Centre for Internet and Society

Pastebin, Dailymotion, Github blocked after DoT order: Report

praskrishna — 2015-01-03T04:17:48Z

A number of Indian users are reporting they're not able to access websites such as Pastebin, DailyMotion and Github while accessing the internet through providers such as BSNL and Vodafone.

The article by Anupam Saxena was published in the Times of India on December 31, 2014. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

The block was first reported by Pastebin, a website where you can store text online for a set period of time, through its social media accounts on December 19. In a follow-up post on December 26, the site posted that it was still blocked in India on the directions of the Indian government.A number of users also posted about the blocks on Reddit threads confirming that the sites have been blocked by Vodafone, BSNL and Hathway, among others.It now appears that the blocks are being carried out on the instructions of DoT (Department of Telecom). The telecom body reportedly issued a notification regarding the same on December 17. A screenshot of the circular has been posted on Twitter by Pranesh Prakash.

The notification mentions that 32 URLs including Pastebin, video sharing sites Vimeo and DailyMotion, Internet archive site archive.org and Github.com( a web-based software code repository), have been blocked under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. DoT has also asked ISPs to submit compliance reports. However, we have not been able to verify the authenticity of the circular.

At the time of writing this story, we could not access Pastebin, DailyMotion and Github on Vodafone 3G and our office network that has access via dedicated lines. Vodafone is not displaying any errors and is simply blocking access. However, a number of users report that they're getting an error that says 'the site is blocked as per the instructions of Competent Authority.' However, we were able to access all the websites on Airtel 3G.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/times-of-india-anupam-saxena-december-31-2014-pastein-dailymotion-github-blocked-after-dot-order

Govt cracks down on cyber jehad network, blocks access to 32 websites

praskrishna — 2015-01-03T03:29:21Z

The Modi government is starting the New Year with the resolve to wipe out terror and it has cracked down on websites that have been carrying anti-India views and spreading the propaganda of the Islamic State (IS).

The article published in India Today on January 1, 2015 quotes Pranesh Prakash.

Reacting to an alert from the antiterror squad of a state police department, the Department of Telecom (DoT) has blocked access to 32 websites. The DoT order that was tweeted by Pranesh Prakash, policy director of the Bangalore-based research organisation, said that 32 URLs have been blocked under section 69 of the Information and Technology Act, 2000.

The order was reportedly issued on December 16 and it was shared on Twitter on Wednesday. GitHub, Archive.org, Imgur, Vimeo, Daily Motion, Pastebin, sourceforge, justpaste, cryptbin were among the sites that were blocked.

As reports emerged on the ban of these sites, there was outrage on Twitter on the issue of internet censorship. However, most of the websites mentioned in the list that were to be blocked were accessible. Pastebin and Internet Archive, two websites that have reportedly been blocked, tweeted their views.

"If you are from India and unable to visit Pastebin, please email us," Pastebin tweeted on December 19. Internet Archive tweeted on December 31 that they too received complaints from users in India who can't access its website.

Reacting to the outrage, Arvind Gupta, national head of the BJP IT Cell took to Twitter and said that these sites have been blocked after an alert from an anti-terrorism squad that most of them were carrying anti-India content from the Islamic State (IS).

"We should congratulate the government for taking a preventive and precautionary step in a proactive manner based on an advisory," Gupta told Mail Today.

He added that he does not have any details of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) order and only reacted to the Twitter debate on the subject.

Intelligence agencies have been struggling to monitor terror activities on cyber space. There have been reports of terror groups using social media to attract young minds to jehadi ideology.

The recent arrest of Bangalore-based executive Mehdi Masroor Biswas, who was operating a Twitter handle under the the name @ShamiWitness and promoting the views of the Islamic State, has come as a wake-up call for security agencies. Biswas, an engineer working as a "manufacturing executive" with ITC Foods, was nabbed from his rented oneroom apartment after a news report stated that his was the most popular IS Twitter account with close to 17,000 followers, and his tweets were getting viewed over two lakh times a month.

Sources said there are close to 30,000 such Twitter handles and other social media forums along with websites that are spewing venom, and little can be done to monitor all of them and act on time. With cyber threat becoming a clear and present danger, the Centre has decided to set up a highlevel committee to only monitor social media and cyber space. Counter-terror officials believe that the jehadi nexus has a huge bearing on India as youth active on social media are vulnerable to the propaganda being carried out online.

Other than @ShamiWitness, there are Twitter handles such as @MagnetGas with radical views and pro-IS tone that are now under the lens. What is disturbing is that many such sites are India-specific and some are believed to be handled by Indians.

"If there is misuse of Internet and social media, it needs to be dealt with legally. The Internet is like a public place, so if there are extreme views, the state needs to exercise its powers," says D.C. Pathak, former chief of the Intelligence Bureau.

This is not the first time that the DoT has clamped down on websites for promoting "objectionable" content. In June 2013, 39 websites that allowed users to share pornographic content were reportedly blocked.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/india-today-january-1-2015-govt-cracks-down-on-cyber-jehad-network-blocks-access-to-32-websites

India 'jihadi' web blocking causes anger

praskrishna — 2015-01-03T02:48:48Z

A government block on more than 30 high-profile websites has caused anger across India.

The story was published in BBC on January 2, 2015. It was also mirrored in the Puffington Post the same day. Pranesh Prakash is quoted.

India's Department of Telecoms ordered the blocking of the sites in order to prevent the publicising of "jihadi activities".

After considerable pressure, four of the sites - Weebly, Vimeo, Daily Motion and Github - were unblocked.

Officials said the other sites would have their blocks lifted if they complied with the "law of the land".

The Indian Ministry for Communication and Information Technology said in a statement: "It was stated that Anti National group are using social media for mentoring Indian youths to join the Jihadi activities."

It went on to say that the primary concern was that users posting material on the sites did not require any authentication, and that identities could be hidden.

The four websites that have been unblocked were said to have worked with the Indian government to address concerns - although it is unclear what changes, if any, have been made.

Some users were reporting that they were still unable to reach the apparently unblocked sites.

Pranesh Prakash, from the India-based Centre for Internet and Society, said: "Any intelligent person can see these sites don't incite terrorism."

'Many complaints'

Ahead of the ban lifting, a Vimeo spokeswoman said: "It is Vimeo's longstanding policy not to allow videos that promote terrorism, and we remove such videos whenever we become aware of them.

"We have not received notice from the Indian government concerning such videos and have contacted them requesting the blocking order to identify, and evaluate the video in question."

Many internet users in the country are angry that other sites remain blocked, in particular Pastebin - a site used for "dumping" text online anonymously - and The Internet Archive, a US organisation that offers a database of old websites.

The Internet Archive said on Twitter that it had received "many complaints" from users who were unable to access the service.

India has a history of sporadically blocking websites, or issuing warnings about online content.

In August 2012, 245 sites were blocked by the government in an attempt, it said, to quell violence.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/bbc-january-2-2015-india-jihadi-web-blocking-causes-anger

Government blocks 32 websites to check ISIS propaganda

praskrishna — 2015-01-02T13:37:39Z

The Centre has blocked 32 websites, including vimeo.com, dailymotion.com, pastebin.com and github.com, in an effort to curb ISIS propaganda, prompting a wave of online protests.

