty has to be ratified by governments before being adopted.

But for five long years, it has been a long hard battle between copyright owners and those fighting for human rights of the visually impaired. Finally, as one observer, put it: 'a rare victory is in sight for human rights'.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/business-world-june-26-2013-chitra-narayanan-a-treat-for-the-blind

A Ludicrous Ban

Achal Prabhala and Lawrence Liang — 2012-06-04T04:22:11Z

Achal Prabhala and Lawrence Liang have written an article for the Open Magazine about the bizarre ways in which the Internet is regulated in 21st century India.

Small acts can have outsize consequences. In 15th century England, Richard III lamented that for want of a nail, a kingdom was lost. In 21st century India, the question is this: for want of copyright protection for a single film, will the whole Internet be lost? On 29 March 2012, the Madras High Court issued an order whose effect Internet users in the country are still reeling from. As we go to press, most Internet users in India are unable to access a number of popular websites that millions of people around the world use every day. These banned websites are not forums for human trafficking or illegal weapon sales, but merely extensions of ordinary human activity like learning, sharing and growing—activities that are particularly well facilitated by the Internet. That the websites have been banned is of great concern; that the order purportedly banning them, and its effect, are both inexplicable and badly understood is of greater concern still.

How did we get here?

These are the facts. Earlier in the year, a little-known Chennai firm called Copyright Labs filed a petition on behalf of RK Productions, seeking protection for their client’s upcoming release—the Tamil film 3—against copyright infringement on the Internet. The film had not opened to audiences yet; the petition sought pre-emptive protection. In response, the Madras High Court passed a ‘John Doe’ order—John Doe being American shorthand for the anonymous everyman—which has a wide, sweeping scope and is designed to protect against potential offences by necessarily nameless persons, or in other words, everyone. The order applied to several Internet Service Providers (ISPs), as well as the aforesaid nameless persons (the John Doe of India is, apparently, ‘Ashok Kumar’), binding them, and their heirs, assignees, representatives and the whole shebang, against infringing copyright in relation to the film on networks they administer.

In apparent compliance with the John Doe order, Indian ISPs reacted with obsequious haste, in singular—and totally arbitrary—fashion. Between them, they have blocked a range of torrent sites (like the Pirate Bay, which is always Target No. 1, regardless of the circumstances), a few video-sharing sites like Vimeo and DailyMotion, and for good measure, some unrelated and completely irrelevant websites such as Xmarks, which allows users to share and sync bookmarks, and Pastebin, a service to store text and code. The weirdest aspect of this countrywide clampdown on a large chunk of the Internet is that the Madras High Court order did not actually specify any websites to block at all. How—and why—the ISPs zeroed in on these particular entities remains a mystery.

The Pirate Bay certainly hosts large amounts of pirated material, but it is also in some part a way to distribute legitimate content legitimately; Vimeo, on the other hand, is the distribution channel of choice for independent films uploaded by the filmmakers themselves; Pastebin has strict policies that are respectful of copyright and is mostly used by free and open source developers to tweak and relay copyright-free software. The sweep of this clampdown by the ISPs defies logic by deeming everything illegal: the wedding video that we cherish and put up to share with our friends, the small, independently financed film we wish to distribute electronically, the piece of free and open source software we just improved upon and would like the world to know about. Luckily for us, any blocking action imposed by local ISPs can be easily subverted by going through a virtual private network—a proxy—and if you’d like to see just how easy and quick this is to execute, please go to http://anonymouse.org. You’re welcome.

But first, the law. There is some confusion as to whether blocking whole websites for copyright infringement is legally permissible, and the answer is mostly no—and partly yes. The procedure for blocking websites in India is governed by Section 69A of the Information Techno- logy Act 2000, as amended in 2008 (the IT Act). Section 69A of the IT Act gives the Central government, or any of its officers specially authorised by it, the power to direct either a government agency or an intermediary to block access to any website under a list of very specific circumstances, namely: a) in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of lndia, b) for the defence of India, c) for the security of the State, d) for friendly relations with foreign States, e) for public order, or f) for preventing incitement to the commission of any cognisable offence relating to the previous points. Failure to comply with a blocking order thus issued is punishable by imprisonment and fines.

Importantly, however, neither copyright infringement nor obscenity (the other popular trigger for censorious actions) is listed as grounds for which a website may be blocked. Sure, the IT Act has specific provisions that lay out the consequences of transmitting obscene material and the infringement of copyright, but being blocked is not one of them. On the basis of its powers under Section 69A(2), the government has laid out procedures for blocking websites and notified the Information Technology Rules, 2009 (with the ‘Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public’), as well as designated nodal officers who can receive these complaints under the Act.

Section 6 of these IT Rules lays out a clear procedure for initiating and implementing a block. The procedure not only involves a thorough examination of the claims, but also reiterates the grounds under which a request for a block might be permissible, namely, the conditions laid out in the IT Act. Section 7 of the same IT Rules lays out the procedure for examination of the request and places it in the hands of a committee; the procedure involves the participation of several high-ranking officials and outlines detailed steps, such as contacting the potentially offending parties and giving them time to respond or take action as appropriate, only after which blocking may be deployed if still necessary.

The law is clear that copyright infringement cannot be legitimate grounds for the blocking of a website. Section 79 of the IT Act, in fact, explicitly provides safe harbour for ISPs, though the controversial Intermediary Due Diligence Rules, 2011, have made a mockery of this section. These Intermediary Rules are currently the subject of heated debate, with many civil society organisations and even some parliamentarians calling for them to be repealed. (You can learn more about the protests at www.it2011.in).

As things stand, a copyright holder can ask for the removal of infringing content by sending a take-down notice under the provisions of the Intermediary Due Diligence Rules, however flawed they are, or by asking for a John Doe order. A take-down notice is a complaint by the copyright holder to a website, indicating the specific uniform resource locator (URL) where the infringement is allegedly happening. It is a procedure further reinforced in the 2012 amendment to the Indian Copyright Act, which reiterates the rights of intermediaries, such as ISPs, to transmit any potentially infringing content until a take-down notice is sent and examined. A John Doe order, by its wide, sweeping nature, is normally exercised with the greatest caution, and only granted in the most exceptional circumstances. John Doe orders do not provide for public examination and discussion of claims; they do not allow any other side—other than the petitioning party—to state their case; and they can be badly misunderstood by the parties involved, as vividly demonstrated in this case.

In this case, both the petition and the order are questionable in several ways. The Tamil film 3—starring Dhanush and Shruti Haasan and directed by Rajini- kanth’s daughter Aishwarya—is not exceptional. It is one of the hundreds of Tamil films made this year, following on from the thousands of Tamil films made thus far. There is no particular reason why this film alone is worthy of a John Doe order. Ironically, it is exceptional only in that until Copyright Labs’ petition, the film served as a working demonstration of the benefits of a free and open Internet: the reason we knew of the film was the massive publicity generated by the viral hit ‘Kolaveri Di’—a song whose popularity spiralled by being shared freely and widely, regardless of copyright ownership. In the case of ‘Kolaveri Di,’ the producers saw the piracy of the song as publicity, and encouraged it. Then, it would seem, they decided that any piracy of the film was, well, piracy—and decided to stop it in the most insensible and ruthless manner possible. And there you have it: not only can you now have your cake and eat it too, you can also smash it in the faces of millions of users with impunity.

Copyright Labs, the previously unknown firm in Chennai that acted for the producers of 3 appears to be run by one Harish Ram, whose Twitter feed covers the catastrophe in revealing detail. Facing the wrath of fellow tweeters who were outraged at their inability to access their favourite websites, his collected responses on the handle @harishramlh instructively outline the disastrous way by which the court order he wanted has been implemented. Harish claims that his firm was forced to take action because infringing sites “don’t respond”. His cry for help would be plausible except for one inconvenient detail: the film 3 released on 30 March 2012, and the John Doe order was obtained on 29 March 2012—a day before the film’s release. What kind of piracy could Copyright Labs have been trying to battle unsuccessfully prior to the film’s release? There are instances of pre-screening prints of a film making it to torrent sites, though these are rare. Most often, the piracy of a film only happens after its public release. At the time of Copyright Labs’ petition, it is likely that very few or no take-down notices had been served because very few or no infringing acts had been committed yet: this is the very basis of the petition and ensuing order. (A quick search on Pirate Bay confirms that the only torrents related to the film are dated after its release, and not before). A little while later, perhaps upon discovering that he too cannot watch his best friend’s wedding video on Vimeo, Harish casually tweets that he has “written to unblock the whole site and block only specific piracy links” and presto, Vimeo is unblocked.