The article by Kim Arora was published in the Times of India on January 1, 2015. Pranesh Prakash gave his inputs.

An Indian "hacktivist" group, Anonymous India, has threatened reprisal. By Wednesday evening, however, websites that had complied with the government order to remove objectionable content had been unblocked, sources said.

A confidential department of telecom order, dated December 17, instructing all internet service licensees to block the websites appeared online on Wednesday. When contacted to verify the news, Dr Gulshan Rai, director of the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-In), told TOI the directions had been issued to internet service providers following a Mumbai additional chief metropolitan magistrate's November order directing the government's Department of Electronics and Information Technology (DeitY) to implement the same.

He added that Mumbai's Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) had approached the judiciary after interrogating Arif Majeed, a 23-year-old ISIS recruit from Kalyan. More recently, Bengaluru professional Mehdi Biswas was arrested for allegedly spreading ISIS propaganda on Twitter. "These websites were being used to invite youths to join ISIS. We had contacted the websites sometime back and asked for the removal of the objectionable content. At that time, our communications were ignored. Some of them have now agreed to work with the government. The websites that have complied are being unblocked," Rai told TOI.

The move met with opposition from the online community. While the tech community opposed the Github ban, others were upset about video-sharing websites like dailymotion.com and vimeo.com being taken down. "By blocking vimeo and dailymotion along with other websites, India is walking in the footsteps of Pakistan," tweeted @baawraman.

The list of websites in the DoT document was heavy on large text-sharing and collaboration websites, like Github and Pastebin, popular with coders and software developers. Many objected to the blocking of entire websites instead of specific URLs hosting problematic content. However, Rai explained that individual URLs could not be blocked because of the "high mobility of content" on the websites. "It can just be removed and pasted elsewhere. There are no checks and balances," he said.

Hacktivist group Anonymous India tweeted, "One fine morning, Indian government decided to block sites like Github. Now now, it is time to wake-up. Government of India, Expect Us," a tweet from their handle @opindia_revenge said.

As questions began to be raised on social networks, BJP IT cell head Arvind Gupta tweeted, "The websites that have been blocked were based on an advisory by the Anti-Terrorism Squad, and were carrying anti-India content from ISIS. The sites that have removed objectionable content and/or cooperated with the ongoing investigations, are being unblocked."

The sustainability of counter-measures like blanket blocking to contain threats is being questioned. Prasanth Sugathan, counsel at Software Freedom and Law Center, said such a move is short-sighted. "If you block one website, terrorists can always use another one. Or they will move to using encrypted channels, peer-to-peer communication or even telephones. One can't block everything. In my opinion, such a move only inconveniences the daily users and doesn't solve the long-term purpose," said Sugathan. The sentiment was echoed by common Twitter users as well.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi's tweet from August 2012 condemning blanket blocking of websites was pulled out for recirculation. "As a common man, I join the protest against crackdown on freedom of speech! Have changed my DP. 'Sabko Sanmati De Bhagwan.' #GOIBlocks," Modi had tweeted on August 24, 2012.

Pranesh Prakash, policy director at Bengaluru-based Center for Internet and Society, questioned the lack of transparency around the practice of blocking websites under the Indian law. "Qn for govt: Why does the law require secrecy of web blocking orders when it doesn't allow such secrecy for books, films? #GoIBlocks," he tweeted, adding, "The 69A Rules don't allow for transparency, accountability, time-limits on blocks, etc. So easily misused by govt. + courts + individuals." The websites were blocked under section 69 A of the IT Act, 2000 and the IT (Procedure and sdafeguards for Blocking of Access of Information by Public) rules, 2009.

Currently, the Supreme Court is in the middle of hearing a clutch of petitions challenging several IT Act provisions, including blocking and takedown of websites.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/news/the-times-of-india-jan-1-2015-kim-arora-government-blocks-32-websites-to-check-isis-propaganda

Good Intentions, Recalcitrant Text - I: Why India’s Proposal at the ITU is Troubling for Internet Freedoms

geetha — 2014-11-02T15:13:45Z

The UN's International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is hosting its Plenipotentiary Conference (PP-14) this year in South Korea. At PP-14, India introduced a new draft resolution on ITU's Role in Realising Secure Information Society. The Draft Resolution has grave implications for human rights and Internet governance. Geetha Hariharan explores.

At the 2014 Plenipotentiary Conference (‘PP-14’ or ‘Plenipot’) of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), India has tabled a draft proposal on “ITU’s Role in Realising Secure Information Society” [Document 98, dated 20 October 2014] (“Draft Resolution”). India’s proposal has incited a great deal of concern and discussion among Plenipot attendees, governments and civil society alike. Before offering my concerns and comments on the Draft Resolution, let us understand the proposal.

Our Draft Resolution identifies 3 security concerns with exchange of information and resource allocation on the Internet:

First, it is troubling for India that present network architecture has “security weaknesses” such as “camouflaging the identity of the originator of the communication”;[1] random IP address distribution also makes “tracing of communication difficult”;[2]
Second, India is concerned that under the present allocation system of naming, numbering and addressing resources on the Internet, it is impossible or at the very least, cumbersome to identify the countries to which IP address are allocated;[3]
Third, India finds it insecure from the point of view of national security that traffic originating and terminating in the same country (domestic traffic) often routes through networks overseas;[4] similarly, local address resolution also routes through IP addresses outside the country or region, which India finds troubling.[5]

In an effort to address these concerns, the Draft Resolution seeks to instruct the ITU Secretary General:

First, to develop and recommend a ‘traffic routing plan’ that can “effectively ensure the traceability of communication”;[6]
Second, to collaborate with relevant international and intergovernmental organisations to develop an “IP address plan” which facilitates identification of locations/countries to which IP addresses are allocated and coordinates allocation accordingly;[7]
Third, to develop and recommend “a public telecom network architecture” that localizes both routing[8] as well as address resolution[9] for local/domestic traffic to “within the country”.

Admittedly, our Draft Resolution is intended to pave a way for “systematic, fair and equitable allocation” of, inter alia, naming, numbering and addressing resources,[10] keeping in mind security and human rights concerns.[11] In an informal conversation, members of the Indian delegation echoed these sentiments. Our resolution does not, I was told, raise issues about the “concentration of control over Internet resources”, though “certain governments” have historically exercised more control. It also does not, he clarified, wish to make privacy or human rights a matter for discussion at the ITU. All that the Draft Resolution seeks to do is to equip the ITU with the mandate to prepare and recommend a “roadmap for the systematization” of allocation of naming, numbering and addressing resources, and for local routing of domestic traffic and address resolution. The framework for such mandate is that of security, given the ITU’s role in ‘building confidence and security in the use of ICTs’ under Action Line C5 of the Geneva Plan of Action, 2003.

Unfortunately, the text of our Draft Resolution, by dint of imprecision or lack of clarity, undermines India’s intentions. On three issues of utmost importance to the Internet, the Draft Resolution has unintended or unanticipated impacts. First, its text on tracing communication and identity of originators, and systematic allocation of identifiable IP address blocks to particular countries, has impacts on privacy and freedom of expression. Given Edward Snowden’s NSA files and the absence of adequate protections against government incursions or excesses into privacy,[12] either in international human rights law or domestic law, such text is troublesome. Second, it has the potential to undermine multi-stakeholder approaches to Internet governance by proposing text that refers almost exclusively to sovereign monopolies over Internet resource allocation, and finally, displays a certain disregard for network architecture and efficiency, and to principles of a free, open and unified Internet, when it seeks to develop global architecture that facilitates (domestic) localization of traffic-routing, address resolution and allocation of naming, numbering and addressing.

In this post, I will address the first concern of human rights implications of our Draft Resolution.

Unintended Implications for Privacy and Freedom of Expression:

India’s Draft Resolution has implications for individual privacy. At two different parts of the preamble, India expresses concerns with the impossibility of locating the user at the end of an IP address:

Pream. §(e): “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”;
Pream. §(h): “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.

The concerns here surround difficulties in tracking IP addresses due to the widespread use of NATs, as also the existence of IP anonymisers like Tor. Anonymisers like Tor permit individuals to cover their online tracks; they conceal user location and Internet activity from persons or governments conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis. For this reason, Tor has caused much discomfort to governments. Snowden used Tor while communicating with Laura Poitras. Bradley (now Chelsea) Manning of Wikileaks fame is reported to have used Tor (page 24). Crypto is increasingly the safest – perhaps the only safe – avenue for political dissidents across the world; even Internet companies were coerced into governmental compliance. No wonder, then, that governments are doing all they can to dismantle IP anonymisers: the NSA and GCHQ have tried to break Tor; the Russian government has offered a reward to anyone who can.

Far be it from me to defend Tor blindly. There are reports suggesting that Tor is being used by offenders, and not merely those of the Snowden variety. But governments must recognize the very obvious trust deficit they face, especially after Snowden’s revelations, and consider the implications of seeking traceability and identity/geolocation for every IP address, in a systematic manner. The implications are for privacy, a right guaranteed by Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Privacy has been recognized by the UN General Assembly as applicable in cases of surveillance, interception and data collection, in Pream. §4 of its resolution The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. But many states do not have robust privacy protections for individuals and data. And while governments may state the necessity to create international policy to further effective criminal investigations, such an aim cannot be used to nullify or destroy the rights of privacy and free speech guaranteed to individuals. Article 5(1), ICCPR, codifies this principle, when it states that States, groups or persons may not “engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein…”.

Erosion of privacy has a chilling effect on free speech [New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254], so free speech suffers too. Particularly with regard to Tor and identification of IP address location and users, anonymity in Internet communications is at issue. At the moment, most states already have anonymity-restrictions, in the form of identification and registration for cybercafés, SIM cards and broadband connections. For instance, Rule 4 of India’s Information Technology (Guidelines for Cyber Cafe) Rules, 2011, mandates that we cannot not use computers in a cybercafé without establishing our identities. But our ITU Draft Resolution seeks to dismantle the ability of Internet users to operate anonymously, be they political dissidents, criminals or those merely acting on their expectations of privacy. Such dismantling would be both violative of international human rights law, as well as dangerous for freedom of expression and privacy in principle. Anonymity is integral to democratic discourse, held the US Supreme Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission [514 U.S. 334 (1995)].[13] Restrictions on Internet anonymity facilitate communications surveillance and have a chilling effect on the free expression of opinions and ideas, wrote Mr. Frank La Rue, Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression (¶¶ 48-49).

So a law or international policy for blanket identification and traceability of IP addresses has grave consequences for and prima facie violates privacy, anonymity and freedom of speech. But these rights are not absolute, and can be validly restricted. And because these human rights are implicated, the ITU with its lack of expertise in the area may not be the adequate forum for discussion or study.

To be valid and justified interference, any law, policy or order interfering with privacy and free speech must meet the standards of reasonableness and proportionality, even if national security were the government’s legitimate aim, laid down in Articles 19(3) and 17 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) [Toonen v. Australia, Communication No. 488/1992, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/50/D/488/1992 (1994), ¶6.4]. And as the European Court of Human Rights found in Weber & Saravia v. Germany [Application no. 54934/00, 29 June 2006 (ECHR), ¶95], law or executive procedure that enables surveillance without sufficient safeguards is prima facie unreasonable and disproportionate. Re: anonymity, in Delfi AS v. Estonia [Application no. 64569/09, 17 February 2014, ¶83], while considering the liability of an Internet portal for offensive anonymous comments, the ECHR has emphasized the importance of balancing freedom of expression and privacy. It relied on certain principles such as “contribution to a debate of general interest, subject of the report, the content, form and consequences of the publication” to test the validity of government’s restrictions.

The implications of the suggested text of India’s Draft Resolution should then be carefully thought out. And this is a good thing. For one must wonder why governments need perfect traceability, geolocation and user identification for all IP addresses. Is such a demand really different from mass or blanket surveillance, in scale and government tracking ability? Would this not tilt the balance of power strongly in favour of governments against individuals (citizens or non-citizens)? This fear must especially arise in the absence of domestic legal protections, both in human rights, and criminal law and procedure. For instance, India’s Information Technology Act, 2000 (amended in 2008) has Section 66A, which criminalizes offensive speech, as well as speech that causes annoyance or inconvenience. Arguably, arrests under Section 66A have been arbitrary, and traceability may give rise to a host of new worries.

In any event, IP addresses and users can be discerned under existing domestic law frameworks. Regional Internet Registries (RIR) such as APNIC allocate blocks of IP addresses to either National Internet Registries (NIR – such as IRINN for India) or to ISPs directly. The ISPs then allocate IP addresses dynamically to users like you and me. Identifying information for these ISPs is maintained in the form of WHOIS records and registries with RIRs or NIRs, and this information is public. ISPs of most countries require identifying information from users before Internet connection is given, i.e., IP addresses allocated (mostly by dynamic allocation, for that is more efficient). ISPs of some states are also regulated; in India, for instance, ISPs require a licence to operate and offer services.

If any government wished, on the basis of some reasonable cause, to identify a particular IP address or its user, then the government could first utilize WHOIS to obtain information about the ISP. Then ISPs may be ordered to release specific IP address locations and user information under executive or judicial order. There are also technical solutions, such as traceroute or IP look-up that assist in tracing or identifying IP addresses. Coders, governments and law enforcement must surely be aware of better technology than I.

If we take into account this possibility of geolocation of IP addresses, then the Draft Resolution’s motivation to ‘systematize’ IP address allocations on the basis of states is unclear. I will discuss the implication of this proposal, and that of traffic and address localization, in my next post.

[1] Pream. §(e), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that the modern day packet networks, which at present have many security weaknesses, inter alia, camouflaging the identity of originator of the communication”.

[2] Pream. §(h), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that IP addresses are distributed randomly, that makes the tracing of communication difficult”.

[3] Op. §1, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to collaborate with all stakeholders including International and intergovernmental organizations, involved in IP addresses management to develop an IP address plan from which IP addresses of different countries are easily discernible and coordinate to ensure distribution of IP addresses accordingly”.

[4] Pream. §(g), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that communication traffic originating and terminating in a country also many times flows outside the boundary of a country making such communication costly and to some extent insecure from national security point of view”.

[5] Pream. §(f), Draft Resolution: “recognizing… that even for local address resolution at times, system has to use resources outside the country which makes such address resolution costly and to some extent insecure from national security perspective”.