Regulators, take note. This is how the Internet is governed in 21st century India: by the fluctuating whims of an excited young man in Chennai in possession of a court order he neither deserves nor understands.

Thanks to the fact that our governments and corporations are constantly fantasising about how to censor our Internet (and frequently succeeding), the people who bring us the Internet, the hapless ISPs, have been beaten into submission; they now jump to the mildest murmur of reproach with wildly imaginative and unduly overreaching reactions. The last thing we need in an online environment full of dirty tricks is more dirty tricks. If anyone in power has any desire to keep the Internet working for the millions of Indians who prosper by it, safe harbour for ISPs must be restored in the IT Act—and the Intermediary Due Diligence Rules must be repealed.

Our courts cannot be used as quack-houses to buy pills for imaginary problems. The copyright industry is not a sick patient; it’s just a hypochondriac. Films don’t fail because of piracy; they fail because they’re not worth watching. The most popular films in this country are also the most pirated, and yet they remain money-spinners. The real problem is the unbending inability of this industry to adjust to the world; to the Internet; to the life-changing technologies that human beings have witnessed and embraced and prospered by over the past two decades. Instead of responding to these changes creatively, film producers and music distributors think that digging in their heels and acting like petulant children is going to delude consumers into seeing them as something grander than they are. The reality is that they are simply packers of culture and knowledge who aren’t even wrapping up their products competently. For now, though, these children have been given a nuclear bomb to play with, and they just used it to kill a cockroach. Beware the radiation.

Lawrence Liang is a lawyer and researcher at the Alternative Law Forum; Achal Prabhala is a writer and researcher in Bangalore

Click to read the original published in the Open Magazine on June 2, 2012

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/a-ludicrous-ban

A Guide to Key IPR Provisions of the Proposed India-European Union Free Trade Agreement

glover — 2011-08-30T13:06:03Z

The Centre for Internet and Society presents a guide for policymakers and other stakeholders to the latest draft of the India-European Union Free Trade Agreement, which likely will be concluded by the end of the year and may hold serious ramifications for Indian businesses and consumers.

In its ongoing negotiation for a FTA with the EU, a process that began in 2007 and is expected to end sometime this year, India has won several signicant IP-related concessions. But there remain several IP issues critical to the maintenance of its developing economy, including its robust entrepreneurial environment, that India should contest further before ratifying the treaty. This guide covers the FTA's IP provisions that are within the scope of CIS' policy agenda and on which India has negotiated favorable language, as well as those provisions that it should re-negotiate or oppose.

Download the guide here, and please feel free to comment below.

You may also download a chart comparing the language proposed by India and the EU respectively with that included in the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).

Following is a summary of CIS' findings:

India has become a de facto leader of developing countries at the WTO, and an India-EU FTA seems likely to provide a model for FTAs between developed and developing states well into the future.
The EU has proposed articles on reproduction, communication, and broadcasting rights which could seriously undermine India's authority to regulate the use of works under copyright as currently provided for in the Berne Convention, as well as narrowing exceptions and limitations to rights under copyright.
The EU asserts that copyright includes "copyright in computer programs and in databases," without indicating whether such copyright exceeds that provided for in the Berne Convention. Moreover, by asserting that copyright "includes copyright in computer programs and in databases," the EU has left open the door for the extension of copyright to non-original databases.
India should explicitly obligate the EU to promote and encourage technology transfer -- an obligation compatible with and derived from TRIPS -- as well as propose a clear definition of technology transfer.
The EU has demanded India's accession to the WIPO Internet Treaties, the merits of which are currently under debate as India moves towards amending its Copyright Act, as well as several other international treaties that India either does not explicitly enforce or to which it is not a contracting party.
In general, the EU's provisions would extend terms of protection for material under copyright, within certain constraints, further endangering India's consumer-friendly copyright regime.
An agreement to establish arrangements between national organizations charged with collecting and distributing royalty payments may obligate such organizations in India collect royalty payments for EU rights holders on the same basis as they do for Indian rights holders, and vice versa in the EU, but more heavily burden India.
The EU has proposed a series of radical provisions on the enforcement of IPRs that are tailored almost exclusively to serve the interests of rights holders, at the expense of providing safety mechanisms for those accused of infringing or enabling infringers.
The EU has proposed, under cover of protecting intermediate service providers from liability for infringement by their users, to increase and/or place the burden on such providers of policing user activity.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/a-guide-to-the-proposed-india-european-union-free-trade-agreement

‘Miracle at Marrakesh’ to help visually impaired read

praskrishna — 2013-07-02T10:07:28Z

The treaty will make access to books for the visually impaired, blind and print disabled easier.

The article by Ramya Kannan was published in the Hindu on June 30, 2013. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

On Friday, in the same city that established the World Trade Organisation nearly two decades ago, another significant treaty was born. In Marrakesh, Morocco, international negotiators signed a treaty that will make access to books for the visually impaired, blind and print disabled easier.

After a week of intense debate among the negotiators (facilitated by the World Intellectual Property Organisation), the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired, or otherwise Print Disabled emerged.

It will address the ‘book famine’ for the visually impaired by “requiring its contracting parties to adopt national law provisions that permit the reproduction, distribution and making available of published works in accessible formats through limitations and exceptions to the rights of copyright right holders.” Very simply, it allows the waiver of copyright restrictions in order for books to be available in formats such as formats such as Braille, large print text and audio books.

Pranesh Prakash of the Centre for Internet and Society, in his closing remarks said: “It is historic that today WIPO and its members have collectively recognised in a treaty that copyright isn't just an ‘engine of free expression’ but can pose a significant barrier to access to knowledge.”

To recognise that copyright should not frustrate access for some groups of people and thereby to free books from that ‘constraint’ is of immeasurable significance for people otherwise unable to access books in the conventional format.

The treaty also provides assurances to authors and publishers that that system will not expose their published works to misuse or distribution to anyone other than the intended beneficiaries. “There are no winners and no losers, this is a treaty for everyone,” said Moroccan Minister of Communications Mustapha Khalfi, going on to describe it as the “Miracle in Marrakesh.”

There are an estimated 285 million blind and partially-sighted people in the world, of which the largest percentage lives in India. Only 1 to 7 per cent of all books published are available in formats accessible to them. India’s key campaigner for the treaty, the late Rahul Cherian of Inclusive Planet was full of beans when he spoke to The Hindu in December last year, anticipating the possibility of a treaty half a year later.

“It is a breakthrough!” he said excitedly as he broke the news, “The Extraordinary General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property Organisation has referred the Treaty for Visually Impaired Persons to a diplomatic conference in June of 2013.”

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/the-hindu-ramya-kannan-june-30-2013-miracle-at-marrakesh-to-help-visually-impaired-read

35th SCCR: CIS' Question to Dr. Rostama on her Study on the Impact of the Digital Environment on Copyright Legislation

sinha — 2017-11-19T07:50:49Z

Anubha Sinha, attending the 35th Session of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (“SCCR”) at Geneva from 13 November, 2017 to 18 November, 2017, posed this question on the agenda 'Other Matters' on behalf of CIS on Day 5, 17 November, 2017.

Thank you for the presentation, Dr. Rostamma.

My question relates to provisions allowing reverse engineering of computer programmes. You mentioned that 81% of member states (with the scope of your study) have exceptions for compilation and interoperability of computer programmes.

Can you comment, qualitatively, on how open/ strict you have found the limitations and exceptions to be in your study? Is there a member state that stands out in its treatment of limitations and exceptions for computer programmers, and/or users of such digital objects?