[6] Op. §6, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend a routing plan of traffic for optimizing the network resources that could effectively ensure the traceability of communication”.

[7] Op. §1, Draft Resolution; see note 3.

[8] Op. §5, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures that effectively the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country remains within the country”.

[9] Op. §4, Draft Resolution: “instructs the Secretary General… to develop and recommend public telecom network architecture which ensures effectively that address resolution for the traffic meant for the country, traffic originating and terminating in the country/region takes place within the country”.

[10] Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶3: “Planning and distribution of numbering and naming resources in a systematic, equitable, fair and just manner amongst the Member States…”

[11] Context Note to Draft Resolution, ¶2: “…there are certain areas that require critical attention to move in the direction of building the necessary “Trust Framework” for the safe “Information Society”, where privacy, safety are ensured”.

[12] See, for instance, Report of the Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (“OHCHR”), Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, A/HRC/27/37 (30 June 2014), ¶34-35, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf. See esp. note 30 of the Report, ¶35.

[13] Many thorny political differences exist between the US and many states (including India and Kenya, who I am told has expressed preliminary support for the Draft Resolution) with regard to Internet governance. Irrespective of this, the US Constitution’s First Amendment and judicial protections to freedom of expression remain a yardstick for many states, including India. India, for instance, has positively referred to the US Supreme Court’s free speech protections in many of its decisions; ex. see Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1963 Cri. L.J. 329; R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1995 SC 264.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/good-intentions-going-awry-i-why-india2019s-proposal-at-the-itu-is-troubling-for-internet-freedoms

We the goondas

praskrishna — 2014-08-04T15:06:18Z

You can now be arrested in Karnataka even before you commit an offence under the IT Act. You could be in jail under the Goonda Act even if not guilty under the Indian Copyright Act. If govt thinks you are planning to send a 'lascivious' photo to a WhatsApp group, or forwarding a copyrighted song, you can be arrested.

The article by Shyam Prasad was published in the Bangalore Mirror on August 4, 2014. Sunil Abraham gave his inputs.

Have a smartphone? Run for cover. Bizarre as this might sound, the cops are going to come after you if you so much as forward a song to a friend. Forget actually doing it, any plans to do so could land you in serious trouble too. You could be labelled a 'goonda' in the eyes of the State and find yourself behind bars.

In a completely unfathomable move, Karnataka has brought most offences under the Information Technology Act, 2000, and Indian Copyright Act, 1957, under the ambit of the Goonda Act. Until now, people with a history of offences like bootlegging, drug offences and immoral trafficking could be taken into preventive custody. But the government, in its enthusiasm, while adding acid attackers and sexual predators to the law, has also added 'digital offenders'. While it was thought to be against audio and video pirates, Bangalore Mirror has found it could be directed at all those who frequent FB, Twitter and the online world, posting casual comments and reactions to events unfolding around them.

So if you are planning a digital 'offence' — which could be an innocuous opinion like the young girls' in Mumbai after the bandh declared on Bal Thackeray's death — that could attract the provisions of the Information Technology Act. You can even be taken into preventive custody like a 'goonda'. Even those given exceptions under the Indian Copyright Act can find themselves in jail for a year without being presented before a magistrate. Technically, if you are even planning to forward 'lascivious' memes and images to a WhatsApp group or forwarding a song or 'copyrighted' PDF book, you can be punished under the Goondas Act.

The law-makers clearly did not dwell much on the implications while bringing the majority of the populace within the ambit of this law. On July 28, the Karnataka Legislature passed (it took barely a minute from tabling to voice vote), 'The Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug-offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Slum-grabbers and Video or Audio Pirates, (Amendment) Bill, 2014'. The amendment adds, "Acid attackers, Depradator of Environment, Digital Offenders, Money Launderers and Sexual Predators", to the title. In common parlance, this law is known as the 'Goonda Act'.

The move has come as a shock to the legal community which has slammed it, terming it an attempt by the state to usurp central powers. The government had earlier included 'piracy' under the Goonda Act. But it was applicable only to those pirating film DVDs. Now, this will include books, film songs, music, software or anything big corporates and multinationals claim they have copyright on.

Sunil Abraham, executive director, Centre for Internet and Society, is left in no doubt that the new law is "a terrible thing". "It is a sad development. It is not just bringing the provisions of the IT Act, but also the Copyright Act, that will hurt the common man," he said.

'Digital Offenders' means "any person who knowingly or deliberately violates, for commercial purposes, any copyright law in relation to any book, music, film, software, artistic or scientific work and also includes any person who illegally enters through the identity of another user and illegally uses any computer or digital network for pecuniary gain for himself or any other person or commits any of the offences specified under sections 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74 and 75 of the Information Technology Act, 2000."

Section 67 of the IT Act will be the most dangerous for the common man with a smartphone in hand now. The section, "Publishing of information which is obscene in electronic form," includes "any material which is lascivious or appeal to the prurient interest." This could have a very broad interpretation.

Advocate Nagendra Naik says, "The Goonda Act provides for preventive arrest. In the Information Technology Act and The Copyright Act, you have to commit the offence to be arrested. But here, you can be taken into preventive custody even before you commit the said offences. In normal arrests, you can straightaway apply for bail. But under the Goonda Act, you cannot. There is a long process of review and you will be in custody at least till then. The third impact is, you can have a history sheet started against you by the police. Technically, your slips on WhatsApp will attract the Goonda Act against you."

Supreme Court advocate KV Dhananjay said the Goonda Act is a draconian piece of legislation and it necessarily mocks at the institution of courts and lawyers. "After the passage of the various amendments to the Goonda Act, Karnataka now looks like a mini North Korea where police mood swings will decide whether the ordinary citizen has any right at all," he said.

Advocate Shyam Sundar, says, "What if your smartphone has a list of repeated material sent out over days or weeks. Most people do not even know if their phones are affected by viruses which could be sending out such material. Another example is of Facebook. There are so many FB pages with pornographic content. If someone who has subscribed to such a page sends you a friend request and you accept it, that content will surface on your page. It will have a history of repetition. The amendment clearly opens up huge problems for the common people. There is no doubt of the law being grossly misused and the amendment to include provisions of the IT Act has been done without application of mind. What is lascivious appeal in the first place? A porn star has been made a film star in India. Is this not lust? Are there enough filters in place to secure your smartphone from online abuse?"

The new law will in all probability create more corruption than anything else, say experts. Dhananjay says, "Until last week, police postings in Bangalore and other bigger cities were selling for tens of lakhs. Thanks to these amendments, some postings that enforce the Goonda Act will now sell for a couple of crores. The public will not feel safe due to this draconian legislation. Those who enforce the Goonda Act, however, will become richer through corruption, thanks to the fear created by these new amendments."

One year in jail for the innocent too

Sunil Abraham gives two examples by which the amended Goonda Act will become a ruthless piece of legislation. "If I publish an image of a naked body as part of a scientific article about the human body, is it obscene or not? It will not be obscene and, if I am arrested under the IT Act, I will be produced before the magistrate within 24 hours and can explain it to him. But now, I will be arrested under the Goonda Act and need not be produced before a magistrate for 90 days. It can be extended to one year. So for one year, I will be in jail even if I have not committed any wrong. Another example pertains to bringing offences under the Copyright Act under the Goonda Act. In the Copyright Act, there is an exception for reporting, research, educational and people with disability. A visually impaired person, for example, can, without paying royalty, convert a book into another format like Braille or audio and share it with another visually impaired person on a non-profit basis. But if he is arrested under Goonda Act, he will be in jail for one year, even before he does it."

HAVE THEY READ STATUTE?
Supreme Court advocate KV Dhananjay says, "The definition of a 'digital offender' is simply laughable. I do not think that whoever asked the state government to include 'digital offence' under the Goonda Act has carefully read the Constitution of India. Under the Constitution, both copyright and telecommunications are exclusive central subjects. This means that states simply cannot make any law on these subjects." Dhananjay gives the example of payment of income tax. "You know already that only the central government can demand and collect your income taxes. Can any state government say that it will create a new law to punish its resident who defaults in payment of income tax? You would simply laugh at any such law. This new definition of 'digital offender' is no less amusing. Offences under the Information Technology Act, 2000, are exclusively punishable by the central government only. State governments have no power to say that an Act shall become an offence when it does not even have the power to regulate such an Act."

CRIMINAL LAW EXPERTS SAY
Senior designate advocate, MT Nanaiah: "This law will be too harsh. There are MLAs who do not know the meaning of cyber crime. We (advocates) will be kept busy at the cost of innocent people because of this step. It provides for arresting anyone who would allegedly be planning to do something. Finding him guilty or otherwise comes later. What happens if your phone is lost or somebody sends something from your phone without your knowledge? For the first few years, innocents will go to jail. Then the courts will probably intervene and call for modifying what is at best a bad law. A similar situation arose with Section 498(A) of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. It was misused to such an extent that courts had to step in." Senior designate advocate and former State Public Prosecutor HS Chandramouli : "Even social legislations have been misused. And, in this case, most people are illiterate about what cyber crime is. It is mostly teenagers and college students who will feel the heat. These are the people who mostly forward material considered obscene. It is necessary to educate people through discussions, workshops in the bar associations, law college and with experts. The amendment has been passed in the Legislature without discussion, which is a tragedy. At least now, before it is gazetted, people should be warned about what is being brought into the Goonda Act. I do not know how fair adding 'digital offenders' in the Goonda Act will be to the public, but the chances of misuse are more. There are no riders or prosecution for misuse. And how many policemen know about cyber crimes? During the infamous 'kidney' case (where people were cheated and their kidneys removed) many policemen did not know the difference between kidneys and testicles."

ONE YEAR IN JAIL WITHOUT CHANCE OF BAIL FOR..

Forwarding a song from your phone
Forwarding an e-book from your email
A nude photo which the govt thinks is obscene
Any software that a company says it owns
A movie which a company says it has copyright on

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/news/bangalore-mirror-shyam-prasad-august-4-2014-we-the-goondas

GNI and IAMAI Launch Interactive Slideshow Exploring Impact of India's Internet Laws

jyoti — 2014-07-17T12:01:01Z

The Global Network Initiative and the Internet and Mobile Association of India have come together to explain how India’s Internet and technology laws impact economic innovation and freedom of expression.

The Global Network Initiative (GNI), and the Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI) have launched an interactive slide show exploring the impact of existing Internet laws on users and businesses in India. The slide show created by Newsbound, and to which Centre for Internet and Society (CIS) has contributed its comments—explain the existing legislative mechanisms prevalent in India, map the challenges of the regulatory environment and highlight areas where such mechanisms can be strengthened.

Foregrounding the difficulties of content regulation, the slides are aimed at informing users and the public of the constraints of current legal mechanisms in place, including safe harbour and take down and notice provisions. Highlighting Section 79(3) and the Intermediary Liability Rules issued in 2011, the slide show identifies some of the challenges faced by Internet platforms, such as the broad interpretation of the legislation by the executive branch.

Challenges governing Internet platforms highlighted in the slide show include uniform Terms of Service that do not consider the type of service being provided by the platform, uncertain requirements for taking down content and compliance obligations related to information disclosure. Further the issues of over compliance and misuse of the legal notice and take down system introduced under Section 79 of the Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules 2011.

The Rules were created with the purpose of providing guidelines for the ‘post-publication redressal mechanism expression as envisioned in the Constitution of India'. However, since their introduction, the Rules have been criticised extensively, by both the national and the international media on account of not conforming to principles of natural justice and freedom of expression. Critics have pointed out that by not recognising the different functions performed by the different intermediaries and by not providing safeguards against misuse of such mechanism for suppressing legitimate expression, the Rules have a chilling effect on freedom of expression.

Under the current Rules, the third party provider/creator of information is not given a chance to be heard by the intermediary, nor is there a requirement to give a reasoned decision by the intermediary to the creator whose content has been taken down. The take down procedure also, does not have any provisions for restoring the removed information, such as providing a counter notice filing mechanism or appealing to a higher authority. Further, the content criteria for removal of content includes terms like 'disparaging' and 'objectionable', which are not defined and prima facie seem to be beyond the reasonable restrictions envisioned by the Constitution of India. With uncertainty in content criteria and no safeguards to prevent abuse complainant may send frivolous complaints and suppress legitimate expressions without any fear of repercussions.

Most importantly, the redressal mechanism under the Rules shifts the burden of censorship, previously, the exclusive domain of the judiciary or the executive, and makes it the responsibility of private intermediaries. Often, private intermediaries, do not have sufficient legal resources to subjectively determine the legitimacy of a legal claim, resulting in over compliance to limit liability. The slide show cites the 2011 CIS research carried out by Rishabh Dara to determine whether the Rules lead to a chilling effect on online free expression, towards highlighting the issue of over compliance and self censorship.

The initiative is timely, given the change of guard in India, and stresses, not only the economic impact of fixing the Internet legal framework, but also the larger impact on users rights and freedom of expression. The initiative calls for a legal environment for the Internet that enables innovation, protects the rights of users, and provides clear rules and regulations for businesses large and small.

See the slideshow here: How India’s Internet Laws Can Help Propel the Country Forward

Other GNI reports and resources:

Closing the Gap: Indian Online Intermediaries and a Liability System Not Yet Fit for Purpose

Strengthening Protections for Online Platforms Could Add Billions to India’s GDP

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/gni-and-iamai-launch-interactive-slideshow-exploring-impact-of-indias-internet-laws

FOEX Live

geetha — 2014-07-07T12:36:49Z

Selections of news on online freedom of expression and digital technology from across India (and some parts of the world)

For feedback, comments and any incidents of online free speech violation you are troubled or intrigued by, please email Geetha at geetha[at]cis-india.org or on Twitter at @covertlight.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/foex-live

Facebook and its Aversion to Anonymous and Pseudonymous Speech

Jessamine Mathew — 2014-07-04T07:53:07Z

Jessamine Mathew explores Facebook's "real name" policy and its implications for the right to free speech.