Answer: I would not like to make any qualitative comments.

Read Dr. Rostamma's study here.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/35th-sccr-cis-question-to-dr-rostama-on-her-study-on-the-impact-of-the-digital-environment-on-copyright-legislation

35th SCCR: CIS Statement on GRULAC Proposal for Analysis of Copyright in the Digital Environment

sinha — 2017-11-17T10:03:21Z

Anubha Sinha, attending the 35th Session of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (“SCCR”) at Geneva from 13 November, 2017 to 18 November, 2017, made this statement on the agenda 'Other Matters' on behalf of CIS on Day 5, 17 November, 2017.

We would like to reiterate the importance of GRULAC Proposal for Analysis of Copyright in the Digital Environment.

The Centre for Internet and Society is a non-profit organisation in India that undertakes research on internet and digital technologies from an academic and policy perspective.

In an environment of monopolies controlling the distribution of digital goods and services, which connect users and creators, such a comprehensive study assumes significant importance, especially for creators in the global south.

We are especially concerned with the methods by which platform intermediaries are enforcing their private IP rules on creators worldwide, and if there are fair systems in place to address takedown, and the subsequent restoration of works unfairly taken down from their platforms. It must be noted that there is a serious lack of transparency as far as the conduct of such intermediaries go, and often actions are taken without appropriate justification/explanation.

It is equally important that we continue to build on limitations and exceptions for libraries, museums, archives, educational institutions, researchers, and users’ in the digital environment.

Thank you.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/a2k/blogs/35th-sccr-cis-statement-on-grulac-proposal-for-analysis-of-copyright-in-the-digital-environment

34th SCCR: Observer Statements on Proposal for Analysis of Copyright related to the Digital Environment

sinha — 2017-05-30T05:39:22Z

Observers made the following statements on GRULAC's proposal on analysis of copyright related to the digital environment on 5th May 2017. CISAC:

Thank you, Chairman. I'd like to thank the WIPO Secretariat for this initiative because I think it can contribute to a constructive discussion in this committee on a number of issues raised in the document proposed by GRULAC. CISAC would like to thank the two professors on their presentations on the work done in April, and we look forward in great interest to the presentation of the conclusions at the next meeting of SCCR in November. (CISAC) we have a number of -- I'd like to refer to the need to the transfer of values. The greatest challenge -- which is the greatest challenge facing creators, and then there's the changing role of Internet service providers. As very often the authors are marginalized by the digital economy and the value chain. And then the comments about the need to interpret WIPO treaties in the most faithful way possible to the original spirit and also prudence in implementing exceptions and limitations using other alternatives where possible, such as licenses. Thank you.

FILE:
Thank you, Chairman, and I congratulate you and your vice chairs on your guidance at this meeting, and I associate myself with these statements made by -- the statements made by states such as the USA, E.U.. I'd also like to congratulate GRULAC on this proposal and recommend the committee, in the face of all these studies, which are very interesting, that we performers believe there are priorities, including, for example, the very low or zero remuneration being paid to authors for our works and our performances on Internet in the digital environment, and so we would, therefore, recommend that mainly this study should focus on that and the GRULAC proposal should be a permanent item on the agenda, and as regards the discussion of the legal systems used -- so this should be included and also the three conclusions reached by the professor should be included on the agenda of this committee. And in all this, the market is developing so rapidly, so we should invent our norms as quickly as possible so that we can compete on an equal footing, on a level playing field in this market. Thank you.

Knowledge Ecology International:
Thank you very much. I was -- like others, we'd like to take a harder look at the study. One observation I would make is in the original GRULAC proposal, looming large were issues about economics, concentration of ownership in the area of distributing works, questions about the fairness of the distribution of revenue between creative people and distributors of works. I think in some ways that what was described as the study, although it looked very competent and a great cast of characters in terms of the researchers, I would -- I think you may want to examine whether there's more economics or economists that can be brought in to shed more light on the issues raised in the initial paper. And the last thing I wanted to say is we're -- and we've talked to some Delegates about this, or actually, I should say they've talked to us about it and we agree, that the issue of metadata as it relates to digital works is really a new topic that has come about because of the digitalization of works and the development of the Internet. We often feel that the metadata's managed on behalf of right owners but not necessarily on behalf of either the creative individuals or the audiences or the readers or the listeners, and so I think this is a -- related to the GRULAC proposal. It may be a subset, but I also think it's a topic that we would like to see explored more. Thank you very much.

PAAIG:
Thank you, Chair. I would like to focus on the role of limitations and exceptions in the digital environment for the priority of the committee at this time. There's things called non expressive uses, uses that are necessary for technological processes but do not compete with the copyright owner necessary to offer the services and Internet offer over it. We have been doing research on this topic and have been doing studies that suggest the presence of such exceptions is related to investment in growth of local digital technologies. We cannot have streaming without buffering, we can't have artificial intelligence, machine learning, text and data mining, Internet-based translation services without the right to use whole works for purposes that do not compete with the original, but only a small number of countries around the world provide these clear limitations and exceptions, and the lack of those limitations and exceptions is reducing local investment and local innovation in this area. As the experts note, the E.U. has taken a step in the right direction in this regard, creating a mandatory exception for certain technological processes in the directive. That model's not perfect. Many of these digital innovations that I mention actually require permanent copies. Nonetheless, the concept that we need a mandatory exception in this regard that can facilitate cross-border digital trade and local production and innovation should guide this committee. Thank you.

Corporacion Innovarte:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We're grateful for the work done by the Secretariat on this topic, as also the explanations from the professors that gave us their opinions. We think that the issue of guaranteeing fair remuneration for creators is extremely important. This item should be considered as a standing item on the committee's agenda. However, we also wanted to hearken back to what El Salvador said; in other words, there should be more participation and transparency in the work done in the group of experts in order to guarantee that all of the concerns and issues are covered that are related to this work. Finally, as to the checklists on contracts, this should include not just intermediary platforms such as YouTube, but also contracts between authors and producers or collective entities which also should be a subject of interest for this committee. Thank you.

Latin Artists:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Latin artists represents associations of actors and other performers in the audiovisual field. We are grateful for looking at the precarious situation of artists and other creators in connection with the use of their performances in the digital era. This was described, effectively, by GRULAC in its proposal. This affects not only musical work but audiovisual works as clarified by the Delegation of Brazil at the last session of this committee, and despite the fact that the same Delegation has referred exclusively today to music. In this situation, we think that the solution is not just exploratory studies, as we heard this morning. We also need to bear in mind that this scope exceeds the specific problems indicated in the GRULAC proposal, more particularly in the need to find appropriate formulas to guarantee that artists and other creators can benefit from the economic content of their performances in the digital era; in other words, formulas that guarantee that artists and authors can have fair remuneration in online use of their interpretation and performance and works. From this viewpoint, we think in the framework of the study we have to look not just at computers or databases. This can simply distract us from the questions we have before us, something that seems to be of concern to certain Delegations, as was expressed this very morning. In fact, ultimately, sir, if the debate that took place at the last session of this committee focused on the proposal of GRULAC, the study should focus exclusively on the problems identified in that proposal. That is all. At any rate, we are attentive to the conclusions which we hope will be reached and presented at the next session of this committee, and we hope that they will foster a debate that can no longer be delayed. Artists and authors need solutions. With all due respect, we cannot allow this time wastage to take place. We need an equitable sharing and the economic benefits derived from the digital use of their interpretations and works. Lastly, Latin artists understands that this question should be a standing independent item on the agenda of the committee. Thank you very much.

LCA:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to echo the statement of El Salvador and the United States that it will be very helpful to have written conclusions of the experts in advance so that we can react to them intelligently. Also, I would like to agree with the United States that the committee should focus on copyright issues and not more abstract market issues. If we start focusing on issues like the value gap, we also need to consider the value to authors of the free global distribution provided by Internet platforms. Thank you.