The power to be unidentifiable on the internet has been a major reason for its sheer number of users. Most of the internet can now be freely used by anybody under a pseudonym without the fear of being recognised by anybody else. These conditions allow for the furtherance of free expression and protection of privacy on the internet, which is particularly important for those who use the internet as a medium to communicate political dissent or engage in any other activity which would be deemed controversial in a society yet not illegal. For example, an internet forum for homosexuals in India, discussing various issues which surround homosexuality may prove far more fruitful if contributors are given the option of being undetectable, considering the stigma that surrounds homosexuality in India, and the recent setting-aside of the Delhi High Court decision reading down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. The possibility of being anonymous or pseudonymous exists on many internet fora but on Facebook, the world’s greatest internet space for building connections and free expression, there is no sanction given to pseudonymous accounts as Facebook follows a real name policy. And as the recent decision of a New York judge, disallowing Facebook from contesting warrants on private information of over 300 of its users, shows, there are clear threats to freedom of expression and privacy.

On the subject of using real names, Facebook’s Community Standards states, “Facebook is a community where people use their real identities. We require everyone to provide their real names, so you always know who you're connecting with. This helps keep our community safe.” Facebook’s Marketing Director, Randi Zuckerberg, bluntly dismissed the idea of online anonymity as one that “has to go away” and that people would “behave much better” if they are made to use their real names. Apart from being a narrow-minded statement, she fails to realise that there are many different kinds of expression on the internet, from stories of sexual abuse victims to the views of political commentators, or indeed, whistleblowers, many of whom may prefer to use the platform without being identified. It has been decided in many cases that humans have a right to anonymity as it provides for the furtherance of free speech without the fear of retaliation or humiliation (see Talley v. California).

While Facebook’s rationale behind wanting users to register for accounts with their own names is based on the goal of maintaining the security of other users, it is still a serious infraction on users’ freedom of expression, particularly when anonymous speech has been protected by various countries. Facebook has evolved from a private space for college students to connect with each other to a very public platform where not just social connections but also discussions take place, often with a heavily political theme. Facebook has been described as instrumental in the facilitation of communication during the Arab Spring, providing a space for citizens to effectively communicate with each other and organise movements. Connections on Facebook are no longer of a purely social nature but have extended to political and legal as well, with it being used to promote movements all through the country. Even in India, Facebook was the most widely adopted medium, along with Twitter and Facebook, for discourse on the political future of the country during, before and after the 2014 elections. Earlier in 2011, Facebook was used intensively during the India Against Corruption movement. There were pages created, pictures and videos uploaded, comments posted by an approximate of 1.5 million people in India. In 2012, Facebook was also used to protest against the Delhi gang rape with many coming forward with their own stories of sexual assault, providing support to the victim, organising rallies and marches and protesting about the poor level of safety of women in Delhi.

Much like its content policy, Facebook exhibits a number of discrepancies in the implementation of the anonymity ban. Salman Rushdie found that his Facebook account had been suspended and when it was reinstated after he sent them proof of identity, Facebook changed his name to the name on his passport, Ahmed Rushdie instead of the name he popularly goes by. Through a series of tweets, he criticised this move by Facebook, forcing him to display his birth name. Eventually Facebook changed his name back to Salman Rushdie but not before serious questions were raised regarding Facebook’s policies. The Moroccan activist Najat Kessler’s account was also suspended as it was suspected that she was using a fake name. Facebook has also not just stopped at suspending individual user accounts but has also removed pages and groups because the creators used pseudonyms to create and operate the pages in question. This was seen in the case of Wael Ghonim who created a group which helped in mobilizing citizens in Egypt in 2011. Ghonim was a Google executive who did not want his online activism to affect his professional life and hence operated under a pseudonym. Facebook temporarily removed the group due to his pseudonymity but later reinstated it.

While Facebook performs its due diligence when it comes to some accounts, it has still done nothing about the overwhelmingly large number of obviously fake accounts, ranging from Santa Claus to Jack the Ripper. On my own Facebook friend list, there are people who have entered names of fictional characters as their own, clearly violating the real name policy. I once reported a pseudonymous account that used the real name of another person. Facebook thanked me for reporting the account but also said that I will “probably not hear back” from them. The account still exists with the same name. The redundancy of the requirement lies in the fact that Facebook does not request users to upload some form identification when they register with the site but only when they suspect them to be using a pseudonym. Since Facebook also implements its policies largely only on the basis of complaints by other users or the government, the real name policy makes many political dissidents and social activists the target of abuse on the internet.

Further, Articles 21 and 22 of the ICCPR grant all humans the right to free and peaceful assembly. As governments increasingly crack down on physical assemblies of people fighting for democracy or against legislation or conditions in a country, the internet has proved to be an extremely useful tool for facilitating this assembly without forcing people to endure the wrath of governmental authorities. A large factor which has promoted the popularity of internet gatherings is the way in which powerful opinions can be voice without the fear of immediate detection. Facebook has become the coveted online space for this kind of assembly but their policies and more particularly, faulty implementation of the policies, lead to reduced flows of communication on the site.

Of course, Facebook’s fears of cyberbullying and harassment are likely to materialise if there is absolutely no check on the identity of users. A possible solution to the conflict between requiring real names to keep the community safe and still allowing individuals to be present on the network without the fear of identification by anybody would be to ask users to register with their own names but still allowing them to create a fictional name which would be the name that other Facebook users can see. Under this model, Facebook can also deal with the issue of safety through their system of reporting against other users. If a pseudonymous user has been reported by a substantial number of people for harassment or any other cause, then Facebook may either suspend the account or remove the content that is offensive. If the victim of harassment chooses to approach a judicial body, then Facebook may reveal the real name of the user so that due process may be followed. At the same time, users who utilise the website to present their views and participate in the online process of protest or contribute to free expression in any other way can do so without the fear of being detected or targeted. Safety on the site can be maintained even without forcing users to reveal their real names to the world. The system that Facebook follows currently does not help curb the presence of fake accounts and neither does it promote completely free expression on the site.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/facebook-and-its-aversion-to-anonymous-and-pseudonymous-speech

Free Speech and Civil Defamation

gautam — 2014-07-08T08:31:18Z

Does defamation become a tool in powerful hands to suppress criticism? Gautam Bhatia examines the strict and unrealistic demands of defamation law, and concludes that defamation suits are a weapon to silence dissent and bad press.

Previously on this blog, we have discussed one of the under-analysed aspects of Article 19(2) – contempt of court. In the last post, we discussed the checking – or “watchdog” – function of the press. There is yet another under-analysed part of 19(2) that we now turn to – one which directly implicates the press, in its role as public watchdog. This is the issue of defamation.

Unlike contempt of court – which was a last-minute insertion by Ambedkar, before the second reading of the draft Constitution in the Assembly – defamation was present in the restrictions clause since the Fundamental Rights Sub-Committee’s first draft, in 1947. Originally, it accompanied libel and slander, before the other two were dropped for the simpler “reasonable restrictions… in the interests of… defamation.” Unlike the other restrictions, which provoked substantial controversy, defamation did not provoke extended scrutiny by the Constituent Assembly.

In hindsight, that was a lapse. In recent years, defamation lawsuits have emerged as a powerful weapon against the press, used primarily by individuals and corporations in positions of power and authority, and invariably as a means of silencing criticism. For example, Hamish MacDonald’s The Polyester Prince, a book about the Ambanis, was unavailable in Indian bookshops, because of threats of defamation lawsuits. In January, Bloomsbury withdrew The Descent of Air India, which was highly critical of ex-Aviation Minister Praful Patel, after the latter filed a defamation lawsuit. Around the same time, Sahara initiated a 200 crore lawsuit against Tamal Bandyopadhayay, a journalist with The Mint, for his forthcoming book, Sahara: The Untold Story. Sahara even managed to get a stay order from a Calcutta High Court judge, who cited one paragraph from the book, and ruled that “Prima facie, the materials do seem to show the plaintiffs in poor light.” The issue has since been settled out of Court. Yet there is no guarantee that Bandyopadhyay would have won on merits, even with the absurd amount claimed as damages, given that a Pune Court awarded damages of Rs. 100 crores to former Justice P.B. Sawant against the Times Group, for a fifteen-second clip by a TV channel that accidentally showed his photograph next to the name of a judge who was an accused in a scam. What utterly takes the cake, though, is Infosys serving legal notices to three journalistic outlets recently, asking for damages worth Rs. 200 crore for “loss of reputation and goodwill due to circulation of defamatory articles.”

Something is very wrong here. The plaintiffs are invariably politicians or massive corporate houses, and the defendants are invariably journalists or newspapers. The subject is always critical reporting. The damages claimed (and occasionally, awarded) are astronomical – enough to cripple or destroy any business – and the actual harm is speculative. A combination of these factors, combined with a broken judicial system in which trials take an eternity to progress, leading to the prospect of a lawsuit hanging perpetually over one’s head, and financial ruin just around the corner, clearly has the potential to create a highly effective chilling effect upon newspapers, when it come to critical speech on matters of public interest.

One of the reasons that this happens, of course, is that extant defamation law allows it to happen. Under defamation law, as long as a statement is published, is defamatory (that is, tending to lower the reputation of the plaintiff in the minds of reasonable people) and refers to the plaintiff, a prima facie case of defamation is made out. The burden then shifts to the defendant to argue a justification, such as truth, or fair comment, or privileged communication. Notice that defamation, in this form, is a strict liability offence: that is, the publisher cannot save himself even if he has taken due care in researching and writing his story. Even an inadvertent factual error can result in liability. Furthermore, there are many things that straddle a very uncomfortable barrier between “fact” and “opinion” (“opinions” are generally not punishable for defamation): for example, if I call you “corrupt”, have I made a statement of fact, or one of opinion? Much of reporting – especially political reporting – falls within this slipstream.

The legal standard of defamation, therefore, puts almost all the burden upon the publisher, a burden that will often be impossible to discharge – as well as potentially penalising the smallest error. Given the difficulty in fact-checking just about everything, as well as the time pressures under which journalists operate, this is an unrealistic standard. What makes things even worse, however, is that there is no cap on damages, and that the plaintiff need not even demonstrate actual harm in making his claims. Judges have the discretion to award punitive damages, which are meant to serve both as an example and as a deterrent. When Infosys claims 2000 crores, therefore, it need not show that there has been a tangible drop in its sales, or that it has lost an important and lucrative contract – let alone showing that the loss was caused by the defamatory statement. All it needs to do is make abstract claims about loss of goodwill and reputation, which are inherently difficult to verify either way, and it stands a fair chance of winning.

A combination of onerous legal standards and crippling amounts in damages makes the defamation regime a very difficult one for journalists to operate freely in. We have discussed before the crucial role that journalists play in a system of free speech whose underlying foundation is the maintenance of democracy: a free press is essential to maintaining a check upon the actions of government and other powerful players, by subjecting them to scrutiny and critique, and ensuring that the public is aware of important facts that government might be keen to conceal. In chilling journalistic speech, therefore, defamation laws strike at the heart of Article 19(1)(a). When considering what the appropriate standards ought to be, a Court therefore must consider the simple fact that if defamation – as it stands today – is compromising the core of 19(1)(a) itself, then it is certainly not a “reasonable restriction” under 19(2) (some degree of proportionality is an important requirement for 19(2) reasonableness, as the Court has held many times).

This is not, however, a situation unique to India. In Singapore, for instance, “[political] leaders have won hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages in defamation cases against critics and foreign publications, which they have said are necessary to protect their reputations from unfounded attacks” – the defamation lawsuit, indeed, was reportedly a legal strategy used by Lee Kuan Yew against political opponents.

Particularly in the United States, the European Union and South Africa, however, this problem has been recognised, and acted upon. In the next post, we shall examine some of the legal techniques used in those jurisdictions, to counter the chilling effect that strict defamation laws can have on the press.

We discussed the use of civil defamation laws as weapons to stifle a free and critical press. One of the most notorious of such instances also birthed one of the most famous free speech cases in history: New York Times v. Sullivan. This was at the peak of the civil rights movement in the American South, which was accompanied by widespread violence and repression of protesters and civil rights activists. A full-page advertisement was taken out in the New York Times, titled Heed Their Rising Voices, which detailed some particularly reprehensible acts by the police in Montgomery, Alabama. It also contained some factual errors. For example, the advertisement mentioned that Martin Luther King Jr. had been arrested seven times, whereas he had only been arrested four times. It also stated that the Montgomery police had padlocked students into the university dining hall, in order to starve them into submission. That had not actually happened. On this basis, Sullivan, the Montgomery police commissioner, sued for libel. The Alabama courts awarded 500,000 dollars in damages. Because five other people in a situation similar to Sullivan were also suing, the total amount at stake was three million dollars – enough to potentially boycott the New York Times, and certainly enough to stop it from publishing about the civil rights movement.

In his book about the Sullivan case, Make No Law, Anthony Lewis notes that the stakes in the case were frighteningly high. The civil rights movement depended, for its success, upon stirring public opinion in the North. The press was just the vehicle to do it, reporting as it did on excessive police brutality against students and peaceful protesters, practices of racism and apartheid, and so on. Sullivan was a legal strategy to silence the press, and its weapon of choice was defamation law.

In a 9 – 0 decision, the Supreme Court found for the New York Times, and changed the face of free speech law (and, according to Lewis, saved the civil rights movement). Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan made the crucial point that in order to survive, free speech needed “breathing space” – that is, the space to make errors. Under defamation law, as it stood, “the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public criticism [is] an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot survive.” And under the burden of proving truth, “would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is, in fact, true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." For these reasons, Justice Brennan laid down an “actual malice” test for defamation – that is, insofar as the statement in question concerned the conduct of a public official, it was actionable for defamation only if the publisher either knew it was false, or published it with “reckless disregard” for its veracity. After New York Times, this standard has expanded, and the press has never lost a defamation case.

There are some who argue that in its zeal to protect the press against defamation lawsuits by the powerful, the Sullivan court swung the opposite way. In granting the press a near-unqualified immunity to say whatever it wanted, it subordinated the legitimate interests of people to their reputation and their dignity to an intolerable degree, and ushered in a regime of media unaccountability. This is evidently what the South African courts felt. In Khulamo v. Holomisa, Justice O’Regan accepted that the common law of defamation would have to be altered so as to reflect the new South African Constitution’s guarantees of the freedom of speech. Much like Justice Brennan, she noted that “the media are important agents in ensuring that government is open, responsive and accountable to the people as the founding values of our Constitution require”, as well as the chilling effect in requiring journalists to prove the truth of everything they said. Nonetheless, she was not willing to go as far as the American Supreme Court did. Instead, she cited a previous decision by the Supreme Court of Appeals, and incorporated a “resonableness standard” into defamation law. That is, “if a publisher cannot establish the truth, or finds it disproportionately expensive or difficult to do so, the publisher may show that in all the circumstances the publication was reasonable. In determining whether publication was reasonable, a court will have regard to the individual’s interest in protecting his or her reputation in the context of the constitutional commitment to human dignity. It will also have regard to the individual’s interest in privacy. In that regard, there can be no doubt that persons in public office have a diminished right to privacy, though of course their right to dignity persists. It will also have regard to the crucial role played by the press in fostering a transparent and open democracy. The defence of reasonable publication avoids therefore a winner-takes-all result and establishes a proper balance between freedom of expression and the value of human dignity. Moreover, the defence of reasonable publication will encourage editors and journalists to act with due care and respect for the individual interest in human dignity prior to publishing defamatory material, without precluding them from publishing such material when it is reasonable to do so.”