AADI:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the general association of performers and collective management of related rights of musical performers in the Republic of Argentina, I should like to congratulate you on your appointment as Chairman of this committee as also your new vice chairs. We wish them every success in their work with the cooperation of the Secretariat and the Delegations of the countries making up this committee. I have no doubt that you will have a successful outcome. Also, I'd like to congratulate professors to thank them for both of their presentations and also the Secretariat for its necessary and positive work to bring information to us. Since the first time that the GRULAC brought a document forward has welcomed this discussion. This was an informed document made available in December 2015 by the Delegation of Brazil. At that time and today, apart from a legal solution for each country, that has found four questions on this item, the document is 31/4, which plays a major role placing on the agenda the issue of performers' rights in a digital era to make the possible damage visible to them that are suffered by performers and artists as also to make it obvious who has caused this damage; in other words, major musical production companies. We have made this public and we have fought for obligatory reflective remuneration for artists and performers in my country. I would like to point out today we are not the only ones to have this stance. We have the extraordinary of Filia, which is a Latin America company of artists and performers, which stated at its annual meeting in October 2016, it is important for document SCCR/31/4, which proposes an analysis of copyright in the digital age to be made visible and to make obvious the various difficulties encountered as also to enable our artists to consolidate their work. I do not wish to dwell on these matters further, but I must say that on a daily basis, I see how major corporations make huge profits at the expense of performers. Is this some kind of a joke? But what we need is actions from whatever quarter can prevent their action and promote our action as performers in the digital era. Thank you.

Centre for Internet and Society:
Thank you Mr. Chair. On behalf of CIS, it is my submission that the study can additionally focus on all the key actors along the entire supply and value chain involved in content dissemination in the digital environment, complementing the study of the legal environments. This would shed considerable light on national legal frameworks and also provide us evidence of transparency, or the lack thereof in the businesses involved and the extent of low proportions of copyright and related rights payment to the creators and their unfair treatment. Thank you.

Electronic Information for Libraries:

Thank you, Mr. Chair. There were very many proposals on the interest of libraries, including the management of copyright limitations and exceptions in the digital environment, digital exhaustion, licenses, territoriality, and the interpretation of the three-step test. I'd like to thank the two professors for their presentations. We'd be very interested in the findings with regard to the review of copyright laws for digital uses that was dealt with at the start of the presentation. When we looked at data from the Crews study on limitations and exceptions for libraries and archives, we found that in countries that have amended their copyright laws in the last five years, digital copying is expressly barred in over 1/3 of them, even for preservation reasons. My question is are you also considering in the work the evidence and examples of problems experienced by beneficiaries of certain exceptions, such as the library and archive community, when working in the digital environment, as presented to this committee by the community over the last number of years? That would help to further inform the discussion and the possible conclusions. Thank you.

Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property:
I would like to support that aspect of the GRUAC proposal that focuses on the role of limitations and exceptions in the digital environment as a top priority for this committee.
There is an increasing recognition that so-called non-expressive uses – uses necessary for technological processes that do not compete with the copyright owner – are necessary to enable the internet and the services that are offered over it.
We at American university have been doing studies that suggest that the presence of open exceptions for technological processes isrelated to investment and growth of local digital technologies. Countries with more open exceptions do better at attracting investments in fields such as software engineering. We cannot have local streaming services without local buffering rights. We cannot have local search, artificial intelligence, machine learning, text and data mining, and internet based translation services without local rights to use whole works for purposes that do not compete with the original.
Only a small number of countries around the world provide the clear limitations and exceptions in these areas. And only a small number of countries have robust industries in related fields. But all these services are international by nature, and therefore the lack of harmonization of enabling rights is increasingly perceived as a barrier to trade.
As the experts note, the EU has taken a step in the right direction that can serve as a model in this regard – creating a mandatory exception for certain technological uses in the INFOSOC directive.
That model is not perfect. Many digital innovations I have mentioned use entire works on a basis that might not be viewed as temporary. Nonetheless, the concept that we need a mandatory exception in this regard to facilitate cross border digital trade is salient, and should guide this committee.
Thank you.

Note: Source of the statement texts are WIPO's realtime transcription service.

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