The South African Constitutional Court thus adopts a middle path between the two opposite zero-sum games that are traditional defamation law, and American first amendment law. A similar effort was made in the United Kingdom – the birthplace of the common law of defamation – with the passage of the 2013 Defamation Act. Under English law, the plaintiff must now show that there is likely to be “serious harm” to his reputation, and there is also public interest exception.

While South Africa and the UK try to tackle the problem at the level of standards for defamation, the ECHR has taken another, equally interesting tack: by limiting the quantum of damages. In Tolstoy Milolasky v. United Kingdom, it found a 1.5 million pound damage award “disproportionately large”, and held that there was a violation of the ECHR’s free speech guarantee that could not be justified as necessary in a democratic society.

Thus, constitutional courts the world over have noticed the adverse impact traditional defamation law has on free speech and a free press. They have devised a multiplicity of ways to deal with this, some more speech-protective than others: from America’s absolutist standards, to South Africa’s “reasonableness” and the UK’s “public interest” exceptions, to the ECHR’s limitation of damages. It is about time that the Indian Courts took this issue seriously: there is no dearth of international guidance.

Gautam Bhatia — @gautambhatia88 on Twitter — is a graduate of the National Law School of India University (2011), and has just received an LLM from the Yale Law School. He blogs about the Indian Constitution at http://indconlawphil.wordpress.com. Here at CIS, he blogs on issues of online freedom of speech and expression.

For more details visit https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/free-speech-and-civil-defamation

Free Speech and Source Protection for Journalists

Gautam Bhatia — 2014-06-19T20:10:28Z

Gautam Bhatia explores journalistic source protection from the perspective of the right to freedom of speech & expression. In this post, he articulates clearly the centrality of source protection to press freedoms, and surveys the differing legal standards in the US, Europe and India.

In the previous post, we discussed Vincent Blasi’s pathological perspective on free speech. The argument forms part of a broader conception that Blasi calls the “checking value of the First Amendment”. Blasi argues that the most important role of free speech is to “check” government abuses and reveal to the public information that government wants to keep secret from them. Naturally, in this model – which is a specific application of the democracy-centred theory of free speech – the press and the media become the most important organs of a system of free expression.

In addition to the checking value of free speech, there is another consideration that is now acknowledged by Courts in most jurisdictions, including our Supreme Court. When we speak about the “right” to free speech, we do not just mean – as might seem at first glance – the right of speakers to speak unhindered. We also mean the rights of listeners and hearers to receive information. A classic example is the Indian Supreme Court’s opinion in LIC v. Manubhai D. Shah, which used Article 19(1)(a) to vest a right-of-reply in a person who had been criticised in a newspaper editorial, on the ground of providing a balanced account to readers. Furthermore, instruments like the ICCPR and the ECHR make this clear in the text of the free speech right as well. For instance, Article 19 of the ICCPR states that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds.”

In addition to the individual right to receive information and ideas, free speech need not be understood exclusively in the language of a right at all. Free speech also serves as a public good – that is to say, a society with a thriving system of free expression is, all things considered, better off than a society without it. The unique value that free speech serves, as a public good, is in creating an atmosphere of accountability and openness that goes to the heart of the constitutive ideals of modern liberal democracies. As Justice Hugo Black noted, a good system of free speech “rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.” Unsurprisingly, he went on to add immediately after, that “a free press is a condition of a free society.”

If free speech is about the right to receive information, and about the public good of a society in which information circulates freely and widely, then the vehicles of information occupy a central position in any theory or doctrine about the scope of the constitutional right. In our societies, the press is perhaps the most important of those vehicles.

Establishing the crucial role of the free press in free speech theory is important to understand a crucial issue that has largely gone unaddressed in Indian constitutional and statutory law: that of source-protection laws for journalists. A source-protection law exempts journalists from having to compulsorily reveal their sources when ordered to do so by government or by courts. Such exemptions form part of ordinary Indian statutory law: under the Indian Evidence Act, for example, communications between spouses are “privileged” – that is, inadmissible as evidence in Court.

The question came up before the US Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes. In a 5-4 split, the majority ruled against an unqualified reporters’ privilege, that could be invoked in all circumstances. However, all the justices understood the importance of the issue. Justice White, writing for the majority, held that government must “convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest.” Justice Powell’s concurring opinion emphasised that the balance must be struck on a case-to-case basis. Since Branzburg, there has been no federal legislation dealing with source protection. A number of states have, however, passed “shield laws”, albeit with broad national security exceptions.

Perhaps the reason for the American Supreme Court’s reticence lies in its reluctance – notwithstanding Justice Black’s ringing oratory – to place journalists on any kind of special pedestal above the rest of the public. The European Court of Human Rights, however, has felt no such compunctions. In Goodwin v. UK, the ECHR made it clear that the press serves a crucial function as a “public watchdog” (a consistent theme in the ECHR’s jurisprudence). Compelled disclosure of sources would definitely have a chilling effect on the functioning of the press, since sources would be hesitant to speak – and journalists would be reluctant to jeopardise their sources – if it was easy to get a court order requiring disclosure. Consequently, the ECHR – which is normally hesitant to intervene in domestic matters, and accords a wide margin of appreciation to states, found the UK to be in violation of the Convention. Journalists could only be compelled to reveal their sources if there was an “overriding requirement in the public interest.”

Where both the United States and Europe have recognised the importance of source-protection, and the simple fact that some degree of source protection is essential if the press is to perform its checking – or watchdog – function effectively, Indian jurisprudence on the issue is negligible. The Law Commission has twice proposed some manner of a shield law, but no concrete action has been taken upon its recommendations.

In the absence of any law, Article 19(1)(a) could play a direct role in the matter. As argued at the beginning of this post, the Supreme Court has accepted the democracy-based justification for free speech, as well as the individual right to receive information. Both these arguments necessarily make the role of the press crucial, and the role of the press is dependant on maintaining the confidentiality of sources. Thus, there ought to be an Article 19(1)(a) right that journalists can invoke against compelled disclosure. If this is so, then any disclosure can only be required through law; and the law, in turn, must be a reasonable restriction in the interests of public order, which – in turn, has normally been given a narrow interpretation by the Supreme Court in cases such as Ram Manohar Lohia.

It is unclear, however, whether the Courts will be sympathetic. As this article points out, while the Supreme Court has yet to rule on this issue, various High Courts have ordered disclosure, seemingly without much concern for the free speech implications. One thing is evident though: either a strong shield law, or a definitive Supreme Court ruling, is required to fill the current vacuum that exists.

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